Fr. Domenico Palmieri, S.J.

On the Roman Pontiff

With a Prolegomenon on the Church

Sonnet 4.6 Translation

ON THE ROMAN PONTIFF

FR. DOMENICO PALMIERI, S.J.

ON THE ROMAN PONTIFF

WITH A PROLEGOMENON ON THE CHURCH

PROFESSOR OF FIRST RHETORIC, PHILOSOPHY,
THEOLOGY, & SACRED SCRIPTURE



ORIGINAL LATIN PUBLISHED IN PRATO FROM THE
PRESS AND BOOKSHOP OF GIACHETTI,
SON & ASSOCIATES

M.DCCC.XC.I

ROGERIUS FREDDI

Provincial Superior of the Roman Province of the Society of Jesus

Since certain revisers of our Society, to whom the task was entrusted, have examined the second edition of the work entitled Treatise on the Roman Pontiff, etc., written by Fr. Domenico Palmieri, a priest of our Society, and have judged that it may be published, we grant permission for it to be committed to print, if it shall so seem fitting to those to whom the matter pertains.

In witness whereof we have given these letters, signed by our hand and sealed with the seal of our Society.

Rome, on the Commemoration of All the Faithful Departed. In the year 1890.

(L. S.)

MPRIMATUR

4 June 1891—Canon Archdeacon Joachim Gori, Vicar General

TO THE DIVINE MOTHER OF GOD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PROLEGOMENON ON THE CHURCH

§ I	Definition of the Church as a divinely called assembly.	1
§ II	Christ institutes the Church through the apostolic ministry.	3
§ III	The Church exists always, but is constituted by Christ.	11
§ IV	The Church's end, and the means–end distinction within it.	15
§ V	The Church is a supernatural assembly.	16
§ VI	The Church is distinct from the Synagogue.	18
§ VII	The Church is necessary for salvation by divine institution.	19
§ VIII	The Church is perpetually enduring until the world's end.	27
§ IX	Definition of the Church as Christ's kingdom on earth.	31
§ X	The Church is essentially visible, not partly invisible.	34
§ XI	The Church's body and soul: social form and grace.	50

§ XII	Apostolic authority as the Church's governing principle.	75
§ XIII	Ordination by imposition of hands as a sacrament.	91
§ XIV	Bishops and presbyters: distinct orders and sacraments.	103
§ XV	Deacons as a sacramental order within hierarchy.	118
§ XVI	Transition to jurisdiction: origin, subject, nature, efficacy.	134
§ XVII	Bishops hold ordinary and immediate jurisdiction by Christ.	135
§ XVIII	The Church is a perfect society independent of civil society.	146
§ XIX	Ecclesiastical jurisdiction is truly coercive by divine law.	156
§ XX	Christ wills the Church's infallibility in revealed truths.	196
§ XXI	The Reformation dispute centers on the Church's magisterium.	208
§ XXII	Christ institutes a living magisterium with teaching authority.	209
§ XXIII	Magisterium as witness and as teacher: two formalities.	213
§ XXIV	Apostolic magisterium exercised by speech and writing.	217
§ XXV	Apostles follow God's word infallibly as a sufficient norm.	219
§ XXVI	Apostolic magisterium as supreme judge and interpreter.	224
§ XXVII	Apostolic magisterium is perpetual through succession.	228

§ XXVIII	Successors in magisterium are bishops by historical record.	234
§ XXIX	Succession preserves and propagates doctrine as testimony.	236
§ XXX	Doctrinal development: progress in understanding immutable doctrine.	247
§ XXXI	Non-bishop teachers in unity: especially martyrs.	251
§ XXXII	Fathers and Doctors: antiquity and wisdom as prerogatives.	253
§ XXXIII	Bishops teach only in unity under a principle of unity.	257
§ XXXIV	The unified magisterium has perpetual infallibility from Christ.	259
§ XXXV	Universal consensus of teachers with their head is infallible.	264
§ XXXVI	In dissension, follow the one who holds first place.	265
§ XXXVII	Section title not provided.	266
§ XXXVIII	Necessity of magisterium against Scripture-only and "interior" claims.	268
§ XXXIX	Scriptural texts cited against magisterium are misapplied.	278
§ XL	Infallibility extends beyond revealed truths to related matters.	284
§ XLI	Even if all revelation were in Scripture, magisterium remains necessary.	295
§ XLII	Scripture and magisterium compared: origin, fullness, and scope.	296
§ XLIII	Authority compared: magisterium prior for us, interpreter, and necessary.	301
§ XLIV	No circularity in proving magisterium's institution and authority.	306

§ XLV	Teaching authority is part of jurisdictional power.	309
§ XLVI	Duties of the faithful and use of tradition and Fathers.	312
§ XLVII	Fathers' weight in dogmatic vs historical exegesis.	319
§ XLVIII	The Church's unity: communion, faith, and rite.	321
§ XLIX	Heretics, schismatics, excommunicates, and catechumens are not members.	335
§ L	Holiness as a property tied to Christ-given authority.	351
§ LI	Catholicity in right and fact, grounded in ecclesiastical power.	359
§ LII	Apostolicity through unbroken succession of pastors.	367

THE PRIMACY OF BLESSED PETER

Chapter I	Institution of Peter's primacy.	379
Thesis I	Gospel testimony that Peter received universal primacy of jurisdiction.	379
Thesis II	Luke 22 promise: Peter's infallible magisterium and confirming office.	448
Thesis III	John 21 fulfills promise: primacy conferred on Peter alone.	465
Thesis IV	Evidence from Evangelists and Acts for Peter's preeminence.	474
Thesis V	Paul's lists and rebuke do not negate Peter's primacy.	480
Thesis VI	Apostolic equality does not prevent Peter's jurisdictional primacy.	486
Chapter II	Succession to Peter's primacy.	501

Thesis VII	Primacy endures perpetually in the Church by Christ's design.	501
Thesis VIII	Roman bishop succeeds Peter by divine right through Rome's title.	511
Thesis IX	Roman pontiff's succession to Peter is immutable and revealed.	524
Thesis X	God ratified Peter's choice of Rome for primatial succession.	533
Thesis XI	Petrine promises apply equally to each Roman bishop.	543

FORCE & NATURE OF THE ROMAN PRIMACY

Chapter I	Roman pontiff's power in general.	547
Article I	Roman pontiff's power toward the Church.	547
Thesis XII	Primacy establishes effective unity of Church and churches.	547
Thesis XIII	Roman jurisdiction over all faithful is ordinary and immediate.	560
Thesis XIV	Fullness of jurisdiction: bishops' ordinary power derives from Rome.	572
Thesis XV	Primatial power is not limited by ecclesiastical canons.	591
Thesis XVI	Gallican appeals to Constance do not justify limiting papal power.	603
Thesis XVII	Appeals, final judgments, and legateship are proper papal powers.	626
Thesis XVIII	Church governance is monarchical by divine right.	656
Thesis XIX	Standard historical objections to papal jurisdiction are unsound.	664
Thesis XX	Claims minimizing Roman primacy are historically and doctrinally erroneous.	677

Article II	Roman pontiff's power toward societies distinct from the Church.	699
Thesis XXI	Political power is subordinated indirectly to papal religious authority.	699
Thesis XXII	Concordats do not diminish the power of primacy.	711
Thesis XXIII	Princes cannot impede papal communication; placet/exequatur rejected.	724
Thesis XXIV	Papal immunity from lay jurisdiction and its role in Church life.	736
Chapter II	Infallible magisterium of the Roman pontiff.	757
Thesis XXV	Ex cathedra definitions are infallible and irreformable.	764
Thesis XXVI	Without the pope, the pastors' college lacks promised infallibility.	812
Thesis XXVII	Distinguish judge from norm; universality witnesses faith under Rome.	841
Thesis XXVIII	Bishops as authentic teachers; councils depend on papal definition.	850
Thesis XXIX	No essential difference between papal and conciliar definitions.	882
Thesis XXX	Papal prerogatives are personal and belong to each successor.	899
Thesis XXXI	No further council needed to clarify ex cathedra definitiveness.	906
Thesis XXXII	A definition can be infallible without being addressed directly to all.	913
Thesis XXXIII	Alleged papal ex cathedra errors do not refute infallibility.	921
Thesis XXXIV	Historical episodes cited do not prove papal fallibility or conciliarism.	941
Thesis XXXV	Cyprian, Augustine, and Gregory are misused against papal infallibility.	960

Thesis XXXVI	Papal obligation to believe does not prevent papal defining.	975

APPENDIX

§ I	Marks of the true Church: unity, holiness, catholicity, apostolicity.	978
§ II	Only the Roman communion possesses all marks; "Roman" as identifying mark.	988

TO THE READER

The work before you is an English translation of the *Tractatus de Romano Pontifice*, together with its prefatory *Prolegomenon on the Church*, written by Domenico Palmieri, S.J. (1829–1909), and first published in its second edition at Prato in 1891. Palmieri was among the most distinguished scholastic theologians of the nineteenth century—a man who spent sixteen years as professor at the Roman College, who served as theologian of the Sacred Penitentiary under both Leo XIII and Pius X, and who was consultor to the Holy Office and a member of the Commission for the Code of Canon Law. That so grave and carefully wrought a work has remained inaccessible to readers without Latin is a circumstance this translation hopes in some small measure to remedy.

The title requires no apology. The *Tractatus de Romano Pontifice* is precisely what its name declares: a thorough, ordered, and philosophically serious treatment of the Roman Pontiff—his office, his authority, his prerogatives, and the limits thereof—set within the broader ecclesiological framework that the *Prolegomenon* supplies. Palmieri himself was modest enough to call that prefatory treatise on the Church a mere prolegomenon, judging it not yet possessed of its full proper amplitude; the reader may form his own view on whether that modesty was warranted. What is beyond dispute is that the work as a whole represents the mature achievement of a theologian formed in the great Jesuit scholastic tradition, writing in the immediate aftermath of the First Vatican Council and in direct engagement with the questions that Council had both settled and, in settling, further sharpened.

The second edition, which serves as the basis for this translation, differs from the first in several respects that Palmieri himself enumerates in his preface to the reader: a new treatment of the Magisterium has been added to the *Prolegomenon*, the question of the Concordats has been handled afresh and differently than before, and various lesser additions and corrections are distributed throughout. These changes have been translated in full, and no attempt has been made to reconstruct or restore readings from the first edition.

This translation was produced with the assistance of Anthropic's Claude, which served as the primary instrument of rendering the Latin into English, under human oversight applied throughout for accuracy and fidelity to the original. The use of so modern a tool on so venerable an author is a circumstance worth naming honestly, and it does not diminish the responsibilities of those who oversaw the work, nor does it lend any authority to the English text that the Latin does not itself possess. That authority belongs to Palmieri alone—and behind Palmieri, to the tradition of the schools in which he labored, and to the Church whose faith he sought to expound and defend.

A word of caution is therefore owed, and it must be taken seriously. This translation is a guide, not a source. Wherever a passage bears doctrinal, historical, canonical, or polemical weight—and in a work of this kind, such passages are not rare—the reader must consult the Latin. The edition of Giachetti, Prato, 1891, is the sole authentic and citable authority. Citations to Scripture, to the Fathers, to the councils, to the canon law, and to Palmieri's own prior writings have been prepared with care, but they cannot be guaranteed free of error. Every citation of consequence must be verified. Where the English reads awkwardly, where a distinction appears softened, where the accent of the schools seems to fall in the wrong place—none of this is to be laid to the account of the author. The fault lies with those who translated him, and the remedy is always the same: return to the Latin, and let Palmieri speak in his own voice.

This translation is offered in a spirit of genuine service to students, scholars, and serious readers who wish to engage with the ecclesiology and papal theology of the post-conciliar Thomistic revival—whether as a subject of study in its own right, as a resource for understanding the

doctrinal history of the period between Vatican I and Vatican II, or as a contribution to the broader retrieval of the great scholastic inheritance. If it proves useful, the credit belongs entirely to Palmieri. If it falls short, the fault belongs entirely to those who made it.

PROLEGOMENON
ON ON THE CHURCH

§ I

On the definition derived from the name itself, which is indeed a real definition, though an inadequate one, the Church can be defined as follows: the assembly of those divinely called to worship God.

I. A nominal definition must be set out before the treatise, to indicate what the subject under discussion is. Since the name itself, considered etymologically, carries a certain definite meaning, and since it is established that the name was used to signify a particular reality by those who knew both the force of the name and that reality perfectly well, the definition derived from the very force of the name must be regarded as a real definition; for it sets forth the true objective concept of the thing, even if it is not an adequate definition, because it does not set forth all the primary and essential notes of the thing.

II. In the New Testament, the name "Church" frequently designates those who have professed the faith of Christ, both all of them taken universally and a more or less extensive portion of them: 1 Cor. 6:4; 10:32; 12:28; Eph. 1:22; Matt. 16:18; Acts 9:31; Col. 4:15. The same usage appears in all subsequent ecclesiastical documents.

Now, if account is taken of secular usage, ἐκκλησία (from ἐκ + καλέω) is an assembly of men gathered by a summons. For since men can come together in one place in many ways—by nature, by agreements, by command, or by a summons—an assembly or gathering

of the people collected in this third manner was called an ecclesia. Likewise, in sacred usage, קְהַל (the verb קָהַל is equivalent to καλέω) is primarily the assembly of the people of Israel, gathered at God's call, and is rendered by the Septuagint sometimes as συναγωγή and not infrequently as ἐκκλησία: Deut. 18:16; 23:2; 31:30; Neh. 13:1; 1 Kgs. 19:20; and קְהָלָה גְּדוֹלָה in Neh. 5:7 is the assembly gathered to pass judgment. Likewise in 1 Macc. 5:16, ἐκκλησία μεγάλη is the assembly of those gathered to deliberate on public affairs. In the New Testament as well, the name ecclesia is taken in the secular sense in Acts 19:32, 39, and of the assembly of the Israelite people in Acts 7:38. It is always, however, used of men gathered together, or at least the contrary has not been established: for 1 Cor. 11:18 may not be cited against this, if the following verse (v. 20) is compared. "We regard your house, not a small one, as a Church of Christ," Alypius and Augustine said to Juliana, the mother of Demetrias (Letter 188, n. 3).

III. Therefore, the subject that is frequently called Church by the writers of the New Testament is an assembly gathered by a summons. Indeed, those who belong to it are frequently called "the called," the called of Christ: Rom. 1:6–7; 1 Cor. 1:2. And since those who are called are called to something, this name "Church" already implicitly states what such formulas as the following express explicitly: called into the fellowship of the Son of God, into the grace of Christ, into the admirable light of God, and so on. Cf. 1 Cor. 1:2, 9; Rom. 1:6; Gal. 1:6. Moreover, they are called by God: Eph. 1:18; Gal. 1:6; 1 Pet. 2:9–10; 1 Thess. 2:12. They are called, namely, to worship God by the profession of the Christian faith, as is clear from the passages cited. For this reason, this kind of assembly is distinguished from the assembly of the Israelite people even by the usage of the name itself: for the assembly of Israel is commonly called the synagogue, while the assembly of those professing the faith of Christ is called the Church. Cf. Gal. 1:13, the grounds for which distinction Augustine explains in his *Inchoata expositio epistolae ad Romanos*, n. 2 (cf. § VI below).

Thus, the reality signified by this name "Church" is: 1° an assembly, that is, not merely some multitude of men, but a multitude gathered into one; 2° an assembly gathered by a summons; 3° an assembly of

those divinely summoned to worship God by the profession of the Christian faith.

§ II

Christ, in instituting the apostolic ministry, thereby instituted his Church and gave to it a definite social form.

I. Christ promised that he would build his Church (Matt. 18:18), which was not to be multiple but unique on earth; for Christ makes mention of only one Church as his own. This, moreover, was demanded both by the unity of God and of the mediator between God and men (1 Tim. 2:5), and by the universality of the redemption, of which the Church is the means of application; and we are further taught this from the fact that the Church is the body of Christ (1 Cor. 14:13) and the spouse of Christ (Eph. 5:23ff.), nor do Protestants deny this singular unity, at least under some confused notion, to the Church instituted by Christ.

Furthermore, when Christ sent the Apostles (John 20:21) and gave to them the power of binding and loosing (Matt. 16:19; 18:18), of remitting and retaining sins (John 20:23), and commanded them to teach all nations, to make disciples of them, to initiate them through baptism, and to hand on to them the observance of all that he had commanded (Mark 16:15–16; Matt. 28:18–20), he instituted the apostolic ministry. It is clear that here we are taking apostolic authority under some true but general concept, with the question left aside as inopportune here concerning the perfection and manner in which it was shared by the individual apostles.

Now by the very fact that Christ instituted that authority, he instituted a certain religious assembly; for from the Apostles teaching, binding and loosing, and sanctifying, and from the men who would be their disciples and subject to their authority and sanctified by them, a certain assembly naturally coalesces. This assembly is one that consists of those who believe the truth manifested by the Father through Christ and by Christ through the Apostles (John 1:18; 3:11; 7:16; 16:13; 1 John 1:1–3; Gal. 1:8; 2 Tim. 2:2), and who worship God in the manner that Christ prescribed. Such an assembly, moreover, must be called the

Church of Christ; because it is itself the assembly of those called by Christ to believe and to worship God. Since, therefore, it is established that Christ instituted the Church, and that he instituted only one; and since by the institution of the apostolic ministry he certainly instituted some Church: this is in fact the Church instituted by him, which he himself calls his own.

Nor did Christ institute his Church otherwise than by instituting the power of binding and loosing, of teaching and sanctifying, which he first placed in the Apostles. For by this institution all the necessary elements of a religious assembly such as the Church are present. A religious assembly is constituted of itself by the unity of saving doctrine, of sacred rites, and of mutual communion; and all these things are secured through that threefold power and the due subordination owed to it. Accordingly, if any other institution of the Church originating from Christ is conceived, it is either entirely distinct from this one or is as it were a part and complement of it. The first hypothesis must be rejected; for otherwise Christ would have instituted two of his Churches, which not even Protestants have dreamed of. If you maintain the second alternative, then either what is called a part and complement of that institution which we defend—namely, of the apostolic ministry—is so bound up with that same ministry that it necessarily exists together with it, or it is independent of that ministry such that it can exist separately from it. If the latter is supposed, we fall back into the hypothesis of a double Church already rejected. If the former is maintained, there would still remain the question of how this other institution, which is supposed, stands in relation to the institution of the ministry as a part to it; but without anticipating questions, we can certainly now establish this much: that if any other element necessary to the Church from Christ's institution can be conceived as existing in the Church, this would be interior holiness and faith; and yet from that same institution of Christ, these are so bound up with the ministry that they are obtained through it and are as it were its effects. For through the teaching of the ministry, faith is generated; through the same ministry administering the sacred rites, holiness is generated; and through its governing and ruling, a moral norm is established to which actual holiness is required to conform. Therefore, by the institution of

the apostolic ministry, Christ in fact instituted his Church. Hence, when Christ first makes the promise of building his Church, he presents it under the image of a kingdom and promises the power of the keys, of binding and loosing, by which that kingdom is to be governed (Matt. 16:19; cf. what will be said in Thesis I).

Witnesses to this truth are all those who trace whatever belongs to the Church back to the apostolic authority persevering continuously in it. For if this is so, apostolic authority is the principle that contains the Church of Christ by its power, and apart from it there is no Church of Christ; and therefore, once that authority was instituted, and only together with it, the Church of Christ was also instituted. Now it is the common teaching of the Fathers that whatever belongs to the Church flows from the apostolic authority living within it and is preserved through it, as will become clearly apparent in the course of the treatise. This is surely confirmed by what Ignatius the Martyr prescribes to the Trallians: that without the bishop, the presbyters, and the deacons, the Church of God is not to be called such, and that nothing pertaining to the Church is to be done without the bishop, as he says to the Smyrnaeans. To the same point belongs what Cyprian says in Letter 69: that the Church is in the bishop and the bishop in the Church, and that he who is not with the bishop is not in the Church.

And indeed, from the entire history of apostolic preaching, which can be gathered from the Acts and Letters of the Apostles, it is clear that the Apostles founded churches to the extent that they established in each place a certain hierarchy to preside over the others by governing, teaching, and sanctifying. Acts 14:22; 2 Tim. 2:1–2; Tit. 1:5.

II. This is the fundamental truth in the treatise on the Church, namely that Christ instituted the Church insofar as he instituted in the Apostles the power of governing, teaching, and sanctifying. The Socinians and Protestants are entirely at odds with this truth (Faustus Socinus in his *Tractatus de Ecclesia*, *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*, Vol. 1; Francis Turretin, *Locus* XVIII, on the Church, q. II, n. 12), following the Waldensian heretics of the twelfth century, who rejected the authority of superiors in the Church and granted to all the faithful the power of preaching the word (Lateran Council IV, c. 3; cf. the *Tractatus contra Waldenses* of Bernard, Abbot of Fontis Calidi, found in Galland,

Vol. XIV). For these men conceive of the Church as an assembly of men united not in the manner of a society informed and constituted by governing authority, as political societies are, but united to God through faith and righteousness, in accordance with the promise of the new covenant given in Jer. 30:33–34; so that whoever follows the doctrine of God is in the Church, whether or not he knows other faithful, for they are mutually bound together by faith known to God. From this it follows, in their view, that Christ instituted the Church insofar as he proposed the revelation and merited faith and justification for all through his redemption.

But in this opinion there is only a part of the truth, and if it is taken exclusively, it is false. For Christ indeed instituted the Church insofar as, by proposing the revelation, he willed there to be an assembly of the faithful; but an assembly of those faithful who would receive the doctrine of faith from the teaching authority he instituted, to which he entrusted the deposit of revelation (the full demonstration of which will be given shortly); and he instituted the Church insofar as he is also the author of our justification and merited it for us by his merits—in which sense the Church is said to have proceeded from his side—but he is the author of justification to be obtained through the sacred rites to which he merited the power of sanctifying, and the administration and care of which he entrusted to certain pastors, in whose communion the sacraments were to be received in order to be efficacious (as is demonstrated in the treatise on the sacraments). The Church, that is to say, as instituted by Christ, is not merely an assembly of men united to God, but of men united to God in a definite manner, which manner consists in the very ministry instituted by Christ. The interior gifts of grace and holiness are indeed proper to this assembly, as is clear from the cited passage of Jeremiah; but it is one thing to say that such goods are proper to this assembly, which is what Jeremiah says, and quite another to say that men are bound and united into the Church of Christ by these goods alone, which Jeremiah does not say.

From the Protestant system there also springs the following opinion: that the Church was instituted by God insofar as a code was divinely given to men, called Sacred Scripture, from which, under divine illumination, they would draw all doctrine to be believed and all

law to be observed, such that the ministry is indeed useful for the visible form of the Church, but is not essential to the Church, which is by nature invisible. But leaving aside for now the dispute about the visibility of the Church: if this is so, then—apart from the absurdity that God would demand of men what is impossible for the generality of them and would leave them to be tossed about by every wind of doctrine—it follows that Christ is not the author of the Church he calls his own, except insofar as he communicated doctrine to the Apostles who afterwards recorded it in writings. But first, in this case Christ would have been the author of his Church not immediately but only mediately; for the Church would be gathered immediately through the Apostles' writings: and yet the Christian understanding presents Christ as the immediate author of his own Church. Secondly, in this hypothesis there would be no reason why the origin of the Church should be traced back to the Apostles sent by Christ rather than to Moses and the other authors of the sacred books, from whom revealed doctrine is equally received. Finally, in this hypothesis Christ would in fact have instituted no Church at all. For even if you wished it to be merely an assembly of those inwardly believing: in order for anyone to be the institutor of such an assembly, he must be the author of that means by which this assembly can of itself be brought together, namely, by which the agreement of many in the same truth is brought about, whether interior or external. But Scripture certainly is not this means; and the recourse to an interior divine illumination, by which God would immediately teach each individual what is contained in the Scriptures, is ineffectual, for nowhere does a divine promise of such illumination exist, and the countless dissensions of Protestants in interpreting the Scriptures manifestly contradict it (on which point, shortly, when we treat of the Magisterium): therefore in this hypothesis Christ would have instituted nothing. Either, then, Christ did not institute the Church, or he instituted it by the institution of the apostolic ministry.

III. Moreover, just as Christ instituted his Church by instituting the apostolic ministry, so by this institution he gave it a definite social form—which the Protestants deny. For as they argue (Boehmer, *Ius ecclesiasticum antiquum*, d. VIII, c. 2; Grotius, *De Imperio summarum potestatum*, c. 11; Francis Burmann, *Disputatio theologica de Synagoga*,

§§ 86ff.), Christ instituted no separate assemblies; he taught everywhere, attended Jewish synagogues, and equally those who followed him came together with him to them, for they did not separate themselves from the Jewish assembly nor constitute a distinct Church. Nor after Christ did the Apostles separate themselves from the Jewish assemblies and synagogues; rather, they gathered with the Jews in the synagogue and in the temple, preached the word of God there, and attended to Jewish rites; to such a degree that they even wished to bind converts from the Gentiles to observe these practices. It was by occasion of the persecutions by which the faithful were oppressed from the synagogue, and of the conversion of Gentiles who were unwilling to submit to the yoke of the Mosaic law, that the faithful gradually came to separate themselves from the Jewish assemblies and to hold their own gatherings. Only then did the Apostles provide presbyters for these assemblies of the faithful to govern them. Moreover, the norm to which the Apostles conformed the governance of these separate assemblies was not some norm handed down by Christ, but was the very form of the Jewish synagogues, or rather of the congregations that came into existence after the Babylonian captivity, which owed their origin to human institution and bore the character of independent corporations, federated with one another, but bound by no laws other than those they had given themselves. The churches of the primitive age would have failed themselves had they not assumed for themselves that same freedom of governance that the Roman authorities permitted to the Jewish synagogues. For this reason, the entire governance of the Christian churches was fashioned after the model of the synagogues. For just as Christianity itself is nothing other than reformed Judaism, so too the administration of the Christian churches was nothing other than a continuation of the functions of the synagogues. Finally, the recent school of unbelievers, which because of its notorious abuse of criticism is called "critical," distinguishes between the form that Peter gave to the Church from the beginning and the form that Paul afterwards gave it, which ultimately prevailed. Peter, they say, gave it a Jewish and particular-church form; but Paul gave it a form accommodated to all the Gentiles, that is, of a universal church,

emancipated from Jewish society and asserted into freedom (Edgar Quinet, *le Christianisme et la révolution française*, p. 67).

These Protestant fictions are indeed consonant with their supreme notion of the Church, which they conceive as an assembly of the faithful adhering immediately to God through interior faith and invisible in itself, and they have been conveniently devised by them to vindicate the legitimacy of their own assemblies. But 1° it is certain that Christ established a determinate social form for his Church. For an author of a society who establishes a determinate power within it—namely, the power of governing, and that in the most ample degree ("whatsoever you shall loose… whatsoever you shall bind…"), the power of teaching all revealed truths, the power of sanctifying through certain sacred rites —and who subordinates those augmented by this power to one—a point that will be abundantly demonstrated in the following treatise—assuredly gives a determinate social form to the assembly he has instituted. But Christ acted in this manner; therefore.

2° What is adduced by Protestants either proves nothing or is false. Those things said about Christ, who did not separate himself from the synagogue, prove nothing; nor do those things said about legal observances occasionally practiced by the Apostles, nor what is said about the similarity between the governance of synagogues and of churches. For Christ, still a sojourner in these lands, did not say that he had built the Church, but that he would build it—which he truly did when he entrusted his sheep to Peter to pasture. Protestants have not sufficiently attended to the Apostle's words in Gal. 4:4–5 concerning Christ: "made under the law, that he might redeem those who were under the law" (namely, from the yoke of the law; cf. our commentary on this passage)—from which it is clear how poorly those argue who deny that the Church is distinct from the synagogue because Christ did not separate himself from it; since, on the contrary, Christ's voluntary subjection to the law was itself the cause of the abolition of the law, so that with that temporary covenant abolished, the Church might succeed it, which was therefore to be entirely distinct and separate from it. The Apostles did indeed from time to time make use of legal observances, but without obligation and out of a certain economy of prudence and charity; hence it does not follow that they constituted one assembly

together with the Jews. And since the synagogue was a type of the Church, what wonder is there if a certain similarity of governance existed between them, even though the Church received its own proper social form from Christ? But it is false that from the beginning the faithful, even those from among the Jews, did not hold separate assemblies from the Jews: let the texts be compared, from Acts 2:42, 46; 4:32, 34; 5:12–13, where it is expressly affirmed that "none of the rest dared to join them, but the people held them in high esteem." What did the Apostle mean when he narrated that, at the time when he was advancing in Judaism, he had persecuted the Church of God (Gal. 1:13–14), if the Church was not distinct from Judaism?

And indeed in the Council of Jerusalem (Acts 15) it was decreed that the disciples were not bound by the Mosaic law (v. 10); which decree, though directly issued for the benefit of Gentile converts, the Apostles sufficiently indicated was valid for all the faithful, both by their use of the common name "disciples," by speaking of the yoke of the Mosaic law as something already done away with ("which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear"), and by stating their reason for the decree, which was equally valid for all the faithful—namely, that "we believe that we are saved through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ" (cf. the Letter to the Romans). Moreover, in this council, it was not Paul's opinion, as Quinet would have it, but Peter's—if it is lawful to speak so—that prevailed, and it was established by arguments drawn from the Christian institution itself. But it is absurd to say that an assembly not bound by the Mosaic laws was not separate from the assembly of the Jews; therefore. It is therefore false that Christians separated themselves from the Jews by occasion of the persecutions; for on the contrary, the separation was the occasion of the persecutions. For in order to have Stephen arrested and condemned, the Jews brought forward this charge—that Stephen, as they themselves alleged, said that Jesus of Nazareth would destroy that place, that is, the temple, and change the traditions that Moses had handed down to them (Acts 6:14): the Jews perceived, in other words, that an entirely different religious society was beginning, and from this the persecution arose.

It is false that the Apostles conformed the governance of the churches they founded to the norm of synagogue governance. For 1° it

is false in the sense that they borrowed the norm from the synagogues as if they lacked a proper norm received from Christ, as we have already proved. 2. It is false in the sense that the governance of both was equal. Since Protestants contend that such synagogues were governed by the common authority of many and lacked true jurisdiction, and that each was independent, the Apostles, on the contrary, placed a single leader over each church with the power of jurisdiction to which all were subject (cf. what we shall say about bishops in §§ XIV and XVII), and they brought all the individual churches back to unity of governance by subordinating them to one, by Christ's institution, as will be demonstrated in the following treatise.

§ III

Although the Church of Christ has in a certain true sense always existed, it nonetheless obtained a special constitution and form through Christ as its author; by which it came about that after Christ, no one belongs to the true Church who does not belong to this Church instituted by Christ as its author.

I. The Church of God taken in the broad sense is the assembly of the faithful worshipping God. But in order that a Church may be called the Church of Christ in some true sense, the following suffice: namely, that it exists on account of the merits of Christ and that the object of its faith, and therefore of its worship, is Christ; so that in this way, both in its being and in its acting, it is referred to Christ. Now such a Church existed among men from the promise made by God to the first parents concerning the future Redeemer. Indeed, a triple question can be raised: 1° whether by divine institution those could always exist among men who worshipped God by faith in Christ, whether explicit or at least implicit; 2° whether they actually always did exist; 3° whether they were always required to exist.

To the first question an affirmative answer is evident from the universality of the salvific will, given the necessity of faith for salvation. Nor did God ever fail them, both in interior and supernatural helps and in exterior ones (Acts 14:16; Rom. 1:20; cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, bk. VI), and God exercised providence over each individual

man; for each rational being is subject per se to divine providence. Hence, with Augustine (*De vera religione*, c. 25), a particular providence over individuals is to be admitted in addition to universal providence.

To the second question as well, sacred history teaches that the answer must be affirmative. For it is clear, ascending from Christ back to Moses and Abraham, that there always existed, at least among the descendants of the latter, some who believed and awaited the Redeemer and worshipped God; the same is clear from Abraham back to Noah, who reached the age of Abraham and who was faithful and had faithful sons; and finally the same is established from Noah back to Adam, among whom there were sons of God distinct from the sons of men, whom Adam himself was able to cultivate, since Adam died in the age of Lamech, the father of Noah. It must further be noted that such faithful also constituted some sort of assembly, that is, a church. This is sufficiently evident for those who lived under the old law given by Moses; for they were bound together into a religious society by numerous rites professing the faith, which prepared men for Christ. Before the law, however, even if the union was lesser, nonetheless 1° individual families revering their patriarch and receiving from him the doctrine handed down, and offering sacrifices to God together with him, constituted certain definite assemblies; 2° these particular assemblies were really united by the external profession of the same faith and the exercise of true worship—an observation that holds also for those faithful who existed among the Gentiles while the Mosaic law was in force.

What we have asserted historically is confirmed by Eusebius (*Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. I, c. 4). For in order to show that the Christian institution is not new, he proves historically that before Christ there always existed those who followed the rule of life prescribed by him. Having established this with regard to the Hebrews, he continues: "But if anyone, starting from Abraham and going back to the first man, affirms that all those whose righteousness has been attested by such illustrious testimony were Christians not in name but in reality, he will surely not stray far from the truth. For since by the name 'Christian' nothing else is signified than a man adorned through knowledge of Christ and his teaching with modesty, justice, endurance, fortitude, and

the profession of piety and the worship of the one God who is above all things, all these things the ancients cultivated no less diligently than we." For this reason Gregory the Great (Homily XIX on the Gospels) calls the universal Church "the vineyard of God," which, from righteous Abel to the last of the elect who is to be born at the end of the world, has sent forth as many branches as it has produced saints. And Augustine likewise testifies (*Retractationes*, bk. I, c. 13): "The very thing which is now called the Christian religion existed among the ancients and was not absent from the beginning of the human race, until Christ himself came in the flesh, from which time the true religion, which already existed, began to be called Christian." "The times have been varied, not the faith," as he himself says (*Tractatus in Ioannem*, 45, n. 9).

The third question comes down to this: whether God willed his Church to exist perpetually among men before Christ by an efficacious decree, or only by an antecedent will that men were able to resist, so that it might accordingly come to pass that there was no Church among men. Now the calling of Abraham and the election of his posterity, and the Mosaic institution, which was required to endure until Christ, sufficiently prove that there was that efficacious decree from Abraham at least until Christ—an efficacious decree, namely, that some true church would always exist in the world. As for the age of the natural law, the same conclusion may be drawn from the analogy of the subsequent institution.

II. It must now be demonstrated that the Church received a special constitution and form surpassing the old through Christ as its author. Indeed, the Church before and after Christ is in some sense the same; for the end is the same, namely supernatural holiness in this life and eternal salvation in the next; the interior formal principle is the same, namely faith; the subordination to one supreme head is the same, which is Christ, of whom all the faithful are members. Where the end, the formal principle, and the head are the same, there is, at least under this consideration, one society. But what is one can successively exist in one manner and then another; and indeed the Church of Christ has in fact been so. For through Christ as author, beyond a fuller knowledge of the faith, the Church obtained the perfect constitution of a supernatural society—namely a hierarchy by which it would be governed and

infallibly taught, and sacraments by which it would be sanctified—such that thereafter men adhered to Christ the head to the extent that they were united to and subjected to the hierarchy instituted by him. If the Church is considered according to this special character of an absolute society, it is new and begins with Christ, and for this reason Christ said he would build his Church. In brief, then: the Church insofar as it adheres to Christ the head has existed from the beginning of the world; insofar as it adheres to the apostolic ministry instituted by Christ and through it to Christ, it took its origin from Christ.

Moreover, from these things it follows that after Christ there is no other Church of Christ than this one—that is, no one can claim to belong to the Church if he is outside this Church, as if he were a member of that Church which already flourished before Christ and now continued on. For since the form introduced by Christ is the necessary mode of the Church, the subject which is the Church can no longer be found without this mode, nor is it present where this mode is absent. And that this form introduced by Christ is the necessary mode of the Church is clear from the very institution of the Church made by him. For Christ built his Church: and now either he instituted an entirely new Church from the ground up, or he imposed on the pre-existing Church an essential mode, or an accidental one. If he instituted a completely new one, the prior one was by that very fact abrogated, and the form of the Church introduced by Christ is therefore necessary. Likewise, if he imposed an essential mode—one which he himself by his institution willed to be essential—such a form will be necessary to the Church. But it cannot be said that Christ added only an accidental mode to the already pre-existing Church of God; for in this hypothesis Christ would falsely affirm of himself that he was going to build his Church; for he who adds some ornament to a house is not the builder of that house. Therefore, the Church of God can no longer be found after Christ without the form introduced by Christ, and accordingly, if the Church is one—which is proper to the Church before Christ—that property now exclusively belongs to the Church existing according to the form that Christ decreed.

§ IV

The end of the Church instituted by Christ is that men may attain holiness and salvation through it and in it; accordingly, a distinction must be drawn within the Church itself between what has the character of a means and what has the character of an end.

I. The end of the instituted Church is itself the end of the incarnation and redemption; for through the Apostles, Christ continues the work for which he was sent: "as the Father has sent me, even so I send you" (John 20:21). But the end of the incarnation and redemption is the holiness and eternal salvation of men. Indeed, the ministry of the Apostles tends toward this: that through their teaching men may be taught the true faith and believe; that through the sacraments administered by them they may be freed from sins and sanctified; and that through their authority they may be governed, which authority is ordered "to the perfecting of the saints" (Eph. 4:11–12). Therefore. And indeed Christ gave himself up to death that he might sanctify the Church and present to himself "a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing, but that it should be holy and without blemish" (Eph. 5:25ff.).

This, therefore, is the end of the Church instituted by Christ: the holiness and salvation of men. Furthermore, we say first that this end is obtained through the Church. For it is obtained both through the exercise of the power given to the Apostles of teaching, sanctifying, and governing, and through the due subordination of men to those same teachers, sanctifiers, and governors—insofar as they believe what these teach, receive the sacraments from them, and obey them. But from these two elements joined together—namely the authority of the pastors and the submission of the flock—the Church is constituted; therefore. We say secondly that this end is obtained in the Church. For it is obtained insofar as men are subordinated to their teachers, sanctifiers, and rulers; and in this very act they are in the Church; therefore.

II. The Church is therefore a means of salvation. In order that this may be understood more distinctly, a distinction must be drawn within it between what has the character of a means and what has the character of an end. For insofar as the Church denotes the apostolic ministry and the subordination of men to it, it is a means instituted by Christ for

achieving the end of his redemption. But insofar as it denotes the union of believing and holy men to God, it is the end that Christ intends, in which sense the Apostle speaks in Eph. 5:23ff. The former holds only in these earthly lands in the state of wayfaring; the latter will also endure in the next life at the terminus.

§ V

The Church of Christ is a supernatural assembly.

I. That assembly is properly called supernatural which is essentially enriched with supernatural goods. Three modes can be distinguished in which an assembly may be said to be essentially enriched with supernatural goods: by ordination and potentiality, insofar as it is ordered by its very essence to a supernatural end; formally, insofar as it actually possesses supernatural goods; and actively or efficiently, insofar as the assembly by its intrinsic nature possesses the power of conferring supernatural gifts—which power, being itself also supernatural, brings it about that the assembly is also actually, or formally, enriched with at least some supernatural good. But the essential proximate end of the Church is interior holiness consisting in adoptive divine filiation, by reason of which the faithful who are what they ought to be are called the temple of God, the temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 3:15; 2 Cor. 6:16), and adoptive children of God (Rom. 8:14–15), in whom the Most Holy Trinity dwells (John 14:25); and the ultimate end is the corresponding beatitude consisting in the vision of God; and each of these ends is supernatural, as is clear from what has been said elsewhere. Likewise, essentially present in this assembly is a communicative principle of supernatural goods and one that contributes to their acquisition and advancement—namely the law of holiness, the teaching authority of the faith, and the administration of the sacraments, the power over which is essential to the Church, and through which faith is generated and interior holiness is either infused, or, once infused, increased, or externally nourished and promoted. These are sufficient for the assembly to be called supernatural by its very essence. Whether, however, it pertains to the essence of the same that

those who share in the sanctifying gifts should actually be present within it, is a matter to be disputed later.

II. This prerogative of the supernaturality of the Church can be illustrated from the fact that it is called the Body of Christ and the Spouse of Christ. For when "body" is used metaphorically, the metaphor is usually drawn from the organic body. Now the Church is called a body and the body of Christ, of which he is the head (Rom. 12:4–5; 1 Cor. 6:15; 10:17; 12:13, 27; Col. 1:18; 3:15; Eph. 1:23; 4:12). In the head of a living organic body three things are to be considered, according to the teaching of St. Thomas (III, q. 8, a. 1): order, perfection, and power, corresponding to the threefold relation of the head to the members. As regards order and perfection, Christ alone is the head of the Church; but as regards power, by which the head exercises influence over its subject members and governs them, Christ exercises his interior influence of grace and gifts upon his members in such a way that he also sanctifies and governs the Church through the ministry he himself instituted. It is furthermore called the πλήρωμα of Christ (Eph. 1:23), in that it externally completes Christ, as the terminus of his activity, receiving his influence, under which, with which, and through which it lives, acts, and is held in unity. Now from the testimonies of the Apostle it is clear that a most intimate relationship of union exists between the Church and Christ; that the Church lives by the Spirit of Christ; that the life of Christ is continued in the Church; that Christ and the Church are in some sense contained within the same order, such that the Church is by participation what Christ is by nature. But this kind of fellowship is certainly supernatural; and it is essential to the Church, just as union with the head is essential to the living human body; therefore.

There is added the further image of the Spouse: for the Church is the spouse of Christ (Eph. 5:22ff., compared with Rev. 21:2, 9). From this comparison instituted by the Apostle it is clear that Christ loves the Church as something of his own and communicates to it all his goods; that as the relation of wife to husband is a relation of likeness, honor, dignity, and sharing in goods, so the Church, which is the spouse of Christ, is similar to Christ and shares in his dignity—and these things constitute the Church in the supernatural order in which Christ exists; therefore.

§ VI

The Church of Christ is an assembly distinct from the Synagogue.

I. The Synagogue was a religious and civil assembly; it is here considered as religious. Two questions are to be distinguished regarding the Synagogue: the question of fact and the question of cause. The first is whether the Israelites possessed, or could have possessed, interior sanctifying gifts; the second is whether by virtue of the old covenant they possessed them. To the first question the answer must be affirmative; but to the second, the answer is that the old institution with all its rites and sacrifices did indeed dispose those existing in that covenant for the obtaining of grace, yet grace was conferred not by virtue of that covenant but by virtue of the Christian covenant—that is, the covenant entered into by God with Christ as mediator and head of men and through Christ with men—to whose Church all the faithful and the just already belonged. Moreover, when the Church is compared with the Synagogue, each is considered according to what is proper to it.

II. The distinction of the Church from the Synagogue is established: 1° from their differing ethnographic breadth; 2° from the diversity of their immediate author—for the author of the Synagogue is Moses, the servant of God (Heb. 3:3), while the author of the Church is Christ, the Son of God; 3° from their different relation to one another—for the Synagogue was a type and shadow of the Church, while the Church is the antitype of the Synagogue (Heb. 10:1; 8:4; Gal. 3:24); 4° from the diversity of the priesthood, which is the argument pursued by the author of the Letter to the Hebrews, chapter 8; 5° from the differing divine promises—for the covenant made with the Synagogue was in itself confined to earthly goods, while the other is contained within heavenly and supernatural goods (Jer. 31ff.; Deut. 28; Josh. 24; Heb. 8:6). Since, however, those who belonged to the Synagogue also pertained or were bound to pertain to the Church of Christ, which was the end of the Mosaic institution itself, there is nothing surprising in God's addressing the Israelites through his prophets and, just as he exhorts them to holiness, also promising them supernatural goods. These goods could also be shared by Gentiles living rightly with the grace of God. Both

kinds of promises were indeed made to Abraham (Gen. 12:2), as well as to Jacob (Gen. 28:14); but it must be noted that Abraham was constituted the father not only of the Israelites but of all nations, which were to be blessed in his seed (Rom. 9:6–8; Gal. 3:8–9, 16). Hence 6° the immediate end of the sacraments differs in the two covenants: in the old it was a certain legal holiness and a disposition toward grace; in the new it is grace itself. The ultimate end was therefore common to both covenants; but this ultimate end of man was mediate for the Synagogue, immediate for the Church; and therefore the proper and immediate end of each differs. What Paul affirms of the Israelites in Rom. 9:4—that theirs was the υἱοθεσία, the adoption of sons—is not to be understood of adoption properly so called, the interior sanctifying adoption, but of that by which that people had been chosen as the people of God, bound to him by a special tie above all other peoples.

§ VII

The Church of Christ is necessary by divine institution for all men by necessity both of means and of precept; and therefore those who have not satisfied this divine institution cannot be saved.

I. This is denied only by those who admit no revealed religion, or who think that God can be legitimately worshipped and salvation obtained in any religion. Those who deny the necessary permanence of the Church, such as the Socinians and Remonstrants, on the grounds that it depends on the free will of men, are not by this very fact to be considered as denying the necessity of the Church for all men, except on certain supposed conditions by which it is brought about that a Church, once it has failed, can no longer be restored in any place. These conditions they refuse, though without justification, to admit.

II. The necessity of entering a society can arise in one way from nature, in another from positive institution or law. When it arises from institution or positive law, it is required, certainly, that adults, coming together to form a society, should voluntarily give their name to it and voluntarily remain—in which sense the society is called voluntary. Adults, I say; for if it is the institution of a means, it can bind even infants who are incapable of will; but by adults the necessary means

must also be employed freely. However, from this hypothesis of institution or law it does not follow that it is open to anyone to belong or not to belong to that society, or to withdraw from it and exempt himself from its authority; for an institution or law can generate an obligation by which someone is bound even against his will. Now such is the institution of the Church from the positive will of God, from which there arises for men the necessity of coming together in the Church. For this reason it differs entirely from those societies which coalesce from the free concurrence and free agreements of those joining them. This must now be briefly demonstrated.

We therefore teach that it is necessary for men by divine institution to be incorporated into the Church and to persevere in it in order to obtain eternal salvation; namely, the necessity of the Church—and that an intrinsic one—is determined by the end, which is eternal salvation and the glory of God; which, given the divine institution, can only be obtained through the Church. Moreover, a twofold necessity is distinguished: of means and of precept. That which is necessary by necessity of means for salvation is that which is actually a means, such that without it being had in some manner, salvation cannot be obtained. That is said to be necessary by mere necessity of precept which must be done by us in order to maintain the moral order. Now the connection of a means with its end can have its origin from two causes—either from the very natures of things, or from the free institution of one who has the power to connect the attainment of an end with a particular means. A precept, moreover, is not to be confused with a simple institution of God; for a precept imposes a moral obligation under guilt upon a subject, whereas a simple institution of a means can be content with this: if anyone is to achieve this end, he must possess or perform this thing. Both necessities can converge on the same object; for the use of means can also be commanded if the attainment of the end is necessary, as in the case of baptism for adults. The one can also be separated from the other, as in the case of baptism for infants. Nor should you infer from this that whatever falls under a precept is necessary only by necessity of precept; for if its connection with the end is so necessary that the end cannot be obtained without it, even though it pertains per se to the moral order and is prescribed, it will also be necessary by

necessity of means. Thus, actual faith is necessary for all adults; and, given sin, contrition or attrition with the Sacrament is also necessary—which, if you omit it without guilt because you are overtaken by death, does not thereby bring salvation.

We have placed in the definition of what is necessary by necessity of means: "without it being had in some manner"; for that which is necessary by necessity of means can often be supplied in two ways by an adult (since an adult is not condemned without personal fault), namely either in reality or in desire—a desire, that is, joined to another act such as charity or contrition, which desire can also be implicit. We have said a desire joined to another act; for when it is said, for example, that baptism in desire justifies, the meaning is not that a desire for baptism suffices for justification, but that charity or contrition joined with that desire justifies. Hence not every act that is a necessary means can be had by desire, as is the case with faith and with charity itself. Note the distinction between this desire and the general intention to keep the law, which is required for justification. For the intention to keep the law is the intention of something which is not per se required before justification, even though the intention itself is required as a disposition; whereas the intention of baptism is the intention of something which per se, given the divine institution, is required for justification, and which therefore, if it pre-exists, per se contributes to justification as its proper means ordered to it. For this reason, through such a desire the justification that is obtained is subordinated to the means instituted by Christ, and thus it is true that without subordination to the means instituted by Christ, justification and salvation are not obtained. Cf. on this matter Cardinal Lugo, *De Eucharistia*, disp. 3, sect. 1.

III. We prove first that the Church is necessary for all by necessity of means. Certainly entering it is a precept for adults who acknowledge it, but it is prescribed because it is a means—such that, even if it happens to be omitted without fault, if it is in fact omitted in every way, salvation is not obtained. This is Catholic doctrine, solemnly promulgated: outside the Church no one at all is saved. Thus Lateran Council IV in its definition against the Albigensians: "There is one universal Church of the faithful, outside of which no one at all is saved," and in the profession of faith proposed to the Waldensians: "We believe

in our heart and confess with our mouth one Church, not of heretics, but the holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church, outside of which we believe no one is saved." Cf. also the decree of Eugene IV for the Jacobites. The same is taught by Boniface VIII in the Bull *Unam sanctam*, by Gregory XVI in his Brief to the Bishops of Bavaria, 27 May 1832, and again on 27 September 1834, and by Pius IX in the Address delivered on 9 December 1854. And this was the constant preaching of the Church: "For the holy universal Church," says Gregory the Great (*Moralia*, bk. 14, c. 2), "proclaims that those outside her cannot truly be saved, asserting that all who are outside her are by no means saved." Read also Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, c. 38. For this reason, drawing a comparison from the ark of Noah (1 Pet. 3:20–23), the Fathers teach that the Church is the one ark of salvation, and that whoever has not entered it will without doubt perish. Cf. Tertullian, *De Baptismo*, c. 8; Jerome, Letter 13 to Damasus and *Dialogus adversus Luciferianos*, n. 22; Cyprian, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*; Gaudentius of Brescia, *Tractatus* I *De Lectione evangelica*; and the anonymous third-century writer against Novatian (Galland, *Bibliotheca*, Vol. 3, p. 371). Even heretics made the same claim for their own sects.

Indeed, it is necessary for men to be subordinated to the ministry of teaching, sanctifying, and governing instituted by Christ for the purpose that through it men may be brought to salvation. But through this subordination a society with that ministry is constituted, and this society is the Church; therefore. The minor is clear from § II. The major is evident; for without subordination at least in desire to this ministry, no one is subordinated to and adheres to Christ the head; for Christ is the head of his body, nor can he be head except of a body. But the body of Christ is one; and the body of Christ is that which is united by the ministry he instituted. For God placed in the Church apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors and doctors "for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ" (Eph. 4:11–12); and the sense of these words is to be taken exclusively—namely, that the body of Christ is built up only through the ministry of those whom God has placed; for it is established that it is to be built up through the ministry of some, and it cannot be built up except by the ministry of those whom God has placed, since the effect depends

entirely on the free institution of God. Therefore, the body of Christ is only that which is built up by the ministry he instituted. It is therefore necessary to be subordinated to that ministry in order for subordination to Christ the head to be had. "For to salvation itself and eternal life no one attains except he who has Christ as his head; but no one will be able to have Christ as his head unless he is in his body, which is the Church." Augustine, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, c. 19.

Now in these things you have a means in the proper sense; for what is at stake is not the consideration of moral rectitude, of which law or precept provides; but the consideration of attaining the end, to which only the means leads; therefore the Church is necessary by necessity of means.

Again, baptism is necessary by necessity of means for all; therefore so too is the Church. The inference is proved; because through baptism one is incorporated into the Church: for baptism tends toward this, that one may become a member of Christ and be made part of the body of the Church; "for in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body" (1 Cor. 12:13), and therefore baptism is the gateway to the spiritual life; because through it we are made members of Christ and part of the body of the Church, as Eugene IV teaches in the decree for the Armenians. The antecedent is clear from the words of Christ in John 3:3ff., from which it is established that just as natural life cannot be had without birth, so supernatural life, whose terminus is the vision of the Kingdom of God, cannot be had without regeneration, which takes place through baptism, and therefore baptism is necessary for all, even infants—as has been decreed by the Church against the Pelagians.

And indeed, infants who lack baptism, though without personal fault, do not attain salvation. Adults, however, can supply the lack of baptism through an act—say, of charity—joined at least implicitly with the desire for baptism; nonetheless the requirement of this desire is the requirement of subordination to the means instituted by Christ, the obligation of employing which means persists even after justification. Hence in adults the character of necessity of means also appears, not of mere precept. Cf. what we have said in the treatise on Penance concerning the necessity of the sacrament.

Likewise, faith is necessary for all by necessity of means—whether habitual faith alone for infants, or actual faith as well for adults; therefore the Church is equally necessary. The inference is proved: because it is the same thing to have faith and to belong, whether in reality or at least in desire, to the Church; for he who believes subjects himself to God teaching him and at least implicitly also subjects himself to the divinely instituted teaching authority through which faith is proclaimed, and is prepared to do what it teaches and to entrust himself to its governance. The antecedent is proved by the words of Heb. 11:6: "Without faith it is impossible to please God," compared also with the frequent formulas of the Apostle calling justification "the righteousness of faith," "righteousness from faith," "through faith": Rom. 2:13, 25; 8:30, etc. For this reason, the Fathers of Trent testify (Session VI, c. 7): "Without faith no one has ever attained justification," and (c. 8): "Faith is the beginning, foundation, and root of all justification of human salvation." Faith, however, must be understood in the proper sense; for this is what the cited authorities are speaking of, and it is also clear from the condemnation of proposition 23 by Innocent XI on 2 March 1679, by which condemnation the sufficiency for justification of faith in the improper sense is denied—namely, faith arising from the testimony of creatures or a similar motive (that is, a natural one). Cf. Lugo, *De Fide*, d. 12, sect. 2 and 3.

From these things conclude further: that when in the Scriptures the necessity of faith and of baptism is proclaimed, the necessity of the Church is thereby proclaimed by that very fact.

Finally, for all men religion is necessary by necessity of means for the attaining of salvation, to which even infants can in some manner be incorporated by a certain consecration; but the necessary religion cannot be other than the true one; and the true religion is none other than Christianity; and Christianity in the concrete is the Church itself; therefore.

From what has been said the necessity of precept is also made manifest; for since the use of means is in our power, if we are obliged to the end, we are also obliged to the means; because Christ truly enacted a law binding upon all: Matt. 28:20; Mark 16:16.

We may therefore conclude with the words of Augustine in a sermon delivered to the people of the Church of Caesarea in the presence of Emeritus, the Donatist bishop: "Outside the Catholic Church one can have everything except salvation. One may have honor, one may have the sacraments, one may sing Alleluia, one may respond Amen, one may possess the Gospel, one may have and preach faith in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit—but nowhere except in the Catholic Church will one be able to find salvation."

IV. But how is this necessity to be reconciled with the care that God must be believed to exercise for the salvation of all men? For there are many to whom the faith of Christ has not been preached; they cannot therefore believe and join themselves to the Church; why then, outside the Church, can they not attain salvation?

I respond. It must first of all be recalled that he who willed the Church to be necessary is himself the one to whom means cannot be lacking for carrying out the counsel of his will, which "wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth"; therefore there is no reason to doubt that these two things are perfectly reconciled, and there is no need for us to be so troubled in investigating this matter; we can rest in the wisdom and omnipotence of God.

Nevertheless, an explanation of the matter may be offered, by which it can be shown that there is no reason for us to be anxious about divine mercy and justice. Indeed: 1) it must be held, as a Catholic dogma, that he who through invincible ignorance is ignorant of the faith does not sin if he does not believe, nor is he condemned for the involuntary lack of faith; 2) it must be held, from the teaching on the salvific will of God, that God provides to all men those actual graces by which, if they faithfully correspond, they will infallibly arrive, with God cooperating and if necessary also employing extraordinary means, at faith and thus at the Church. Such means, since they are required in certain circumstances by that ordinary providence which wills all men to be saved, are not in this respect to be regarded as extraordinary. "There is no one so barbarous," says Lugo (*De Fide*, Disp. 12, sect. 3), "whom God does not rouse and enlighten from the grace given through Christ, first of all to observe the natural law; and if he observes this for

some time, it pertains to the prudence of God to enlighten him regarding matters of faith either through human preaching or by another means that would not be miraculous, given the common law of God by which he decreed to illuminate sufficiently every man and not to deny the grace of illumination toward faith to the one who does what is in him through the helps he then has; which illumination is a supernatural act, dictating the obligation of praying or seeking the doctrine of true salvation." The same is taught more explicitly by St. Thomas (*De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 4, ad 1), saying: "It pertains to divine providence that it should provide to each one the necessities for salvation, provided there is no impediment on his part. For if anyone so nurtured—that is, in the forests or among brute animals—should follow the guidance of natural reason in seeking good and fleeing evil, it is most certainly to be held that God would either through interior inspiration reveal to him what is necessary to be believed, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, just as he sent Peter to Cornelius." So fully convinced was St. Thomas of the necessity of faith properly so called for salvation! Accordingly, 3) those who are damned without faith must be judged to be damned not for the involuntary lack of faith, but for the sins which they committed in scorning the divine graces, and which they could have avoided had they been willing. Hence 4) from the fact that faith has not been preached throughout the whole world, it cannot be inferred that God does not will any particular person to be saved through this means.

"It is known," says Pius IX of holy memory in his encyclical letter *Quanto conficiamur* of 10 August 1863, "that those who labor under invincible ignorance of our most holy religion, and who, diligently observing the natural law and its precepts inscribed by God in the hearts of all, and being prepared to obey God, lead an honest and upright life, can, through the working power of divine light and grace, attain eternal life, since God who clearly sees, searches, and knows the minds, souls, thoughts, and habits of all, because of his supreme goodness and clemency, by no means permits anyone to be punished by eternal punishments who has not the guilt of voluntary fault. But it is also very well known that the Catholic dogma teaches that no one can be saved outside the Catholic Church." Having premised this dogma

also in the Address of 9 December 1854, the same Holy Father notes that those who call it into doubt "are accustomed to inquire what is to be the lot and condition after death of those who are in no way devoted to the Catholic faith." He adds, however: "Far be it from us to presume to set limits to the divine mercy, which is infinite; far be it from us to wish to scrutinize the hidden counsels and judgments of God, which are a great abyss. But what belongs to our apostolic office, we wish to rouse your episcopal solicitude and vigilance to drive from men's minds that impious and equally disastrous opinion, namely that the way of eternal salvation can be found in any religion whatsoever. For it must be held by faith that outside the Apostolic Roman Church no one can be saved; that she is the one ark of salvation; that whoever does not enter her will perish in the deluge; but it must equally be held as certain that those who labor under invincible ignorance of the true religion, if such ignorance is invincible, are not held guilty of any fault in this matter before the eyes of the Lord."

From what has been discussed, it follows that no other necessity of the Church is to be asserted than that which is the necessity of baptism, by which men are made members of the Church; and just as baptism is said by all theologians, confirmed by the Council of Trent (Session VI, c. 3), to be necessary in reality or in desire, so too it is necessary to be a member of the Church either in reality or in desire.

§ VIII

Christ instituted his Church in such a way that it would necessarily and without any substantial change exist perpetually until the consummation of the world.

I. The permanence of a thing can be had in two ways: contingently and necessarily. That is said to endure contingently which lasts in such a way that by reason either of its essence or of the end for which it exists there is no requirement of its duration, and therefore its ceasing could be verified without any contradiction. On the contrary, that necessarily perseveres which endures because cessation is incompatible with its essence or its end. Necessity in turn is to be distinguished as twofold: absolute and hypothetical. The former arises from the very natures of

things considered in themselves and holds in any hypothesis whatever; the latter supposes some contingent hypothesis, and once this is posited, something can be necessarily connected with the nature of a given thing. This second kind of necessity is what we vindicate for the permanence of the Church—on the supposition, namely, of the institution of Christ, which institution also encompasses the end for which it was made by Christ.

The ancient heresies did not deny the permanence of the Church. Even the first Protestants, as Bellarmine attests (*De Ecclesia*, bk. 3, c. 13), concede that by the law of God the Church cannot fail—though they are speaking of the invisible Church, which they consider the true Church. But that the visible Church can fail or become obscured according to this external and visible form, so that no public assembly of it appears, the Protestants readily concede (cf. Möhler, *Symbolica*, bk. I, c. 3, § 34ff.); indeed they maintain it, as Turretin does (*Locus* XVIII, q. 9), in order to extricate themselves from that troublesome question with which they are pressed: where their Church was before the Reformers. Among the rationalists, however, the foremost of whom are the Socinians, the dogma of the permanence of the Church finds its chief opponents.

We defend the permanence of the Church until the consummation of the world—that is, until the human race continues its pilgrimage on earth; for it is clear from the words of Christ foretelling the consummation of the world (Matt. 24:14; 28:20)—which is either the human race itself or encompasses it—that the pilgrimage of the human race will one day be brought to an end. Nor do the natural sciences refuse this, since they readily concede that planetary bodies will one day be rendered unfit for preserving animal life.

II. The permanence of the Church is demonstrated both from divine promises, and from the nature of the Church, and from the constant tradition of the same Church. Let the testimonies of Isa. 9:6–7 be compared: "A child is born to us and a son is given to us, and the government is upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor, God, Strong, Father of the world to come, Prince of peace. His empire shall be multiplied, and there shall be no end of peace; he shall sit upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom, to

establish it and to strengthen it with judgment and with justice, from henceforth and forever." Jer. 23:5: "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, and I will raise up to David a just branch; and a king shall reign and shall be wise and shall execute judgment and justice in the land; in those days shall Judah be saved, and Israel shall dwell confidently; and this is the name that they shall call him: יהוה צדקנו, the Lord our justice." Luke 1:32: "The Lord God shall give unto him the throne of David his father, and he shall reign in the house of Jacob forever, and of his kingdom there shall be no end." From these it is clear: 1° that the kingdom of the incarnate Son of God is promised—a kingdom dedicated to divine worship, gathered from men to be saved, existing on this earth—all of which applies solely to the Church: Augustine (*Ad Orosium contra Priscillianistas*, c. 7): "Can the kingdom in the house of Jacob and on the throne of David be understood otherwise than in the Church and in that people which is his kingdom?" 2° It is clear that a kingdom is promised forever, which shall have no end, and this on this earth; for it is a kingdom in judgment and justice, in the house of Jacob and on the throne of David. 3° It is clear that what is signified there is not merely the conditional will of God—that this kingdom will always be, insofar as it depends on God, provided only that men are willing—but the absolute will which achieves its effect by bringing it about that men are willing. For first, not merely a decree is set forth, but a future fact is foretold; and the truth of the prophecy requires that the fact itself should actually come to pass; secondly, the promise is made to Christ himself and what is promised is owed to him as a reward and recompense and is given to him who asks it (Ps. 2:8; Isa. 53:10–11; Luke 24:23); but promises of this kind are absolute; for Christ is heard by the Father (John 11:42), and it is incompatible with reason that promises made to Christ who merits them should be frustrated by the wills of men; therefore.

Likewise, Christ promised that he would be with the apostolic ministry until the consummation of the world: Matt. 28:20. Now the promise of God confirmed by the words "I am with you, I will be with you" always signifies in the Scriptures the assistance of God together with success. Moreover, the expression ἡ συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος in the Scriptures always signifies the end of the world, not of any particular

person's age. Therefore this apostolic ministry will always be efficacious. Christ also promised that the gates of hell would never prevail against his Church founded upon the rock: Matt. 16:18. And he foretold that the preaching of the Gospel begun by the Apostles would be joined with the consummation of the world: Matt. 24:14. And he foretold that the good seed—that is, the children of the kingdom—would always be mixed with the weeds—that is, the wicked—in the world until his second coming; and that likewise in the same net there would always be both good and bad fish: Matt. 13:24ff. (compared with vv. 57ff. and 47ff.). But these things presuppose the actual permanence of the Church; therefore.

The nature of the Church also demands permanence; for the Church sojourning here on earth is the Spouse of Christ, whom he will never hate (Eph. 5:23ff.); she is the body of Christ (1 Cor. 12:12ff.), living by the Spirit of Christ who will always be with the Church (John 14:16; Isa. 59:21). Moreover, she is the institution necessary for all for attaining salvation, those who are united to Christ by her and through her; and she, if she were ever to fail, could not be repaired, since she is necessarily contained in the continuous succession of the ministry, as will be declared below; therefore.

There is no need to accumulate the testimonies of tradition; for the common and constant profession of the Church is sufficiently evident, both from the profession of faith in the Creed—"I believe in the holy Catholic Church"—which profession is perpetual and which it has always been believed will always be true; and from the certain and common faith in the necessity of the Church for all men, to whom the merits of the Savior must be applied, who are altogether all men who will ever exist on this earth.

Since the Church will always endure, it must endure according to its essence as such as Christ instituted it; but it would not so endure if it admitted substantial changes; therefore. And indeed, whatever belongs to the substance of the Church is an object of revelation and is contained in the deposit of faith; hence it cannot be changed without the deposit of faith itself being changed; but this will always remain immutable; therefore the substance of the Church will also never be

changed. The major is evident; the proof of the minor is to be sought from the treatise on Tradition.

III. It is, however, incorrectly objected by adversaries from the words of Christ in Matt. 24:10, 12: "Then shall many be scandalized, and the charity of many shall grow cold"; for 1° if those words proved anything, they would tell against the breadth of the Church, not against its permanence; 2. nor do they tell against its breadth, because charity is not necessary for one to be a member of the Church.

It is also incorrectly objected from the words of Christ in Luke 18:8: "But yet when the Son of Man comes, shall he find, think you, faith on earth?" For in fact nothing is affirmed here; Christ sets forth this in the guise of one who doubts—a manner of speaking by which the difficulty of the matter is indicated—and moreover "the earth" spoken of here is not the whole earth, or at least that is not certain, but rather a particular region, namely Palestine.

As for the ἀποστασία of which 2 Thess. 2:3 speaks, it is not the departure of all men, or even of the greater part of them, from the Church; but, as we consider more probable, it is the apostasy of civil societies as such, or of civil powers, from God and the Church—such that they are no longer governed by her institutions but rather oppose them, proclaiming a godless state (βίος θεός); and we are witnessing this apostasy with our own eyes.

Moreover, the absolute decree of God that the Church should be permanent is not opposed to the freedom of men. For by means of middle knowledge, God is able to choose and efficaciously establish that order in which men, freely indeed, nonetheless will what God wills. Cf. what we have said in *Institutiones Philosophiae Theologicae*, Thesis XLVI, Part II.

§ IX

The Church can therefore be really defined as: the kingdom of Christ on earth, to be governed by apostolic authority.

I. From the testimonies of the Old and New Testament it is established that Christ will have a kingdom on earth. Indeed, let the testimonies cited in the first place from Scripture under § VIII be

compared; it is clearly manifest there that Christ is called a king and is presented with the characteristics of a true king, such as sitting upon a throne, feeding a people, executing judgment and justice, and holding dominion. It is equally manifest that the subject there is a kingdom on earth—that is, among mortal men; for Jeremiah expressly affirms it in the passage cited, and it is required by the functions of this king, which are to execute judgment and justice, and by the typical formula by which he is represented, namely that this king is to sit upon the throne of David.

Such a kingdom is entirely different from the kingdoms of this earth, which have their origin and force from nature; it is, namely, a supernatural kingdom. Christ himself testified to this, saying: "My kingdom is not of this world" (John 18:36); its origin, namely, is from heaven—that is, from the free and supernatural institution of God. And indeed, as is clear from the testimonies to which we appealed above, this kingdom is ordered to this end: that the Lord should be God to those who are subjects of this kingdom—that is, that God may be worshipped, that justice and peace may be on earth, and that men may be saved. But the divine worship, justice, peace, and salvation of men spoken of in the Scriptures and which God through Christ procures for men, are supernatural realities pertaining to holiness and eternal glory.

Finally, this royal dignity of Christ is other than that which as God he has and always has had over men by reason of supreme dominion over all creatures. For by this dignity Christ is related to those who are specially subordinated to him, namely those who worship him by believing in him; and therefore the foundation of this royal dignity is not simply creation, but, that being presupposed, it is properly redemption, which pertains to the supernatural order.

Now this kingdom is none other than the Church instituted by Christ himself. For either there is no such kingdom of Christ on earth, contrary to the absolute promises of God (cf. § VIII), or it is the Church instituted by him; for no other can be conceived, and in it all the conditions of this kingdom are found. Indeed it is the kingdom of Christ, because it exists through him, instituted by him; because it is governed by the authority he instituted; because all the members of the Church therefore obey Christ as supreme Prince, reverencing his power

and will; because the Church tends toward the procuring of the holiness and salvation of men, which Christ merited for all with his blood; because in it Christ exercises through his ministers all the royal faculties of a supernatural king, binding and loosing, teaching and sanctifying. For this reason, the Church of Christ is frequently called in the Gospels the Kingdom of Heaven.

Therefore, the Church is certainly the kingdom of Christ on earth. And since the Church is governed by apostolic authority—that authority, namely, which Christ first conferred upon the Apostles, and which continues in the ever-living Church (§ VIII) by perpetual succession, the authority by the institution of which Christ instituted the Church itself (§ II)—the Church is therefore the kingdom of Christ, governed by apostolic authority.

II. The question can be raised whether this is an essential definition of the Church, that is, a complete definition. In order to be a complete essential definition, it must embrace those fundamental notes of the essence of the thing from which everything else proper to the thing can be derived. Now it is easy to see that in these two notes—which are "the kingdom of Christ" and "the governance of apostolic authority"—everything proper to the Church is contained. For to summarize: the properties of the Church are either interior sanctifying gifts, whether incomplete or complete, and those conducive to holiness, or they are exterior ones; the former are contained both in the fact that the Church is the kingdom of Christ the Savior of the human race, a kingdom, namely, of justice and holiness, and also in the fact that the Church is governed by apostolic authority, which is instituted for the perfecting of the saints; while the other and exterior properties, whatever Christ willed to be in his Church, depend upon the apostolic authority as the vicarious authority of Christ the king, and upon the due subordination owed to that authority. For from the authority by which the whole society is governed and through which the society itself exists —such as the supernatural apostolic authority as the vicar of Christ—all rights and all the essentials of society flow.

III. Nor does this definition differ from the common one handed down by Bellarmine (cf. § XI, n. 4) except in being more explicit; for apostolic authority is the authority persevering in the bishops and

especially in the Roman Pontiff, the successor of Peter, whose full authority always prevails in the apostolic see, as we shall see later. The profession of the same faith and the communion of the same sacraments and subordination to legitimate pastors are already contained in the statement that it is a kingdom governed by apostolic authority, which is the authority of teaching, sanctifying, and governing, and which demands due subjection—which, if rendered by all to the same authority as occurs in a kingdom, unity and communion are certainly secured.

Yet this definition which we propose has this special quality: that it presents Christ himself, who is the supreme head of the Church, and exhibits the fundamental relation of the Church to Christ as consisting in the fact that it is the kingdom of Christ.

§ X

The Church of Christ is by its very essence a society of men that is visible; accordingly, the Church does not have two forms, one invisible and one visible, such that the former contains the essence of the Church; rather there is one Church that is essentially visible, and Protestants pervert the word of God when, by separating a double form of the Church, they contend that the prerogatives of the true Church belong solely to the Church existing under the invisible form.

I. In order for the Church to be visible, it is required first that the persons belonging to it be visible, the rites by which they are associated, the ministry by which they are governed, and the like. This is material visibility, but it is not sufficient. It is required secondly that it should be seen and known that these persons, these rites, this ministry, and the like are the Church itself, so that it can be pointed out as it were by a finger to those with understanding: "This is the Church of Christ." This is called formal visibility, because not only are those things seen of which the Church consists, but the society itself as such is seen. In this way any civil state is seen. Now something is said to be visible properly when it falls under the sense of sight; but the term is also used in a broader sense to mean what falls under the other senses as well; we do not exclude this broader sense now. Moreover, something can be said to

be visible in two ways: immediately and mediately. Immediately, what the senses directly attain; mediately, what is present in what the senses attain, and which is seen by the intellect in what the senses attain through them. The former can be called sensible visibility, the latter intelligible visibility; the former corresponds to material visibility, the latter to formal visibility. Examples are to be found everywhere: in this way we say we see corporeal natures, we see men. Hence when a subject is composed of two elements of which one is per se immediately invisible, if this other element can nonetheless be mediately seen through the other with intelligible visibility, the whole subject is said to be and is simply visible—as a man is. Now when we vindicate visibility for the Church, we assert no other or greater visibility than that which everyone concedes to human nature.

Since intelligible visibility encompasses certain elements that are per se proper to reason, a distinction must be drawn between what reason understands by the force of its natural light and what it understands by the light of faith. For that is strictly called seen intelligibly whose existence and intrinsic reason for being the intellect understands through itself—as that this subject is a man; for in this way intellectual vision is opposed to the obscurity of faith.

Since Protestants distinguish degrees in visibility, we note that that is properly called visibility by which a thing is conspicuous and discernible from others; for it is not lawful to call visible that which cannot be seen. But you cannot see the Church if it is so obscured that you cannot distinguish it from other assemblies. Indeed, we assert such visibility to be necessary for the Church as is able to determine with certainty this judgment: "This is the true Church." For the visibility of the Church tends to this: that men may be certain which assembly they must join for the attaining of eternal salvation. The visibility of the true Church is therefore the certain manifestation of the true Church.

Nothing prevents what is visible from also being an object of faith; for first, the same thing can be known by several different motives, and thus we believe by faith that the corporeal world exists and that men consist of not only spirit but also body, and simultaneously we see both of these intelligibly; thus the existence of the Church too can be both seen and believed. Secondly, something can be seen under one aspect

and apprehended under another by the understanding of faith; thus baptism is both seen and believed—the exterior rite is seen, while the character of the Sacrament and its divine institution are believed. Thus the Church can be seen, both immediately and mediately, as regards persons, rites, social communion, and those qualities that belong only to the true Church; and at the same time its divine institution—and that perpetual—together with its intrinsic supernatural dignity, its necessity and efficacy for attaining the end, and its other prerogatives, can be believed. But more on this below. And these are the remarks concerning the mode of visibility.

II. When the question of the visibility of the Church is raised, the question of its essential constitution is touched upon: namely, whether some element per se interior and invisible—such as interior faith—pertains to the essence of the Church. For those who deny the necessary visibility of the true Church are moved by the fact that the Church is the assembly of the members of Christ, or of the just, or at least of believers; but justice and faith are invisible and are not certainly manifested by exterior acts, for these can arise from hypocrisy.

Unless therefore you settle whether or not some interior gifts belong to the essence of the Church, you are not permitted to consider the question of the visibility of the Church as settled. Nor do you make much progress if you profess to be speaking in the question of visibility of the body of the Church. For what do you mean by this which you call the body of the Church? Is it the whole Church in terms of essence, or only a part? If only a part, you have not yet demonstrated that the Church is visible unless you demonstrate that the other part is made visible through it; for otherwise the whole will be invisible. But if you do demonstrate this, you are proving not only the body but the body and the soul, that is, the whole Church, to be visible; and therefore you are speaking adequately of the Church itself, not merely of the body. But if what you call the body of the Church is in terms of essence the whole Church, then you must treat the question of the interior principle as well; for it is on account of the necessity of this principle that many deny visibility to be essential to the Church.

Moreover, since the Church exists only in its members, the question "whether some interior and per se invisible principle belongs

to the essence of the Church" is transformed into this one: "whether some interior principle, such as faith, is necessary in order for one to be a member of the Church." And indeed these two questions differ per se; for something can be essential to the whole without being formally present in each of the parts, as reason is in man. Yet the resolution of the second question is necessary for the completion of the question about visibility; for if interior faith is necessary for members of the Church, then not seeing it, you are ignorant of the true members of the Church, and thus you do not know which or where the Church is. Hence in the question about the visibility of the Church, the question about its members—or about what is essential for one to be a member of the Church—is customarily disputed as well.

Bellarmine (*De Ecclesia*, bk. 3, cc. 1–10), in order to place the visibility of the Church on firm ground, denied that any interior gifts, any interior virtue whether of holiness or of faith, are necessary for constituting a member of the Church. Others on the contrary, with Fr. Suárez (*De Fide*, disp. 9, sect. 1, n. 24), deny that one who lacks interior faith is a true member of the Church, maintaining that such a one is only apparently such; yet they deny that from this it follows that the Church is rendered invisible. And since the reason for this denial which they render is certainly sufficient in the controversy held with Protestants (we shall examine it more closely in the following §), it is now worth presenting it, so that with either hypothesis—that of Bellarmine or that of Fr. Suárez—granted, we may be free to dispute about visibility, setting aside the difficulties. It is clear, then, that these two things can be reconciled: that the Church is the assembly of the truly believing and that it is certainly visible, if the interior element is certainly manifested through the exterior one. This manifestation can come about in two ways: either insofar as what is exterior naturally manifests the interior—whether in individuals or at least in the assembly as a whole—or insofar as by the special disposition of divine providence it comes about, and this is known to us, that in a visible assembly whose elements are already otherwise determined, there are always truly faithful members, whether all or at least the majority, who genuinely hold in their hearts what they outwardly show. For given this hypothesis, and taking into account also the moral law—by which it is

established that in so great a multitude of those professing the faith, without sufficient reason, there cannot fail to be several who are truly faithful—the interior faith of the whole assembly is certainly manifested through exterior profession; and therefore the necessity of that interior faith does not prevent the assembly from being necessarily visible. For it can certainly then be established that this assembly is an assembly of believers, and even though it cannot be established regarding individuals with absolute infallibility, but only prudentially, that they are true members of the Church, it is nonetheless established that true believers are in this assembly and that this assembly coalesces from true believers. We shall indeed see in the following §, that this demonstration is not sufficient for defending the visibility of all things that ought to be visible; but because it is sufficient for asserting the visibility of those things which Protestants also admit, it is therefore permissible to be content with these in controversy with heretics.

III. Although the necessity of some interior principle does not per se exclude the visibility of the Church, neither does it per se include it; hence the entire question remains intact: whether the Church of Christ is necessarily visible. Catholics affirm it; the more recent heretics deny it to a greater or lesser degree. Huss taught that the unique holy universal Church is the totality of the predestined (article 1; cf. also 21): the Church would therefore be invisible, for predestination is invisible and places nothing in the predestined.

Luther, moreover, from his principles concerning justification, was forced to relegate the Church to invisible things. For he contended that God through himself immediately teaches, sanctifies, and unites to himself the faithful and the saints. Given this, Scripture too would seem useless; but since it exists and its use is indifferent to heretics, this opinion was moderated, so that it was said God does indeed place meanings in the soul, but at the reading or hearing of Scripture, so that the interior word and the exterior word are the same. Accordingly both things are true: that God alone teaches the faithful through the interior word, and that without Scripture there is no knowledge of Christianity. As God alone teaches, so he alone governs through the commandments or laws he gives in the Scriptures; and since faith alone justifies and God infuses faith by teaching, so he alone immediately justifies. There is

therefore no necessity of a ministry of teaching, governing, or sanctifying; the Church therefore by God's institution is per se invisible. What is per se invisible can be manifested and made visible through effects and acts that are not necessary to it, as when an angel appears; thus the interior faith and justice of men belonging to the Church can be made visible through their exterior acts, and in this way a visible Church is had, or a visible form of the Church is had. This visible form, however: 1° is not necessary; 2. it is a consequence of the interior form, not a principle. In this exterior form there are some above others to whom the preaching of the word is entrusted; but these have their commission from the community; and today those who are laity are those who yesterday were ministers, and all the people have per se the right to teach and are priests. For the rest, this appearance of governance was retained against their own principles by the heretics, in order to provide for the propagation and permanence of their doctrine and to have those whom they could lead. Cf. Möhler, *Symbolica*.

Among the Calvinists, the Counter-Remonstrant Francis Turretin (*Institutiones Theologicae*, Locus XVIII, on the Church, q. 7) teaches that the Church has two forms, the internal invisible and the external visible; that whatever properly constitutes the Church are internal and invisible things—namely election and efficacious calling, union with Christ, the Spirit, faith, regeneration, the inscription of the law in hearts, and λογικόν and spiritual worship; that the external form, residing in the profession of faith and participation in the Sacraments under legitimate pastors, can cease—that is, can be obscured and hidden so as not to appear (qq. 8 and 9); and that the promises of Christ belong properly to the Church under the invisible form. They contend, that is, that the principle governing a state or earthly kingdom is different from that governing the Church; for the formal principle of the Church consists in the mystical communion of the faithful with Christ and with one another; and this communion and society of men can exist without their recognizing one another and seeing one another.

Among the Arminians, Limborch affirms the same (*Theologia Christiana*, bk. VII, c. 13), contending indeed that the division of the Church into invisible and visible is not "a division of a whole into its parts, but of a subject into its attributes"; while simultaneously teaching

that the true members of the Church are imperceptible to men; for the Church is the society of only the truly faithful; and therefore, against the Romanists, as he says, he constructs an invisible Church.

The Anabaptists rejected external ministry, admitting only the interior inspiration of the Spirit, to which they subordinated Scripture. They had, however, prophets—those breathed upon, that is, by God—by whom they were taught. Likewise, the Quakers admitted only the interior communication of man with God through an interior light by which he is illuminated, cleansed, and sanctified. They do, however, have ministers for the preservation of their sect. Möhler, op. cit., bk. 2, c. 1, § 60 and c. 2, § 69; cf. also Patricius Murray, *De Ecclesia*, disp. V, sect. 1, n. 15ff.

And so Protestants in general differ from Catholics not in the fact that they posit two Churches as two distinct subjects, or that they deny the visible Church; but in the fact that they affirm the Church to consist essentially in the invisible form alone and deny that the visible form belongs to the essence of that Church to which the promises of Christ were made—and therefore deny that the external form, that is, the external ministry and external society with it, is the necessary principle and means of generating and preserving the interior form.

Catholics on the contrary teach that the Church of Christ is essentially a society and that it cannot be enclosed in the invisible form alone, but that the visible form pertains to its essence—no differently than the visible social form pertains to the essence of any human society —and that this visible social form, or the ministry to which others are subordinated, is the certain principle of generating and nourishing interior life, so that from the interior and external form one thing is made that essentially requires both. In order therefore to demonstrate the visibility of the Church, we must bring forward arguments that prove the visibility of the Church under that adequate Catholic concept which is opposed to the Protestant one.

IV. And 1°, it is clearly manifest that the Protestant position is false. For on their view the visible form is not necessary to the Church, since the Church can exist without it. But it is certain that this visible form is necessary, at least from the extrinsic will of God, such that without it the Church cannot exist.

a) The Church promised in the Scriptures is a visible and highly conspicuous assembly; for it is the house of the God of Jacob situated on a mountain, to which many peoples, mutually exhorting one another, come together to be taught the ways of the Lord and to walk in his paths: Isa. 2:2–5; Mic. 4:1ff. That the Church is promised here is clear from the notation of the last age—"in the last days"—from the designation "House of God," from the function performed by God in it (for he teaches his ways), from the gathering to it of all nations ("all nations shall flow to him"), with which the House of Jacob is also exhorted to draw near to walk in the light of the Lord: "O house of Jacob, come and let us walk in the light of the Lord." Cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, bk. 5, n. 33, who clearly interprets this testimony in this way. It is moreover such an assembly that "from the rising of the sun even to the going down, the name of the Lord is great among the Gentiles," in that "in every place there is sacrifice, and there is offered to the name of God a clean oblation": Mal. 1:11. But these things present a conspicuous Church; for conspicuous is that which is shown situated on a mountain, to which the peoples exhort one another to come as to an appointed place; likewise, the great glory of God among the Gentiles, the sacrifice offered in every place from east to west, require a conspicuous assembly in which God is glorified and honored with sacrifice; for through sacrifice, the religious assembly in which the sacrifice is performed is made visible, and through sacrifice offered in every place it becomes conspicuous to all. (We take it here that the discussion is about sacrifice in the proper sense, which is demonstrated elsewhere.) But the Church must necessarily be such as was promised; therefore.

b) The Church instituted by Christ is a society of men bound together not only with God but mutually with one another; but such a society is, by virtue of its very institution, necessarily visible; therefore. The major is clear first from the very name of the Church, which signifies such a society; then from the words of Christ, who wills that both the Apostles and those who would believe through their word should be one and consummated into one—in that unity, namely, by which the world may know that the Father sent Christ and has loved them: John 17:21, 23. The same is clear from the fact that the Church of Christ is a kingdom (Matt. 16:19), a city (Rev. 21:2), a house (1 Tim.

3:15; 1 Pet. 2:5), a sheepfold (John 21:13), a tribunal before which wrongdoers are to be brought (Matt. 18:17), in which consequently there are rulers and subjects, pastors and sheep, teachers and disciples. The minor is proved; because men cannot be mutually bound together unless they communicate with one another in some way; but they cannot communicate with one another except through exterior acts; it is therefore necessary that the communication be exterior and therefore visible; therefore.

c) The Church of Christ is none other than that whose history of propagation is narrated above all in the Acts and in the Apostolic Letters. For certainly the Church of Christ was the assembly of the Apostles gathered by Christ; and its growth is made manifest in those documents. Moreover, the history of this assembly is narrated there, and such as it is presented there, it is necessarily visible; therefore.

d) The Church of Christ is that of which the Christian tradition speaks exclusively; but such was the Church always conceived by the Fathers as being so conspicuous that it could not fail to be conspicuous. For the Church of Christ is not hidden; because it is not under a bushel, but on a candlestick, to shine to all who are in the house. And of it it was said: "A city set on a mountain cannot be hidden" (Augustine, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, c. 16); and "The Church of the Lord, suffused with light, pours its rays over the whole world, and is a single light which is diffused everywhere" (Cyprian, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*). Hence we must not heed those who say: "Behold, here is Christ," but who do not show him in the Church that is full of splendor from east to west, that is full of the true light, that is the pillar and ground of truth (Origen, *In Serie Commentariorum Matthaei*, on ch. 24, v. 23). "Not even the sun is so splendid, nor is its light so clear, as are the things pertaining to the Church; for just as a house on the summit of mountains is manifest to all, so much more did it become conspicuous to all men" (Chrysostom, *Interpretatio Isaiae*, c. 2).

And indeed this was the unanimous opinion of the ancients: that those who were separated from this visible Church were alienated from Christ and estranged from salvation—as is established regarding heretics and schismatics, namely those who were unwilling to be subject to the Church's prelates in their teaching and governing; that those who

do not have the Church as Mother do not have God as Father—that is, the Church that is founded upon the rock by the voice of the Lord (Cyprian, loc. cit.); and that the succession of bishops is the criterion for discerning the truth (Tertullian, *De Praescriptione*; Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses*, bk. 3, c. 3). That the force of this last argument may be the more apparent, consider what is most clearly contained in this disputation of the ancient Fathers with the heretics. For it is most openly handed down that faith is necessary for salvation; that the true faith is to be sought from the Church, or from the teaching authority divinely established in the Church; that all disputes concerning doctrine are settled by the authority of the Church; that by the very fact that one contradicts this teaching authority, he is alienated from the true faith and from God. But these things could not have been handed down by the Fathers unless they had simultaneously conceived and affirmed that Christ instituted his Church in such a way that he willed it to be none other than that which consists of visible prelates and teachers, subjects and disciples—and therefore willed the Church to be visible; therefore.

The ancient author of the Letter to Diognetus, c. 6 (Galland, Vol. 1), says: "What the soul is in the body, Christians are in the world… the soul invisible in a visible body… and Christians are recognized (presumably as such) while dwelling in the world, but their divine worship is invisible." But he asserts this invisibility of the divine worship of Christians in opposition to the worship of the pagans, which was entirely material and sensible; he asserts, that is, that worship is in spirit and in truth, but he does not deny that this worship is made manifest through exterior rites and exterior acts of virtue; rather, he presupposes this, affirming that Christians are recognized by men.

Now it is necessary that the Church always be both such as was promised and such as Christ instituted it and the Apostles propagated it and the Christian mind acknowledged it; but there is no other Church of Christ than this one; for the Church of Christ is unique: "I will build," he says, "my Church," and it cannot be double, just as the body of Christ cannot be double and the spouse of Christ cannot be double. Therefore, the Church instituted by Christ is necessarily visible.

2° Most true is the Catholic teaching that the Church of Christ is by its very essence visible. For several elements per se visible pertain to

the essential constitution of the Church, and in such a way that only with them and through them is there a true Church of Christ. But an assembly whose essence is constituted, even if not by all, by several elements per se visible, and which can only be through them and with them, is: first, entirely visible either immediately or mediately with intelligible visibility, for other elements, if any, that are necessarily connected with the visible ones are manifested through these; second, essentially visible, by reason of the fact that since visible elements pertain to its essence, visibility itself also pertains to it; therefore the Church is essentially visible. The minor is evident; the major is proved. These elements are: the institution of Prelates and Teachers, the preaching of the Word, the rite of initiation of baptism, the rite of mutual communion and the Eucharist, the other Sacraments, the profession of faith, and the like—that these are visible is evident. That they pertain to the essential constitution of the Church and that the Church can only be had with them and through them, is clearly established from the fact that the Church was instituted by Christ to the extent that those elements were instituted (§ II); therefore. And indeed, the Church on this earth is essentially a means of salvation—it is instituted for this unique purpose, that through it and in it men may believe and, believing, attain justice and salvation; but it cannot be a means of salvation unless it is constituted by those elements; therefore, if it is essentially a means, it is essentially constituted by those elements; therefore.

From this the force of that common argument is evident, by which the visibility of the Church is demonstrated from the fact that it is a means proposed and prescribed to all men by which alone they can attain salvation; for it is a necessary means, not in the way that a gift is conferred by God alone, but a means that is to be freely embraced by men insofar as men seek and receive faith and sanctification from other men. For this to take place, it is necessary that men know the Church and distinguish it from other assemblies, and know that it is the Church of God; for otherwise they can by no means direct themselves to it.

V. From the demonstration handed down, it is manifest: first, that the visibility to be vindicated for the Church is intelligible visibility, by which it is known as the Church; second, that visibility belongs to the

Church in the manner in which it is defended by Catholics—namely that the essential exterior visible form of the Church should be a principle of generating and nourishing the interior form; for the exterior form is the teaching authority, governance, profession of faith, and sacred rites; and through these, interior faith and justice is generated and nourished. And in this way Christ first, by his call and by his external as well as interior teaching authority, gathered the primitive Church, and through that same external ministry—always operating interiorly—he willed the faithful to be permanently united. It is manifest third that the invisibility of faith or of the character does not hinder the visibility of the Church; for: a) they are made morally certain through themselves by reason of the profession of faith and the reception of baptism—not in individuals, but at least universally in the assembly itself; and b) they are made simply certain in the assembly itself and in its many members through the exterior form of the Church, because through divine promise it is established that wherever the principle of the unification of the body of Christ is present, there will be true faithful and true members of Christ.

VI. Now those certainly pervert the word of God who contend to elicit from the Scriptures what is both beyond and contrary to the Scriptures themselves; and this is what Protestants do when they wish to prove from certain Scriptural testimonies that the true Church of Christ can be invisible; for this is neither contained in the Scriptures, but is rather contrary to them. That it is contrary to them is clear from the demonstrations adduced; the force of these demonstrations Protestants deny, however, because, they say, the doctrine opposing the Catholic thesis is contained in the Scriptures. Therefore, with their arguments dismissed, it will be wholly clear that they are proceeding both beyond and against Scripture.

And so it is incorrectly objected from the words of Jer. 31:33–34, where an opposition is drawn between the old and new covenant; where the difficulty lies in the words: "A man shall no longer teach his neighbor"—by which the external ministry seems to be excluded. The explanation of this prophecy and the resolution of the difficulty will be given explicitly below, where we treat of the Magisterium.

It is also incorrectly objected from the words of Heb. 12:18ff. The purpose of the Apostle is to proclaim the excellence of the New Covenant, so as thereby to increase in the faithful their love for their calling and to make them steadfast against temptations and persecutions. For this reason, he commends the Church from its nobler elements, and does not provide a complete account or definition of it. Two properties of the Old Covenant are indicated here: first, that the law was given in a terrestrial and accessible place, signifying thereby a temporal covenant residing in temporal goods; second, that it was given with terrifying signs, and was therefore a law of fear (vv. 18–21, 25). Two properties of the New Covenant are opposed to these: that it is a spiritual covenant given from heaven (Sion and Jerusalem are taken tropically), through which covenant there is communion with the Angels and with those who are enrolled in heaven and with the spirits of the just (vv. 22–23); and that it is a covenant of mercy and love on account of the blood of the mediator Jesus, speaking more excellently than Abel. Hence it follows that we must not fall away from the grace of God, and that we are much more bound in the New Covenant than they were in the old not to refuse God who speaks to us. The covenant is therefore spiritual and of grace; but this is not the same as an invisible covenant. Moreover, the fact that the faithful are said to have drawn near to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to the company of many thousands of Angels, is not the same as saying that the assembly of the faithful is invisible. For what is signified is that there is a communion between the assembly of the faithful and the Angels, and that the faithful are ordered to be blessed together with the Angels in the end. But this does not require the assembly of the faithful on earth to be invisible.

Likewise, the words of Christ in John 4:23—"The hour comes, when the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth"—include an opposition between the adorers of the New Covenant and the Jewish and Samaritan adorers. In the context here, by the word "adoration" sacrifice is signified (v. 20). Now the Jewish sacrificial worship was true at that time, but carnal—that is, offered through carnal victims; whereas the worship of the Samaritans was false, for they adored what they did not know (v. 22). The sacrificial worship of

Christians is opposed to both: to the Samaritan worship, because it is "in truth"; to the Jewish worship, because it is "in spirit," insofar as the victim offered belongs to spiritual rather than carnal things, being supernatural and vivifying the spirit. But this does not exclude a visible assembly; on the contrary, it demands it, for sacrifice is an act of external worship which has its place in a visible religion.

Likewise, the words of Peter in 1 Pet. 2:5, calling the faithful a spiritual house, signify the proper prerogative of the New Covenant—that it is the covenant of grace and that the faithful are the temple of the Holy Spirit and live a supernatural and divine life.

What, however, do the words of Christ in Luke 17:20 teach: "The kingdom of God comes not with observation" (μετὰ παρατηρήσεως)? παρατήρησις is the attentive scrutiny of something that must be subtly observed in order to be recognized, such as was done in the taking of auguries. Therefore, to the Pharisees asking "When does the kingdom of God come?", Christ replies that there is no need of subtle scrutiny to recognize its coming, and gives his reason—that it was already present: "For behold, the kingdom of God is within you," that is, in your midst. And the kingdom of God here is probably Christ the king himself. Far from opposing the visibility of the Church, this statement rather proclaims it.

In the words of Christ in John 10:27–28—"My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me, and I give them eternal life, and they shall not perish forever, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand"—note that the sheep are described according to what they ought to be, or the sheep that are perfect sheep are designated; and that it is said those sheep will never perish, the ones who hear Christ, follow him, and to whom Christ gives eternal life. Hence it does not follow that there are no other sheep of Christ in the sheepfold of Christ—it does not follow, that is, that the Church consists only of the predestined. Note, that is to say, with Bellarmine (*De Ecclesia*, bk. III, c. 7), that three distinctions must be employed. The 1st is: "sheep of Christ," "member of Christ," "son" can be said in two ways—that is, according to predestination and according to present state. Hence Augustine, *Tractatus* 45 *in Ioannem*: "According to foreknowledge and predestination, how many sheep are outside, how many wolves are

inside!" Those, however, who according to predestination alone are sheep, are such in potency, not in act. The 2nd distinction is: one who is actually a member of Christ can be such either in truth of essence alone, or also in truth of end, that is, of perseverance. In this way, those who will finally fall are not members of the Church: "If you remain in my word, you shall be my disciples indeed" (John 8:31). The 3rd distinction is: one who in truth of essence is a sheep and member of Christ can be such perfectly or imperfectly—perfectly if he is just, imperfectly if he has faith alone. Now we grant that according to predestination some are already members of Christ, and according to truth of end and perseverance some are not members of Christ; but we deny that by this very fact the former are, and the latter are not, members of the Church; because it is one thing to be in the Church, another to attain salvation—which two things are wrongly confused—and nothing prevents a predestined person from not yet being actually a member of Christ, just as nothing prevents him from not yet existing; nor does anything prevent one who is in the body of Christ from failing to persevere.

Nor is the distinction between the carnal covenant of the Jews and the spiritual covenant of Christians to be placed in the fact that the former was visible and the latter invisible; for they differ not as opposites in every respect, but as the imperfect and the perfect, as type and shadow differ from antitype and reality. How they differ, we have said above in § VI.

VII. Besides arguments from the oracles of Scripture, Protestants produce others from the analogy of faith which come down to this: that the Church is called the mystical body of Christ, and that the same is set forth in the Creed as an object of faith; for "we believe in the Church." But as regards 1°, we deny that mystical and invisible are the same; for the body of the Church is called mystical in that it is not a physical body but a society of men supernaturally joined to Christ, by a mystery similar to that by which he joined to himself in the womb of the Virgin a singular humanity. Thus by this appellation the supernatural character of this society, by which it is referred to Christ, is signified—not its invisibility.

To 2° we respond, first, that not only is the Church to be believed, but this Church is to be believed—just as the Apostles were obliged not

only to believe that the Son of God was made man, but that this particular man was the Son of God. For it is not enough to believe that some Church exists instituted by Christ; but this determinate Church which Christ instituted must be believed, and it must be believed that it is the true Church of Christ; for this is a matter of faith. And indeed, as Fr. Suárez says (*De Fide*, Disp. 9, sect. 9), we are bound to believe what the true Church believes; but this is impossible unless a certain Church is believed in particular. Now in order for this Church to be believed, it is necessary that this object of faith be placed as a fact and be also demonstrable to the senses; for otherwise it cannot be called "this Church." And so the argument can be turned back in this way: this Church is to be believed; but this Church cannot be believed unless it is also visible; therefore, the Church is such as to be believed as necessarily visible—and indeed not only with material and sensible visibility; for in that way no Church would be seen; but also with intelligible visibility, as was explained at the beginning of the Thesis. But how are these two things reconciled? Namely, two things are to be distinguished: the evidence of credibility and faith. We know, or intelligibly see, by reason, or also from the Scriptures, that motives or signs are present in a certain assembly that can belong only to the true Church, and thus we know that it is evidently credible that this assembly is the Church instituted by Christ and endowed with all the prerogatives that Christ promised to his Church; for through these signs we know with certainty the testimony of God concerning the truth of the Church; relying on divine authority, we therefore affirm that it is the Church of God. And since affirmation resting on the authority of God is an assent of divine faith, we therefore believe this. (Cf. *Institutiones Philosophiae Theologicae*, last thesis, p. 313.)

It is tiresome to refute what is adduced from history. For it is established that in the age of persecutions the Church was always so visible as to strike the eye both of those who persecuted her with the sword and of those who attacked her with writings, and of those who daily came to her to be saved. It is established that in the Arian age the Church shone with brilliant visibility; and if after the Council of Ariminum the whole world was amazed to find itself Arian, as Jerome says (*Adversus Luciferianos*), it is already clear that the world was not

actually Arian, or it would not have been amazed—and that hyperbolical expression of Jerome comes down to this: that the Catholic world was amazed that many bishops, who represented it, had, though imprudently, conceded to Arian perfidy. Cf. Prudentius Maranus, *Divinitas*, bk. 2, c. 6.

§ XI

Since the Church is the living body of Christ, we consider that two kinds of life can first be distinguished in it: one external and social, of the kind that can belong to any well-constituted society; the other interior, which directly affects or can affect individual members. In consideration of this second kind of life, a twofold element is customarily distinguished in the Church—interior and exterior, soul and body. The body is constituted by those elements which contain the social form of the Church—namely the ministry of Pastors and the subordination of the flock, the profession of faith, and participation in the sacraments. The soul consists of the interior gifts of faith and charity, sanctifying grace, and the other virtues. A twofold formal principle must therefore be distinguished in the Church: one is the formal principle of society, the other is the formal principle of supernatural life in the members. The former is essential to the Church insofar as it is a society and a means suitable for men in attaining justice and salvation; the latter is necessary for members, that they may attain this end and be what they are called to the Church to be. Moreover, just as justice is not necessary for one to be regarded as a member of the Church, so with Bellarmine we consider that hidden heresy does not prevent someone from still being a member of the Church.

I. Since the Church is a society, one can first conceive in it a life such as that found in any other rightly constituted society. A society is said to live when it operates toward the attainment of its end; it operates, moreover, when authority validly and effectively governs and subjects follow the direction of authority. Likewise, the Church as a visible society, consisting of prelates and subjects, will be said to live if the authority of the prelates validly and effectively governs the faithful and these obey the same authority. Therefore the Church will live if its

authority is exercised, if due reverence and obedience is rendered to its power, if its teaching is heard, and if subjects are governed by right laws and judgments. This is a certain exterior, social life, belonging to the Church because it is a society. The soul, if it is lawful so to speak, of this life is the authority itself, which Christ the head and prince of the Church instituted and by which he mediately governs his visible body.

II. But in the Church, besides this, there is another interior life that directly affects or can affect individual members—supernatural life, by which meritorious works for eternal life may be performed. This is commonly what is usually understood specifically when the life of the Church is spoken of. With this life in view, theologians are accustomed to distinguish body and soul in the Church, so that the soul is what is as it were the formal (not efficient) principle of this life, while the body is what is as it were informed by it. Care must be taken, however, lest these metaphorical expressions be carried beyond their proper limits—as would be done by one who wished to reason about the soul and body of the Church according to all the notions and relations of the soul and body of man. In order, then, to preclude confusion of ideas, we make the following observations.

III. When the body of the Church is spoken of, two things are understood: first and formally, those elements are understood by which the external visible form of the Church is constituted—which are the ministry of the Pastors and the subordination of others to it, together with which the profession of faith and communion in the sacred rites coalesce. These are exterior per se, and through them men are fitted into a society or into a certain body. Secondarily and materially, therefore, when the body of the Church is spoken of, the persons fitted to it by these bonds are understood, and these same persons are called members of the Church.

The soul is that which proceeds from the supernatural influence by which Christ vivifies and unites to himself his members, so that they may be able to operate for salvation. This is interior, inhering in the manner of a formal cause, an existing principle of supernatural operations and of the merits of eternal life. Such are the interior gifts of faith, hope, charity, sanctifying grace, and the other virtues connected with them. Charismatic gifts freely given, however, pertain rather to the

ministry and therefore to the body of the Church, and are indeed enumerated by the Apostle together with the ministry in 1 Cor. 12:28.

Now if you consider the notion of the soul insofar as it is the principle of life in a subject which it informs, it is clear that the subject which can be informed by that form which is called the soul of the Church is every man; while the subject which is actually informed is informed either perfectly or imperfectly. It is perfectly informed when it participates in the whole form, as regards essence—that is, faith, hope, charity, and sanctifying grace; it is imperfectly informed when it participates in it in part—having, that is, only faith, which is the beginning of interior life, or also hope. Actual graces are indeed a preparation for acts and a complement of habits; and for this reason they too are referred to the soul; but if they exist alone without habits and without consent, since they do not unite with Christ in any way or do not give life, or do so incompletely, they do not have the character of soul.

From what has been said, it follows that a twofold formal principle must be distinguished in the Church: one exterior, by which society is constituted; the other interior, in which the supernatural life of the members consists. In order that the distinction of these two principles may be more fully understood, it must be noted that the grace of faith and holiness is the end for which the Church was instituted, and that grace is conferred first and per se upon individual members, and through them upon the body they constitute; for it is individual men who are to be justified and saved, and the salvation of individuals is the end of the Church itself and the reason why they are called to the Church. Hence these gifts are indeed conferred upon individuals insofar as they are in unity; but not because they are first and per se destined for the society and then for individuals; rather because the ministry of the Church is the means by which those gifts—which are per se first destined for individuals—are conferred upon them. On the contrary, the exterior formal principle, which is authority, pertains per se and immediately to society; it was instituted for this purpose—that there might be a society, and that society in and through which men might be saved. Hence, just as it is necessary to be subordinated to that authority through the exercise of which salvation is procured for men, so it is

necessary to belong to the Church; for the Church emerges from those endowed with that authority and those subordinated to it; and this whole thing is the means by which individuals can attain justice and salvation.

With these premises in place, a twofold question is to be settled: 1° whether justice, by which the interior soul of the Church is completed, is necessary in order for one to be a member of the Church; 2° whether at least interior faith is necessary. For this twofold question naturally arises from the doctrine already established on the soul and body of the Church.

IV. Now as regards the second question, the difficulty arises especially, in view of the visibility of the Church, with regard to occult heretics. Some expedite themselves from it by teaching only this: that heretics are not members of the Church—making no distinction between occult and manifest (cf. Passaglia, *De Ecclesia*, bk. 3, c. 36). Others concede that occult heretics belong to the body of the Church, but deny that they belong to its soul (Tournely, *De Ecclesia*, q. 4, a. 3, concl. 2)—which response does not sufficiently meet the question; for it is per se evident, and is admitted in the very posing of the question, that a heretic does not belong to the soul of the Church if the soul consists of faith, hope, and charity. But the question remains whether one who is said to belong to the body truly and simply belongs to the Church. Bellarmine (*De Ecclesia*, bk. 3, cc. 2 and 10) certainly concedes this, noting that a bishop or pope who is an occult heretic still truly retains jurisdiction—and that the very reasoning plainly teaches that one who holds ordinary jurisdiction in the Church is a member of it, and especially that one is its head who is such. He therefore distinguishes the twofold function of a member—as to life and as to instrument—and occult heretics would in this Bellarmine view be called members of the Church in the character of instruments, especially if they are persons invested with jurisdiction; they would not merely be said to belong to the Church as bad humors are in a body; for the head of the Church cannot truly be compared to a bad humor hostile to the body, and moreover bad humors are only very improperly said to be part of the body—even though Bellarmine in c. 2, considering occult heretics in

general, says they are indeed true parts of the Church but are like hair, nails, or bad humors in the human body.

This opinion—asserting that occult heretics are members of the Church—has no small number of defenders among the more recent theologians especially. The contrary opinion is, however, judged more true by Fr. Suárez (*De Fide*, Sect. 1, n. 24), who cites Torquemada, *Summa*, bk. 4, pt. 2, c. 20; and toward this negative opinion Patricius Murray inclines (*De Ecclesia*, Disp. 3, n. 107). This opinion seems to be favored by Pius IX in the Constitution *Ineffabilis* on the Immaculate Conception, where he concludes thus: "If any, which God avert, should presume to think otherwise than as defined by us, let them know and understand that they are condemned by their own judgment, that they have suffered shipwreck in the faith, and have fallen away from the unity of the Church; and moreover, that they subject themselves by the very act to the penalties established by law if they should dare to manifest in words, or in writing, or by any other external means, what they hold in their heart." Here two things are distinguished: thinking in the heart, and manifesting externally what is thought in the heart; and it is for the former that one is said to have fallen away from the unity of the Church, which is separation from the Church. So Murray cited argues. But in fact this inference is not evident; for the distinction of the Pontiff's words can be stated differently: 1° those who have presumed to think otherwise in their heart have suffered shipwreck in the faith; 2° but those have fallen away from the unity of the Church and moreover have subjected themselves to penalties, who have externally manifested what they hold in their heart. Since it is harsh to suppose that the Pontiff wished, incidentally and in passing and without any prior examination, to repudiate a celebrated school opinion, this second interpretation, which is also sufficiently obvious, is more acceptable to us.

The patrons of this negative opinion deny that from it there follows the invisibility of the Church; for, as Fr. Suárez says (ibid., sect. 8, n. 6), interior faith can be seen in some way through external signs; and although regarding individual members exhibiting signs of true faith we cannot judge with absolutely infallible certainty—but only prudentially—that they are true members of the Church, we can

nonetheless judge not only prudentially but also infallibly about the whole body: that it is the true Church. For even though one or another member could easily deceive us, the entire body cannot do so, since by divine promise it is established that the true Church will always be and will never fall away from the faith.

Bellarmine, on the contrary, contends that with this doctrine established, there would no longer be any question between us and the heretics about the visibility of the Church—which he proves thus: "Lutherans and Calvinists posit certain visible and external signs of the Church, namely the preaching of the word of God and the administration of the Sacraments, and they constantly teach that wherever these signs are observed, there is also the true Church of Christ. Yet since they want only the just and pious to belong to the true Church, and since no one can know for certain who is truly just and pious among so many who outwardly show justice and piety, it being certain that there are many hypocrites and false brethren everywhere, our men rightly conclude that they make the Church invisible. But among Lutherans and Calvinists, justice consists in faith alone, and for them it is the same thing for the Church to be the assembly of the just and pious and to be the assembly of the truly believing. Who then does not see that we fully agree with them if we exclude from the Church all those who do not have true faith in their heart?" This argument in itself, insofar as it refutes the opposite position, is more directed against a demonstration—indeed against a particular demonstration of the adversaries' thesis—than against the thesis itself.

Some think they can resolve the disagreement on this matter by teaching that occult heretics are not truly in the Church but are only apparently so—insofar as they have certain marks by which they appear to us to be in the Church. But no one denies that they appear to be in the Church; the real question is whether they truly are in the Church, such that they can be called members of the Church—though imperfect, dry, and dead ones, as Bellarmine calls them (loc. cit., c. 10)—even before God.

Nor is this controversy among theologians merely about a name, as if the theologians were in disagreement only about words; it is about the reality. For those who, with Bellarmine, affirm that occult heretics

are part of the Church—even while granting they do not belong to the soul of the Church—nonetheless contend that they belong to the body in such a way that they are truly members of the Church and are contained within its definition; whereas those who, with Fr. Suárez, deny that they belong to the Church, deny that they truly belong even to the body, and maintain that they are not comprehended by the definition of the Church. The question is therefore whether or not those persons truly pertain to the Church—which is certainly a real question, and those who disagree on it are in controversy about the thing, not merely about words.

V. Against Bellarmine's argument drawn from the invisibility that would supposedly have to be conceded to the Church if interior faith were required, an objection is raised by opponents in the following manner. The necessity of some interior gift does not hinder visibility; for in the Church, truly baptized and truly consecrated bishops and presbyters are certainly required, without whom neither the remission of sins nor the sacrifice and other sacraments would be present; yet for these to exist, the character is required—which is not seen and cannot be certainly recognized from the administration of the rite; moreover the intention of the minister is also required, which is per se invisible and can be simulated no less than faith. And yet the requirement of these does not hinder the visibility of the Church; therefore neither will the requirement of interior faith hinder it.

VI. In order to settle the question as much as lies within us, we note: 1° that given the definition of the Church accepted from Bellarmine (*De Ecclesia*, bk. 3, c. 1)—that it is the assembly of men joined together by the profession of the one Christian faith and the communion of the same sacraments, under the governance of legitimate Pastors and especially of the Roman Pontiff (which definition others also accept, though by the words "Christian faith" they understand interior faith as well)—the invisibility of certain characters of baptism and holy orders, which are undoubtedly required in the Church, does not harm its visibility. For it suffices: 1° that it is certainly established that the assembly of the faithful universally coalesces from the truly baptized, and that the assembly of priests is in fact universally constituted from the truly ordained; and 2° that it is certain that all

living in the Church under the governance of the Pastors and participating in the Church's sacraments—even if perhaps through no fault of their own they have not been baptized—are truly members of the Church. Now this second point is certain from the declaration of Innocent (c. *Apostolicam*, *De Presb. non baptiz.*). And the first point is also established; for a) with due regard for the moral law by which the actions of men are governed, it is made certain that in so great a multitude, many of those baptizing and ordaining and many of those baptized and ordained will have had the required intention; and b) with due regard for divine providence governing the Church, we are infallibly certain that many of the baptized, and bishops and presbyters, are truly such, and regarding individuals, unless otherwise established, we rightly presume. For this reason it is generally certain that the assembly of the faithful is an assembly of the baptized and that the assembly of presbyters and bishops is in fact such.

What then of the head of the Church, who may not be baptized? Since he has lived in the communion of the Church, he is truly judged to be a member of the Church enjoying the same rights as the baptized; and therefore he is capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which God communicates to him for the good of the Church, and so he is truly the head of the Church. These considerations can suffice; for in this way with intelligible visibility a certain assembly is seen—one that is certainly an assembly of the baptized, of priests, and of members of the Church. And what we have said about the certainty of the existence of the truly baptized and ordained, the same must be said about the certainty of the existence of those who have interior faith; and therefore, even though we cannot certainly affirm this regarding individuals, it can nonetheless be certainly affirmed about the whole body universally and rightly presumed regarding individuals; for the reasoning is the same.

But 2° if interior faith is required for one to be a member of the Church, such that even if one appears to be a member externally, he is truly not in the Church, then the visibility of the Church is not so easily secured. For although it may be certain that a large or even the greatest part of this assembly is truly faithful, when it comes to individuals the certainty fails; for no divine promise exists concerning individuals, nor is it permissible to invoke, as in the former hypothesis, communion

with the Church and participation in the sacraments; since in this hypothesis this does not suffice without true faith. Now, even though we need not be concerned regarding others, in the matter of individuals, there is certainly one person who must concern us: namely the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff, who is essential to the Church—as we now suppose, and state this now because we are disputing with Catholics as well. In this view, it will be necessary to say that it is certain by divine promise that he will never be an occult heretic; for if he were, he would cease to be a member, and if he is not a member, he can certainly not be the head. What great uncertainty, therefore, in so necessary a matter for the Church is introduced if this divine promise is not had? But although it is probable that the Roman Pontiff will never be a heretic either privately or secretly, this is not certain, since not even the Roman Pontiffs themselves have been certain of it, and therefore that divine promise is not certain. And so an essential member of the Church, which is the head, would not in this hypothesis enjoy the visibility that is necessary. What we say about interior faith required in individual members must equally be said about the sacerdotal character, if it were judged to be so necessary that without it one could not be head of the Church.

From all these considerations we conclude that it is not the same thing to require interior faith as an essential mark of each member of the Church, as to require the character of baptism and holy orders and interior faith itself in the Church universally, as defined by Bellarmine's definition; nor is Bellarmine's argument drawn from the invisibility of those characters sufficiently and appropriately turned back against him.

VII. With due regard, then, for what we established at the beginning of this §, we recall: 1° that the formal principle of the Church, insofar as it is a society, is authority; and this authority, insofar as it is the formal principle, can not unreasonably be called the soul of the Church. All those, therefore, who are subject to that authority are to be said to be animated by it. Now, those who externally profess the faith that the authority of the Church teaches, who obey it, and who communicate with it in the participation of the sacred rites, are indeed imperfectly animated—because they hold back faith from the heart—yet are nonetheless animated in some true way by that formal principle;

because they freely subordinate themselves to it in external profession and communion. We recall: 2° that the Church of Christ is essentially a society that is subject to the ministry instituted by Christ; and therefore, even though as an assembly of believers it agrees essentially with the Church that existed before Christ, it differs essentially from it when considered integrally according to all its essentials. Accordingly, in order to know what is necessary for members of the Church of Christ, this must be gathered directly from an inspection of her proper essence.

VIII. With these things established, we say that the true opinion seems to us to be that of Bellarmine—namely, that occult heretics are still members of the Church. And indeed this is shown first by the necessary certain visibility of the Church and of its head, which we have already considered. It is also shown by the fact that an occult heretic bishop still possesses jurisdiction—and that ordinary jurisdiction—which belongs to him by virtue of his office, not in the manner in which even a schismatic or publicly heretical priest can in a case of necessity have the extraordinary faculty of absolving; for a bishop who is secretly a heretic retains the same authority previously annexed to his office; for he loses it only when he begins to preach heresy. Thus Celestine I, in Letter 14 to the clergy and people of Constantinople (Galland, Vol. IX): "The authority of our See has plainly decreed that no bishop, cleric, or Christian by profession who has been removed from his place or communion by Nestorius or those like him, from the time when they began to preach such things, should be regarded as having been deposed or excommunicated… because one who was preaching such things did not stand firm and could not depose anyone." This is confirmed by Nicholas I, Letter 8 to Emperor Michael. From which one may argue thus: the sense of the Church is that a bishop, unless he openly teaches heresy, retains his jurisdiction and is truly to be regarded as a bishop; therefore in fact a bishop, even if secretly a heretic, retains the proper jurisdiction of his office and is truly the head of his Church. But whoever is head of a particular Church is truly its member and a member of the whole Church; therefore.

And indeed this seems to be required by that economy which Christ provided for his Church in the parable of the weeds (Matt. 13:29), forbidding the gathering of the weeds, lest perhaps the wheat be

also uprooted along with them. That is to say: those are not to be cast out of the Church and regarded as estranged from it, the removal of whom or treatment of whom as strangers would cause even those who are truly members of the Church to be in danger of being regarded as estranged from it—which would happen if some interior and hidden element were required in order for one to be in the Church; for then it could not be certainly established about anyone that he was in the Church. Hence Augustine too in his Psalm against the Donatist party presents the Church thus speaking: "I expel the wicked whom I can; those whom I cannot, I am compelled to bear; I bear them until they are healed or separated at the end." And indeed reason certainly presides over this ecclesiastical economy: "There is a reason," he says (*De Fide et Operibus*, c. 3), "for tolerating and enduring the wicked in the Church, and there is in turn a reason for rebuking and correcting them, for not admitting them, or for removing them from communion." And what is this reason? The peace of the Church; for he adds in the following chapter: "But we consider it to pertain to sound doctrine that we both tolerate dogs in the Church for the sake of the peace of the Church, and that we not give what is holy to dogs where the peace of the Church is safe." This reason, taken in its full breadth, proves that occult heretics are to be regarded as members of the Church; for a great cause of dissensions would arise if it were certain that such heretics were outside the Church; for the wicked would readily seize upon this as an occasion for refusing obedience to their superiors, saying that they might perhaps be heretics; and since these could not prove the contrary—because the fact is internal and not necessarily connected with external acts—such quarrels could not be brought to a certain and irrefutable end, which is nonetheless necessary for the peace of the Church.

The same can be demonstrated from 1 John 2:18–19. The Apostle there speaks of heretics, calling them antichrists; and this appellation both properly belongs to heretics and in this epistle is applied to those who are opposed to the faith. Now of these he says: "They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would doubtless have continued with us." In these words two things are said of the heretics: that they went out from us, and that they were not of us. Now this second thing must have been true before they went out; for it

is said "they were not," not "they are not." And the two are set in adversative opposition (ἀλλά, "but")—that they went out from us and were not of us; if this negation had been true only at the time they went out, there would be no opposition. But one who leaves someone was first in that person; therefore both things were true before they left: that they were not of us—which is expressly affirmed—and that they were of us—which is equivalently affirmed when they are said to have gone out. Moreover, by the words "they went out from us" a secession from the assembly in which they previously were is signified, as is clear from the very antithesis established with the following words: "but they were not of us." Now the reason why they were not of us cannot be predestination alone failing them; for first, if this were so, in order for that to be affirmed, John would have needed to know that those of whom he spoke were not predestined—and that he could only know from revelation. Nor does it follow from the mere fact that one is now a heretic and secedes from the Church; for he can return and thus be saved. But is it probable that the Apostle knew this from revelation—especially when he speaks not of one or another specific person, but indiscriminately of all the heretics of that time, and speaks in a manner that can hold for all heretics who will go out from the Church in the future as well, as his words are accepted by the Fathers? Furthermore, predestination alone places nothing in the predestined; but the reason why someone who bears the Christian name is not of us must be something really in him, or a defect of some reality or due perfection. But since John is speaking of heretics, no other reason can be given than heresy. And heresy, before they depart, is occult; for it is by the public profession of heresy that they wholly separate themselves from the Church. Therefore in occult heretics both things are true: that they are of us and that they are not of us. But this can only be true if they still in some true sense belong to the Church—insofar as, even though they are not of us in mind and will (for if they were, they would remain), they are nonetheless of us in external profession and in communion in the sacraments; therefore. Augustine confirms this in *Tractatus* 61 *in Ioannem*, n. 2, saying: "Both are true: both 'of us' and 'not of us,' in one sense 'of us' and in another sense 'not of us'—according to the communion of the Sacraments, of us; according to the peculiarity of their crimes, not of us." And Augustine

there speaks also of heretics, as is clear to one examining n. 1; and that in Augustine's view those who are united to us by the communion of the sacraments are in the Church will be apparent from what we shall say next.

And indeed it is false that such men are only apparently in the Church; for they are bound to it by certain bonds sufficient to constitute them members of the Church. For the Church is essentially a society coalescing from the ministry instituted by Christ and the subordination of others to it, and is essentially visible; moreover, the bonds by which these two things are visibly bound together are external obedience, external profession of faith, and communication in the sacraments; these are essential for the existence of society, and it cannot be denied that with these present, a true visible society is had; nor does the Church in fact demand anything else in order to consider someone as belonging to it. But an occult heretic supplies all of these; therefore these suffice to constitute him a member of the Church; for that suffices for this purpose which in some true way unites him with this body that is the society. For it is not necessary in order for something to be a member of a body that it obtain every perfection found in certain more excellent members. Nor is it true that an occult heretic is in no way a living member of this body; for as we have already said, the proper life of this social body consists in subordination to legitimate governance, which the occult heretic retains in some true way, since he freely professes the faith that the teaching authority of the Church teaches and is subject to legitimate governance. Interior faith and grace, however, are properly the soul of individuals and are those goods which we acquire in and through the Church—not those by which we are necessarily constituted members of the Church.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the Church is indeed the assembly of the faithful; but in the manner of speaking of the ancients, the faithful are not those who merely believe, but those who profess the faith through a solemn rite, namely the sacrament of faith received; and for this reason that appellation was generally denied to catechumens. In assigning this appellation, that is, primary weight was given to the exterior solemn profession of faith; and therefore, as long as this persists, the same appellation can continue, albeit imperfectly.

You will say: is not faith shown to be necessary from the material cause of this assembly, in that the faithful are the living stones from which the spiritual house of the Church is built, as Augustine testifies in *Tractatus* 6 *in Ioannem* (1 Pet. 2:2)? I respond that the appellation "living stones," applied by Peter to the faithful, can be taken in two ways: a) in opposition to what the metaphor is drawn from, insofar as the stones from which the house of the Church is built are living men; b) by reason of the Christian life—and this again in two ways: for it can mean either the exterior life placed in the profession of faith, or the interior life, and this again is twofold—either complete or incomplete. Now the first interpretation is per se sufficient for this metaphor to be true; and the sense of Peter seems to be that he is considering the faithful according to what they ought to be, setting before them the purpose for which they came to Christ the living stone—for which reason he exhorts them, "laying aside all malice and all deceit, simulations, detractions, and envies, to desire, as newborn babes, the rational milk without guile" (vv. 1–2).

To the argument drawn from the words of Pius IX cited above, we have already responded.

Therefore, since Christ willed his Church to be certainly visible and social peace in it to be secure—which the parable of the weeds sufficiently signifies—he must also be considered to have willed that those who were only secretly heretics should still be regarded as members of the Church, albeit imperfect and more imperfect than others.

IX. With these points established regarding the necessity of interior faith, the question about the necessity of justice for constituting a member of the Church is already prejudged. Yet this question can be treated and resolved by its own proper arguments, and these must therefore be adduced.

Propositions 72–78 of Quesnel were condemned by Clement XI, in which it is asserted that the Church consists only of the just; and the same doctrine was declared heretical by Pius VI in the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*, prop. 15. The chief argument from tradition is supplied by the disputation of the Catholic Church, in which the African bishops acted against the Donatists.

The Donatists were anticipated by the Novatians, who wished the lapsed to be considered alien to the Church (cf. Pacian, Letter 3 to Sympronianus, n. 3). They were followed by the Pelagians, who taught that the Church coalesces only from those who are perfect in justice (cf. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, n. 88). But all are refuted by the same arguments by which the Donatists are refuted. The Donatists, for their part, did not exclude all sinners from the dignity of membership in the Church, but denied it to all manifest sinners, conceding that occult sinners, like the bad fish in the net, still belong to the Church. This is clear from the Conference held between them and the Catholic bishops, and from Augustine, who frequently—as in the books *De Baptismo*—argues ad hominem from that head of doctrine against those same heretics. And this limitation was demanded by their principle—namely, that communion with the wicked is illicit; for communion amounts to a kind of consent to their sins, and by that communion the Church is corrupted (as the Novatians had also contended—see Pacian, Letter to Sympronianus, cited above). And communion with the wicked can only be illicit if the wicked are known. Hence the Donatists defended a visible Church and said it was that which was at that time only in the party of Donatus, having formerly existed throughout the whole world. The Catholics, however, maintained that not only the occult wicked but also the manifest wicked belong, or can belong, to the Church—that is, that one does not become estranged from the Church by the mere fact of sinning, whether secretly or openly. It can come about that a certain sin—such as heresy or schism—makes a sinner alien to the Church; and it can come about that certain graver sins deserve to be punished with the penalty of separation or excommunication; but generally, the faithful, when they sin (we understand mortal sin), even if the sin is committed publicly, do not by that very fact cease to be members of the Church. This they proved by the authority of the Scriptures and tradition, appealing most of all to Cyprian, to whom the Donatists attributed great weight. This is clear from so many of Augustine's works against the Donatists and from the cited Conference. Accordingly, it is certain that this doctrine was publicly defended by the Church in the fifth century: that it must be held from the authority of the Scriptures and the consent of the earlier Church that the Church does not coalesce

from the just alone; that openly sinning members are also members of the Church; and that justice is not a necessarily required condition for one to be a member of the Church. Hence Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, c. 43: "Hold most firmly and doubt not at all that the Catholic Church is the threshing floor of God and that within it, until the end of the world, chaff is mixed with the grain. But at the end of the world the good shall be separated from the wicked." Indeed, as Gregory the Great says (*Homilies on the Gospels*, hom. 28): "The good alone are nowhere except in heaven, and the wicked alone are nowhere except in hell. But this life, which subsists between heaven and earth, like a middle term receives the citizens of both sides in common; the holy Church, however, now takes them in indiscriminately and will subsequently discern them in the separation and end of the world."

And indeed from the parable of the weeds (Matt. 13:24–30, 36–43) we learn that until the end of the world, the wicked—who will be thrown into the furnace of fire—will be mixed together with the children of the kingdom, who will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father; and that they will be so mixed that this mixed society itself is the Church militant on earth, to which consequently both the good and the wicked belong as members. For although the field, in which the good seed and the weeds are sown, is, according to Christ's own interpretation, the world; yet the very mixed crop of good seed and weeds represents the Church; for the Kingdom of Heaven, which is the Church, is shown to be compared to this whole—namely to both good seed and bad—as that parable relates. This is clear first from the fact that the Kingdom of Heaven is compared by Christ to this whole (even if it is partly expressed obliquely, as also happens in other parables), and second from the fact that in the explicit conclusion of its explanation, Christ says that all stumbling blocks and those who do iniquity will be gathered by the Angels at the end of the world from the kingdom of the Son of Man. By this parable of Christ, the necessity of the wicked being in the Church is certainly not established; but it is first established as a fact that they will coexist until the end of the world; and second it is established as a right, namely that the Church by Christ's institution does not require that it consist only of the just; indeed, it requires that even the bad crop, if it is present, be allowed to grow together with the

good until the harvest—that is, until the end of the world—lest the good crop and the Church itself perish utterly. The same conclusion may be drawn from the parable of the dragnet, ibid., vv. 46–50.

Now here no distinction is made between the occult and the manifest wicked; rather, all are included together—and indeed the matter is plainly about the manifest wicked, since the servants are shown to be asking permission to pull them up; they therefore recognized them. Accordingly, by Christ's authority, openly sinning members are not, for being such, alien to the Church.

Furthermore, it is established that Christ gave his Church the power of remitting sins; but it is certain that the right of the sacraments does not belong to those outside the Church, nor can the sacraments be legitimately conferred upon them. Therefore, the sacramental power given to the Church presupposes that sinners, who need absolution, are in the Church; and this power is given also to known sinners; therefore. You will say: the sin of public heresy is also absolved, even though by it one is separated from the Church; therefore the inference of the argument is not valid. I respond that absolution is not given unless the heresy has first been abjured, so that the sinner has already returned to the unity of the Church having true faith; for faith is a necessary disposition for receiving the sacrament—but it is not required that the state of grace be had in order for absolution to be given.

And indeed the faithful, even when sinners, still belong to the Church as a social body, no differently than the just. For those belong to the society of the Church who cohere with and are subject to the Church's authority teaching, governing, and sanctifying; who therefore profess the same faith that that authority teaches, revere the same power that authority exercises, and communicate in the same sacraments that are dispensed by that authority—and to these all the bonds by which the body of the Church is joined together come down. But through sin (unless it be heresy or schism) none of these bonds is broken; nor does mere disobedience toward the Church, if one should sin in this matter at some point, abolish subordination to the superior, but only some exercise of it. Now, one who remains bound to a society by the same bonds by which he was previously bound and by which others are bound truly belongs to that society. Therefore, notwithstanding sin, the

sinning faithful truly belong to the society of the Church and live that social life whose formal principle we have said to be authority.

The sinning faithful also belong, though imperfectly, to the soul of the Church, by which members individually live. For they still retain faith—and unless they have sinned against hope, hope as well—and faith is the inchoate interior life; therefore sinners still live a certain interior life, though incomplete; for the complete and perfect life is through charity and sanctifying grace. Therefore, the just, who are endowed with this grace, belong perfectly to the soul of the Church; sinners, imperfectly—that is, the former live the perfect interior life, the latter the imperfect. Nor is it necessary that all members participate in the life from the soul at the same degree of perfection in order to be true members.

But is not the Church essentially holy, without spot or wrinkle, consisting of those in whose hearts the law of charity is written? I respond that the Church is essentially holy, and this on multiple grounds: because its institution is holy, its doctrine holy, its law and sanctifying principle holy, and the cause of holiness; and under these considerations, by which the very essence of the Church is constituted, it has no spot or wrinkle. But the interior holiness of all individual members is not essential to it, as has already been demonstrated and is supposed in the objection. If, however, it is said that it is essential to the Church always to have some holy members, that "essential" can be taken in two ways: a) insofar as it signifies that which necessarily belongs to the intrinsic constitution of the Church; b) insofar as it signifies that which God wills always actually to be in the Church—and this is not necessarily the same as what pertains to the intrinsic constitution of the Church; it can rather be that which is the perfection of the Church after the manner of an end, a perfection whose complete absence Christ did not will. And indeed the charismatic gifts too must be in the Church by the will and promise of Christ; yet from this you would wrongly conclude that they pertain to the intrinsic and essential constitution of the Church. We can, however, concede this holiness as essential to the Church only in this second sense. This, besides the arguments already adduced, can also be proved from the fact that such holiness has no determinate subject; whereas those things that pertain to the intrinsic

constitution of the Church, even if not common to all—such as the power of holy orders and jurisdiction—do have determinate subjects. Moreover, the words of Jeremiah to which the objection appeals tend to this: to declare the character of the new covenant in comparison with the old; and this character of the Church consists in the fact that in it there is effective power of those supernatural goods, and that in and through it God is prepared to confer the same upon men. The words of the Apostle (Eph. 5:22), when referred to the members of the Church, do not signify the Church as it now is, but as it is being prepared to be (Augustine, *Retractationes*, bk. II, c. 18); or they do signify the Church as it now is, but they signify the end for which Christ willed the Church to be—an end, however, which is future at the terminus of the journey, not present along the way.

Why then are sinners called dead members? For dead members are not members except equivocally—that is, not truly members; hence it seems that sinners are not truly members of the Church. I respond that this appellation is applied to sinners with respect to the soul which is in individuals the principle of life—and with respect to the perfect life which is through charity—not however with respect to the exterior formal principle, which can itself also be called soul (n. I of this §). Indeed, as we have already noted, if sinners are compared to this visible society and its essential constitutive elements, they are not dead members but live this social life like the others; if however they are compared to that which is the end of this society and which is the principle of supernatural life in the members, sinners destitute of this life are dead members—though not entirely, for they live imperfectly; hence some more aptly call them half-dead (cf. Cornelius à Lapide on 2 Tim. 2:20).

Nothing prevents the same men from being under different aspects both members of Christ and members of the devil. "Those who have the sacraments but have not good morals are both called God's and not God's, and are said to be his and alien to him: his by reason of the sacrament, alien by reason of the vice" (Augustine, *In Ps.* 47, n. 8). Hence the wicked, although they are not simply children of God, since they lack sanctifying grace, can nonetheless in a certain imperfect manner—by reason of generation and by reason of the doctrine they

hear—be called children of God; though they are degenerate and wicked by reason of imitation and sin, according to which they are children of the devil (cf. Bellarmine, ibid.).

X. The remaining difficulty arises from Augustine's opinion. For he teaches that only the good are built together into the body and members of Christ (*De Unitate Ecclesiae*, c. 21); that the wicked appear to be inside but are in reality outside (*De Baptismo*, bk. 4, c. 3; bk. 6, c. 2); that they are in the Church as bad humors are in the body (*In Epistolam Ioannis Tractatus* 3); that Christ cannot have damned members—those, namely, condemned by Christ on account of their evil and polluted conscience (*Contra Cresconium*, bk. 2, c. 21); that the power of administering the Sacraments and in general the power of binding and loosing was given by Christ to the good, not to the wicked (*De Baptismo*, bk. 7, cc. 12, 51; bk. 6, cc. 3, 24); that the wicked are not on the rock upon which the Church is built (ibid. and *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, c. 18); that the Church is truly the chaste and pure dove, without spot or wrinkle, to which the wicked cannot belong (*In Ioannem Tractatus* 6; *De Baptismo*, bk. 4, cc. 3, 4; bk. 6, c. 3); that indeed those who persevere in their wickedness do not belong to the body of Christ (*In Ps.* 139); and that the body of Christ, which is the Church, will be at the right hand—that is, in blessedness (*De Agone Christiano*, c. 26).

Now it is manifest that the interpretation applied by Protestants to these expressions of Augustine is entirely false. For it is certain: first, that Augustine vigorously attacked the heresy of the Donatists and defended the Catholic dogma against them; and the Donatist heresy was that sinners, at least manifest ones, do not belong to the Church; while the Catholic dogma was that the Church in its present state consists of both good and wicked; and Augustine employs these expressions in works written against the Donatists. Therefore it cannot be the case that by these expressions he wished to teach that the Church coalesces from the saints alone—which is an affirmation including the Donatist affirmation and something more. It is certain, secondly, that Augustine together with the other African Fathers in the Donatist controversy never conceived of or approved two Churches, but always defended only one. For when the Donatists reproached them (cf. *Breviculum*

Collationis, third day) with somewhat making two Churches—one which now has the wicked mixed in, another which after the resurrection would not have them—the Catholics, among whom Augustine, replied that this was a slander, and that they taught only this: "that the one and same holy Church is now otherwise, but will then be otherwise—just as Christ is not thereby two, because he first died and thereafter will not die again." And Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana*, bk. 3, c. 32, commenting on those words of the Canticle: "I am black, but beautiful," notes that that one and same Church is now dark on account of the wicked it contains and beautiful on account of the good.

With these points established, note that the reason by which Augustine was moved to frequently inculcate what is contained in those expressions was first polemical—namely, to refute by argument ad hominem the arguments of the Donatists (*De Baptismo*, bks. 6 and 7), by which they contended that heretics could not confect the sacraments. For the Donatists had two errors: one, that the Church consists of both good and wicked but only the occult wicked; the other, that one outside the Church cannot confect the sacraments. And why? Because he cannot give the Holy Spirit, which he does not have. And in their defense, the Donatists invoked the authority of Cyprian and his bishops at the Third Council of Carthage, who by numerous arguments had tried to prove that heretics cannot baptize and confer the other sacraments, because they cannot give the Holy Spirit which they do not have. Now Augustine, in order to break the force of his adversaries' arguments and to show that they contradict themselves, responds that if heretics cannot give the sacraments, as Cyprian with his party maintained; and if the same is true of manifest sinners, as the Donatists maintained; then by the same token the wicked—whoever they may be, even occult sinners—cannot give them either; for neither do these have the Holy Spirit, and therefore they too cannot give what they do not have. And Augustine frames this response thus: if heretics and public sinners cannot give the sacraments because they are outside the Church which possesses the Holy Spirit, neither can occult sinners confer them; because they too are outside the Church—that is, the Church which has the Holy Spirit—for they lack it no less than manifest sinners. "Just as I am pressed when it is said to me, 'therefore a heretic remits sins,' so I

press in turn when I say, 'therefore one who does not keep the heavenly commandments—a miser, a robber, a usurer, an envious man, one who renounces the world in words but not in deeds—remits sins.' If by the force of God's Sacrament, so does the one as well as the other. If by their own merits, neither the one nor the other. For that Sacrament even in evil men is recognized as Christ's; but neither the one nor the other is found in the body of the one dove, incorrupt, holy, modest, having no spot or wrinkle" (*De Baptismo*, bk. 4, c. 4). Hence, since the Church is instituted for this—that all its members have the Holy Spirit, charity, and grace—and thus such members are the more excellent part of the Church itself and accordingly belong to the Church in a more perfect manner than the wicked; and therefore their union more properly claims for itself the name "Church." And since heretics seemed not to conceive of any Church except a Church holy in all its members, which is only the more noble part of the true Church, Augustine carefully distinguished between the whole that is the universal Church and its nobler part, which is the Church of the saints, which he calls the holy, modest dove—a distinction that is true in itself. But Augustine was compelled by this distinction to frequently use it against heretics, in order to expose the flaw in their argument—for they confused the perfect mode of existing in the Church with that which is simply necessary for one to be in the Church, or confused what is required in order for one to be profitably in the Church with what is required in order for one to be in the Church simply (cf. *Tractatus* 6 *in Ioannem* and *De Baptismo*, bk. 4, c. 2, and frequently elsewhere); and also to show that those who contradicted themselves were excluding from the Church—because it is holy—several sinners, while nevertheless admitting occult sinners. For from the Church taken in this sense he teaches that all the wicked are alien.

A further reason for employing these formulas is to be sought from the character of Augustine's mind; for it is certain that it was Augustine's habit, when considering things, to look above all at what is most excellent in them and at what they ought to be (cf. Faure, *Enchiridion*, cc. 1–2). In this way, the just and those who persevere to the end are the Church; because they belong to it in the perfect manner of truth of essence and also finally. Moreover, in the way in which the

just alone are called members of the Church and of Christ, the sinners or the damned are said to be unable to be members of Christ; for in the cited passage, the damned are none other than sinners who can be converted and reincorporated into Christ.

For the rest, it is certain 1° that Augustine does not deny simply that the wicked are in the Church, but only in a qualified sense—namely, he denies they are in that Church which is called and is the modest, incorrupt dove, having no spot or wrinkle, which fruitfully possesses the sacraments, which is the more excellent part of the Church sojourning on earth and which will endure forever. "Wherever," he says (*Retractationes*, bk. 2, c. 18), "in those books" (namely the seven books *De Baptismo*) "I made mention of the Church having no spot or wrinkle, it is not to be understood as though it already is so; but it is being prepared to be so, when it will appear also in glory. For now, because of the ignorances and infirmities of its members, it has that for which it may say daily in its totality: 'Forgive us our debts.'" For this reason Augustine accurately distinguishes, together with the other Catholic bishops, the Church that is below and the Church that is above —not as though there were two Churches, which he expressly denies in response to the Donatists who raise this objection, but insofar as it exists in one way and another, which difference consists in the fact that the Church on this earth consists of both good and wicked, while that other consists only of the good; the former is a tabernacle, the latter a house (*Breviculum Collationis*, third day; *In Ps.* 131, n. 10).

It is certain 2° that Augustine asserts the wicked to be in the Church, not merely insofar as they are mixed with the good by a kind of juxtaposition, but insofar as they are socially bound together with the good, united, that is, in one society, which is the Church itself. For to this tends that manner of speaking: that the wicked are joined to the good through the bond of the Sacraments, by which men are united in one religious society. "For into no association in the name of religion, whether true or false, can men be coagulated, unless they are bound together by some association of visible signs or sacraments" (*Contra Faustum*, bk. 19, c. 11); and the right to participate in them belongs to none except those who pertain to the same religious society of which the sacraments are a part. But when the wicked are simply said to be in

communion in the Sacraments together with the good, this communion is understood as that which belongs to them by social right; for otherwise the same could be affirmed of schismatics and manifest heretics and other unbelievers, who make use of those sacred rites in some manner—which is certainly foreign to Augustine's mind. Accordingly, the wicked by reason of the communion of the Sacraments are said to be in the Church and in the Christian congregation: "In the Christian congregation," he says (*Sermon* 15, n. 2), "as far as it pertains to the participation and communion of the sacraments, they have been multiplied above number. But there is one number, and there are others above number. The number consists of those of whom the Apostle says: 'the Lord knows those who are his.' Above number, however: because in a great house there are not only golden and silver vessels, but also wooden and clay." Therefore Augustine calls the wicked chaff—but interior chaff as distinct from the separated chaff, which are the heretics (*Contra Cresconium*, bk. 3, c. 67): "The East does not communicate with Africa, nor Africa with the East—not among the heretical chaff separated from the Lord's threshing floor; but among the Catholic grain and interior chaff, the East does entirely communicate with Africa and Africa with the East." Hence the wicked are said to be in the body of Christ (*Sermon* 137, n. 1): "Jesus Christ is the head of the Church and the Church is his body, and in his body the unity of members and the bond of charity subsists as health does. But whoever shall have grown cold in charity is ill in the body of Christ. Yet he who has already exalted our Head is powerful to heal even weak members, provided they are not cut away by too great impiety, but cleave to the body until they are healed." And he therefore teaches that all the faithful belong to the body of Christ (*In Ps.* 62, n. 2).

Accordingly, when Augustine denies that the wicked belong to the Church, are members of the body of Christ, and so on, he takes the Church in a more restricted sense—according to what is most noble in it, and what by Christ's will it ought to be, and what permanently exists both in this age and in the next. Hence by the metaphor of bad humors, it is not signified that sinners have nothing in common with the just, but that they are in the unity of the same body, though as infirm members, separated from them in spirit. As for what is said—that the

power of baptizing and so on was given to the good only—note that the dogma which Augustine argues with all his strength against the Donatists is this: that baptism and the other sacraments can be given also by the wicked, and that the value of the sacrament depends not on the merits of men, but on him of whom it was said: "he it is who baptizes" (cf. *Tractatus* VI *in Ioannem*). Why, then, does Augustine say that Christ gave to bishops, not to the wicked, the power of baptizing, and that murderers do not have the power of baptizing and remitting sins? Namely, Augustine's response is ad hominem. His adversaries said: Christ did not give this power to heretics but to the Apostles or to the Church; therefore heretics cannot baptize. Augustine responds: nor did Christ give this power to murderers, misers, and the wicked, and yet according to you they baptize. This response is also true in itself, insofar as not only did God not designate such men as such to be ministers of his Sacraments, but also insofar as he willed per se that the good alone should licitly confer his sacraments, just as he willed that only in his Church should the administration of the Sacraments be licit.

Moreover, Augustine denies the wicked to be on the rock, because those who hear the words of Christ and do not do them (Matt. 7:24ff.) build on sand, not on rock. That is to say: to be on the rock, to be built upon the rock—given the words of Christ in Matt. 7—is not merely to adhere to the rock of the Church and to be in the Church, but to adhere to the rock and to be in the Church in the perfect and fruitful manner, so that it cannot truly be said of one that he is on sand. And those who are not predestined he denies to belong to the Church that is being prepared to be, not to the Church that now is.

Therefore, the opinion of Augustine is in fact no different from the opinion of Bellarmine and other theologians who assert that the wicked, even though they are not living members through charity, are nonetheless truly members of the Church, which is one, not double. Cf. Bellarmine, loc. cit.; Alticotius, *Summa Augustiniana*, pt. 3, q. 1, a. 3.

§ XII

With the notion of the Church thus sketched in its external outlines, its nature must now be more deeply examined. Since Christ instituted the Church by instituting apostolic authority (§ II), and all the properties present in the Church belong to it by virtue of this authority, it is necessary to dwell first on declaring this authority more fully; and first to treat in particular of its subject by divine institution.

In instituting the power of his Church, Christ did not communicate it to the whole assembly of the faithful to be delegated by them to certain ministers, but conferred it immediately upon certain persons, to be propagated perpetually from them to others who would be taken up by a determinate rite and legitimate authority; accordingly, the distinction between clerics and laity is to be traced back to the institution of Christ and to divine law.

I. When the question is raised about the subject of social authority, an accurate distinction must be drawn between it and the end to which that same authority is ordered. For all social power is instituted not for the good and benefit of those who hold it, but of others who are governed. For this is the difference between the dominion of a master over slaves and domestic and social governance: in the former, governance is directed toward the master's benefit, for the slave is in some sense a possession of his master and exists for him; whereas domestic or social governance is for the sake of those who are governed and is ordered to the good of subjects. Hence all those republics that tend toward the common utility are just; those that look only to the private gain of those who rule are corrupt; for they pass over into the dominion of a master over slaves—yet a city is a society of free men. So Aristotle, *Politics*, bk. 3, c. 6. If, then, the question is asked who are those for whose sake ecclesiastical power was instituted, they are all who are governed—all the faithful—that is, the Church. "All things are yours, whether Paul or Apollo or Cephas… and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's" (1 Cor. 3:22). Hence, since this is the common character of every

form of just governance, from it no distinction between one form and another can be gathered.

But it is one thing entirely for social power to be for the benefit of those who are to be governed, and another for those who are to be governed to be at least the primary subject of that power. For these two things differ formally, as is evident; they also differ materially, insofar as it is not a necessary consequence that those for whose sake power exists are its subject. Certainly, the good of the whole household is the end of paternal authority, which is nonetheless in no way in the children or domestics; just as the illumination of the eyes is in a certain sense the end of the light of the sun, without the eyes being the subject emitting the light—for that is the sun. Indeed, the fact that power exists for the good of others gives them only this right: that this power be exercised for their benefit and that they be well governed. But this can per se be secured even if the subject possessing primary and radical authority is not all of them but one man. For this reason, nothing is more inept than that "infallible foundation" by which the Paris School once, as Richer testifies, fortified itself. For he says (*De Ecclesiastica et politica potestate*, c. 1): "It is a common and undoubted axiom of faith that God and nature intend the whole suppositum more immediately and primarily than any part of the suppositum, however noble. And for this reason, the faculty of seeing, for example, was given to man as a whole, so that it might be exercised through the eye as through the organ and minister of man; for the eye exists through and for man. The Paris School, fortified by this infallible foundation and in agreement with the mind of all the ancient doctors of the Church, perpetually and constantly taught" (from the time of the Council of Constance in the early fifteenth century) "that Christ, in founding the Church, gave the keys or jurisdiction to the whole Church first, more immediately, and more essentially than to Peter—or, which comes to the same thing, that he conferred the keys upon the whole Church, so that they might be exercised ministerially through one. Inasmuch as the whole ecclesiastical jurisdiction pertains primarily, properly, and essentially to the Church, but to the Roman Pontiff and the other bishops only instrumentally, ministerially, and as regards execution alone, as the faculty of seeing belongs to the eye. For 'all things are yours' (that is, the

Church's), 'whether Paul' etc., from 1 Cor. 3:22." This most inept sophism, as is evident, rests entirely on the confusion of the ideas of the end and of the subject of power. Nor was the faculty of seeing given to man in such a way that its primary subject is all parts of man simultaneously—soul and all the members of the body—of which the eye then performs the function; rather, it is immediately as in a subject in the soul and in the eye alone, which is also the action of the man; for actions are of the suppositum, and it exists for the man and for the other members—that is, for the use of the other members. Maior indeed (in an inferior text) plays with words, when in support of the same view he invokes the axiom: "That on account of which a thing is such, is itself more so." For this principle—if it is a principle—can indeed hold when effects are compared with their efficient causes; but it does not hold, at least per se, with regard to intrinsic causes; for if Peter is a man on account of the soul, the soul itself is not more a man; nor does it hold with regard to final causes; for if the master is learned on account of instructing the disciple, the disciple is not more learned. So likewise, even if Peter's power was given on account of the Church, it does not follow that the Church can do more than Peter. It is true that Richer could have taken the occasion for this opinion about the power of the Church from the doctrine that the primary subject of social power is the society itself, which by the guidance of nature then transfers it to the King or to others; but whatever may be said of that doctrine—about which we do not wish to raise a question—it is manifest that the same reasoning cannot be applied equally to natural society and to the supernatural society, which is an institution free, positive, and divine, beyond and above the requirement of nature.

For this reason, in this controversy one may make use of the following prescription: When the question is asked whether Christ conferred the power instituted by him first upon the whole Church or upon the entire assembly of the faithful, to be communicated by them afterwards to certain ministers, or whether he conferred it only upon certain persons distinguished by it from the rest: we prescribe that the solution of the question is not to be sought from the principles of reason by which the ordering of natural societies is established, but from the

will alone of Christ the institutor of the power. It is, that is, a question of fact, which is to be resolved by testimony reporting the free will of God.

II. It was therefore the opinion of certain Gallican doctors (Gerson, *De Potestate Ecclesiastica*, Consid. 4ff.; James Almain, *Quaestiones resumptae*, Concl. 3, and *De Auctoritate Ecclesiae contra Caietanum*, c. 6; Maior, *Disputatio de Auctoritate Concilii supra Papam*, and others) that Christ gave the supreme power immediately and principally to the Church. By the Church, some seem to understand the assembly of all the prelates; some also understand the collection of all the faithful. Following these, Richer established what we already heard: that the whole ecclesiastical jurisdiction pertains primarily, properly, and essentially to the Church, which exercises it through its ministers and instruments, the Pope and the Bishops. Imitating him, Febronius (*De Statu Ecclesiae*, c. 1, §§ 3, 6) teaches that the power of the keys was given by Christ to the whole body of the Church, which holds it principally and radically and exercises it through its ministers and especially through the Roman Pontiff. In accordance with these men, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in France was issued in the closing years of the past century, in which the form of ecclesiastical governance was subjected to civil authority—that is, to the people—and was condemned by Pius VI in the Constitution *Charitas* of 13 April 1791. The same Pius VI condemned as heretical the propositions of the Synod of Pistoia: the 2nd, which established that the power given by God to the Church in order that it might be communicated to the pastors who are its ministers for the salvation of souls, understood in such a way that the power of ecclesiastical ministry and governance is derived from the community of the faithful to the pastors; and the 3rd, which established that the Roman Pontiff is the ministerial head, so explained as to mean that the Roman Pontiff receives from the Church, and not from Christ in the person of blessed Peter, the power of ministry by which, as the successor of Peter, the true vicar of Christ and head of the whole Church, he holds authority over the universal Church.

III. The question is therefore which persons Christ willed not only to commit the exercise of ecclesiastical power, but upon which persons he willed to confer the power itself originally. Now only those are to be said to have had the power conferred upon them originally by Christ, to

whom it is established exclusively from the testator's documents—that is, from the Gospel—that it was conferred. But from these it is established that it was conferred only upon certain determinate persons —that is, the Apostles; therefore.

The major is evident; for the power by which Christ governed his faithful on earth was his own, independent of any consent of subjects, and it was therefore entirely within his right to bestow it on whomever he wished, such that no one else could have it unless he had given it. The minor is proved. It is established both that power was conferred by Christ upon Peter first and with Peter upon the other Apostles, whom Christ had bound to himself in a special way and set apart from others; and also that it was conferred upon them not insofar as they were an assembly of the faithful or represented that assembly, but insofar as they were persons distinct from the others and so that through that power they would be set apart from others and superior to them by divine right. But with these points established, the power was conferred only upon those determinate persons; therefore.

The major as regards its first part is clear from the testimonies of Luke 6:13–14; Matt. 16:18ff.; 18:18; John 21:15; Matt. 28:20, etc. The second part of the major is also evident; for besides the fact that there is no express indication of such representation—on the contrary, they were already set apart from the others—this part is proved as follows. For it is manifest that when a social power is conferred upon certain persons as distinct from others, it is conferred upon them as future authors of a society; for if the society is to exist in the future through them once they are invested with authority, then all power is conferred upon them alone as distinct from the rest of society, which does not yet exist. But so it was in the divine institution of ecclesiastical power. For although while Christ was living among men there already existed certain faithful together with the Apostles, who were immediately governed by Christ along with them; nonetheless the Church to be built by Christ was that which would exist according to the form established by him after his departure from the earth—for Christ speaks of a Church still to be built by him, while he already had the faithful adhering to him, which therefore in its social form cannot be the same as that which already existed at that time. But the Apostles were the

authors of this future Church; therefore. The minor of the preceding argument—that with these points established, the power was conferred by Christ only upon those determinate persons—is evident; therefore.

IV. That this is the sense of the Church is demonstrated by its constant and consistent manner of acting. Indeed, general councils have never been convened from all the faithful, nor has their vote been sought by authority; rather, councils have been assembled from the bishops alone as successors of the apostles, and only their authentic votes have been solicited. The power of instituting presidents and bishops has never been given to all the faithful; but the distinct right of bearing testimony and even of requesting, and the right of electing and conferring power, were always allowed to the faithful for the former, but always denied for the latter. "Let the desires of the citizens be waited for," says St. Leo, Letter 10, c. 4, "the testimonies of the people, the judgment of the honorable, the election of the clergy—things which are customarily observed in the ordination of priests by those who know the rules of the Fathers… Let the subscription of the clergy be maintained, the consent of the order, and the choice of the people; let him who is to preside over all be elected by all." In the first part of the statement, the election, which is asserted to belong to the clergy, is distinguished from the testimony and the request or desires of the people; in the second part, since from all these acts one act emerged that concluded in an election, the election is attributed to all simultaneously—but this must be understood with the appropriate distribution. Indeed, Canon 31 of the Apostles establishes: "If any bishop, using secular powers, obtains a church through them, let him be deposed and all who communicate with him be separated." Council of Nicaea, Canon 4: "A bishop ought most of all to be constituted (καθίστασθαι) by all the bishops in the province… But the validity of what is done in each province shall be attributed to the metropolitan bishop." Council of Laodicea, Canon 13: "The multitudes are not to be permitted to carry out the elections of those who are to be constituted in the priesthood." At the 4th Roman Synod in the case of Symmachus, it was condemned "that laymen had reduced the election of a bishop to their own power, which is manifestly contrary to the canons." Second Council of Nicaea, Canon 3: "Every election of a bishop, presbyter, or

deacon made by magistrates shall remain invalid. For the one to be promoted to the episcopate must be elected by the bishops." Eighth Ecumenical Council, Canon 22: "The holy and universal synod defines that no lay princes or powerful persons shall insert themselves into the election or promotion of a Patriarch, metropolitan, or any bishop… especially since it is not fitting that any powerful person or the rest of the laity should have any power in such matters, but rather should be silent and attend to themselves until the election of the future Pontiff regularly receives its conclusion from the college of the Church." For this reason, as Celestine I says, Letter 5 to the bishops of Apulia and Calabria: "The people are to be taught, not followed." Florus, deacon of Lyons at the end of the ninth century, wrote a book on the elections of bishops. He says therefore in n. 4: "As for the custom that prevailed in certain kingdoms afterwards" (that is, after there ceased to be one Emperor) "that an episcopal ordination should take place with the counsel of the Prince, this is valid for the increase of fraternal charity on account of the peace and concord of worldly power, but not for completing the truth or authority of holy ordination, which can by no means be conferred upon anyone by royal power but only by the nod of God and the consent of the faithful of the Church… Hence any prince gravely sins who thinks he is able to bestow by his favor what only divine grace dispenses; for he ought to add, not to preempt, the ministry of his power in carrying out such matters." Found in Galland, Vol. 13.

Since, however, appeal is made to the authority of Cyprian to assert certain rights of the laity, we shall cite his own words from Letter 68, which, if the whole context is read, place in the clearest light the opinion we defend, defining the limits of the people's action. For he says that the people themselves most of all have the power either of choosing worthy priests or of refusing the unworthy. Which thing we also see descending from divine ordination—that a priest should be chosen before the assembled people, under the eyes of all, and that he should be approved as worthy and suitable by the public judgment and testimony —as the Lord prescribed to Moses in Numbers, saying: "Take Aaron your brother and Eleazar his son and place them on the mountain before all the synagogue, and strip Aaron of his vestments and put them on Eleazar his son." Was Eleazar elected by the people? By no means. To

what purpose, then, in Cyprian's mind, does this example of divine authority tend? Hear what follows: "God commands the priest to be constituted before all the synagogue—that is, he instructs and shows that the ordinations of priests ought not to take place except with the knowledge of the assembled people, so that with the people present, the crimes of the wicked may be exposed or the merits of the good praised, and that the ordination may be just and legitimate, having been examined by the vote and judgment of all." Then, after other examples drawn from Scripture, he concludes: "which thing was so diligently and carefully done with the whole people assembled, so that no one unworthy might steal into the ministry of the altar or the priestly rank." Election, therefore, in the proper sense is not attributed to the people, but insofar as it was a testimony to the fitness of the one to be elected. But if you ask by what right this practice was introduced, we respond by making a distinction: insofar as a worthy person is chosen by using a means by which the fitness of the candidate can be recognized, this is of natural and divine right; but insofar as the matter was conducted in this manner—that the election was made by the clergy with the people present, bearing testimony and even making requests—this was of ecclesiastical right, flowing from the authority of the Church, in whose power it therefore is to substitute other modes. Cf. what we shall say in Thesis XIV. Now these distinct functions of the people bearing testimony and the clergy electing must be understood to have held also in the election of the Roman bishop (Cyprian, Letter 52)—though by reason of the unity of the act that arose from many, the people too were said to elect (as in the *Liber Diurnus*, §§ 38, 60). In which election, however, there occurs this special feature: that the election is simple and no institution or conferral of power by men takes place, since God immediately confers the power of the Primacy on the one designated as the successor of Peter, as we shall see later.

From Protestant dogmatic prejudice, it is contended that by the word "Church" in the words of Christ (Matt. 18): "Tell it to the Church," the assembly of the faithful is meant. But the name of a society can per se refer both to those who preside over it and juridically represent it, and it is manifest that this is indicated in the words of Christ. For there is a connection—a causal connection—between those words and the

following: "Amen, amen I say to you: whatsoever you shall bind," and so on; insofar as the power given to the Apostles of binding and loosing is the reason why the faithful must hear them and be subject to them, if they wish to be numbered in the assembly of the faithful.

V. A recent writer who harks back to and amplifies the ancient errors, from the sect of those who have assumed a name from antiquity in order to simulate by name what they had lost in fact—Dr. Joseph Langen, in a work (*Das vatikanische Dogma von dem Universal-Episcopat und der Unfehlbarkeit des Papstes in seinem Verhältnis zum neuen Testament und der kirchlichen Überlieferung*, second edition, Bonn, 1876) in which he expressly attacks the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff—has also revived the heresy asserting that the power existing in the Church is per se in the hands of the community, whose deputy certain persons exercise it; and that even the laity, women excepted, share with others in the governance of the Christian society and in the teaching office. And why? Because: 1° Christ most clearly indicated that in the Church there is no preeminent or inferior place, but only more difficult or lighter obligations; that there is no master upon earth; and that the Church is constituted in a manner entirely contrary to political societies—so that no desire for domination ought to be present there: Matt. 20:23; 23:8. And certainly 2° Paul denies that he is commanding in 2 Cor. 8:7ff. Hence 3° the tribunal is the community itself, the Church: Matt. 18:15. And for this reason 4° the Apostle judges together with the community: 1 Cor. 5:3–4, 12. And 5° the community itself immediately and actively participates in the life or administration of the Church: Acts 6:1ff. Indeed 6° the decree of the apostolic council was promulgated in the name of the Apostles, the presbyters, and the laity; for this is the inscription which is read in certain codices and ancient versions: Acts 15:23: οἱ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοί. It is also established 7° that laymen fulfilled the function of teachers: Rom. 12:4ff.; 1 Cor. 12:1ff.; 1 Thess. 5:19; Jas. 3:1. The Apostle, however, excepts women alone from this ministry: 1 Cor. 14:34; 1 Tim. 2:11. Accordingly, by virtue of this real participation of the laity in the life of the Church, the whole Christian community is called by the Apostles Peter and John a priestly race, a royal priesthood. Therefore, if any power is exercised in the Church in the name of Christ, it belongs to the

whole community, and he who exercises it acts as the representative of the whole. (Op. cit., Pt. 1, § 5, where there is nothing new beyond singular rashness.)

You would indeed guess with difficulty what notion of the Church from the New Testament this Professor ordinary of New Testament Exegesis has formed in his mind. The authority of the Church is with the whole body, the ministers who exercise authority exercise it in the name of the whole body; you would therefore say that the ministers were deputed by the people to enjoy the exercise of power, with the supreme right of power and the right of choosing ministers remaining with the people. But this Doctor is not content with this; for he attributes the very exercise of power to the laity simultaneously with the Apostles and presbyters—and indeed to the laity alone, acting separately from others, if the Holy Spirit moves them, the exercise of the authority of teaching—if what is produced from Rom. 12:4ff.; 1 Cor. 12:4ff.; 14:34 proves anything. But this is not merely democracy; it is anarchy. This is indeed consistent with what he teaches in the same place: namely, that even if the Apostles were teachers with respect to the Gentiles, the Jews, and those not yet fully instructed in Christian doctrine, with respect to the perfectly educated faithful there was no longer any teacher; for all were brothers and therefore equals. Did Christ institute this Church? What then does the Apostle say when he states that God gave to the Church some apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers (Eph. 4:11), denying that all are teachers (1 Cor. 12:29), and asserting on the contrary (ibid.) that the body of the Church is constituted after the manner of an organic body, in which no function whatsoever suits all members, and that all the members cannot be equal? It is tedious to refute these fabrications, so contrary to reason, which are nonetheless put forward with great confidence as if no response had ever been given by Catholics to the arguments—that is, the sophisms—with which they are defended.

And indeed, they say, Christ in Matt. 20:23, 26, as also in Luke 21:23, 26, denies that there should be in the Church those who exercise power. Are all power and all exercise of power therefore denied? If so, why did Christ institute it, why did the Apostles use it—and indeed, as this Doctor would have it, even the laity exercised it? Or is not rather a

certain species of power and a certain exercise of power denied, such as the kings of the nations claimed for themselves—namely, domination or despotism, and the use of power for the benefit and advantage not of subjects but of rulers? This indeed must be held; for Christ makes mention not of kings simply, but of the kings of the nations, who dominated their subjects like slaves; and he denies the manner, not the thing itself (cf. what we shall say at the end of the following Thesis II in the following treatise); and he wills that those who will be greater shall be the ministers of others—that is, that they shall use their authority for the benefit of others. And indeed, why in that place does Christ, to teach the Apostles humility, say that they must not be like kings? Why does he bring kings into the discussion? This is certainly intelligible if true authority over others also belonged to the Apostles, which they were nonetheless to exercise in a different manner from kings; but if the opposite had been the case, how ineptly Christ would have mentioned the arrogance of kings in order to exhort private men to modesty! Indeed, the Apostles, who had received the promise of power to be conferred upon them by Christ, were comparing themselves to the princes of the world and were asking who among them was greater—not in virtue or holiness, but in power, who as it were would be king among them; and Christ, without denying the power he had promised, denies that it must be exercised by them as it is exercised by the kings of the nations, who conduct themselves toward their subjects as lords toward slaves—which was indeed the manner of the kings of the East and even of the Roman Emperors at that age—but teaches that it must be exercised as he himself shows by his own example.

Again, Christ commands his disciples not to be called teachers (magistri), because their one Teacher (Magister) is Christ. What follows from this? He commands the same in the same place: not to wish to call anyone their father on earth. Why, then, did Paul claim for himself the reality signified by this very name, when he says to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 4:13) that they have not many fathers, even if they have many pedagogues, because he himself had begotten them in Christ Jesus through the Gospel? Why does he there call Timothy his son, if he himself cannot be called father? That is to say: not the thing itself and the dignity of father and teacher, which is certainly subject to God the

Father and God the Teacher, but such appellations with arrogance, such as the Pharisees were ambitious of, as is noted in the same place—and without subordination to divine paternity and divine teaching authority —are rejected by Christ.

Moreover, from the fact that the Apostle sometimes says "I do not speak as commanding," it would follow that he lacked the power of commanding and of its independent exercise only when it is demonstrated that one who relies on independent authority cannot address subjects except in the imperative mode.

Furthermore, as to what the name "Church" in Matt. 18:15 is to be understood to mean, we have already taught. But in 1 Cor. 5:3–4, the Apostle certainly presents himself as the judge, and the Corinthians as gathered together with him in spirit; but it is one thing to be gathered, another to be gathered for the purpose of judging; for a public assembly of the people is also convened so that a solemn sentence may be pronounced and made known and that there may be one who executes it. But when in v. 12 of the same chapter, to prove that it does not concern him to judge those who are outside, he says: "Do you not judge those who are inside?," these words either refer to those in the Church at Corinth who had the authority of judging, or they are about secular judgments, which the following chapter also treats.

In the election of the deacons, it is clear enough that the people played the role of witnesses—which no one denies them. As for that reading from Acts 15:23, it is certainly permissible to read the text with the Vulgate and to omit "καὶ οἱ," just as Tischendorf, on the authority of codices of the highest quality, omits it in his edition of the New Testament. But even if that reading is accepted, what will you conclude from it? Namely, that the entire Church assembled in Jerusalem sends greetings to the brethren from the Gentiles, and that the following decree was issued with the agreement of all, even the faithful from the circumcision. But the inference is denied that the simple brethren acted authoritatively in issuing that decree; for when one action is performed by many, some of whom alone command by authority while others render due consent, the same action can be attributed to all with the appropriate distribution. The passages adduced from the Letter to the Romans 12 and 1 Cor. 12 tell against the Doctor Langen himself; for

they exhibit the Church as an organic body, whose individual members do not perform the same act. Why the same Doctor should wish to confuse the extraordinary charismatic gifts freely given with the teaching ministry institutionally established by Christ in the Church, let him see for himself. Finally, the appellation of a priestly race and royal priesthood applied to the totality of the faithful proves with equal force that each individual faithful is truly a priest and invested with power, as it would prove that all and each of the French are kings, because their totality is called the Kingdom of France.

VI. That Christ wished the power originally conferred by him to be successively propagated to others in perpetuity is clear first from the words of Christ in Matt. 28:20; and then simply from the permanence of the Church, which is demonstrated for several arguments on its own; and this permanence cannot exist without the power (§ II) instituted by Christ. Together with successive propagation, there is joined what may be called extensive propagation—by which those invested with power communicate to others a participation in the same, who together with those giving it may exercise it more or less perfectly, more or less subordinately. For with the Church expanded, the number of pastors and teachers had to be increased, and those had to pre-exist through whom, when the former had died, continuous succession could be maintained.

Now the propagation of sacred power in the Old Testament was accomplished through carnal generation, with a divinely established law from the beginning that fitting subjects for it would be those born from certain families who would exercise it. But now, "with the privilege of fathers and the order of families set aside, the Church receives as its rulers those whom the Holy Spirit has prepared" (St. Leo, Sermon III on his Nativity). With the way of carnal generation set aside, if power is to be propagated to others, it is necessary first that those who are to be incorporated into the group holding power be taken up by those who already belong to that group—through an act either of institution conferring authority, if inferior persons are concerned, or at least of election, if the supreme and full power is concerned, which God immediately confers upon individuals. This is proved both by the doctrine of Paul on the necessity of legitimate mission (Rom. 10:15),

and by the very nature of the power, which is so instituted that it belongs only to a certain group; for unless new persons are taken up by those who already hold power, power could be found apart from this group and against it—which would entirely subvert the institution of Christ. The primary witness of this economy is St. Clement, Letter to the Corinthians, nn. 42, 44. It is furthermore necessary that the ministers of this power be initiated by some sacred rite, if God willed that fitting subjects of the same power be constituted by a sacred rite. Now that Christ so willed is established by the entire Ecclesiastical Tradition, which always makes mention of a certain and determinate rite under the name of either ordination, or χειροθεσία, or χειροτονία, by which sacred ministers must be initiated. The witnesses of this are all the liturgical books, nearly all the synods; and for its antiquity it is enough to consult the Apostolic Canons in the *Apostolic Constitutions*, bk. 8, cc. 4ff. (the Apostolic Canons being cited without our wishing to affirm that they were written by the Apostles; we nevertheless consider that on account of the Church's subsequent constant manner of speaking, they were handed down to the Church—at least the first fifty—by the Apostles and especially by Peter; and indeed it must be held that certain laws determining divine law and disciplinary laws were enacted at the beginning of the Church; for without them such a society could not be rightly governed and administered. Now Christ enacted laws regarding things to be believed, confirmed the natural law, and instituted the hierarchy and sacraments; all the rest that would be needed for the right use of the sacraments, for keeping inferiors in due subordination to superiors, for fostering unity among all, and for setting forth the Christian life, he permitted or established to be determined by the ministry he instituted. The Apostles therefore had to enact some canons as occasion demanded, to the norm of which the governance of the Church would be required to conform. Since, therefore, canons exist which the Church attributes to the Apostles, why should we not think they proceeded from the Apostles? Cf. Nazianzus, Or. 14 *On the Love of the Poor*, citing words of Peter from the *Apostolic Constitutions*) and the Canons of the Council of Carthage of A.D. 398.

VII. Now by ecclesiastical usage, κλῆρος has been called the body of those who, devoted to sacred functions, are specially deputed for the

worship of God—after the manner in which the people of Israel was called κληρονομία of God, by which was signified the gratuitous election and the great good proceeding from God; for those who were the κληρονομία of God, for them God was the κλῆρος—lot, portion, inheritance. Hence the adjective κληρικός, one who pertains to the clergy. Jerome gives the reason for this appellation in Letter 32 to Nepotianus, n. 5: "Let the cleric first explain his own name, and having put forward the definition of his name, let him strive to be what he is called. For since κλῆρος in Greek, sors in Latin, they are called clergy either because they are of the Lord's lot, or because the Lord is their lot —that is, their portion and inheritance."

By a most ancient custom, the beginning of which is not on record, under the name of clerics in the Church come those who are dedicated to the sacred ministries (Bellarmine, *De Clericis*, bk. I, c. 1); and these are distinguished from the λαϊκοί (in 1 Cor. 14:16, Paul said ἰδιώτην for λαϊκόν). Cf. Apostolic Canons 14 and 15, *Apostolic Constitutions*, bk. 2, c. 26; Nicene Canons 1, 2, 3, 8, 17, 18, 19. Cornelius, the Roman Pontiff, in a letter to Fabius (Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 6, c. 43), makes mention of the communion of the laity granted to a penitent bishop. Clement of Rome, *First Letter to the Corinthians*, n. 40, opposes the λαϊκούς to the Priests and Levites. Tertullian, *De Monogamia*, c. 12: "When we rise up and are inflamed against the clergy, then we are all one, then we are all priests; because he has made us priests to God and the Father (for to this testimony we appeal). But when we are pressed to equal ourselves to the priestly discipline, we put down our garlands and we are unequal."

It is therefore clear that a distinction exists between clerics and laity, and that they constitute two distinct orders in the Church. If the Church is called a royal priesthood (1 Pet. 2:9) and the faithful are called priests (Rev. 5:10), this is said analogically in the sense in which the people of Israel were likewise honored with these titles (Exod. 19:6). For the Church is a royal and holy Priesthood because it is a kingdom governed by priests and ordered to the exhibiting of divine worship in a special way through hierarchical acts. In this sense, even simple faithful, insofar as they are part of this kingdom, can in some sense be called priests—although the words of the Apocalypse do not seem to apply to

all the faithful. The distinction which Paul denies among the faithful in Gal. 3:28 refers to the sanctifying gifts ordained to salvation.

Regarding the distinction between clerics and laity, two questions can be raised: 1° whether it is of divine right; 2° whether it is through some intrinsic form divinely impressed and immutable, such that one who is a cleric can never become a layman. The solution of the first question is to be sought from what has been demonstrated. For clerics are those who more or less enjoy sacred power in the Church; since, therefore, by Christ's institution and therefore by divine right, certain persons are endowed with sacred power who are continued in perpetual succession, and these alone, it is clear that they are by divine right distinct and set apart from the laity, to whom no sacred power belongs. The second question, to avoid its being too indefinite, is to be taken about those clerics who are such not by ecclesiastical institution alone, but by divine right, and who are by divine right the fitting subject capable of the power of jurisdiction. Now with the question thus circumscribed, the answer must be affirmative—without, however, this affirmation needing to be taken exclusively. The reason for the answer is that such clerics are deputed and consecrated to the divine ministries by a sacred rite in such a way that this consecration is indelible and always remains. This must now be briefly demonstrated in what follows.

These must be prefaced with the distinction of the twofold power of holy orders and of jurisdiction. The power of holy orders is a supernatural force conferred through a sacred rite for producing certain sacraments in the manner of a physical cause. In the manner, I say, of a physical cause; for it acts as a physical cause which, when applied to a fitting subject, produces its effect without being able to be impeded by any extrinsic finite will. The power of jurisdiction is a moral power—that is, the right of directing coercively the acts of subjects; it is therefore the power of enacting laws, judging the acts of subjects, and coercing them with penalties—namely, legislative, judicial, and coercive power. Both powers belong to the ministry instituted by Christ, and both are to be treated; for each is essential to the Church insofar as it is a society. And the power of holy orders is to be treated first, through which men are by divine right rendered capable of the power of jurisdiction.

§ XIII

The rite of the imposition of hands, by which men are admitted to the hierarchical order under the authority of Christ, is a sacrament in the proper sense of the term and imprints a character.

I. Order is the fitting arrangement, according to some principle, of a number of things, whether equal or unequal (Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 19, ch. 13, compared with bk. 2 of *De Ordine*). Hence the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which has several diverse grades cohering with one another, has been called an order, and in comparison with the simple faithful has been termed the ecclesiastical order. Likewise, each one of these grades has been called an order—thus the order of bishops, of presbyters, of deacons—which manner of speaking is very frequent in ecclesiastical monuments. Hence, by a transfer of the name from effect to cause, order has been called by theologians that rite by which someone is established in some order, which is more clearly called ordination. Hierarchy—ἱερῶν ἀρχή—is the principality of sacred things (as Petavius gathers in *De Angelis*, bk. II, ch. 2, from Dionysius and Maximus): it is the power and function of governing sacred things, which power also has regard to those who are to be perfected through the administration of sacred things. A hierarchy can be at once manifold and one under different respects, if there are several sacred powers yet all subordinated to one, which moreover contains the rest within itself. That there is a certain sacred principality in the Church is sufficiently established from the preceding section, and will now be made more manifest once its essence has been declared, taking our starting-point from the manner in which men are admitted into the hierarchy.

II. Χειροθεσία is the imposition of one hand or of hands. Χειροτονία is primarily the extension of one hand or of hands, which can be done either by raising, as in the casting of votes, which was the custom among the Athenians (cf. Carlo Sigonio, *De Republica Atheniensium*, bk. 2), whence this term spread also to sacred elections in the Church; or it can be done by stretching out over something. This latter meaning is understood when χειροτονία is taken in place of

χειροθεσία. Luke mentions this in Acts 6:6 and 13:3, and Paul in 1 Tim. 4:14, 5:22, and 2 Tim. 1:6; the phrase τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιθεῖναι occurs there, whence the same act is also called τῶν χειρῶν ἐπίθεσις, and the same word and phrase appear frequently in ecclesiastical monuments. Likewise χειροτονία occurs in numerous ecclesiastical monuments and in all Greek ritual books or sacramentaries, for that which the Latins call ordination is named thus among them, and among them, within the rites of ordination, the terminus used is imposition of hands, of which the cited canons of Carthage speak. It must be noted that the imposition of hands—τῶν χειρῶν ἐπίθεσις, etc.—was of many kinds in the Church; that which is employed for the ordination of sacred ministers, however, is easily distinguished. We do not therefore wish to assert that wherever χειροτονία occurs in Christian monuments it is to be taken as imposition of hands, for it also retains at times its original sense of the raising of the hand, or rather of a vote cast in an election; the fifth canon of Laodicea seems to be understood in this way. But in the fourth canon of Nicaea, if it does not signify the ordaining imposition of hands, it must signify the vote—not of those requesting but of those determining by authority—by which someone is constituted a bishop, that is, καταστάσιν. As for the text of Acts 13:3, cf. what we have disputed in our commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, ch. 1, v. 1. Cf. also 2 Cor. 8:19. Consult, if you are able, the *Thesaurus* of Suicer at this word.

Since therefore among the pagans magistrates were created by election alone, χειροτονία among them signified election only; but because ecclesiastical ministers are not made by election alone but are constituted by a sacred rite and consecration, hence by ecclesiastical usage χειροτονία acquired the meaning of this rite as well, and most frequently means consecration—καθιέρωσις, τελεσιουργία.

Now it is certain that the rite constantly employed for initiating or consecrating priests and sacred ministers, or for admitting men into the hierarchical order, is χειροτονία, that is χειροθεσία, or the imposition of hands together with a certain fixed verbal formula. Witnesses to this continuous practice are the Apostolic Canons, the Constitutions of Clement, the cited canons of Carthage, Dionysius on *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, all Greek and Latin ritual books, and the Syrians and other distant sects down to our own times. We omit for now the question of

whether this was the only rite formerly employed and whether it alone was always held to be necessary; it suffices for the present that it was always and by all employed. From this its apostolic origin is manifest. That this rite is employed under the authority of Christ (whether specifically or at least generically) will be clear from the fact that it is demonstrated to be a sacrament.

III. The demonstration is drawn from the Scriptures and is completed by the testimony of Tradition. The testimonies from the Scriptures are 1 Tim. 4:14 and 2 Tim. 1:6–7. Now a sacrament is a sensible rite efficacious of interior sanctifying grace. There is no need to add that it must be such by divine institution, for this is evidently clear if the efficacy of grace is certain; since that can only be from divine institution. But in these testimonies a sensible rite efficacious of interior grace is presented—a rite which is that by which men are constituted in the hierarchical order: therefore. The minor premise is proved as follows. That the rite is sensible is clear, for it is the imposition of hands, which, although employed for many reasons in the Old Testament and employed also in the New Testament, is not thereby prevented from being used also for the consecration of those in the hierarchy; for it is determined by the form, and although it is not an element—that is, some kind of matter—but an action, it is nonetheless a sensible rite. Its efficacy for producing sanctifying grace is gathered from these passages: a) there is signified a grace that is by its nature permanent, for we are taught this by the words "which is in you," even though it was given of old (2 Tim. 1:6), and by the fact that it can be neglected long after it was given (1 Tim. 4:14), and by the fact that this grace is to be stirred up, especially having regard to the force of the word ἀναζωπυρεῖν. b) There is signified a grace of virtue, love, and sobriety; for these words in v. 7 are connected as an exegesis with the words of the preceding verse; now such a permanent grace is sanctifying grace. From which it is also clear that the Protestants are wrong to contend that the passage deals only with gratuitously given grace or the grace of some office, on the grounds that Paul calls it χάρισμα and not χάρις; for 1) the character, which is a gratuitously given grace, can be signified—for it is a sacramental effect —yet nevertheless 2) the spirit of virtue, love, and sobriety—σωφρονισμοῦ, that is, of discipline and prudence—is not gratuitously

given grace nor merely the grace of an office, but is sanctifying grace together with special actual graces given on account of the office, with which a certain spiritual power can also cohere; and χάρισμα also signifies sanctifying grace in Rom. 5:15 and 1 Cor. 12:31—cf. the *Thesaurus* of Suicer at this word. c) Moreover, this grace is presented as the immediate effect of the external rite, in the same way that the efficacy of the rite of baptism is signified elsewhere: "which is in you through the imposition of my hands" (2 Tim. 1:6); "which was given to you with the imposition of my hands" (1 Tim. 4:14). The prophecy mentioned in 1 Tim. 4:14 can only be some condition that preceded and that determined Paul to impose hands on Timothy. Cf. 1 Tim. 1:18. Finally, this rite is that by which the Apostle admitted Timothy into the hierarchical order—Timothy who was certainly a bishop. Indeed, let both contexts of the testimonies we cited be considered. In 2 Tim. 1:6 ff., the grace said to be in Timothy through the imposition of hands is to be stirred up so that he not be ashamed of the testimony of the Lord, but labor together with the gospel according to the power of God; this furthermore is the proper work of a bishop: therefore, by that imposition of hands the grace of the episcopate was conferred. Likewise in 1 Tim. 4:11 ff., Timothy is considered by the Apostle formally as a bishop. "Command these things and teach," he says, which is proper to a bishop. "Let no one despise your youth"; there is indeed no reason why a simple faithful person should be despised on account of youth, but it can happen that one who presides over others, if young, may be held in contempt. "But be an example to the faithful in word, in conduct, in charity, in faith, in chastity. Until I come, attend to reading, to exhortation, to teaching"—all of which pertain to the bishop. "Do not neglect the grace" etc. "Attend to yourself and to doctrine. For in doing this you will save both yourself and those who hear you." Timothy had disciples, you see, and was a teacher of saving doctrine. Now all these things present to us not a common faithful person but one who presides over them with authority and teaching office and who was called a bishop. Since, therefore, in this context the Apostle exhorts Timothy not to neglect the grace that is in him with the imposition of hands of the presbyterate—so that he may duly execute his office as is fitting—it is

clear that the imposition of hands was that by which the grace of the episcopate was conferred on him.

It must moreover be noted that what Paul in one place calls "the imposition of my hands" he calls in another "the imposition of hands of the presbyterate." Now πρεσβυτέριον either signifies the honor and dignity of a presbyter, or an assembly or gathering of presbyters. If the former: then that imposition of hands had in view the admitting of Timothy into the order of presbyters (in which bishops also were comprised), that is, into the hierarchical order. If the latter: this imposition of hands—both of Paul and of the other presbyters together—as productive of interior grace cannot be conceived as anything other than that of which mention is made throughout the whole tradition. Now there it is prescribed either that a bishop be ordained by two or three bishops holding their hands over him (Apostolic Canon 1 and Carthage 2), or that a presbyter be ordained by the bishop holding his hand over him together with the other presbyters (Canon of Carthage 3). Nor, if we look at the matter historically, have multiple imposers of hands ever by themselves been required for any effect other than ordination. This, therefore, is the imposition of hands of which Paul speaks. And indeed that the passages cited speak of the ordaining imposition of hands is attested by the unanimous consensus of the Fathers: hence Chrysostom on 1 Tim. 4:14 says: "He does not speak here of presbyters, but of bishops; for presbyters would not ordain a bishop." Therefore. Cf. the Council of Trent, Session 23, ch. 3.

IV. What is demonstrated by the authority of the Scriptures is established more evidently still by the testimony of Tradition. For it is certain: 1° that sacred ordination has always been counted among the seven sacraments of the New Law, witnesses to which ancient and universal tradition are the ritual books not only of Catholics but also of those sects that broke from the Catholic Church in the fifth century. Cf. the work of Morin, *De Sacris Ordinationibus*. It is established 2° that in the controversies with heretics concerning sacramental matters in the fourth and fifth centuries, it was assumed by the Fathers as known to all that ordination is a sacrament; for Augustine disputes thus in the name of all against the Donatists (*De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, bk. I, n. 2): "For the sacrament of baptism is that which the person baptized has,

and the sacrament of conferring baptism is that which the person ordained has. And just as one who has been baptized does not lose the sacrament of baptism if he departs from unity, so too one who has been ordained does not lose the sacrament of conferring baptism if he departs from unity; for no injury is to be done to any sacrament... Just as those who return, having been baptized before they departed, are not rebaptized, so those who return, having been ordained before they departed, are certainly not reordained; but they either minister, if the utility of the Church so demands, or if they do not minister, they nonetheless bear the sacrament of their ordination, and therefore hands are not imposed on them among the laity." Conformable to this is the disputation of Jerome against the Luciferians, whose argumentatio ad hominem comes to this: if the layman baptized among heretics is received, then also the bishop ordained among heretics, or who was a heretic, is to be received. "If the one who baptized could not harm the baptized in his own faith (that is, in the communion of the baptizer), neither did the one who ordained defile the priest constituted in his own faith" (n. 11). It is established 3°—and this is already contained in what has been said—that it was believed that men are sanctified through the blessing of ordination: Innocent I places this as a certain fixed point in his letter to Rufus, n. 8; that the Holy Spirit is given through ordination such that the soul is transformed for the better by his grace (Nyssenus, *Oratio in Baptismo Christi*), and is nourished with the charity of the Father, enriched with the habit and virtue of the priesthood (Dionysius, *Hierarchia Ecclesiastica*, ch. 5), and receives grace to preside over the Church and the spirit of virtue and charity (Chrysostom on 2 Tim., hom. 1), and that through the imposition of hands the Spirit is given, who comes upon men like fire as he came upon the Apostles, and an ineffable power dwells in the man (St. Ephrem, *De Sacerdotio*). The same is proved by the consensus of both sides in the Donatist controversy: that, namely, the Holy Spirit is given through ordination—whence the Donatists denied that orders could be conferred outside the Church and therefore disapproved of the ordination of Caecilian.

V. Now, the sacrament of ordination imprints a character. The Catholic doctrine on the character of certain sacraments—which is a

certain permanent consecration distinct from sanctifying grace, and which can therefore be received even by those who do not receive the sanctifying Spirit—this Catholic doctrine, I say, was explained in the fifth century in the Donatist controversy and was declared and defended by Augustine in the name, as it were, of the whole Church. That in that controversy ancient tradition was being defended is clear from the fact that Augustine's doctrine is no more than a more distinct explanation—and was always regarded as such—of the doctrine affirming, on the one hand, that certain sacraments can be conferred even outside the unity of the Church and therefore without infusion of charity, and, on the other hand, denying that these same sacraments can be repeated; which doctrine was more common even in the age of Cyprian and afterwards, toward the end of the fourth century, became common among Catholics, all doubt being removed.

Now, concerning the sacrament of ordination, Augustine affirms the following as settled and fixed in the minds of all: that it remains in those who afterward become heretics, schismatics, or impious; that it is validly exercised by the same and conferred on others; and therefore that it cannot be repeated in those who, having been ordained in the Catholic Church, have afterward defected from it, nor in those who were ordained by such defectors—and this not merely because such repetition would be illicit on account of its being prohibited, but for a reason drawn from the nature of the thing, because the sacrament remains, which is given by a certain consecration. This consecration, proceeding from the power of the sacrament itself, belongs to divine law. "For both (baptism and ordination) are a sacrament, and both are given to a man with a certain consecration—the former when he is baptized, the latter when he is ordained; and therefore in the Catholic Church neither may be repeated" (*Contra Epistolam Parmeniani*, bk. 2, n. 28). Hence those who were ordained in the Catholic Church, if after a schism they returned to her, "were not reordained; but just as baptism remained in them, so too ordination remained intact; because the fault was in the separation, which was corrected by the peace of unity, not in the sacraments, which are the same wherever they are" (ibid.). And as regards those who received the sacrament of ordination outside the unity of the Church, Augustine likewise teaches that "just as what was

held outside is not given back to one who returns, so what was received even outside need not be repeated when one comes back" (ibid., n. 30). There remains, that is, a certain supernatural and sacred power, which is conferred by the Holy Spirit by virtue of ordination independently of the holiness of the minister and of the recipient, a permanent reality which is therefore different from that which remains after matrimony has been contracted. For in matrimony what remains is a bond—that is, a mutual right and mutual obligation, which originate of themselves from the contract and are ordered to an act that is by nature natural; whereas as regards the sacrament of ordination, what remains is a power divinely instilled by the Holy Spirit—by nature supernatural—for confecting certain sacraments, such as confirming, consecrating, ordaining, etc., which Augustine calls the right of conferring the sacrament: "for no reason is shown," he says, "why he who cannot lose baptism itself can lose the right of conferring it" (ibid., n. 28). So St. Thomas in the commentary on the *Sentences*, bk. 4, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3: "The character of the priestly order is nothing other than the power of exercising that to which the order of the priesthood is principally ordered." But a consecration by which—even apart from sanctifying grace—a supernatural power of confecting sacraments is instilled by the Holy Spirit through the sacrament itself, which power is likewise permanent by virtue of that same sacrament and therefore prevents the sacrament from being repeated, is a character: therefore.

We therefore do not prove the impression of the character from the mere fact that ordination cannot be repeated; for generally, what is given by a certain consecration—even if it be of ecclesiastical institution—is not repeated, such as the consecrations of altars, temples, virgins, abbots. But we prove it from the fact that ordination is a consecration of such a kind that by it a supernatural power is conferred, a power that belongs to divine law inasmuch as it is ordered to the confecting of sacraments—which can only come from God alone—and a power that is permanent by divine law; for it is permanent by the very fact that it was conferred by virtue of the sacrament of ordination, such that the sacrament itself would be wronged if it were repeated (cf. the words of Augustine cited in the preceding section). For such a consecration is a

character in the proper sense. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 63, a. 2.

Hence the Church's practice of receiving those coming from heresy or schism—whether previously ordained by themselves or ordained there—with the due manner granted to them of exercising orders, without any repetition of the sacrament, and indeed with such repetition disapproved and forbidden. Witnesses to this perennial practice and doctrine are the judgment of Miltiades in the case of Donatus (Optatus, bk. 1, n. 24), the Nicene Synod, ch. 8 (the sense of the Nicene canon in the Greek text we possess is this: concerning those who call themselves Cathari, if they come to the Catholic Church, it has pleased the holy and great Synod that they remain in the clergy just as having received the imposition of hands—ὥστε χειροθετουμένους αὐτοὺς οὕτω μενεῖν ἐν τῷ κλήρῳ. For the question was not whether the ordination of the Novatians was to be approved as valid, but, that being presupposed, whether those ordained among them, when they returned, were to be received with the same honor, namely to sacerdotal communion. For heretical bishops, when they returned, were generally received indeed but to lay communion or to the communion of an inferior order. But the Nicene Fathers decreed that milder treatment be extended to the Novatians, just as was later decreed by Athanasius at the Synod of Alexandria for Arian bishops who had not been leaders of the heretics, and at the seventh ecumenical council, Act 1, for other heretical bishops. Such a Nicene decree evidently presupposes that ordination received in schism is valid; for it does not prescribe reordination, but commands that they remain in the clergy as already ordained. Cf. also canon 19. The Latin translation of that canon found in Innocent I's decretal letter to Rufus, n. 10, reads thus: it has pleased that, having received the imposition of hands, they remain in the clergy. But there is no real opposition. For this imposition of hands of which Innocent speaks is not sacramental but reconciliatory, which was employed for those returning to unity. Nor let a difficulty be drawn from the fact that through such an imposition of hands the Holy Spirit was said to be received, as St. Leo says in letter 85: "But if it is established that someone was baptized by heretics, by no means let the sacrament of regeneration be repeated with regard to him, but only let

that which was lacking there be conferred, and through the imposition of the bishop's hand let him receive the power of the Holy Spirit." From these words one might perhaps suspect that the sacrament of confirmation or its character was not at that time acknowledged by Catholics as present among heretics, and that the doctrine of the character asserted equally for three sacraments would thus be uncertain. But St. Leo speaks of the imposition of one hand only, not hands, which is reconciliatory, and his meaning comes to this: in heresy baptism can indeed be received, but is not received profitably—that is, it is received without grace; this grace of the sacrament is then conferred on them when they return to unity; because therefore they were joined to the unity of the Church by the imposition of the bishop's hand, they were then said to receive the Holy Spirit. This interpretation is supplied by Augustine, bk. 3 of *De Baptismo*, ch. 16: what is said to be given by the Holy Spirit in the Catholic Church alone through the imposition of hands—"our Fathers wished this to be understood as that of which the Apostle speaks: 'because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us'... For those who do not love the unity of the Church do not have the charity of God. And therefore it is rightly understood to be said that the Holy Spirit is not received except in the Catholic Church." Cf. the note of the brothers Ballerini on letter 159 of Leo, ch. 7. For this reason, it was wrong for Cyprian in his letter to Magnus to draw an argument from this custom of the Church, as though his adversaries held that the sacrament of confirmation was to be repeated. Cf. the Dissertation of Natalis Alexander on the sacrament of confirmation. Cf. the words of Justin in his Reply 14 to the Orthodox.), the Synod of Alexandria under Athanasius on the reception of the lapsed, the Synod of Capua in the case of Bonosus, Innocent I, letter 17 to Rufus, nn. 9, 10 ff. and letter 16 to Marcianus, Anastasius II in the Acacian case, letter 1 to the Emperor Anastasius, nn. 7, 8, and Gregory the Great, bk. 2, letter 32. In these testimonies what is chiefly to be noted is that the comparison is established, usually explicitly and therefore also to be understood where implicit, between baptism and ordination—namely, that neither sacrament may on the same grounds be repeated. The same is proved by the policy employed by the Roman Church with the Churches of the

East when unity was restored, regarding which cf. Morin, *De Sacris Ordinationibus*, pt. I; and finally by the definition of Eugene IV in the *Instructio pro Armenis* and by Trent, Session VII, ch. 9, in which the reason for not repeating is drawn from the character.

As for the controversies that arose from time to time concerning certain illegitimate ordinations, regarding which it was said that those thus ordained could receive nothing because their ordainers had nothing to give, it is enough to note that the mind of the Church is to be sought not from the statements of this or that individual writer, but from the common and constant practice and from the opinions of authentic witnesses and doctors who explain that practice. Although, therefore, there were some who, even in subsequent ages, seem to have doubted or, carried away by the heat of controversy, denied the validity of ordinations among heretics—such as Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida in his bk. 1 *Adversus Simoniacos* in the eleventh century (Migne, *PL*, vol. 143)—the Church always countered them by her practice, nor offered any other reason for that practice than faith in the character. Thus Peter Damian defends the truth in his book titled *Gratissimus*, arguing that just as baptism, given by anyone, is valid provided it be rightly administered, so too ordination, because just as there Christ is the one who baptizes, so here it is Christ who consecrates. He nevertheless testifies that in his own day certain bishops had reordained those ordained by simoniacs (in the preface), and also that the Roman Pontiff asked the bishops to pray to God for light on what was to be decided in this troublesome matter (namely, regarding those ordained by simoniacs) (ibid.). But he does not say—at least not clearly—that the Pope doubted the validity of the ordination itself.

Indeed, in the same eleventh century, Bernard the priest, who had investigated more deeply the tradition of the Fathers and the mind of the Church, in his work *De Sacramentis Excommunicatorum* (Migne, *PL*, vol. 148, p. 1061), having compared the opinions of the Fathers, concluded that the holy Fathers commonly tell us: "outside the Church sacraments neither exist nor come to be effectively, that is, with benefit to the soul; yet we do not deny that those same sacraments exist and come to be there, though unprofitably—indeed, perniciously. For if they entirely denied that sacraments existed or came to be outside the

Church, they would by no means ratify those same sacraments in the reconciled." In this sense Nicholas II, in the same century, among the decrees attributed to him (Mansi, *Collectio Conciliorum*, vol. 19, p. 875), in decree 9 prescribes that those knowingly ordained by simoniacs should know that they have not been ordained. They lack, that is, honor and right; just as decree 3 in the same place declares that married presbyters who refuse to put away their wives are to lose the Church together with their orders. Accordingly that manner of speaking which was also employed in antiquity—and by those very persons who did not repeat ordinations received outside the Church—aimed at denying to men thus ordained the honor of the priesthood (Innocent I, in his decretal letter to Rufus, n. 7: "On the contrary, it is asserted that he who has lost honor cannot give honor, nor has the other received anything, because there was nothing in the giver that the other could receive. We agree, and it is true. Certainly because what he did not have he could not give, he gave the damnation which he had through a wicked imposition of hands; but how one who has been made a sharer in damnation is to receive honor we cannot discover") and at denying them the acquired right to exercise orders and to govern the Christian people, and that same right was denied to them when they returned to the Catholic Church unless certain conditions were met, as Innocent I himself determined—conditions under which they would be received to the honor of the priesthood without any repetition of the sacrament. Nor is Morin to be heeded on this matter, in his cited work, pt. 3, exercise 5. Cf. Tournely, *De Sacramento Ordinis*, q. 6.

That the rite of ordination is not to be repeated can be supported by the authority of the Scriptures from the fact that the Apostle exhorts the bishop to stir up by his works the grace which he has obtained, and does not propose a repetition of the same rite.

Thus ordination is ordered 1° to consecrate a man intrinsically to God by that consecration whereby he permanently exists as fit and capable of performing certain sacred and sacramental actions, and 2° to increase, through sanctifying grace and appropriate actual aids, the one consecrated if he is rightly disposed. Hence the Scholastics defined order as a certain sign (an external sign) of the Church by which spiritual power is transmitted to the one ordained. Cf. St. Thomas,

Supplement, q. XXXIV, a. 2. Rightly does the Doctor Eximius in his *De Sacramentis*, d. 11, sect. 1, note that the primary effect of ordination—the one first intended—is the character; for ordination of itself is ordered precisely to constituting ministers of sacred things and priests; whereas grace is conferred so that the ministry may be duly exercised. St. Thomas teaches the same thing explicitly in his commentary on the *Sentences*, bk. 4, d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, ql. 2.

§ XIV

Now it is certain from Christian tradition that there are by divine law two orders, those of bishops and of presbyters, and that the former are by divine law superior to the latter; and moreover that the sacred rite by which a bishop is initiated is a sacrament distinct from that by which a presbyter is initiated.

I. The distinction of the two orders, which the whole tradition evidently attests, seems to be obstructed by the manner of speaking in the New Testament, according to which the same persons appear to be both bishops and presbyters—as both Jerome (in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus, ch. 1, and in letter 146 to Evangelus—Petavius and others read "to Evagrius") and Chrysostom (on the Epistle to the Philippians, ch. 1) observed. On this matter the following points are to be held. In the New Testament no mention is ever made of the sacred ministers of the New Law under the name of priests; for at that time ἱερεῖς were by current usage understood to mean priests of the Old Law; mention is nonetheless made of sacrifice in 1 Cor. 10:16–21 compared with 11:23 and Heb. 13:10. By the name of priest in the earliest centuries of the Church the bishop was principally understood.

In the New Testament the names bishop, presbyter, presbyterate, and deacon occur. A bishop (from profane usage: overseer with jurisdiction—cf. Petavius, *De Hierarchia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 2, ch. 5) is in the New Testament one who presides, who governs the Church, who imposes hands, who judges presbyters, who guards the deposit of faith (Tit. 1:5; 1 Tim. 5:1, 7, 19, 22; 6:20; 2 Tim. 2:2; 4:2; Acts 20:28). Under the name of presbyters come also those who were bishops (Tit. 1:5; Acts 20:17–28; 1 Pet. 5:1, 2). But also those who are subject to the bishop

come under this name. For in 1 Tim. 5:19, the Apostle commands Timothy not to receive an accusation against a presbyter except under two or three witnesses; the bishop, therefore, judged those presbyters.

Presbyter is a name of dignity and office, as is clear from the passages cited; and it stands in the same relation as זָקֵן in the Old Testament (Exod. 3:16; 4:29; Deut. 19:12; 21:3, 6; 22:15–18). Whether it is always a name of dignity may be doubted from 1 Tim. 5:1.

The presbyterate is in itself an assembly of presbyters, and also of bishops if those called presbyters are bishops. Cf. the letter of Cornelius, Roman Pontiff, to Fabius of Antioch, in Eusebius (*Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 6, ch. 43).

Since it is established that in the New Testament the same persons are called—though not always—both bishops and presbyters at the same time (though it is not established that one who was only a priest of the second order, whom we now call a presbyter, was called a bishop), the question debated among scholars is whether these two names in the New Testament signify two dignities and two differing offices that coincide only materially on account of the same subject, or whether they signify the same thing formally, so that all distinction lies in the names. This latter position can be affirmed in two ways. One may say that the name presbyter was first employed generically to designate any sacerdotal office with jurisdiction, and afterward became in the Church a specific name for a certain order. Or one may say that the name presbyter has in the New Testament exactly the same specific meaning which it now carries. If you say the former, you may affirm that in the New Testament the name presbyter designates the same thing as bishop, without being thereby permitted to conclude that the presbyterate and the episcopate are the same order; but if you say the latter, you assert at the same time that there was one sole sacerdotal order.

St. Epiphanius (*Haereses*, 85) held that presbyters and bishops in the books of the New Testament are different persons endowed with different dignity; the Apostles, that is, established bishops and deacons in one city, presbyters only and deacons in another, according as they found suitable candidates and as need required. The explanation of Theodoret on 1 Tim. 3 is self-contradictory. Jerome (in the above-cited place) contends that the presbyters and bishops in Tit. 1:5 and Acts

20:17–28 are the same persons, having in view, however, the governance of the Church, which he believes was then conducted in common by several, and not having in view the power of each; for he ascribes to bishops the power of ordaining, which he denies to presbyters. Chrysostom, in hom. 1 on the Epistle to the Philippians, maintains that presbyters and bishops were names for the same order, and indeed for the second order, since there were several in a single city. But in hom. 11 on 1 Tim., giving the reason why Paul passes from bishops to deacons, omitting presbyters, he says this was done because bishops and presbyters are separated by a small difference, namely the power of ordaining, which belongs to bishops alone.

The opinion of Petavius (*Dissertationes Ecclesiasticae*, bk. 1, ch. 2) is that those called presbyters in the New Testament were also bishops, that is, priests of the first order, on the grounds that there were then several ordained bishops in one church, who were ready to evangelize other peoples and were at hand for the Apostles, who would send them wherever necessary. This explanation rests on the hypothesis that the bishops called from Ephesus and those to whom the Epistle to the Philippians is addressed are all bishops of one and the same city. But that is at least uncertain, and the opinion of Irenaeus, bk. 3, ch. 14—that they were bishops of neighboring cities—is more probable as regards the passage from Acts; cf. the same Petavius, *Hierarchia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 2.

More probable in our view is that interpretation which holds that the name presbyter was formerly employed both in a generic sense and at times in a specific sense, when set in opposition to a bishop; and that the reason why presbyters taken specifically are sometimes not mentioned, when bishop and deacon are mentioned, is either that only bishops existed, as in the Epistle to the Philippians, or that the presbyter is included in the bishop and the same precepts nearly apply to both (1 Tim. 3:2 ff.). Besides, this interpretation presupposes the testimony of tradition, from which the two orders of the priesthood can certainly be gathered; for from the Scriptures alone nothing can be certainly defined on this matter.

The deacon—to speak of him now as well—is also among profane writers a minister, and in ecclesiastical writers the word occurs in two

senses: a broader one, which denotes a minister of the word and of the New Testament (Eph. 3:7; 2 Cor. 3:6), and a narrower one, which denotes a certain other order distinct from the presbyter and bishop (1 Tim. 3:8 compared with Tit. 1:5).

II. Now, that there are two formally distinct orders of the priesthood (even though they can coexist in the same subject and thus be materially identical) is evident from Christian tradition. For the distinction of the episcopate from the presbyterate is clear from the fact that a) in the enumeration of the grades of ministers, bishops are distinguished from presbyters: cf. all the letters of St. Ignatius, who, for example, says to the Trallians, n. 2: "it is necessary that you do nothing without the bishop; but also be subject to the presbyterate; let all likewise reverence the deacons." Cf. Dionysius the Areopagite, *Hierarchia Ecclesiastica*, ch. 5, the Apostolic Canons, the canons of the Fourth Council of Carthage, Jerome on Micah, ch. 7. b) That one bishop has always from the apostolic age presided in individual churches having several presbyters is established from the same letters of Ignatius, from the letter of Cornelius to Fabius (*Historia Ecclesiastica* of Eusebius, bk. 6, ch. 43), and from the ancient catalogues of bishops left us by Irenaeus (*Adversus Haereses*, bk. 3, ch. 3), Optatus (bk. 2, n. 3), Eusebius —who describes accurately the successions of the principal sees—and Epiphanius, who in *Haereses*, 27, n. 6 gives the reason why he describes the catalogue of Roman bishops, namely because thereby truth is shown perpetually and with certainty and accuracy; and from the testimony of Augustine in letter 53, and from the testimony of Tertullian, who appeals to these catalogues in *De Praescriptionibus*, ch. 20 (read concerning this the work of Petavius, *De Hierarchia Ecclesiastica*), and from the manifest doctrine of Cyprian in his book *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, which unity is indeed obtained through the subordination of all the presbyters too to one bishop. c) That consequently the bishop presided over the presbyters and that the κῦρος of the Church was his, is clear again from Ignatius, who in his letters labors especially to teach this— for example, to the Smyrnaeans, n. 8: "all follow the bishop; let no one do anything pertaining to the Church apart from the bishop; let that Eucharist be held valid which is under the bishop or to whomever he has given leave. It is not lawful to baptize or to celebrate an agape apart

from the bishop... whoever acts secretly against the bishop renders service to the devil"—and the same is clear from the Apostolic Canons, nn. 12, 24, 31, 32, 34, the letter of the Roman clergy to Cyprian on the lapsed, and the other passages just cited. d) That a different power belonged to bishops and presbyters: for the right and power of ordaining has always been asserted for bishops alone, as is clear from the Apostolic, Nicene, and Carthaginian canons, and from Jerome, letter 146 to Evangelus, from Epiphanius, *Haereses* 75, from Chrysostom on 1 Tim., hom. 11, n. 1, and finally from the proscription of the heresy of Aerius; whence also simple chorepiscopi were never acknowledged to have the power of ordaining, as Leo III responded, following the opinion of his predecessors, to the bishops of Gaul (cf. Mansi, *Collectio Conciliorum*, vol. 13, p. 1039). Hence priests of the first order and priests of the second order were distinguished (Optatus, bk. 1, ch. 13; Leo the Great, *Sermo* 10 in Quadragesima; Jerome, letter 78 compared with letter 41, n. 3).

Now this distinction is by divine law. Witnesses of this fact are: 1° Clement, letter to the Corinthians, n. 42, who, aiming to commend the institution of bishops and deacons, says: "Christ was sent by God, and the Apostles by Christ, and both things came to pass in an orderly way from the will of God. Having therefore received their instructions... they went forth announcing the kingdom of God. Preaching therefore throughout the regions and cities, they appointed those who were their firstfruits—having tested them by the Spirit—as bishops and deacons for those who were to believe": in which words the appeal to the mission of Christ and to the will of God is made by Clement not merely for the preaching of the Word, which is mentioned only in passing, but for the appointment of bishops and deacons. 2° Ignatius is a witness, saying in his letter to the Ephesians, n. 3: "Bishops established throughout the farthest reaches of the earth are according to the mind of Jesus Christ." For if, as we have proved, the bishop is distinct from the presbyter, and if by the will and mind of Christ the bishop was established by the Apostles, he was certainly established as he really is—that is, distinguished in dignity and power from the presbyter—and therefore he is such by divine law. Indeed, this distinction has always existed in the Church from the apostolic age; for it is established that the Apostles

placed one bishop over individual churches, as all the cited monuments teach, and this is not countered by the address of the Apostle to the Philippians 1:1, "with the bishops and deacons," for those were bishops of a region, each one in his own city, not bishops of one single city—just as were also the elders of the Church whom Paul, as he was departing for Ephesus, summoned to himself (Acts 20:17–28). This distinction, moreover, pertains to the intrinsic constitution of the Church; for "without these (bishop and presbyters) the Church is not called" (Ignatius to the Trallians, n. 3). But whatever is of this kind is in the Church by the authority of Christ. Furthermore, the power of ordaining, since it is sacramental, belongs to divine law; since therefore it belongs to bishops alone, they are by divine law set apart from presbyters. Likewise, such a distinction between bishop and presbyter has always been believed immutable, such that it cannot be changed even by the authority of the Church; for it has always been believed that the power of ordaining remains in bishops separated from the Church, and that they truly ordain, even if they do so against the Church's will, and that the Church cannot impede the efficacy of their act—as is clear from the doctrine of the character. Now what cannot be changed by the Church is of divine law, if it cannot be derived from purely natural law.

III. This doctrine appears to be opposed by Jerome, who in letter 146 teaches that one bishop came to be set over the rest when contentions arose of the sort, "I am of Apollo, I am of Cephas," etc., and that this was done as a remedy for schism: "That one was afterward chosen to preside over the rest was done as a remedy for schism, lest each one, drawing the Church of Christ to himself, should tear it apart." He says the same in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus, ch. 1: "Before, by the prompting of the devil, factions arose in religion, the churches were governed by the common counsel of the presbyters. But after each began to regard those whom he had baptized as his own and not Christ's, it was decreed throughout the world that one chosen from among the presbyters should be set over the rest, upon whom the entire care of the Church should devolve." This opinion of Jerome was afterward transcribed by not a few, among them Alcuin in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus, ch. 1, Amalarius Symphosius in *De Officiis Ecclesiasticis*, bk. 2, ch. 13, the pseudo-Anselm or Hervaeus on

Philippians, ch. 1, and the Fathers of Aachen in the year 816, *Canones*, bk. 1, ch. 10 (Migne, vol. 193).

But 1° what kind of a decree is this one published throughout the world, and when was it issued? Jerome alludes to the dissensions existing in the church of Corinth in the age of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:11, 12). Was the decree issued then? We would then have an apostolic decree: but it is remarkable that a universal decree of this kind should have been issued on account of the fault of certain faithful in one church. Jerome looks to something else then; but unless something further is brought forward, we are not yet—with due reverence to the holy Doctor—bound to believe this history. 2° What Jerome affirms does not cohere very well with itself. For in the former passage he concludes the discussion thus: "What, apart from ordination, does a bishop do that a presbyter cannot do?" But if only the bishop is capable of ordaining, since this power is necessary in the Church, is of divine institution, and of itself already makes bishops fitted to the governance of the Church and superior to presbyters; therefore not by accident, on account of schisms that later arose, but of themselves, by divine ordinance, there were bishops in the Church from the beginning who presided over the rest. Here, that is, is one of those cases in which the holy Doctor, carried away by the heat of controversy, does not speak with perfect accuracy. The view of Jerome can, however, be extracted from the context. Had he said simply that it was done as a remedy for schism that one was chosen, his words could have been taken in the same sense in which Cyprian also spoke—namely, that Peter was placed over the rest so that, schisms having been removed, unity might be maintained by all, that is, for the good of unity, which certainly does not exclude divine right and divine institution but rather includes it. But by saying "afterward chosen," the holy Doctor indicates that he is speaking of an arrangement that did not exist from the beginning but was instituted on account of schisms that later arose. We therefore believe with Petavius, *Hierarchia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 2, ch. 7, n. 1, that Jerome was looking only historically at the use of ecclesiastical governance, which can of itself be twofold, while the inherent right of the bishop always remains intact. For it is possible that the bishop, together with the presbyterate, govern his flock in such a way that acts of episcopal

governance proceed along with the action of the presbyterate, insofar as everything is done in common and defined by common votes; it is also possible that the bishop alone decides what is to be done, and though he from time to time seeks the counsel of the presbyters, yet issues decrees and governs in his own name alone. Jerome believed the former method to have prevailed from the beginning and everywhere; but we do him no injustice if without witnesses we do not yet believe this of him. Even granting this, however, it does not follow that bishops were equal to presbyters even in the actual use of ecclesiastical governance; for the right of governance of the bishop prevailed and it was that which gave force to the governance of the presbyterate; and indeed, was it not even in this hypothesis—that the bishop and the presbyters governed the Church in common—the bishop himself who governed the presbyters both individually and collectively? Does this not clearly emerge from Paul's letters to Timothy and Titus, from Ignatius's letters, from the whole manner of speaking and acting of Cyprian? It is therefore false—to say what must be said—that "bishops are greater than presbyters more by custom than by the truth of the Lord's arrangement," as the same Jerome says in the cited place on the Epistle to Titus; but they are greater by divine institution both by reason of character and of the power of order (which Jerome himself concedes) and by the power of jurisdiction, which the Church has always recognized in bishops above presbyters.

IV. Now from the demonstrations given it is established that the bishop is superior to the presbyter; for it is the bishop who ordains the presbyter, who governs the Church alone and presides over the presbyters. Moreover, he is superior by divine law; for by divine law he alone ordains, and from the fact that he ordains—that is, begets rectors of the Church and is capable of perpetuating it—he is by divine institution the subject fitted to govern the Church and to preside over the presbyters. Since the Council of Trent, Session 23, ch. 4, has asserted both of these things, it has also implicitly asserted that bishops are superior to presbyters by divine law, even though it was unwilling to define this explicitly.

Note that Eutychius, Patriarch of Alexandria in the late ninth century, deserves no credence when he writes in his book *De Originibus*

Ecclesiae Alexandrinae that formerly in all Egypt from Mark to Demetrius there was only one bishop, namely the Alexandrian. Cf. Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, sec. IV, Diss. 44, § 26.

V. What the Presbyterians together with Blondell gather from the scriptural passages Phil. 1:1, Acts 20:17, 1 Tim. 4:14, and 1 Pet. 5:1 rests on an equivocation; for it is one thing for the episcopate and the presbyterate to be the same dignity and the same order, and quite another for the name presbyter to have at some time been common to both, or for the same person to have been endowed with both dignities. Moreover, by the name of presbyters Irenaeus, bk. 3, ch. 2 and bk. 4, chs. 43–44, understands the individual bishops in each church. Likewise Clement of Alexandria in bk. 4 of the *Stromata*, having first distributed the ecclesiastical grades into presbyter and deacon, soon speaks more distinctly and enumerates the progressions of bishops, presbyters, and deacons; and the same is to be seen in Origen, hom. 11 on Numbers. The προεστώς of whom Justin speaks in his First Apology is himself the bishop.

From the fact that bishops administered their church together with the presbyters and even with the deacons, making use of their counsel and labor (Cyprian, letters 71 and 213)—which they still do today—it does not follow that the bishop is not superior to the presbyter by divine law. Nor does it follow from the fact that bishops addressed presbyters as fellow-presbyters; for there is a true fellowship in the priesthood: indeed they also at times addressed deacons as fellow-deacons, as Gregory does in letter 47 among the Basilians, Basil in letter 273, Augustine in letter 192, and Fulgentius to Ferrandus in letter 12, yet it would not therefore be lawful to infer that the episcopate and the diaconate are one order.

On this point the anonymous author of the *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* must be corrected, who in q. 101, *De iactantia Romanorum Levitarum* (of which question the Luciferan Roman deacon Hilary cannot at least be deemed the author), denies that a bishop calls his ministers his fellow-deacons. The same author, following in the footsteps of Jerome, in order to blunt the arrogance of deacons, extols the dignity of presbyters and mentions among other things that "in Alexandria and throughout all Egypt, if the bishop is absent, the

presbyter consecrates (or, in another reading, confirms)." Likewise the author of the commentary on Paul's letters among the works of Ambrose says at Eph. 4: "In Egypt presbyters confirm if the bishop is not present." But they did this extraordinarily by special permission; and the consecration spoken of in the first testimony is nothing but confirmation, as the other reading has it.

VI. It remains now to demonstrate that the sacred rite by which the bishop is initiated is a sacrament distinct from that by which the presbyter is initiated, which we defend as a theological truth. For it was the opinion of certain earlier Scholastics that the episcopal power is not properly a character—at least not in the sense of being a new character distinct from the presbyteral—nor is episcopal ordination a sacrament distinct from presbyteral ordination; and therefore the episcopate, insofar as it is such, or insofar as it is something beyond the presbyterate, is not truly a sacrament. For, they said, through episcopal power a man is not ordered directly to God but to the mystical body of Christ; although this power remains indelibly like a character, since it is given by consecration; moreover, one order that is a sacrament does not depend on a prior one as regards the necessity of the sacrament, whereas the episcopal power does depend on the presbyteral, since it cannot be received unless the latter has first been obtained; furthermore, the sacrament of order consists of seven orders, whereas if the episcopate were a sacrament it would consist of eight. For every order that is a sacrament is ordered as to its end toward the Eucharist, for the confecting of which the sacerdotal power is given; since therefore the bishop has in this respect no power other than the presbyter, and a more perfect power cannot exist, it follows that the episcopate, insofar as it is distinguished from the presbyterate, confers no new character and is not a sacrament. They granted, however, that it is an order, insofar as an order is an office with respect to certain sacred actions, and that it is an order instituted by Christ, since it is a spiritual and indelible power of conferring certain sacraments; and that it is an order divinely superior to the presbyterate, since by divine law it alone can ordain presbyters and must preside over them. Cf. the Scholastics cited by Vasquez, *In Tertiam Partem*, d. 240, ch. 2, and d. 243, ch. 2, although not all agree in all respects. Cf. St. Thomas, *Supplement*, q. 40,

a. 5, and q. 38, a. 2, ad 2. Some of the earlier writers, such as Paludanus in his commentary on the *Sentences*, bk. 2, d. 24, q. 7, a. 4—who perhaps present the common opinion in a clearer manner—deny indeed that a new character is conferred by episcopal ordination, but teach that the preceding one is extended, because the bishop can do more: for he can ordain and confirm, which previously he could not do. Akin to this is the opinion of Vasquez, *In Tertiam Partem*, d. 240, ch. 5, n. 34 compared with d. 239, ch. 6, n. 57, who denies that through episcopal consecration a new character is conferred or even that the preceding one is truly extended, but affirms that a new power is instilled—consisting in a relationship of divine designation, and that indelible, toward this or that ministry—which is an extrinsic denomination. The opinion of Peter of Soto (*De Institutione Sacerdotum*, sect. 4), of Bellarmine (*De Ordine*, ch. 5), and of many more recent writers, is that episcopal ordination is a sacrament distinct from presbyteral ordination and that through it a proper character is conferred, or the preceding one is enlarged by an ampliation equivalent to the impression of a new character. Cf. Morin, *De Sacris Ordinationibus*, pt. 3, exercise 3, ch. 1.

VII. It is certain that the arguments of the earlier writers who deny that the episcopate, as such, is a sacrament lack demonstrative force. For it is gratuitously assumed that through the character men are directly ordered only to God and that orders are ordered only to the Eucharist; and even granting this, the conclusion would have to be denied, since even if the episcopate is in itself a sacrament, the seven orders do not on that account cease to exist, of which the last is the priesthood—if this be twofold, namely of the first and the second order. Moreover, just as the requirement of a preexisting baptismal character does not prevent a true character from being conferred through confirmation, so neither will the requirement of the presbyteral character hinder this with regard to the episcopate.

Nor is there sufficient coherence in the opinion of those who deny that a character is impressed by episcopal consecration, while also denying that the power conferred by it can be lost even by the Church's ordinance—which they prove from the fact that such power is given by consecration. For either this is a consecration instituted by Christ and therefore sacramental, and the power conferred by it is a true character;

or it is a consecration instituted by the Church, and its permanence will depend on the will of the Church (Vasquez, ibid., d. 243, ch. 1).

VIII. In the thesis we defend both the presbyterate and the episcopate as sacraments, and the latter not because it is the same as the presbyterate which is a sacrament, but in itself, so that there are two sacraments. And indeed that the presbyterate is a sacrament is agreed upon by all Catholics. For from the testimony of Scripture, apostolic tradition, and the unanimous consent of the Fathers it is clear that some sacred ordination is a sacrament (preceding section); and it has equally always been believed that among sacred ordinations the one that is a sacrament is the one by which the priesthood is transmitted, as is clearly gathered from the doctrine of Trent, Session 23, chs. 1 and 3, canon 4, and from the fact that in the earliest centuries the name of priest was given to those who hold the supreme grade of the hierarchy in order, to which sacred ordination certainly pertains. Moreover, the presbyterate has always been believed inseparable from the priesthood—that is, presbyters are truly priests—as is clear from canon 3 among the cited canons of Carthage and from the decretal letter of Innocent I to Decentius of Gubbio, ch. 3, and from the fact that the latter were said and considered to be indeed priests of the second order but truly priests. And certainly it has always been believed that they have the power of offering sacrifice, in which the priesthood properly consists, and of remitting sins, so that they are successors of the Apostles in the priesthood (Trent, ibid., ch. 1): therefore.

Hence among the Scholastics, for whom it was certain that order is a sacrament, some doubted whether the diaconate is a sacrament; not a few, especially the earlier ones, denied that the episcopate taken in itself is a sacrament; but all affirmed it of the presbyterate.

Indeed, as the whole tradition attests, by the ordination of a presbyter is conferred the indelible power of confecting the Eucharist and remitting sins, which in no way belongs to others not so ordained; this power was instituted by Christ, and the rite by which it is conferred is certainly that which Christ instituted or immutably approved, since after it has been conferred in this way it cannot be taken away or conceded to another by the Church herself if he has not received it in this way; to this rite, therefore, by the will of Christ there is connected

the conferral of this power, a connection of efficient causality; for this is the nature of sacred rites in the new dispensation, with which the conferral of a supernatural gift is permanently bound. We have therefore in this rite what is proper to a sacrament—the efficacious bestowal of a supernatural and indelible power over the real and mystical body of Christ, namely a special character. The conferral of sanctifying grace coheres with the character, since without special holiness such a power cannot be exercised as it ought.

Note that among the Greeks the imposition of hands is also used for conferring the lower orders, and even for instituting deaconesses; but it is established that those orders can be conferred in another way, as is evident in the Latin Church (cf. the canons of Carthage); therefore it is not permissible to affirm of this imposition of hands what we affirmed of the former—namely that it is a rite instituted by Christ or immutably approved by Christ for conferring a certain power.

Now as regards the episcopate, it is to be noted 1° that there exists, if we are to believe Morin (*De Sacris Ordinationibus*, pt. 3, exercise 11, ch. 2), no example of an episcopal ordination conferred on one who was not a presbyter. And what Martène (*De Antiquis Ecclesiae Ritibus*, bk. I, ch. 8, a. 3) reports is either instances in which historians expressly wished to signify only the final grade attained by the one ordained, or is to be attributed to the ignorance of certain private individuals and does not prejudge the common consent. It is to be noted 2° that it makes no difference whether the episcopal character be said to be adequately distinct (whether really or formally) from the presbyteral, or inadequately distinct, insofar as it is a real ampliation and extension of it to the production of sacred effects that the presbyteral character alone cannot produce; for the same efficacy is required of itself in this second hypothesis as in the first. Cf. Bellarmine, ibid.

Thus some prove that episcopal ordination is a sacrament from the fact that it is demonstrated that sacred ordination is a sacrament from the words of the Apostle already explained (Trent, Session 23, ch. 3); but the ordination spoken of there is the ordination of one who was a bishop; therefore episcopal ordination. But one may reply that Timothy was indeed made a bishop by a sacramental ordination, but insofar as by such an ordination he was made a presbyter—that is, he received the

priesthood, which is essential to the episcopate. The thesis is therefore proved by another argument, as follows. A sacrament is that rite by which a divine power—indelible by divine law—of performing certain sacraments is conferred, and by which interior sanctifying grace is conferred; but by episcopal ordination is conferred the power of ordaining and confirming, which is certainly divine; for some order is certainly a sacrament, and confirmation is a sacrament: therefore what St. Thomas says in the *Supplement*, q. 34, a. 2 holds good: "by reason of order a man becomes the dispenser of the other sacraments; therefore order has more of the nature of a sacrament than the others." Now that this power is indelible by divine law is clear from the doctrine of the Church transmitted above (preceding section) and from the common opinion that a bishop even solemnly degraded by the Church validly ordains (cf. Vasquez, *In Tertiam Partem*, d. 243, ch. 2).

That sanctifying grace is conferred is clear from the fact that, as the Council of Trent teaches in the cited place, ch. 4, through sacred ordination the Holy Spirit is given—words by which, according to the common manner of speaking, infusion of grace is signified. For in the controversy with the Donatists both sides agreed that outside the Church the Holy Spirit—that is, sanctifying grace—is not given. Now that this is the sense of the Tridentine canon is clear above all from the fact that there the infusion of the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the impression of the character. It is moreover equally clear by the authority of the same canon that in that sacred ordination in which the bishop says to the one being ordained "Receive the Holy Spirit," the Holy Spirit is given; now these words are said in the consecration of a bishop according to the Roman Pontifical. Nor does it matter that these words were not formerly used (cf. Martène, ibid., a. 10, n. 14); for the necessary sense of the Tridentine canon is this: in that ordination in which these words are pronounced, the Holy Spirit is given, whether given through them or through another sacramental form (cf. Morin, cited work, pt. 3, exercise 2, ch. 2).

The bishop, therefore, is a priest and simply possesses the priesthood by reason of presbyteral ordination; he is made, however, the high priest through episcopal ordination, since by it he obtains the power of instituting priests and governing them in the celebration of the

mysteries and the administration of the other sacraments, and they therefore depend on him for the lawful and valid exercise of the sacred office. Nor are there in the bishop two persons—a priest and a high priest—for the high priest separately by himself is nothing; but he obtains to be a high priest through that ordination by which the sacerdotal character is amplified, so that one who can consecrate the Eucharist and remit sins can also constitute consecrators and judges of souls and govern them.

IX. What then does Jerome say in letter CXLVI about the institution of the Bishop of Alexandria, wishing to show that "one was afterward chosen to preside over the rest as a remedy for schism, lest each one, drawing the Church of Christ to himself, should tear it apart"? He says: "For in Alexandria, from Mark the Evangelist down to Heraclus and Dionysius, the presbyters always chose one from among themselves and, placing him in a higher grade, called him bishop: just as an army might make a general, or deacons might elect from among themselves one whom they knew to be diligent and call him archdeacon. For what does a bishop do, apart from ordination, that a presbyter cannot do?" Something similar is reported by the deacon Liberatus in his *Breviarium*, ch. 20: "It was the custom of Alexandria that he who succeeded the deceased should keep watch over the body of the deceased, place the right hand of the deceased upon his own head, bury him with his own hands, receive upon his neck the pallium of blessed Mark, and then lawfully take his seat." Mention of the Alexandrian custom reported by Jerome is made by the pseudo-Alcuin in *De Divinis Officiis*, ch. 37 (Migne, *PL*, vol. 101) and by Amalarius Symphosius in *De Officiis Ecclesiasticis* in the cited place, calling it the consecration of a bishop. If these things are taken to mean that the bishop of Alexandria was constituted as such by that ceremony alone, it will have to be said that Jerome believed a presbyter could, without any sacramental consecration, ordain—and that those who transcribed Jerome's words in the ninth century believed this. And yet Jerome denies that a presbyter can ordain presbyters, and the others who transcribed him certainly knew about the sacred episcopal ordination and its necessity. The discussion in Jerome, that is, concerns the election, in regard to which the Alexandrian Church differed from others in that the election

then lay with the presbyterate and a successor was chosen exclusively from among the presbyters—not unlike what now takes place in the Roman Church (cf. the dissertation of J. B. Sollerius among the Bollandist *Acta*, vol. VII of June, ch. 1, Parergo 1). If you think otherwise, you must explain what sort of bishops these Alexandrian bishops were down to the declining third century and how they ordained presbyters and bishops in their diocese; for it is of faith that a presbyter cannot ordain without having received episcopal consecration, just as it is of faith that bishops are superior to presbyters and that the power they have of ordaining is not common to presbyters. Trent, Session 23, ch. 7; nor does any mention ever occur of an extraordinary minister of episcopal or presbyteral ordination. This is something that the learned-rather-than-theological Morin, in his cited work, pt. 3, exercise 3, ch. 2, ought to have noted.

§ XV

Deacons also belong to the hierarchical order, being inferior to presbyters and bishops, and their ordination is to be regarded as a sacrament.

I. Mention is frequently made of deacons in the New Testament and in ecclesiastical monuments. That they are distinguished in grade from presbyters and bishops is clear from all the testimonies already cited—for example, from the letters to Titus and Timothy, and from the letter of Clement, the letters of Ignatius, the Apostolic Canons, the canons of Carthage, the canons of Nicaea, from Dionysius the Areopagite (with regard to this author and his works, those before all others are to be read: Sirmond in his *Diatriba de Duobus Dionysiis* and Morin, cited work, pt. II, ch. 1), Optatus, etc., where also their special duties and their special initiation are described. From the same sources it is likewise clear that they are inferior to bishops and presbyters; for they are ministers of both, as the name itself indicates, and they are not priests, since they are ordained not to the priesthood but to ministry, as the canons of Carthage say—although less properly they are at times called priests of the third order (cf. Optatus, ibid.), and everywhere they are compared to the Levites of the old covenant. Cf. the rites of

ordination presented by Morin, cited work, pt. 2. And certainly if they are distinct from priests, since they cannot be superior to priests in the proper sense, they must be inferior. To this point refers the cited letter of Jerome to Evangelus.

II. The Council of Trent, Session 23, canon 6, teaches that deacons belong to the hierarchy; for the ministers placed in the third rank are certainly at least deacons, who are thus called κατ' ἐξοχήν and hold beyond controversy the first rank among ministers. Now the hierarchy consists of those who are deputed, by an indelible consecration, to sacred functions, to the administration of sacraments, and to the sanctification of others; and deacons are such. For it is their office to assist and minister to the sacrificing priest; it is their office to distribute the Eucharist to the faithful; from their office it belongs to them to baptize, as is clear from Acts 8:5–12 and 26–38, as the Roman Pontifical of Clement VIII attests; and it likewise belongs to them (under mandate of the bishop, to be sure) to preach, which is clear from Acts 6, 7, and 8, and as we are taught again by the same Pontifical. Moreover, they are deputed to these functions by a sacred rite similar to that by which bishops and presbyters are initiated, as is clear from all the Greek and Latin sacramentaries or euchologies; and that the effect of this rite is permanent and indelible is established from the same ancient monuments from which we gathered the indelible character of ordination in § XIII.

III. That the ordination of a deacon is a sacrament has not yet been defined; yet it is certain by theological demonstration. It is persuasively established from the Scriptures, considered together with the subsequent Tradition. Let it be noted: a) that the murmuring of the Greeks and the perceived necessity of appointing ministers of tables (Acts 6:1–2), if considered in itself, may be regarded as having been either merely the occasion for bringing a certain institution into act, or as having been the end—whether adequate or inadequate—of the ordination of deacons (that these were deacons, and that from them the order of deacons who serve the mysteries—that is, such as have always since existed in the Church—took its origin, is attested by the whole Christian tradition, against which the 16th canon of the Quinisext Synod wrongly contends, misinterpreting the words of Chrysostom on

this passage—who speaks not of the dignity but of the name of deacon). b) That this was rather a simple occasion and not even an adequate end is clear both from the conditions required in those to be chosen (cf. also 1 Tim. 3) and from the offices which the elected are described as having at once exercised, which are: the preaching of the word (ch. 6:8 ff.; ch. 7) and the administration of baptism (ch. 8) even outside the city of Jerusalem—offices with which, in those who were simply ministers, the ministry of tables could also cohere, for this was not a profane but a sacred service, namely the custody and distribution of alms offered to God for the faithful poor. Nor does Jerome deny that the institution of deacons had this purpose, in his letter to Evangelus—he only puts before the eyes of certain arrogant deacons the occasion on which they are said to have been chosen, namely the ministry of tables, in order to blunt their arrogance. That the office of ministering to the priest celebrating the divine mysteries was also joined to the office of preaching and baptizing, we are taught (collating 1 Tim. 2:9–10) by the most ancient writer who conversed with the Apostles, namely St. Ignatius, to the Trallians, n. 2: "Deacons too, as ministers of the mysteries of Jesus Christ, must please all in every way. For they are not ministers of food and drink but ministers of the Church of God." Moreover, c) that the institution of these deacons was not merely apostolic but divine is proved first by the fact that ministers of sacred things belong to the intrinsic constitution of a religious society; and such, by the authority of Christ, are in the Church. It is then further established by the testimony of Clement in the cited place, who says that the Apostles, sent by divine ordinance and having received their instructions, preached the word and appointed bishops and deacons; and by the testimony of Ignatius, who in his letters always associates deacons with presbyters and bishops as belonging to the same institution, saying, for example, to the Smyrnaeans, n. 8: "All follow the bishop as Jesus Christ follows the Father, and the presbyterate as the Apostles; and reverence the deacons as the commandment of God"—and after enumerating deacons, presbyters, and bishops, he adds: "without these the Church of God is not called" (to the Trallians, n. 3). From these passages the theoretical sense underlying the constant and perennial practice of the Church of instituting deacons and of enrolling

them in the hierarchical order is clear. Now what Cyprian commands in letter LXV—that deacons remember "that the Lord chose the Apostles, that is, bishops and prelates; but deacons, after the ascension of the Lord into heaven, were instituted by the Apostles themselves as ministers of their episcopate and of the Church"—is aimed at showing, also from the immediate and personal institution of bishops by Christ, their excellence above deacons and their greater necessity. Now d) the rite employed by the Apostles for constituting deacons is the imposition of hands with prayer, just as it is employed for the ordination of bishops and presbyters, and the same rite has always been used throughout the whole Church, both Greek and Latin, and by it a certain sacred power is conferred—namely the power or faculty of ministering at the altar to the priest and of dispensing the body of Christ and of baptizing and preaching—and it has always been believed that this rite is necessary for conferring such power, and that the same power is indelible, or in other words that by that sacred rite a character is imprinted: which would be wrongly denied on the grounds that there is no function of the deacon that could not also be validly performed by another; for an equal difficulty could be raised against the character of confirmation, and although another person may materially perform the same actions, the sacred and ministerial action which is attributed to deacons can nevertheless only be performed by them. Moreover, the impression of a character is the proper effect of a sacrament. It has likewise always been believed—as the Council of Trent attests, Session 23, ch. 4—that through this rite the Holy Spirit—that is, sanctifying grace—is given; for in the consecration of a deacon according to the Roman Pontifical the words "Receive the Holy Spirit" are said. Now a rite of this kind is a sacrament: therefore.

Nor is it an obstacle that deaconesses too (whose apostolic institution is believed to be attested in Rom. 16:1; 1 Tim. 5:9, 10) were among the Greeks ordained by imposition of hands and to the altar; for this rite was not common to the whole Church, nor was it believed to be necessary, nor was it believed that deaconesses were set apart from the lay order. Cf. canon 26 of the First Council of Orange under Leo I, canon 21 of the Council of Epaon under Hormisdas, and canon 18 of the Second Council of Orléans under John II. But it was a ceremony

instituted by the Church in analogy with the ordination of deacons. On this point Morin, in his cited work, pt. 3, exercise 10, ch. 1, must again be corrected.

SCHOLION

I. The question is raised concerning the number of orders. Among the Greeks, after the diaconate there are two minor orders: subdeacon and reader. The offices exercised by these two are the same as those exercised by several orders among the Latins. Epiphanius in his *Expositio Fidei*, n. 21, describes as it were two series of orders: in the first he places bishops, presbyters, deacons, subdeacons, readers; in the other, exorcists, interpreters, laborers, those who care for the dead, doorkeepers, and all who are instituted for the sake of discipline. Mention of exorcists also occurs in canon 10 of Antioch. In the Latin Church all the orders that are now in force, in the same subordination, were already found in the third century; those existing in the Roman church are enumerated by Cornelius, Roman Pontiff, in his letter to Fabius of Antioch (Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 6, ch. 43); the same orders are enumerated toward the end of the fourth century in the already cited canons of Carthage. Yet it does not appear that the same minor orders always existed in all churches of the Latin rite. In the Roman Synod attributed to St. Sylvester, between the subdeacon and the deacon is placed the guardian of the martyrs. Gelasius, letter 9, after naming doorkeepers as the lowest of the orders, places notaries and defenders between readers and acolytes, and subjects acolytes to subdeacons. The canons of Carthage, after listing four minor orders, place under the doorkeeper the psalmist, also called the cantor; yet this is evidently more of a simple office than an order. The anonymous author of the little work *De Septem Ordinibus* (among the works of Jerome)—who is sufficiently learned and ancient (writing as he seems to in Italy in the fourth century, when the metropolitans in the province of the Roman Pontiff began to be instituted, he says: "recently the election of a bishop has been referred to the metropolitan, so that supreme priests begin to submit not by right but of necessity to another priest") —lists the minor orders thus: gravediggers, doorkeepers, readers,

subdeacons; to which, adding deacons, presbyters, and bishops, there are seven orders in all. Whether all those we have reviewed were truly orders is usually disputed. Some of them were probably simply offices, which according to the various ages and needs or utilities of churches were assigned to some order, or were simply ecclesiastical offices without an order—that is, without a special consecration placing someone in a certain grade of the clergy—as the psalmist appears to be in the canons of Carthage. Cf. Martène, cited work, ch. 8, a. 1; Morin, cited work, pt. 3, exercise 11, ch. 1; and Thomassin, *De Beneficiis*, pt. 1, bk. 2, ch. 30. As the Council of Trent attests, Session 23, ch. 2: "From the very beginning of the Church the names of the following orders and their proper ministries are known to have been in use: subdeacon, acolyte, exorcist, reader, and doorkeeper." These words need not be understood as referring those orders to the very age of the Apostles and to apostolic institution. The letter of Ignatius to the Antiochenes, in which subdeacons, readers, cantors, doorkeepers, laborers, exorcists, and confessors are enumerated (cf. the *Apostolic Constitutions*, bk. 8, ch. 23), is held to be spurious. Urban II, however, decreed at the Council of Benevento: "Let no one be chosen for the episcopate unless he be found living religiously in sacred orders. We call those orders sacred which are the diaconate and the presbyterate; for these alone is the primitive Church read to have had; for these alone do we have an apostolic precept. Subdeacons, however, because they also minister at the altars, we allow by way of concession when occasion demands, but very rarely." Therefore no other orders were then held as distinct in the primitive Church—unless you think Urban wanted to say that the primitive Church had only those two orders as major and sacred, as Innocent III interprets him in the passage to be cited below. Gratian took it differently in dist. 21, saying: "We read that Levites were ordained by the Apostles, of whom the greatest was blessed Stephen; subdeacons and acolytes the Church constituted in the course of time." Cf. also the Master of the Sentences, bk. 4, d. 24; Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis Fidei*, bk. 2, pt. 3, ch. 13. From the custom of ministering at the altar and the celibacy already prescribed by Leo the Great and especially from the concession of Urban II confirmed afterward by Innocent III, ch. *a Multis*, *De Aetate et Qualitate*, etc., that subdeacons could be chosen for

the episcopate, it came about that the subdiaconate was finally numbered among the major and sacred orders toward the end of the twelfth century. For Peter the Cantor, who died in the year 1197, says in his *Liber de Verbo Mirifico* that the subdiaconate was newly instituted as a sacred order. Moreover, "an order is called sacred," says St. Thomas, commentary on the *Sentences*, bk. 4, d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, ql. 1, n. 3, "which has some act concerning a consecrated thing"—as the priest and deacon have concerning the body and blood of Christ, and the subdeacon concerning the consecrated vessels; but Peter the Cantor understands "major order."

II. The question is raised whether the orders below the diaconate are so many sacraments. Many Scholastics held this with the Master in his commentary on the *Sentences*, bk. 4, d. 24, nn. 2, 10, and St. Thomas, ibid., a. 2, ql. 2; many more recent writers either doubt or deny it with Morin, cited work, pt. 3, exercise 11, chs. 1–2 (cf. Perrone, *De Ordine*, ch. 2, Schol. 1°), on the grounds that their origin appears to be not divine but merely ecclesiastical. This too seems to be what the author of the lesson in the Roman Breviary for the feast of St. Cajus on April 22 intended when he says that Cajus decreed that one should ascend to the episcopate by these grades and honors in the Church: doorkeeper, reader, exorcist, acolyte, subdeacon, deacon, presbyter. For if all and each of these grades were of divine institution, their subordinate succession would also be such, and thus there would be no room for any determination by the Church. But if several of these grades are of ecclesiastical institution, it can truly be said that Cajus instituted this whole arrangement, even though some of these are by divine law. We admit, however, that it is not difficult to offer another plausible interpretation. Nor is it proved that these orders imprint a sacramental character from the fact that they are not repeated; for as we have heard from St. Thomas, every consecration is perpetual; yet as he also says in q. 1, a. 1, ql. 3, ad 3: "not every blessing or consecration is a sacrament, because monks and abbots too are blessed, and yet those blessings are not sacraments, since by them one is not ordered to the dispensation of the divine sacraments, as one is by the blessing of order." Yet the earlier writers held that the fullness of the sacrament is in one order—that is, in the priesthood—and that in the others there is a certain participation in

the order; and therefore that all orders are one sacrament, which is a certain whole—not integral nor universal, but potential—whose nature it is that the whole in its complete aspect is in one, while in the others there is some participation of it (St. Thomas, commentary on the *Sentences*, bk. 4, d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, ql. 1, ad 2). We think Thomassin rightly said in the cited place: "nothing is more probable than that the minor orders, comprehended as it were within the subdiaconate, are certain portions of the diaconate, carved out of it at various times and necessities. Wherefore in some sense—and a true sense—you would rightly say that the minor orders, in their source and origin, that is in the diaconate from which they sprang as streams, are of divine institution." Cf. St. Bonaventure in his commentary on the *Sentences*, bk. 4, d. 24, a. 2, q. 1, and St. Thomas, ibid., q. 2, a. 1, ql. 2, who teach the same.

As regards the clerical tonsure: from the beginning of the Church it was the custom for clerics not to let their hair grow but to wear it short and modest, with the ears uncovered, which was also common to the faithful; afterward, when it became possible to go out in public without danger, clerics, with their hair cut shorter, left below a circle or crown of hair (Council of Toledo IV, ch. 41; Bede, *Historia Anglorum*, bk. 4, ch. 1), or in addition shaved the crown of the head in the form of a circle. The tonsure or corona was received together with the first order; but around the year seven hundred, as Morin thinks, the custom began to be introduced of admitting someone to the clerical state by the ceremony of tonsure alone, and it began thus to be given separately before the other orders. Cf. Morin, cited work, pt. 3, exercise 15; Thomassin, cited work, pt. 1, bk. 2, ch. 37 ff.; Martène, ibid., a. 7; St. Thomas, commentary on the *Sentences*, bk. 4, d. 24, q. 3, a. 1.

III. The question is raised: what is the matter and form of ordination, and first of the ordination of presbyter and deacon—whether the imposition of hands alone, or the tradition of instruments alone, or both together. Although many very distinguished Scholastics held that the matter and form of the sacrament consist in the tradition of instruments alone together with the words pertaining to it, and some required both, as Bellarmine, *De Ordine*, ch. 9: nevertheless 1° it cannot be denied that the imposition of hands is essential to the sacrament; nor

does St. Thomas deny this, who teaches that grace is conferred through it, though he holds the character to be imprinted by the tradition of instruments (commentary on the *Sentences*, bk. 4, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3). 2° It is at least highly probable that the tradition of instruments is not essential to either ordination, nor is the last imposition of hands with the words "Receive the Holy Spirit, whose sins you shall remit, etc." in the ordination of a presbyter. Indeed, as regards 1°: a) in the Greek Church the imposition of hands alone has always been used (Morin, cited work, pt. 3, exercise 7), and the Greek ordinations have always been approved by the Roman Church (Morin, cited work, pt. 1). b) Likewise in the Latin Church up to the ninth century the imposition of hands alone was employed, and the canons of Carthage, in which for these orders the imposition of hands is exclusively transmitted (cf. canon 3), have been repeated in all subsequent sacramentaries as the norm for ordination (Morin, ibid.); and in the same Church the tradition of instruments was later introduced in such a way that it was nonetheless simply affirmed that presbyters are ordained by imposition of hands, as the Council of Trent says in Session 14, ch. 3, on the sacrament of extreme unction. c) The first deacons were certainly not ordained by the tradition of the book of the gospel, which was not yet written. d) In the Scriptures only imposition of hands is mentioned; and yet it is certain by everyone that the passage there deals with ordination. Now 1° if the imposition of hands is not essential in the present order, one of two things must be said: either it was never essential, or by the authority of the Church it was afterward changed to another. But the first is evidently false from what has been said; and we do not know how the second can be defended. For even granting that Christ did not determine in every detail the matter and form of this sacrament but permitted them to be determined by the Church; nevertheless two things are to be noted: a) it is not the same thing for Christ to have given the Church this power and to have given it the power of changing again what it itself had instituted; for it is certainly probable, in the hypothesis that Christ gave this power to the Apostles, that Christ gave the Apostles the power of determining in every detail the matter and form in such a way that God confirmed the apostolic decree with his consequent will as perpetual, lest in a matter of such great moment

there be room for changes. That Christ did not so conduct himself—is this demonstrated? for the comparison drawn by Morin with the sacrament of matrimony is not valid, since in matrimony the Church has never changed the matter or form but only the conditions required for them to be such; and if it is not demonstrated, the imposition of hands employed by the Apostles must be held to be still essential. b) It is to be noted that if the Church, capable of changing the essential matter of a sacrament, should wish to do so, it must make its will known to all through some solemn decree; for the matter is of the greatest necessity in the Church, on which the apostolic succession itself depends. But certainly no such decree exists (we will speak shortly of the decree of Eugene in particular); rather, these rites joined themselves to the imposition of hands gradually and imperceptibly, with the same imposition of hands always persisting, just as in the ordination of a presbyter the anointing of hands was added, which in the ninth century was employed in certain Latin churches while the Roman Church was still unaware of it, as is clear from the letter of Nicholas I to Rudolf, bishop of Bourges (cf. Morin, exercise 6, ch. 2). On the contrary there exist old canons received by the Latin Church and confirmed in its sacramentaries, frequently and never expressly revoked, signifying that presbyters and deacons are ordained by imposition of hands and not by the tradition of instruments. There is therefore no decree signifying the will of the Church to change the form and matter of ordination. It therefore cannot be proved by the authority of the Church that the essential form and matter of ordination were afterward changed. The opinion which says that in the tradition of instruments there is contained the imposition of hands is of no worth whatever, for the canons of Carthage contradict it quite apart from the common sense. The imposition of hands, therefore, has always been and still is essential.

2° From what has been said it also follows, as we said in the second place, that it is highly probable that the tradition of instruments is not essential to either ordination. For it was certainly not essential formerly; but if it were so now, a change—and an essential one—in the matter itself would have been introduced by the Church, so that what was not previously essential would now be essential; and that such a change has not been introduced seems to us to be proved by the same argument by

which we denied the former change. Nor does the present practice of the Church prove it; for the Church was in the habit of adding over the course of time several ceremonies to the essential rite of the sacraments, to make the celebration of the sacrament more august and the signification of its effect more expressive, as is to be seen, for example, in baptism. Nor let it be said that the fact that the bishop in the ordination of a presbyter, when handing over the instruments, says "receive the power of offering sacrifice to God, etc." signifies that the sacrament is made by that rite; for something similar occurs in the sacrament of matrimony, in which the priest says "I join you," etc., without the sacramental union being made by those words. Cf. the Master of the Sentences on bk. 4, d. 24, and Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, bk. 2, pt. 3, ch. 12, teaching that those words are pronounced by the bishop so that the presbyters may acknowledge that they have received the power of offering. Why then in the Roman Pontifical are deacons, before the gospel is handed to them, and presbyters, before the chalice with the paten etc. is handed to them—though they have already received the imposition of hands—still said to be in the process of being ordained, and afterward said to be ordained? The distinction must be made between the essence of ordination and its integrity. All the prescribed rites pertain to the integrity of ordination, and therefore the ordination is integral only when all have been completed; wherefore if the Church does not wish to define what belongs to the essence alone, or if it abstracts from that consideration and keeps only the integrity of the rite before its eyes—which it prescribes not without reason—it must necessarily speak accordingly, and say that ordination is complete, or that certain persons are ordained, when the entire rite has been completed. As for the decree of Innocent III, ch. *Pastoralis*, and that of Gregory IX, ch. *Presbyter*, *De Sacramentis Non Iterandis*, which decree that if the imposition of hands was omitted, the ordination—the entire ordination, that is—is not to be repeated but what was omitted is to be supplied: this coheres perfectly with our opinion as well.

Since in the ordination of a presbyter according to the Roman Pontifical there are three impositions of hands—the first by the bishop alone saying nothing meanwhile, the second by the bishop together

with the assisting presbyters while the bishop pronounces the blessing, that is, speaks the words, and the third at the end of Mass after communion—the first does not appear to be the essential matter, because no form accompanies it; nor does the third appear to be essential, because it is not employed in the Greek Church and in the Latin Church itself is three centuries more recent than the tradition of instruments, and since the presbyters are already ordained at that point, they already possess by that very fact the power of order to remit sins which belongs to presbyters. The sense of Trent's canon 4, Session XXIII, has already been explained above. It follows that the second imposition of hands with the bishop's prayer is the essential matter and form of the ordination of a presbyter. Lugo, however, holds that the first imposition is sufficiently continuous with the second so that the form can also refer to the former (Disp. 2, n. 99); indeed that both impositions are continuous with the presenting of the instruments, so that the form pronounced finally in the presenting of the instruments pertains also to the double imposition of hands (ibid., n. 90).

As regards the ordination of a bishop, the question can arise whether the placing of the gospel over his head is the essential matter. This is certainly ancient and is prescribed in the Apostolic Constitutions and the canons of Carthage; yet that of itself is not sufficient for it to be called essential matter, for it could be a ceremony instituted by the Church which, having been instituted in early times, became universal; and it does not appear that the first bishops were ordained by this rite. The anointing too in the ordination of a bishop is ancient in the Roman Church, mention of which is made by Gregory the Great on the First Book of Kings, ch. 5 (cf. also his Sacramentary from a very ancient ritual in his works in the Galliccioli edition, vol. 10), and St. Leo seems to indicate it in *Sermo* 8 *de Passione Domini*, n. 70. St. Ephrem also mentions it in his Nisibene Hymns recently edited, hymns 17 and 19. Yet in Africa in early times it appears not to have been employed, since the canons of Carthage do not prescribe it; and it appears to have been received later in Spain, since Isidore in bk. 2 *De Officiis*, where he deals at length with the ceremonies of ordinations, does not say a word about anointing, although he discourses copiously on the anointing of the

priests of old. Nor does the pseudo-Alcuin present it in his book *De Divinis Officiis*.

In the ordination of the other orders, the most ancient custom of the Latin Church is to impose no hands but to hand over instruments: thus canon 3 of Carthage: "When a subdeacon is ordained, since he does not receive the imposition of hands, he is to receive an empty paten from the hand of the bishop and an empty chalice; and from the hand of the archdeacon, a cruet with water, a towel, and a finger cloth"—and so with the following orders and their respective instruments. The Greek Church ordains subdeacons and readers by imposition of hands, but is also accustomed itself to hand over instruments; these are given after the ordination, to be used as proof of the ordination, with no verbal formulae; whereas in the Latin Church the instruments are given with set words, so that the ordinands are ordained by them. Cf. Morin, cited work, pt. 3, exercise 11, ch. 7.

IV. Against what was established in the first place, objection is raised from the doctrine of Eugene IV in the decree which he issued with the approval of the sacred Council of Florence for the Armenians, in order to set forth in a brief compendium the truth of the orthodox faith concerning the unity of the divine essence and the Trinity of persons and the humanity of Christ and the seven sacraments of the Church and other matters pertaining to the orthodox faith and the rites of the universal Church—for so Eugene himself speaks. Now, in treating of the sacraments he says: "The sixth sacrament is order, whose matter is that through the handing over of which the order is conferred; as the presbyterate is conferred through the presentation of the chalice with wine and the paten with bread. The form of the priesthood is: receive the power of offering sacrifice, etc."

We respond 1° that this difficulty must also be resolved by those who hold that both the imposition of hands and the tradition of instruments are essential matter, as Bellarmine accordingly does in the cited place; for if Eugene's words are aimed at teaching what is to be held by faith concerning the matter and form of the sacraments, they must be taken exclusively, as we shall presently demonstrate. We respond 2° that although Eugene appears here to be presenting teaching on a matter of faith, it is nevertheless possible that in this part of the

decree where he treats of the sacraments he wishes, with respect to some things, to present to the Armenians those matters which pertain to the rites of the sacraments approved by the Roman Church and employed throughout the whole Latin Church; for a) beyond matters of faith he said from the outset that he would also speak about rites; b) to use the words of the learned Perrone (*De Ordine*, n. 126), unless we wish to fall into absurdities, the response of Bellarmine and others must be admitted—that the aim of the Supreme Pontiff was to bring the Armenians into conformity with the Roman Church in the conferring of orders, and therefore he enumerated only what the Armenians did not employ. This response presupposes that Eugene made his mind clear to the ambassadors of the Armenians, with whom the business of union was conducted, so that they might understand what the last part of the decree—taken word for word from the opuscule of St. Thomas on the sacraments—was aimed at. c) This of itself seems sufficient to show that no definition of faith is contained here; for the Roman See is not accustomed to issue definitions of faith in this fashion, namely by transcribing the work of some doctor. d) Moreover, what the intrinsic argument makes at least probable is rendered certain by an extrinsic argument; for what is and what is not the intention of a ruler in issuing a decree is rightly gathered a posteriori from the subsequent consent ratified also by the authority from which the decree proceeded (note that it is one thing to interpret a decree of the Roman See from the mind of the Church, and quite another to derive the validity of decrees of that See from the consent of the Church). But from this consent it is clear that the intention of Eugene was not to propose a doctrine of faith concerning the essential matter and form of the sacrament of order. For if that were so, the entire matter would have had to be transmitted; for it is false to predicate of a part of the matter that it is the matter; and therefore it would have to be said that the imposition of hands is not the matter according to Eugene's mind—for Eugene omitted it—and therefore it would be false that priests are made by the imposition of hands. Yet not merely this or that theologian but the entire Council of Trent, approved by the Roman See after the decree of Eugene, still expressed the rite of ordination by saying in the cited place that "priests rightly ordained by bishops through the imposition of hands of the

presbyterate." Therefore the doctrine of Eugene was not received in the sense that in that decree was proposed what was to be believed concerning the matter and form of ordination.

V. The question is raised concerning the minister of ordination. All the sacramentaries and euchologies of the Latin and Greek Church, all the canons beginning from the Apostolic down to those of Trent, the Fathers Jerome, Epiphanius, and Chrysostom—already cited, with whom the rest agree—present the bishop alone as the minister of χειροτονία by which the faithful are admitted to the hierarchical order, that is, as the sole minister of the ordination of bishops, presbyters, and deacons; and although some earlier Scholastics held that by delegation of the Pontiff a presbyter can be the extraordinary minister of the ordination of deacons and presbyters, this opinion (as the learned Perrone says in the cited place, n. 134) is obsolete and was in fact asserted gratuitously against every proper principle of theology. As for the privilege said to have been granted by Innocent IV to the Cistercian abbot to confer the diaconate, it is either rejected by most as entirely false or deemed corrupt. That presbyters can by delegation of the Pontiff confer the lower orders including the subdiaconate is agreed upon among theologians, both on account of the concession formerly made to chorepiscopi, who were simple presbyters, and on account of the same concession made even in recent times by the Roman See to presbyters. Cf. Benedict XIV, *De Synodo*, bk. 2, ch. 110. Moreover, in the decrees of Anastasius II issued by Dionysius, decree VI, it is enacted that presbyters have no right, without the Supreme Pontiff, to make subdeacons and acolytes.

The question is further raised whether a heretical bishop cut off and condemned by the Church validly ordains. "This question," says Peter Lombard in the commentary on the *Sentences*, bk. 4, d. 25, n. 1, "the words of the doctors, who seem to disagree greatly, make involved and almost insoluble." But in truth there is no real perplexity here. For the opinions of the ancient Fathers which the Master cites teach only that such ordination is illicit and deny that the power of execution, the honor of the grade, and jurisdiction are conferred by it. The doctrine of the Church presented in § XIII is sufficiently clear. What has been said generally of those cut off from the Church holds also in the case of those

specifically degraded, for the reason is the same: because the character is imprinted by ordination, which according to the doctrine of the Church is indelible.

VI. Concerning the celibacy of clerics, read the excellent work of Fr. Antonio Zaccaria, *Storia polemica del celibato sacro*. In brief, hold the following. 1° The celibacy of clerics is not of primary divine law; 2° it is, however, of secondary divine law—that is, it is supremely fitting; 3° but the power to prescribe it and to make the marriages of those bound by it null is of primary divine law; 4° in the Latin Church it has always been observed by law, nor can any example be brought of a bishop, presbyter, deacon, or subdeacon who contracted marriage or made use of a previously contracted marriage with impunity. This, Siricius teaches in letter 5 to the Africans, was decreed by an apostolic constitution of the Fathers. Although in the fourth century subdeacons in the whole Latin Church were not yet bound to continence, yet that it was already observed in the Roman Church is clear from the letter of Leo to Anastasius of Thessalonica, letter 14; for in Rome subdeacons ministered at the altar, and when this subsequently became universal under Pelagius II and Gregory the Great, the law of continence became universal for subdeacons. 5° In the Greek Church too this custom prevailed in the fourth century; witnesses are Jerome and Epiphanius. The former, against Vigilantius, ch. 1, saying: "What will the churches of the East do, what those of Egypt and of the Apostolic See" (you have all three patriarchates) "which either receive clerics who are virgins or continent, or if they have wives, live as if they had none?" The latter, in *Haereses* LIX, n. 4, saying against the Novatians: "Indeed, even a man who is still living in matrimony and giving attention to children, although he be the husband of one wife, is by no means admitted by them to the order of deacon, presbyter, bishop, or subdeacon"—note: even subdeacon. He teaches the same thing in his *Expositio Fidei*, n. 21. Cf. also Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 10, and *Demonstratio Evangelica*, bk. 1, pp. 31–32, Viguer edition. Yet at times, beyond this custom, actions were taken in the Greek Church by presbyters, deacons, and subdeacons contrary to it; the explanation of this is given by Epiphanius, who in the cited place adds: "Which is done principally in those places where the ecclesiastical canons (a law, therefore, existed)

are accurately observed. But in some places presbyters, deacons, and subdeacons still have children; I answer, that is not done by the authority of the canon, but by the negligence of men, which is accustomed to act carelessly and connive at certain times on account of too great a multitude of people, that is, when those who would apply themselves to these functions are not easily found." The Greek Church, falling ever further from that holiness, at last in the late seventh century issued the Trullan canons.

§ XVI

With this report now given of those who by divine law hold the power of sacred things in the Church and who by that same law are intrinsically distinguished from the laity, we must now discuss the power of jurisdiction, for which those who belong to the hierarchical orders are by divine law qualified. We shall discuss those matters which serve to clarify its origin, subject, nature, and efficacy.

The origin of this power in a proper and special sense is divine.

I. In the first article of the Gallican assembly of the year 1682, the independence of civil power from sacred power was established by the argument that according to the Apostle that power is from God—namely, as is implied, immediately from God. By this same argument they could equally—indeed with better right—have proved that paternal power over children, a husband's power over his wife, a proprietor's power over his goods, etc., were independent of any other power, so that nothing would have remained to the authority of Louis XIV in his own kingdom. This doctrine, moreover, serves as a foundation for all those who posit civil power as altogether independent from, or indeed superior to, ecclesiastical power.

But political power can be considered either in a universal sense, abstracting from any of its particular forms, or in a particular sense according to its determined forms. Considered in the former way, it is itself from God and is therefore from God because from God the nature ordered toward society was created; hence by natural law it is the case that such a power exists; and the law of nature is a certain divine law; therefore, without any positive institution of God, with nature alone

existing, the principle of civil authority already exists. The form of government, however, whether monarchical, aristocratic, constitutional, or any other, is not of natural law but is determined by certain contingent facts and ultimately by the counsel and will of men. This authority considered generically is therefore natural and of natural divine law, though—if a comparison is permitted—it is less primarily intended by nature, because less necessary, than paternal authority (cf. St. Gregory in the *Regula Pastoralis*, pt. 2, ch. 6, compared with *Moralia*, bk. 26, on ch. 36, v. 46). Any particular form of it, however, is of human law and therefore mutable.

Ecclesiastical power, on the contrary, does not follow from nature —for it is supernatural; and therefore it is immediately from God insofar as God instituted it by a positive institution, establishing the supernatural order. Moreover, it was not only generically but specifically instituted by God—that is, the very form of the determined government was constituted by the same institution—and is therefore immutable itself. Therefore, in a special and proper way, and in a more excellent way than political power, does ecclesiastical power take its origin from God. Cf. Bellarmine, *De Laicis*, ch. 6.

§ XVII

By the institution of Christ, besides the successors of Peter, bishops must hold the power of jurisdiction in the Church, presiding over individual churches with ordinary and immediate jurisdiction.

I. The jurisdiction of Peter and his successors we shall prove in the following treatise; for now we prescind from treating of it. The question that remains is this: whether, besides Peter and under Peter, there are by the institution of Christ others who are to govern the sheep of Christ with ordinary power, and who they are. Since it is historically established that there have always been bishops who governed the Church, the question comes down to this twofold point: whether by the institution of Christ the Church is to be governed by bishops who preside over individual churches with ordinary and immediate power. For although Christ could have arranged matters by committing the whole Church to Peter and leaving it to him to send his own appointed

delegates to govern the individual parts of the fold and assist him in the governance of the whole Church, he could nevertheless also have arranged matters in such a way that by his will he determined those who were to be called by Peter to share in the burden of responsibility—and these would be bishops. This hypothesis does not require us to say that Christ willed the primacy of Peter and the authority of the other bishops with the same primary intention; but he could have willed them in order that Peter might be assisted in the governance of the universal Church, since the Church cannot be governed by one person in all necessary acts without the ministry of another. If, therefore, Christ did not merely give Peter the power of delegating his authority to others as he wished and to whatever extent he wished—or if he did not leave it to Peter to determine who should be associated with him and in what manner—but himself determined and willed there to be bishops endowed with ordinary and immediate power, then it must be said that they govern the Church under Peter by the institution of Christ. Christ primarily, insofar as he simply willed the Church to exist, instituted the primacy of Peter in it; and secondarily, insofar as he had regard for the universality of the Church and the necessity of those who would assist Peter in governing it, he willed there to be bishops who would govern individual flocks by ordinary right. If he himself willed this, then bishops are by the institution of Christ the pastors of the churches. In defending this, we do not wish to say that Christ himself determined the limits of individual churches or prohibited any particular church from being governed by a bishop and his ordinary jurisdiction; for these are not necessary conditions for that institution of Christ to be true. Nor do we enter into the question of whether the jurisdiction of bishops is immediately from God or from the Pope; for that question, which we shall treat in the following treatise, is independent of our present contention; for whether you deny or affirm that the jurisdiction of bishops is immediately from the Pope, it can always be true that it is the institution and will of Christ that the Church be governed under Peter by bishops with ordinary jurisdiction. That, then, is what we now undertake to demonstrate.

II. Now, from the institution of the Apostles made by Christ (Luke 6:13; Matt. 18:18; John 20:22) and from the promise of the perpetuity of

their ministry (Matt. 28:20) it is clear that Christ willed that besides Peter and his successors there should be others possessing the power of governing, teaching, and sanctifying—a power to be perpetually propagated to others. "You err," said Bernard to Eugene III (*De Consideratione*, bk. 3, ch. 4), "if you think that your apostolic power is the only one instituted by God, or even that it is the supreme." Now by virtue of that institution whereby it is decreed that not only Peter but also others—who are called his brothers—must hold power in the Church, and that this be perpetual, there must be several who share this power with Peter and under Peter. These, however, cannot have the power that was extraordinary in the Apostles; for only what is ordinary is perpetual. The ordinary power, moreover, is that which is expressed in the words of Christ addressed to the Apostles (unless they are shown to be regarded under the special aspect of being first and the beginning of a perpetual succession, as in John 16:12–13); for in those words the institution of the Church is contained, and it was necessary for Christ, as he instituted the Church, to exhibit the form that was to be the ordinary one in it. And indeed it would be useless to try to prove from the words of Christ the extraordinary prerogatives of individual Apostles—such as universal authority and infallibility—since Christ, with the exception of Peter, never speaks to individuals but always to all together and together with Peter. These prerogatives are established from elsewhere, but it is certain that they ceased with the Apostles. It remains therefore that the ordinary power which was first in the Apostles is the power of binding and loosing, the power of teaching, and the power of sanctifying through the administration of all the sacraments, apart from infallibility and universal authority in individuals; for such a power is both signified by the words of Christ and is necessary for the Church. Hence the Apostle says in Eph. 4:11–12 that God gave some indeed as apostles... and some as pastors and teachers for the perfecting of the saints in the work of the ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ. From which it is clear that the action of those enumerated must continue as long as the saints are to be perfected and the body of Christ is to be built up. Now this continuance can persist in two ways: either insofar as its efficacy remains, or insofar as it always actually exists by continuous succession. But it is also clear

that the latter is required; for they are said to be given by God for the work of ministry—εἰς ἔργον διακονίας—which requires the actual exercise of power. Now the Apostles, as such according to the full extent of their power, were not to be perpetual; and that prophets and evangelists, insofar as a special office is signified, were not to be perpetual is sufficiently clear. It remains therefore that pastors and teachers as such—whose is the proper ministry by which the body of Christ is built up and the saints are perfected—continue by perpetual succession; and by their ministry it is also achieved that the efficacy of the ministry of others, which has passed away, always perseveres. Therefore, by divine institution there must be in the Church after the Apostles those who are pastors and teachers—who, namely, have the power of governing, teaching, and sanctifying.

Now it is established that those whom Christ willed to succeed in the ordinary office of the Apostles and to be pastors and teachers in the Church, are by the same institution of Christ the bishops who govern a portion of the flock of Christ with ordinary power—that is, with a power intrinsic to their proper office—such that both things pertain to the institution of Christ: that the Church be governed by bishops and that it be governed by bishops holding jurisdiction individually over parts of the flock of Christ. The former is clear 1° because if Christ willed some to be pastors, he certainly willed those whom he made fit for perfectly executing this ministry; but only bishops, by reason of the power of order which is of divine law, are the fitting subject for governing the Church perfectly; for the ruler of the Church must be one who is capable of creating in it ministers by whom the functions of ecclesiastical office are exercised, and who can perpetuate the Church and is thus more eminent than others who exercise its functions; but such by divine law is only the bishop, who is capable of begetting not only sons but also fathers. 2° As the Apostle testifies in Acts 20:28, the bishops are placed by the Holy Spirit to govern the Church of God—words which signify at least a divine ordinance that bishops govern the Church. 3° As Clement testifies in his First Letter to the Corinthians, n. 42, the Apostles sent by Christ, having received his instructions and preaching through the regions and cities, appointed those who were their firstfruits, having tested them by the Spirit, as bishops and

deacons. 4° Ignatius Theophorus, bearing concern for those churches in Asia to which he writes, inculcates almost exclusively that due reverence and submission be given to the hierarchical order and especially to the bishop, admonishing that the bishop is to be regarded as the Lord himself and that all should concur in his opinion and obey him and the presbyterate with undivided mind, sharing in the one sacrifice, and that the presbyterate should be fitted to the bishop as strings to a lyre (to the Magnesians); to live according to Jesus Christ, who is subject to the bishop as to Jesus Christ; without the bishop, presbyters, and deacons the Church is not called; to guard oneself from heretics and to remain indivisibly joined to God, Jesus Christ, and the bishop and the precepts of the Apostles; and whoever acts without the bishop, presbyters, and deacons is not pure in conscience, and they ought to be subject to the bishop as to the commandment of God (to the Trallians); where the shepherd (bishop) is, there the sheep must also follow; one Eucharist must be used; there is one flesh of Christ and one cup in the unity of his blood; one altar just as there is one bishop with the presbyterate and deacons; nothing is to be done without the bishop; God forgives all penitents if they repent and return to the unity of God and the council of the bishop; good are the priests but more excellent is the high priest, to whom are entrusted the holy of holies (to the Philadelphians); all are to follow the bishop as Jesus Christ follows the Father, and the presbyterate as the Apostles; no one is to do anything pertaining to the Church without the bishop; let that Eucharist be held valid which is under the bishop; where the bishop appears, there let the multitude be, just as where Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church; it is not lawful to baptize or to celebrate an agape without the bishop; whatever he approves is the good pleasure of God; he who honors the bishop is honored by God; and one who acts secretly against the bishop renders service to the devil (to the Smyrnaeans); he who thinks himself greater than the bishop will perish; it is fitting that bridegroom and bride make their union with the bishop's consent, so that the marriage may be according to the Lord; the bishop is to be attended to so that God too may attend to us (to Polycarp). Now it is manifest that this due reverence and submission toward the bishop is so frequently urged by Ignatius so that the unity of the Church—that is, the unity of faith and

communion—may be safeguarded, and that unity cannot be maintained without this reverence and submission; but what is exhibited as necessary for the unity of the Church is said to be required by divine institution.

5° It was the custom of antiquity to call the sees of bishops apostolic sees, the apostolic lot, the apostolate, as Paulinus does in his letter to Alypius, letter 3, n. 1, and to Florentinus, letter 42, n. 3; Gregory of Tours, *Historia Francorum*, bk. 4, ch. 26; Apollinaris Sidonius, letter 4, bk. 6; Avitus of Vienne, letter 37; and bishops were always honored with this title as successors of the Apostles. "For this we ought above all to labor," says Cyprian in letter 42 to Cornelius, "that we preserve, as far as we can, the unity handed down by the Lord through the Apostles to us their successors." "Among us," says Jerome in letter 41 to Marcella, "bishops hold the place of the Apostles; among them (the followers of Montanus) the bishop is third." "The bishops of the Church now hold the place of these (Apostles), receiving the authority of binding and loosing," says Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, 26, n. 5. Hence the Council of Trent, Session 23, ch. 4, declared that "bishops who have succeeded to the place of the Apostles principally belong to the hierarchical order." This succession is not to be taken strictly, since almost no bishop, except the Roman, has had an Apostle as his predecessor in his see, and bishops were constituted while the Apostles were still living; nor is it to be taken according to equality if you compare individual bishops with individual Apostles, since they are not equal to individual Apostles; but it is to be taken according to similarity if you compare individual bishops, except the Roman Pontiff, with individual Apostles, for they possess ordinary power of binding and loosing, of teaching, and of sanctifying; and according to equality too if you compare the whole college of bishops with the apostolic college, for the power is equal.

The Church has regarded the bishops as successors of the Apostles in such a way that it has simultaneously regarded this economy of ecclesiastical governance as immutable for itself and therefore as belonging to divine law. This is clear not only from the never-interrupted practice from the apostolic age onward, but also from the asserted dignity of bishops above others as successors of the Apostles in

the governance of the Church; for it is secured by divine law that some succeed the Apostles. And this is also clearly established by the explicit profession that bishops placed to govern the Church of God belong principally to the hierarchy instituted by divine ordinance. Hence the Church was defined by Cyprian as "the people united to the priest (bishop) and the flock adhering to its shepherd" (letter 69), and it was said that the Church is in the bishop and the bishop in the Church (ibid.).

III. The second thing to be demonstrated—namely, that by the same institution of Christ each bishop is to have assigned to him a portion of the flock to govern with ordinary jurisdiction—is demonstrated as follows. The Catholic concept of the divine institution of the episcopate certainly represents the divine institution itself so as to be entirely conformable to it; but this Catholic concept presents that institution in such a way that individual bishops (with the one exception of the Roman Pontiff) cannot govern any and all faithful or the universal Church, but are destined by ordinary right to govern only a certain portion of the flock of the Lord, and in such a way that this pertains to the essential constitution of the Church; therefore such was in fact the institution of Christ. The minor premise can be established by several considerations. Indeed, this is how the Apostles brought the divine institution into act; for Paul commanded Titus (1:5) to appoint presbyters in each city, and John in the Apocalypse 2 ff. assigns seven angels or bishops to seven churches, and blessed Peter in 1 Pet. 5:2 admonishes bishops to tend the flock of God that is among them—not the whole flock of God but that which is among them; for the church is in the bishop as its head. Witnesses to this apostolic ordinance are Clement in the cited place and St. Ignatius, who recognizes a proper bishop for each church and testifies in his letter to the Ephesians, n. 3, that "bishops established throughout the farthest reaches of the earth are according to the mind of Jesus Christ."

Nothing in ecclesiastical history is more certain than this; for individual pastors have always had assigned to them a portion of the flock for each to govern and guide (Cyprian, letter 33 to Cornelius). For the episcopate is one, of which each holds a part individually in its fullness (same author, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*). Cf. Augustine, letter 34 to

Eusebius, n. 3. Hence it was always forbidden for bishops to abandon their own church and invade those of others, or to receive those excommunicated by others (Apostolic Canon 11; Nicene Canon 15 and 3); hence the legitimate election of bishops was ordinarily that which was made for a determined church to which the bishop was assumed, such that he was never permitted to transfer to another, even if he had not been received by the one to which he was elected, except with the permission of the Roman Pontiff—testimonies of which we shall bring forward in the proper place. Hence each bishop takes his title from the city of his see, as is clear from synodal subscriptions. Moreover, this has been believed to pertain to the essential constitution of the Church; for it has always been believed that the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff alone, as having the primacy, is universal in the Church, and that therefore by divine law the other bishops can have only a partial jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction over a portion of the flock—and are accordingly said to be called to share in the burden of responsibility but not to the fullness of power.

From what has been demonstrated it is clear that the jurisdiction of bishops must be ordinary—for it is by virtue of an office instituted by Christ himself—and must be immediate with respect to those faithful committed to their care; for these are constituted as subjects of the bishops by means of this jurisdiction, and a jurisdiction over subjects cannot but be immediate.

SCHOLION

I. It is established that by divine law bishops exist in the Church. The grades of the episcopate, however—patriarchs, primates, metropolitans, simple bishops—are of ecclesiastical law. An adumbration of the metropolitan right is found in the Epistle to Titus, to whom the right of consecrating bishops in the cities of Crete is conferred by the Apostle. But it is not sufficiently established whether this right was given as permanent with permanent jurisdiction, or whether the office was only imposed on Titus for that occasion. Moreover, it is clear that Peter established three sees—Antiochene, Alexandrian, and Roman—endowed with those rights on account of which they were afterward

called patriarchal. Mention of metropolitans is made in the Apostolic and Nicene canons. That this institution derives ultimately from ecclesiastical or apostolic-ecclesiastical law is clear. For by divine law all bishops are equal; for all are equally regarded as successors of the Apostles; and this prerogative is asserted equally for all bishops in all ecclesiastical monuments, with no distinction made between simple bishops, metropolitans, archbishops, etc. The opinion of Bernard, abbot of Fontfroide, in his *Tractatus contra Waldenses et Arianos* in the twelfth century (Galland, XIV, 523), that archbishops hold the place of the Apostles and bishops of the disciples, is unique. Since therefore the Apostles, with the exception of Peter, were equal by divine law, bishops too will be equal if only divine law is considered. Moreover, all bishops equally obtain by divine law that through which they are destined by God for the governance of the churches—that is, the episcopal character. What is not of divine law is therefore to be traced to ecclesiastical or apostolic-ecclesiastical law. This apostolic and ecclesiastical institution, however, had a certain divine norm and is supremely consonant with reason, as St. Leo discourses in letter 14 to Anastasius of Thessalonica, ch. 2: "Among the most blessed Apostles there was a certain distinction of power in the similarity of honor; and although the election of all was equal, yet to one it was given to preside over the rest. From this form (that is, the distinction of power between Peter and the other Apostles) the distinction of bishops too arose, and by great disposition it was provided that not all should claim everything for themselves, but that in individual provinces there should be individuals whose opinion among the brethren should be held the first, and again that certain ones established in greater cities should take on a wider care, through whom the solicitude of the universal Church should flow to the one See of Peter and nothing anywhere should diverge from its head."

II. It was the fabrication of Gerson and the Sorbonne, later propagated by the Jansenists, that not only bishops but also parish priests are in the Church by divine institution; a doctrine which the Jansenists expanded by asserting that parish priests are immediate pastors in such a way that the bishop is in himself only a mediate pastor and can exercise immediate jurisdiction over the flock of parish priests

only for the purpose of supplying or correcting the deficiency of the parish priest—not unlike what they taught about the Roman Pontiff with respect to bishops. Hence they wished the right to belong to parish priests to decide controversies of faith in synods and to excommunicate, with the result that the parish priest was ultimately honored by the simple appellation of pastor. But although it is indeed by divine institution that priests of the second order are such as to be capable of being assumed to the office of parish priest, and the law of nature itself teaches that it is fitting in certain existing conditions that they be assumed, it is not by divine institution that there must be parish priests —that is, there is no divine law or divine precept determining the existence of parish priests. For a parish priest is not simply a presbyter who exercises care of souls through the preaching of the word of God and the administration of certain sacraments, but is a presbyter legitimately deputed to minister from obligation and in his own name the word of God and the sacraments to a certain number of the faithful of a diocese, who are in turn to some extent bound to receive sacred things from the same parish priest. Cf. De Bouix, *De Parocho*, pt. 1, sect. 2, ch. 9, § 3.

Now that which cannot be said to be required by divine institution in the Church is that which for a long time was not in the Church, even at a time when nothing prevented the divine institution from being brought into act. But in the first three centuries, when the number of the faithful had already increased such that they could certainly have been distributed not only into episcopal but also into parochial divisions, especially rural ones, there was yet no parish priest; rather, the bishop exercised the entire care of souls, either himself or through presbyters whom he sent for given occasions without any habitual permanent jurisdiction over determined flocks. All jurisdiction was with the bishop alone, whom he exercised with his presbyterate, and the assemblies of the faithful on the Lord's Day took place before one bishop, to whom even those in the countryside had to come. Read Justin's Apology and the letters of Ignatius. In the fourth century presbyters or colleges of presbyters began to be established in rural areas outside the cities, and also chorepiscopi over the presbyters—who were of themselves simple priests of the second order—to whom the ordinary

care of souls under the bishop of the city was entrusted. But within the boundaries of cities, parishes were not constituted until after the year 1000, with everything being administered by the bishop together with his presbyterate or college of canons; so that in the time of Trent as well certain cities still lacked parish priests (Session 14, ch. 13 *de Reform.*). This has been extensively demonstrated by Mario Lupi in his work *De Paroeciis Ante Annum 1000* and by Luigi Nardi in his copious work *De Parochis*, which should be consulted.

Those therefore err who think that under the name of presbyters in ancient monuments (unless a special declaration is added from context) parish priests are designated. It is therefore false and alien from the whole tradition that parish priests as such constitute a certain grade of the hierarchy; and it is far more false that they constitute a certain grade of the hierarchy which is of divine law. For parish priests as such are not required by divine law in the Church, as has been shown; whereas the hierarchy which is of divine law is required by that same law in the Church.

Moreover, the hierarchy is considered either with respect to order or with respect to jurisdiction. If with respect to order, parish priests are equal to other presbyters. If with respect to jurisdiction—and one may consider either jurisdiction in the external forum or in the internal forum—if in the external forum, parish priests have no such jurisdiction; for they can neither enact laws, nor institute tribunals, nor inflict punishments. If in the internal forum, it is that which any presbyter can have from the bishop and frequently does have; and the whole difference is that the parish priest has it annexed to his office by institution of the Church, while the simple presbyter has it by delegation. But this is not sufficient to constitute a new grade of the hierarchy; for grades of the hierarchy are constituted by a special power, whereas here there is only a special manner of obtaining a power that is common to others as well.

Gerson therefore erred most shamefully in affirming (in his opuscule *De Statibus Ecclesiasticis*) "that the state of curates is by the institution of Christ and his Apostles from the beginning of the foundation of the Church, and that the state of curates is of the essential and intrinsic hierarchy of the Church, just as is the state of prelates"; and

(in his *Sermo contra Bullam Regnans Alexandri V*) "that lords curates are in the Church lesser prelates and hierarchical persons—that is, principal and ruling persons—by the primary institution of Christ, and that this state cannot be destroyed by the Pope." This error Gerson bequeathed to the Sorbonne, and it bore its fruits in the Council of Basel and in the Synod of Pistoia. Now since the appellation of pastor, by biblical and ecclesiastical usage, designates one who has jurisdiction in the external forum and has been used throughout all centuries from the apostolic age down to the present day to designate bishops, it is clear that parish priests have no right to claim the appellation of pastors without any qualification.

From all this the reason already indicated above why bishops are by divine law also superior to presbyters with respect to jurisdiction becomes more clearly apparent.

§ XVIII

Having regard to the end of the Church and the origin of the power by which the Church is governed, it is clear that the Church is a perfect society altogether independent of civil society.

I. This is denied in our age by all the enemies of the Church, and all atheistic governments of civil societies aim at placing in chains the Church which they cannot eradicate. The heresy opposed to the doctrine which all Catholics defend has always appealed more or less to kings and emperors, who, ignorant of the end of their authority and striving to amplify it, could not bear that there should be another power on earth independent of themselves. Errors of this kind were condemned by Pius IX in the *Syllabus*, prop. 39 ff.

II. A perfect society is one which is neither a part of another society nor subordinated to another society; for if it is such, it must be self-sufficient—that is, the power by which it is governed must be sufficient for the attainment of its end, so that the society is integral and whole in itself, that is, perfect. Now a part of some society, or a college within a society, can only be a community whose end is subordinated to the end of that society, whether it receives from the same society its power of constituting itself or whether this power is from nature; the

reason is that the end of the part must be subordinated to the end of the whole, from which it follows that social power has the right to govern the colleges that are parts of the society. But the end of the Church is more excellent than the end of any other society distinct from it. For the only societies distinct from it are civil societies; for if there are any other societies that are called religious, they have no right to exist unless they are members of the Church. Now the end intended by civil society is some temporal good—namely, the unfolding of the individual capacities of its members and the protection of those individual rights which are by nature inbuilt and refer to temporal life; and when these two are obtained, a certain temporal happiness results. To this, to be sure, civil laws are directed, which do not directly intend to make men simply virtuous and thus fit for the attainment of their supreme end, but to make good citizens—that is, good men in social life in this present life.

It is true that in the order of pure nature, if it existed, the duty of the ruler would also be to see to it by his laws that men were good and devout toward God; but this would arise from the fact that in that order the civil ruler would also be the supreme priest and legislator in the religious order—two formal aspects that are distinct even if they might be in the same subject (though in that order it would not have been necessary that the same subject held both powers), and distinct in such a way that civil power as respecting a less noble end would have been subordinated to religious power. But in the present order of providence, the entire care of religion has been entrusted by God to persons other than rulers, who ought indeed to ensure that the laws enacted by the religious power are observed by their subjects (regarding which we shall speak in Thesis 21 ff.) but have no right to enact religious laws. For this reason, with respect to civil society and civil power as such, it is ordered of itself toward temporal good. The end of civil societies, therefore, is something natural. Quite different is the end of the Church, which is a supernatural society. The Church's end, namely, is the supreme end of man to be obtained in the next life, to which it leads immediately and of itself; and to this supernatural end the other natural ends and the ends of other political societies are subordinated. Nor is another supernatural society to be supposed on earth; for the universal Church is one, just as the end is one.

Likewise, a society subordinated to another receives its governing authority from the one that subordinates it; but it is impossible for the Church to receive its governing authority on earth from another society, because other societies are natural and can confer only some power consonant with the natural order, whereas the power of the Church is supernatural. Nor can a society that is subordinated to another with respect to authority be ordered toward a more excellent end such as the Church is in comparison with civil societies.

Therefore the Church is an integral and whole-in-itself society, and therefore self-sufficient—which is to be a perfect society.

III. Indeed it must be maintained that the Church is a society altogether independent of civil society—which must be certain if the authority by which the Church is governed is entirely independent of civil authority. We wish to demonstrate this prerogative of ecclesiastical power—today so foolishly denied by its enemies—yet more evidently, if need be. The question truly comes to this: whether ecclesiastical power is independent of civil power; for societies stand to one another as do the powers by which they are constituted.

Now just as there can be two kinds of dependence of one power on another, so too there can be two kinds of independence. One dependence is direct, another indirect. Direct dependence obtains when some power is subject to another with respect to itself, that is, insofar as it is such a power; whence the superior power governs all the acts of the inferior power in relation to the very end of this inferior power, because the same end is intended more universally by the superior power. Thus the power of a provincial governor is subject to the power of a king. Indirect dependence obtains when one power is subject to another by reason of something other than itself—for instance, by reason of a more noble end which is intended by some power and which another power cannot oppose but to which it is rather subordinated as a means. Thus paternal power is subject to the power of social jurisdiction.

From this one understands what direct and what indirect independence is.

It must further be noted that when powers are compared, the comparison can be formal or material. It is formal when powers are compared in themselves—or, which amounts to the same thing, when

their subjects are compared insofar as they are endowed with that power and exercise it; and it is material when the subjects are compared but under another aspect.

We now defend that the power of the Church is altogether independent of civil power—not only directly but also indirectly. The arguments we shall first bring forward will certainly prove direct independence; we shall then add that by which indirect independence also becomes evident.

IV. The words of Christ to the Apostles are: "Whatsoever you shall bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven." Now in these words the power of the Church, which is most ample, is exhibited as independent of itself from any human power, and therefore also from civil power. For when the Church binds, God binds; when the Church looses, God looses: the connection is immediate, as is clear, and necessary—that is, it is impossible for the Church to bind or loose anything that God does not equally bind and loose, for "whatsoever you shall bind, whatsoever you shall loose" is said: nothing is excepted. This divine ratification of the power of binding and loosing exercised by the Church is not a ratification or approval of the act as it belongs to the moral order, but insofar as it is an act of authority. For God himself binds and looses when the Church binds and looses. Now 1° this universal proposition of Christ would be false if the power of the Church depended on civil power; for then, when the Church binds or looses—that is, enacts or abrogates laws, judges, or punishes—civil power could invalidate what the Church decrees, and this invalidation would be legitimate and valid; but if such an invalidation existed, God who would ratify it would not hold valid the act of the Church, or would not bind or loose in heaven what the Church binds or looses on earth: therefore. 2° No human power can bind what God looses or loose what God binds; therefore neither can it bind what the Church looses or loose what the Church binds. The consequence is proved: since God binds and looses whatever the Church binds and looses, if someone were to bind what the Church looses, he would thereby bind what God looses; and if he were to loose what the Church binds, he would loose

what God binds: therefore. The power of the Church is therefore independent of civil power.

This is also manifest from the purpose of ecclesiastical power. For the power of the Church is the efficient principle of the unity of the whole Catholic Church; for this is what authority in society is aimed at. But this power cannot be subject to civil power; therefore. The major premise is clear: civil power is manifold in the world, corresponding to the diverse kingdoms and empires; but if the power of the Church were subject to civil power, it would have to conduct itself differently in different kingdoms according to the pleasure of kings, and it could come about that no law of the Church, no direction, would be common to the whole Church; whereas the power that is the efficient principle of a society requires that it be able to govern the whole society by common laws and statutes: therefore. Indeed, if the power of the Church were subject to civil power, the supreme power for the Church in each kingdom would be the civil power, to which the authority of the Church would be subject; and there would therefore be as many supreme powers in the Church as there are kings—that is, there would be as many churches as there are kingdoms, meaning there would no longer be one Church. Therefore.

And indeed, either the authority of the Church depends on civil power insofar as the latter is such, or insofar as it exists in a Christian subject. But the Christian character confers no authority over the Church on a ruler but rather subjects him to it like a lamb, no differently from others. If, however, the authority of the Church is subject to civil power as such, then a pagan, Hebrew, heretical, or excommunicated ruler would also be able to interfere in the affairs of the Church and govern it—which is absurd; for it is absurd that Christ entrusted his sheepfold to wolves: therefore. Cf. prop. 44 of the *Syllabus*.

V. Thus the power of the Church is not directly dependent on civil power. But neither is it so indirectly. For the indirect subjection of one power to another can only obtain when the end of one power is subordinated to the end of the other; in which hypothesis, in order that the end of the superior power may be served, the inferior power can be compelled to serve as a means to the superior. But the end of the power of the Church is not subordinated to the end of civil power: therefore.

The minor premise is evident. The major premise is clear because the nature and force of social power depends on the end toward which it orders its acts in society; therefore powers stand to one another as do their ends. Cf. what we shall say in the cited Thesis of the following treatise.

VI. Objection is usually made from the power exercised by the Christian emperors of the early centuries of the Church in ecclesiastical affairs themselves, to which the Roman Pontiff too seemed subject; so that appeals to them were made from the judgments of bishops; they themselves designated bishops—including the Roman bishop, as Constantine did—for purposes of judging; they convened synods even universal ones, to which the Roman bishop was summoned; and so on: therefore. But we respond: 1° that certain emperors indeed usurped the right in these matters as if it were their own, but these were either heretics, or deceived by heretics, or at any rate ignorant of ecclesiastical power and liberty. 2° That the Church consistently protested against such violations of her rights. Thus Lucifer of Cagliari, in his first book in defense of Athanasius addressed to the Emperor Constantius: "But you say that in this passage (Deut. 17:9) God-fearing Moses made mention of both priests and of a judge. Prove that you have been made a judge over us; prove that you have been constituted emperor for the purpose of leading us by your arms to fulfill the whole will of your friend the devil. Since you cannot prove it—because it has been commanded to you not only not to rule over bishops but to obey their statutes, and if you attempt to subvert their decrees and are found in arrogance, you have been ordered to be put to death—how can you say that you can judge bishops?" Hosius of Córdoba, to the same Constantius (in Athanasius, *Historia Arianorum*, n. 44): "Do not meddle in ecclesiastical affairs, nor give us commands in these matters, but rather learn from us; God has committed to you the empire, to us ecclesiastical matters." Athanasius, ibid., n. 53: "If this is a decree of bishops, what has it to do with the emperor? But if it is an imperial threat, what need is there of men called bishops? When from the beginning of time was such a thing heard? When did a decree of the Church receive authority from an emperor, or when was this counted as a decree? Many synods have been convened previously, many decrees of the Church have gone forth; but

never did the Fathers urge such things on the emperor, never did the emperor inquire curiously into ecclesiastical matters." Hilary to Constantius, bk. 1, n. 1: "Let your clemency provide and decree that all judges everywhere, to whom the administration of provinces has been entrusted, whose sole concern and care ought to be public affairs, abstain from religious observance, and no longer presume and usurp and suppose that they should adjudicate the cases of clerics." Ambrose, *Contra Auxentium*, n. 35: "The tribute of Caesar is not denied; the Church belongs to God and surely ought not to be assigned to Caesar, for God's temple cannot be Caesar's right... The emperor is within the Church, not above the Church." 3° When good emperors consulted ecclesiastical matters by their authority, they did so with the expressed or tacit consent of the Church or at its request or counsel, because temporal authority was necessary for the execution of certain matters, and the Church had the right to demand the assistance of its power from rulers and rulers were bound by obligation to render it. Thus in the case of Hilary of Arles, condemned by Leo the Great, Valentinian III issued his constitution to defend Leo's decree, saying: "Since the merit of Saint Peter, who is the prince of the episcopal crown, and the dignity of the Roman city, and the authority of the holy Synod, have confirmed the primacy of the Apostolic See, let no unlawful presumption attempt anything against the authority of this See; for then the peace of the churches everywhere will be preserved, if the whole body acknowledges its ruler... And indeed that judgment (of Leo's) was going to be valid throughout the Gauls even without imperial sanction. For what would not be permitted in the Church to the authority of so great a Pontiff? etc." Rulers therefore discharged this obligation not from power over ecclesiastical affairs, but from the due subordination of themselves to the power of the Church—regarding which see in the following treatise in the cited place.

4° But it is most false and utterly absurd what the Most Illustrious Archbishop of Paris, De Marca, teaches (*Concordia*, bk. 7, ch. 2): "that emperors had the authority to grant rescripts for the review of supreme judgments, whether civil or ecclesiastical. For," he continues, "the edicts of the prefects of the praetorium were not subject to appeal but only to review, if one who had lost a case requested it by presenting a petition to

the emperor... Rescripts of rulers were also invoked against supreme judgments of synods" (here De Marca teaches that the supreme authority belongs to the synod of each province). He then teaches that this kind of right of granting review of ecclesiastical cases was granted to the Roman Pontiff by the Sardican Fathers (for thus that most acute man interprets the canons concerning appeal—but of these things in the following treatise); yet in such a way that the same right, intact and fuller, as being native, remained with the emperor, ibid., ch. 3. The absurdity of this opinion, which De Marca in his modesty admits was unknown to the interpreters of Greek and Latin canons, is most evident. For this power of granting rescripts for the review of cases already judged by bishops is: 1° the power of deputting other judges to institute a second judgment; it is 2° the power of judging—unless the emperor acts like a machine—whether the sentence delivered in the prior judgment is to be subjected to examination, and therefore of instituting a judgment concerning an ecclesiastical case and concerning the sentence of bishops; 3° consequently it is a power to which the authority of the bishops who judge and the ecclesiastical case are directly subject, just as civil cases and civil judges are directly subject; and it is therefore 4° the proper power of one to whom Christ committed the governance of the Church. But Christ committed supreme and universal power over the Church not to emperors but to Peter—which power, as we have seen, is entirely independent of civil power. Since therefore all ecclesiastical power is proper to the Church and is independent, no power remains to the emperor in ecclesiastical matters and affairs, nor can these be in any way subject to one who is not a pastor but a lamb to be tended. "As for what pertains to religion," says Gelasius in his *Commonitorium to Faustus*, "the supreme judgment of the whole belongs to none but the Apostolic See; as for secular power, that power ought to learn from the pontiffs and especially from the vicar of blessed Peter what things are divine—not judge them itself; nor does any most powerful person in the world who is nonetheless a Christian presume to claim this for himself, unless perhaps he be persecuting religion."

As for what specifically concerns the convocation of councils, we shall speak in its proper place when we treat of councils. The laws enacted by emperors touching ecclesiastical matters had force only

insofar as they were accepted by the Church and confirmed by its authority.

Objection is made from what Optatus says in bk. 3: "Already then was Donatus plotting, against the precepts of the Apostle Paul, to do injury to the powers and kings, for whom, if he would hear the Apostle, he ought to have been praying daily. For thus he teaches: 'Pray for kings and powers, that we may lead with them a quiet and tranquil life.' For the republic is not in the Church, but the Church is in the republic—that is, in the Roman empire—where too there are holy priesthoods and chastity and virginity, which are not found among barbarous peoples, and if they were, could not be safe. Rightly does Paul teach that prayer is to be made for kings and powers, even if the emperor were one who lived as a pagan. How much more since he is a Christian, how much more since he fears God, how much more since he is religious, how much more since he is merciful, as the very facts prove?" Now the statement: "not the republic is in the Church, but the Church is in the republic" signifies that the Church is subject to the republic as a part to the whole, as some kind of association existing within society is subject to the social power.

I respond that those words of Optatus are immediately connected with the words of Paul and are aimed at giving the reason why Paul said "that we may lead a quiet and tranquil life with them"—that is, why Paul signified that the tranquility of Christian life also depends on kings—namely because the Church is in the republic. By "republic" here is meant not just any civil society but the Roman empire, which retained that appellation antonomastically for a long time, which had been destined by God for the protection of the Christian name (which Christ calls Lebanon, etc.). Wherefore the existence of the Church in the republic is not a physical existence, which it also had in other societies, but rather a civil one—namely, that it might be protected by the authority of civil laws against the injurious attacks of adversaries; which in Optatus's time obtained only in the Roman empire. Thus the Church's being in the republic is equivalent to the Church's enjoying its liberty in the republic and benefiting from the due patronage of civil power against its enemies. Hence in turn the republic's not being in the Church means nothing else for Optatus than that the republic or Roman

empire did not use the patronage of the Church against its enemies—just as until the time in which Optatus was writing, the Roman empire had defended itself against its enemies by its armies, not by the patronage of the Church. Therefore the emperor is not to be wronged, as Donatus was plotting to do, but prayer is rather to be made for him, since through him we lead a quiet and tranquil life. Cf. the learned Tarquini, *Iuris Ecclesiastici Publici Institutiones*, bk. 1, n. 56.

Moreover, if the opinion of the adversaries is considered in itself: the Church is in the republic, or, as they interpret, in civil society—first, it must be denied that it is formally in the republic, because not only are the ends different, but the end of the Church is supernatural and the society itself is intrinsically supernatural; second, it must be denied that the Church is materially in civil society simply, because the Church is one and Catholic, exceeding any civil society; although if particular churches are considered, one may, in a secondary sense, concede that the Church is materially in the republic; third, it must therefore be denied that the Church is a part of the republic: both because it is a society of a superior order—namely, supernatural—and because it is a perfect society; for it has a full power of jurisdiction by which it is governed, independent of any human power, as we have proved, and is therefore something whole and complete in itself, not a part. Cf. the cited work, n. 57.

As for the claim that civil authority is also moral and religious, on the grounds that it is immediately from God, according to Paul in Rom. 13:1–8: omitting for now the interpretation of the Pauline text, of which more must be said elsewhere, it is enough to note that it does not follow that a power is religious from the fact that it is immediately from God, and that it is one thing for men to be religiously obligated to obey that authority, and quite another for it to be able to enact religious laws.

COROLLARY

Therefore, since in the Church there is a certain power constituted by God and this power must be self-sufficient for the governance of the society, and since the Church is a visible and perfect society of men that accordingly demands the governance necessary for maintaining order and tranquility within it; and since moreover the power necessary for the governance of a society is the power of jurisdiction—that is, coercive power for enacting laws, judging, and punishing—such a power is to be attributed to the Church. This is to be declared and demonstrated more fully in the following section.

§ XIX

Ecclesiastical power is by divine law a genuinely coercive power of jurisdiction.

I. Marsilius of Padua in his *Defensor Pacis*, pt. 2, chs. 4 ff., teaches that the Roman bishop or any other bishop or presbyter or cleric can claim for himself by virtue of the words of Scripture no coercive principate or contentious jurisdiction over any cleric or layman, and that all bishops, and the Roman Pontiff himself, must be subject to the coercive judgment and principate of the dominant authority of the human legislator, especially the faithful one. There are, he says, doctors in the Church who teach what is to be done, and there is authority in their hands in the internal forum to declare sins remitted and to commute punishments of the next life into punishments of this life; but there is no one who can urge the observance of the law, no judge endowed with coercive power in cases of transgression of the evangelical law apart from Christ, who however reserved judgment to himself not in this age but in the next. But if the secular ruler has sanctioned some evangelical law by his authority, he can compel observance of it and institute coercive judgment concerning it; or the Church can do this too, but by concession of the secular ruler and using his authority.

M. Antonius de Dominis teaches the same in his *De Republica Ecclesiastica*, bk. 5 ff. Likewise Richer in his work *De Ecclesiastica et Politica Potestate*, chs. 11–12, teaches that since the Church has neither territory nor the right of the sword from Christ and was instituted only for a supernatural end, it judges concerning the means necessary for salvation only by way of persuasion and direction, not coercively by inflicting temporal punishments. But the political ruler, as lord of the republic and of the territory, is the avenger and protector of divine, natural, and canonical law; and therefore to that end he can impose laws and draw the sword. Febronius, who grants the Roman Pontiff a primacy indeed of direction but denies one of jurisdiction, consequently also refuses coercive power. Eybel likewise holds this view (as Pius VI reports in the Brief *Super Soliditate*, by which he proscribed his work as containing propositions respectively false, rash, etc., tending to heresy and heretical)—namely, that the force of the primacy is contained in this one prerogative of supplying the negligence of others and providing for the preservation of unity by exhortations and example.

The same errors were revived by Johann Nepomuk Nuytz in his *Institutiones Iuris Ecclesiastici* and in his treatises on universal ecclesiastical law, which works Pius IX condemned by the Brief *Ad Apostolicae*, August 22, 1851. Nuytz taught, namely, that the Church does not have the power of using force, nor any direct or indirect temporal power.

Hence John XXII (by a Constitution issued October 28, 1327, preserved in Raynaldus) condemned as heretical this fifth among five propositions of Marsilius: "that the whole Church assembled together cannot punish any man with coercive punishment unless the emperor concede this." Likewise Pius VI thus confuted the fourth proposition of the Synod of Pistoia: "The proposition affirming that it would be an abuse of authority for the Church to transfer that authority beyond the limits of doctrine and morals and to extend it to external matters and to exact by force what depends on persuasion and the heart, and further that it is much less her province to exact by external force submission to her decrees; insofar as by those indeterminate words 'extending to external matters' it brands as an abuse of the Church's authority the use of that power received from God which was used by the Apostles

themselves in establishing and sanctioning external discipline: heretical. Insofar as it insinuates that the Church does not have the authority to exact submission to its decrees except by means that depend on persuasion; insofar as it intends that the Church does not have a power conferred on her by God not only to direct by counsels and persuasions, but also to command by laws and to restrain and compel the deviant and contumacious by external judgment and salutary punishments, from Benedict XIV in the Brief *Ad Assiduas* of the year 1755 to the primates, archbishops and bishops of the kingdom of Poland: introducing a system already condemned elsewhere as heretical." In the encyclical letters of the most holy Pius IX, *Quanta Cura*, among the depraved and so-often-condemned inventions of innovators there is enumerated: that which denies to the Apostolic See all rights concerning what pertains to the external order, and maintains that the laws of the Church do not bind in conscience unless they are promulgated by civil power; also that the right does not belong to the Church of coercing with temporal penalties violators of its laws; and that those judgments and decrees of the Apostolic See whose object is declared to concern the general good of the Church and its rights and discipline, provided they do not touch on dogmas of faith and morals, can be dissented from and disobeyed without sin and without any loss of Catholic profession—which errors, along with many others, are reproved, proscribed, and condemned.

II. It is therefore to be proved that the power of the Church is coercive and that it is such by divine law. Now we call fully considered coercive power that which has simultaneously these three things: 1° it binds by enacted laws the free wills of others, so that it is not lawful for them to act against the law; 2° it can institute tribunals concerning the actions of subjects and deliver sentences against the unwilling, by which the same are bound; 3° it can sanction enacted laws with prescribed penalties—not only spiritual but also corporeal—and oblige the contumacious or unwilling to them, and can either itself inflict them or command that a subordinate power inflict them. An obligation is said to be imposed on the unwilling and a penalty inflicted on the unwilling when, independently of their consent, whether they will or not, they are subject to the obligation and actually undergo the punishment which

the vindicatory power has decreed. The coercive force of power certainly does not consist merely in being able and in being physically able to compel; for robbers can do this: but from its essence it requires that it impose on the unwilling an obligation to do or to omit something, and an obligation to some penalty proportioned to the crime, and that it inflict this on the unwilling. Thus John XXII in the cited Constitution proves that coercive power was given to Peter in those words "whatsoever you shall bind" etc., saying: "for not only the willing but also the unwilling are bound." As for penalties that are also corporeal: although the essence of coercive power can still be conceived if it truly imposes by its laws and sentences a moral obligation and sanctions its laws and sentences only by spiritual penalties, nevertheless it will readily be granted that coercive power in human society lacking the force of inflicting corporeal coercion is imperfect; and it is perfect if it has this coercive force. Now it is this perfect coercive power that we defend to be that of the Church, and it is what all Catholics understand when they speak of the power of jurisdiction. The two modes of inflicting corporeal penalties we shall explain when the demonstration reaches that point. For the sake of clarity, however, we distinguish two things: 1° the power of enacting laws binding in conscience, of likewise delivering judicial sentences binding in conscience, and the power of inflicting at least spiritual penalties; 2° the power of enacting such laws and sentences concerning also external and temporal matters and of inflicting also corporeal penalties. The adversaries object more strenuously to this second.

We demonstrate the first from the words of Christ. For to Peter and the Apostles a power of binding and loosing was given by Christ—a universal power, touching all things that pertain to this kingdom of God which is the Church, and divinely efficacious: "whatsoever," he says (Matt. 18:19), "you shall bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven." Now the force of this composite phrase "to bind and to loose" certainly signified in Christ's time the exercise of that power which is supreme in some kingdom (cf. what we shall bring forward in Thesis I). And indeed the action of binding and loosing presupposes some bond, which is imposed or removed. The speech is not of physical

bonds or chains, but of moral bonds. Now the moral bond by which a man can be bound and from which he can be loosed is threefold: the bond of law, the bond of guilt, and the bond of punishment. With respect to the bond of law and punishment, someone can be loosed and bound by another; but with respect to the bond of guilt, one can be loosed by another, but only oneself can directly bind oneself, while another can do so indirectly insofar as absolution is refused to one by the one who has the power to absolve. Now since the words of Christ are most universal ("whatsoever"), the Apostles are given power to impose and to loose any moral bond in Christian society: the power therefore of enacting laws and of abrogating them, the power of delivering judicial sentences and of imposing and remitting penalties—a power which has the most efficacious force of binding; for what the Apostles loose or bind, God looses or binds: that is, the exercise of their authority as such is held valid by God, who looses and binds together with them. Therefore the ecclesiastical power instituted by Christ in the Apostles is a truly coercive power of jurisdiction.

The same can be demonstrated from the practice and doctrine of the primitive Church. First, with respect to the force of enacting laws. In Acts 15:28, Peter together with the Apostles issued this edict to the faithful: "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication; from which keeping yourselves, you will do well." Now: a) this decree is a law binding in conscience, for a burden is imposed and a thing is commanded as necessary for doing well. And indeed the question was whether the faithful were to be bound to the Mosaic law, that is, whether the yoke was to be imposed upon the necks of the disciples which the fathers were not able to bear (ibid. 10); and it is decreed that, other burdens being set aside, this alone is to be undertaken: so the discussion was about a law properly so called, just as the Mosaic law was such. b) It is a new law, first enacted at that time; for Christ had not determined this: otherwise there would have been no need for the Apostles to convene to consider this matter, or mention would have been made of his command in the law; but the matter is handled in the council in such a way that deliberation

precedes, bearing in mind the Christian economy from which what is to be decreed is gathered. Nor is a decree of this kind to be derived from the old law, for it is prefaced by the statement that the old law does not hold for the faithful in these matters. It is therefore a new decree. c) As for certain matters it is certainly a positive law. This decree d) is issued by the Apostles from the authority divinely given to them: "it has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us." Therefore the power of the Apostles was a coercive power—that is, the power of commanding or enacting laws binding in conscience. You will say that the Apostles did not by their own authority enact a new law, but only proposed either the natural law with respect to fornication and things sacrificed to idols (which law, to be sure, is required for the interpretation of Paul in 1 Cor. 8:1 ff.), or the positive law of God with respect to the other things—namely, the law promulgated by God to Noah himself in Gen. 9:4, which law is therefore older than the Jewish law and bound all men. I respond: omitting what was said in the first place, that it is false that the Apostles only proposed a law of God given to Noah, teaching what was to be observed by the gentiles from the precept of God, rather than themselves enacting a law. This is evidently demonstrated. For it must be certain that the first Christians were not bound by that law of Genesis; the reason is that we are not now bound by it: therefore that law ceased after Christ, either because it was abrogated by him or because it was not enacted with the intention that it last even after Christ. For if that law remained after Christ, it would still be in force today; since the Church, as inferior to a superior, cannot abrogate a law of God. Now the Apostles certainly knew what the Church knows—that this law ceased after Christ. But if so, they could not impose this burden on the faithful from the force of a divine law that did not exist; they had to give the force of law to that ordinance by their own authority: therefore.

III. The power moreover of coercing by external judgment, by which sentence is delivered against the unwilling, is clear from 1 Cor. 4:18 and 5:3 ff. The Apostle says: "As if I were not coming to you, so some are puffed up... What will you? Shall I come to you with a rod, or in charity and a spirit of meekness?... I indeed, absent in body but present in spirit, have already judged as present him who has so done, in

the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, you being gathered together and my spirit, with the power of the Lord Jesus, to deliver such a one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that his spirit may be saved in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ." Paul, that is, judges—delivers a sentence decreeing punishment on the guilty party; he judges indeed while absent, from knowledge of the crime received not through the free confession of the accused but through report ("it is heard among you that there is such fornication" etc.); he nevertheless indicates that such a judgment is usually rendered in presence (I have judged as present)—in the presence, namely, of the judge and his assessors ("you being gathered together") and of the accused, presumably for the case to be known through witnesses and the accused to be heard; which investigation was on this occasion supplied by the notoriety of the crime. The sentence, moreover, is delivered by Paul which the accused, willing or not, must undergo. Now in these things is contained the essence of external coercive judgment, which is exercised "with the rod." The power therefore existed and the custom was in the Church of holding such judgments. Likewise Paul in 1 Tim. 5:19 admonishes the bishop not to receive an accusation against a presbyter except under two or three witnesses. But an accusation is brought to a judge in the external forum so that a sentence may be delivered; and by judge, accuser, witnesses, and accused, an external judgment is constituted by which a sentence is delivered against the unwilling—that is, a coercive judgment.

IV. The coercive power finally of inflicting punishments is demonstrated first from what has already been proved concerning legislative power, which requires the sanctioning of laws, and from what has been proved concerning external judgment; for a judge in the external forum has the right to inflict punishments and to compel the accused to undergo them; and indeed a most grave punishment is decreed and inflicted by Paul there, from which he is afterward released (2 Cor. 2:6–8). Then it is established from the words of Christ in Matt. 18:17: "Tell the Church; and if he will not hear the Church, let him be to you as the heathen and the publican. Amen, amen, I say to you: whatsoever you shall bind" etc.; in which words, among other things, the power of excommunicating the contumacious from the Church is

asserted—which power (says John XXII in the cited Constitution, n. 33) is indeed coercive; for the unwilling are excommunicated. St. Paul teaches the same more than once. For in the passage cited above he makes mention of the rod with which the wicked are punished; and in 2 Cor. 10:3 ff. he says: "For though we walk in the flesh, we do not war according to the flesh; for the weapons of our warfare are not carnal (that is, weak: clear from the opposite) but powerful to God, unto the pulling down of strongholds, bringing into captivity every understanding, and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God... and having in readiness to revenge (ἐκδικῆσαι) all disobedience"; and he adds: "Now if I should glory somewhat more abundantly of our power, which the Lord has given me unto edification and not unto destruction (εἰς οἰκοδομήν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς καθαίρεσιν), I shall not be ashamed." But the power of avenging all disobedience is the power of punishing even the unwilling. This moreover is the power which he says he has received from the Lord unto edification and not unto destruction; the meaning of which, if we believe the Greek Fathers Chrysostom, Oecumenius, and Theophylact (cf. Petavius, *Hierarchia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 3, ch. 9) is this: the Apostle has from God the power of commanding and punishing—which he calls himself the power of building up and destroying—yet in such a way that the power of punishing or destroying was not given to the Apostle of itself and by the primary will and intention of Christ, but in support of the other and as it were incidentally; which the Apostle expresses by the negation: unto edification, not unto destruction—that is, the power was given of itself to command, not to punish, except incidentally, that is, if there are those who are disobedient. Thus Chrysostom on this passage: "That very thing is the most excellent kind of building up, to remove obstacles... And for this purpose we received the power, to build up. But if someone resists and fights and is incurable, we shall use the other action as well, to destroy and cast down." Indeed, he had spoken earlier of the power unto destruction; therefore the same is what he now speaks of in the same context: and previously he had said that he had the power unto destruction, or weapons δυνατὰ τῷ θεῷ πρὸς καθαίρεσιν ὀχυρωμάτων —of the strongholds, namely, with which those fortify themselves who exalt themselves against the knowledge of God; which are precisely that

external opposition and resistance against which criminal judgment and the coercive power of punishment are directed (Taparelli, *Saggio*, etc., Diss. 3, ch. 6, a. 4). He therefore could not afterward simply deny this power. Cf. ibid., 12:10 (note that when Dionysius Petavius in the cited place had referred this passage of the Apostle to prove the jurisdiction of bishops, the learned Salmasius replied in his usual manner in his *Apparatus ad Libros de Primatu*, pp. 161–62: "Petavius, the distinguished interpreter of ecclesiastical doctrines, who has never understood in his life what he proposes to prove from the same Apostle, or rather to persuade us of—namely, that the power and jurisdiction of the bishop, which he divines, is commended in the gravest and most explicit terms —says that the Apostle writes thus to the Corinthians in 2 Cor. 10:8: 'For even if I should glory somewhat more...' The impure Dogmatist has not seen, through the stupor and blindness of his mind, that the Apostle is speaking here not of the power and jurisdiction of a bishop, but of that ἐξουσία which was given to him as Apostle by Christ. And so all interpreters rightly explain it, and above all Jerome, whose words on this passage are: 'For even if I say I have received more power from Christ than the rest, as an Apostle, I shall not be ashamed.' Besides, this fabricator and constructor of ecclesiastical hierarchy is so foolish that he does not perceive that, from the whole of sacred Scripture, no passage more makes against the jurisdiction and authority of a bishop than this one of the Apostle, even if it were to be taken of the ordinary power of the bishop and not of the extraordinary apostolic power. For this power Paul says he received from Christ not for destruction but for edification —that is, not for coercing, punishing, killing, but for building up, conferring benefits, and doing good to everyone. Far removed is this from that ecclesiastical jurisdiction or rather tyranny which they attribute to bishops to be exercised against the unwilling, and which consists in the coercion of the disobedient... For if indeed the apostolate is called a διακονία in the Acts of the Apostles, that is, a ministry: what person in his right mind will contend that the episcopate was an empire and magistracy?" and so on. We have recited these things so that a specimen may be had of the shamelessness of this heretic, who has not even learned to spare men of the highest estimation even among non-Catholics, such as Petavius was. But this arrogant heretic betrayed his

own ignorance and blindness in the very thing he reproaches Petavius for. For he did not see that those commentaries on the Apostle's letters from which he quoted the words are not Jerome's but those of a pelagian heretic or of Pelagius himself, which some had already perceived in the thirteenth century and which all scholars subsequently came to know. Nor did he see that his distinction between the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Apostles and the ordinary jurisdiction of bishops did nothing to harm Petavius's argument. For with respect to jurisdiction, the authority of individual Apostles differs from the authority of individual bishops not in kind but only in universality and amplitude, and the authority of the whole apostolic college and the whole episcopate is entirely the same. Unless this heretic denies that bishops are successors of the Apostles and that those who now exist as such in the Church are by divine institution; in which matter his ignorance was well chastised by Petavius. The rest is abuse.)

Now in this bond of punishment, by which the wicked are bound, two things are to be distinguished: the obligation itself, by which the subject is held to undergoing punishment, and the execution of the same. The obligation arises from the law or the sentence of the judge, by which the guilty party is compelled to be a debtor of punishment. The execution, however, does not present itself in one way only. For if the punishment consists in the deprivation of some spiritual good or of some right, which can be perfectly lost without any externally applied force, then either no execution is required or the execution's place is taken by the law or sentence of the judge itself which induces that deprivation. Of this kind is the punishment of excommunication. If however the punishment consists in some evil which cannot exist unless some physical cause is applied, then execution is obtained through the action of certain ministers who physically compel the guilty party to undergo the punishment; of this kind is the punishment of imprisonment. The same action is also required in order to physically prevent someone from acting against a sentence of punishment already delivered above. Now this kind of action is exercised through what is usually called the public force.

Moreover, a distinction must be made between the juridical power of coercing and the ready faculty of exercising coercion. For this latter

can be lacking even without the juridical power being lacking. For if a legitimately condemned guilty party flees from the territory of a ruler, the ruler cannot exercise his power over him, yet his power is none the less truly coercive.

Now if the Church can inflict punishments to which the guilty, willing or not, are bound, this very fact already establishes that a coercive power of punishing is contained in the power of the Church; and this it can do, as is established from the demonstration already given, which certainly proves some power of punishing the unwilling, at least with regard to penalties consisting in the deprivation of spiritual goods or of certain rights, which the guilty must undergo, willing or not, as soon as the sentence has been delivered. For although someone who has been excommunicated, for instance, scorning the sentence of the judge, conducts himself as though not excommunicated, or one who has been deposed continues by force in the ministry: yet he is always truly excommunicated before God and the Church and lacks those spiritual goods of which excommunication deprives him; and one who has been deposed truly lacks the rights he previously had, so that he can no longer lawfully—or even validly, if jurisdiction is in question—exercise the ministry. But the power that takes away goods and rights from the unwilling (and all surely bear that deprivation with difficulty) is coercive. For the coercion of power depends of itself on its efficaciously exerting its force on the unwilling. Wherefore this power deprives of goods; deprivation of goods is an evil, and since it is on account of a fault, it is a punishment: but it deprives the unwilling of goods; therefore this punishment is coercive, or the guilty are compelled to suffer it, and thus the power is coercive. Whether this is the only coercive power that belongs to the Church, or whether another also belongs to it that is exercised through physical force—by which violence is resisted, and by which the guilty are constrained by corporeal punishments and are punished—this we shall dispute presently, speaking specifically of the power of punishing through corporeal punishments.

What has been proved thus far by the authority of the Scriptures is confirmed by the authority of Tradition; but it is not now necessary to gather testimonies placed in words or deeds; for it is known to all that

the Church and the Roman Pontiffs have issued laws or canons by which the consciences of the faithful were bound; that external tribunals were held by the Roman Pontiff, by other inferior bishops, whether individually or gathered in synods; and that punishments such as censures, depositions, and degradations were inflicted everywhere on the wicked and the contumacious: therefore.

V. With the first member thus demonstrated, there remains the second, about which there is more controversy. The question is whether it is within the power of the Church to enact laws and judicial sentences concerning external and temporal matters, and to inflict corporeal punishments. It must first be presupposed that the Church is: 1° a religious society, which the adversaries will readily grant; and 2° a perfect society, which has already been demonstrated; and 3° a society of associated men, which therefore must use, in accordance with the proper nature of men, means for the attainment of its end. For the nature of the means by which a society attains its end is determined objectively by the nature of the end, but must be determined subjectively by the nature of the subject using them; for they are actions or things around which actions are concerned, and these necessarily depend on the nature of the acting subject (it is to be noted by scholars that bishops of old, with Christian society existing, exercised judicial jurisdiction over the faithful even in cases that in themselves pertained to a merely lay forum; but they did this, it is said, following the ordinance of the Apostle in 1 Cor. 6:1 ff.; and therefore Constantine and other emperors approved and confirmed but did not confer this right of bishops—*Revue des Questions Historiques*, Paris, October 7, 1877. The fact is certainly certain. But that this right descended not from the consent of rulers but from the ordinance of Paul will be difficult to demonstrate, since Paul speaks not of bishops but of those who are of lower account in the Church being constituted as judges. It is one thing to persuade the faithful to settle disputes among themselves amicably by choosing arbitrators, and quite another to assert and confer civil jurisdiction).

With these things established as in outline, it is manifest that a society of men that is religious needs visible or external means by which it is assembled and by which religious worship is offered—such as

sacred rites, altars, temples, liturgy, and the like; and it needs also external things by which those things that pertain to worship can be provided and by which persons deputed to divine worship can be supported—such as movable or immovable goods. These, although they are in themselves temporal, yet extrinsically, by reason of the end to which they are ordered, become sacred. Now concerning all these things, which are more or less sacred, the power of the Church can exercise itself by enacting laws and judicial sentences. For a perfect society can enact laws concerning all those things that as means—whether simply necessary or merely useful—conduce to its end; and the Church is a perfect society (preceding section); therefore authority certainly belongs to it of enacting such laws. And whoever can enact laws can also deliver judicial sentences concerning the observance or violation of laws: therefore this power also belongs to the Church concerning all things that conduce to the end of the Church. Since therefore among these things there are several that are external and temporal, the legislative and judicial power of the Church is to be exercised also concerning them.

VI. As for corporeal punishments, we call that punishment corporeal which we undergo according to the body, or which consists in the deprivation of sensible goods. Two things are asked: whether the Church can punish the wicked with such punishments; whether the Church, with the application of external force, can execute such punishments. As for the first, the answer is affirmative. For such a power certainly belongs to the Church if a) it has full power of punishing in its own kind; if b) corporeal punishment is not against the nature of this society; if c) such corporeal punishments can conduce to the end which the vindicatory power in this society intends. Now: a) it is evident that the Church has the fullest power of punishing; for it has the universal power of binding its subjects. b) It is evident that corporeal punishments are not opposed to the nature of this society, which is the Church; for they would be opposed, as heretics wish, only insofar as the Church is a spiritual society; but a foul equivocation lurks here. For the Church is and is called a spiritual society by reason of its end, not by reason of the elements of which it is constituted and the means it uses; hence from this it follows that the end of punishment must be spiritual,

not that the punishment itself must be something spiritual. Since therefore the Church is a society of men visibly—and therefore sensibly and corporally—associated, sensible and corporeal means for promoting unity and peace and for removing disorders and dissensions are consonant with its nature, and therefore punishments too can be corporeal. c) It is evident that corporeal punishments can conduce—indeed, often only they can conduce—to the end intended by the vindicatory power of this society. For the proper end of the vindicatory power is the defense of society against violators of order; which defense is preventive when the law threatens a punishment so as to deter men from violating order, and executive when the punishment is inflicted. In a society such as the Church, whose end is also the private formation of each individual, the end of the vindicatory power (although not necessary for its exercise) is also the correction of the offender. But violators of order (unless they do so only from error) cannot be restrained by reason, which does not guide them, but can be held in check by force; and those who depart from the path of justice out of love of sensible things can likewise be brought back to that same path by fear of sensible evils. "For if," says Augustine in letter 93 to Vincent, n. 3, "they were terrified and not taught, this would seem to be an unjust domination; but if again they were taught and not terrified, those hardened by the old habit of custom would be moved too sluggishly to take up the way of salvation"—men who, as he says in n. 1, "by some force of custom would in no way think of changing for the better, unless, struck by this terror, they had their troubled minds turned toward the consideration of truth." And therefore, as he says in n. 6, "whatever a true and legitimate mother does, even if it is felt to be harsh and bitter, she does not return evil for evil, but applies the good of discipline in expelling the evil of iniquity—not with the desire to harm but with the love of healing." The same Augustine in the same letter, n. 17, admits that his earlier opinion was that no one should be compelled to the unity of Christ, that the matter should be dealt with by word, fought with by discussion, won by reason, lest we have feigned Catholics whom we knew as open heretics. He says, however, that he changed this opinion, convinced by examples offered by his colleagues.

Although these testimonies of Augustine, like others in letter 185 to Boniface, n. 21, directly speak of laws enacted by Christian emperors, they nevertheless show that corporeal punishments are useful and justly employed for the correction and amendment of the wicked, so that the just and holy may freely advance; and this is what we wish to demonstrate by these testimonies. That this power, however, belongs to the ecclesiastical authority itself, follows from the complete demonstration we have presented.

This is confirmed by the constant practice of the Church. Thus John XXII argues in the cited Constitution, n. 33: "Since greater excommunication not only removes the excommunicated person from receiving the sacraments but also excludes him from the communion of the faithful, a corporeal coercion of the Church by Christ is permitted" (the regalians deny with Richer, *De Potestate Ecclesiae in Temporalibus*, bk. 3, ch. 4, § 3, that the power of excommunicating extends to temporal effects, or that it can deprive of the commerce of civil life or of earthly goods or other supports of human life. Hence he also denies in the same work, ch. 2, § 3, that excommunication is a coercion "since coercion and coercive constraint, if we love truth, properly consists in the external force which is imposed by the political magistrate." The reason given for denying this is "because the coercive power of the Church corresponds proportionately to its directive power according to the essential spiritual and temporal causes of ecclesiastical power. When therefore the directive power of the Church has the soul as its matter and subject, which it informs through hierarchical acts, it follows likewise that the coercive power must necessarily be referred to the soul exclusively." But this reason has already been refuted; and insofar as it denies that excommunication is a coercion, 1° he is not self-consistent, for in the words just cited he speaks of excommunication; 2° although external force is not employed, we have already demonstrated that some true coercion obtains.). Now this effect of excommunication existed from the beginning of the Church, as is clear from Paul in 2 Thess. 3:14; 1 Cor. 5:2; 2 John 11. But the Church was also accustomed to impose other corporeal punishments. Gregory the Great, in bk. 13, letters 8, 9, 10, having granted privileges concerning also temporal matters to a Xenodochium, a Monastery, and a Church built by Queen Brunhilda,

adds: "But if any of the kings, priests, judges, or secular persons, recognizing this page of our constitution, shall attempt to come against it, let him be deprived of the dignity of his power and honor." That this privilege is not spurious but authentic is made evident by the notes on letter 8 in the Venetian edition of Giovanni Battista Galliccioli and in the Migne edition. The Fourth Lateran Council, ch. 3, decrees: "If a temporal lord, when asked or warned by the Church, neglects to purge his territory of this heretical filth, let him be bound by the bond of excommunication by the metropolitan and the other co-provincial bishops; and if he disdains to make satisfaction within a year, let this be signified to the Supreme Pontiff, that from then on he may denounce the vassal as absolved from fidelity to him and expose the land to occupation by Catholics, who, having exterminated the heretics, may possess it without any contradiction." Innocent IV, with the approval of the Fathers of the First Council of Lyons, by an issued Constitution in which he enumerated many crimes of Emperor Frederick II, from the power given to him in Peter by God (Matt. 16:18) deprives Frederick himself by sentence of the empire, all kingdoms, and every honor and dignity. The same Innocent, in the same Constitution, ch. 1, *De Homicidio in Sexto*, with the approval of the sacred Council, decrees that whoever, whether a ruler, a prelate, etc., has caused any Christian to be killed by assassins, etc., shall incur the sentence of excommunication and deposition from dignity, honor, etc., and shall be "defied" (*diffidatus*) by the whole Christian people. Now one who is *diffidatus* in law is one against whom the power of killing with impunity is given to all. Cf. Fr. Suárez, *De Fide*, disp. 20, sect. 3, n. 23. Likewise the Council of Trent, Session 4, in the decree on the edition and use of the Sacred Books, forbids, under penalty of anathema and monetary fine, the printing of any books on sacred matters without the author's name and without the approval of the Ordinary. It must therefore be certain that there is in the Church a coercive power of this kind.

VII. Yet the question remains how the Church can require the payment of such punishments—whether it can, that is, by applying external force, compel the guilty. And because if it can by applied external force compel the guilty to undergo punishment, it will simply be able to apply external force whenever it is necessary, both for

inflicting punishments and for repressing violence; hence the question asked in absolute terms is whether it is within the power of the Church to apply external force.

First, it may be noted that the use of external force can be in the power of the Church in two ways. Namely: 1° insofar as ministers of the Church instituted by it and immediately receiving from it the faculty exercise external force when it is necessary; 2° insofar as the Church itself commands secular rulers to exercise their force in its defense and thereby to repress all violences and exact due punishments. In this hypothesis the external force of the Church would be the force of civil power itself, but serving the Church and depending on its direction for its own causes. Now it is certain that at least in this latter way—namely, mediately—it is within the power of the Church to apply external force. This is taught to us by Boniface VIII in the Bull *Unam Sanctam*, among the *Extravagantes Communes*, bk. 1, tit. 8, ch. 1, and confirmed in the Lateran Council under Leo X. "We are instructed by the words of the gospel that in this Church and in her power there are two swords, the spiritual and the temporal. For when the Apostles said: 'Behold, here are two swords'—that is, in the Church, since it was the Apostles who spoke —the Lord did not say it was too many but sufficient. Surely one who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter has not attended well to the word of the Lord who said, 'Put up your sword into the sheath.' Therefore both swords are in the power of the Church, the spiritual and the material. But the one is to be wielded for the Church, the other by the Church. The one belongs to the priest, the other is in the hands of kings and soldiers, but to be wielded at the nod and sufferance of the priest. For one sword must be subordinated to the other, and temporal authority subjected to spiritual power."

In these words it must be noted that the doctrine asserted must be distinguished from the proof adduced for it; for the doctrine asserted is that about which the magisterium is engaged and for which—if proposed from the chair—the gift of infallibility is promised. The proofs of the asserted doctrine drawn from the word of God must indeed be present, but it is not necessary that they be brought forward explicitly; rather, it can happen that either only a probable reason is brought forward, or the word of God is indeed adduced but in a more obscure

manner—namely through a certain accommodated interpretation of some testimony, which interpretation was sufficiently received in that age and therefore is a witness of the common opinion of the Church regarding the thing itself. Both happen in the proof adduced by Boniface VIII; for it should be known that it was taken word for word from St. Bernard, *De Consideratione*, bk. 4, ch. 3 (mention of this interpretation was also made by Emperor John Comnenus in his first letter to Honorius II, in the appendix to the works of Demetrius Pepanus, Rome 1781: "Hence some, and what in the Gospel is said by the chief of the disciples concerning two swords, which the Savior said were sufficient, took for these two principates as if in equal measure both powers were needed for our affairs"): and therefore the Pontiff using Bernard's very own words: 1° must be said to have wished to bring forward Bernard's authority, which is at least a probable argument (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 8); 2° Bernard's own authority could have caused that accommodated interpretation to be commonly received as representative of the doctrine of the two powers in the Church, which Bernard himself declared from the evangelical words: and therefore the Pontiff in bringing forward that interpretation was in fact appealing to the common sense of the Church. There was, therefore, no reason for certain Protestants to be so much moved on account of this kind of argumentation by Boniface VIII, whom all enemies of the Church and those very persons alone have always held in contempt. This then is the doctrine which Boniface VIII solemnly promulgated in a dogmatic bull. Whether this part of the Bull contains a definition of faith we shall dispute in a more convenient place below; for now it suffices us that this is a doctrine publicly and solemnly asserted by the Roman Pontiff and incorporated into the body of canon law.

This doctrine is proved most evidently. For granted the existence of the Church instituted by God among men, by which they are brought to the ultimate and supernatural end, by natural law itself civil power is ordered to bringing assistance and protection to the power governing the Church, just as the good of civil society is ordered to the good intended by the Church; for to the ultimate end all things are subordinated, and the authority which leads men to the ultimate end prescribes the rule for the use of all the means by which those same

men are disposed toward the attainment of that end. Since therefore civil power is to be exercised for the good of society, which is the sole reason for its existence, and the good of civil society is ordered toward the ultimate end to be attained by individuals: this subordination requires that civil society and its elements—among which the authority is most prominent—assist its members in attaining the ultimate end, and therefore assist that authority by which the same are promoted toward this end. Regarding this matter more fully in the following treatise, Thesis XXI. Since therefore ecclesiastical authority has the power of decreeing corporeal punishments, and in civil power is the inflictive force of the same, and this power is subordinated to ecclesiastical authority so as to be exercised for its good and for the end it intends: therefore the Church can command the political power to use its sword in the protection of the Church. This to be the duty and office of civil power the Church has always taught. Thus the bishops of the Council of Byzacena to the lord Constantine Augustus: "Almighty God, providing for his Church, has placed in its protection kings of the Roman name, predestinated and predestined, so that whenever the storm of a diabolical faction shall have attempted to stir up something against it, it may be able to be repressed by the severity of your clemency, so that its tranquility, procured by the support of your power, may be able to be defended; because you subject your power to his service, by whose gift and protection you reign." Leo the Great, letter 156 to Emperor Leo, says: "you ought without hesitation to consider that royal power has been granted to you not only for the governance of the world, but above all for the protection of the Church, so that in repressing wicked attempts, you may both defend what has been well established and restore true peace to what has been troubled." And Gregory the Great, letter 63, bk. 3, to the Emperor Maurice: "To this end the power over all men has been given from heaven to the piety of our lords, that those who seek good things may be aided, that the way to heaven may be more widely opened, that the earthly kingdom may serve the heavenly kingdom." Augustine, letter 185 to Boniface, n. 20: "What sober-minded person would say to kings: 'Do not care in your kingdom about who holds or attacks the Church of the Lord your God; it does not pertain to you in your kingdom whether someone wishes to

be religious or sacrilegious?' To whom it cannot be said: 'It does not pertain to you in your kingdom whether someone wishes to be chaste or unchaste.'" The Council of Trent, Session 23, *de Reform.*, ch. 20, admonishing secular rulers of their duty, calls them those whom God has willed to be protectors of the holy faith and the Church, and admonishes them among other things that they "allow what is of ecclesiastical right not to be harmed by their ministers, but that they deal severely with those who impede the liberty, immunity, and jurisdiction of the Church." And Pius IX in the encyclical *Quanta Cura* exhorts bishops in these words and also "that you do not omit to teach that royal power has been conferred not only for the governance of the world but above all for the protection of the Church." Hence it is not infrequent for the Roman Pontiffs, when they decree temporal punishments, to admonish inferior judges that, if necessary, the assistance of the secular arm should also be invoked. Cf. what we shall say at length in Thesis XXI.

COROLLARY

It is therefore so far from true that the Church does not have coercive power to be exercised with temporal punishments on the grounds that its power is spiritual, as De Dominis wishes in bk. 5, ch. 1 ff., that on the contrary the opposite follows from this very fact, if it is rightly understood. For spiritual power exercised among men, since it directs them to the supreme end, subordinates all other things to itself and extends also to temporal means, which any human society whatsoever needs.

Moreover, it is to be noted in this matter that this coercive power of the Church, although it has always existed in habit from the beginning, did not, however, immediately unfold itself in its entirety, nor could it; for its exercise, which is also the work of prudence, depends on many circumstances and on the character of the societies in which the Church lives. Hence it is wrong to appeal exclusively to the early centuries in order to have the full notion of ecclesiastical power. "For who at that time," says Augustine to Boniface in the cited letter, "had believed in Christ as an emperor to serve him for piety against

impiety by enacting laws?" But since the Church is always the same at any age, a theologian rightly argues from its acts in subsequent centuries no less than from what took place in the earlier ones; indeed this is necessary.

You will say: if rulers refuse to obey the Church in these matters, what becomes of this coercive power of the Church? I respond: what if soldiers or other guardians of order refuse to obey the ruler? This does not argue a defect of moral power or of right, but only that physical incapacity which is inherent in any human power.

The deficiency of means for applying force can indeed be twofold: 1° a personal deficiency; 2° a real deficiency. A personal deficiency consists in the fact that the person endowed with supreme authority cannot by his own powers restrain and punish the wicked; all rulers labor under this deficiency, and God alone is the king of kings who can of himself execute his sentence and exact punishment from the unjust. Real deficiency consists in the fact that someone lacks even the right of using the ministry of others for exacting punishments. Kings in the secular sphere have this right with respect to their inferiors; but this right is also enjoyed by the Church with respect to kings themselves. The difference indeed is that the king's ministers are in the same social order as the king himself, whereas kings are in a different—that is, lower—order than the Church; but since this difference does not remove but rather establishes the subordination and dependence of kings on the Church, it cannot prevent it from having in fact a real right to compel kings or rulers of civil society to lend their assistance; and therefore it cannot be said that the Church lacks means for applying force in protection of order. It is moreover established from the history of past centuries that the Church has used its authority even over Christian kings and subjected them to punishments, the execution of which it committed to Christian society—and when it did this, at opportune moments, it always appealed to the power divinely given it by Christ the Lord. Cf. the First Council of Lyons and the Fourth Lateran Council.

Note the Censure of the Sacred Faculty of Paris given December 17, 1527 (see the *Historia Ecclesiastica* of De Graveson, vol. 9, Chronological Table eleven, observations) on certain propositions of Erasmus. Erasmus had said: "I neither urge nor dissuade rulers from

slaughtering heretics; I demonstrate what the office of a priest is." Now the Sacred Faculty says: "if ecclesiastics are permitted, according to the disposition of the law, to declare wars or to induce temporal magistrates to declare them against Turks and Jews, no less certainly will it be permitted to them to do so against notorious heretics... and where secular rulers would gravely fail by not exterminating heretics conspiring against the destruction of the Christian commonwealth and drawing very many into their heresy, orthodox bishops are bound by every means to induce them to do it; otherwise they themselves would sin." Erasmus had also said: "For the early bishops the ultimate penalty was anathema." The Sacred Faculty says: "on account of the infestation of tyrants in the primitive Church, heretics could not be mulcted with a more severe punishment than that of excommunication; but afterward, when the rulers of the world subjected their necks to the Church, it was necessary—not only fitting—that heretics, perceiving their contumacy and impiety, should be dealt with by the temporal sword." Another censure establishes that heretics who are nothing other than heretics can and must be extirpated by the temporal sword.

We do not think it necessary to treat at length the other question of whether the Church or the Roman Pontiff can inflict corporeal punishments through its own ministers.

From all of the foregoing it is clear that coercive power in all its parts belongs to the Church by divine law. This is evident from the fact that such power has been proved either by the very testimonies by which the divine institution of ecclesiastical power was proved, or by an analysis of the power instituted by God.

VIII. It is necessary to resolve not a few difficulties. Marsilius of Padua in the cited place notes that when Christ was living on earth he had no regal or coercive power; for his kingdom was not of this world (John 18:36); and he denied that he was constituted a judge over others (Luke 12:14), and withdrew from those who wished to make him king (John 6:15); and the tribute he paid to Caesar was not paid condescendingly out of the liberality of his piety, but compelled by necessity; and having been brought before the tribunal of the Roman governor, he did not protest that the judge was incompetent, but even approved his authority over him (John 19:11). But the Church and the

Roman Pontiff do not possess the power which Christ lacked on earth; for the power of the Church is not greater than that of Christ: therefore. 2° Christ has coercive power over all the faithful and all men, but did not commit it to his Vicar on earth; for he exercises it in the next life, where future judgment and the distribution of reward and punishment will take place, not here, where there is always room for repentance. 3° Christ did not wish the Apostles to rule like kings, whose proper characteristic is coercive force (Luke 22:25; Matt. 20:25). All the faithful moreover, Apostles, bishops, and the rest, are commanded to be subject to higher powers without any exception (Rom. 13:1); now the higher powers of which Paul speaks are secular rulers: it is therefore their prerogative to exercise contentious jurisdiction over the faithful in all things; on the contrary those same faithful are prohibited from involving themselves in secular affairs (2 Tim. 2:4); but contentious jurisdiction is a secular affair. 4° Coercion contradicts the end of the Church, which is to bring the faithful to salvation through their meritorious works; but coercion is opposed to merit as it is opposed to liberty, which is required for merit. These points are reinforced by Marsilius with the authority of the Fathers interpreting the adduced passages of Scripture. Others add: 5° that the Church is a spiritual society (Richer, cited work, ch. 11); 6° that it does not have territory (ibid.); 7° that clerics are to be kept away from cases involving blood; 8° that the Fathers and Doctors denied to the Church the power of coercing through temporal punishments—twenty-five Fathers and twenty Doctors of which Richer cites in his work *De Potestate Ecclesiae in Rebus Temporalibus*, bk. 3, ch. 3. 9° He who lacks means of exercising coercive power also lacks this power. 10° Finally, the moderns cry out that if coercive power belongs to the Church, there is a state within a state, which is repugnant.

Now to objection 1: it is an intolerable heresy that Christ on earth was juridically subject to the powers of the world and that the rulers of the world had coercive power over him. Christ indeed, for the economy of redemption, abstained from using his supreme royal power; but he could not abdicate from himself the right essential to him of independence and power. Besides, the present question is not about civil power but about the sacred power by which the Church is

governed: this, while Christ was living on earth, he himself alone exercised and did not allow it to another human power; he alone instituted magistrates in the Church, prescribed the form of governance, enacted laws, and conferred all authority on Peter and the Apostles. Nor, if he never made use of coercive external force, is this to be thought to have come about from a deficiency of power. Moreover, the argumentation of Marsilius, if it proved anything, would prove this: that the Church is subject to civil power in civil cases, or that it lacks immunity; not, however, that those who preside in the Church lack the power of coercive jurisdiction over the faithful in ecclesiastical affairs—which would have to be demonstrated. Yet neither do the testimonies cited by Marsilius prove anything.

For a) Christ, accused of making himself king of the Jews and interrogated by the governor whether he were the king of the Jews, replies that his kingdom is not of this world—ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου—meaning not a worldly, civil kingdom, one that takes its origin from the world—that is, from human nature itself—not that kingdom which the kings of the Jews previously had, the only kind the governor could have had in mind; but it is the kingdom of heaven, taking its origin from heaven, leading men to heaven, supernatural, divine. The sign of this Christ exhibits to Pilate by adding: if my kingdom were of this world, my servants would certainly fight that I might not be delivered to the Jews—namely, if my kingdom were such as the kings of the world have, I should be losing it by dying, and therefore my servants (whose existence Christ does not deny) would fight to rescue me from the hands of the Jews and free me from death; but since my kingdom is eternal, and it is through my death that I am to acquire it, I do not wish my servants to fight that I may not be delivered to the Jews. Now this kingdom of Christ is the Church itself, a pilgrim on earth, triumphant in heaven. These words of Christ, however, contain no denial of the coercive power of Christ—whether in his kingdom or over all men generally—just as Christ does not deny that he has a kingdom in this world; on the contrary, he affirms it to Pilate who again asks him: "Therefore you are a king?" to which he replies: "You say it: I am a king. For this was I born, and for this I came into the world—εἰς τοῦτο—that I should give testimony to the truth: everyone that is of the truth hears

my voice." In these words he also indicates that his kingdom is among men and teaches its end, but not the form of its governance. The entire response of Christ therefore turns on the nature of his kingdom as supernatural and spiritual by reason of its end, existing among men; and since coercive power is not repugnant to this nature but the nature of a kingdom demands it, Marsilius effects nothing with this testimony.

b) Christ denies that he wishes to act as judge and divider, and denies that he was constituted for this purpose; for he was not sent by the Father to do this, nor—which would have been unworthy—had he received this commission from any human power. But he does not deny that he has the power to do this. Moreover, Christ's response proposed in that manner of questioning can be taken to mean that he denies nothing but only asks for the faith of that young man—whether he believes Christ to have such power from God.

c) By that flight Christ refused the act, not the power.

d) It is false that tribute was then paid to Caesar. For Christ (Matt. 17:24) reasons thus: "What is your opinion, Simon? The kings of the earth: from whom do they receive tribute or custom? From their own children or from strangers?" And he said: "From strangers." Jesus said to him: "Then the children are free." It is clear that Christ concludes by this argument that he himself is free from tribute. But he had expressly concluded that the children are free; he therefore indicates that he is free because he is a son. In Christ's argument one premise is explicit: kings do not receive tribute from their children; and the conclusion is: therefore I am free—it is clear what minor premise is to be supplied, namely: but I am the son of the king for whom tribute is demanded; therefore I am free from paying it. But Christ is a son of no one but God; therefore that didrachma was to be paid to God. Why then did Christ say "the kings of the earth"? In order to argue from the similar: the kings of the earth do not receive tribute from their children; therefore generally sons of a king are exempt from tributes paid to their father; but I am a son; therefore I am free from the tribute due to my Father. John XXII indeed interprets this differently in the cited Constitution—namely that Christ declared himself exempt from that obligation because he was the son of King David according to the flesh; but this explanation is neither presented as the only or necessary one,

nor is it to be regarded as a definition. Moreover, Christ himself teaches that he paid not under compulsion but voluntarily—having declared his liberty, he says he pays so as not to give scandal to those collectors.

e) That Christ did not protest the incompetence of the judge proves only that Christ did not wish to use his right, but permitted violence to be done to him. Distinguishing, however, power of right from power of fact: Christ in those words did concede to Pilate a power of fact over himself—namely, it was permitted from on high to Pilate to exercise over Christ, though unjustly, the power which he rightfully exercised over others—but Christ did not concede a power of right; for there is nothing that requires this interpretation, which moreover conflicts with the dignity of Christ.

To objection 2: Christ exercises coercive power in the next life over all men, not only over the faithful, and with respect to the violation of laws not only natural or divine but also human, which men have legitimately established by the power that is ultimately from God; and to all men whatsoever, as long as they are in this life, room for repentance is given for what has been committed against any law. Therefore if Marsilius's argument proved anything, it would also prove that secular rulers lack coercive power. A distinction must therefore be made between the two powers corresponding to the two forums. The power proper to the external forum, by which the good of visible society itself is served, Christ does not exercise in the next life, where it has no place, but in this life, and in the Church through ministers; in civil society Christ as God exercises it through kings, insofar as the power of kings is derived from God. The power proper to the internal forum, by which the good of each person in relation to the ultimate end is directly served, Christ exercises in this life and in the next—in the next by pronouncing the final judgment by which perpetual reward or perpetual punishment is established, and in this life by remitting or retaining sins, which he exercises through his ministers.

To objection 3: a) Christ does not exclude any power whatsoever, but a certain mode. "The kings of the Gentiles," he says, "exercise lordship over them"—κατακυριεύουσιν αὐτῶν—by which, as Salmasius notes (ibid., p. 10), a violent domination is signified, such as rulers and kings commonly used to exercise over the peoples subject to them. But

Christ adds: "but you shall not be so"; thus a mode is forbidden, the mode by which authority was commonly exercised, not the authority itself. Cf. what we shall say at the end of Thesis 2 of the following treatise.

b) The words of the Apostle to the Romans—"let every soul be subject to the higher powers" etc.—are abused by heretics for two ends: both to prove that coercive power in all things belongs to secular rulers and therefore all coercive power exercised on earth is secular and none is ecclesiastical; and to prove that the power of secular rulers is entirely or indirectly independent of ecclesiastical power, and that ecclesiastics in temporal matters are directly subject to the coercive power of secular rulers—that is, they do not enjoy personal and real immunity. For the establishment of both points this passage is brought forward by Marsilius and by Richer in his work *De Potestate Ecclesiae in Rebus Temporalibus*, bk. 2, ch. 1, § 4 ff. The present question is not about the second heresy, which will have to be refuted when the indirect power of the Roman Pontiff and his immunity are to be disputed. Now we are concerned only with the former. Now, granted that the Apostle speaks there directly of civil power, so that from it one could conclude that no coercive power belongs to the Church, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the Apostle asserts that all coercive power exercised on earth is in the hands of civil rulers. But this neither is nor can be effected. For he teaches that obedience is to be given to rulers, but does not say that such obedience is to be exercised with respect to everything in which men are bound to obey, so that they alone would be superiors to whom obedience is due. Therefore one must be subject to civil rulers; but one must also be subject to ecclesiastical rulers, and the one does not exclude the other.

c) The Greek reads: οὐδεὶς στρατευόμενος ἐμπλέκεται ταῖς τοῦ βίου πραγματείαις, ἵνα τῷ στρατολογήσαντι ἀρέσῃ. Bellarmine (*De Romano Pontifice*, bk. 5, ch. 10) notes that the word "God" is not found in all Latin codices. Πραγματεία τοῦ βίου is not some kind of governance or coercive power, but business, trade, or the anxious concern for gaining a livelihood. The sense therefore, as the same Bellarmine interprets, is: I have said that you should labor (preceding verse) as a good soldier of Christ; now a good soldier is not anxious

about food and care of the body, but is content with little. Therefore the Apostle, drawing an example from the soldiers of this world, forbids excessive concern about bodily life to Timothy and, along with him, to others deputed to the ecclesiastical ministry.

To objection 4: for works to be meritorious they must be free from that necessity which destroys liberty, not from the coercion that is applied externally and under which interior liberty remains intact. Besides, external coercion does not aim only at calling men back from evil, but primarily at the protection of social order, which is violated by the wicked.

To objection 5: we have already given a sufficient response to this sophism in the proof of the last conclusion.

To objection 6: since Christ said to the Apostles "whatsoever you shall loose, bind upon earth," it is clear that the whole earth is the territory of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Nor is it repugnant that in the same territory a twofold jurisdiction be exercised, if the jurisdictions are of different orders and one is subordinated to the other, such as is political and ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

To objection 7: clerics are indeed forbidden to conduct or to actively take part in cases involving blood. Thus in the decree, ch. 30, caus. 23, q. 8: "Those who are to handle the sacraments of the Lord are not permitted to conduct blood-judgment" etc.; and in the Decretals, ch. 9, *Ne Clerici vel Monachi*: "No cleric shall dictate or deliver a sentence of blood, nor exercise blood vengeance, nor be present where it is exercised." If however a cleric obtains temporal jurisdiction, he must and can, with the danger of irregularity set aside, delegate this to others in relation to cases involving blood, according to ch. *Episcopus*, same title, in the Sixth. But passing over the fact that these positive laws do not bind or have coercive force over the supreme authority of the Church, which established those laws: it is one thing for clerics to conduct cases involving blood—which is not a little opposed to priestly gentleness—quite another for ecclesiastical persons having temporal jurisdiction to delegate this power to others, in which act nothing but love of justice shines forth without loss of gentleness; and quite another again for the Church or persons having ecclesiastical authority to command secular rulers, that they restrain and punish as is fitting the

disturbers of ecclesiastical peace and unity, especially heretics. The Church certainly approves civil laws inflicting capital punishment on heretics—indeed it wishes them, when just, to be put into execution (ch. *ad Abolendam*, *de Haereticis*). Cf. Fr. Suárez, *De Fide*, disp. 23. Wherefore it would be against the gentleness and meekness proper to the Church to execute the death penalty through its own ministers: granted; through the arm of the secular power: denied, if the order of charity does not demand it; if it does demand it, the supposition is denied—namely that in this hypothesis gentleness would be a virtue, for it would rather be a vice. Likewise the Church abhors bloodshed through its ministers: granted; through the ministry of the secular arm: in cases where it is not necessary, conceded; otherwise, denied. "For there are certain affairs," says Gerhoch in his exposition of Ps. 64, n. 31, "which the spiritual man sitting on the chair of Moses can administer through himself, and others which he ought to commit to prudent laymen, especially those that pertain to the punishment of evildoers, against whom the armed minister and the sword-bearing judge bears the sword not without cause; which no one ought to take up by his own presumption, lest one who takes up the sword perish by the sword; but with the ecclesiastical power ordering the secular and sometimes restraining, sometimes spurring it on, let the nations be thus judged by holy men, so that, with them ruling justly, the hand and tongue of the priest may be clean of blood." And the Church first proceeded more mildly against heretics with excommunication, then also with confiscation, until understanding that those punishments profited little, it commanded them also to be afflicted by the lay power with the supreme penalty—which is the punishment due to them, necessary for the tranquility of political and ecclesiastical society; it wished, that is, that they be struck with the penalty that the civil laws had decreed, which was the death penalty. Cf. the Constitution *Licet* of Urban IV, § 12; the Constitution *Cum Adversus* of Innocent IV; and canon 27 of the Third Lateran Council. Cf. Fr. Suárez, ibid., sect. 2. Hence it also proscribed the thirty-third article of Luther—that burning heretics is against the will of the Holy Spirit.

To objection 8: as regards the authority of the Fathers, we note: 1° that the testimonies of the Fathers are adduced by Richer for the

purpose of demonstrating that the Roman Church from the time especially of St. Gregory VII usurped what by divine law was forbidden to it and gravely erred when it taught that corporeal coercive power belonged to it—from which it follows that the bulls of Boniface VIII and John XXII are heretical. Since the matter finally comes to this, a Catholic already has a certain presumption that either the testimonies of the Fathers were not adduced in good faith—and they teach something altogether different—or that the conclusion is not well drawn from the opinion of one or another Father, who could have erred. 2° An accurate distinction is needed both among acts of power and among the different modes of exercising it. As regards the first, the following acts are to be distinguished: a) directly usurping for oneself the civil power by which human societies are governed; b) by arms or corporeal punishments forcing unbelievers into faith, or in general wishing to bend minds to faith by arms or corporeal punishments; c) stirring up sedition against one's own kings; d) employing arms or corporeal punishments directly to the end that faith may be persuaded to the Church's own subjects; e) employing corporeal coercive power for the protection of order and also for the correction of wicked subjects. As regards the mode, a distinction must be made: a) between the proper mode of the ministers of Christ, in which this power is exercised, and the mode in which the rulers of the world exercise their power with pomp and display; b) between the immediate or mediate use of coercive power; c) between the licit or illicit use of it, for it is not always lawful to use a power that is possessed.

That there is a difference among those former acts is evident. For what we put in last place—which is what we defend—certainly differs from the first; for the power of the Church is a sacred power to be exercised over Christians as such for the attainment of their eternal end, which power is altogether different from that by which citizens are governed toward a temporal end; and therefore one who claims that power for himself does not claim civil principate for himself. It also differs from the second; for ecclesiastical power is exercised over subjects, whereas this would be exercised over non-subjects, over whom there is no power. Moreover, when the question is of bending minds themselves to faith, the means to that end is not externally applied force but persuasion; while coercive power aims of itself at protecting the

social order, and insofar as it also pertains to this end that the subject may repent inwardly, it does not tend to this immediately but mediately —that is, through persuasion, and through punishment it comes about that the contumacious person, his evil inclinations being laid aside, wills to attend to the truth which was already proposed to him and is proposed again, and is thus inclined to it by persuasion. Hence if it is asked how the mind is to be bent to faith, the answer is simply: by persuasion; but if it is asked what indirect means may lawfully be used so that someone may be disposed toward embracing truth—just as there are many such means, so when a person is a subject and is bound to believe, this means too is at hand, namely corporeal correction. But if there is no right to exercise coercive power in relation to faith, it would be employed wrongly and unjustly. It also differs from the third, both because the concept is altogether different—for that is the power of a superior over his subjects for maintaining order in Christian society, while this is a disturbance of the civil order against the superior of civil society—and because from that coercive power over the subjects of the Church it does not follow that the faithful can make a sedition against their own king. It also differs from the fourth; for corporeal coercive power is of itself for the protection of social order through the repression of violence, and when applied for correction it presupposes guilt and is essentially punitive; hence the coercion inflicted is just and is applied to this end, that a person may be admonished by punishment to do willingly what he ought. But this is different from directly compelling a subject by force to a certain profession of faith or to willing something else; for, as we said a little earlier, coercion or corporeal punishment justly applied does not directly aim at eliciting an act of faith or of another interior virtue, but when applied for correction it aims that through fear a person may cast off the evil inclinations by which he is impeded from assenting to faith or from loving virtue, and thus being disposed may be inwardly obedient to the doctrine which is simultaneously externally proposed to him together with the coercion, and which alone directly aims at this end. Cf. Augustine in the cited letters to Vincent and Boniface.

Now almost all the Fathers adduced by the adversaries exclude from the Church what we enumerated in the first, second, third, or

fourth place, or exclude an illicit mode of using the power that belongs to it. In this regard, what is especially to be kept in view is this: that, while the right of the Church to use temporal means in its defense remains intact, if the civil power resists and brings its arms against the Church, prudence most frequently will counsel that it is not lawful for the Church to repel force with force; for resistance would generally be useless and would only bring damage. This the Fathers considered when they lived under emperors who had not yet learned, as was fitting, to subject themselves to the Church. A distinction must therefore be made in the opinions of the Fathers between what flows from the right of the Church and what is determined by prudence from the circumstances of times and persons. Or finally certain Fathers disapprove of the immediate use of physical power. But the Fathers do not exclude corporeal coercive power, which we placed in fifth place, nor its exercise at least mediately.

Let us cite the more notable testimonies.

Ambrose, in his oration on the surrendering of basilicas, denies that he can stir up sedition against the ruler who was seizing the churches of Catholics by arms, and also denies that it is lawful for him and his people to repel force with force; yet he does not say this is illicit in itself, nor could he truly have said so, for the right of defense belongs to anyone even against those who are superior; therefore the circumstance of the time gave rise to the fact that armed defense was then illicit, since it would have profited nothing but to embitter the adversaries' minds further. Thus Ambrose tempers and softens the fury of the faithful who wished to repel force with force: "I shall never of my own will abandon the right; I do not know how to resist under compulsion; I shall be able to grieve, to weep, to groan; against arms, soldiers, and even Goths, my tears are my weapons. For such are the defenses of a priest; otherwise I neither ought nor can resist." In his commentary on Luke, ch. 10, he denies that coercive force is to be used for drawing men to faith: "He sent them to sow, who would not coerce but teach, and would not exercise the force of power but would extol the doctrine of humility." And in the same work, ch. 12, on the words of Christ, "Who has constituted me a judge?" etc., he excludes civil and worldly principate.

Gregory the Great, bk. 3, letter 53, reproves the bishop of Constantinople because he allowed a presbyter and monks of Isauria to be beaten, or ordered them to be beaten himself: "what the canons say about bishops who wish to be feared by beatings, your fraternity well knows. For we have been made pastors, not persecutors. And the excellent preacher says: 'argue, beseech, reprove with all patience and doctrine.' This then is a new and unheard-of kind of preaching, which exacts faith by blows." But, as we have already noted, the Church does not use coercive power directly for this purpose of exacting faith; rather doctrine is patiently applied; but this does not prevent the contumacious from being punished and the corruption of others being impeded by the coercion of the wicked. Gregory's letter 3, bk. 5, is also cited, in which he reproves the bishop of Carthage, who had decreed in a Synod that those who neglected to report heretics should be punished with deprivation of possessions and dignities for the purpose of investigating heretics: "Although therefore these things are so and we desire that all heretics may always be restrained by Catholic priests with vigor and reason: yet, carefully considering, it disturbed us lest through what happened with you scandal be generated—which God forbid—for the primates of other councils. For the sentence published by you in the conclusion of the proceedings, in which while you admonish concerning the investigation of those heretics, you inserted that those who are negligent should be punished with deprivation of possessions and dignities. It would be best, therefore, dearest brother, that in those things which are to be corrected externally, internal charity be first preserved, and that we be submissive in mind (which we judge most proper to your gravity) even to persons of lesser dignity. For then you will conveniently oppose the errors of heretics with all forces united, when you shall have studied, after the manner of your priesthood, to preserve ecclesiastical concord." Now: 1° Gregory here does not deny that such a punishment could have been established by the bishop; 2° nor does he simply disapprove of the deed; indeed, at the beginning of the letter he praises him "because he by no means neglected with priestly zeal to restrain the deviating sects of heretics." But 3° he only admonishes that charity and interior union be considered first and foremost, so that schisms may be avoided—namely, that power be

exercised in such a way that its use may conduce to the good of the Church, which is above all the good of unity; for if the evil of schism is feared and is a greater evil than that of concealing heretics, those punishments are to be avoided. But this norm does not deny the coercive power of the Church which those who assert it affirm. Moreover, one who prescribes a norm for the exercise of power does not deny the power but affirms it; therefore.

Appeal is also made to St. Martin, who, as Severus Sulpicius relates (in the *Sacra Historia*, book 2, no. 50, and in *Dialogus III* on the life of St. Martin, no. 2), refused to communicate with Ithacius, a Spanish bishop who had persuaded the Emperor Maximus to put the Priscillianist heretics to death, saying that it was more than sufficient if heretics, once judged by episcopal sentence, were expelled from the Churches; that it was a new and unheard-of crime for a secular judge to adjudicate an ecclesiastical cause. But either Martin was reproaching the fact that a secular judge was adjudicating an ecclesiastical cause by his own authority, with a bishop acting as accuser before him—and indeed in a capital case, which is certainly a crime—or there was something in that affair which demonstrated the evil intention of Ithacius, as Sulpicius seems to indicate in both his history and his dialogue, even though the matter was good in itself; or if Martin believed that secular power was not permitted to punish with the sword heretics who were particularly hostile to civil society (as the Priscillianists were), and that the Church was not permitted to urge princes to do so, then he must be said to have erred; for it is lawful to punish capital enemies of the commonwealth with the supreme penalty, and it is lawful for the Church to urge others toward that which is good. Certainly Pope Leo the Great considered this lawful, as seen in his letter 15 to Turibius, Bishop of Astorga, regarding those same heretics: "With good reason our fathers, in whose times this wicked heresy broke out, strove earnestly throughout the entire world to drive this impious fury from the whole Church; at which time even the princes of the world so detested this sacrilegious madness that they struck down its author and most of his disciples with the sword of the public laws… And this severity long served to benefit the gentleness of the Church, which, though content with the priestly judgment and shrinking from bloody

punishments, is nonetheless aided by the stern decrees of Christian princes."

It is above all in Chrysostom that De Dominis exults, calling him his chief teacher in this matter (book 3, chapter 2, no. 33). But what does Chrysostom actually teach? In Homily 3 on the Acts (which homilies certain scholars deny are by Chrysostom), while expounding the difficulties of episcopal ministry, he says: "Is not the whole world subject to the Emperor, while this man (the bishop) governs only a single city? Yet his anxieties are all the greater, inasmuch as the sea is more turbulent and raging than the current of a river. Why so? Because there many ministers are at hand and everything is carried out by law and command, but here it is not so. For it is not permitted to give commands by authority, οὐδε ἐπ' ἐξουσίας ἔστιν ἐπιτάξαι, that is, it is not free to issue mandates." But: first, Chrysostom is speaking historically, not juridically; second, he views the office of the bishop, as he nearly always does, with respect to that end which is the instruction of men in faith and doctrine and the reformation of morals and the cultivation of virtue—an end for which those means are required that can produce persuasion in the mind and bend free wills of their own accord. But he does not deny that the bishop or the Church has the right to punish with bodily penalties those who disturb the order of ecclesiastical society and who rebel against its authority, or to restrain the wicked by those same penalties from harming others, or to demand from the civil power its assistance in the exercise of this authority. Likewise, in Homily 4 on the text "I saw the Lord" from the words of Isaiah, he affirms that it belongs to priests only to rebuke and freely to admonish, and denies that it belongs to them to take up arms, to seize shields, to brandish lances, and so forth. But first, he is speaking of the priest of the Old Testament; and second, he is speaking of those actions which priests can perform of themselves and which are proper to them —he is surely regarding the priest in opposition to the king who, having violated the sacred law, was taking up arms and employing his own power. Moreover, in book 2, chapter 3 of *De Sacerdotio*, he does say "that of all men, Christians are least permitted to correct by force the falls of those who sin"; but he says this because he is treating of the manner of reforming men and making them better and of producing in

them a firm resolve to abstain from sins. "But it is necessary to persuade a man and to make him better… since Christ grants the eternal crown not to those who abstain from sin under compulsion, but to those who do so with firm resolve." Chrysostom, then, focused on that which by its own nature conduces to the reformation of the wicked, denies that this should be obtained by force but by persuasion. He adds also "nor has so great a faculty been given us by the laws for restraining offenders"; but we note: first, insofar as these words are spoken historically and signify that the Church did not then employ coercive power against sinners, they can be true without prejudicing our thesis; for a power of this kind did not unfold all at once from the beginning but gradually over the course of time. Second, however, insofar as they appear to signify that the Church does not possess coercive power through bodily penalties by proper right, but can only obtain it through the concession of princes, this was said in passing by Chrysostom and would stand contrary to the teaching subsequently asserted authentically by the Church; nor is it necessary to interpret Chrysostom in this way—he means only that for the actual and peaceable exercise of this power on behalf of the Church, the free consent of princes is required, which consent, however, as we have demonstrated, is owed.

St. Peter Damian (book 4, epistle 9) disapproves of priests bearing arms or waging war in defense of the Church's temporal goods, and against those who raise the objection that "Pope Leo IX frequently involved himself in military affairs, and yet was a saint," he replies "that Peter does not hold the primacy of the Apostolate on account of his denial; nor does David merit the oracle of prophecy on account of his taking possession of another man's wife." But as regards the action of Leo, this belongs to a different question—namely, concerning the temporal dominion of the Roman See—and once that is granted, one may set against the authority of Damian the authority of Leo himself, who was equally a holy and learned pope, and then the manifest reason: for he who has a right to temporal goods has the same right to preserve them by appropriate means, such as arms against enemies; and if he is a supreme independent prince, he has the right to reclaim those goods by his own power. The entire Church together with its head has in our own

age borne witness that it is lawful to defend the temporal patrimony of the Church by arms.

In the *Decretum*, Cause 33, question 2, canon 50 *Inter*, these words of Nicholas are cited: "The Holy Church of God is never bound by worldly laws; it has no sword except the spiritual one, which does not kill but gives life." He is decreeing there that it is not lawful for men to kill adulterous wives, which the civil laws permitted. But he does not deny to the Church bodily coercive power; he denies only that power which it exercises by itself alone, and he expressly treats only of the penalty of death. Moreover, the *Correctors* of the *Decretum* note that the epistle of Nicholas, from which the canon itself is taken, is of doubtful authenticity.

Cause 23, question 3, canon 20, says of princes that "powers within the Church would not be necessary, were it not that what the priest cannot accomplish through the discourse of doctrine, this power should accomplish through the terror of discipline. Often through the earthly kingdom the heavenly kingdom advances, so that those who, placed within the Church, act against the faith and discipline of the Church, may be crushed by the rigor of princes, and that the discipline itself, which the humility of the Church is unable to enforce, the principal power may impose upon the necks of the proud." Isidore—for the canon is excerpted from his work (from book 3 of the *Sententiarum* or *De Summo Bono*, chapter 51)—does not deny that there is in the Church a bodily coercive power; rather, he teaches who its minister is and therefore what the office of secular power is, which power must exercise its force in defense of the Church, as Boniface VIII states—especially since the gentleness and mildness of the Church suggests that it should not immediately employ its own force. Hence he concludes: "Let the princes of the world know that they owe an account to God for the Church, which they receive from Christ to protect."

Appeal is made chiefly to the authority of Gregory II in his second doctrinal letter to Leo the Isaurian concerning the veneration of images. For he says: "The institution of ecclesiastical constitutions is one thing, and the sense of secular matters is another… And behold, I write to you of the distinction between palace and churches, between emperors and pontiffs… For just as the pontiff has no power to look into the palace

and to confer royal dignities, so neither has the emperor power to look into the churches, to conduct elections in the clergy, or to consecrate, or to administer the symbols of the holy sacraments, nor indeed to partake of them without the ministry of a priest. But let each one of us remain in that calling in which he was called by God. You see, Emperor, the distinction between pontiffs and emperors. If someone offends you, you confiscate and plunder his house, leaving him only his life, and in the end you kill him by hanging, or behead him, or send him into exile… Pontiffs do not act thus; rather, when someone sins and has confessed, in place of hanging or amputation they place the Gospel and the cross about his neck, and cast him as it were into prison in the sacristies and treasuries of sacred vessels; they relegate him to the diaconia of the church and to the catechumena; they impose fasting upon his bowels and vigils upon his eyes and prayer upon his lips. And when they have chastised him thoroughly and afflicted him sufficiently with hunger, then they impart to him the precious Body of the Lord and give him to drink of the holy Blood, and when they have restored him as a vessel of election and cleansed him of sin, they send him thus pure and innocent to the Lord. You see, Emperor, the distinction between Churches and Empires?"

First, the interpretation of Richerius deserves to be noted. These words of the Pope are cited as a certain rule of the Church's own power; equity would require that the authority of Gregory be received in its entirety when he discusses the rights of the Church, whether when he teaches what the Emperor cannot do in the Church. For the judgment of this matter certainly belongs to the Church. But let Richerius be heard; he concludes indeed that the Pope does not absolutely have the power to look into the palace and to confer royal dignities; yet he adds this: "Third, when he says that the Emperor does not have the power to look into the Church, etc., this is true in the sense that he should not involve himself in the handling or establishing of regular or even spiritual matters; but it is false if he wishes to deny that the Emperor has the authority to compel ecclesiastics to observe the canons." But what is it to look into the churches, if this is not? Gregory was therefore amplifying the rights of the Church, and was unaware of this dependence of the Church upon the Emperor; and thus, even before

Gregory VII, popes were already amplifying their own rights. But if Richerius thought it permissible for himself to circumscribe the words of Gregory, he thereby grants us also the power to add certain qualifications to the words of Gregory, and we shall make very modest use of this. We reply, first, that in these words the power of the Church to inflict bodily penalties is asserted—and indeed an immediate power—and that once this is granted, the determination of their quality and manner depends on external circumstances and the judgment of the Church. We reply, second, that Gregory, wishing to assign the proper characteristics of each power, set forth the proper end of the Church—which is the salvation of souls—and enumerated, with respect to the Church, those things which are proper to the Church and which it exercises by itself; and the Pope omitted those things which the Church was accustomed to exercise not by itself but through the mediation of the power of princes, such as certain harsher bodily coercion. But he does not deny that the Church has the right to require that the secular power apply that coercion at its direction. That the words of Gregory are to be taken in this sense is sufficiently demonstrated also by the practice of subsequent popes. Moreover, in the same sense as Gregory, Nicholas I speaks in his eighth epistle to the Emperor of Constantinople. In the same direction, St. Bernard in *De Consideratione*, book 1, chapter 6, denies to bishops the right to exercise judgments—namely, the right to adjudicate "concerning the petty earthly possessions of men" and the power "to divide estates." He is denying, that is, that civil secular power which is ordered to the good of earthly society. "These base and earthly matters have their own judges, the kings and princes of the earth. Why do you invade the boundaries of others? Why do you extend your sickle into another's harvest?"

But he contends that power over greater matters has been given to them: "therefore your power is over crimes, not over possessions; for on account of the former, and not the latter, you received the keys of the kingdom of heaven." Likewise in book 2, chapter 6, he denies that the Roman Pontiff has gold and silver by apostolic right; for Peter left him nothing other than what he himself possessed: but Bernard does not deny that these things can be held by the Roman Pontiff—he denies only that they are held by hereditary right from Peter. In the same place

he denies that the dominion spoken of by Christ in Luke 22:25 belongs to the Roman Pontiff; yet since the Roman Pontiff had already been the prince of a secular dominion for many centuries, Bernard does not disapprove of this—indeed, he approves and defends it in his 243rd letter addressed to the seditious Romans, and says that the Apostolic See is singularly elevated by divine and royal privileges. The denied dominion, therefore, is to be understood with respect to the flock of Christ and in accordance with that mode which Christ excluded. "Consider," he says (book 4, chapter 7), "that the holy Roman Church, over which you preside by God's authority, is the mother of churches, not their mistress, and that you are not the lord of bishops but one of them"—yet in such a way that he immediately adds that he is the teacher of nations, the leader of Christians, the avenger of crimes, the terror of the wicked, the father of kings, the moderator of laws, the dispenser of canons, the vicar of Christ, the Pharaoh's God, and so forth.

From this simple consideration of the most important testimonies of the Fathers cited by Richerius, it is plain how false it is that the Catholic tradition contains that teaching which denies the Church's bodily coercive power. Since, therefore, both the argument drawn from the very nature of the Church's power demonstrates that such a power belongs to it, and the Church's own testimony and practice over many centuries demonstrates the same, it is impious to deny it and futile to prop up that denial with the argument drawn from non-use in the early centuries; for: first, this is not entirely true; and second, non-use of a power does not prove the absence of power, especially if there are reasons to be given why one should abstain from its use.

To the 9th we have already given more than sufficient reply at the end of the demonstration.

To the 10th. A state within a state (that is, two societies composed of the same members, each of them perfect) is contradictory if they have the same end, or if they have ends that are opposed to one another absolutely; but not if they have subordinate ends, which can incidentally be opposed at times. Such indeed are the end of civil power and the end of ecclesiastical power; whence the power of the Roman Pontiff simultaneously governs those whom civil power governs; and both

powers can and should by their very nature be united in friendly alliance—but the perversity of the world usually stands in the way.

The thesis is therefore proved; and from this proof, for the sake of a corollary, we draw this conclusion: the words of Christ in Matthew 18 —"If he will not hear the Church, let him be to you as a pagan and a tax collector"—do not contain every penalty that the Church can impose, nor do they exclude bodily coercion; for the words of Christ are positive, not exclusive. And because such men are indeed to be regarded by the faithful as pagans with respect to fellowship, yet they are not actually such—they still remain subjects of the Church; therefore the Church can punish them. See Fr. Suárez in the cited passage. Moreover, some incorrectly deny this on the ground that the Church is a voluntary society; for the antecedent must be denied in the sense of the adversaries (§ VII). Since, therefore, the Church is a society necessary by divine institution, and since the Church's power is truly coercive, once someone has become a member of the Church, he cannot by any act of rebellion withdraw himself from her authority so as by that very act to be exempt from the obligation of obeying the Church—as some Protestants or unbelievers have affirmed, proceeding from an utterly misconceived notion of the Church.

§ XX

Christ willed his Church to be infallible concerning all revealed truths.

I. Two questions must first be distinguished: whether the Church, that is, the universal body of the faithful, is infallible; and then by what means, by Christ's own doing, the infallibility of the Church is obtained. Again, the question can be posed simply as a matter of fact—whether Christ willed his Church to be infallible—and then whether there was any necessity for him to so will it.

The Protestants together with the Socinians deny to the visible Church the prerogative of infallibility; indeed, they deny that infallibility in all revealed matters is even a necessary prerogative of the true Church. The notion of infallibility comes down to this: first, that the fact of error is excluded, that is, it shall never come to pass that the Church errs and this is certainly established; and second, that there is in

the Church a divine principle, or efficient cause, of this exclusion of error, which cause is the assistance of the Holy Spirit—and with this cause present and persisting, it follows that the very possibility of error is also excluded. Hence it is clear that the inerrancy of the Church is to be distinguished from a merely human inerrancy. What pertains to the nature of this assistance we shall inquire into when we debate the infallibility of the Pontiff.

Now we demonstrate that Christ willed his Church always to be immune from error in those things which are to be believed with divine faith. Once this fact is established, infallibility follows. For such immunity, in matters impervious to reason and certain for us, cannot exist except on the basis of a certain promise of divine assistance which, as we have said, excludes the possibility of error and establishes true infallibility.

II. Moreover, the immunity of the Church from error in those things which are to be believed with divine faith can be demonstrated first by this simple argument. The Church of Christ must be perpetual by Christ's institution; therefore, it must also be immune from error by that same institution. To make the correctness of this inference clear, note that the Church is essentially a society of the faithful—that is, of those who not only adhere to God who reveals with a pious disposition of belief, whether they err or do not err regarding the object believed, but who believe according to truth that which God has revealed—both by external profession, so as to belong to the body of the Church, and also by interior assent, so that faith may avail them for salvation. For true faith is that which God willed to be the beginning of salvation, so that men not only submit themselves to God who reveals with a formal submission, but also, by its own nature, with a material submission as well (though incidentally, formal submission alone can at times suffice for some), namely in those specific truths to be believed which God himself has revealed. For the kingdom of Christ is the kingdom of truth (John 18:37), the kingdom of light (1 Peter 2:9–10), and of light (1 John 1:5–7), and the foundation of piety is true faith, namely that which is "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things not appearing" (Hebrews 11). And so true faith is that which God willed to be celebrated also in external profession within the Church, and

therefore to be taught by his Church; for on this depends interior faith, since we believe what the Church teaches. Therefore, a Church that does not teach true faith is no longer that medium instituted by God by which men can attain true faith by believing the truths revealed by God and by faith attain justification and holiness. The Church, that is, ceases to be a society of the faithful if men believe what she teaches and she no longer teaches what God has revealed; she therefore ceases to be a medium of salvation; and from this she finally ceases to be the Church herself, who is essentially a society of the faithful and essentially a medium of salvation. Therefore, if the Church is perpetual, she is also perpetually immune from error, and therefore infallible in the sense we established at the outset.

Furthermore, in 1 Timothy 3:15 the Church is called the pillar and foundation of truth. The passage is somewhat involved; hence it must be recited in full. The Apostle says: "These things I write to you, hoping to come to you shortly. But if I am delayed, that you may know how you ought to conduct yourself in the house of God, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἐκκλησία θεοῦ ζῶντος, στῦλος καὶ ἑδραίωμα τῆς ἀληθείας. Καὶ ὁμολογουμένως μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον, Θεὸς (some manuscripts, along with the Claremont manuscript, have what the Vulgate reads; others, better ones, together with the Sinaitic, have ὅς) (if we are to believe the deacon Liberatus in his *Breviarium*, chapter 19, the reading ΘΣ, that is, ΘΕΟΣ, was produced from OE by Macedonius, bishop of Constantinople, at the beginning of the sixth century; compare Hincmar of Reims in his *Opusculum* to Hincmar of Laon; the more probable view is that the primitive reading was ὅς, inasmuch as it could more difficultly have been substituted by copyists and the other readings are easily explained from it) ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι, ὤφθη ἀγγέλοις, ἐκηρύχθη ἐν ἔθνεσιν, ἐπιστεύθη ἐν κόσμω, ἀνελήφθη ἐν δόξῃ."

The question is what the subject is of which it is said that it is the pillar and foundation of truth. For some think it is Timothy himself, as if it were said: how you ought to conduct yourself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, ὡς στῦλος, or στῦλος ὤν, as a pillar—that is, as being a pillar—and foundation of truth. Moreover, they say, the ellipsis of ὡς or τοῦτο is frequent. So says Aug. Dathius in Salomon Glass's *Philologia Sacra*, book 2, tract 1, chapter 13. The

grounds for this interpretation are: a) because the designation of pillar is attributed elsewhere to the leaders or principal members of the Church (Galatians 2:9; Apocalypse 3:12); b) because since the Church has just been represented under the figure of a house, it is incongruous for it to be represented in the same context of discourse under the figure of a pillar—for a pillar is a certain principal part of a house, just as a bishop is of the Church. Others contend that the first part of the sentence is completed with the words "Church of the living God" and that the following words begin another part of the sentence; namely, that the words "pillar and foundation of truth" are to be joined with what follows, so that the reading should be: "The pillar and foundation of truth, and manifestly great is the mystery of piety," etc. The grounds are: a) what was cited in second place in the earlier opinion; b) because Paul is not accustomed to begin a sentence with the conjunction "and"; c) because this is a familiar formula among the Jews when they hand down the principal tenets of religion, calling them the pillar and foundation of wisdom—so Maimonides at the beginning of the *Mishnah*; indeed, Paul himself called the doctrine of Jesus Christ, which is here also set forth, the foundation in 1 Corinthians 3:11; d) because the sequence of the discourse suggests it; for since the Apostle first taught what kind of person a pastor ought to be, he now teaches what he ought above all to hand down as the foundation of religion; e) because Irenaeus seems also to have read it thus (book 3, chapter 1; compare, if permitted, Svicerus's *Thesaurus* at the word στῦλος).

Yet there is no reason to admit these interpretations. As for the first: bishops taken together can indeed be called the pillar and foundation of truth by their authority; but to apply this designation to a single individual bishop is going too far, and it does not cohere sufficiently in the context with the logic that the one who is being instructed and shown to stand in need of instruction should at the same time be called the pillar and foundation of truth. Moreover, in the passage cited at Galatians 2:9, the designation of pillar is given to the Apostles, who, holding first place in the Church, were sustaining and governing it by their authority and doctrine. In the Apocalypse, on the other hand, the metaphor of a pillar of truth does not occur at all; rather, only that of a pillar, and thereby is signified a special prerogative

of steadfastness in faith granted to the one who conquers. Furthermore, the ellipsis is asserted without cause: both because Paul is speaking in general of all, "that you may know how one ought to conduct himself in the house of God"; and because between the subject to which the predicate "pillar," etc., would have to be attributed, and the predicate itself, another subject intervenes, namely the Church. And it is the Church that is said to be a pillar—not immediately the house itself—the Church of the living God, which is represented under a twofold image: as a house with respect to God who dwells in it, and as a pillar and foundation with respect to truth. Nor is it contrary to the manner of speaking in the Scriptures for two different metaphors to be applied simultaneously to the same subject. Compare Jeremiah 1:18: "For behold, I have made you this day a fortified city and an iron pillar and a bronze wall."

As for the second interpretation: it is generally false that it is not permitted to begin a part of a sentence with a conjunctive particle; for just as the members of a single period can be joined together, so also can several periods. It is also false that Paul is not in the habit of beginning his sentences in this way. Compare 1 Corinthians 2:1, 3; Ephesians 2:1. Moreover, the fact that the doctrine of the incarnate Christ, that is, the mystery of piety, could be called the pillar and foundation of truth, is not a sufficient reason for it to be so called here. As for Irenaeus in the cited passage, he says only that the Gospel written by the Apostles was to be for us the pillar and foundation of truth against the errors of the Gnostics, who were endeavoring to pervert the divine revelation handed down by the Apostles. Irenaeus, that is, used the same metaphor that the Apostle used; and this metaphor has a true sense even in Irenaeus, which he could have employed even without following the Apostle—yet there is nothing to show that in that place Irenaeus is interpreting these words of Paul such that the same thing is predicated by both of the same subject. Nor does the sequence of the discourse demand this interpretation, as will presently be evident.

The common reading of all the Fathers and interpreters is therefore to be maintained, so that the words "pillar and foundation of truth" are joined to what precedes; and their common interpretation is that these words are said of the Church (considering that all Greek,

Latin, Syriac, and Arabic manuscripts read and punctuate exactly as our bibles do, and that moreover all the Fathers have likewise interpreted the final words as referring to the Church and not to the mystery of piety; I judge that one must be content with this, and that a new interpretation should not be introduced without necessity—so says Daillé, a Protestant author, in his French sermons on 1 Timothy, chapter 3, verse 15, Sermon 21).

And indeed Paul, writing this epistle, had before his eyes the Gnostics, against whose false knowledge he was eager to render safe the faithful entrusted to the care of Timothy (1:4–7; 4:1 seq.; 6:3–5, 20–21). The teaching of these "false teachers" (6:3) is called "falsely named knowledge" (6:20) and was opposed to the faith which the Apostles had preached and which the Church of the living God professed. Hence, after the Apostle had taught Timothy (epistle 3) what kind of persons the bishops, deacons, and women in the Church ought to be, he notes that he wrote these things so that, even if he himself were delayed in coming, Timothy might know how both he himself and others ought to conduct themselves in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God; and upon making mention of the Church, in order to set himself against the new and false teaching of the Gnostics, he reminds his reader that it is the pillar and foundation of truth—so that the faithful might understand that truth is to be sought from it, and not from those new teachers. The words, therefore, are fully consistent with the purpose of Paul's epistle, understood as being said of the Church. And indeed they cannot be joined with what follows; for in that hypothesis, since the subject is μυστήριον, which has the article, the sense would be: the mystery of piety is the pillar and foundation of truth and is manifestly great—but what would be the point of saying that the mystery is great, after it had already been said to be the pillar and foundation of truth? And when one would expect an increase in the sentence, one sees it ending in a predicate of lesser import that conveys no new information. Thus, just as there are two subjects of this sentence —namely the Church and the mystery of piety—so there are two things to be distinguished that are predicated of each: "pillar and foundation of truth" of the Church, and "manifestly great" of the mystery of piety. That those words are an apposition of the Church and not of some other

subject is clear from the immediate syntactical connection; since moreover there is no other subject in the sentence to which they can be attributed.

Moreover, the Church that is the pillar and foundation of truth is the universal Church, even though the formal principle of this prerogative is the Magisterium, as we shall see presently; for by the name "Church," when there is no restrictive apposition, the universal Church is understood—and here there is none; for from the fact that the precepts were handed down to Timothy so that he might know how he ought to conduct himself in the Church, it does not follow that this Church is the Church of Ephesus, of which Timothy was bishop, since in the universal Church he and all others likewise conducted themselves, of which Church they were parts and members. And indeed the universal Church is the house of God and the Church of the living God.

Likewise, "the truth," ἡ ἀλήθεια, is not this or that truth, but is the entire doctrine of revelation, that is, the objective faith which in the Scriptures is simply called ἡ ἀλήθεια or ἀλήθεια—as in this same epistle at 2:4—and which is set in opposition to τῇ ψευδωνύμῳ γνώσει τῶν ἑτεροδιδασκάλων.

The universal Church, therefore, is στῦλος καὶ ἑδραίωμα τῆς ἀληθείας. It is not said what the Church ought to be according to some moral law, but what it is; hence it is said to Timothy: "that you may know how you ought"—but concerning the Church it is simply affirmed that it is the pillar of truth. Metaphorically, στύλος is everything upon which something rests, from which something derives firmness, stability, and security. Ἑδραίωμα is a word occurring ἅπαξ λεγόμενον in this passage alone; yet the words from which it derives do occur: ἕδρα, which signifies first a seat and then that which is placed beneath a thing to support or prop it; hence ἑδραῖον, which means firm (1 Corinthians 7:37; 15:58; Colossians 1:23); from which ἑδραιόω, meaning "I establish, I make firm" (compare Stephanus at this word); from which ἑδραίωμα, which, as Phavorinus and Suidas attest, is στήριγμα, a foundation, a support. In ἑδραίωμα, therefore, there is contained the concept both of the seat on which something rests, and of that which supports and confirms, or which confers firmness and stability upon what rests upon

it. Metaphorically, then, ἑδραίωμα is everything that is firm in itself and imparts stability and firmness to that which rests upon it. Now, although a pillar is also used to raise something aloft and set it in the sight of all, the metaphor is not drawn from this reason alone in common usage, but from the reason of the strength and firmness which it possesses in itself and communicates to another—whether from this reason alone or combined with another reason as well. And indeed that the reason of strength and firmness is the basis of the transference is made manifest by the fact that both στῦλος and ἑδραίωμα are coupled together as appositives of a single subject. Moreover, something can be called a pillar and foundation of truth for two reasons: a) insofar as στῦλος and ἑδραίωμα constitute a certain seat, that thing may be called the pillar and foundation of truth which is the seat of the same, in which truth obtains its seat; and b) insofar as στῦλος and ἑδραίωμα are a firm and stable seat imparting firmness and stability to what rests and sits upon them, that thing may be called the pillar and foundation of truth which imparts firmness and stability to it. Both reasons, however, must be present simultaneously, for the first without the second cannot represent the metaphor of a pillar and foundation. The second, moreover, can obtain in two ways: namely, first, so that truth itself is made firm in itself; and second, so that the manifestation of truth, or the teaching of truth, is made firm. For although truth is firm in itself, it may nonetheless need an external support by which knowledge of it is established; and this support is needed by divine truth, which is to be made manifest to men through men—a support which cannot be anything other than authority. And although truth, that is, divine revelation viewed ontologically, establishes the Church, yet the knowledge and certainty of it can be made firm by the authority of ecclesiastical teaching.

Since, therefore, the Church is the pillar and foundation of truth, it is first the seat of truth, and then the firm and stable seat of truth, conferring stability and firmness not indeed upon truth in itself—for the Church does not constitute truth, which on the contrary it received from God—but upon the knowledge of it, producing in all nations a certain knowledge of truth by its authority. Authority, however, would exercise no force unless it were certainly established that it is impossible

for the Church to err; for if doubt on this matter is permitted, there is no firmness in the faith that is given to it. Once that certainty is granted, the very prerogative of infallibility is obtained. Nor should one say that the Fathers called certain men pillars and foundations of faith without thereby wishing to call them infallible; for those honored with such titles were men who strenuously defended the doctrine of the Church, and they were held to be infallible not by power but by fact, not from themselves but on account of the infallible doctrine of the Church which they followed and championed—hence they were not called pillars of truth with respect to everything, but only with respect to certain things. Such a designation, therefore, always signifies some infallibility. The difference, however, is this: when this designation is applied to individual doctors who receive doctrine from the Church, infallibility flows from the doctrine already handed down by the Church to the persons and exists in them after the manner of a passing act, not a permanent habit; but the Church, which is taught by God alone, which is the pillar of all truth and at all times, is by its authority the infallible ground of our certainty regarding truths, and it possesses this infallibility habitually and from itself by reason of its own office.

Moreover, the Church has always in practice claimed this prerogative for itself, by delivering definitive sentences in controversies of faith, or by simply proposing the faith—and in both cases in such a way as to exact from the truths it proposed that assent which is owed to the Word of God, namely an assent most certain and unchangeable under no hypothesis; an assent which the faithful were bound to render even without any scientific inquiry on their own part, on this supposition alone—that the Church had spoken. And this is exactly equivalent to claiming for itself infallibility from divine assistance. This, however, does not prevent the Fathers from sometimes urging the universal consent of the Church also under this special consideration—that there is a certain universal consent which, when tested according to the rule of pure reason, produces moral certainty and is customarily an argument of truth. When Tertullian says (in the *De Praescriptionibus*): "what is found to be one thing among many is not an error but a tradition," he seems to have had this moral principle in view, even if not exclusively. When, however, Augustine says (in his work *Contra*

Epistolam Manichaei, chapter 4): "I should not believe the Gospel, unless the authority of the Catholic Church confirmed me," he considers divine authority; for that authority, as he had spoken of it a little earlier, had its beginning in miracles.

Not only the Catholic Church but all the ancient heretical sects claimed for themselves the prerogative of infallibility, just as they claimed the dignity of being the true Church. Hence, assembling synods, they delivered peremptory sentences by which they exacted from all who wished to remain in their sect—or, as they themselves called it, in the true Church—submission to their faith.

III. But did Christ will his Church to be infallible regarding all revealed truths, or only regarding some that are principal and, as it were, fundamental for the piety and justice that leads to salvation? The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles can be employed in three senses: first, with respect to knowledge, so that by comparison among them, those are called fundamental which are more excellent and contain the others virtually; second, with respect to explicit or implicit faith, so that those are called fundamental which must be believed explicitly, while non-fundamental are those which suffice to be believed implicitly; third, with respect to the necessity of believing, so that those are fundamental which must be believed for the unity of faith to be preserved, while non-fundamental are those which, even though revealed, need not be believed for the unity of faith to remain intact, and which may be denied. Not in the first and second senses, which are found among Catholic theologians, but in the third, all Protestants defend the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles, and thus they contend that the true Church is the one that does not err in fundamental matters, even if it errs in others; and hence that it cannot be proved that Christ willed his Church to err in no revealed matter. But: first, this distinction must be utterly rejected. Indeed: a) by an argument ad hominem, it is not supplied by the Scriptures, from which the Protestants ought to demonstrate both that this distinction exists and which matters belong to the first and which to the second class, lest the distinction be entirely useless. The doctrine of 1 Corinthians 3:11 pertains to the distinction taken in the first and second sense, not the third, which is proper to the Protestants. b)

Indeed it is openly refuted by the Scriptures, as in Matthew 28:20; Galatians 1:8; 2 Thessalonians 3:14. c) This is a new doctrine, utterly unknown to the Church before the Protestants; which, on the contrary, d) openly contradicts it, whether when it struck with anathema those who refused to believe articles which no Protestant would count among the fundamental ones—such as many matters concerning the errors of Origen, the rebaptizers, the error of the Novatianists, and so forth—or when it taught what the rule of things to be believed is; for the Church placed this rule not in the dignity or objective necessity of truths, but in divine revelation manifested through the authentic Magisterium. e) Such a distinction is devoid of every criterion, as can be seen in the very Protestant authors themselves, among whom there are as many opinions as there are minds, and it by its own nature opens the way to latitudinarianism and indifferentism. f) It utterly subverts the nature of faith and implies a contradiction: for the formal motive of faith is not the dignity or necessity of a truth, but is solely the authority of God who reveals, which exacts faith; therefore all things which are established to have been revealed by God are to be believed, and indeed they are to be believed with the same ground and the same obligation, because the motive is the same—hence either all or none are to be believed; but that these must be believed and those need not involves a contradiction, since it would mean one both ought and ought not to believe God who reveals.

Therefore, second, the infallibility of the Church regarding revealed truths encompasses not merely some of them but all of them. For it must be infallible concerning those things which are to be believed with divine faith; the Church is indeed instituted to this end, that it should infallibly propose divine revelation; therefore it must be infallible concerning all things that are to be believed with divine faith, for the same ground of conferred infallibility always holds for each and every one of them; and moreover all revealed things are to be believed—for they are revealed precisely in order to be believed, and the same formal motive of faith holds for all of them; therefore.

From what has been said it follows that if the question is raised whether the infallibility we have declared belongs to the Church necessarily—necessarily, that is, as a consequence of Christ's will—it is

plain that the answer must be affirmative; for from what has been adduced the divine will is sufficiently established.

IV. There remains therefore a twofold question: the first, whether it was necessary for Christ to will that his Church be infallible; the second, how Christ willed infallibility to be obtained in the Church. We treat now the first question—whether there is some antecedent necessity for this prerogative of infallibility, so that Christ was under obligation to enrich the Church with this prerogative. The question, moreover, can be raised both in general concerning the infallibility of the Church, and in particular concerning the infallibility of some specific magisterium. Furthermore, it may be noted that such a question cannot be posed and resolved unless there is already presupposed some knowledge of the Church, from whose nature or purpose one may gather what is necessarily required of it. For if one abstracts from knowledge of the Church, one has neither a subject of inquiry nor any reason to place one thing rather than another.

Now the Church of Christ is a gathering of those who profess the true faith, nor can the Church exist without profession of the true faith; and the necessity of true faith is the necessary exclusion of error in faith —which is precisely infallibility; therefore some infallibility is necessary to the Church by reason of its nature. The necessity of true faith—and indeed of interior faith—and thus the necessity of infallibility in the Church, is admitted even by the Socinians and Protestants themselves. For since they wish the Church to be a gathering of those who are united to God by interior faith, and want anyone whatsoever who has true faith and worships God with true faith to belong to this gathering (which is in itself invisible), even if such faithful do not know each other as such, and since by the very fact that anyone falls from the true faith he ceases to be a member of this gathering—they too concede that the true Church of Christ cannot but be immune from error. Although, on account of the distinction of articles of faith into fundamental and non-fundamental, they wish the true faith necessary to the Church to be only that which embraces the fundamental articles. Yet they deny that the visible Church is infallible in the profession of faith. But it is certain that the Church is a visible society and that the profession of faith in it is

visible; therefore the infallibility which is said to be necessary to the Church of God must be attributed to the visible Church itself.

We proceed to the other question—how the infallibility of the universal Church is obtained—but the question is more extended and must be treated over several sections. Let it therefore be:

ON THE MAGISTERIUM OF THE CHURCH

§ XXI

The controversy between the Protestants and Catholics in the sixteenth century, although it first revolved around particular dogmas, nonetheless easily came to center upon this principal point, which is the matter of the Ecclesiastical Magisterium.

The position of the Protestants comes down to this: Christ, in order to provide his Church with knowledge of the truths to be believed and with the integrity and perpetuity of faith, first sent out and commanded to be spread among the people a certain divinely inspired book—a book which was partly already written in the old economy (the Old Testament) and partly to be written by the first propagators of ecclesiastical doctrine (the New Testament)—which book individual persons were to read. Second, so that men reading this book might certainly learn what they must believe and what they must do for the sake of attaining eternal salvation, they are guided by the interior direction of the Holy Spirit. Third, Christ gave to men this book alone as the certain rule of faith and morals, excluding any humanly established magisterium divinely instituted that would commend this book to the faithful by its infallible authority and authentically interpret it.

The Catholic antithesis is not that Christ willed the doctrine of his faith to be handed down not only in writing but also by word; that is a certain consequence of Christ's institution, so that the Church might make use of both methods as occasion demands. The Catholic antithesis is this: Christ, for the sake of generating, propagating, and preserving faith, instituted a living, personal Magisterium, composed of men who teach, furnished with divine authority to teach whatever must be

believed and done in the Church; and Christ willed this Magisterium to be perpetual. To this infallible Magisterium, which represents him on earth until he comes, Christ subjected all his sheep, so that from it they might receive every revealed truth and the Scriptures themselves. Moreover, he willed this Magisterium to reside in those to whom he entrusted the power of governing and sanctifying his faithful.

This Catholic thesis must be defended against the ravings of the Protestants in all its parts. Hence it must be demonstrated: first, the institution of this Magisterium; second, its perpetuity; third, its necessity; fourth, its unity; fifth, its infallibility. The arguments proper to this question in debate with the Protestants—since they admit the sacred Scriptures and wish the matter to be settled by them alone—must be drawn first from the Scriptures, considered as reliable historical monuments reporting what Christ did and what he ordained; and then also—from which argument the Protestants themselves do not recoil—from the ancient historical monuments of that society which was constituted by those whom Christ sent. It is unnecessary to note that here we presuppose the authenticity of the Scriptures, which is demonstrated in another place.

§ XXII

Christ instituted a living, personal Magisterium, furnished with authority to teach in his name, with an obligation imposed on all others to hear it and to believe what it teaches.

1° A living, personal Magisterium, as we have already noted, is a person or a gathering of persons endowed with the authority to teach. This authority is perfect if, together with the institution of the magisterium, an obligation of hearing it and professing what it teaches is imposed upon others. That Christ instituted such a magisterium in the Apostles cannot be doubted. In Matthew 28:18–20, Christ says to the Apostles: "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth. Going therefore, μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." Mark 16:15–16: "Going into the whole world, preach the Gospel to every creature: he

who believes and is baptized will be saved; but he who does not believe will be condemned."

And so: first, Christ sends men into the world to make disciples: μαθητεύσατε, since it is followed by διδάσκοντες, cannot simply mean "teach," but means "make disciples," μαθήτας ποιεῖτε (compare John 4:1); they are therefore Masters who are to have a school; and disciples are to be drawn from all nations, from every creature, that is, from all men. Second, this mission is connected to and is a consequence of the power which Christ possesses in heaven and on earth, that is, over all creatures whatsoever: "going therefore."

The particle οὖν, even if it is not found in all manuscripts and is absent from the Sinaitic as well, is nevertheless found in several manuscripts—B, A, E, F, H, K, M and 57 minuscules—and was read in the West by the Latin translator, in Egypt by Origen, Athanasius, and Cyril, and in the East by Chrysostom and Basil (as cited in Wetstein); furthermore, even if it were absent, it would need to be supplied mentally, for there is a connection between these words of Christ: what else is the mention of Christ's power prefaced for, if not to reveal the ground of the following command? That is, Christ by virtue of his supreme power, by which all creatures and all men are made subject to him, sends the Apostles to make disciples of all men. The Apostles therefore, by the power of Christ, are Masters—that is, they teach and make disciples not by their own authority but by the authority of Christ. "Since all power has been given to me in heaven and on earth," and therefore the power of gathering disciples to myself from all men, "I communicate this to you by way of participation; make therefore all men disciples by my authority, in my name." Third, in the very word μαθητεύσατε the obligation of learning is already signified: if μαθηταί are to be formed, they must certainly learn something; this is what Mark expressed: "preach the Gospel to every creature." Moreover, that which is signified by the words "make disciples" is completed and perfected by baptism. The words μαθητεύσατε… βαπτίζοντες (some manuscripts have βαπτίσαντες) are not equivalent to Christ having said: μαθητεύσαντες βαπτίζετε, "after you have made disciples, baptize them"; rather, by the second word the manner and completion of the first is indicated. Men become perfect disciples of Christ by receiving

baptism, by which they profess faith and enter the Church of Christ. Fourth, "teaching them…": this word is coordinated simultaneously with "baptizing them": both are linked with μαθητεύσατε; the condition of a disciple, like the magisterium itself, is something habitual and permanent; the act of the magisterium is to teach. Moreover, fifth, that the act of teaching must precede baptism (the reference is to adults) is clear from the words of Mark: "preach the Gospel… he who believes and is baptized"; but that it must also follow from baptism is gathered from the words of Matthew, where mention of doctrine is made after baptism (so Jerome in the cited place) and where men are said to become disciples of the Apostles through baptism. If the baptized are disciples, they are therefore to be taught. And so the disciples of Christ, who constitute his Church, are continuously and both before and after baptism under the Magisterium and discipline of the Apostles. Sixth, the obligation imposed upon others of hearing and believing what these Masters teach arises spontaneously from the very mission of the Masters made by Christ in virtue of the power by which all things and all persons are subject to him. The same obligation is manifestly proclaimed by the same Lord in Mark: "He who believes and is baptized will be saved; but he who does not believe will be condemned." Faith in the Gospel is required, but faith in the Gospel as preached by the Apostles; therefore this faith also contains the submission of the intellect to the preaching and Magisterium of the Apostles. The Gospel, that is, is to be believed—but the Gospel as preached by the Apostles—and therefore the Apostles as they preach are to be believed; for they are the ones who must make disciples for themselves, as is said in Matthew at the cited place. And the salvation spoken of in Mark's "will be saved" is that of which Christ himself says in John 4:17: "God did not send his Son into the world to judge the world, but that the world might be saved through him"—namely, as he had said immediately before, in verse 16, "that everyone who believes in him should not perish but have eternal life." What is commanded under the sanction of damnation or eternal life falls certainly under the gravest obligation.

II. And indeed, why did Christ from among the number of his disciples choose certain ones and name them Apostles and therefore bring it about that they should be such (Luke 6:13)? Surely he assigned

to them an office to be exercised toward others to whom they were sent; for Apostles are "those who are sent." Why, therefore? Namely, that he might send them to preach (Mark 3:14)—not only while he was still alive on earth (which was a kind of preparatory exercise), but so that he might substitute them for himself in the Magisterium of the world, as is clear from the words of the Savior in John 17:18–20, addressed to the Father: "As you sent me, and I have sent them into the world, and for them I sanctify myself, that they also may be sanctified in truth. Not for them only do I pray, but also for those who will believe" (the present participle πιστευόντων cannot here be taken other than indefinitely, for any time after the mission) "through their word in me, that all may be one, as you, Father, are in me and I in you, that they also may be one in us." That is, whoever is hereafter to be one with God—that is, every Christian—will believe in Christ through the word of the Apostles, and through this faith will be brought to unity with God. Our Lord therefore chose the Apostles that they might be his witnesses unto the ends of the earth (Acts 1:8; compare Matthew 24:14; Luke 24:48)—witnesses who should recount what they had seen and heard from him (1 John 1:1; Acts 1:21–22), so that whoever received their testimony should be united to the Apostles and through them to God (1 John 3:1–3), while those who did not receive it, or who did not give assent to that testimony, would likewise withhold assent from God (Luke 10:16; Matthew 10:40).

III. And indeed such an institution of the Magisterium is the reason why the Apostle says in Romans 10:17: "Faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ"—the word of faith which the Apostles preach (ibid. 8). "But how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach unless they be sent?" (14, 15). The mission of the Apostles for the purpose of preaching and teaching is therefore the medium instituted by God for generating faith in the hearts of men. We have therefore in the Apostles a living, personal Magisterium instituted by Christ and endowed with his authority.

§ XXIII

A twofold formality must be distinguished in the Magisterium of the Apostles, namely the formality of witness and the formality of teacher: the former is prior, the latter is more universal.

I. A witness is one who reports to others a fact which he has seen or heard; an authentic witness in general terms is one who has the right to be believed, and specifically, one who has the legal authority to testify and the right to have his testimony taken into account. Such certainly is he who is sent by God, with an obligation imposed upon others to believe him—by which arrangement he also becomes a necessary witness, even though this very mission must be proved by divine signs.

A teacher in general terms is one who communicates to another the knowledge of some truth which he himself holds; under this universal notion, a witness is also a teacher. In a special sense, a teacher —insofar as he is distinguished from a mere witness—is customarily called the one who imparts to another the knowledge of rational truths which he himself knows. This can happen in two ways: either by simply affirming to another what he himself knows, or by guiding the mind of the other through an ordered series of ideas toward a clear knowledge of the truth. This second way is the proper office of a teacher, by which he generates knowledge in another. When a teacher employs the first method—which is indeed the manner in which one who has already acquired the name of a wise man frequently conducts himself before the untutored—assent to the doctrine handed down by him is rendered on account of the authority or wisdom of the one teaching, and faith is produced, not knowledge. Such assent, however, when the teacher is a mere man, is by its nature weak, or reduces to assent to the probability of the matter; which probability, nonetheless, in practical affairs is usually sufficient for one to acquiesce honorably in the reply of a teacher. A teacher who, by the mere force of his own affirmation, renders others so certain of a rational truth that it would be wrong to withhold assent, cannot be other than an infallible teacher, of which kind God is by himself, and through God, one who has been endowed by him with the charism of infallibility.

Finally, an authentic teacher is one who by legitimate authority has the right to teach; and who will further be a necessary teacher if others are obliged to hear him by virtue of that same legitimate authority.

II. In the new economy, the first one to discharge most excellently the office of witness was the Author and Institutor of that economy himself: "what we have seen," he himself says in John 3:11, "we testify, and our testimony you do not receive." And likewise in John 18:37: "For this was I born, that I should give testimony to the truth." For Christ spoke the things which he saw at the Father's side (John 8:38), and his teaching was contained not in demonstration but in the affirmation of something seen which, being real, was in the position of an established fact, and therefore his affirmation was rightly called testimony, to which faith was the proper response—even when he affirmed what he himself was (John 8:14). Then in the same office of witness the Holy Spirit also functioned, as the Lord says: "When the Paraclete comes" (John 15:26), "he will bear testimony to me."

III. Christ willed this very office of bearing witness to be continued through the Apostles. Indeed, immediately after the preceding words, he adds: "And you also will bear testimony, because you have been with me from the beginning"—for by that fellowship with him, it came about that they could testify to others what they had seen and heard from him. Hence our Lord, as he was about to ascend into heaven, sending them into the world, makes mention of this office: "And you shall be witnesses to me in Jerusalem and in all Judaea and Samaria and even to the uttermost parts of the earth." Aware of the same office, Peter, when the election of a substitute for Judas was being arranged, laid down this condition: that it was necessary for one to be chosen who had been in the company of the Apostles and of Christ from the beginning of his preaching until the day of his assumption, and who would be a qualified witness of his resurrection (Acts 1:21–22). The Apostles themselves frequently call themselves witnesses. Compare Acts 2:32; 4:33; 5:30–32; 13:31; 1 John 1:1–3. "What we have seen and heard," says John (ibid.), "we announce to you"; "for we cannot," Peter said to the princes of the synagogue, "but speak the things we have seen and heard" (Acts 4:20).

To this end the Magisterium of the Apostles certainly came: to report what they had seen in Christ, what they had received from him,

what the Holy Spirit had revealed to them. Paul himself, converted to faith after the ascension of Christ and called to the Apostolate, had received by revelation of Jesus Christ the Gospel which he was preaching (Galatians 1:11–12), so that he too might hand on what he had received (1 Corinthians 11:23). The Apostles were bearing witness to the fact of divine revelation, first communicated to themselves, affirming that Christ had done these things, had handed down these things, that the Spirit had revealed these things. Hence Peter in Acts 5:30–32, having made a summary recapitulation of the whole Christian economy, adds: "and we are witnesses of these words" (that is, of these things) "and so is the Holy Spirit." Nor could they in any other way have proved to their hearers those truths that surpass the grasp of reason and were as obscure to them as to others, except by affirming that Christ had thus taught, that the Spirit had thus instructed them—that is, by bearing witness to the fact of revelation. And the signs and miracles were directed to this end: that the word of the Apostles, namely their testimony, might be confirmed (Mark 16:20)—that it might be shown, that is, that their testimony was the testimony of witnesses divinely sent, which should be believed, and that therefore the fact of revelation which the Apostles were testifying to should be believed.

IV. But the office of teacher was additionally required. For indeed, that which the Apostles testified they had received from God was either some doctrine, the fact of whose revelation they were affirming, or it was simply some fact—such as the virginal conception, or a fact of which they themselves had been spectators, as the Resurrection of the Lord. Now, any doctrine whatsoever needed to be explained, accommodated to the grasp of reason, even defended and proved from the authority of the Scriptures, and a rule needed to be handed down according to which the dogma was to be conceived. Evidently the same task was to be performed with regard to revealed facts as well. When the Apostles were doing this, they were fulfilling the office of teacher. Although they had received through the same revelation both the very concept of the dogma or supernatural fact by which they had received the dogma or the fact itself, so that they could testify to the concept just as to the dogma or fact itself: nevertheless, first, not everything that had to be set forth for the explanation of a revealed matter was contained in

that revelation, but some things also had to be drawn from their own knowledge, even if under the direction of the Holy Spirit, since the Apostles were infallible—compare, for instance, the Apostle reasoning in 1 Corinthians 15 about the resurrection, and in Galatians 3:15 seq. and 4:1 seq. reasoning "according to man." The knowledge of the Scriptures also was necessary to them for the defense and confirmation of the doctrine preached by the Apostles; it was a charism freely given to them (Luke 24:45), but a charism of teacher, not of witness; for it was directed to providing understanding of a matter, not to simply affirming the fact itself—see its use in the epistles to the Romans and to the Galatians for demonstrating the necessity of faith and Christian freedom. Second, the distinction between the office of teacher and that of witness is intrinsic, arising from the very essence of these qualities, whatever the cause by which these qualities are obtained; a witness affirms a fact, which office the Apostles fulfilled by affirming what they had seen, what they had heard, in general the fact of revelation; a teacher displays the knowledge of a matter, employing rational ideas which either natural light alone or the light of faith as well suggests, and opens the mind of the hearer toward attaining understanding of the matter. Since, therefore, the Apostles did this and it was necessary for it to be done by them, they must be said to have fulfilled both offices, of witness and of teacher. Compare the beginning of the Gospel of John, where both the fact of revelation concerning the incarnate Son of God is asserted and a rule is handed down for thinking about him.

V. But because these qualities belonged to the same subject and in actual practice so concurred together that, while sometimes the former could exist without the latter, the latter, however, could not exist without the former—for this reason we have called them two formalities of the same Magisterium.

VI. It is easily and doctrinally clear that testimony is prior to explanation; for through testimony that which is to be declared through explanation is established as present. But why have we said that the latter is more universal? This depends on the proper character of teachership. For in order for a dogma to be explained and vindicated, one must take as aids rational ideas by which it can be apprehended, take up principles of reason which it presupposes, and consider truths

which flow from the revealed dogma by right reasoning. But all these things need not be revealed; yet for the teacher to hand down with full certainty the doctrine or science concerning revealed matters, he must be able to affirm all these auxiliary matters with certainty—that is, he must be able to teach and defend them as well. At times also certain human facts must be certain for a dogma to be handed down with certainty.

You have an example of this in the commendation made by the Apostles to the Church of the Alexandrian version. For it was necessary to know not only that that version was authentic—which the Apostles could receive from Christ or from the Holy Spirit—but also that the codices which the Apostles used and thus commended to the Churches actually represented, at least substantially, that version, that is, that the codices had not been corrupted, so that the faithful could use them safely. But this the Apostles affirmed not as witnesses of a revelation—there being none in this matter—but from certain knowledge, in their capacity as teachers of the Church.

Therefore the office of teacher is not concerned only with revealed matters, but extends also to handing down many things which revelation does not touch, but without which our certainty about a dogma will not be complete. See what is to be said in § XL.

Since, therefore, the witness is concerned only with handing down a revealed matter, while the teacher extends beyond this as well, it follows that the office of the latter is more universal.

VII. But since the office of witness and teacher is proper to the Apostolic Magisterium, and the Apostles were sent with divine authority with an obligation imposed upon others to hear them, it follows that they are authentic and necessary witnesses and teachers.

§ XXIV

The act of this ecclesiastical Magisterium instituted in the Apostles could be exercised both by living voice and by writing.

I. Certainly Christ commanded the Apostles to teach, but he did not determine the manner; he willed, that is, that they should teach in the way in which men are generally taught by other men, leaving it to

their judgment to use the method which they themselves would judge more useful as occasion demanded. Now men are generally taught both by word of mouth and in writing; it was therefore open to the Masters instituted by the Lord—by the same Christ's authority—to use either or both methods. Whatever method they used, the act was the act of a living, personal Magisterium, which consists not exclusively in someone speaking with a living voice, but in this: that it is an act proceeding from a living person, knowing what he teaches and judging and signifying that what he hands down is true. This can be done no less in writing than in speech. Indeed it often happens that it is better to teach in writing than by word of mouth. For by writing more people can be taught, even those absent; moreover, writing ensures that the doctrine handed down is more easily preserved and propagated to posterity.

Hence we see that the Apostles used both methods, and that doctrine handed down by either method is commended by them in the same way: "Stand fast and hold the traditions which you have received, whether by word or by our epistle," says the Apostle in 2 Thessalonians 2:15.

II. Apostolic writings, beyond this dignity—that they are the writings of the first Masters of the Church, whom Christ sent, and are therefore each individually infallible in matters of faith and morals, because the Apostles also individually (as we shall demonstrate later) were infallible—have also the distinction that each individually is inspired, at least those writings which we know (a matter to be discussed elsewhere), and therefore from this ground as well they are infallible—and indeed in all things that are written, in accordance with the nature of divine inspiration. But under this special respect these books are not here being considered.

§ XXV

Christ, in instituting his Apostles as Masters, did not exempt them from every norm; rather, he prescribed as their norm the very Word of God —whether already written or revealed by himself or by the Holy Spirit—but at the same time brought it about that the Apostles infallibly followed this norm, so that therefore their infallible Magisterium was itself a certain and sufficient norm for men with respect to knowing that very Word of God.

I. The Apostles were legates of Christ, sent by him to preach and teach not whatever pleased them, but his doctrine, the Word of God: "preach the Gospel," "teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you," "you shall be witnesses to me." They were witnesses who were to recount what they had seen and heard, what the Spirit of truth had taught them. They had therefore a norm which they were to follow in their preaching and magisterium—namely, this very Word of God manifested to them, from which it was not permitted to deviate.

But because the Word of God was in part already committed to writing, and it was certainly not permitted to anyone to deviate from it or contradict it, and an intimate and necessary connection existed, by divine ordering, between that written Word and the Word revealed to the Apostles: it was a consequence that this very written Word of God—which the Apostles knew perfectly from the teaching of Christ himself, for Christ opened their minds to understand the Scriptures (Luke 24:45)—became the norm of their Magisterium. And indeed the Apostles confirmed their preaching either by appealing to what they themselves had seen and heard (1 John 1:1–3), or to what they had received through revelation (Galatians 1:11–12), or by appealing to the Scriptures, as can be seen in all their epistles, or by combining both at once, as again appears in their epistles and in the Acts—for example, Acts 1:22–32; 13:26–37, etc.

On account of this subordination of the Apostolic Magisterium to the Word of God, it came about that Paul was able to say in Galatians 1:8: "Even if we or an angel from heaven should preach to you a gospel

other than that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema." For it was not lawful for him to depart from the doctrine handed down; and therefore, if the hypothesis were granted that he had departed from it (which hypothesis is no more conceivable as possible than the other about an angel from heaven preaching something different—compare our *Commentarium* on this passage), he would not have been to be heard.

II. We further establish that the Magisterium of the Apostles was infallible, so that in teaching they infallibly followed the norm prescribed for them—the revealed Word of God. For the distinct notion of infallibility, see what we shall hand down in the following *Tractatus*, part 2, chapter 11, Prenotions. It suffices now to have what we established in § XX.

This truth is fundamental and holds the place of a first principle in the Christian religion. For all Christians are persuaded of this: that what the Apostles handed down is true, and that they hold what is true in religious matters insofar as their doctrine is the very doctrine preached by the Apostles, whether by word or in writing. Compare Tertullian's *De Praescriptionibus*. If doubt is entertained about the truth of Apostolic doctrine, there is no longer any ground on which a Christian can stand; he can no longer have any certain knowledge of the doctrine of Christ, nor does there remain for him anything that he may profess with certainty in religious matters.

III. The Christian persuasion, which had its beginning in the Apostles themselves—for they too believed this—finds its foundation both in the institution of Christ and in his own words. Surely, first, our Lord willed the Apostles to teach all nations (Matthew 28:19–20) and willed all to believe what they preached, under the threat of eternal punishment (Mark 16:16). But what the Apostles preach is to be believed as God who reveals it; for the object of faith is something impervious to human reason, known to God alone (1 Corinthians 2:6–10), which the Only-Begotten Son (John 1:18; Matthew 11:28), the Holy Spirit (John 14:26), the Father (Galatians 1:16; Matthew 11:25–26) has revealed, and faith is required in God and toward God (Romans 4:3 seq.; John 3:11–16; 6:29–30; 17:20; 14:1; Galatians 2:16, 20, etc.). But it is impossible to exact—and indeed under the gravest obligation—faith in

God on account of the word of a man, unless the word of that man is entirely immune from error and truly reports what God has revealed, and this is certainly established for those who are to believe. For it is not lawful to believe God except in truth, and precisely in the truth which God himself speaks; and the assent of divine faith cannot be other than most firm and infallible, to which no error can be hidden, since it rests on divine authority. Such an assent cannot be elicited unless there first precedes the certainty that the word of men is to be received as truly the Word of God (1 Thessalonians 2:13); and as long as it is permitted to doubt about this, neither can the assent be firm, nor is there reason why you should believe God, nor why you should be eternally punished if you do not believe.

From this it follows that the Magisterium of the Apostles is infallible not only insofar as they infallibly know the truth, but also insofar as they infallibly set forth and manifest the truth to others.

2° The words of Christ are John 14:16–17: "I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete, that he may remain with you forever, the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him; but you shall know him, because he shall abide with you and be in you." Ibid. 26: "The Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things and will suggest to you all things whatsoever I have said to you." John 16:13: "When that Spirit of truth comes, ὁδηγήσει ὑμᾶς εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, he will lead you into all truth" (in tutta la verità). Acts 1:8: "You shall receive the power of the Holy Spirit coming upon you, and you shall be witnesses to me."

Note here that what is being spoken of is a charism freely given for the good of others, the promise of which charism is absolute, just as the will that men be taught and that the Church be founded is absolute. Now in the cited words of the Lord you have: first, that the Spirit of truth is the Teacher of the Apostles: "he will teach you all things"; second, that the Apostles will rightly understand what the Spirit will teach: "he will lead you into all truth"—that is, into knowledge of all truth, of the whole truth that is to be handed down; third, that the external Magisterium of the Apostles will be in conformity with that knowledge received and with the teaching of the Holy Spirit; for first

this connection is shown by the words: "you shall receive the power of the Holy Spirit and you shall be witnesses to me"—the very external testimony will be by the power of the Holy Spirit; then this connection is clear because this is the end of the interior teaching of the Spirit, that the Apostles might teach the truth to others. Now from these considerations the immunity from error of the Apostolic Magisterium and its necessary immunity is established; for those cannot err in teaching who in apprehending and speaking follow the teaching of the Holy Spirit.

This asserted infallibility certainly belonged to the body of the Apostles. Concerning individuals, there can be a question. For we observe that the words of Christ that stand in the Gospels, said to the Apostles concerning their authority and rights, were always said to all of them in common, with the exception of those that were said to Peter (which will need to be explained in the following *Tractatus*). Hence there is no word of Christ from which, at least immediately, the infallibility of the individual Apostles—except Peter—can be gathered. Yet note: first, that the fulfillment of the promise of giving the Spirit of truth, which was made at times at least personally to the Apostles themselves as in John 16:13 (as we shall show below), came to pass in such a way that this Spirit of truth was given to each one of them individually (Acts 2:3–4). Note, second, that it was certainly fitting that the first ones sent by Christ—the founders of churches, by whose Magisterium the other faithful were to be formed—should be infallible. Note, third, that Paul without doubt claimed this prerogative for himself in Galatians 1:8–9, pronouncing anathema upon those who taught otherwise than he had taught; where he does not consider himself united with the other Apostles so as to derive the authority of his doctrine from all of them together, but considers himself separately, against whom the authority of the other Apostles was being set—even if wrongly—and he claims infallibility for himself on the grounds that he was an Apostle immediately created by God (1:1) and one who had received revelation from Jesus Christ (1:2; compare our *Commentarium* on this passage).

IV. Now if one asks the end for which this charism of infallibility was conferred on the Apostles, it appears to be that effect which

spontaneously arose from it and which Christ required in the disciples of the Apostles. For Christ willed that others should hear the Apostles and believe what was preached by them. This followed spontaneously if the Apostolic Magisterium was infallible; for in that case it became a certain norm of faith for all who heard them, so that no one could justifiably refuse the obedience of faith—as we have already noted (III). This, therefore, was what Christ intended through the charism of Apostolic infallibility: that the Apostolic Magisterium should be a certain norm of faith for all who were to hear them.

The norm of faith—considered, of course, from our side, who need a norm—can be distinguished as twofold; for such a norm is that by which the Word of God to be believed is certainly known. Now this norm: first, is divine revelation itself considered actively; but this revelation was not made to everyone; it was necessary, therefore, second, that it be manifested to us by the infallible testimony of those to whom it was made. This testimony at once brings to light both the fact of divine revelation and the revealed truths, and thereby leads men to certain knowledge of the truths to be believed. Such Apostolic testimony, therefore, is for men a certain and infallible norm of faith, insofar as it infallibly manifests both the act of divine revelation and the things revealed. But that by which it becomes certain that these things are to be believed is the revelation of God itself, or the authority of God who reveals—which, therefore, is customarily called not so much the norm as the ground of faith.

This infallible Magisterium was moreover a sufficient norm. For the faithful to know with certainty all the truths to be believed, the affirmation of the Apostolic Magisterium sufficed, without any need on their part for the Apostles to put forward the Scriptures and prove their doctrine by means of that testimony. For even though at times it was necessary that Apostolic doctrine conform to the written Word of the Old Testament, when handing down, that is, what was already written—just as it also had to conform to the word of Christ and of the Holy Spirit immediately manifested to them—still, this very conformity of Apostolic doctrine with the Word of God, whether written or handed down, was already infallibly certain to the faithful, on account of the infallibility of the Magisterium of those teaching. For the Apostles from

the teaching of the Holy Spirit knew all things to be believed; and moreover their testimony was infallible: you have therefore witnesses possessed of knowledge and truthfulness—who, that is, know what they testify and are unwilling, indeed unable, to deceive—and such testimony is sufficient for you to be certainly established that the matter stands as the witness affirms.

§ XXVI

From this institution of Christ, the Apostolic Magisterium was therefore the supreme and irrefragable judge in all questions of Faith, the authentic and necessary interpreter of the Scriptures, which the faithful were obliged to receive from the Apostles.

I. In any human society that professes some doctrine, it is necessary, on account of the diverse and fallible characters and pursuits of individual men, that questions should arise and controversies exist. If the doctrine is such as is called scientific knowledge—which is to be found and explained by investigation and analysis of reason—the question can be settled only scientifically by reason, employing legitimate arguments that make the truth evident, so that the end of the question will come when all are individually persuaded and see and affirm the same thing—at least those who are worthy to be heard on the matter. But because in the end the reason that settles the question by means of the arguments adduced is individual, belonging to this person or another, and is essentially the same in each person, while a perverse method or disordered affection prevents many from seeing what is by itself evident—and moreover it can also come about that a false opinion obtains universal consent among learned men, as happened over so many centuries in astronomical and physical matters—hence (setting aside the supreme truths of reason, which are the patrimony of common sense) it is never possible among men to hope for that end of scientific questions which is such in an absolute sense, so that the matter passes for the whole human race into a settled judgment, unless they are questions of fact. For these depend less on the artifice of reason and are made manifest by more certain, sensible arguments; namely, they are settled by the authority of testimony, which can easily be discerned and

brought forward. This last observation contributes not a little to explaining the cause of the method chosen by God for propagating and preserving revealed doctrine; for he reduced every question ultimately to a question of fact.

And so, if the doctrine which the society professes is a doctrine of faith, held by the authority of a Magisterium, the questions that have arisen in the society concerning it will also have to be settled by authority; for the settling of a question is nothing other than a certain act of the Magisterium by which the doctrine already handed down is declared and confirmed, and persuasion of it—with doubts set aside—is produced; which are all manifestly acts of the Magisterium.

And if the authority of the Magisterium is infallible, the settling of the question will be irrefragable, so that the question is juridically settled in an absolute sense, even though some, on account of ignorance or malice, may resist.

II. Now Christ instituted the Magisterium in the Apostles in such a way that he certainly willed them to perform all the acts of Masters that would be necessary for generating and strengthening the faith of their disciples; for he willed the faith of the disciples to be certain and firm (Ephesians 4:13–14) and to rest upon the Magisterium of the Apostles; and the necessary act of the Magisterium for the firmness of doctrine in the mind of disciples is the settling of questions and the delivery of certain judgment; therefore. Likewise, Christ willed this Magisterium to be infallible; the Apostles would therefore settle questions infallibly; and therefore their definition was irrefragable; for what is permitted against a certain manifested truth? But this is brought about by infallible definition.

And indeed, it was not otherwise that the first faithful conducted themselves, when the question arose about the necessity of legal observances—they appealed to the living Magisterium of the Apostles and elders of the primitive Church of Jerusalem, who taught under the Apostles and with the Apostles and certainly followed their doctrine (Acts 15:1 seq.). You will say that this was done at that time because the Scriptures did not yet exist that would teach this, as they did later—for instance, the epistles to the Romans and to the Galatians. But this escape is empty. For: first, these very epistles were acts of the living,

personal Magisterium (§ XXIII), just as the definition delivered at Jerusalem and transmitted in writing to the Churches (Acts 15:23 seq.) was. Second, it is not correct of the Protestants to say that the Scriptures then existing did not contain a sufficient solution to this question. For Paul, treating the question in the epistle to the Galatians, solves it from the Scriptures; certainly the matter was not entirely clear—but would not the faithful, through the interior teaching of the Holy Spirit, have learned in the scriptures of the Old Testament what Paul saw there? Why then did the Apostles at Jerusalem, rather than calling a meeting and holding a council, not refer the faithful to the Scriptures? Surely from the very beginning the faithful needed to be taught by what means they ought themselves to acquire knowledge of the truths to be believed and to settle controversies.

Moreover, the words of Christ to Peter clearly establish this right of the Apostolic Magisterium (of which, as we shall prove in the proper place, Peter was the summit). Matthew 16:19: "Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound also in heaven," etc.—which is to be compared with the words said to the Apostles in Matthew 18:18. We shall prove in the following *Tractatus* that by the preceding words of Christ to Peter, "You are Peter," etc., the supreme Magisterium of faith united with the supreme power of governing is promised by Christ to Peter; and we shall prove there that the final words, "Whatever you bind," etc., exhibit the full exercise of the power previously promised. Now Peter, by teaching, binds, inasmuch as he imposes upon the faithful the obligation of believing what he teaches. Furthermore, this authority of binding is so great that what he shall have bound is likewise bound by God in heaven, so that no one can loose what Peter has bound, no one can remove the obligation which Peter has imposed, just as no one removes the obligation which God imposes. But such authority to impose an obligation of believing what one teaches is proper to the last and supreme judge in questions of Faith; for the judgment of Peter becomes necessary (necessarily to be followed) and irrefragable, after which in the Church no other is to be awaited. Such, therefore, is the authority of the Apostolic Magisterium, of which the summit appears in Peter, so that questions of Faith are settled by his judgment.

III. The authentic and necessary interpreter of the Scriptures is one who interprets the Scriptures from authority divinely received and whose interpretation must necessarily be held; and in the Church of God such an interpreter is he who is the infallible, necessary teacher of all truths to be believed; and the Apostles were such teachers; therefore. Proof of the minor, as to the first part: the truths contained in the Scriptures are themselves to be believed in the Church; therefore he who is the teacher in the Church of all truths to be believed must hand them down as well, and if he is an infallible teacher, he hands them down with certainty, infallibly interpreting the Scriptures, and if he is a necessary teacher, the faithful will be obliged to follow his interpretation; therefore. Proof of the minor, as to the second part: that the Apostolic Magisterium was infallible and necessary we have already seen; likewise we have seen that all truths to be believed in the Church were both to be handed down by it and to be learned from its agency by the faithful; for the Holy Spirit was promised to them so that, taught by him, they might be able to teach others (Acts 1:8)—by which means, of course, the Masters were being instituted—led them into all truth, εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν (John 16:13; § XXII); all truth of faith, that is, was communicated to them, that they might hand it on to the faithful. Wherefore Christ opened the minds of the Apostles to understand the Scriptures (Luke 24:45), that they might be witnesses of what had been fulfilled in Christ himself and had been foretold in the Scriptures (ibid. 46–48); therefore.

IV. For the faithful to receive the Scriptures from the Apostles is for them to be taught by the Apostles which books are the true Scriptures; and by Christ's authority it was necessary for the faithful to be taught this matter also by the Apostles and to hold their doctrine necessarily; therefore. Proof of the minor: that certain books are Scripture, or contain the written Word of God, is a revealed truth to be believed, no differently from any other; and every revealed truth to be believed in the Church was to be handed down by the Apostles and to be learned by the faithful through the agency of the Apostolic Magisterium; therefore.

§ XXVII

This Apostolic Magisterium was so instituted by Christ that it would be perpetual in the Church through continuous succession.

I. It is proved first from the words of the mission. For after saying to them: *going, teach*, he added: *Behold, I am with you until the consummation of the age* (Matt. 28:20). Now the phrase *I am with you* is the customary expression for signifying the present help of God furnished to a man for some work to which he is destined by God. Cf. Ex. 3:12; Jos. 1:5; Judg. 6:16; Jer. 1:19; etc. Therefore Christ regards the Apostles insofar as they were about to carry out some work committed to them by God; but Christ spoke of nothing other than the Magisterium, by which the Apostles were to make disciples for themselves, sealing them with baptism and teaching them whatsoever the Lord commanded: it is for this Magisterium, therefore, that the Savior pledges his assistance. He promises moreover that he will be with the Apostles until the consummation of the age. Ἡ συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος can have no other meaning than the one it always has elsewhere in the same Matthew (13:39, 40, 49; 24:3), namely that it is the end of the age, with the second coming of the Lord. Nor, because αἰών is equivalent to עוֹלָם and this word is repeatedly used for the life of each individual, is it permissible to understand here that Christ said he would be with the Apostles until the end of their lives. For since this restricted meaning of the word עוֹלָם arises from the very subject of the discourse about which עוֹלָם is said, but here the proper subject of the discourse is Christ himself, who is said to be present until the consummation of τοῦ עוֹלָם αἰῶνος, and since he certainly could assist until the end of the ages, had he wished to signify the boundary of the Apostles' lives, he would doubtless have said ἕως τῆς συντέλειας τοῦ αἰῶνος ὑμῶν, or would have used some other similar phrase. Let there remain, therefore, the meaning which appears everywhere else in the same Matthew, who alone uses this phrase, and which we have already indicated. Now it is possible that Christ is with the Apostles teaching until the consummation of the age in either of two ways: either insofar

as the very persons of the Apostles were to live until the end of the age, or insofar as they were to have continuous successors. For even in this latter hypothesis Christ would have spoken properly in saying that he would be with the Apostles until the end of the age; for what one wishes to say to an entire succession is rightly affirmed of the first members considered as first, who are to have perpetual heirs. Now the former mode is excluded by history itself; therefore the latter remains. Consequently the Apostolic Magisterium will endure perpetually in the successors of the Apostles and, with Christ's assistance, will happily fulfill its duty, making disciples, teaching, that is, actively exercising itself.

From these considerations the words of Christ in Mark 16:15–16 are more clearly understood. For to the words *whoever believes* must be supplied from the context: *as you preach*, not only the word preached by you from the beginning; for this limited interpretation is rejected by Christ's words in Matthew, where the discourse concerns the perpetuity of the act of teaching.

To this point also pertain the words in Christ's prayer to the Father (John 17:20). For Christ prayed for all who were to believe in him, not only in the first century but until the end of the world; and he says that they will come to believe through the word of the Apostles; therefore such a word, which is the act of the Magisterium, must always persevere.

II. The Church of Christ must assuredly persevere in no other manner than the way Christ instituted it; for it must always be his Church, and therefore the Church which he himself built; but it cannot be such unless it is always that same Church which it was from the beginning, which proceeded immediately from Christ. There is certainly no human power to alter in this kingdom of Christ the constitution which it received from its very author, God. But Christ so instituted his Church that it would be a society of teachers and disciples in such a way that this relationship would be necessary for the very end of the Church, which is the profession of the doctrine revealed by God and the observance of the commandments of Christ, knowledge of which he willed to depend upon the Magisterium. Therefore.

And indeed, Christ, speaking of the Church he was about to build, constituted its foundation, a foundation placed in the authority, conferred upon a person, of governing and teaching (Matt. 16:17–19; cf. Thesis I of the following treatise): but the foundation is necessary to the building and must endure as long as the building is to endure; therefore the authority of the personal Magisterium must be perennial in the Church, which cannot be the case except through perennial succession.

III. It cannot be doubted that the Apostles founded the Church according to the norm received from Christ, which the Church in succeeding centuries ought continually to follow. Now the Apostles, in founding churches, set over each of them rulers (Acts 14:23), of which kind were certainly those called Bishops, who were to have care of the Church of God (1 Tim. 3:1–5). Moreover their duty was certainly to teach. *Do not therefore* (mention has first been made of ordination) *be ashamed of the testimony of our Lord… but labor together with the Gospel, according to the power of God*, says Paul to Timothy (2 Tim. 1:8; cf. Rom. 1:13, 16). For this reason he adds in the same place (1:13–14): *Hold to the form of sound words which you have heard from me, in faith and in the love which is in Christ Jesus: guard the good deposit.* The form of sound words is certainly necessary for teachers and must first be commended to them; moreover the deposit of which the Apostle speaks is the deposit of doctrine, as is evident from the parallel passage in 1 Tim. 6:20: *O Timothy, guard the deposit, avoiding profane novelties of speech and the contradictions of what is falsely called knowledge.* Just as in that passage, for the safeguarding of the deposit, he commands the form of sound words to be preserved, so here he prescribes that profane novelties of speech be avoided; moreover the deposit, to which science of a false name is opposed, is the deposit of doctrine. He further admonishes Timothy to abstain from foolish and undisciplined questions (2 Tim. 2:23), which advice is most opportune for a teacher who must protect his authority. That Bishops were instituted as teachers is also clear from the words of the Apostle to Titus (1:9): *A Bishop must hold fast to the faithful word which is in accordance with the teaching, that he may be able both to exhort in sound doctrine and to refute those who contradict.*

That this institution of teachers ought not to have ceased with those first teachers, the same Apostle teaches in these words (2 Tim. 2:2): *And what you have heard from me through many witnesses, commit these things to faithful men who will be competent to teach others also.* The Magisterium therefore was to be propagated by succession. Such teachers are those whom the Apostle commands Titus to appoint in every city of Crete, whom he first calls presbyters (1:5) and then Bishops (1:7), and to whom he affirms that the Magisterium belongs (1:5, 9).

IV. The Apostolic Fathers recognized this economy of the churches founded by the Apostles and acknowledged it as necessary, and therefore perpetual. Clement of Rome, in his epistle to the Corinthians, chapters 42 and 44, says: "The Apostles were preachers of the Gospel to us, sent forth by the Lord Jesus Christ; Jesus Christ was sent from God; Christ therefore is from God and the Apostles from Christ; and both came about in orderly fashion from the will of God. Having therefore received their commands and being fully assured through the resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ and confirmed in the word of God, with full assurance of the Holy Spirit they went forth proclaiming the good news that the kingdom of God was coming." The discussion concerns the Apostles teaching from a divine mission; he continues: "Going therefore through countries and cities (note this therefore, namely that a consequence is announced of the aforementioned divine mission of the Apostles to preach), preaching, they appointed their first-fruits, having tested them by the Spirit, to be Bishops and deacons of those who were to believe. Nor was this a new thing; for indeed Bishops and deacons had been written about many ages ago. For thus the Scripture says somewhere: I will appoint their Bishops in righteousness and their deacons in faith (Isa. 60:17; cf. the Greek text)." He proves, evidently, that such an institution made by the Apostles had already been foretold; this is the reason he says it was not done in a new way. "Our Apostles also (just as Moses in the case of the Priesthood of the old law, as he said above) knew through our Lord Jesus Christ that there would be strife over the title of Bishop; for this reason, therefore, being possessed of perfect foreknowledge, they appointed those already mentioned and afterwards gave the rule that, when these should fall asleep, other approved men should succeed to their ministry." One must

take care not to think that the institution of Bishops throughout the regions and cities, made by the Apostles, was merely some incidental institution on account of contentions foreseen as about to arise. For, first, contentions concerning the episcopate could not have been foreseen as about to arise unless some preceding law had already established that there were to be Bishops in the regions and cities. Secondly, the foresight here spoken of is like that by which Moses foresaw future dissensions regarding the Priesthood of the Old Law, which did not prevent the institution from having been made by divine authority, namely that there should be priests from the tribe of Levi. Thirdly, what Clement says was done by the Apostles to forestall dissensions and controversies is not the institution of Bishops and deacons itself, but that the Apostles themselves, while choosing Bishops and Deacons, also established a norm according to which they were to be chosen thereafter, as he makes clear his meaning in the words immediately following: "Those therefore who were appointed by them, or afterwards by other eminent men, with the consent of the whole Church, and have ministered blamelessly to the flock of Christ with humility, quietness, and unselfishness, and have long borne a good report from all—these men we consider to have been unjustly removed from their ministry." Moreover he makes express mention of the dissensions he foresaw, because he is writing to them and is writing because of this very fact, namely that they themselves were in disagreement with one another over this matter.

That the Bishops established in cities by the Apostles, of whom Clement speaks, were each individually in their respective cities, and that Clement intends to say this, there is no need to demonstrate here, since we have already spoken of this in § XIV, n. 3; for it is sufficient for our purposes to show from Clement's words that by divine ordinance the Apostles, sent to teach, appointed other teachers as their successors, who in turn were to appoint others: the Apostles therefore judged and willed that the personal Magisterium be continued by perpetual succession.

That Bishops are teachers and that there is one in each Church is more clearly taught by Ignatius, contemporary with Clement, in all his letters, which are more precious than gold. To the Philadelphians,

chapter 7: *Obey the Bishop and the presbyterate and the deacons… The Spirit proclaimed, saying: without the Bishop do nothing.* To the Smyrnaeans, chapter 8: *Let no one do anything pertaining to the Church apart from the Bishop.* To the Ephesians, chapters 1–2: *You must regard the Bishop as you would regard the Lord himself.* Ibid., chapter 4: *It is fitting that you concur with the mind of the Bishop.* And to the Trallians, chapter 7: *Guard yourselves from heretics: this will come about if you are neither puffed up nor cut off from Jesus Christ and the Bishop and the commandments of the Apostles.* To the Philadelphians, chapter 2: *Children of light and truth, flee division and wicked teachings; where the shepherd is, there follow as sheep.* Tertullian likewise, in his book on Prescriptions—than which no more effective work against errors has ever been published in the Church, and whose teaching the Church has always received—rejecting heretics from disputation about the Scriptures, will not allow (chapters 15 and 21) that what Christ revealed should be proved in any other way than by the testimony of those who succeed the Apostles. "If the Lord Jesus Christ sent the Apostles to preach, no other preachers should be received than those whom Christ instituted… And as for what they preached, that is, what Christ revealed to them, here also I will prescribe: it must not be proved except through those same Churches which the Apostles themselves founded," which, as he himself adds, "unfold the series of their Bishops running down from the beginning through successions, so that the first Bishop had as his author and predecessor some one of the Apostles or of Apostolic men who, however, continued with the Apostles."

Who here does not discern the living Magisterium, apart from the Scriptures, enduring without interruption, from which the doctrine of Christ is to be sought? The entire Church is for Tertullian a kind of public school in which the Apostolic Magisterium perseveres not through dead letters but through the succession of teachers.

V. To this is added the perennial sense of the Church. For as often as controversies of the Faith have arisen, they have been decided by the authority either of Synods or of the Apostolic See, insofar as by them the meaning of the doctrine handed down by the Apostles or contained in the Scriptures was defined. What was the purpose of this practice in the hypothesis of the Protestants? To Synods there gathered not just any of

the faithful nor the wiser among them, but Bishops, who had the right to teach; their sentence was certainly not independent of Scripture and Tradition, as was known to all, since the Fathers in Councils confirmed their doctrines by their authority; but from Councils the Church awaited a decision on what was contained in the Scriptures or Tradition, and the decree of ecumenical Synods or of the Apostolic See was held as a certain and irrefragable norm of Faith. How could this have been the case, if there were no divinely instituted teachers present in the Church whom it was necessary to hear? For certainly the Bishops in Synods and the Roman Pontiff conducted themselves as teachers. If the sole reading of the Scriptures, illuminated inwardly by the Holy Spirit, was, after the death of the Apostles, the single norm for each individual and therefore for all in knowing the truth, then the decrees of Bishops would not merely have been useless but would have been considered contrary to the institution of Christ. It was therefore the conviction of the ancient Church that it had living teachers from whom it was to be taught, whom it was bound to follow in order to profess the true doctrine of Christ, and consequently that the Apostolic Magisterium instituted by the Lord endures in the Church through perennial succession.

§ XXVIII

From the arguments already adduced it follows moreover that the successors of the Apostles in the perennial Magisterium of the Church are those who in ecclesiastical records are known by the name of Bishops.

I. Concerning Bishops—who they are, by what right, and that there is one in each Church—we have already spoken in the preceding sections. That these are the successors of the Apostles in the Magisterium is easily evident.

Certainly, by the institution of Christ, Bishops are the rulers and pastors of the individual Churches (§ XVII); but governance of the flock in the society of believers cannot exist without the authority of teaching; therefore, by the will of Christ, Bishops are teachers. But are they those who ought to be called successors of the Apostles in the Magisterium?

II. The difficulty is that perhaps only one succeeds the Apostles in the Magisterium, or perhaps there is another order of teachers who succeed the Apostles. But that there must be simply a plurality of teachers (even if with subordination to one, about which matter later) is clear from the very institution of Christ, who instructed not just one person but the Apostolic college with the authority of teaching; now to a college there succeeds not one person but one order of several, if the Church is to endure in the manner in which it was instituted. That there is no other order of teachers succeeding the College of the Apostles, possessing its rights and offices, other than the order of Bishops, is evident: first, from the practice of the Apostles, who committed the duty of teaching to Bishops instituted by themselves (1 Tim. 3:15; 4:6, 11, 16; 6:20; 2 Tim. 1:9, 13; 2:14, 16; 4:2; Tit. 2:1, 6–8; 3:1, 2, 9, 10) and likewise willed the same to be handed on to Bishops who were to be instituted by those already established (1 Tim. 3:2—διδακτικός, apt for teaching; Tit. 1:7–9; 2 Tim. 2:2). It is evident, secondly, from the sense of the ancient Church, which shines forth both from the testimonies of Clement and Ignatius already cited, and from the fact that when questions of faith were to be resolved, or when inquiry was made as to what was to be held, when it was agreed that the doctrine was to be believed which the Apostles had handed down, recourse was had for ascertaining it to the testimony of Bishops, whose series from the beginning had had an Apostle or someone instituted by an Apostle as its author and originator; which is nothing other than to regard Bishops as the legitimate successors of the Apostles in the Magisterium. Cf. Irenaeus, book 3, chapters 2–3: "The Apostolic tradition in the whole world is manifest in every Church, and it is in our power to enumerate those who were instituted as Bishops in the Churches by the Apostles, and their successors down to our time, who taught and knew nothing of what these men madly maintain… By means of the succession of Bishops reaching down to us, we confound all those who in any way… gather (πᾶς ὅ δεῖ συλλογιζομένους) contrary to what is right." And chapter 4: "But what if neither had the Apostles left us the Scriptures? Would it not have been necessary to follow the order of the tradition which they delivered to those to whom they committed the Churches?" In the same way Tertullian, *Prescriptions*, after what has already been

cited (in the preceding section), thus challenges the heretics, n. 32: "If any (heretical sects) dare to insert themselves into the Apostolic age… we can say to them: let them then bring forth the origins of their Churches, let them unfold the series of their Bishops running down through successions from the beginning, so that their first Bishop had as his author and predecessor some one of the Apostles or of Apostolic men (who yet continued with the Apostles). For in this way the Apostolic Churches exhibit their records: just as the Church of the Smyrnaeans records that Polycarp was placed there by John, just as the Church of Rome puts forward that Clement was ordained by Peter; in like fashion also the rest present those who were appointed as Bishops by the Apostles, as the offshoots of the Apostolic seed." Tertullian speaks directly of Churches having chairs constituted by Apostles or Apostolic men; but he had noted before, in chapter 20, that from those Churches "the other Churches in turn borrow and continue to borrow every day the tradition of the faith and the seeds of doctrine, so that they become Churches; and on this account they too are counted as Apostolic, as the offspring of Apostolic Churches." It is evident, thirdly and manifestly, from the ancient and perpetual use of that same universal Church, by which those who were always called by native right to Councils, where questions of faith were discussed and defined, were Bishops alone, in the common persuasion that Councils of Bishops constitute a Council—as the Council of Chalcedon attests.

§ XXIX

The Magisterium of the successors of the Apostles does not aim at proposing from time to time something newly revealed beyond what the Apostles handed down, but only at preserving and propagating in the Church the Apostolic doctrine; so that consequently the Apostolic succession, in the Magisterium of revealed truth to be believed, is a continuous series of witnesses, and its proper act is the testimony of truth.

I. The Apostolic tradition, considered actively, was the very act of teaching of the Apostles; considered passively, it is the entire Christian doctrine and its explanation handed down by the Apostles to the

Church—which, as is fitting, contained also the legitimate interpretation of the Scriptures, or a certain manner of interpreting them, at least in all those things which pertain to faith and morals. Cf. § XXVI, 3–4. Now the question is whether, just as the Apostles brought a new revelation to men, so also their successors, beyond what they received from them, are to hand on new dogmas which they receive through divine revelation, so that a real accretion is made day by day to the Apostolic doctrine; or whether rather the successors of the Apostles are only to preserve and propagate in the Church that store of revealed truths which they received from the Apostles. This question is also customarily posed in the following way: whether the deposit of revealed truths which were to be believed in the Church of Christ was closed in the Apostolic age by the Apostles themselves, or, remaining incomplete at that time, can and should always be augmented in the course of time by those who are appointed as teachers in the Church. This manner of posing the question either supposes or permits one to suppose that Christians at the close of the Apostolic age could have known certain dogmas which Christians at the beginning of the Apostolic age were bound to be ignorant of—a supposition whose acceptability we shall discuss at the end of this section. Now we treat the question as posed in the former way, which is the legitimate and clear manner and one which presccinds from that incidental question.

A distinction must be made in the first place between a new dogma—namely a truth which is not even implicitly contained in the revelation already made—and a clearer, more distinct, fuller knowledge of a revealed dogma. What is called an accretion to the doctrine of the Apostles is what is termed a new dogma.

The answer to the question therefore is: the deposit of revealed truths to be believed in the Church was given whole by God to the Apostles and by the Apostles to the Church, in such a way that their successors must not look forward to any new revelation for themselves, but must preserve and propagate what was effected from the beginning.

II. This is evident first from the words of the Apostles. For in instituting other teachers after themselves, they expressly admonished that these should hand on what they had received from the Apostles (2 Tim. 2:2; 1:13), that they should guard the deposit of doctrine handed

on to them (1 Tim. 6:20; 2 Tim. 1:14), that they should remain in those things which they had learned and which had been entrusted to them, knowing from whom they had learned (2 Tim. 3:14)—with never a mention made of the possibility of a new revelation and of the manner in which it was to be discerned and received. Now one who is admonished to guard a deposit that has been handed on, to remain in what he has received, is by that very fact on guard against all things which are new and other than what he has received; if therefore new revelations were to occur, the admonition of the Apostles would have been incomplete and would have exposed to the danger of error those whom they were admonishing—which one may not suspect of an Apostle. Or to put it another way: in the first instruction of those who are to continue the work begun by the Apostles—an instruction which ought also to benefit those coming after—a prudent instructor must speak according to the character of the economy in which he is engaged. If therefore the economy is such that its doctrine must grow in the course of time, it is necessary that one who is training future teachers should teach this very thing and instruct them how new doctrine is to be discerned. But if the economy is such that the doctrine handed down from the beginning is no longer to be augmented, it is enough to admonish that one remain in the doctrine and that the deposit be guarded. Now this is how the Apostle acts; therefore the Apostle judged that the doctrine handed down would receive no further increase.

III. Furthermore this was the firm and perennial conviction of the Church. For, first, when appeal was made to the authority of the teachers, what was required of them was not what they themselves thought or what they had received immediately from God, but what the Apostles had handed down, so that once this was made known, both the faithful would have what to believe and heretics would be refuted. This is evident even from the words of Tertullian, *Prescriptions*, chapter 21, where, having established the principle that what Christ revealed must be proved through the Churches founded by the Apostles, he adds: "It follows therefore that all doctrine which agrees with those Apostolic Churches, the matrices and original sources of the faith, is to be regarded as truth, as holding without doubt what the Churches received from the Apostles, the Apostles from Christ, Christ from God; and that

all other doctrine is to be prejudged as false, which savors of anything contrary to the truth of the Churches and of the Apostles and of Christ and of God." Thus Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 26: "It is necessary to obey the presbyters who are in the Church, those who have succession from the Apostles, as we have shown, who together with the succession of the episcopate have received the sure gift of truth according to the good pleasure of the Father… Wherefore it is necessary to seek the gifts of God where the charisms of God have been placed, that is, with those who hold that succession which is from the Apostles, and with whom there subsists that which is sound and irreproachable and uncorrupted and incorrupt in speech." Likewise Origen, *On First Principles*, Preface, n. 2: "That alone is to be believed as truth which differs in nothing from ecclesiastical and Apostolic tradition."

Consistently with this, the ancients, secondly, affirmed that the Apostles had been ignorant of nothing and had known everything that would ever need to be believed, and by this peremptory principle they rejected those who dared to put forward new dogmas. "They are accustomed to say," says Tertullian, *op. cit.*, chapter 22, "that the Apostles did not know all things, agitated by the same madness by which they again turn and say that the Apostles knew all things indeed but did not hand on all things to all, in both cases subjecting Christ to reproach, as having sent either inadequately instructed or insufficiently straightforward Apostles. For who of sound mind can believe that they were ignorant of anything, whom the Lord appointed as teachers?… Was something hidden from Peter, who was called the rock for the building of the Church?… He had indeed said at one time: I have many things yet to say to you, but you cannot bear them now; nevertheless, adding: when that Spirit of truth comes, he will teach you all truth, he showed that they were ignorant of nothing, since he had promised that they would attain all truth through the Spirit of truth." Likewise Irenaeus, book 3, n. 1: "For not through others did we gain knowledge of the plan (οἰκονομίαν) of our salvation than through those by whom the Gospel came to us; which Gospel they then proclaimed, and afterwards, by God's will, handed down to us in the Scriptures as the foundation and pillar of our faith. For it is not lawful to say that they preached before they had perfect knowledge, as some dare to say,

boasting themselves to be correctors of the Apostles. For after our Lord rose from the dead and they were clothed with the power of the Holy Spirit coming from on high, they were filled concerning all things and had perfect knowledge (περὶ πάντων ἐπληροφορήθησαν καὶ ἔσχον τελείαν γνῶσιν)."

Hence, thirdly, as often as questions of faith have arisen, it has always been proclaimed that antiquity is to be followed, that what is to be held is not only what has been believed by all and everywhere but especially what has always been believed; cf. the *Commonitory* of Vincent of Lérins, nn. 2, 3, 27. For this reason the proper character of doctrine to be rejected has always been considered its novelty: "Let novelty cease to assail antiquity" (Celestine, epistle 21); "let nothing be innovated except what has been previously handed on" (Pope Stephen, as quoted by Cyprian, epistle 74). Hence the Commonitory of the Lérinian, n. 6: "What therefore was the outcome of the whole affair? What, of course, but the customary and familiar one? Antiquity was retained, novelty was rejected."

And indeed, fourthly, if another doctrine were to be professed in the Church in the course of time beyond what was handed down by the Apostles, Apostolicity as regards doctrine at least would no longer be a property of the Church; indeed, as regards the same point, it would no longer be the Christian Church. For according to the mind of the Fathers, Christian doctrine is solely that which Christ through himself or through the Holy Spirit taught the Apostles, not what he himself could afterwards, if he wished, reveal. This is established from the testimonies already cited.

III. That the Apostles knew everything that was to be believed in the Church, so that nothing remains for their successors other than to guard and propagate the doctrine handed down by the Apostles, Christ signified in those words directed to the Apostles which the Fathers already used to reject new revelations (John 16:12–13): *I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. But when that Spirit of truth comes, he will teach you all truth* (ὁδηγήσει ὑμᾶς εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν). To forestall a difficulty, we note that, although Christ in addressing the Apostles also intends to direct his words to their successors, yet nothing may be understood as promised to the

successors which is not also promised to the Apostles themselves; for the rest are promised blessings as successors, that is, as heirs of the Apostles; the Apostles represented the others only in this way; but an heir, as such, has no more than his predecessor. For the notion that Christ does not address the Apostles immediately and in them and through them address the other successors, but that in the same manner he immediately addresses all equally, whether present or future, is a gratuitous fancy, alien to Christ's words directed certainly to the Apostles; for in that hypothesis he would not have directed his words to them in the second person, but would have stated the matter absolutely in the third person about teachers to be instituted by him. Now to the Apostles there is promised the revelation of πάσης τῆς ἀληθείας; what πᾶσα ἡ ἀλήθεια is, is clear—namely the entire doctrine to be believed in the Church of Christ. Therefore the Apostles already obtained it perfectly; it is therefore impossible that there should remain any new revelation of a truth to be believed in the Church which would find its place in the Church after the Apostles.

In setting forth this argument we supposed, or permitted it to be supposed, that Christ here addresses the Apostles' successors also in the Apostles. But we consider this supposition to be false, and once this is proved, the argument already given will become more evident. For the Lord speaks to the Apostles as they are determinate persons, distinct also from their successors and not representing them. For consider, first, that these two things are placed in opposition: *you cannot bear them now*, and *when he comes, he will teach you*—so that the Holy Spirit is to teach those who at the moment cannot bear, that is, cannot grasp, the doctrine of Christ. Now this was the proper, personal condition of the Apostles, in which respect they did not represent their successors. Therefore to them alone was that promise of the Spirit made.

The same conclusion is reached by comparing the words in John in the same discourse of Christ (14:25–26): *These things I have spoken to you while I am still with you; but the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things and bring to your mind all things whatsoever I have said to you.* The subject *you* in the words *he will teach you and bring to your mind* is that same one to whom it was said: *I have spoken to you while I am still with you*; and this

immediate conversation with Christ was proper and personal to the Apostles; therefore in this promise of the Spirit by whom they are to be taught all things, the Apostles are regarded as singular persons, distinct from all others.

Consider, secondly, that the promise of the Holy Spirit made to the Apostles in John 16:13 and 14:26 is of the same thing which in Acts 1:4 the same Christ commands the Apostles to await; for he commands them to await the promise of the Father, that is, the gift promised by the Father, namely the Holy Spirit, *which* (he says) *you heard from my mouth*; this is therefore a renewal and confirmation of a promise of this gift already made, and he made it at the passages in John cited. But such a mission of the Holy Spirit, which took place on the day of Pentecost, was proper and personal to the Apostles themselves, in which reception of the transient Holy Spirit they acted on behalf of no other person; therefore also in the words of Christ in John 16:13 the promise of the Holy Spirit made to the Apostles, who was to lead them into all truth, was proper to the Apostles.

And indeed in a continuous series of those who transmit to one another in succession a gift divinely received, it is a certain privilege of those who are first—a privilege in which others cannot share, just as neither can they be first. It is necessary, that is, that the first receive directly from God that gift which is to be common to all thereafter; for this reason revelation of truth must first be made to them, which is then to be guarded by those who follow.

According to this understanding, we have two promises of the Holy Spirit made by Christ to the Apostles: the first is that by which the Spirit of truth is promised, who would make them as Christ's disciples to be the first witnesses and teachers of the doctrine to be believed, so that they could have heirs—and this is the promise of which Christ speaks in the passages already cited; the second is that by which the Spirit is promised who will remain with the Magisterium forever, and this is found in John 14:16. Now this second promise does not promise a Spirit who will teach new things to the successors of the Apostles, because neither do the words of the promise require this, and already, as we have shown, the Apostles were taught all things; but it promises a Spirit who will cause the truth previously handed down to be preserved

infallibly in perpetuity. This indeed is gathered from the words *forever*, taken together with the words of Christ in Matt. 28:20—which words *forever* are absent from those passages where we have said the promise was made to the Apostles alone.

IV. The custody of the deposit, then, commended by the Apostle to Bishops, must keep it immune from any change, whether by subtraction or by addition. "Who is Timothy today," says Vincent of Lérins in the *Commonitory*, chapter 22, "if not either generally the universal Church or specially the whole body of the prelates?… What does 'guard the deposit' mean? Guard it, he says, against thieves, against enemies, lest while men sleep they sow tares over that wheat which the Son of man had sown in his field. What is the deposit? That which is committed to you, not what you have invented; what you have received, not what you have devised; a thing not of genius but of doctrine, not of private appropriation but of public tradition, a thing brought down to you, not put forward by you; in which you ought to be not an author but a guardian, not a founder but a follower, not a leader but a follower." These things and similar ones directly exclude human inventions; but in what is affirmed there is always contained that Christian principle: that nothing is to be believed in the Church except what Christ taught the Apostles. For the guardians of the deposit are commanded to teach only what belongs to public tradition, what has been brought down to them through successive tradition, and nothing else.

Moreover, if new revelations were to occur by which the Christian deposit would be augmented, they would be made either to the successors of the Apostles or to others. If the first, those handing them on would be bound to depart from the norm set before them of teaching what has come down to them from the Apostles through continuous succession; if the second, there would moreover be required a perversion of the very institution of Christ, by which the Apostles and their successors alone were constituted as teachers; for other teachers would certainly then have to be recognized, who would plainly be the equals of the Apostles.

Since the word *revelation* is not always taken in the strict sense, and since the doctrine revealed to the Apostles and handed on by them to the Church admits of progress and increase in its more explicit and

distinct knowledge of itself (as we shall shortly see), whenever formulas occur in the ancients by which, when some question of faith exists, it is said that God has not yet revealed to the teachers of the Church what is to be held, or phrases of this kind—these are not to be understood of a revelation in the proper sense of a new dogma, but are to be understood of that assistance and illumination of the Holy Spirit by which dogmas previously handed down are gradually brought, in the Church and in the course of time through the analysis of revelation, into clearer light.

V. The economy of the Magisterium hitherto defended is recommended by the reason for which the Church was founded. For first the Son of God came as the Wisdom of the Father; he associated the Apostles with himself, communicated to them his wisdom (John 17:8; 15:15) and authority (Matt. 28:18–20; 18:18; Luke 10:16), and made them the Princes of his Kingdom (cf. § IX); then he commanded them to make disciples for themselves and to appoint successors who would carry on their work, as is evident from what has been said. Now in this way all the goods of the Church flow from the highest to the lower, from the summit to the ground, not in reverse—that is, from Christ the founder of the society and under him from the Apostles to the rest. According to this order it is fitting that all the faithful who are ever to exist should receive all the doctrine of the faith from the highest and first, that is, from the Apostles. Augmentation of the store of revealed truths was indeed permitted in the Old Testament, because the progression was from Moses to Christ, from man to God (Heb. 1:1–2); but there is no reason for it to be augmented now, since the beginning was made by Christ himself, God, in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge of God.

VI. What has been said thus far is certainly valid against new revelations to be believed in the Church of Christ, which revelations would nonetheless be considered to leave the Church of Christ intact as regards its essential elements.

But if the discourse is about a new revelation that would introduce a new economy taking the place of the present Christian one, just as this one succeeded the Synagogue, then this hypothesis is rejected both because of the demonstrated perpetuity of the Church of Christ, and especially because of the demonstrated perpetuity of the Apostolic

Magisterium, which from the very beginning already knows all things that are ever to be believed under its discipline.

VII. Therefore it is proper to the successors of the Apostles not to put forward new dogmas but to hand on what they themselves received from the Apostles; so that consequently the first generation, as it were, of successors was bound to teach the faithful what it itself was taught by the Apostles, the second generation what it received from the first and through it from the Apostles, and so on. These teachers therefore fulfill the function of witnesses, testifying, namely, that these and these things were handed down by their predecessors, by the Apostles themselves, and finally by Christ himself. There therefore exists an unbroken series of witnesses; and since they teach while testifying that this has been handed down, it is necessary that their Magisterium be referred back to a certain testimony, which is the testimony of truth, namely of the doctrine of the faith that is to be believed.

VIII. Now let us say something about the incidental question posed in section I.

And first, if a question of fact is raised, I think it will be difficult to demonstrate that an augmentation was actually made during the Apostolic age to the revealed truths, unless the discourse be about prophecies of future events, which we do not deny could have been added and were added to the primitive revelation. For what is gathered from chapter 10 of Acts is not very firm ground. Already Christ had commanded the Apostles to baptize all nations (Matt., last chapter): what then was Peter still ignorant of? He was ignorant, or could have been ignorant, of the fact that the Gentiles were to be admitted directly to baptism without passing through Judaism by circumcision, which indeed Peter learned by that vision, not immediately and at once, but through a certain progression. Cf. vv. 17, 19, 28, 34. But, first, even if we grant this, we would not here truly have a new revelation, but rather a distinct explanation of the preceding one, which any Apostle, by applying reflection and also comparing the Scriptures—as Paul does, for example, in the epistle to the Galatians—would have certainly and infallibly attained, by reason of the charism of infallibility. And indeed, secondly, the same Paul, who had preached to the Gentiles that doctrine that Gentiles have no need of circumcision—assuredly after the baptism

of Cornelius—when writing however to the Galatians, affirms that he received this doctrine through a revelation of Jesus Christ, which was indeed made to him when he was converted to the faith and created an Apostle (Gal. 1:6–16). Will you hold that this was revealed to Paul alone and not to the other Apostles, so that Paul was at that time more truly instructed by the Holy Spirit than the other Apostles and Peter? If Paul received this through the revelation made to him when he was made an Apostle, why should we doubt that the other Apostles were taught the same thing by the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost? Therefore, thirdly, I think it must be said that already in the revelation possessed from the beginning and in the command of Christ in the last chapter of Matthew, this special truth was revealed to the Apostles at least implicitly—that the Gentiles, without need of circumcision, were to be received into the Church—so that by the sole analysis of Christ's words *teach all nations, baptizing them* and by comparing other truths, as Paul does, the Apostles could have arrived infallibly, by reason of the charism of truth, at the explicit knowledge that the Gentiles, taught and instructed, were to be joined to Christ by baptism alone without preceding circumcision; yet God wished, by special providence, to open this explicit knowledge in addition more directly to Peter, because it was of the greatest importance—for which reason Peter rightly relies on that instruction received directly from God (vv. 28, 34). Therefore we do not truly have here a revelation of a new dogma.

Setting aside this special fact, one may indeed affirm that in the course of time within the Apostolic age itself, as occasion arose, new dogmas beyond the principal ones which all were explicitly to hold and which were to be expounded from the beginning, were set forth by word or in writing; but there is no reason to say that these were not revealed to the Apostles from the beginning, which is entirely different from the former claim.

Among those things which are written, and which therefore because of the inspiration of God are to be believed, there are also certain events which, when the Church began, had not yet occurred, as is evident to one comparing the Acts and many of the Epistles; but such events, for the writing of which the sacred writers were inspired, are not the object of revelation but of historical knowledge.

If the question of right is raised, we do not deny, out of respect at least for theologians, that it was possible that God did not reveal all at once everything he wished to be believed in his Church, but added new revelations from time to time while the Apostolic age was still active; we judge, however, that it seems more fitting if all things were revealed to all from the beginning; for in this way the words of Christ in John 16:13 would be more literally verified: *When that Spirit of truth comes* (and he came on the day of Pentecost; cf. what was said above), ὁδηγήσει ὑμᾶς εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

For the rest, the opinion of theologians is rather negative than affirmative: that is, it is more a matter of denying that a new revelation is to be expected after the Apostles than of affirming that the Christian revelation received a real increase during the age of the Apostles themselves.

§ XXX

With the immutability of Apostolic doctrine there coheres a scientific progress by which the doctrine handed down from the beginning is evolved and explained day by day, that is, more distinctly apprehended and more fully understood.

I. The explanation of a certain truth, effected through the analysis of that same truth and by comparison with others, so that we pass from a less clear or confused concept to a distinct and complete concept of the same truth, and thus perceive, as far as possible, all its elements, relationships, and connections clearly—such a logical explanation or evolution, I say, does not present us with a new truth, that is, a new knowable object, if we consider the terminus of the knowledge; it gives only a new, and certainly more excellent, knowledge of the same thing. For the object of a confused concept and of a distinct concept is really the same, even though the latter is illuminated by new light, that is, by new items of knowledge gathered here and there, which are indeed now in act but previously lay in potentiality in the confused concept from which they were elicited; so that what is known explicitly through the distinct concept was already known implicitly through the confused concept. Moreover, this is the natural condition of our rational intellect,

to progress from first concepts that are involved and confused to those that are clear and distinct.

II. Now if this is how the matter stands, if such is the relationship between confused knowledge and distinct knowledge of truth—that the thing known is the same in both types of knowledge, though known in a different manner—it follows that from the fact that no new truth or revealed reality can accrue to the deposit of revelation, the Catholic intellect is not prevented from attaining in the course of time a more perfect knowledge than was previously held of the same truths which are always believed; for it can come about that they are now perceived more distinctly and more fully than they were formerly grasped.

III. Now if consideration is given both to revealed truths of this kind, which individually contain several separable elements that cannot ordinarily be perceived individually at first glance, and to the human intellect, which proceeds from the known to the unknown and from the confused to the distinct, and which for the undertaking of an analysis of truths is usually determined by some incidental cause, then it is manifest that it was morally necessary, at least in the case of several truths (namely those of which a distinct knowledge was less necessary), that in the minds of Christians the confused knowledge should precede the distinct.

This history of dogmas confirms most fully. For when heresies pressed upon the Church or disputes arose among Catholics themselves, it came about that the minds of scholars were sharpened, the dogma was investigated more deeply (which comes from employing a more complete analysis) and thus placed in a clearer light. So, for example, the dogma of the Incarnation was expressed more lucidly after the Nestorian and Eutychian conflicts, fuller knowledge of the Sacraments was obtained after the errors of Luther, the supernatural order was more clearly expressed after Baius, and knowledge of those things pertaining to the Sacrament of Matrimony is more complete in our century than it was in preceding ages.

This progress is called scientific, because it is achieved through analysis, which is the proper act of science, and because through this very analysis the intrinsic reason, as far as possible, of the truths and the connection of one with another is perceived, and thus all truths—

whether pertaining to one capital dogma, or ultimately pertaining to all dogmas—can be coordinated and subordinated into one logical system, which whole enterprise is the work of science.

IV. The matter is most excellently set forth by Vincent of Lérins in his *Commonitory*, chapter 23: "Is there to be no religious progress in the Church of Christ? Certainly there is to be progress, and the greatest progress… But in such a way that it is truly a progress of the faith, not a change. For it belongs to progress that each thing should be enlarged within itself; to change, that something should be transformed from one thing into another. Let the understanding, knowledge, and wisdom of individuals and of all men, of one person and of the whole Church, grow and advance greatly and vigorously through the course of ages and centuries—but only within its own proper limits, that is, in the same dogma, the same meaning, and the same judgment." Hence a little earlier, in chapter 22, he had said: "O Timothy, O priest, O expounder, O teacher… let that be understood more luminously by your exposition which was previously believed more obscurely; let posterity rejoice through you in understanding what antiquity venerated without understanding. Yet teach the same things which you have learned, so that though you say things in a new manner, you do not say new things."

V. But did not the Apostles have a distinct and very clear knowledge of all dogmas? Did they not hand it on to their disciples? Therefore there was no progress from obscure to clear knowledge, from confused to distinct, from imperfect to perfect; rather the transition was made in the opposite direction, from perfect to imperfect.

I respond that, setting aside for the moment the earlier question, it is false that the disciples of the Apostles received from them a distinct and very clear knowledge of just any dogma. This is historically evident; for such knowledge certainly does not appear in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, nor generally in the earlier centuries of the Church, nor indeed does it appear as having been handed down in the very writings of the Apostles—from which it is gathered that it was not the method of the Apostles in teaching that when they taught a dogma they would turn it over in all its parts and explain it as fully as possible.

Moreover, this less complete knowledge as regards manner received by the disciples of the Apostles made possible and necessary the progress of which we have been speaking.

As regards the earlier question, many indeed judge (though this is not a matter of faith) that the Apostles possessed a most perfect knowledge of all dogmas, and this by reason of their singular dignity. But even granting to the Apostles a perfect knowledge of dogmas, up to a certain level, which would be more excellent in them than in each of their individual successors; if we are speaking of the most perfect, that is, the most distinct, knowledge, it is perhaps better to make a distinction in the following way. The Apostles had the most distinct knowledge of all dogmas insofar as, given the occasion, if they had been questioned, they would have been able by applying reflection to probe all the parts of each dogma and to define them with certainty—this I grant; for the prerogative of their first and foundational Magisterium required that each of them individually could do what the whole Church can do; insofar, however, as the Holy Spirit had already by itself given them the most distinct knowledge of all dogmas, which they would retain either in act or in memory, I do not hold this to be certain; for it was not necessary. For what has not been necessary in the whole Church until now, there is no reason to believe was necessary in the first teachers of the Church.

VI. From these considerations it follows that in such matters faith, which supplies the object to the analytic reflection, must precede the illuminating intellect and science; then that the norm of the scientific illumination of any dogma is the faith itself, so that nothing is said which is contrary to the faith, whether of this dogma or of another; for all true things are mutually consistent, and what coheres with the faith is to be set forth; indeed that must be advanced which naturally arises from the dogma of the faith itself when more attentively examined or compared with others. If you proceed otherwise, you do not illuminate the dogma but subvert it and substitute something else from your own ingenuity.

VII. Since the perfection of knowledge of a dogma, which it is permissible to attain in this shadowed place, is circumscribed by certain limits defined by the eminence of the truth and our innate incapacity, it

can certainly come about that of many dogmas a distinct knowledge has finally been attained in the Church such that a more perfect one can no longer be hoped for. This being granted, it is evident that there is no longer room for progress as regards these. Which these are is taught especially by the sense and judgment of the Church.

§ XXXI

With the authentic teachers, successors of the Apostles, there are to be joined in second place also those who, although not Bishops, yet teaching in the unity of the Church, have contributed their suffrage to the ecclesiastical Magisterium—and especially the Martyrs.

I. Certainly if there are in the Church learned and pious men outside the order of Bishops who, teaching in agreement with the ecclesiastical Magisterium, present and illustrate the Apostolic doctrine, and whose doctrinal exposition has been approved by the authentic Magisterium, we already have from them a certain knowledge both of the doctrine of the ecclesiastical Magisterium and of Apostolic tradition. Now it is clear that these men are approved by the Ecclesiastical Magisterium; for either this is declared by it through an explicit solemn suffrage, as when someone is called a doctor of the Church, or when the testimony of someone is invoked in ecumenical Councils or by the supreme teaching authority, or when the doctrine of some learned man is generally appealed to in the Church in questions of faith with the knowledge of the Magisterium and without its objection, or when learned men of some age have commonly handed on something in a matter of faith without the opposition of the Ecclesiastical Magisterium. Although these men are not all authentic teachers, because no divine mission was made to them in the Apostles, yet because from the approval of the ecclesiastical Magisterium it is established that they hand on the Apostolic doctrine, they spontaneously become a source from which the faithful can safely draw the tradition of the Apostolic doctrine, in those matters at least to which the same approval of the authentic Magisterium, by which they are fortified, certainly extends. Thus among the witnesses of tradition and dogmatic doctrine we count as luminaries: Justin, Tertullian in many

respects, Ephrem, Jerome, Prosper, Cassian with some exceptions, Vincent of Lérins, Bede, Damascene, Bernard, St. Thomas, Bonaventure, and others whom it would be tedious to enumerate, and generally the Scholastic doctors when teaching anything unanimously in a matter of faith.

II. Together with these are certainly to be numbered those whom the Church has distinguished with the special title of witnesses—namely the Martyrs. For their confessions and professions of faith, which they put forth as occasion arose, rested upon the special promise of Christ (Matt. 10:19–20): *It shall be given to you in that hour what you shall say; for it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father speaking in you.* "How," says Ambrose, book 3 *On the Faith*, chapter 7, "can we deny the faith of those whose victory we proclaim?" By reason of that promise of Christ, the testimony of the Martyrs, once the judgment of the Church establishes that they truly suffered martyrdom, enjoys a special prerogative, so that, although they are not authentic teachers in the manner that the successors of the Apostles are, they are nonetheless rightly regarded as extraordinary divine witnesses, through whose mouths the Holy Spirit preached the true Faith. These men, because of their special manner of witnessing to the Faith—consisting in sealing their profession of faith with their blood—deserved to be called κατ' ἐξοχήν μάρτυρες, that is, witnesses, so that the name which by native right belongs to and is claimed by the ordinary teachers instituted by Christ should cling to these extraordinary witnesses whose testimony joined with heroic virtue had won such great glory for the Church.

§ XXXII

In the teachers of the first and second order just mentioned, a twofold office is to be distinguished, as in the Apostles: that of witness and that of doctor. Then consequently a double prerogative is to be distinguished—antiquity and wisdom: on account of the former they are called Fathers; on account of the latter, in a stricter sense, Doctors; and depending on the diversity of questions, now the authority of the one group, now of the other, prevails.

I. The arguments which prove that the Apostles were not only witnesses but also doctors (§ XXIII) hold also for their successors, both because they are heirs of the same Magisterium, and because in the ages following the Apostles it was necessary not only to continually testify to what had been handed down from the beginning, but also to declare, explain, and defend it; for the Catholic intellect can make progress (§ XXX) and new enemies are always to be expected.

II. Now since the series of such teachers is an unbroken series from the Apostles to us, which preserves what was previously handed down so as to maintain the principle that what is earlier is true, the necessary prerogative of this continuous series is antiquity, so that it is actually connected with the first, that is, with the Apostles. From this it follows that those through whom this prerogative is obtained, who are earlier than others and closer to the Apostles, excel the rest in this respect. And indeed this is congruent with the very nature of the thing, that in a successive series of witnesses, those who are earlier and closer to the event they attest should be held in greater esteem than those who come later. It can indeed happen that individual successions of witnesses through the centuries possess equal authority, if all are augmented by the charism of infallibility; yet even in this hypothesis (which is certainly true, as we shall say), a certain excellence of the more ancient over the others remains by the very nature of the thing, which excellence certainly exerts its force in those controversies which are had with those who do not accept the infallibility of the Magisterium.

Again, since it belongs to a teacher to be well versed in the doctrine which he hands on to others—so that consequently teachers

instituted by Christ must be imbued with the science of revelation, by which they can set forth, explain, and defend the revelation—it follows that wisdom is generally a necessary prerogative of this Magisterium. For this reason those among them who excel in the wisdom by which they have illuminated and defended the dogmas against the arguments of what is falsely called science are to be said to excel others in this respect. Moreover it is manifest that both prerogatives and excellences can be found in the same men, who stand out among others both in antiquity and in learning.

III. Now it has been received by ecclesiastical usage that teachers of revealed truth, having regard for antiquity, be called Fathers. This, as it is an appellation proper to a certain age, is a personal appellation made to individuals; for if the authentic teachers, that is, Bishops, teaching together, are considered, they are called Fathers of whatever age—thus we speak of the Fathers of Trent, the Fathers of the Vatican Council. But as the appellation is made to individuals, those are called Fathers who belong to an ancient age. That is, under this appellation both teachers of the first and second order are considered together, and they are considered by reason of antiquity, insofar as by virtue of antiquity they are fitting witnesses of ancient doctrine and Apostolic tradition.

Those who are truly ancient and were earlier belong here by right; but since from the nature of things there is no certain limit at which the series of the ancients ends, it has been settled by the judgment of the Church that the age of the Fathers is reckoned to cease where the series of Scholastic theologians began—who themselves also, unless they are also Bishops, belong to that series of teachers which we said belongs in second place. The reason for this determination of the age seems to have been that, since it was fitting as the centuries passed to distinguish the ancient from the more recent, the age of the schools showed itself marked by that character by which it could easily be distinguished from preceding centuries as regards the treatment of divine matters. The last of the Fathers is therefore Bernard, in whose time the chief founders of the Schools, the Victorines, flourished.

Another age is that of the Scholastics, which still continues: in this age the authentic Magisterium of Bishops proceeds in the same manner

as before, and under these the Magisterium of those whom we have called second-order teachers; but the individuals teaching in this age are no longer called Fathers, for want of antiquity. Thus the first twelve centuries constitute the age of the Fathers, and all Catholic men who, during those centuries, left writings pertaining to religion can and are often accustomed to be called, by the common appellation, Fathers. Nevertheless a certain further distinction is customarily made. The appellation of Father can namely be taken in a broader and in a stricter sense. The broader sense is that which we have given, which consists in antiquity; the stricter sense fully expresses the concept of Father, namely of one who begets, nurtures, and educates children; according to this sense those are called Fathers κατ' ἐξοχήν who by their writings brought notable benefit to Catholic doctrine, so as to be celebrated in the Church of subsequent centuries as guides of doctrine, or what is more, to obtain the title of Doctor. Among these one may also count those who left few writings, if by reason of the authority of their writings they are of great moment—of which kind are the Apostolic Fathers, especially Clement of Rome and Ignatius the Martyr. The rest are more customarily called Ecclesiastical Writers, not to deprive them of the dignity they obtain from antiquity, but to distinguish them from those who, living in the same period, excelled and were held in special esteem by the Church.

IV. By reason, therefore, of wisdom, those who excelled in this have been called Doctors. These men were distinguished especially in explaining, confirming, and defending Apostolic doctrine. Men of this kind were produced by every age, whether of the Fathers or of the Scholastics; indeed in the former age one finds those more excellent than whom the latter age has not yet produced. Among the Fathers the following are eminent in wisdom: Irenaeus, Tertullian insofar as he wrote as a Catholic, Athenagoras, Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, Jerome, Augustine, Gregory the Great especially in moral doctrine, Damascene, and Anselm. The later age produced Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, St. Thomas, Bonaventure, Fr. Suárez, Bellarmine, Petavius—who by reopening the fountains of ancient wisdom irrigated most abundantly the dried-up fields of the Scholastics—Alphonsus Liguori in moral theology, and

Francis de Sales in mystical doctrine. The title of Doctor, however, which is rightly to be conferred upon them by the whole Church, is held by none except those whom the Church itself has approved by its decree; and the Church is accustomed moreover to honor with this name only those who have deserved to be enrolled in the Canon of Saints, and among these not those whose dignity of Martyrdom has raised them to a more exalted level.

V. Two questions can arise in dogmatic matters: first, what was handed down by the Apostles; second, how the dogma handed down by the Apostles is to be understood. Either question can certainly be resolved immediately by the authority of the living authentic Magisterium in the Church. But because, first, the present Magisterium itself follows the tradition of its predecessors, and because, second, that twofold question can be treated scientifically and resolved—not authentically but doctrinally—by any theologian privately, it is not without reason that the question is raised as to what force the Fathers (taken in the broader sense) and the Doctors have in this matter. We say therefore that the first question is by its nature a historical question, to be resolved by attestation, which is therefore settled only by showing what was handed down of old. To this purpose the testimony of the ancient Fathers contributes, and if their testimony is available it must necessarily be followed and preferred over that of all later ones who may appear (if perhaps this should happen) to teach otherwise; because what is earlier is true. Thus in the question of the institution of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the testimonies stand out which are found in the letters of Clement and Ignatius, and they prevail over, say, the assertions of Jerome. But if the question concerns the understanding of a dogma, it is not necessary that this should have been more perfect or equally perfect among the earlier Fathers as among those who came later; because, as we said, the Catholic intellect can make progress from day to day (cf. what we gave in the treatise *On God the Creator*, regarding the question of the Spirituality of the Angels, Thesis 18). Consequently in this matter the authority belongs, apart from the always living authentic Magisterium, to those who by the judgment of that Magisterium declared the Apostolic dogma more fully and sincerely—namely the Doctors. Thus you will seek the understanding of the dogma of the

Trinity rather from Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Augustine, and St. Thomas, than from not a few pre-Nicene Fathers.

And let what has been said briefly suffice on this matter for now. As for the use of the authority of the Fathers and of the Scholastics and Doctors, this will be treated more distinctly below in its proper place.

§ XXXIII

Since the successors of the Apostles in the authentic Magisterium are all the Bishops, Christ willed that these teachers, no differently than the first ones he sent, should teach in unity, and constituted among them an efficient principle of unity, so that consequently those teachers would have the right to teach only when they adhered to this principle of unity.

I. We set aside for now the second-order teachers, whose authority depends upon the first-order teachers and whom we included only for the purpose of exhibiting the notion of the Magisterium as to its complete extent as well. The first part of the proposition has already been demonstrated in § XXVIII. The argument of this proposition is the unity of the Magisterium.

II. The mission of teaching (Matt. 28:19–20), as also that of governing (Matt. 18:18) and of sanctifying (John 20:23; Matt. 28:19), was given by Christ not to the individual Apostles separately (with the exception of Peter, the reason for which we shall indicate shortly), but to all of them together united; and accordingly he also prayed to the Father for them that they might be consummated in one (John 17:23). That is to say, the college of the Apostles was endowed with the authority of teaching; but in doing this, Christ certainly signified that he willed some kind of unity; he did not, however, signify that he willed a unity of action, that is, in such a manner that the Apostles could only teach all together at the same time—which would have been pointless and would have made the choice of several members useless; but, which is all that remains, he signified that he willed a unity of principle, and therefore willed that each individual should teach as a member of one college. For it is the same thing to confer upon a college or moral body the authority of teaching as to establish one principle of the Magisterium.

III. And indeed this unity of the Magisterium, which Christ willed, is not merely the objective unity in teaching, that is, the unity which obtains in the exercise of teaching by reason of the same terminus of the action of the individual teachers; rather it is something prior to that. Christ willed that unity by the very fact that he commanded his doctrine to be preached by all those sent by him, which doctrine is necessarily one, so as thereby to introduce objective unity in the Magisterium. But because he gave the power of preaching to the Apostles not individually but to all joined together at once, so that they would thereby constitute one moral body to which that power would belong; and because one moral body endowed with authority possesses a unity of subject which is prior to any of its actions—from this it follows that Christ willed a certain unity in the Magisterium which would be prior to the objective unity in teaching.

The unity of the college, the unity of the body, must therefore precede unity in the exercise of teaching as a necessary condition of that exercise itself, so that each individual may be able to perform what is proper to the whole. Now what held for the Apostles holds also for their successors; that is, the College of Bishops succeeds the College of the Apostles.

IV. And indeed Christ constituted the unity of the moral body of teachers in the Apostles by instituting a perpetual efficient principle of unity—namely Peter, endowed with supreme authority, to whom as head the other teachers would be subordinated and with whom they would form one body. This authority of the head, superior to that which the body under him would possess and to exist always the same in each of his individual successors, was the reason why to him alone, separately from the others, promises were made and rights were conferred. The demonstration of this matter ought to be given here; but because we are about to give it in the following treatise, which is wholly devoted to this, the prudent reader will kindly indulge us in passing over it now, and will seek it there if he desires it. A real moral unity, therefore, such as obtains between a body and its head and between the members of a body—a unity therefore that is in some way social—must, by the will of Christ, prevail among the teachers established by him, so that each one may have the right to teach validly.

V. Given this, it follows that the body of teachers whom Christ willed to be endowed with the authority of teaching is constituted by those who adhere to the efficient principle of unity instituted by that same Christ; those therefore who do not satisfy this condition are not members of the ecclesiastical Magisterium and lack the right to teach.

§ XXXIV

This Magisterium, one from many, has been endowed by Christ with the perpetual prerogative of infallibility.

I. The notion of infallibility certainly contains: first, that the fact of error is excluded; second, it is excluded necessarily—either with absolute necessity, as in God, or with hypothetical necessity, presupposing, for example, some special assistance of God—so that not only error but the possibility of error is excluded; for we do not call infallible one who merely does not err, but one who cannot err; third, that such a prerogative of the Magisterium be certainly known publicly; for the Magisterium was instituted not for itself but for the entire Church, which it could in no way benefit if it were permissible to doubt its immunity from error; and let it be known not on account of an examination conducted by us of the Magisterium each time it teaches, but antecedently to the very act of teaching. This infallibility is different from that which logicians usually attribute to reason when it exercises itself rightly, for example when it reasons correctly, experiences correctly, testifies correctly, or correctly admits testimony. For this consists in the fact that, given the antecedent possibility of finding the truth by reason of the correct exercise of reason, in each instance the truth is attained, which excludes consequently in that case the possibility of error, because truth and falsity cannot coexist. In this infallibility, therefore, which is human, the exclusion of the possibility of error is something consequent upon the excluded fact of error, and this possibility is always present as long as the inquiry into truth lasts. But the infallibility of which we speak is that in which the possibility of erring is already excluded in itself, in which the exclusion of the fact of error is consequent upon the excluded possibility—and it is only according to this latter that one is truly accustomed to be called

infallible. A certain instance of this kind of infallibility is found in nature with regard to primitive truths evident in themselves, such as one's own existence; but this is limited and natural. There can be another kind extending to very many truths of any genus whatsoever, and it is supernatural—and it is of this latter kind that we now speak. These things are clear and, since they suffice for the question we are treating, we abstain from a deeper investigation of the notion of infallibility, which we shall pursue in its proper place in the following treatise.

Such therefore is the infallibility which we claim for the ecclesiastical Magisterium with regard to all those things which it is commanded to teach. In fact the demonstration of this matter has already been anticipated in the demonstration of the infallibility of the Church. But this must be set forth briefly; for one could conceive in at least two ways how God might have provided for immunity from error in the perennial succession of teachers. The first mode would be this. After the infallible Apostolic preaching had been set forth, God provided that knowledge of it should be preserved through a perpetual succession of historical witnesses, who would in themselves be on a par with other human witnesses; through whose testimony knowledge of the doctrine once handed on by the Apostles would be propagated to each succeeding age—propagated, however, with that degree of certainty which human testimony can supply. So that the present witnesses would assure us with human certainty that this and not some other is the doctrine handed on by the Apostles; but since the Apostles were infallible, it would be only by their infallible authority that we would be made infallibly certain of the revealed truths. In this hypothesis there would be two necessary corollaries. The first: since the medium by which we attain the doctrine of the Apostles is solely the attestation of subsequent witnesses, and since these, being on a par with other human witnesses, engender through their testimony only human certainty—hence, although the knowledge of the doctrine handed on by the Apostles is, by reason of their infallible Magisterium, infallibly certain, yet our knowledge of that same doctrine, if it must be gathered from those premises as from its principles, is not infallible knowledge; because it depends not only upon the infallible Magisterium of the

Apostles, to whom we believe it, but also upon the human testimony of witnesses, which presents to us as it were the current state of the Apostolic Magisterium, but does not present it infallibly. Hence since the Apostolic Magisterium itself—that is, whether they taught this and this—is not infallibly certain for us, we are not yet, if we wish to rely on those premises, infallibly certain of the truth of the divine revelation which they are said to have promulgated; for the conclusion, as the saying goes, follows the weaker premise. The second corollary is: since the certainty of the testimony of human witnesses is present when they have used reason correctly, with the intent of deceiving removed; but this rectitude is not certain a priori but resides simply in the correct exercise of reason and in the love of truth—we have the right, whenever we hear their testimony, to subject such testimony to examination, in order to know whether they have been deceived or not, before we give our assent.

The other mode in which one may conceive God to have provided for the perpetual preservation of Apostolic doctrine with immunity from error is this: that the same infallibility with which the College of the Apostles was endowed should persist uninterruptedly in the college of their successors, so that these also, by divine assistance, are rendered immune from the danger of erring when they attest and teach; the possibility of erring is excluded from them not because on each individual occasion they are in fact not erring, but because by reason of the antecedent divine assistance it is impossible that they err.

It is evident that with this second mode adopted, the two corollaries of the first mode no longer obtain, but the contrary ones do.

Now we say that God provided for the preservation of the deposit of revealed truths in such a way that the Magisterium, which is to endure forever, should enjoy the perpetual prerogative of infallibility, so that in each succeeding age, no differently than in the Apostolic age, the college of teachers, persevering in its unity, should be infallible.

II. I do not think it necessary to premit a demonstration of the possibility of this privilege conferred on men by God. That the Protestants are so indignant about it is itself truly stomach-turning. Do they not admit, or did they not formerly admit, the infallibility of Scripture? Do they think it is harder for God to render a man infallible

than a book?—especially since the infallibility of a book presupposes, by God's special assistance, the infallibility of the human writer at the time of writing.

III. Now from what has already been demonstrated it is evident that the Magisterium of which we speak is an authentic Magisterium, one which teaches from the authority of God and obliges those who hear it, by the very prescription of God, to believe what it teaches. *Preach the Gospel to every creature: whoever believes and is baptized will be saved; but whoever does not believe will be condemned* (Mark 16:15–16). By these words Christ addressed not only the Apostles but also their successors (§ XXIX). Now the faith to be accorded to the Gospel is divine faith, by which we believe God revealing the Gospel. But, first, they cannot be punished with eternal punishment who do not believe what is, being impervious to reason, received moreover only from those who can set forth erroneous doctrine, or received through those who can err in transmitting the doctrine originally handed on by an infallible Magisterium; for in that case suspension of assent is justified. In the same way one cannot believe God revealing what is known to possibly be false, or about which we rightly doubt whether it has been revealed by God; for this would be a contradictory and injurious act toward God. This would indeed occur if the Magisterium of these teachers possessed only the authority of a human historical witness, if it were not immune from error, or if this were not certainly known to us. The immunity from error which is required is that which can be the reason why, upon hearing the preaching, there is a most grave obligation to believe—*Preach… whoever believes*—why the word of the preachers is to be received as the word of God (2 Cor. 5:20), why, apart from any other examination, what is preached is believed.

IV. And indeed Christ left no room for an examination by which the faithful would assure themselves whether the teachers and witnesses instituted by him were handing on true things; but given their preaching, he demanded faith, the obedience of faith, so that every intellect would be brought into captivity in obedience to Christ (2 Cor. 10:5), even of those who would be capable of examination. Nor is the faith of Christians of the Apostolic age one thing and that of subsequent ages another.

Moreover, the promise which Christ made of his assistance and that of his Spirit, upon which the infallibility of the Magisterium depends, extends also to the successors of the Apostles. *Behold, I am with you all days until the consummation of the age: I will give you another Paraclete, that he may remain with you forever, the Spirit of truth.* Now the Spirit of truth is not the true Spirit, but the Spirit proceeding from him who is truth, sent to inspire and teach truth.

V. Likewise from ecclesiastical history it is established that it was always believed that causes of faith were settled once the Magisterium had delivered its sentence; and that never, after that sentence had been given, was any inquiry permitted to the faithful by which, before giving their assent, they could, through a comparison of the present doctrine with the ancient tradition and through knowledge of the competence of the teachers or of the reasoning by which these had attained the truth, assure themselves whether the doctrine handed on was certainly that which the first teachers had originally handed on.

VI. Therefore this Magisterium is the certain norm of our faith. Origen, *On First Principles*, Preface, n. 2: "Since there are many who believe they think the thoughts of Christ, and some of them think differently from their predecessors, let the ecclesiastical preaching be preserved which was handed down through the order of succession from the Apostles and which endures to the present day in the Churches. That alone is to be believed as truth which differs in nothing from ecclesiastical and Apostolic tradition."

VII. From what has been said it is evident that this authentic and infallible Magisterium is not a simple series of historical and human witnesses and teachers, but of divine witnesses and teachers.

We do not indeed deny that their testimony, when they attest the fact of revelation, has the force which belongs to purely human testimony—indeed this force is presupposed, but it is perfected and completed by the divine charism. The testimony of these same ones considered under this aspect alone can be urged against those who refuse to acknowledge any other, more excellent, prerogative; and in fact we thus proceed against the Protestants.

Likewise we do not deny that the doctrine of these teachers in explaining dogmas is to be received with that reverence which even mere human learning can require.

But we deny that only these things are to be regarded in them; for they are witnesses and teachers of a higher order, not human but divine.

§ XXXV

The universal consensus of teachers teaching together with their head is infallible, whether they are assembled together at the same time or each sitting individually in his own chair.

I. What is said in the first place is nothing but the necessary consequence of the preceding points. For the Magisterium, when it teaches, is infallible; but given the consensus of which we have spoken, nothing more can be desired to constitute the teaching Magisterium; therefore.

Note the conditions: the universal consensus of teachers teaching together with their head.

Now what is the relationship in this infallibility of the subordinate teachers to the chief teacher, who is the successor of Peter (§ XXXIII), we do not say here; but we shall explain it in the following treatise, on the Infallibility of the Pontiff, to which we accordingly refer the reader.

We said: whether assembled together at the same time or each remaining individually in his own seat; for the exercise of the Magisterium does not require a specific place, nor does it require a local assembly of its members. For even those remaining individually in their own Churches constitute one assembly, no differently than the Church dispersed throughout the entire world, and they constitute that assembly to which the promise of infallibility was made: *Behold I am with you* (teaching) *all days*—not only when you all gather in one place, which can happen very rarely, but *all days*, always.

II. To be sure, in civil society, where the legislative power resides in some assembly deputed for this purpose, it happens that the assembly does not possess that authority unless its members gather together and jointly conduct deliberation and cast their vote. But this is ultimately a positive institution, most rational in the civil order; but Christ did not

will this to be necessary in his Church. For by divine institution, each individual who belongs to this assembly, even if they remain apart in their own churches, is truly a teacher (as also a legislator) for his flock, and in order to exercise the common act of the Magisterium, it is enough that they, remaining in unity and following the same norm, teach the same thing.

For given this, infallibility necessarily belongs to this Magisterium, just as the Church hearing that Magisterium is infallible—which infallibility is a prerogative that never ceases. Otherwise, since all the individual Churches hear their own pastors, if all of these err while teaching the same thing, we would have an erring Church, which is repugnant.

And thus the Church has always understood the divine institution of its founder, appealing in the same way to the consensus of Bishops dispersed as to the consensus of those assembled. Cf. Vatican Council, Session 3, ch. 3 *On Faith*, in which it is decreed: "All those things are to be believed with divine and Catholic faith which are contained in the Word of God written or handed down and which the Church, either by solemn judgment or by ordinary and universal Magisterium, proposes to be believed as divinely revealed."

This does not prevent the convocation of general Synods from being useful or morally necessary from time to time for drawing up a new definition, as also for enacting new laws; about which see what will be said in the following treatise on Councils; and this is not the same as saying that the authority of the Magisterium toward the universal Church is exercised only in Synods.

§ XXXVI

If there is dissension among teachers, it cannot be established as a rule that the greater part should prevail; but the rule is that the doctrine of him who holds the first place among them is to be followed, whether the greater or the lesser part agrees with him before the definition.

This we shall demonstrate in the following treatise.

§ XXXVII

COROLLARY

I. The infallibility of the Magisterium exists for the sake of the universal Church, so that there may be unity of the whole body in the true faith. This unity, finally intended by Christ, can never be lacking to the Church, as we shall see shortly; consequently a universal consensus in the true faith will always obtain. Hence from the universal consensus of all the faithful it will always be permissible to infer what revealed truth is—namely that which is the object of that same universal consensus. Thus Irenaeus argues, book 1, chapter 10. But when you have in this way proved the revealed truth from universal consensus, another question still remains: namely by what means this universal consensus exists in the Church. And this is resolved by saying that such consensus exists through the agency of the Magisterium instituted by Christ, to which the Holy Spirit assists. Therefore the appeal to the universal consensus of the Church for establishing the dogmas of faith does not oppose the doctrine of the active infallibility of the Magisterium, but rather presupposes it, as may be seen in the same Irenaeus, comparing the cited passage with book 3, chapter 3.

You will ask whether the Synagogue was infallible. It must be held that God provided that the true faith in his Church before Christ—which was found most especially in the Synagogue—should remain intact among not a few. But as we have seen, God could achieve this in more than one way. Since faith was not the proper good of the old covenant, we seriously doubt whether God provided at that time for the integrity of the faith by conferring the gift of infallibility on the religious authority of that assembly; but perhaps he provided by other means—for example, through the mission of the prophets, through oracles given by himself, and generally through his gentle providence, which chose that order in which not a few would always profess the true faith. Moreover from the words of Deuteronomy 17:8, taken also together with 2 Chronicles 19:9–10, it is not sufficiently clear that the High Priest was constituted as judge in matters of faith, nor does the obligation of

acquiescing to his judgment under penalty of death prove the infallibility of the High Priest, but only his supreme authority, which has its place also in civil society and rightly demands obedience, and which is in a certain manner infallible—that is, inappellable. Cf. however Becanus, *On the Judge of Controversies*, who defends the affirmative position.

COROLLARY II

Indeed from that first demonstrated principle—namely that a perennial, living, authentic, and infallible Magisterium was instituted by God—we must proceed to resolve the question whether there exist in the Church divine unwritten Apostolic traditions not written by the Apostles, which must be received no differently than the written Word of God. For whatever that Magisterium hands down as to be believed is to be believed. If therefore it teaches something to be believed which is not contained in the Scriptures, the consequence will be that not all Apostolic doctrine was committed to writing by the canonical writers, and therefore that there are some traditions or unwritten truths. Either could in itself have occurred—namely either that the whole deposit of faith was committed to the canonical writings, or not all of it; but which actually took place is to be learned from the doctrine of the Magisterium itself compared with the Scriptures.

It is therefore absurd to prescribe a priori that only that is to be believed which is contained in the Scriptures, unless the thesis concerning the institution of the living, perennial, and infallible Magisterium is first shown to be false.

§ XXXVIII

The necessity of this Magisterium, which was begun by the Apostles and is perpetually continued in their successors, while already manifest from what has been proved, is further confirmed by the fact that the Protestants wrongly advance the sufficiency of the Scriptures or claim for themselves an interior Magisterium of the Holy Spirit teaching each individual the true meaning of Holy Scripture.

I. By necessary we here understand what by the institution of Christ cannot but be in the Church. But from what we have given in the preceding propositions (§§ XXII–XXVI) on this matter, this will of Christ is made manifest; therefore.

II. And indeed it is necessary that there be some means by which the faithful certainly know what God wills them to believe and do in order to attain salvation. Now such a means is either the Scripture and that alone, or it is an interior Magisterium of the Holy Spirit teaching each one individually what the Scripture contains and making them more certain, or it is some living perennial Magisterium which, possessing the deposit of revelation, proposes the doctrine of the Faith —either interpreting the Scriptures or also teaching by its own authority without use of the Scriptures—to which Magisterium the Holy Spirit assents in each individual, moving them to believe it. We do not deny that Scripture is some means which, joined with a legitimate interpreter, can certainly be useful; but we deny that it alone suffices, and we affirm that a living personal Magisterium is required, one which both hands on to us the Scriptures themselves, legitimately interprets them, and teaches us whether or not the fullness of revelation is contained in the Scriptures, and if anything is lacking there, supplies what is missing from its own authority, as itself possessing the entire revelation.

III. That Scripture alone does not suffice is easily demonstrated. For, first, how is it certainly established for me that it is a divine, infallible, inspired book? Established, I say, with that certainty which demands the assent of divine faith? What is the use of compiling many testimonies from this book teaching this very thing? The same question will always remain completely unchanged: is what is asserted by these

testimonies true? We are stuck therefore at the very threshold and cannot proceed further in inquiring into the truths to be believed, if only this book is available, since it has not yet been established that this is a divine book. That is to say, the Protestants, who always appealed to Scripture and extolled Scripture, would have had first to demonstrate that this book is actually Scripture, that it contains the Word of God, and that it consists of these and not other parts. How do you prove this? By the authority of the teaching Church? Then you admit a living personal Magisterium. Do you prove it by historical tradition alone? So indeed Socinus (Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, vol. I, p. 278) and the Counter-Remonstrants, such as Episcopius (*Institutio Theologica*, book 4, sect. 1, ch. 5): "In order that we may know these books to be divine, it suffices if it is certain that they were written by those authors whose names they bear. For that these were divine men, taught and inspired by God, cannot be doubted, provided the history told about them is true." But leaving aside other things that could be noted, is this history certain, and with what kind of certainty? You have nothing but human historical testimony; but we saw that this is insufficient (§ XXXIV).

Having only these books, therefore, we do not yet know whether we have the divine Scriptures. Will you have recourse to the authority of the Synagogue? But, first, what will you do about the books of the New Testament? Second, you who deny the Magisterium of the Church, how will you accept the Magisterium of the Synagogue? Third, from where does it infallibly appear what the canon of the Synagogue is? You will say, from the writings of the New Testament. But, first, this is false for all the books of the Old Testament, and it is false that the entire books of the Old Testament and their individual parts are known from the writings of the New Testament; fourth, how is the authority of the writers of the New Testament shown? Therefore, if Scripture alone exists, nothing can be believed.

Secondly, even if we suppose the book to be divine, the difficulty still remains. For a question can arise about the meaning of the statements it contains—for example: *The Father is greater than I*; *This is my body*; *God wills all men to be saved*; *You are Peter*, etc.—for in explaining these not all Christians who reverence the Scriptures agree.

How then will an end be put to these questions? The Protestants answer in the way in which the ancients resolved controversies with heretics, namely by appealing to Scripture itself, that is, to other clearer passages of the same text from which light is shed upon the disputed testimonies. For the Fathers, against Arius and against Eutyches for example, appealed to Scripture in order to refute their false interpretations of certain passages, and so the question was settled.

This answer is inept, as it either conceals or reveals ignorance of the historical truth. For the reason why the question was settled for Catholics was not merely the production of certain Scriptural testimonies by which the heretics were convinced, but the production of testimonies made by the authentic Magisterium, in whose hands, Catholics believed, lay the right to interpret the Scriptures and to impose its interpretation upon the faithful. Hence it is that recourse was had to Synods of Bishops in order to know with certainty what was to be believed and what the doctrine of the Scriptures was.

But the condition of the Protestants is entirely different. For that Magisterium is absent and we have nothing but Scripture. Therefore the entire question remains: by what means are questions arising about the Scriptures themselves brought to an end? Will you refer those in dispute back to the clearer passages of Scripture itself? But any one of those in dispute will affirm that the passage upon which he himself relies is the clearest of all and that all other Scriptural testimonies on the same matter are to be judged by it.

In what well-ordered republic is a question arising among citizens about the meaning of the Code or the force of some law referred back to the citizens themselves to be resolved by reading the whole Code more carefully? In none, certainly, and for this simple reason: because in this way disputes would never be ended. What then comes to the mind of the Protestants, that questions about the Scriptures in the Church can and should be ended in this manner? In the Church, I say; for this the Protestants either do not notice or subtly pass over. For the matter concerns bringing a dispute within the Christian society itself to an end, in such a way that whether or not the other party to the dispute agrees, the rest of the society may know with certainty which of the two offends against the Code, and may have the right to punish the contumacious

party and even to expel him from itself. Now such an end to the question cannot be obtained when the decision of the dispute is ultimately left to the zeal of the litigants themselves. God would therefore have to be said not to have provided for his Church, which is the society of believers, in establishing the necessary means by which disputes about the Word of God within it are brought to an end—so that as a consequence those who believe what is true and those who believe what is false could both legitimately exist within it at the same time.

Thirdly, it is necessary that what contains divine revelation, if it is the unique means, should contain it wholly, and this should be certainly known to the faithful; otherwise they will always be in doubt as to whether they believe what God wills them to believe. Now how is it established for the Protestants that all the dogmas to be believed are contained in the Scriptures? Scripture certainly does not say this. Could God not have used some other means than a written document for making known the truths to be believed?—so that God could have spoken only to the literate. How then do the Protestants know that all the dogmas to be believed are contained in the Scriptures?

But if they do not certainly know this, they are little concerned for their salvation if they rest content in Scripture alone. They say that the ancient Fathers also drew all their dogmas from the Scriptures and from them alone. Is that so? How then did the ancients prove from the Scriptures that infants can and must be baptized? You will say, from the words of Christ in John 3:5. That is to say, those words have force for Catholics who know that this interpretation is contained in the Apostolic tradition persevering in the Church; but if you take those words in John alone, you will certainly not achieve this unless you first demonstrate that infants are by Christ's prescription capable of baptism. Concerning this, if we had only the Scriptures, there would be serious doubt; for when Christ gave the Apostles the mission of baptizing, he spoke of adults only (Matt. 28:20). The ancient Church therefore baptized infants, instructed by Apostolic tradition. Thus Origen, book 5 on the Epistle to the Romans: "The Church received from the Apostles the tradition of also baptizing infants."

Nor did Lightfoot adequately help the defeated cause (Horae Hebraicae on John III) by noting that since the Savior adopted the rite of baptism by which the Jews joined proselytes to themselves, and since they also baptized infants, by this very fact the Savior signified that he too wished infants to be baptized. But how do you prove that Christ willed or ought to have retained all that men had previously established, when he abolished the Mosaic rites? Moreover, is the relationship of Christ's baptism to the baptism of proselytes handed down in the Scriptures? The certainty about this baptism of proselytes is only historical; whence therefore comes the certainty of faith concerning the validity of infant baptism? Why do you not rather say that Christ adopted the rite of John the Baptist?

Again, how did the ancient Church prove that heretics also baptize validly? Stephen indeed produced tradition alone. But Augustine, in his tractate on John, appealed to the words of John the Baptist *He is the one who baptizes*, to infer from them that the value of baptism does not depend upon the merit of the minister and therefore that even a heretic can baptize validly.

But who does not see that this argument is nothing but a certain confirmation of a truth that is presupposed as certain from elsewhere—that is, through tradition? For if you press those words alone, the adversaries will respond: granted that Christ is the principal bestower of baptism, granted that the merit of the minister has no influence on the effect of baptism; yet a minister is nonetheless required; moreover, a minister is one whom Christ sent; but Christ sent the Apostles and their successors; but heretics are not successors of the Apostles—which was the argument of Cyprian. Therefore the Church held this dogma also from Apostolic tradition.

Other dogmas are brought forward by Catholics which the Protestants deny, contradicting themselves who defended infant baptism against the Anabaptists. Therefore the Protestants will never prove that all the dogmas to be believed are contained in the Scriptures. From all of which it is evident that the Protestants are unjustly in praising the sufficiency of the Scriptures, which they boast of.

Is it not the case that, after we have heard the Protestants with such keen zeal defending the sufficiency and fullness of the Scriptures and

rejecting every human Magisterium divinely instituted which hands on the Scriptures and authentically interprets them—is it not, I say, permissible to doubt whether the Calvinists acted seriously or comically against the Remonstrants in their pseudo-synod at Dordrecht? For what happened? You deny that there are teachers in the Church who have the right to impose their interpretation of the Scriptures upon the faithful, and nonetheless, following the custom of the Catholic Magisterium, you sit in Synod, you pass judgment on the doctrine contained in the Scriptures, you condemn your adversaries and command all to hold your doctrine who wish to be in your Church—that is, according to yourselves, in the Church of Christ; for you consider your Church to be the Church of Christ. Has not iniquity lied to itself?

Furthermore, if the matter were such that a book alone sufficed for obtaining a certain knowledge of the things to be believed, the society of believers among themselves would already be dissolved. For certainly the bond of teachers and disciples is absent; and when this fails, the bond also of rulers and ruled perishes. For how will you compel someone to obey you, who is taught directly from the Scriptures alone what he ought to do? To one who objects that your precept is contrary to the doctrine which Scripture suggests to him, and that therefore he ought to obey God rather than men—what will you reply? Nor will administrators of sacred things or sanctifiers be able to defend themselves, if the faithful contend that the Scriptures teach that all are sanctified immediately by God; which indeed coheres with another dogma: that all are taught immediately by God.

There would therefore be no society of men with one another; men individually would only be united to God. Men could indeed be similar to one another, but social unity, which demands mutual cooperation of many and subordination, would have no place, neither visible nor invisible. But we have demonstrated that the Church is a society, and a visible one; therefore.

Finally, the sufficiency of the Scriptures, if it existed, would hold for those who know how to read the Scriptures and indeed in the language in which they were written; for all others must be taught by others what they contain, and those who read translations must believe the interpreters that what is presented to them in translations is the

Word of God. Moreover if those who attest this are not infallible, how will one who hears a preacher or reads translations be infallibly certain of what he believes? The necessity of an extrinsic Magisterium breaks forth from every side.

IV. But the Protestants note that when they preach the sufficiency of the Scriptures, they consider the Scriptures not absolutely alone but joined with the interior illumination of the Holy Spirit who teaches each individual believer inwardly what is outwardly presented in the divinely written book. "The foundation," says J. H. Scholten, professor at Leiden, in *De Leer der hervormde Kerk*, etc., 1853, vol. 1, pp. 108 ff., "upon which the conviction of the Reformed Church rests concerning the historical origin of the Christian religion can, from the very nature of the thing, be nothing other than the historical demonstration by which the truth of the evangelical history is established." On the other hand, "the foundation upon which the reformed church itself makes the truth of religion rest and on account of which it accepts the Word of God in the Scriptures as the expression of its faith, is situated neither in the testimony of the Church nor in the testimony of Scripture itself, much less in the historical demonstration of the authenticity and veracity of the sacred books, but in the testimony of the Holy Spirit, that is, in the agreement of those things which God revealed through his legates according to Scripture with those things which he himself reveals through his Spirit in the reason and conscience of man, whose eye, in fellowship with Christ, is open to truth." And this is that clarity which the Protestants asserted from the beginning to belong to the Scriptures —a clarity not natural but supernatural, namely by means of the interior Magisterium of the Holy Spirit. For no one, they say, believes the Scriptures except one taught by God; but he is taught by God through infused faith, which is a gift of the Holy Spirit; hence our believing the Scripture depends on the Holy Spirit, and therefore the very authority of Scripture, which is a certain dogma and which we believe, depends on the Holy Spirit acting in our consciences. Who would deny that among the things which faith proposes to us to be believed, there is the authority of the Scriptures? But all faith is infused by the Holy Spirit. Let the "Papists" therefore tolerate the Catholics (this is what the Protestant doctors formerly called their sect) who assert that it is that Spirit who

does not let us doubt the Scriptures. Thus Daniel Chamier in his מַלְחֶמוֹת יי, vol. 1, book VI, ch. 3 (Geneva, 1626). Cf. also the Confession of the French Reformed Church, article 5. He does not deny that the ecclesiastical Magisterium is useful, but denies that it is necessary; since the Holy Spirit is more than sufficient. Ibid., n. 11. Indeed, they say, the testimony of the Holy Spirit, who by faith testifies within us the truth of the Scriptures and of the individual dogmas contained therein, is the supreme testimony; for no authority is more excellent than or comparable to the authority of the Holy Spirit; let therefore the authority of the Ecclesiastical Magisterium yield. Ibid., ch. 4.

But this is a play on words and a putrid equivocation. That is to say: the Holy Spirit through habitual infused faith renders us capable of supernaturally believing what the Magisterium of the Church, either by proposing Apostolic tradition or by interpreting the Scriptures, teaches; and the same Spirit through actual interior illuminations causes us to supernaturally apprehend what the Magisterium proposes externally, and through inspirations of the will moves and helps us to freely give assent to the apprehended truths—all this I grant. The Holy Spirit speaks interiorly to each of the faithful, affirming the doctrine contained in the Scriptures and confirming by his authority what he makes them sense or feel, in such a way that he thereby manifests the truth and makes each one certain of it interiorly independently of the Magisterium of the Church—this he could do if he wished, in some other economy; let it pass, and he does do this in the present economy of the Church instituted by Christ—this I deny. The Holy Spirit is said to teach interiorly insofar as, by inwardly preventing and aiding, he prepares and thereafter cooperates with us in the act of faith, thereby producing what pertains to the subjective aspect of the act. This act is determined objectively only from without, receiving from the extrinsic Magisterium what is to be believed, and resting upon that extrinsic Magisterium, deriving certainty from it that what is proposed has been revealed by God and is therefore to be believed with faith in God. This is something entirely different from the proper so-called interior locution of God, by which God manifests himself to a man as affirming the things he causes him to know and confirming them by his authority.

This is how God conducts himself with a man to whom he reveals something; this is how he acted in the Prophets.

Moreover, the Protestants would want the Holy Spirit at least frequently to propose immediately to the mind the object to be believed —namely when the letter of Scripture is obscure and pours no meaning into the minds of several of the faithful—and to produce certainty immediately in the mind by himself, and therefore by his manifested authority that this is a revealed truth, that this is the Word of God, that this is the authority of Scripture, and that this book is Scripture. But this would be a properly so-called interior locution, which is a true revelation, and which can extend also to truths already handed on. But that this is false, experience itself attests. For who is conscious of such interior instruction or divine locution? Surely it ought to belong not to Protestants alone but to all who read the Scriptures devoutly. How again can it be that, with the Spirit of truth teaching inwardly in this manner, those who claimed to be taught by him did not agree in their interpretation of Scripture? Moreover, what the Remonstrants rightly objected to the Counter-Remonstrants is that in this way a circle is committed. For if they are asked how they know Scripture to be divine, they answer: from the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit; if they are pressed as to how they know that testimony to be the testimony of the Holy Spirit (and not their own opinion), they will answer: from Scripture. Thus Limborch, *Theologia Christiana*, book I, ch. 4, n. 17. Then pure subjectivism is introduced. "Suppose," says Episcopius, *Institutio Theologica*, IV, sect. 1, ch. 5, "that a Jew or a Muslim asserts with equal composure and confidence that the Holy Spirit testifies to him that these books are not divine—what way will he take to show that his testimony is true and theirs false?" Burmann indeed, *Synopsis Theologiae*, book I, ch. 4, n. 21, responds that "that testimony brings its own light with it, and does not allow the believer to doubt, if he is one who hopes, believes, and loves, that he believes, loves, and hopes." But these are mere words. For indeed this Holy Spirit teaching inwardly is nothing other than the individual human reason of each person; as the later heretics, ridiculing their forebears, openly declare. Thus J. H. Scholten, *op. cit.*, pp. 191 ff. (cf. pp. 200 ff. of the 3rd edition)—and in this way rationalism prevails. Catholics were therefore right to reproach

the first Protestants for subjecting the interpretation of Scripture to the private spirit, that is, to the individual reason of each person.

V. So to return to the argument: there must be a certain means by which we certainly know the revealed truths; this will be either Scripture alone, or the interior Magisterium of the Holy Spirit, or the exterior authentic Magisterium; but neither the first nor the second; therefore the third remains. That no circular reasoning is involved in the Catholic demonstration will be shown in the last proposition on this subject.

VI. Did Ignatius reject every Magisterium by those words—not sufficiently clear in themselves—in the letter to the Philadelphians, chapter 8: *When I heard some saying: unless I find it in the* ἀρχεῖα *(alt. ἀρχαίοις), I will not believe the Gospel; and when I said that it is written, they answered me:* ὅτι πρόκειται*. But for me the* ἀρχεῖα *(alt. ἀρχαῖα) are Jesus Christ, the incorruptible* ἀρχεῖα *(alt. ἀρχαῖα), his cross and death and resurrection and the faith through him*? He speaks against contentious men, probably Jews. The double reading ἀρχεῖα and ἀρχαῖα seems ultimately to come to the same thing. Those men required testimonies from the ancient books which the Jews kept in their archives. When Ignatius replied that what the Gospel records is contained in the books of the Old Testament—for example, in the prophecies—they rejoined ὃ πρόκειται, namely: this is what is set forth for inquiry; the question revolves around this very point; this is what must be demonstrated. Ignatius then adds: for me, in place of archives and all ancient monuments or documents, there is Jesus Christ, his cross, etc. One who already knows Christ from the Magisterium of the Church and the Scriptures, and loves him and in this love experiences him present to himself, speaks in this way indeed—not so as to reject the authority of the Magisterium or of Scripture, but to cut short futile questions with contentious men who are led not by the love of truth but by partisan zeal.

§ XXXIX

The testimonies of Scripture Jer. 31:33–34; Isa. 54:13, taken together with John 6:45; Matt. 23:8, 11; 1 John 5:10; 2:20, 27; 4:1; 1 Thess. 5:21 are not rightly adduced against the institution of the authentic Magisterium; for either they do not pertain to this question or they are to be reconciled with the passages adduced by us, so that these testimonies either recommend the acts whose extrinsic norm is the Magisterium or signify the interior grace by which the Magisterium becomes salvifically efficacious.

I. From the testimony of Jeremiah two things can be urged: one positive—*I will give my law in their inward parts and will write it in their hearts*; one negative—*and a man shall no longer teach his neighbor saying: know the Lord*—by which both an interior Magisterium is instituted and an exterior one is denied: which is exactly the thesis of the Protestants.

I respond that in this passage the prophet is comparing the new covenant with the old and setting forth the excellence of the former over the latter. Now as the words sound, he is indeed speaking of the new covenant, but insofar as it was to be entered into with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah. *Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, and I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah: not according to the covenant which I made with their fathers.* Now the excellence of the new covenant which the prophet sets forth is this: interior grace and sanctification, by which they may be able to fulfill the law as is fitting; the interior grace of illumination by which the law is known and of inspiration by which it is loved and fulfilled.

For interior grace is the proper good of the new Testament; on which matter see the treatise *On Grace*. In this way God gives the law not only exteriorly through the letter, which alone kills, because through it alone alone the knowledge of sin is had; but also interiorly through the life-giving Spirit. This first part of the prophecy therefore looks to promising the interior grace by which the law and the doctrine externally proposed can be fulfillingly observed. As for the other part, we have already given its exposition in the book *On the Historical Truth*

of the Book of Judith and Other Scriptural Passages, section 3, which exposition we briefly summarize here.

That is to say, the prophet, who in the earlier part of the prophecy spoke of the new covenant to be entered by God with the Jews, now predicts that at some time all the Jews will accept that covenant; so that it will no longer be necessary for anyone to exhort the Israelites to know the Lord, because all will know the Lord. Therefore the words *and a man shall no longer teach his neighbor and a man his brother, saying: know the Lord* look to the children of Israel and Judah alone, and, with their full conversion to the Lord promised at the end of the ages, it is declared that there will no longer be any who urge them to know their Lord. And the houses of Israel and Judah would wrongly be taken here symbolically; for God is speaking of those with whose fathers he already entered into a covenant, whom he also led out of Egypt, who indeed broke the earlier covenant—and these are the Israelites alone. A new covenant is therefore promised to them, which indeed already began to be ratified with them from the beginning of the new economy through Christ and the Apostles; yet few Israelites then and afterwards accepted it. Moreover, the prophet predicts that there will be a time when all the Israelites will embrace this covenant.

The conversion of all the remaining Jews is thus foretold, which will come about at some time—namely when the fullness of the Gentiles has entered the Church of Christ. Therefore in this prophecy there is indeed a discourse about the new covenant, but with respect to the Israelites.

This interpretation—that in this part of the prophecy the discourse is about the final conversion of the Jews to Christ—is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle (Rom. 11:26–27), who, promising the same thing, namely that after the fullness of the Gentiles has entered, all Israel will be saved, cites for its proof both the prophecy of Isaiah 59:20 and this very one of Jeremiah. For the words which Paul appends to the words of Isaiah—namely *and this is my covenant for them, when I shall take away their sins*—are not found there in Isaiah but in Jeremiah in this very passage. Therefore Paul saw that the promise we described is contained in those words of Jeremiah. And there is no reason to believe (Wolfenbüttel Commentary on this passage) that these words are taken

from Isaiah 27:9, where there is no mention of a covenant. The Apostle therefore cites this Jeremiah prophecy, recounting its first and last words; our interpretation is therefore owed to the Apostle.

Nor does it constitute an objection that in the Epistle to the Hebrews 10:13–18 appeal is made to this same prophecy of Jeremiah to demonstrate what ought to obtain not at the end of time but always in the new economy. For, first, the sacred writer demonstrates that thing having regard only for the benefit promised—namely the law written in hearts and the remission of sins—from which he infers that there is no longer room for an offering for sin. This benefit, however, promised there by Jeremiah to the Israelites, pertains in the new economy to all, so that the Apostle may rightly argue indefinitely. Now the Apostle in citing Jeremiah's prophecy here takes no account of the time in which it must be fulfilled. Second, even for the Israelites, the prophecy according to the words cited in the Epistle to the Hebrews had already begun to be fulfilled, though in part, with many Jews having converted. We conclude that this prophecy is wrongly adduced in the question concerning the Magisterium of the Church.

II. The words of Isaiah 54:13 are: *I will make… all your children taught by the Lord*—in Hebrew: disciples, students of Yahweh; in Greek: πάντας τοὺς υἱούς σου διδακτοὺς θεοῦ. John, recording the words of Christ, wrote: ἔσονται πάντες διδακτοὶ θεοῦ. Διδακτός according to the Seventy corresponds to the word disciple, one who is taught. All will therefore be disciples of the Lord. The Vulgate perhaps wished to signify the habitual nature of the thing and the continuity of the act.

Now by these words of the prophet, the gift of interior grace is declared—both of illumination and of inspiration; for both are necessary for one to be an actual disciple of the Lord, that is, not only to hear but also to learn, that is, to freely believe, as Christ explains in the words immediately following. That this gift of interior grace is declared by the words of Isaiah is evident from the citation of Christ, who uses them for this very purpose. That is to say, Christ had been speaking to the Jews about himself and had thus exhibited an exterior Magisterium. But this he declares to be insufficient, and affirms that the drawing of the Father is required—which can be nothing other than his interior operation in the mind and will of man. He who not only hears from the

Father but also learns, that is, freely believes, comes to Jesus. Without this interior drawing, which is also an operation of the Son because it is an operation of God, the exterior Magisterium even of Christ himself would profit nothing.

Therefore Christ does not deny the necessity of the exterior Magisterium, of which he himself then made use and of which he afterwards willed his Apostles to make use, but affirms the necessity of interior grace, that is, the interior Magisterium of the Father. Therefore the words of Isaiah cited here by Christ say the same thing.

III. In the words of the Lord in Matt. 23:8: But you, be not called Rabbi: for one is your Master and you are all brethren, a moral doctrine is contained.

Christ had rebuked in the immediately preceding verses the pride and arrogance of the Scribes and Pharisees, who loved the first reclining places at feasts and the first chairs in the synagogues and greetings in the marketplace and to be called Rabbi by men. After this he adds: *but you*, etc. Therefore the words *be not called Rabbi* mean: do not seek this title, do not desire to be distinguished by this name and to be addressed by this appellation by your disciples. By your disciples, I say; for Christ himself supposed that his Apostles were to have disciples—for these are ordinarily the ones who call someone a teacher. From these therefore Christ wishes to remove the spirit of pride which he had condemned in the Scribes and Pharisees. And the reason he gives certainly makes for repressing this inflated sense: *For one is your Master*, the teacher of all, who teaches both you yourselves and your disciples; since you too are disciples of this one universal Teacher, what reason can there be for you to be inflated? *You are all brethren*; which quality is not destroyed by the addition of dignity or authority. That Christ intends a moral sense is evident also from what follows, where the repeated sentence—*neither be called teachers, for one is your teacher, Christ*—is followed by: *he who is greater among you shall be your servant; and whoever exalts himself will be humbled*, etc.; where, as you see, it is supposed that one of the Apostles is to become greater and the manner of conducting himself is prescribed for him.

The words of Christ therefore do not exclude the institution of teachers in the Church; they even suppose that there are to be such

teachers, or those who are to have disciples by whom they will be called Rabbi—just as the words: *and call no man your father upon earth* (v. 9) do not deny that there will be fathers in the capacity of Magisterium and direction, as the Apostle declared himself to be for the Corinthians (1 Cor. 4:15); but they prescribe only the moral norm by which such teachers are to conduct themselves, namely modesty and humility.

IV. In 1 John 5:10 the discourse is about the testimony of God which he possesses who believes in the Son of God. Now this is not the interior locution which the Protestants desire, but is eternal life (certainly in germ) which is in us through faith. For the Apostle explains himself thus (v. 11): *And this is the testimony: that God has given us eternal life.* These things cohere with the words of Jesus in John 17:3: *And this is eternal life, that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.*

V. To understand 1 John 2:20–27, the following must be weighed. First, the Apostle says that he writes to those who already know the truth (v. 21): *I have not written to you because you do not know the truth, but because you know it.* And whence had they known it? From what follows it is evident that they had received it from the Apostolic Magisterium. Secondly, the Apostle exhorts the faithful to retain what they heard from the beginning (v. 24): *What you have heard from the beginning, let it abide in you.* The Apostle therefore requires a permanent subjection to the extrinsic Magisterium. Thirdly, he says that the necessary condition for the faithful to remain in the Son and the Father is if what they heard from the beginning abides in them (v. 24): *If what you have heard from the beginning abides in you, you also will abide in the Son and the Father.* Fourthly, he says that what he wrote here he wrote about those who are seducing them (v. 26): *These things I wrote to you concerning those who are seducing you.* He then immediately adds the controversial words: *And you, the anointing which you received from him, let it remain in you* (here you have a Hebraism—*you* as nominative absolute: as concerns you—and the figure of attraction: *anointing* for *the anointing*) *and you have no need that anyone should teach you, but as his anointing teaches you about all things… abide in him.* The same thing he had already said at the beginning (v. 20): *But you have an anointing from the Holy One and you know all things.*

Now it is manifest that when he says to the faithful *you have no need that anyone teach you*, he does not reject every extrinsic Magisterium; since he requires that they continue to hold what they heard—from the Magisterium, certainly—but he rejects an alien Magisterium which, by teaching new things, would wish to seduce them; for he declares he wrote these things to them because of the seducers. Therefore, since the faithful had already been taught everything by the Apostles, they certainly had no need to be taught by others who were strangers to the Apostles. He exhorts them, that is, to be on guard against teachers whom a little before (v. 18) he had called antichrists, who promised a more excellent doctrine than the Apostolic —assuring them that they already knew everything, instructed as they were by the Apostles. Consider the assaults of the emerging sects of the Gnostics, who sold themselves to the faithful as more learned than the Apostles in Christ's own doctrine, and you will easily grasp the meaning of the Apostle. We speak in the same manner now to a Catholic beset by heretical teachers: you have the doctrine of the Church, you have God teaching you through the Church; you have no need for another to teach you. Now the anointing which they had received from the Holy One and which taught them all things (vv. 20 and 27) is not to be separated from the Magisterium from which they had heard what they were bound to hold constantly so as to remain in the Son and the Father (v. 24). Certainly if, having abandoned subordination to that Magisterium, they were to cease to be in the Father and the Son, they would also cease to have the anointing of the Holy Spirit; therefore the Apostle conjoins both: the exterior Magisterium and the anointing of the Spirit. This anointing therefore is the interior grace which opens the understanding of what the exterior Magisterium teaches, so that we understand it as we ought, love it, and recoil from heretics who teach other things and promise novelties.

VI. In 1 John 4:1 the Apostle wishes the faithful to test the spirits, whether they are from God, because many false prophets have gone out into the world. Paul also in 1 Thess. 5:21 says: *test all things; hold fast what is good.* But these passages do nothing against the exterior authentic Magisterium. For one who tests in such a way as to receive some things and reject others uses some norm; but it is not necessary

that he himself be the author of the norm, for he can use a norm received from outside. Now this is the condition of the faithful, who according to the doctrine which they receive from the authentic Magisterium are able to test all things, whether they are good or bad, true or false. Moreover, neither Apostle says that the norm which the faithful ought to follow in their testing is internal, or that it is Scripture alone: what then do you have against the institution of the authentic Magisterium? Could these words not be urged in the same way against the Protestants: it is for the faithful to test all things; therefore they do not depend on the Scriptures. Do you deny the consequence? We deny it too, and with better reason, since we demonstrate the institution of the Magisterium to which men being subjected become and remain faithful. For I think both Apostles address the faithful; they therefore suppose that subjection. Accordingly John proposes to his faithful in the cited passage as a norm the dogma about the coming of Jesus Christ in the flesh—which dogma had been made known through the Magisterium of the Apostles (1:1 ff.).

Therefore the testimonies considered thus far do not conflict even in the slightest with the doctrine concerning the authentic Magisterium instituted in the Church.

§ XL

The infallibility of the Magisterium and the Church, asserted up to this point, extends to other things beyond mere revealed truths.

I. There are indeed not a few truths which are not revealed but which have a special connection with revealed truths. The connection consists in this: that if certainty about those truths, though not revealed, were lacking, or if an error contrary to them were admitted or permitted, then either the subjective faith of the faithful concerning certain dogmas could not stand firm, lacking as it were some condition, or the objective integrity of the faith among the faithful and the salvation of souls would be more or less endangered; hence it is necessary that what is to be held in these matters be certainly known. Those things that are called dogmatic facts pertain to the first category. To another class belong: a) certain other matters again of a factual

nature—namely so-called dogmatic texts; texts, that is, of human origin but as regards the doctrine they contain conformable or disconformable to revealed doctrine. The truth necessary to know concerning these is whether these texts are or are not conformable to truth, whether or not they contain heresy or error. b) To this class pertain also many speculative or practical truths, contrary to those false propositions from which danger to the faith or the salvation of souls can follow.

That this may be more clearly understood, a distinction must be made between that whose certainty is necessary for us in order for something else to be certain, and that whose truth is necessary for something else to be true. For that whose certainty (certainly subjective) is necessary for us can be something entirely extrinsic to the true thing, which is independent of its truth; thus the certainty of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin requires certainty about the authority of him who defined it, yet this extrinsic truth is external to the truth of the Immaculate Conception and is not necessary for the latter to be true. But that whose truth is necessary in order for something else to be true—which therefore is such that if it is false, the other thing must also be false—is intrinsically connected with the truth of the other thing in such a way as to be a certain element of its adequate truth and to be contained within the comprehension of that truth. So, for example, an element of the truth about the immortality of the soul is its spirituality. Hence an intellect which comprehends a thing, when it affirms one truth, also intends implicitly to affirm whatever is necessarily connected with that truth by a connection of truth; otherwise a certain contradiction would be had in the affirmation. It does indeed frequently happen that when men affirm something, they do not intend—indeed positively do not wish to affirm—what is nonetheless intrinsically connected with what they affirm; but this arises from the fact that men do not comprehend things and are subject to error; they nonetheless intend to affirm whatever they judge to be intrinsically connected with the thing affirmed. Since therefore God comprehends all things, if he affirms anything, he implicitly affirms by that very fact whatever is intrinsically connected with it by a connection of truth. Yet it does not follow from this that all these truths are revealed. For a revealed truth is one which is the terminus of a divine locution of such a kind that for

holding it the authority of God speaking is needed as the only motive. In this are also included all those things which are found to be revealed by analysis alone, for these are as it were parts or elements of the revealed truth and are made known to us by God speaking. But those truths which are gathered through another truth from the revealed one, by a more or less proximate deduction, although implicitly affirmed by God—presupposing the necessary connection of truths—are nonetheless not revealed by God; because they are not made known to us by God speaking; for in order to hold them, the authority of God is not sufficient, but a principle of reason is also required, which in instituting the reasoning can ultimately err. There are therefore certain revealed truths and certain truths connected with the revealed ones but not themselves revealed. Now if those deduced truths are denied, the faith can be endangered; for once the contrary error is admitted, it is possible by reasoning to arrive from it at the denial of what is of faith. And if those truths pertain to morals, when they are denied, piety and the salvation of souls can be endangered for the same reason. Just as therefore the errors contrary to those truths can bring damage to the faith and the salvation of souls, so the defense of those truths can be useful and necessary so that the faith may be kept intact and the salvation of souls may be secure.

Just as truths connected with revealed ones are those which are gathered from the latter by means of another unrevealed truth, so also there can be others which are presupposed by God when he reveals, although not themselves revealed; whose denial would make certainty about the revealed truths impossible. For since the order of revelation presupposes the rational order and God has not revealed all the truths of this order, nothing prevents God from having presupposed some of them—affirming them implicitly, but not manifesting them. Now truths of this kind would belong to the first class.

For the rest, it must be noted that in order to defend what we propose in the thesis, there is no need to determine definitively which these truths are that are connected with the revealed ones; but once their possibility has been established, as we have already done, it is sufficient for us to speak hypothetically: namely, if there are truths of this kind and consequently errors opposed to them, the infallible

authority of the Church can be exercised with respect to these. For the adversaries of the Church must be refuted who take exception to its authority by saying that many things which are defined by it are not revealed but rational or philosophical, and therefore outside the scope of the Church's authority. Now it is sufficient to refute them by establishing that, even if these truths are not revealed, nonetheless the infallible authority of the Magisterium of the Church extends to them. For this is the sense of the Church: that it has the right to use the authority of its Magisterium both regarding revealed truths and also regarding other truths. And this sense is clear from the following.

For first, the Church in proscribing false propositions does not proscribe only those worthy of the censure of heresy, but also those which are erroneous, false, pernicious, scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, etc. Then this was more evidently declared by the Roman See —namely by Pius IX in the brief *Gravissimas inter* of December 11, 1862, and in another brief *Tuas libenter* of December 21, 1863. Cf. Denzinger's *Enchiridion*, 4th edition, pp. 456 and 463.

It is therefore concerning these truths that we contend the infallibility of the Church extends. The question was raised by the Jansenists regarding dogmatic facts, on the occasion of the condemnation of Jansenius's book, which bears the title *Augustinus*. Dogmatic texts are specially connected with revealed doctrine, for they either contain it or contain doctrine opposed to it. Since it is impossible that any doctrinal book should not contain some doctrine which must be either true or false, just as it is impossible that you should speak in a human manner without saying something, these two things—the certain doctrine which is the content of the book and which pertains to the right in itself, and its expression through the book which is the fact itself—are inseparable and constitute in reality one thing, namely the expression of doctrine through writing, or doctrine expressed in writing. If it is defined that some book contains true or false doctrine, the direct object of the definition—that toward which the intention of the one defining directly tends—is the fact itself; the indirect object is the right, which is defined simultaneously with it; for if you say that this book contains heresy, you also say that the doctrine contained in it is heresy. This definition of the fact comes to this, that the meaning of the

book is defined. Now two senses must be distinguished: the sense existing in the mind of the author, and the sense which the words taken together and arranged exhibit of themselves and are apt to produce in the minds of those who understand those words. The former may be called the subjective sense, the latter the objective. The reason why it is necessary to distinguish is because it can happen that one says something other than what he has in mind and wishes to signify, and about purely interior acts the Church cannot judge. Now the objective sense is rightly said to be intended by the Author, because it is rightly presumed that he wished to say what he says. Furthermore, it is signified by that formula that the sense attributed to the book is not fabricated and introduced from outside, but truly arises from the whole context of the writing proceeding from the Author. Moreover the definition of the Church falls only on this sense. Nor when a book is defined as heretical is it thereby defined that the author was formally heretical; for he could have erred imprudently.

II. Given these preliminaries, in order to proceed to the demonstration, it must be established that the Church is not merely a witness of truth but a teacher and judge. The Church was instituted to lead men to salvation; it leads them first by teaching—namely by handing on salutary doctrine and removing errors harmful to salvation. The end of the Church therefore requires that it be the teacher of all salutary truth and that men through it be able to guard against all errors which could impede the attainment of salvation. Hence the Spirit of truth was promised to the Magisterium of the Church, who will lead it into all truth—namely all truth necessary for the salvation of men. Insofar therefore as the Church teaches truth and proscribes errors, and does so with coercive authority, it is the teacher of truth. And because it was necessary that controversies about doctrine be brought to an end by the same authority, insofar as the Church fulfills this role it is called the judge of doctrine. But insofar as it teaches or judges, it sets forth the truth which it received from God revealing, and is called the witness of truth; for it fulfills the office of a witness. These things cannot be denied by anyone. The question is however whether the office of teacher extends as far as the office of witness extends; but the office of witness is understood as the office of authentically attesting the fact of the

revelation of some truth, and the revealed truth is understood as that which we defined above. To this all our controversy with our adversaries reduces, who wish the Church to be able to teach only what God revealed. We prove therefore: first, that the authority of the Magisterium of the Church extends to other truths, namely those of which we have already given the notion; second, that in teaching these also, as in proscribing the errors opposed to them, the Magisterium of the Church is infallible.

Certainly as regards the first point: the Magisterium of the Church aims at directing the faithful through true doctrine to salvation; therefore it must be able to teach everything that is necessary or useful to know for salvation, and be able to remove all those errors which could be an impediment to the attainment of salvation. Likewise, the deposit of revelation was entrusted to the Church to be guarded whole and inviolate; hence the duty is incumbent on the Church of carefully attending that the faith of Christians be pure and undefiled, that truth be preserved immune from all admixture of error, and that the danger of deception be removed. The duty is therefore incumbent on the Church to take care lest what could undermine the true knowledge of the faith be proposed as something to be believed or held. But there are many truths besides the revealed ones which it is necessary or useful to know; there are many errors, even if not directly contrary to revealed truths, which it is again necessary or useful to recognize as such, so that the faith may be kept whole and unblemished in the minds of the faithful, so that the danger of losing the true faith may be avoided and the faithful may thus be able to safely take hold of the path of salvation. Therefore. The major premise is evident; the minor is clear from what has already been said: suppose the faithful are doubtful about those facts which we called dogmatic, or deny them—for example, that the Vatican Council was not legitimate—then neither can their faith regarding what it defined persist; suppose they think that some heretical book contains Catholic doctrine; since many, especially, are not equipped to judge between true and false, they will very easily be deceived and embrace heretical doctrine; suppose they hold doctrines contrary to the deductions from revealed truths, they can ultimately be brought to deny the revealed truths themselves. Thus the purity of the

faith is violated and the way of salvation is impeded, from which error, especially in moral matters, necessarily leads astray. Now these things cannot be met except by the Magisterium; but the Church has the right and duty to teach, since it was instituted as the teacher of all in those things that pertain to salvation, and to it alone the deposit of revelation has been entrusted. Therefore.

The same is confirmed by the practice and doctrine of the Church which, besides heresies, has also proscribed errors contrary to the truths which the faith presupposes or which are deduced from faith and reason: cf. the articles of Nicholas of Autrecourt condemned by the Holy See in 1348 (Denzinger, p. 183), the articles of Wycliffe and Hus condemned at the Council of Constance, and the many propositions condemned by subsequent Pontiffs. In particular, with respect to dogmatic texts, the Fifth Council was convoked for the proscription of the Three Chapters; with respect to dogmatic facts, Martin V in the Bull *Inter cunctas* prescribes that suspects be interrogated "whether they believe that the Pope canonically elected, whoever he may be for the time being, his own proper name expressed, is the successor of blessed Peter, having supreme authority in the Church of God." Therefore it is not only defined that it is generally to be believed as true that one canonically elected to the Roman See is the successor of Peter; but that this specific person (for that is what those words—his own proper name expressed—mean), for example this man who is called Leo XIII, is the successor of Peter, having authority in the Church; and this moreover is a dogmatic fact. The Church therefore considers that the authority to propose truths of this kind belongs to it and to require faith in them from its subjects.

III. We say, secondly, that the Magisterium of the Church is infallible regarding these truths as well. For this is required by the same reason that requires the authority of the Church in these matters—which could not adequately fulfill its end if it were fallible. For given this, neither could it oblige the faithful to believe what it proposes, nor could it be certainly known that what it teaches is true; and therefore the end of this Magisterium would not be attained. And indeed the Church must be infallible in guarding the deposit of the faith; for it is the column and ground of truth; therefore it must be infallible in those

acts by which the deposit of the faith is guarded; but such acts are not only definitions of revealed dogma and condemnations of heresy, but also those by which errors are proscribed from which damage to the faith can arise and the contrary truths are established, and by which the meaning of dogmatic texts is determined; therefore in defining these also the Church is infallible. Likewise, infallibility is a necessary endowment of the Magisterium of the Church; therefore it will extend as far as the teaching authority, by the office imposed upon it, extends; but this extends also to other truths; therefore.

And indeed this was always believed in the Church, in which it was always absolutely affirmed and retained that the Magisterium of the Church is infallible; in which, although things were defined which were not revealed—such as, for example, that the Three Chapters are heretical—the faith due to an infallible Magisterium was nonetheless always required. The Church moreover prescribes that interior mental assent be given to its definitions of this kind, and Clement XI declared this necessary and Pius IX declared it to be owed in conscience (*Apostolic Constitution Vineam Domini*, and at the passages of Pius IX cited above). But a fallible authority cannot prescribe an assent of the mind to its definitions which is owed in conscience and therefore under pain of eternal damnation; the Church therefore judges itself to be infallible in these matters also. (Cf. the fourth dissertation of Garnier on Marius Mercator, p. 7, *On Subscriptions*, etc., where he well demonstrates that the Church aimed at this when it not only condemned errors but also condemned persons and required subscription to both condemnations, as in the case of the heresy of Pelagius.)

In particular, with respect to dogmatic texts, the Jansenists can be refuted by an argument ad hominem. For they themselves grant that the Church is infallible in condemning propositions as heretical—for example, the five propositions of Jansenius. But whoever grants this grants that the Church cannot be mistaken in determining the meaning of a condemned proposition; for unless this is true, the Church will be able to condemn as heretical a Catholic proposition and thus to teach heresy when it proscribes a proposition. But a proposition and the complete context of a book do not differ in kind, only materially in

terms of more and less; therefore if the Church infallibly determines the meaning of a proposition, it can also infallibly determine the meaning of an entire book. And indeed if it can do so for one proposition, it will be able to do so for another, and so on; but a book is built up from propositions. Or let the Jansenists tell us how great the length of a proposition must be, beyond which the infallibility of the Church ceases.

IV. We said that the Church can infallibly define those truths of which certain knowledge is necessary or useful. The reason why we added this is that if certain knowledge of a truth is useful for preserving the integrity of a dogma or for securing the salvation of souls, or if likewise it is useful for the same end to know that some proposition is false and to be rejected, then there is already a connection of that truth with the dogma, insofar as it conduces to preserving its integrity, and likewise a connection of the error with the dogma, insofar as it would conduce to undermining it. But the Church, having the right to the end, has also the right to the means—that is, to what is useful for the end—and therefore also to defining the truth of which certain knowledge is useful for the end it must intend.

From what has been demonstrated it is clear that the authority of the Church and its infallibility in definitions of this kind is itself a revealed truth, even though the object defined is not revealed. What kind of act of faith this is, we shall say shortly in what follows.

COROLLARY

Therefore the Church rightly claims the right to mark with censures other than the censure of heresy those propositions by which the faith and the honesty of morals are in any way attacked.

V. It is asked what kind of act of faith this is which is accorded to the Magisterium teaching these things that are not revealed. It is not an act of divine faith, which rests upon the authority of God revealing; since revelation is absent; but it is an act of religious faith, which rests upon the authority of the infallible Magisterium divinely instituted. This faith is owed; because the Magisterium divinely instituted and infallible has the right to require assent to what it teaches.

Note moreover that this religious faith accorded to the teaching Magisterium also has its place when the Church proposes revealed truths to be believed; for we believe the teaching Church that God has revealed these things; although we embrace the same truths also with divine faith, as the theologians teach in the treatise *On Faith*.

VI. The Church proposes doctrine through sensible signs—which are generally propositions made up of words whose meaning is already fixed and known and must be so, in order that what the Church says may be grasped by men; but this does not prevent the Church from being able to coin new composite words when the force of their components is known, and, if a word has multiple possible meanings, from determining the sense in which it is taken by it and in which it is to be taken by others in the doctrine of the faith. Moreover, from this necessary mode of teaching—namely that the Church must use signs, and specifically words when it defines (for although doctrine can also be proposed through other signs, since however the definitions of the Church must be clear in such a way as to resolve questions, and such signs are none other than words, it is necessary that when controversies exist within the Church itself, the definitive sentence of the Church be proposed in words)—and from the end of definition, which is that truth be made manifest to men and error routed, it necessarily follows that the Church is infallible in the use of the formulas by which it proposes doctrine. This infallibility consists in this: that the words employed by the Church do in fact represent what the Church wishes to teach, and it is impossible for the Church to err in the choice and use of such signs; that is, it is impossible for the Church to say something externally through signs that is contrary to or different from what it conceives and wishes to say. For if this could happen, the institution of the Church's Magisterium and its infallibility would be utterly useless; men would learn nothing nor could they become certain of anything; for given a declaration of the Church, they would still be ignorant of what they ought to believe according to the Church's decree. Or if men would believe whatever the Church manifested by its teaching through words, since they would be able to believe only what they understood through those words, they would frequently be led into error by the Magisterium of the Church. Since therefore the Magisterium of the Church is

sensible and in its exercise is infallible, it is necessary that the sensible form also, in which truth is represented, be infallibly true.

Nor is this a different kind of infallibility; it is the very infallibility of the Magisterium, which is essentially social and sensible; for the Magisterium is directed toward disciples, and since it is directed toward men, it is directed in a sensible manner; hence the infallible Magisterium of the Church is a Magisterium infallibly teaching men in a sensible manner.

And indeed *with the heart one believes unto righteousness, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation* (Rom. 10:10); a profession of faith is required, which cannot be made without certain verbal formulas; but this must be true and must be made under the direction of the Church's Magisterium. Therefore the Church must be immune from error in the determination of those same formulas.

Hence the Apostle prescribes to Timothy (2 Tim. 1:13) that he hold the form of sound words, and requires both things: namely the form of sound words and the custody of the good deposit: *Hold to the form of sound words which you have heard from me, in faith and in the love of Jesus Christ: guard the good deposit through the Holy Spirit who dwells in us.* Cf. 1 Tim. 6:20. Hence the many professions of faith proposed by the Church with the obligation of believing what is contained in them, that is, what is signified by them according to common usage of speech; hence the sanction of certain terms by which the dogma of the Faith was most certainly represented—such as ὁμοούσιος, θεοτόκος, transubstantiation—so that those who denied the true meaning of these terms and disapproved of them were held to be heretics.

What we have said about the infallibility of the Magisterium of the Church in verbal formulas of the profession of Faith, must also be said about other signs—such as paintings and images—by which the Church by ordinary and universal Magisterium represents the doctrine of the faith; for the reasoning is the same.

§ XLI

When the Sacred Scriptures are compared with the authentic Magisterium, this must be maintained first: even if it were true that every revealed word had been committed to the Scriptures, the force and necessity of the Magisterium would remain whole, and the Protestants are deceived when they make every question turn upon the existence of certain unwritten traditions.

I. Indeed the necessity of the Magisterium in the Church does not arise from the fact that it must supply what was omitted by the Scriptures; that office will be something cohering with the Magisterium, if the Scriptures should happen not to contain everything; but it arises from the very institution of Christ, who, just as he willed his Church to be a perfect visible society consisting of subjects and those placed over them, so also willed it to have perpetual teachers who would make disciples for themselves, so that Christians would be made and added to his Church through the exercise of this Magisterium. No perfection of the Scriptures abolishes this essential institution of the Church of Christ; just as in civil society no perfection, however complete, of the Code abolishes the institution of judges.

II. The force of the Magisterium also would remain whole even if every revealed Word were written. For the continuous necessity of exercising this Magisterium would manifest itself. For those who cannot read or understand the Scriptures would need to be taught by it; and also those who know how to read the Scriptures would first need to receive the Scriptures from it; for this dogma—that these and these books, and not others, are the Scriptures of God—was nowhere written (whatever may be said about the possibility that the Apostles also wrote this) and even if it had been written, it would be a necessary function of the Magisterium to perpetually attest that these books which we now have are those same books which the Apostles commended. Moreover, to those same faithful who had received the Scriptures, the Magisterium would have the right and duty of authentically interpreting the Scriptures.

§ XLII

When the Magisterium and the Scriptures are more closely compared with each other—first with regard to their content—this is their relationship: each contains the Word of God, but not in the same way; for as regards the manner of origin of this Word from God, the Scriptures excel; but as regards the fullness of the same Word, if we speak of the Word revealed for its own sake, the Magisterium excels; but if account is also taken of the Word which God spoke for the sake of something else, then again the Scriptures excel.

I. That the Scriptures contain the Word of God objectively is certain and there is no question about this at present. The authentic teaching Magisterium likewise—whether its locution or its writing, that is, its διδασκαλία (teaching)—contains the Word of God; for the revealed truths which it preaches are the Word of God; cf. for example the definitions of Councils. Both are divine in origin and there is one Word in God, from whom as revealing proceeded the Word preached by the Apostles and partly afterwards written, and from whom as inspiring and also revealing proceeded the Word committed to the canonical Scriptures.

II. Since both are divine in origin, the manner of each is not equal in this very origin. The written Word is a word written by men indeed, but by men inspired by God, so that this Word, even as it is written, is referred to God as the direct author of the writing and as the principal determining cause, which directs the mind of the writer and moves his will sweetly and efficaciously, so that he writes all and only what God wills to be written; this is clear from the notion of inspiration, which we presuppose. But the word preached and written by the Magisterium (excepting the first teachers, who in writing were inspired—which is accidental here) is not of this kind. For the word of these, considered objectively—namely the doctrine or truth preached—is certainly the Word of God; but subjectively, as it is preached or written—that is, the very preaching or writing of it—it is not referred to God as its direct author and principal determining cause, that is, as one efficaciously directing the mind and moving the will to speak or write these specific

things; but the direct author and principal determining cause is the man himself (certainly under the influence of grace), while God only assists, lest the man speaking or writing err in those things which pertain to the Magisterium. For this reason the manner in which the written word depends on God is more excellent. This, however, is no obstacle to the certainty of the preached word; for it is equally divinely infallible as the written word, since divine assistance suffices for its attainment, and infallibility itself moreover does not admit of degrees.

III. But if the discourse concerns fullness of the Word, we judge that a distinction must be made among those things which are contained in the Scriptures, in order that the comparison may be properly instituted. Namely, the doctrine of St. Thomas must first be set forth (II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1), which comes to this. Of those things which are contained in the Scriptures, some are credible objects of faith in themselves, others are credible objects of faith not in themselves but only in relation to other things—just as in the sciences some things are proposed as intended for their own sake, others for the manifestation of other things. Now those objects of faith which are so in themselves, or those things which pertain to the faith in themselves, are those which directly order us to eternal life, whether they are speculative or moral; such is the faith of the mystery of the Trinity, the mystery of the Incarnation of Christ, the precept of charity, and other such things. Other things not principally intended but handed on for the manifestation of the former are, for example, many historical facts—such as that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man was raised by the touch of the bones of Eliseus, and other things of this kind which are narrated in Sacred Scripture in order to manifest the divine majesty or the Incarnation of Christ, or in connection with the history by which the manifestation of the former truths—whether speculative only or also moral—is interwoven.

This distinction, as is evident, does not aim at saying that some things in the Scriptures are of faith and others are not, or that some are necessary to be believed (fundamental) while others, although said by God, are not necessary to believe for salvation (non-fundamental), some being the Word of God and others only the word of men. This is how those heretics speak who wish to call only the Revelation of God

the Word of God in the Scriptures (so Scholten, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 ff.). But all things said in the Scriptures are the Word of God; because all Scripture (by the name Scripture each individual proposition contained in the canonical books is designated) is θεόπνευστος, and therefore all things are also to be believed; for to God speaking, whatever it be that he says, faith must be given; for the formal motive of faith is always the same. But there can be a distinction by reason of the subject matter and the end for which things are written. All things that are written were certainly written for our instruction (Rom. 15:4), and all Scripture divinely inspired is useful for teaching, for reproving, for correcting, for instructing in justice (2 Tim. 3:16); but this does not require that whatever is written is of equal dignity and necessity and intended in the same way by God the author of the Scriptures. For even those things which are intended for the sake of other things—namely for the manifestation and declaration of the doctrine principally intended—can and must certainly be of use for teaching, for reproving, etc. Cf. any part, however small, of sacred history.

This distinction of St. Thomas can also be expressed in this way: those things which were revealed by God (whether to the writer himself or to someone before him) and those things which were only inspired are to be distinguished in the Scriptures.

IV. Given this distinction, we establish the following. If the comparison is made between those truths which are to be believed in themselves, the Magisterium was endowed in the Apostles with the fullness of all doctrine necessary for salvation; for the Holy Spirit taught all things, all truth, to the Apostles (John 14:26; 16:13). But the term *all things*, *all truth* includes and embraces any truth whatsoever which is to be believed in the Church—the entire and complete revelation.

The Gospel which the Apostles preached certainly contained every truth to be believed in itself, through which men are directly ordered to salvation; and this Paul had received immediately through the revelation of Jesus Christ (Gal. 1:11–12); and the condition of the other Apostles was the same, that they received the same from Christ on earth or from the Holy Spirit.

That is to say, the Apostles, availing themselves of the Magisterium of Christ and the Holy Spirit, received immediately from him all truth

to be believed in itself which had not yet been written; but at the same time they received immediately also other truths of the same order, even those already written, since these were a part and a necessary element of the truths they were directly to be taught. The words of Christ are therefore to be taken in the fullest sense: the Holy Spirit will teach the Apostles all truth—namely all the truth which the Church must believe.

For this reason the deposit of revelation committed to the Apostles and transmitted through continuous tradition to their successors, which is the Apostolic tradition itself, is wholly complete, containing all things to be believed in themselves. "The Apostles," says Irenaeus (3:4), "as if into a rich treasury, have fully deposited into the Church all things which belong to truth, so that every man, whosoever will, may draw from her the water of life… But what if neither had the Apostles left us the Scriptures? Would it not then have been necessary to follow the order of the tradition which they delivered to those to whom they committed the Churches?" Therefore the Apostolic tradition which the Magisterium holds is complete, possessing all truths, so that, even if the Scriptures were absent, those truths could most certainly be handed on by the Magisterium. But the Scripture is not so; for it does not contain all things that are to be held. Nor should this be surprising; for it was not necessary that anything be written under inspiration, since the Magisterium suffices, and the individual books of the Scriptures owe their origin to a specific occasion, which did not require all truths to be written. And that the Scriptures do not in fact contain every truth which is necessary to know in the Church is evident from a comparison of these truths, some examples of which we have already given above, and the number of which can be augmented. For where is it written that this canon consisting of these books is the sacred Scripture divinely inspired? Where is it written that there are seven Sacraments? Where is it so written, that one may not doubt, that matrimony is a Sacrament—that is, an efficacious sign of grace? The Council of Trent was content to say that this is indicated by the Apostle in Eph. 5:23–32. Where is it written that the power of remitting sins was given not only to Apostles but to priests of the second order, yet the power of confirming was denied to them? Where is it written that the precept recorded in Scripture of not eating what is strangled and blood (Acts 15:29) has

been no longer in force for so many centuries, such that not even the Protestants observe it? Where is it so written, that it is certain from Scripture alone, that the power was given to the Church to remit temporal penalties owed to God outside the sacrament? And so on.

The Protestants oppose this doctrine not by affirming that what Catholics say is not written or clearly written is written or sufficiently written, but, this being granted, by denying that these are revealed dogmas, precisely because they were not written. They advance, that is, their principle established by arbitrary decision concerning the full sufficiency of the Scriptures. On which matter we have already said much in what precedes.

V. But if the comparison between the Scriptures and the Apostolic tradition is made with regard not only to the revealed Word but to any Word of God whatsoever that is inspired, there is no need to claim that the tradition is either more full or equally full as the Scriptures. This would amount to saying that the Holy Spirit taught the Apostles immediately, independently of the Scriptures, every last item of history contained in the Scriptures.

But what was the need for the Holy Spirit to teach the Apostles these things of itself? Was it not sufficient, given the order which these things have toward the truths of the first order, to open to the Apostles the meaning of the Scriptures—which Christ also did (Luke 24:45)?

The meaning of the Scriptures thus instilled in the Apostles is not to be restricted to the dogmas alone revealed in them; for there are very many laws, rites, and histories which contain a mystical sense, from which the Apostles argue, and all things were ultimately written for our instruction. Their understanding therefore was instilled into the Apostles at least as a habit, so that they could, when occasion arose, by a correct interpretation of the Scriptures, confirm and declare dogmas and precepts.

This entire meaning of the Scriptures, therefore, since it was a certain element of the Apostolic Magisterium, must be believed to have persisted in the Apostolic succession—not indeed in each individual, but in the universal body of teachers or in its Head, and not always in act but at least as a habit or capacity; insofar as the ecclesiastical Magisterium, with the Holy Spirit assisting, has the faculty and right of

declaring authentically and infallibly what is the meaning which the Holy Spirit intended in any passage of Sacred Scripture which has some connection with the revealed truths, whether speculative or practical.

With regard to these truths of the second order, therefore, the ecclesiastical Magisterium exercises itself by interpreting the Scriptures when it sees fit.

§ XLIII

Then with regard to authority, the Scriptures and the Magisterium are absolutely equal; but relatively with respect to us: a) the Magisterium is prior, since it must hand on the Scriptures; b) the Scriptures are indeed an authentic instrument, but the Magisterium is their authentic interpreter, who c) must also bring to an end by his own authority questions that have arisen about them; and finally d) the Magisterium, not the Scriptures, is necessary for the propagation of the Gospel and the founding of Churches.

I. Since both the Scripture and the speech of the authentically teaching Magisterium contain the Word of God infallibly, they must be of equal authority in themselves. For inspiration, even if it adds a certain dignity to the written word, does not add a greater authority; for authority comes to this: that it is an infallible word, proposed with God as its author, demanding faith; but this is equally the case for the word of the Magisterium, even though the manner in which infallibility is obtained is different.

But if both are viewed relatively with respect to us, it is clear from what has been said that the authority of the Scriptures cannot move us unless we first know which books are the Scriptures; but we can learn this from none other than the Magisterium. Certainly this dogma—namely that these books are inspired, contain the Word of God, in a word are Sacred Scripture—the Magisterium can teach, which can teach all dogmas. But it can not only teach this, it must teach it. For this truth —that these books are inspired—is neither self-evident nor can it be demonstrated by reason, but can only be made certain by attestation. Not by human attestation, but only by divine; because the fact of inspiration is not subject to human experience, even that of the one who

is inspired, so that it is known to God alone who is its author. Now divine attestation is that which is set forth by authentic witnesses sent by him. Therefore Christ willed that those witnesses should teach this very thing, and we can know it from them alone.

It is therefore necessary that the authority of the Magisterium first be exercised upon us; given this, we will certainly believe the written Word of God on account of his authority. Therefore the authority of Scripture does not depend on the authority of the Magisterium; but the exercise of the authority of Scripture toward us depends on the authority of the Magisterium—not as on a cause, but as on a condition. For knowing which books are divine is antecedently necessary for us as a condition in order that we believe them; but this knowledge is produced in us by the Magisterium, which therefore stands on the side of the condition.

II. Since the Scriptural code is divine, containing the law of believing and acting, whose authority in the Church is certain and irrefragable, it is therefore in this society an authentic instrument. But the Magisterium is its authentic interpreter. The authentic interpreter is one who not only expounds the meaning of the author most excellently according to the principles of correct exegesis, but does so from authority, insofar as he has from a legitimate power both the right to expound and the right that his exposition be received by others. Now such is the Magisterium in the Church with respect to the Scriptures. And indeed this is first the proper right of any supreme authority in a society to interpret the code according to which the society is governed; but the supreme authority in the Church is this Magisterium.

And indeed, the Magisterium possessing infallibly a full knowledge of revelation also knows infallibly what dogmas and what moral laws are contained in the Scriptures; and since it has the mission to teach all truth and the exposition of the Scriptures is a certain and most natural mode of teaching—it therefore has the right to expound the Scriptures; and since moreover the faithful are bound to hear and follow that same Magisterium, and it is certainly not permissible to refuse assent to what teaches infallibly—therefore the Magisterium has the right to demand assent to its interpretations of the Scriptures.

The existence of this right is independent of the question whether the Scriptures are obscure or not; for even if you were to prove the Scriptures to be most clear, you could at most infer that the exercise of this right is not necessary, but not that the right is lacking—a right which necessarily arises from the very essence of this Magisterium.

Moreover, first, even if the Scriptures are clear or where they are clear, the authentic interpretation of them is not useless but often necessary. For even if the exposition of some Scriptural testimony is clear to any individual faithful person or theologian, the certainty which a man obtains of itself by whatever scientific means, is only human certainty, fallible in itself; but the certainty arising from the interpretation of the infallible authentic Magisterium is a certainty of a higher order and more firm—a divinely infallible certainty. Something more excellent is therefore added through the interpretation of the Magisterium; it is therefore not useless. Indeed, because it naturally happens that on account of the weakness we perceive in our own talents and knowledge we are anxious and suspect whether in such divine matters we have attained the truth—which anxiety and suspicion cannot be removed except by the intervention of the infallible Magisterium—and because moreover it is necessary to render the faithful so safe from the cavils and frauds of heretics that they stand immovably in truth, which again can only be done by an infallible teaching authority, hence the interpretation of this Magisterium is often necessary even in clear matters.

Secondly, it is false that the Scriptures are clear in the dogmas they hand down and the moral precepts, and it is much more false that they are clear to all the faithful. To want to demonstrate this is actually to waste effort. How many Catholics and Protestants reading Scripture in good faith judge, after careful study, that they have attained the true meaning of some testimony, and yet both parties disagree! How many Catholics among themselves! And likewise how many Protestants of the same or of different sects again disagree among themselves! This cannot always be attributed to preconceived dogmatic opinions which vitiated the examination; the cause must also be sought in the objective obscurity of the matter. Even if the Scriptures taught divine revelation in a scientific manner, employing definitions and divisions, treating each

matter in its proper place—even then in many cases clarity would be lacking; this is evident in scientific works elaborated with the greatest care, such as the *Summa* of St. Thomas. How then can clarity shine forth everywhere in a work which for the most part narrates history, proposing dogmas as the occasion demands—for example in the Pentateuch and the Gospels? For all the faithful, moreover, difficulty also arises from the style in which these writings are written—alien in many respects from the style of our own idioms—and from the loftiness and sublimity of the subject matter, and from the moral impossibility of comparing all the Scriptures simultaneously and subjecting them to certain laws of exegesis, which however is necessary for one who wishes to extract the meaning of Scripture by his own efforts. Who but a madman would expect an interpretation of all the sentences of Plato from any person who can read a translation of Plato? The Fathers certainly acknowledged the obscurity of Scripture and gave more than one reason for it. Cf. Bonfrère in his *Praeloquium*, ch. 9.

Note that when the Magisterium and the Fathers in general interpret the Scriptures from a knowledge of Apostolic tradition, the tradition which these same ones thus bring forth in the capacity of interpreters is customarily called exegetical—not in the sense that it is merely drawn from the Scriptures, but in the sense that such a tradition says the same as Scripture and serves for the understanding, that is, the exegesis, of Scripture.

III. The necessary consequence of what has been said thus far is that questions, if any should arise, about the meaning of the Scriptures, must be brought to an end by the authority of this Magisterium. That they must be brought to an end is evident; for the faith of the Church ought not to waver or to rest in falsehood equally as in truth. But they cannot be brought to an end by arguments, when it is the very arguments that furnish strength to the question, nor by the authority of men, which cannot be imposed upon anyone; but in the society of believers they cannot be brought to an end except by a public, social, and divine authority, to whose mission and prerogative of infallibility it is wrong to refuse assent. Just as therefore in any society questions about the meaning of the code are resolved by the judgment of the supreme magistrates (even if at times erroneous), so also questions of this kind in

the Church must be resolved by the authority of the Magisterium instituted by Christ himself to teach all truth and to teach it infallibly, and therefore inappellably—both because it is infallible, and because above it there is no other in the Church.

The Protestants customarily appeal here to the words of 2 Pet. 1:19: *And we have a more sure prophetic word*, etc. But in the cited opuscule (§ XXXIX, n. 1), section 4, we have already shown that this is their meaning: *And we have* (that is, we attain) *the prophetic word* (all the prophecies about Christ) *becoming more sure* or confirmed by the words of the Father (*This is my Son*, etc.) which Peter heard and reported. There is no comparison imagined between the authority of Scripture and the Magisterium. Cf. the cited opuscule.

IV. The Magisterium is necessary for the propagation of the Gospel and the founding of Churches. For the propagation of the Gospel was committed by Christ to the Apostles and their successors: *Going, teach* (Matt. 28:19); *Preach the Gospel to every creature* (Mark 16:15); *You will be my witnesses… to the ends of the earth* (Acts 1:8). But the Scriptures alone can contribute nothing, since there is no one to hand them over and attest that they are Scriptures and to interpret them for rude men devoted to idolatry. Furthermore, no Church can be founded and exist without those placed over it (§ II); but these are also teachers, who therefore rule and teach. Christ certainly willed that the teachers he sent should gather disciples to himself and baptize them, and that the baptized should be taught everything which Christ himself had commanded (Matt. 28:19). Those who are to be baptized and those already baptized are therefore subjected to the Magisterium; but the Church consists solely of these; therefore the Magisterium is necessary for the propagation of the Gospel and the founding of Churches.

But the Scriptures are not necessary. For the Magisterium alone can supply everything from itself—namely teach whatever is necessary for salvation and confirm it by its authority. This is also historically evident. For in the first years the Apostles founded and governed churches without the Scriptures of the New Testament, in which Christian dogmatic theology is most fully contained. And so other churches afterwards were founded and preserved without the Scriptures, through the agency of the Magisterium alone. Irenaeus is a

witness to this (3:4): "To that order (namely, that one ought to follow the order of tradition) the many nations of barbarians assent, those among them who believe in Christ, who have their salvation written without paper and ink by the Spirit in their hearts, and who carefully keep the ancient tradition, believing in one God, etc.… This faith those who have believed without letters, as far as speech is concerned, are barbarians, but as far as judgment and custom and manner of life are concerned, because of their faith, they are most wise and pleasing to God."

From this one understands how inept and contrary to the institution of Christ is the method of Protestant missions, in which those who imagine they are gathering the faithful to Christ and propagating the Church through the distribution of sacred books in the vernacular language boast of having made as many converts and adherents to their sect as there are people who have received that book, for whatever use.

§ XLIV

In the demonstration hitherto adduced of the institution of the Magisterium and its authority and infallibility, there is no begging of the question, no circular reasoning.

I. The Protestants attribute this to us, throwing back upon us what we rightly criticize in them. For they say that we prove the authority and infallibility of the Magisterium from the Scriptures and the divine authority of the latter from the former.

But there is nothing to this. We relied in this demonstration on the Scriptures, but: first, on the Scriptures considered materially—that is, on those books which are called the Scriptures, but as authentic historical monuments by which (the reference is to the New Testament) the origin of the Church is described and the will of the founder declared. Second, we relied on the Scriptures because the Protestants receive them and indeed wish the controversies between them and us to be settled from these books alone. From those books therefore as certain historical monuments, at the demand of the Protestants, we demonstrate an instituted Magisterium, a perennial Magisterium, upon which the office and the power have been conferred of teaching and of teaching

infallibly, and of handing on the Sacred Scriptures (whether these are those very monuments from which we set out in the demonstration or others—this we shall need to learn from the Magisterium itself) and of interpreting them. From this Magisterium, however, we learn that both those books which we used as historical documents and others are divinely inspired books, that is, Sacred Scripture, from which the Word of God can be drawn.

But here there is no begging of the question and no circular reasoning. Begging of the question occurs when that very thing which is to be demonstrated, or something which is rightly denied until it is first demonstrated, is used as a principle of the demonstration. A circle occurs when from two equally uncertain things you prove the first by the second and the second by the first.

In our demonstration of the instituted Magisterium there would be a begging of the question if we were to presuppose its authority and argue from it. But we would presuppose it if, in proving from those books which we call the Scriptures an instituted Magisterium of this kind, we were to suppose those books to be the Scriptures—that is, inspired books—and were to infer the instituted Magisterium from the authority of an inspired book as such; for certain knowledge of the inspiration presupposes an already known Magisterium, a known authority and infallibility of it; wherefore it is denied with the same right as all of these, and is not to be admitted until these are first proved. Proceeding in this manner we would also commit a circle; for from the inspiration of the books we would demonstrate the Magisterium and from this the inspiration.

But we suppose only the historical authority of these books, which is demonstrated entirely independently of inspiration, so that it is altogether incidental that the same books become known to us afterwards together with others as divine Scripture. And we suppose this for our demonstration both because it is demonstrated by other arguments independent of our question and because the Protestants, with whom we are arguing, grant it.

Indeed in this controversy with the Protestants it would also be permissible to suppose the inspiration of Scripture without any logical fault and from it to prove our thesis. For we would suppose it, not

relying on the authority of the Magisterium still to be demonstrated, but accepting it as a certain principle from the adversaries themselves. So that our demonstration would then be an argument ad hominem and ad absurdum: by which, positing the knowledge of this book as divine Scripture—a knowledge independent of the Magisterium—from that very book itself we would establish an authentic and infallible Magisterium, one which alone can teach us which books are the true Scriptures. In this way there would follow from the very principle of the Protestants what destroys it; which is a demonstration of its falsity and contradiction.

II. The Protestants, however, err when they think that this is the only way we can demonstrate the institution of the authentic and infallible Magisterium. For we are entirely free to abstract from the Scriptures. There is available to us a demonstration entirely independent of the Scriptures, which we employ with respect to those who are ignorant of or do not accept the Scriptures. In brief, it is the Christian demonstration itself. For in the same way that this demonstration establishes that there exists a religiously founded society divinely instituted which professes the true worship of God, which teaches what is to be believed about God and what is to be done to obtain salvation—by this same demonstration, I say, is demonstrated the existence of a Magisterium divinely instituted for teaching all nations the truths necessary for the worship which God requires. For what is primarily established by this demonstration is in fact the existence of the teaching Church, which all must hear, to which all must be joined; but the teaching Church is itself the Magisterium of which we speak.

Now the infallibility of this Magisterium follows from the very divine institution and from the obligation imposed on all to adhere to it. Since therefore this demonstration, resting on divine signs, is independent of the Scriptures, it is evident that our thesis can also be demonstrated without them. The conviction of Catholics concerning the divinely instituted Magisterium therefore suffers from no fault.

Note. From what has been demonstrated thus far concerning the divine institution of the Magisterium, the falsity and absurdity of the affirmation of Lessing—the father of modern Rationalism—is apparent: namely that the certainty of the Christian religion is independent of

every external authority, whether of teachers or of the canonical books themselves, and that this religion proves itself to the right reason and manifests its truth.

§ XLV

The very authority of teaching in the Church, which is followed in the faithful by the obligation of believing what is proposed by the Magisterium, is a part of the power of jurisdiction.

I. The authority of teaching is a certain power of jurisdiction; because it too is contained under this genus, which is the power of jurisdiction. What does it mean to say that the authority of teaching is a power of jurisdiction? Christ, that is, did not institute the Magisterium in the Church in such a way that it would indeed be infallible, while the obligation of believing what is proposed by it would arise only from natural or divine positive law—because God speaking must be believed, and the teaching of the infallible Magisterium makes it clear that God has spoken. This is indeed one reason why faith is to be accorded to the Magisterium of the Church, but it is not the only one. But moreover the Magisterium itself imposes the obligation of believing, in that it prescribes the assent of faith to God revealing what the Church teaches, and can punish by positive penalties disobedience toward its decrees of faith.

II. And first of all, it cannot be denied that Christ could have endowed with such a power those whom he placed over the preaching, propagation, and preservation of his doctrine in his Church. For jurisdiction can certainly operate in this sphere; and Christ was able to share with others the power which he himself holds by proper right. The question is therefore one of fact: whether such is the authority of teaching instituted by Christ in the Church. We prove the affirmative as follows.

Christ conferred upon those placed over his Church full power of binding and loosing (Matt. 16:19; 18:18), extending to all things which are proper to this kingdom which is the Church (cf. Thesis I of the following treatise); but to impose on subjects the obligation of believing what they are taught is indeed an act of binding and concerns those

things which are proper to the Church, which is the society of believers; therefore together with the power of binding and loosing, Christ conferred on those placed over the Church the power also of imposing the obligation of believing; moreover the power of binding and loosing is a power of jurisdiction.

Furthermore, a believer both assents to God revealing what he believes, and assents to the Church manifesting what God revealed; but the Church rightfully demands this assent from its teaching subject as it teaches with authority and infallibly; it can therefore command this assent; but this is an act of the power of jurisdiction.

The same appears even more evidently when the Church teaches what God has not revealed but what is connected with the revealed: the assent of the faithful rests on the authority of the authentic and infallible Magisterium; therefore the Magisterium has the right to demand and command this assent from it; therefore.

Wherefore the Church has always been accustomed to prescribe the profession of that faith which it teaches, and calling the very act of faith by the same name as decrees or canons, it has been accustomed to treat the laws of faith and the disciplinary laws in the same way, and to punish the contumacious with spiritual and also corporal penalties; moreover the power of punishment presupposes the power of forbidding what is punished or of commanding that whose omission is punished; heretics are therefore punished also by reason of denied obedience to the Church.

Let no one say that the Church cannot prescribe even the internal act of faith; because in general it cannot prescribe internal acts. For, first, when the matter concerns internal acts which are to be connected per se with external acts in order that these be morally upright, and when the external acts can be prescribed, the jurisdiction does extend also to internal acts as constituting some kind of whole together with the external acts. Second, even if only the purely interior act of faith is considered, it may be observed that the foundation upon which the opinion denying this rests is not altogether firm. For they say that the prescribing jurisdiction extends to those things which it can punish; and that it can punish those things about which it can pass judgment; but that judgment cannot be passed on interior acts, because they are

hidden. But: a) it is conceded that the jurisdiction of the Church extends to exterior occult acts which are performed without the knowledge of bystanders; these are said to be occult by accident and not by nature. But I do not see what this distinction contributes to the defense of the doctrine holding that jurisdiction over merely internal acts cannot be had. For in those exterior occult acts too there is the full formal reason which, according to these authors, prevents jurisdiction —namely that men cannot judge of them; wherefore from the fact that they are occult by accident, it would rather seem to follow that, even if by accident, they are nonetheless removed from external jurisdiction. b) Although a sentence in the manner of a judgment cannot be passed on purely interior acts, yet a sentence can be passed in the manner of a law establishing that by that very fact some penalty is to be undergone, for the application of which no exterior execution is needed—just as happens in the case of exterior acts that are occult by accident, which are punished by excommunication. Third, since the jurisdiction of the Church is of a higher order than political jurisdiction and ordered to the good of souls and is the vicegerent of him who rules souls, it seems that it ought not to be restricted to external acts alone.

III. There is, however, a distinction according to the nature of the object in the exercise of the power of jurisdiction with regard to proposing truths to be believed and enacting disciplinary laws. For truths to be believed are immutable, while disciplinary laws are mutable; the Church proposes the former, enacts the latter. Hence decrees of faith cannot be abrogated, while disciplinary laws can be. But this does not prevent the exercise of the power of jurisdiction in proposing the faith from demanding assent and compelling profession of faith; it only means that the exercise of this power is exhausted in proposing the faith, so that there is no room for an act by which the contrary could be proposed and what was proposed revoked. And although the authority of the Magisterium is determined on the side of its object, it is not determined but is free with regard to its exercise concerning that object.

§ XLVI

Having demonstrated the divine institution of the ecclesiastical Magisterium, it remains to say briefly how the faithful ought to conduct themselves toward it and what ought to be the use of the ancient traditions and the doctrine of the preceding Fathers.

I. As to the first point, the answer is easy: when the Magisterium fully exercising its authority teaches the universal Church, defines questions, and proscribes errors, the faithful owe the obedience of faith —and indeed of divine faith if the matter concerns a revealed truth; of religious faith, if a truth not revealed is proposed (§ XL), which religious faith toward the ecclesiastical Magisterium has its place also in the former hypothesis of a revealed truth.

If the Magisterium does not direct its teaching immediately toward the universal Church, if it does not fully use its authority, if not all the teachers teach the same thing—what is to be done will be stated more conveniently in the following treatise where we shall deal with the Magisterium of the Roman Pontiff.

II. As to the second point—namely the use of ancient traditions and the doctrine of the Fathers—this is the duty of the theologian, who must not only set forth the dogmas of the faith but also prove them, and prove them especially by the positive demonstration which is the critical or historical demonstration of the fact of the revelation of each dogma. It is therefore necessary that the theologian carefully examine the monuments of antiquity, in which the testimony of this fact is contained.

The monuments moreover are these: the decisions of ecumenical Synods or of the Roman See alone (as we now suppose, lest we speak only partially of the truth); also the decrees of other Synods; likewise all the works of the Fathers, especially those which treat of doctrine by design, which are directed to the instruction of the faithful or to the refutation of errors; furthermore the Acts of the Martyrs, the liturgical books, the history of dogmas and of heresies, and of ecclesiastical discipline, which can be drawn from the works of adversaries also and from inscriptions left in every age. Also the works of theologians and

interpreters of Scripture and Apologists who succeed the Fathers, who living in Catholic communion have illuminated Christian doctrine to a greater or lesser extent, and whatever else of this kind there may be.

Not all, certainly, that is contained in these works pertains to revelation, and what pertains to it is not all to be had as certain testimony in each individual—even in not a few taken separately; hence certain norms are necessary. Therefore:

1° Whenever divine revelation is sought, which the Apostles handed down, and Apostolic tradition is therefore investigated, a twofold Apostolic tradition must be distinguished. For the Apostles proclaimed the truths divinely revealed to them and founded the Church according to the fundamental laws received from Christ. But moreover by the power given to them by Christ, who did not determine everything, the Apostles by their own authority handed on to the Churches they were founding not a few laws or rules of discipline. Now tradition embracing the former is divine Apostolic tradition, and of this we have been speaking in this treatise on the Magisterium; the other is purely Apostolic tradition. To be sure, what is held by the universal Church and was not established by the authority of Synods (or the Roman See) is to be traced back to the Apostles, as Augustine says in book 4 *On Baptism*, ch. 24; yet it still remains to discern which tradition proceeded from the Apostles. That these traditions differ from each other is evident, and there are certain indications of their distinction ready at hand.

For certainly if the tradition concerns a truth to be believed with divine faith, or constitutive elements of the Church which are also to be held with divine faith—such as the distinction of laity and clergy, the power of Bishops, the Primacy, the seven sacraments—all these cannot belong to purely Apostolic tradition; for nothing can be held with divine faith except what was divinely revealed, nor could the essential constitution of the Church, which has Christ as its author, depend upon the will of the Apostles. That is to say, purely Apostolic traditions are found only in the sphere of discipline.

Discipline can certainly encompass in itself both divine laws of governance and of morals; but here, by common usage of speech, discipline is the term for whatever pertains to the governance of the

Church and the cultivation of the faithful without being a matter of dogma.

Hence another character of each tradition: divine-Apostolic tradition is immutable, purely Apostolic tradition is mutable. For the authority by which the latter was originally instituted persists in the Church (in the Roman chair, certainly, the Apostolic authority is complete and most full); and authority can abrogate what it once prescribed: an example you have in the abstinence from blood and what is strangled commanded by the Apostles (Acts 15:29), which shortly afterwards fell into disuse. For this reason, not of necessity but because it did not see fit, the Roman See was unwilling to abrogate for the Chinese some ceremony of solemn baptism, which belongs to purely Apostolic institution.

It follows therefore that to demonstrate that something belongs to divine tradition, it is not enough to show that it proceeded from the Apostles, but it is also necessary to show that it was believed with divine faith or that it flows from the doctrine or institution of Christ itself.

2° Since in the works of the Fathers we seek the ancient tradition, we must distinguish in these works what they report concerning the doctrine originally handed down as witnesses, and what each one could add from his own store as a private teacher. We said (§ XXIII) that the Apostles were not only witnesses but also teachers. We said that the subsequent teachers can indeed hand on something in a new manner, but not something new; and therefore what they teach must be either the dogma itself handed down by the Apostles, or the Apostolic understanding of the dogma itself, or a more abundant explanation and evolution of the dogma and its understanding preformed by the Apostles. For a twofold correct and differing understanding of the same thing cannot be had. The distinction is therefore between the teachership of the Apostles and that of subsequent teachers: the former received the dogmas and their understanding from the Holy Spirit, and therefore just as they first set forth the dogmas, so also they first preformed their understanding; the latter, just as they must hand on the dogmas received from the Apostles, so also must follow the path of the understanding of dogmas preformed by the Apostles; so that in declaring the dogma they too may play the part of witnesses.

Now it can happen that any one of those who come after, whether belonging to the first-order or second-order teachers (§ XXXI), deviates from the Apostolic norm both in handing on the dogma and in declaring it, following his own private opinion, even though he does not notice this. But the private doctrine of such a person is easily discerned if it is compared with that common to others, or with the doctrine which the authentic Magisterium proposes. Compare the doctrine of St. Cyprian regarding the baptism of heretics.

On the other hand, the explanation of the dogma of the Holy Trinity—that the processions are according to intellect and will—is a doctrine common already from the Apostles themselves, preformed at John 1:1.

It is necessary therefore to set aside what is private, and those greatly err who, carried away by love and esteem for some teacher, tenaciously grasp and stubbornly defend whatever he hands on, and frequently that very thing which is peculiar to him.

3° Since in the explanation of a dogma notions and principles of reason are customarily used—and this not only by the Scholastics but also by many of the Fathers, such as Cyril of Alexandria, Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, and Anselm—a distinction must be made between those rational notions and principles which are necessary for the understanding of a dogma and those which are employed only with a certain degree of plausibility and which, as some philosophical system comes to prevail, can become common over a long period of time without being certain.

An example is found in the explanation of the first chapter of Genesis, where the dogma about the creation and formation of the world is handed on. Basil and Gregory of Nyssa explained this according to the philosophical notions of their age, and afterwards the Scholastics did the same, and their explanation prevailed for many centuries; nowadays the explanation differs somewhat in accordance with fuller knowledge of natural things. Neither has the Church judged to be necessary. On the contrary, the distinction which reason indeed can find by itself—between created nature and its hypostasis, not indeed this or that specific distinction but a true objective distinction—has

always been held to be necessary for the rational understanding of the dogma of the Incarnation.

Therefore, in order to hold with certainty those rational explanations which are more congruent with the dogma, it is not enough to embrace those which have been employed by ecclesiastical teachers in a certain and even prolonged age; one must also see whether by the judgment of the Church they are necessary.

The judgment of the Church is established either by some solemn decision or by a continuous practice—one, namely, in which the Fathers and theologians not only use those specific explanations but simultaneously indicate that they are to be believed as necessary for the correct understanding of the dogma to be preserved.

4° The doctrine of the Church has a twofold character of truth: antiquity and universality. Of these two the first is easily established; for since in the Church of Christ nothing is to be believed with divine faith except what the Apostles handed down, and they were the first, that therefore is true which is earlier (unlike the case in human sciences, whose beginnings are incomplete, uncertain, and mixed with errors); what therefore is not ancient but new—that is, what the Apostles did not hand down—cannot be a divine truth, an object of divine faith.

The second character can be taken both positively and exclusively. Namely, if universality (moral universality, of course) of faith exists, so that something is believed by all, then that is true and was handed down by the Apostles. Otherwise the universal Church, believing with divine faith something not handed down by the Apostles and therefore not revealed, would err—which cannot happen. Wherefore universality is a certain argument for antiquity: what is found to be one thing among all has not been erred into, but handed down. (Tertullian, *Prescriptions*, n. 18.) But can it come about that some doctrine ancient, that is, handed down by the Apostles, is not universal—that is, is not believed universally? It cannot certainly come about that it is denied by the universality or that the contrary is believed by it; but it can come about that some handed-down truth which is implicitly contained in the common profession or deposit of faith at some time is not explicitly known and therefore not believed by all and is even denied by some. For

progress in the explanation and more abundant knowledge of dogma must be admitted in the Church.

Wherefore a mere defect of universality is not an argument for the absence of antiquity. But this must be more carefully investigated and the dogmas explicitly believed must be subjected to deeper analysis—as was done in the fourteenth century in the question of the beatific vision of the blessed before the judgment, and in the recent age in the question of the Immaculate Conception—and the judgment of the authentic Magisterium must ultimately be stood by.

What we have just said about antiquity and universality had already been preformed by Vincent of Lérins in his *Commonitory* in the fifth century: *That is to be held which has been believed always, everywhere, and by all.* Note carefully the word *believed*; for the matter concerns those doctrines which are believed, not merely those which, from whatever cause, are also commonly held by ecclesiastical men. We shall give an explanation of the Lérinian rule in a more convenient place in the following treatise.

But note this much now: that these characters of Christian truth are for us a certain criterion of truth, but that neither of them is a necessary criterion for the faithful when the attestation of the present Magisterium exists; and that the authentic teachers are accustomed and ought to use these criteria before they issue a definition—for they must attest what has already been handed on. But cf. what follows in n. 5.

In order that universality of doctrine be established, it is not always necessary to interrogate each individual; for frequently the doctrine of a few or of one is sufficient. For certainly if the suffrage of the authentic Magisterium in some matter is found to have joined itself to the doctrine of one man, that man's doctrine will be to be held as universal. Thus the doctrine of Augustine on the gratuity of grace against the Massilians was approved by the Apostolic See; the doctrine of Cyril of Alexandria on the Incarnation was approved by the Fathers of the Council of Ephesus and by subsequent ones. In this matter one must carefully consider what the Church has actually approved; for generally when the Church approves the doctrine of some man, it has regard for the principal and essential points of it, but not for each individual opinion or argument used by the teacher; nor is infallibility

asserted of an approved teacher, nor is he equated with an inspired writer.

The consensus of the Fathers of the Western Church also suffices. Thus Augustine, *Against Julian*, book 1, ch. 4: "Or do you think the Fathers I cited are to be despised because they are all of the Western Church and I mentioned no Eastern Bishop among them?… I think that part of the world ought to suffice for you in which the Lord willed to crown the most glorious martyrdom of his Apostles," etc. In which words there is contained a special reason for the Western Church; for it holds and adheres to the chair of Peter, which chair is an efficient principle of the unity of the Magisterium and is per se infallible, as we shall see in its proper place.

5° Since in each age the Magisterium is an infallible witness of Apostolic tradition, in order to know what was handed down in, say, the first or second century, there is no need to cite witnesses of that age; but it suffices to produce the common testimony of any subsequent age; for this reports the same thing which the earlier witnesses handed on.

Against those, however, who deny the infallibility of the Magisterium—and likewise when a question is to be treated scientifically—it is necessary to appeal to the earlier witnesses.

6° By the same method as the consensus of the Fathers, the consensus of those who have taught in subsequent centuries can be urged. The Fathers in the broader sense are called all Christian writers distinguished by antiquity who preserved the unity of the Church, or at least with respect to those works which they put forth while in that unity. In the stricter or nobler sense, Fathers are regarded as those ancient writers who have been approved by the Church as witnesses of tradition and masters of doctrine, either by authentic judgment or by continuous use and appeal to them. Those who are most valuable in explaining speculative or practical doctrine, with the additional note of holiness, have been included among the Doctors—and this has also had its place in subsequent ages.

The Fathers, as their very name indicates, excel in antiquity; in order that their age might be precisely defined, it was settled that those are to be regarded as Fathers who flourished in the first twelve centuries, and that their age ends when theology began to be taught by the

Scholastic method in the universities. Since in Christian doctrine what is earlier is true, in any subsequent age that will certainly be believed which the universal consensus of the Fathers handed down as to be believed; for that consensus exhibits the consensus of the infallible Magisterium of the first centuries and of the Apostolic age itself.

Nevertheless, as to the propagation and conservation of Apostolic tradition, there is no essential difference between the age called that of the Fathers and the subsequent age called that of the Scholastics. For in each age the same infallible Magisterium is active; the consensus therefore of writers of each age together with the Magisterium itself participates in infallibility and becomes a certain criterion of Apostolic tradition for future ages, just as for us the consensus of the Fathers.

Therefore the same method which is employed to draw Apostolic tradition from the doctrine of the Fathers can and must be employed with the Scholastic doctors.

7° Since progress is possible in the Catholic intellect regarding revealed truths, the understanding of a dogma is not always to be required at the level of the earlier thinkers, as if it could not be explained further through reflection and analysis. Cf. the concept of the nature of the Angels in the earliest writers with the concept of subsequent ones; and also the manner of conceiving the Mystery of the Trinity in not a few pre-Nicene and later Fathers.

§ XLVII

What was said about the attestation of tradition holds equally in the dogmatic interpretation of Sacred Scripture. But in the purely historical and philological exegesis of the Scriptures, account must indeed be taken of the preceding Fathers—especially if some among them were eminent and approved, and if the consensus of several exists—yet in this matter the same weight of the authority of the Fathers does not hold as when dogmatic texts are at issue.

I. The dogmatic interpretation of Scripture is here understood objectively: it is the interpretation exhibiting a revealed dogma in the Scriptures, whether concerning a purely credible matter or also one to be acted upon—the interpretation, namely, of dogmatic texts. Since this

act is the same as that by which the Magisterium attests and hands on Apostolic tradition, it is clear why we said the same thing holds in such interpretation as in the attestation of tradition. For this reason in this matter it is not permissible to depart from the common consensus of the Fathers, as the Tridentine Synod, Session 4, and the Pian Profession of Faith decreed.

II. But, first, besides the dogmatic texts there exist in the Scriptures other texts which we can call simply historical (cf. § XLII); and, second, in both series of texts, whether dogmatic or non-dogmatic, exegetical questions can arise, and in two ways.

For, first, a text can be of such a kind that its certain truth admits only one manner of interpretation; second, a text can also be of such a kind that it is consistent with its certain truth to have multiple philological interpretations of its words. Examples of the second kind (for examples of the first are easily available) can be those which we gave in the treatise *On Original Sin*, Thesis LXVI, and *On Matrimony*, Thesis XX.

Now in the first hypothesis, if the text is certain by the authority of the Church or by the common consensus of the Fathers, even the only possible exegesis must be held by force of the same authority; for one cannot exist without the other.

But when the matter concerns the exegetical interpretation of a dogmatic text which, whether solved in one way or another, leaves equally untouched the dogma which the authority of the Magisterium teaches underlies the text; in this hypothesis, I say, first account must always be taken of the preceding exegesis of the Fathers—especially of those who throughout the universal Church acquired a reputation for eminent interpreters. But since the interpretation of the same dogma is possible in either mode of interpreting the text, and since just as progress can have its place in the manner of conceiving a dogma so also in the explanation of the text; it is not contrary to due reverence for the Fathers to explain the text differently while retaining the dogma.

If finally the matter concerns non-dogmatic interpretations, which depend greatly on historical and philological knowledge, we affirm that in these what holds for dogmatic interpretation does not hold. For the reason why in the latter the common interpretation of the Fathers must

be followed is that all dogmas were handed down from the beginning and dogmatic doctrine is immutable. But from these two it follows that, when the matter concerns a dogma, what the earlier Fathers determined must be held. But in other matters, the explanation of Scripture, in very many cases at least, was not handed down from the beginning, and in setting forth these matters the Fathers function not as witnesses but as private teachers. Wherefore in these matters progress is possible regarding the very subject matter spoken of in the Scriptures, not only regarding its clearer explanation.

Therefore it is not permissible to urge the authority of the Fathers in the same manner as is done in the former cases. An example is found in the interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis, regarding the sequence of time in which the world was made.

SCHOLION.

To conclude, we affirm that the universal consensus of the faithful of any age in some matter to be believed is, provided it is established, a certain argument for divine tradition. For this is the consensus of the Church which is taught; but the entire Church is infallible through the Magisterium to which it certainly adheres; hence it manifests to us what the Magisterium teaches and what therefore was previously revealed. Cf. Augustine, *Against Julian*, book 1, n. 31.

ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE CHURCH

§ XLVIII

It is proper to the true Church of Christ that she be one, and indeed with a threefold unity: namely, the unity of communion, or social unity, by reason of which the Church is also unique; symbolic unity, that is, the unity of profession of faith, both material and formal; and likewise ritual unity, which is similarly both material and formal.

I. A certain unity of the Church arising from the fact that she has one founder, one supreme head in Christ, one immediate and mediate end—namely holiness and eternal beatitude—and one Christian

revelation: such a unity, I say, is admitted even by Protestants, who on these grounds assert that the Church of Christ is one and unique. A unity of this kind, however, can exist without any social unity. But that social unity must also be admitted in the Church is evident from what has been demonstrated above, by which we established that the Church of Christ is a society and moreover a visible one (cf. §§ I, II, X). Therefore this matter need not be disputed further under this general concept. Nor likewise need there be any question whether the Church of Christ is unique in some vague and confused sense; for no one denies this. Yet there remain still other, more penetrating questions concerning the determinate concept of the unity and uniqueness of the Church.

For it is asked 1° in what respect the Church of Christ ought to be one and unique: whether, namely, insofar as all the faithful of Christ must be subject to the authority of one and the same governance, or insofar as it suffices that partial Christian societies, otherwise independent in their governance, be joined by a friendly alliance. It is asked 2° whether unity in faith and sacred rites requires the agreement of the faithful in all revealed truths and those connected with them and authentically proposed, together with communion in all the same sacred rites that are of divine institution, or whether agreement in certain fundamental revealed truths and communion in certain more necessary sacraments suffices. It is asked 3° what is, by Christ's institution, the necessary principle of this unity.

Regarding the first question, the position of certain more recent Protestants in England is well known: that the Church of Christ can maintain its unity even if diverse communions—namely, the Roman, the Greek, and the Protestant—are united only by a friendly alliance (cf. Patrick Murray, *De Ecclesia*, disp. VI, sect. 1, n. 57 ff.). Regarding the second question, it is established that Protestants have generally tenaciously defended the opinion that the unity of faith is not violated except by the denial of fundamental articles, and that communion is not required except in those sacred rites that can be certainly demonstrated from Scripture alone. Regarding the third question, finally, it is clear that Protestants teach that the necessary efficient principle of unity is the Holy Spirit alone, who teaches all.

These matters, therefore, must be discussed.

II. Now, social unity does not arise solely from identity of end, means, and laws: this is evident in so many distinct societies or kingdoms that have the same end and frequently have or can have the same laws and means; nor does identity of a king suffice, since a king can govern two distinct kingdoms. Rather, there is required a mutual cooperation of all members under the direction of one governance; for when this is in place, all conspiring together under one authority constitute one body, one society. It was not impossible for Christ to establish as many societies independent of one another as there are, for example, episcopal sees; but in that hypothesis the economy established by him would have been altogether different. The institution of Christ, moreover, is that the universal Church should be one society, that is, that all the faithful should constitute one society, all mutually cooperating toward the same end under the authority of one governance.

Therefore this unity excludes a multiplicity of Churches, each of which would be a complete society among themselves possessing its own governance; even if they were united among themselves by some friendly alliance, just as independent societies can be united while retaining their own independence. And so the unity of the Church comes down to this: that the Church, which as a society must necessarily be one, should also be unique; namely in such a way that all the faithful of Christ are comprehended under the governance of one supreme authority.

This union is also called the union of communion, for the faithful communicate with one another; and it is also frequently called by Augustine the union of charity. But by the name of charity there is not immediately understood the properly so-called theological virtue, by which we love our neighbor for God's sake—for this embraces even those who are outside the Church, and one who hates his neighbor does not for that reason cease to be in the Church—but rather the coordination toward the other faithful and subordination to the Pastors into one society; which accordingly is of itself social charity, and is also called charity simply, because it bears a certain likeness to charity and is naturally determined by it as an effect.

Social unity of the Church does not require that whoever are members of it should always continue to be members or to belong to its body; but it requires that, however many and whoever they may be who withdraw from the others, the Church should always remain one society and not be divided into several societies separated from one another; and therefore that whatever person or group is not a member or part of it, should not in any way be the Church of Christ or belong to the Church of Christ.

This kind of unity is called a property of the Church. And indeed, insofar as unity denotes the conspiracy of many toward the same end under the same authority, it is an essential property of the Church, just as it is essential to her to be a society; and therefore it belongs to her absolutely: for there cannot be a society without unity. But insofar as it denotes the gathering of all the faithful into one and unique society under one governance, presenting one Church of Christ throughout the entire world, it is a property both necessary—in that it is necessary that the Church be such as Christ willed her to be—and also essential, if it be compared with this subject which God indeed instituted, namely with the society ordered to comprehend within itself all the faithful: for that unity is essential to it in this sense. Which unity is indeed in reality the society itself; but this does not prevent it from being called its property, just as the proper unity of any society is in reality the society itself and yet is called its property, insofar as it is compared with it under a different aspect.

We must therefore now prove that Christ so instituted the Church that she be one with social unity, comprehending under one and the same governance all the faithful who are members of Christ; and that she is not multiple, nor divided into parts each of which would have its own independent governance, nor parts which might also be associated together by some alliance without losing their proper independence, in the manner in which several societies independent of one another can be united.

III. The prayer of Christ in John 17:11–20–23 is an efficacious prayer, both because it was made absolutely, and because what is here sought by Christ is a sign of his mission, which was to be manifested by signs (*so that the world may believe that you sent me*), and because the

very effect that is to follow from the prayer is signified when it is said: *I in them and you in me, that they may be perfected in unity*; for with Christ present and working, the effect cannot be lacking. Furthermore what Christ asks is unity, a perpetual unity of all believers—*I do not pray for these only, but also for those who are to believe in me through their word, that they all may be one*—a unity according to the exemplar of divine unity: *that they all may be one, as you, Father, are in me and I in you, so also may they be one in us*. But the unity implored by Christ is a visible unity; for it must be a sign to men of the mission of Christ, the founder of the Church. And this visible unity of all believers is social unity under one and the same governance of one authority.

Indeed, the Church of Christ is called a body—an organic body, one body (2 Cor. 12:12 ff.; 10:17)—is called a kingdom (Matt. 16:17), a house (1 Pet. 2:5), a sheepfold (John 21:15 ff.), one sheepfold under one shepherd (John 10:16). Now when these terms are used metaphorically of a gathering or society of men, they signify: a) that there is one principle of unity, one governance; just as there is one head in a body, one king in a kingdom, one father of a household in a house, one shepherd in a sheepfold. Whether there is a single head, governance, etc., will depend on the question whether there is a single body, kingdom; but certainly when it is called a body, a single head is signified —the head, namely, of that body; when it is called a kingdom, a single governance of that kingdom is signified, etc. For neither can there be a body without a head, or a kingdom without a king or supreme governance; nor can a body have two heads (unless it be a monstrosity), nor a kingdom have two supreme authorities. It is signified b) that all who belong to the body or kingdom are subject to that one head and governance, just as all the members are subject to the head, the entire kingdom to royal authority, the entire household to the father, the entire sheepfold to the shepherd.

Now toward constituting this one body, all who are members of Christ are ordained: 1 Cor. 10:17: *We who are many are one bread, one body, all of us who partake of the one bread.* Ibid. 12:13: *In one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Greeks, whether slaves or free.* That is, all who partake of the Eucharistic bread, all who are baptized, are ordained toward constituting one body; but these are all

who are members of Christ, for no Christian community can exist that lacks these sacraments. Since, therefore, all who are perfected by these sacraments are ordained toward constituting one body, that one body embraces all the members of Christ; therefore all who wish to be members of Christ must be contained under one governance of this body; therefore the Church is one with social unity comprehending all the faithful under one governance, and is so one that she is also unique. And such unity is essential to her; for some form of unity is essential to a society, and therefore that determinate form which either nature or institution requires in it. Likewise from Ephesians 4:11 ff. we are taught that God gave apostles, pastors, and teachers for the perfecting of the saints, for the building up of the body of Christ. But this which is called the body of Christ represents all those who are to be sanctified; for apostles, pastors, and teachers were given for all of them. Now this body is not multiple but one; for under Christ the head there are not parts separated from one another, but a whole that is connected and joined together, making the growth of the body, for the building up of itself. Therefore. And what holds for the body is evidently true of the other metaphors as well.

The necessity of social unity of all the faithful, or the gathering of all under one governance, is also demonstrated directly from the institution of the authority which Christ conferred on one person and to whom he willed all his sheep without exception to be subject; and accordingly the fullest demonstration of such unity is to be repeated from the subsequent treatise.

The ancient Fathers unanimously attest the same. For they not only teach that the Church of Christ is one, consisting of all believers (Justin, *Dialogus*, n. 63; Clement of Rome, *Epistola ad Corinthios*, n. 46; Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses*, bk. I, ch. 10; Origen, *Contra Celsum*, bk. VI, n. 48; Cyprian and Augustine, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*), but they further teach that the unity of the Church is effected through the Bishop, and therefore through authority (Ignatius, throughout his letters); and they likewise teach that there is one episcopate, one chair, one Bishop in the Church, and one Church through the authority of one, and therefore one Church consisting of all the faithful through subjection to one authority.

From all this it is clear that Christ not only willed his Church to be one, but placed within her the principle of unity, that is, visible authority; for it is established that Christ instituted the authority of governance, and the unity of the Church—which is the unity of a body, a kingdom, a sheepfold, etc.—is obtained through authority alone. But in order that such social unity be truly said to belong to the Church, it must be actual; for if it is not actually present, you will have divided parts, which if they are still called the Church, will present a multiple Church, not one. Social unity, moreover, will be perpetual, because the Church will be perpetual; and she will always be the Church such as Christ instituted and willed her to be. Therefore actual unity will be perennial, and it will never come about that the true Church exists and is at the same time multiple and socially divided.

IV. The unity of faith (we are now speaking of theological faith) consists of two elements, subjective and objective: the subjective element is the profession of faith common to all; the objective element is the same doctrine, or the same truths for all believers. Now on the part of the object, in order to have unity, it is required that the very truths which are believed be one, that is, that they stand under one motive, and that there be nothing false in them and no contradiction among them. On the part of the subject, however, there is required a principle determining the common profession of faith. This determining principle must be the evidence of the credibility of the object, which can be obtained in two ways. For either it is a certain evidence of the credibility of the object from the fact that God testifies the truth to individuals either by interior locution or by exterior manifestation through signs; or it is a certain evidence of the credibility of the object from some human authority proposing infallibly what is to be believed, whose infallibility God has made indubitable through certain signs. For one or the other is required, since the evidence of truth cannot be had. In this unity of faith, therefore, a twofold unity must be distinguished, as it were: material unity, that is, the agreement of all in the same truths; and formal unity, that is, the adhesion of all to the same determining principle of agreement.

Now the same profession of faith in all can be either explicit or implicit. It is explicit when truths are distinctly known and believed; it is

implicit when, with certain truths explicitly believed, the others are believed in their formal motive and principle of manifestation, insofar as we will to believe whatever God has revealed and the magisterium instituted by God teaches. Implicit faith, moreover, can be distinguished as twofold: namely, with respect to those truths that have already been proposed by the authentic and infallible definition of the magisterium, which many nevertheless are ignorant of; and with respect to those truths which are indeed contained in the deposit of revelation but have not yet been definitively settled by the peremptory judgment of the magisterium. It must further be noted that both kinds of faith, whether explicit or implicit, are formally the same faith and of the same truths; for the formal motive is the same and the principle upon which each rests is the same.

But since those things that are connected with revealed truths and are proposed by the infallible magisterium must also be believed—by which twofold bond they are drawn back into unity with revealed truths—the unity of faith will accordingly require that these too be believed, whether explicitly or implicitly, on account of their own proper motive, in the manner we described regarding revealed truths.

Now a) material unity of faith is required in the Church of Christ, such that the Church cannot exist without it, and the unity of faith is therefore her property. This is clearly evident: 1° from the very nature of things, for without the unity of faith, social unity cannot be self-consistent; for the Church is essentially a society of those who believe and act according to faith, such that all laws, all rights, all functions by which the members of the Church cohere with one another, presuppose faith and are determined according to it. Therefore, given the existence of diverse professions of faith, the Church is thereby split into several parts and becomes multiple, which is contradictory. Again, the faith which the Church must profess is true faith, and she must profess it integrally: *teach all nations… teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you* (Matt. 28:20); but true faith is only one: therefore the universal Church must profess one faith. It is evident 2° from the explicit testimony of the Apostles, by which the will of Christ is manifested. Thus Ephesians 4:3 ff., from which you have: a) that the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace must be preserved (v. 3); b) that

just as the Church is one body, one Spirit, just as there is one hope of the calling of the faithful, one Lord, one baptism, so there is one faith (vv. 4–5); c) that Christ instituted pastors and teachers lest the faithful be carried about like little children tossed about, by every wind of doctrine —that is, lest there be diverse opinions in faith that the faithful should follow—but that they should all come together *in the unity of faith*, εἰς ἑνότητα τῆς πίστεως, *into a perfect man* (vv. 11, 13): the perfect man is contrasted with little children tossed about; it is a metaphorical expression, but the meaning is that just as human life advances by certain stages to manly perfection, and manly perfection consists in the fact that the strength of the body is firm and the spirit is constant and steadfast in purpose, so our adherence to the faith must be firm and stable, so that we may be in faith perfect men, not little children tossed about. d) Now this unity of faith is clearly to be obtained in this life; for in this life the ministry of teachers exists, and in this life the faithful must grow in Christ, *speaking the truth* (v. 15), ἀληθεύοντες, in charity (for ἀληθής is one who does not depart from the truth: Aristotle, *De Anima*, bk. III, ch. 3). Moreover, since the word *until* carries a temporal signification, when the Apostle says that apostles and teachers were given for the work of ministry *until we all come together* (Paul numbers himself among the rest), the meaning is that this ministry must last as long as from all nations and from every part of the earth there are men to be gathered into the unity of faith—namely, *until all* (the force is in the word *all*, not in the destination *we come together*) *come together* (v. 13) *in the unity of faith.* But all who come together must always agree in the unity of faith and keep it firmly and constantly; for wavering in faith is excluded for all, and speaking the truth in charity is prescribed for all who grow in Christ (vv. 14–15). The meaning is therefore not that the unity of faith is a certain goal toward which the Church tends but which she does not yet immediately attain, such that she could exist even without it.

It is evident 3° from the history of the Church as instituted and propagated; for the first faithful *persevered in the teaching of the Apostles* (Acts 2:42), and they are commanded to stand firm and hold to the traditions they have learned either through the speech or through the letters of the Apostles (2 Thess. 2:14), and bishops are commanded to

guard the deposit, avoiding ἀντιθέσεις of falsely-named knowledge (1 Tim. 6:20), and to entrust what they have heard from the Apostles to faithful men who will be able to teach others as well (2 Tim. 2:2); and universally it is declared that *anathema* be anyone who has preached a gospel other than what the Apostles preached (Gal. 1:8–9). And so the universal Church always maintained this: that those who departed from the unity of faith—namely from that faith which the Apostles handed down to the Church—were considered alien to the Church; as is evident from the entire history of heresiology.

It is evident 4° from the unanimous testimony of the Fathers, from which, by way of example, it suffices to produce the following. For the Church, dispersed throughout the whole world, as Irenaeus (bk. I, ch. 10) testifies, having received the preaching and faith from the Apostles, as though possessing one soul and one and the same heart, with wondrous agreement as though endowed with one mouth, preaches and teaches… and the true and universal Church holds one and the same faith throughout the whole world. "The Apostles went out into the world and proclaimed the teaching of the same faith to the nations and accordingly founded churches in each city, from which the other churches then and continually thereafter borrowed the offshoots of faith and the seeds of doctrine, so that they might become churches," says Tertullian (*De Praescriptione*, n. 20). "For unity (of the Church) is when all believe in the same way," says Chrysostom in *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Ephesios*, hom. XI. "For the Church, born from one faith and brought to light through the Holy Spirit, is one to the only one and one to the mother who bore her" (μία τῇ μόνῃ καὶ μία τῇ γεγεννηκυία), says Epiphanius in *Expositio Fidei*, n. 5. And indeed the entire struggle of the Church against heretics has always looked to this end, as have professions of faith and decrees of faith issued in Councils or by the Apostolic See, that one and the same faith might be kept whole throughout the universal Church.

Nor does Justin contradict this in *Dialogus*, n. 48, when he says: "There are indeed some of our race who confess him (Jesus) to be the Christ, but who assert that he was born a man from men, to whom I do not assent, nor would I assent even if the greatest part of those who share my views were to say the same." For the men whom Justin calls "of

our race" are heretics who, since they were begotten in Christ and are in a certain sense always Christians, are said to be of our race; and the Fathers were accustomed to say this when opposing them to Jews or Gentiles. Cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, bk. III, n. 12; Jerome, *Prologus in librum XI Commentariorum in Isaiam*. But since this is the reason why heretics are called "of our race," it does not follow that they were regarded by the Fathers as members of the true Church; for among several Christian sects there is one true Church of Christ.

b) Since this material unity requires a certain determining principle, such a principle by Christ's institution is the authority of the magisterium; and therefore by Christ's institution the formal unity of faith is also required in the Church, and this is effected through the authentic and infallible magisterium. Indeed, leaving aside the fact that God does not immediately teach individuals, whether inwardly through interior locution or outwardly through signs testifying the truth of what someone proposes in his own name, it is established that Christ constituted an authentic and infallible magisterium and commanded obedience to it on the part of all, and willed that only what it taught—and all of it—should be believed. These things are evident from what has already been demonstrated. And indeed it has always been in this way that the faithful have been distinguished from heretics: that the former listened to the Church, while the latter were teachers of error unto themselves; and to this end professions of faith and decrees of faith issued in Councils have always aimed, that a common badge of faith might be proposed to all who wished to be children of the Church.

c) Moreover, collating what we set forth in the preceding sections rejecting the Protestant distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles of faith, it is clear that the unity of faith required by Christ's institution in the Church is unity regarding all revealed dogmas, whether believed explicitly or implicitly. From this it is evident what judgment must be made regarding the opinion of the modern Protestants which Mr. Jurieu presents in his work entitled *Le vrai système de l'Eglise*, p. 79, where he says: "Our opinion is that the Catholic and universal Church is spread throughout all sects and has true members in all those societies among them that have not demolished the foundation of the Christian religion, even if they are

divided from one another and have mutually excommunicated each other… For the Church," he says on p. 226, "remained visible in all the communions which, notwithstanding the mutual anathemas leveled against each other and their separation, always preserved the principal truths." But he rages impiously against the Roman Church (ibid., p. 54), on the grounds that she teaches herself to be the only Church in which salvation can be obtained: for what else does she teach by teaching this, than that salvation can be had only in the one true Church and that she herself is exclusively the true Church—two things which she evidently demonstrates?

IV. A religious gathering destined for the worship of God must be bound together by certain sacred rites, by which men are both dedicated to God and render worship to God, and in turn are perfected by God. "For men cannot be united under any name of religion, whether true or false, unless they are bound together by some fellowship of visible signs or sacraments" (Augustine, *Adversus Faustum*, bk. XIX, ch. 11). It is therefore of the essence of a religious gathering that it have certain sacred rites. Sacred rites can be common to all who belong to the gathering in two ways: namely, 1° by immediate actual reception, as baptism in the Church, or by right of actual reception, as the Eucharist; and 2° mediately, that is, by consent and participation in their effects, insofar as certain rites which can and must be received only by some are admitted by all and held as sacred rites, and due reverence is paid to them and they redound to the common good, as is the case with holy orders. Actual reception of a sacred rite, moreover, can itself be twofold; for if the sacred rite is of such a kind that it is performed immediately for the good of all, the reception will be either active, by which the rite itself is performed, or passive, by which its effects are participated in—of which kind sacrifice is. From this communion in sacred rites arises the ritual unity of the religious gathering. This unity in turn must be distinguished as twofold: material and formal. The material unity is the very communion of all in the rites, whether immediate or mediate. The formal unity is the principle existing in the gathering that determines this communion and its stability and permanence; for there must be certain definite sacred rites in any given religious gathering, and these must be stable and permanent if the gathering is to be stable and

permanent. To obtain this, it is required that in the gathering itself there be some principle by which it comes about that all perpetually observe the same rites, if that gathering is to be of itself and not accidentally a religious gathering. Moreover, it is necessary that this principle in the Church be what Christ instituted.

You will ask whether there can be certain sacred rites proper only to some part of a religious gathering. If they are certain accidental rites whose exclusion does not include the denial of another essential unity—namely in faith—and which can therefore also be approved by others and used as occasion demands, unity of the religious gathering can be preserved even if not all rites are held in common. But if on the contrary they are necessary or essential rites whose exclusion includes the denial of unity in faith, they must be common to all, whether immediately or mediately, in order that there be one religious gathering.

Now a) material ritual unity is required in the Church. The reason is because it is demanded by the essence of a religious gathering. And indeed the same rite of initiation—that is, of baptism—must be common to all (Matt. 28:19; Eph. 4:3); the same rite of the Eucharist and of sacrifice must be common (1 Cor. 10:17; John 6:54 compared with Matt. 26:26; 1 Cor. 11:23; Acts 2:42). Moreover, the profession of one baptism is contained in the creeds. It is customary for the Fathers to explain the visible unity of the Church through sharing in the same sacraments (cf. the testimonies of Augustine, § 11, n. 10). And the Apostolic Fathers, as Ignatius throughout his letters, when commending the unity of the Church, expressly enjoin that all should be united with the Bishop in the sacred rites and that nothing should be done without the Bishop—the unity of sacred worship is thus asserted.

Furthermore, the ritual unity of the Church must necessarily embrace all rites that are of divine institution, which are in fact the seven sacraments and the sacrifice. These rites are indeed necessary; for a religious gathering instituted by God must worship God and be dedicated to him and be perfected by him in the way that God himself instituted. God, moreover, instituted that these things be done through those determinate rites. And in truth, the exclusion of any of these rites would include dissent in faith; for if God instituted these rites and commanded that they be employed, it must be believed that they are

sacred rites and that they accomplish what divine revelation teaches, and that they are to be employed and are necessary in the Church of God by divine institution. Therefore.

b) But it must be, as we said, that this unity have within the gathering itself the basis for its own stability and permanence. For if this were lacking, it could indeed happen repeatedly that all agree in the same thing, but this would be accidental, not of itself; it would arise from the changeable will of men, not from the force of the religious gathering itself. Therefore, in this hypothesis, the Church would not be of itself one gathering by the unity of sacred rites, and would thus not be of itself a gathering to which the name of Church properly belongs; for if it were not of itself possessed of the unity of sacred rites, it could come about of itself that it lacked all the rites by which its founder willed it to be religious; and therefore it would not of itself, but only perhaps accidentally, be a religious gathering. But if it is not of itself a religious gathering, then it is no gathering at all that deserves to be called a Church.

Now Christ placed in his Church the principle of perennial unity of sacred rites, and in this way willed both unities—material and formal—as was fitting. He placed, that is, a ministry begun by the Apostles to be perpetually continued in their successors, to whom the infallible custody and administration of the sacraments was entrusted. So that the faithful must indeed communicate in the sacred rites, but by receiving them from those or under the direction of those whom Christ instituted as ministers of the sacred rites. These things are evident from the very institution of the ministry by which Christ founded his Church. The teaching of Ignatius in all his letters pertains to this. Hence the liturgical and ritual books issued by ecclesiastical authority even from ancient times, by which the administration of the sacred rites would be governed. Therefore.

§ XLIX

From what has been demonstrated, it follows that heretics, schismatics, the excommunicated, and also catechumens are not actually members of the Church.

I. It must be established at the outset that one who is in the Church can be separated from her in such a way that he must no longer be counted among her members. This is established from the very common concept of a society, from which someone can be separated voluntarily or by compulsion in a total separation. Since the Church is especially a society to which men are indeed obligated, but by law, they must enter it voluntarily and remain in it voluntarily. It is therefore within the power of men to sever the bond of union and to separate themselves from the Church. It is also within the power of the society to expel rebels entirely from itself. And this has always been maintained in the Church and presupposed in every controversy with heretics and schismatics and in their proscription, as will be evident below.

Moreover, in order for anyone to be a member of the Church, he must be joined to the body through those bonds by which the unity of the body is necessarily constituted. Nor is it enough that one be in some way subject to the power of the Church; for even those who are strangers to a given society can be subject, albeit unwillingly, to its authority—as for example those who are conquered in war. Nor is it enough that in certain circumstances someone receives jurisdiction in a transient manner from the Church over her subjects; for in the interest of her subjects a ruler can grant to any outsider the power to exercise what is useful for his subjects—just as Christ granted to any person whatever the power to administer baptism validly, even if he is not in his body. That is, one thing is to be bound to the Church by some real relation of subordination or dependence, and another thing is to be a member of her; for this requires cohering with her body by the bond of unity. Again, the obligation of union with the Church by which one is bound, and the right which the Church has that one be united to her, must be distinguished from actual union; for the former two can exist without the latter. And we are speaking of actual union.

Now the necessary bond of the unity of the Church is threefold: governance, faith, and sacred rites; for there is a threefold unity—social, symbolic, and ritual—which is necessary and essential to the Church (§ preceding).

II. A heretic is one who rejects a faith already received, whether denying one article or all. Two kinds must be distinguished: the occult and the public. The occult is further distinguished as twofold: namely, one who harbors heresy in mind and expresses it by no external signs, and one who does indeed express it, but in the presence or knowledge of no one; the former is called occult of himself, the latter accidentally so. The public heretic is one who openly professes his heresy, such that it is established that he thinks otherwise than the Church teaches, and this is publicly established. For a heretic to be public, two things must concur: interior heresy and its exterior manifest profession. For if someone professes what is heretical through error, thinking it to be Catholic, he is not himself a heretic, and his profession—especially if all the circumstances are considered—is formally in conformity with the magisterium of the Church; for it signifies (though this can on occasion remain hidden, accidentally) that he wishes to believe what the Church teaches. We have already discussed occult heretics in § 9. We now deny that heretics, at least public ones, are actually members of the Church.

Indeed, 1° suppose them to be members of the Church: in this hypothesis the Church will be a society of those who profess both truth and falsehood; and since error is multiple and truth is one, the Church could be a society whose greater and even majority part professes errors, however diverse. Therefore, if this hypothesis is admitted, it will no longer be true that the faith of the Church is one and that the Church professes the true faith and is the pillar and foundation of truth. But this is contradictory; therefore that hypothesis is also contradictory. 2° This hypothesis—that manifest heretics are still members of the Church—is opposed by the universal and constant sense of the Church itself. "There can be no doubt," says St. Athanasius (*Oratio prima adversus Arianos*), "that the founders of all heresies have gone out from us, as the blessed John wrote; since their doctrine neither was, nor is now, with us." Indeed heretics have always been held to be antichrists (1 John 2:18); and the same are said to be outside the Church (Cyprian, *Epistola ad*

Jubaianum); to be openly outside (Augustine, *De Baptismo*, bk. I, ch. 17); their gathering not to be the Church (Jerome, *Adversus Luciferum*); to stand in relation to the Church as a concubine to a wife (Augustine, ibid., chs. 15 ff.); that Christians do not communicate with them, because Christians know them to be atheists, impious, and lawless, and that heretics are not Christians (Tertullian, *De Praescriptione*, ch. 37). Hence those who converted were said to be able to be received into the Church, to convert to the Church, to return to the Church, to be restored to the Church (Council of Nicaea, chs. 8, 19; Irenaeus, bk. 3, ch. 3; Tertullian, *De Praescriptione*, ibid.). And a special manner was established by which returning heretics should be received into the communion of the Church, as is clear from the letter of Siricius to Himerius, n. 2, and the letter of Gregory the Great, 72, bk. II, and the decretal letter of Leo to Rusticus, 167, n. 18. And the heretics themselves returning would say that they were joining themselves to the Catholic Church, that they were approaching it to communicate with it (cf. the subscriptions of the Quartodecimans cited in the Acts of the Sixth Session of the Council of Ephesus). Hence Augustine in *Sermo* 181, reproaching the Pelagians, says: "If you do not wish to be the Church unless it be the one that is without spot or wrinkle, then with your own wrinkles and spots cut yourselves away from its members, cut yourselves away from its body; but why do I still say that they should separate themselves from the Church, when they have already done so? For they are heretics; they are outside; they have remained outside with all their purity. Return and listen, listen and believe." And Tertullian introduces the Church addressing the heretics in the above-cited place with these words: *What business have you in my house, you who are not of mine?* From all this it is clear that these two things are immediately linked: being a heretic and being outside, not belonging to the Church; for they themselves go out, they themselves remain outside, they themselves cut themselves off from the body; and at the mere mention of heresy they are said to be outside the Church and it is denied that they are Christians.

This is what the Apostle John had taught in the first letter, 2:19, saying of heretics that they *went out, they departed*, ἐξῆλθον, *from us*, that is, from our gathering; and this the Apostle asserts generally of

those who became antichrists, that is, heretics; for with this condition stated, he immediately adds: *they went out from us*, who even before they went out belonged to the Christian gathering in an imperfect manner (cf. § 11). Now one who goes out altogether ceases to be inside; for no one is any longer there from where he has departed. That the force of the word ἐξῆλθον is such as to signify departure from and separation from a society is demonstrated, beyond the interpretation of the Fathers, by the very application of the name antichrist to those who go out and by the opposition with the preceding state, in which they were not even then "of us."

What the Apostle has in 2 Tim. 2:20—that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and clay, and some for honorable use, some for dishonorable—does not refer to what was said in vv. 17–18 about the notorious heretics Hymenaeus and Philetus, but to what immediately precedes in v. 19: *the Lord knows those who are his, and let everyone who names the name of the Lord depart from iniquity.* For in the Church there can be those who are not the Lord's, namely by election according to purpose and finally efficacious election, and who work iniquity, through which an opening is made for the subversion of faith. Let those, therefore, who invoke the name of the Lord depart from iniquity, and thus the discourse of heretics will not subvert their faith, as the discourse of Hymenaeus and Philetus, spreading like gangrene, had done in certain cases.

You ask: why then does the Church excommunicate heretics, if they are already outside? I reply: 1° nothing prevents the Church from sanctioning by positive law that which is already established by divine law. 2° Excommunication has certain proper effects that depend on the law of the Church, such as, for example, the deprivation of civil and external intercourse, of public votes, and the like.

Moreover, it is entirely without basis to affirm that in the apostolic age heretics were considered to be members of the Church. This is indeed rejected also on account of the precept made by the Apostle in Titus 3:10. Yet some wish to demonstrate it from the fact that heresy was the position that taught the necessity of observing the law of Moses for Christians; and they claim that the letters to the Galatians, Romans, and Hebrews—which are entirely taken up with attacking this error—show

that these were reckoned within the Church. But a distinction must be made between Christians from the Gentiles and from the Jews. With regard to the former, it was defined in the Council of Jerusalem that they are not bound by that law, and the Apostle, writing to the Galatians who were Gentiles, strikes with anathema those who taught that the Galatians were bound by the law of Moses. Before the definition of the Church, however, there was no formal heresy. With regard to the Jews, moreover, the Apostles taught that the practice of the legal observances was not necessary, but they did not prohibit it (nor was it, in itself, setting aside a perverse intention, evil), and they tolerated it from a certain prudent accommodation; indeed the Apostles themselves would on occasion make use of them. But from the fact that the Apostles, writing to the faithful, refute the position asserting not only the propriety but the necessity of the legal observances for obtaining salvation, it does not in any way follow that those who taught this were held by the Apostles to be among the faithful.

The man weak in faith, of whom the Apostle speaks in Romans 14:1 ff., is not one who lacks faith, but one who, lacking perfect knowledge of the faith, suffers from an erroneous conscience. For throughout this entire chapter, faith is conscience or the judgment of conscience; cf. the final verse. The Apostle therefore commands that account be taken of this brother who labors under an uncertain conscience.

III. St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 39, a. 1) teaches that "schismatics properly so called are those who of their own will and intention separate themselves from the unity of the Church, which is the principal unity." That is, there is a certain partial unity of some members of the body among themselves, and a total unity of all members with the whole body—this is the principal unity. The unity of the Church, says the same holy Doctor, depends on two things, that is, on the connection or communion of the members of the Church with one another, and again on the ordering of all the members of the Church toward one head, who is Christ, whose place on earth the Supreme Pontiff holds (which we here presuppose from the subsequent treatise so that the treatment of the matter may be complete). These two must be distinguished, because, as we already indicated at the beginning

of § 48, several persons can be united under one head or king without being one society; and therefore, beyond subordination to one head, there must also be coordination among themselves. This coordination consists, as Cajetan explains in the same place, in the fact that individual faithful and individual particular communities exist and act as parts of the whole, not as something whole and separated from the others; but they are members one of another (Rom. 12:5). The reason given for this distinction shows indeed that several can be united under one without being united among themselves; and therefore that there can be unity of head without unity of body. But one cannot from this conclude that several can be united among themselves without being united in a head or subject of authority, which in a monarchical unity is one person and in the Church is the Roman Pontiff. For the principle of social unity of the Church, both as a whole and of any particular community, is its head, namely the Roman Pontiff (subsequent treatise, Th. 12). Moreover, St. Thomas concludes: "and therefore those are called schismatics who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff and who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him."

The question arises, however, of what kind 1° this denial of subjection to the Supreme Pontiff must be, and 2° this refusal of communion with the other members, in order for one to be a schismatic; and 3° whether heresy is required for these things. To the first question St. Thomas replies ibid., ad 2, namely that "not obeying commands with a certain rebelliousness constitutes the nature of schism. I say with rebelliousness, when one both pertinaciously despises the commands of the Church and refuses to submit to her judgment." This teaching of St. Thomas is expounded by Cajetan as follows. The command or judgment of the Pope can be refused in three ways: first, on the part of the matter judged or commanded; second, on the part of the person judging or commanding; third, on the part of his office itself. The first occurs when someone is unwilling to obey or to carry out what the Pope has commanded, which can indeed be done while retaining the recognition of him as superior and retaining the faith that he is superior. The second occurs when someone has the person of the Pope under suspicion (which can also happen with reason, since it is possible

that the Pope may be led by a less than upright disposition and may pronounce a sentence or precept that is not fair in particular cases), while being prepared to accept judges not under suspicion from him. The third occurs when someone refuses the command or judgment of the Pope on the part of his office, not recognizing him as superior. Now, says Cajetan, this man is properly a schismatic. "And in accordance with this sense are to be understood the words of this article and similar ones. For disobedience, however pertinacious, does not constitute schism unless it is rebellion against the office of the Pope or the Church, such that one refuses to be subject to him and to recognize him as superior."

To the second question the same Cajetan replies: "Someone is a schismatic from the fact that he refuses to operate as a part of the Church. Nor does it matter from whatever cause this arises; for as long as it comes to the point that one refuses to regard oneself as a part of the one Catholic Church, schism is incurred. For from whatever diversity either of opinions or of dispositions some may deviate to such an extent that they wish to sanctify or be sanctified, to teach or be taught, to provide or be provided for, not as a part of the Church but as though they themselves were, as it were, a whole unto themselves separately—these are schismatics."

On the third question, the common opinion is that schism, viewed in itself, can exist without heresy; or, viewed according to the essence of the matter, heresy is not a necessary element of schism, although as regards the fact, schism either arises from heresy or produces it in order to defend itself. So Jerome in his letter on Titus 3: "Between heresy and schism we consider this to be the difference: that heresy involves a perverse doctrine, while schism, on account of episcopal dissension, equally separates from the Church. And schism from the beginning can in a certain respect be understood as distinct from heresy; but no schism exists which does not fabricate for itself some heresy, so that it may appear to have rightly departed from the Church." And indeed if we speak of schism consisting in the fact that someone refuses to communicate with members of the Church who are subject to the Pope and wishes to act separately from them, three acts must be distinguished: the first, which is formally an act of the intellect, by

which someone does not believe, or denies, that union with the members is necessary, or something else against the Church; the second, by which someone does not wish to be, does not wish to conduct himself as, a part of the Church, and wishes to have no communion with the Catholic Church; the third, by which someone sins against the due social charity toward the members. Likewise with regard to schism arising from rebellion against the head of the Church, these three acts must be distinguished: the first, by which someone does not believe that one must be subject to the authority of the Pontiff; the second, by which he does not wish the Pontiff to be his superior, or does not wish to acknowledge or regard him as his superior; the third, by which in various matters he declines to obey. Now it is manifest that the second act of each series is the one in which schism consists, though it is manifested through the third; the third, however, by itself alone would not be schism. The act of the schismatic, moreover, requires in the subject some determining reason, but this need not necessarily be that first act, namely heresy; some other inordinate disposition can be the reason, for it happens that a man acts wrongly while the judgment of his intellect remains that the action is unlawful, but he does it because it pleases him. Hence Cajetan said that a schismatic is one who refuses the judgment or command of the Pope on the part of his office, not recognizing him as superior, "though he believes this": that is, by the words *not recognizing* there is signified not an act of the intellect but of the will, which does not wish to regard him as superior.

The sin of schism can both be only interior and also issue outward and manifest itself through sensible acts. We are now speaking of the manifest schismatic—not merely of one who harbors a schismatic mind, but of one who actually makes schism by withdrawing from the due union and subjection. There can be several acts by which such schism is manifested and committed.

The question may arise, however, whether one who separates himself from his Bishop is a schismatic. If he so separates himself that he still adheres to the other Churches and especially to the Roman Pontiff, he is not truly a schismatic; but he is if, in separating himself from the Bishop, he also repudiates the communion of the whole Church or refuses to be subject to the Roman Pontiff.

With these matters established, it is manifest: 1° that schismatics who are also heretics are not actually members of the Church; this is evident from what has already been said. The question concerns those who are only schismatics. Bellarmine (*De Ecclesia*, bk. 3, ch. 5) attests that certain Catholics have doubts on this matter, and also reports that Alfonso de Castro affirms that they are in the Church; to whom may be added also Fr. Suárez (*De Fide*, disp. 9, sect. 1, n. 14), whose argument is both that the schismatic retains the faith and that the denial of obedience is not sufficient to place someone outside the Church. But if we inquire into the constant sentiment of the Church, it will be clear that it must be denied that schismatics are actually members of the Church.

Indeed, a) Pope Pelagius I teaches this most explicitly and deliberately in two letters (cf. the fragments of his letters first rescued from obscurity by Lucas Holstenius, in *Concilia*, vol. 5, p. 803), which are also found in the *Decretum*, causa 24, q. 1, chs. 33–34. In these Pelagius teaches that schismatics have made a part for themselves, have segregated themselves from what is one, have divided themselves from the universal Church (ch. 34); that they are branches cut off from the vine, fit only for the fire (ch. 33). But the Church is one, and in unity there can be no division (chs. 33–34); and therefore those who communicate with schismatics do not communicate with unity (ch. 34). Hence he concludes: "In sum: either you believe that they are the Church, and since there cannot be two Churches, you will judge us—which God forbid—to be schismatics; or if it is established that the true Church is in the apostolic sees, acknowledge both that they are divided from unity and that the question of communion is thereby settled, since true communion can only exist in unity." b) The Roman Catechism in its explanation of the ninth article (n. 9) states that it excludes only three classes of men from the Church: first, unbelievers; then heretics and schismatics; finally, the excommunicated—and Gentiles indeed because they were never in the Church… but heretics and schismatics because they have defected from the Church, and these belong to the Church no more than deserters belong to the army from which they have defected. Note both here and in Pelagius that schismatics are said to be outside the Church not because they have been excommunicated, but because

they themselves have defected; hence they are also distinguished from the excommunicated. c) Again, the universal Church on Good Friday prays for heretics and schismatics, that God may deign to call them back to the Catholic Church; therefore they are not in the Church. Likewise in the controversy concerning baptism conferred by heretics and schismatics, it was presupposed by both sides that heretics and schismatics are outside the Church. Furthermore, d) there is the axiom presenting the essential character of the Church, which Cyprian teaches in *Epistola* 66 to Florentius Pupianus, saying: "The Church is the people united to the priest and the flock adhering to its shepherd; hence you must know that the Bishop is in the Church and the Church is in the Bishop, and that those who are not with the Bishop are not in the Church." But schismatics, whether they be unwilling to be subject to the Roman Pontiff in whom the whole Church exists, or whether they refuse communion with the universal Church, are certainly not with the Bishop. Therefore. Hence e) Augustine in *De Fide et Symbolo*, ch. 10, denies that schismatics, no less than heretics, belong to the Catholic Church: the heretics because the Church loves God, the schismatics because the Church loves neighbor. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 39, also teaches that they are outside the Church, numbering them together with Pagans, Jews, and heretics. Optatus, bk. 1, ch. 11, notes that through schism the leaven of peace is scattered and the impious sons go forth as deserters from the Catholic mother. Likewise Chrysostom, in his second homily on the letter to the Ephesians, affirms that schismatics, though they may agree with the true Church of Christ in faith and dogmas, are like a hand cut off from the body.

Reason drawn from the very nature of the Church as Scripture presents her to us establishes the same conclusion. For the Church is one with social unity, such that she is one body under one head, and therefore each individual who belongs to the Church is a member of a member—that is, a partial member—and they are members one of another, cohering with one another as parts and most especially with the Vicar of Christ as head. Such union, moreover, must be actual; for members in a body are actually united. Otherwise someone will indeed be a member potentially or by obligation, but will not actually be a member, because he falls short of the common communion without

which there is no society. Now if schismatics are members of the Church, it must be said that the body of the Church is also constituted of schismatics—that is, both of those who have the Roman Pontiff as head and profess themselves subject to him, and of those who do not have him as head and deny that they are subject to him. Likewise it will be constituted of those one part of which separates itself from the other and wishes to have no intercourse with it in teaching, governing, and sanctifying; for just as schismatics separate themselves from the assembly of Catholics, so also Catholics flee from them. But this is no longer one society; one whole made up of parts no longer actually exists. Rather, several total communities exist which can have similarities with one another regarding laws, faith, and sacraments, but no longer constitute one kingdom, one body, one society, since common agreement has entirely perished. And therefore in this hypothesis there would truly be a split and divided Church. "But the Church, which is the one Catholic Church, is not split nor divided; rather she is certainly joined together and bound by the glue of priests adhering to one another," as Cyprian says in the cited letter. Therefore. From this it is clear that faith alone does not suffice for one to be a member of the Church, contrary to what Fr. Suárez held.

Basil, in the *Prima Epistola Canonica ad Amphilochium*, canon 12, distinguishes three things: heresies, schisms, and parasynagogues. Those are called heretics, he says, who have been completely cut off and are alienated in the faith itself. Schismatics are those who on account of ecclesiastical causes and questions not incurable are in disagreement with one another (he gives the example of the question of penance). Parasynagogues are those assemblies that are made by insubordinate presbyters or bishops and by undisciplined peoples; as when someone, caught in a fault and removed from ministry, does not submit to the canons but claims for himself authority and ministry, and some persons together with him, having abandoned the Catholic Church, depart.

It may be noted first that the teaching transmitted here by Basil regarding the validity of baptism conferred by heretics—in order to explain which he establishes this threefold distinction—is not sufficiently exact by the standard of Catholic Tradition or even of historical truth. As for the rest, the ecclesiastical causes on account of

which schism is made signify all those things pertaining to the governance of the Church which the schismatic opposes. The questions called "not incurable" are so called in comparison with questions of faith, and indeed of faith concerning the principal dogmas, such as the dogma of the Trinity; for with such faith undermined there is no longer any means of repairing unity; but with faith remaining, as it does or can remain in schismatics, dissensions can more easily be settled. The distinction between schism and parasynagogue is accidental if the parasynagogues—whether presbyters or bishops—in this way set up another altar such that they are unwilling to be a part of the Church that punished them; for it is in fact schism. But the distinction will be essential—that is, the parasynagogues will be simply disobedient—if they hold an assembly apart from the Bishop in order to exercise their ministry, which they claim was unjustly taken from them, even against the will of the Bishop or Metropolitan or Patriarch. Which manner of acting could easily be frequent in that era when the sacred assemblies of the faithful generally took place in the presence of a single Bishop, at least in cities.

Basil adds: "It therefore seemed right to the ancients to reject absolutely the baptism of heretics, but to admit that of schismatics, as still being of the Church." Basil appears to affirm from his own position that schismatics are still of the Church, in order to give the reason for that different practice which he attributes to the ancients. Taking into account Basil's purpose, however, his words may be understood to mean that schismatics are said to still be of the Church because they still retain something proper to the Church, namely the faith, which supplies a true form to the sacrament. Not unlike what Augustine says in *De Baptismo*, bk. I, ch. 3: "And so these persons (heretics and schismatics) are with us in certain respects, and in those respects in which they are not, we exhort them to receive what they lack by coming, or to recover it by returning." But one who is with us in a certain respect can be simply outside, as heretics and schismatics are according to Augustine. Cf. the Maurine notes on the cited passage of Basil.

Furthermore, those who think that all who have true faith belong to the Church appear to confuse (cf. Fr. Suárez, loc. cit.) the Church instituted by Christ with the one that existed before Christ, in which

only the first lineaments of the divine Church had been drawn and in which therefore faith alone and some sacred act, even if not held in common, sufficed at that time, apart from any society worthy of the full name of religion. But with the perfect society instituted by Christ, one may not assert that what sufficed then suffices now.

IV. The Communion of Saints is the fellowship of the faithful in participation in those goods with which the body of Christ is enriched. These goods are either inalienable or alienable: the inalienable are predestination and the character impressed on the soul; the alienable are either internal or external: the internal are those in which the soul of the Church consists; the external are all those by which external social life is constituted. Hence deprivation of communion can in itself have greater or lesser amplitude. Excommunication, which is a censure of the Church, deprives one both of external goods and of the lawful use of the power of orders.

In law, one type of excommunication was the lesser (this is no longer in use) and another the greater: the latter is that which separates from the reception of the sacraments, while the former additionally separates from the communion of the faithful and from social unity (ch. *Si quem*, *De Sententia Excommunicationis*). Greater excommunication and anathema do not differ in substance; anathema indeed adds to excommunication some solemnity and special execration. "Let psalm 108 be recited against the murderer of the poor, who seizes ecclesiastical property, so that that curse may come upon him which came upon Judas, that he may die not only excommunicated but also anathematized." So the Council of Tours, canon 24, in the year 570. Excommunicated persons under the greater excommunication are either occult or notorious, and among the latter some are tolerated and others are to be shunned. We are now speaking of notorious excommunicates, whether tolerated or to be shunned; for by the toleration no favor is granted to the excommunicated.

Now it must be certain that the Church has the right to expel from herself those whom she judges harmful or unworthy of her fellowship: so that, although the bond of dependence remains, the bond of social communion and unity ceases. For this right belongs to every perfect society, just as the right of inflicting capital punishment belongs to civil

societies. Moreover, excommunication is a spiritual sword that does in the Church what execution did among the people of Israel, as Augustine says (*Quaestiones in Deuteronomium*, q. 39). Therefore this right of the Church to cast some away from herself, such that they are no longer actually her members, cannot be denied. And indeed Christ in Matt. 18:18, after saying, *If he will not listen to the Church, let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector*, adds the reason: *Amen amen I say to you: whatsoever you shall bind*, etc. That is, authority belongs to the Church to punish the contumacious in such a way that she can visit upon them that penalty by reason of which they must be held as Gentiles and tax collectors. When Christ mentions tax collectors, he alludes to what happened in that era among the Jews, who held the greatest aversion from them and were unwilling to communicate with them. The meaning therefore is that one who does not listen to the Church must be held as though he were a Gentile and had never given his name to the Church. Now one who must be held as a Gentile cannot be considered a member of the Church. The Church therefore has the power to punish with this penalty those whom she herself judges to be deserving of it.

The remaining question can be whether the Church actually makes use of this power. But this too must be certain. The formulas by which the force of excommunication and anathema is explained are persuasive on this point. For the excommunication of Victor inflicted or threatened upon the Asians is reported by Eusebius (bk. 3, ch. 24) as follows: "he attempts to cut them off from communion and pronounces them to be entirely alien from the unity of the Church." Epiphanius, *Haereses*, 42, which is on Marcion, speaking of the excommunication imposed on him by the Bishop, says he was expelled from the Church by his own father. Jerome in his letter on Titus 3 says that sinners excommunicated by the Bishop are driven out of the Church, whither heretics and schismatics go of their own accord willingly. The frequent formulas of excommunication and anathema used by the Church come down to this: that those who are punished by this penalty are said to be separated from the society of all Christians; to be excluded from the bounds of the holy Mother Church in heaven and on earth; to be excluded from every society and commerce with Christians; to be

segregated from the bosom of holy Mother Church; to be eliminated from the fellowship of all Christendom; and they are commanded to be held as pagans and not as Christians and to be compelled to return to ecclesiastical unity (cf. the *Capitularia Francorum* edited by Baluze, vol. 2, *Formulae Excommunicationum*; Theophilus Raynaud, *De Monitoriis Ecclesiasticis*, pt. 2, ch. 7). But by these formulas there is manifestly signified a cutting off from the body of the Church, such that the excommunicate is not actually a member of it. Furthermore, the excommunicate is deprived of the right of every ritual union with the Church, whether of sacraments or sacrifice or public prayers or ecclesiastical assembly. "He is banished from communion in prayer and assembly and all sacred intercourse," as Tertullian says (*Apologeticum*, ch. 39). The bond of ritual unity therefore ceases in the excommunicate; but all members must be joined by this bond: therefore. But since a man cut off from the Church does not lose the power of repenting with the grace of God and of obtaining salvation, his expulsion from the Church cannot be absolutely perpetual but must be conditional—unless he repents; for if he does repent, he must be received back into the Church. Hence this penalty is such that it is at the same time ordered toward the good of the sinner, that he may be frightened into returning to a better way of life; and therefore it is a medicinal penalty.

V. A catechumen is, as Isidore attests (*De Ecclesiasticis Officiis*, bk. 2, ch. 20), one who first comes to the Church from paganism (or some other similar non-Christian sect), having the will to believe in Christ, since he is being instructed in the faith of Christ so as eventually to be baptized. A catechumen can therefore have faith, and even sanctifying grace, if he elicits an act of charity or contrition. That he can be saved if he dies without baptism through no fault of his own is certain; for he already had baptism by desire, and by desire he already belonged to the body of the Church. But the question is whether a catechumen who believes is already by that very fact actually a member of the Church.

That he is not is proved as follows. 1° Christ laid down the norm according to which men should be gathered into his Church (Matt. 28:19): *make disciples of all nations, baptizing them.* Therefore. Hence Acts 2:41 says: *those who received his word were baptized, and there were added (to the Church of the Apostles) on that day about three thousand*

souls. And indeed baptism is presented as that by which men are incorporated into the body of Christ, that is, the Church (1 Cor. 12:13 compared with Gal. 3:27); hence baptism is compared to circumcision, by which men were in former times enrolled in the people of God (Col. 2:11). And in truth men cannot be united into the assembly of the Church unless they are bound together by the fellowship of visible sacraments, as we have already demonstrated; but they are; therefore.

The same 2° the Fathers teach. For although catechumens are called Christians by the Fathers (Augustine, *In Ioannem*, tract. 44: *Ask a man: are you a Christian? He answers you: I am not, if he is a pagan or a Jew. But if he says: I am, you further ask him: catechumen or faithful?*), they are nevertheless not called the faithful, or they are distinguished from them, and they are represented in such a way that they ought to become faithful, that they dwell in the vestibule of piety, that they must still enter, that they must pass through the atrium (Cyril of Jerusalem, *Procatechesis*, n. 1; Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oratio 40, In Sanctum Baptisma*); that they dwell outside paradise and are companions of the exiled Adam (Gregory of Nyssa, *Oratio de Baptismo*). Furthermore, it was prescribed that the faithful should not even pray at home with catechumens (*Constitutiones Apostolicae*, bk. 8, ch. 36); that it was not lawful to perform the sacraments or utter the words pertaining to their form in the presence of catechumens (Synod of Laodicea, ch. 4); that the sacred oblation should not be laid out in their presence (Julius I, *Epistola ad Orientales*, n. 12); and that the sacrament of the Eucharist should be concealed from catechumens (Tertullian, *De Praescriptione*, ch. 41; Augustine, *In Ioannem*, tract. 11; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Procatechesis*, cited above; Epiphanius, *Haereses*, 42). But persons of this kind cannot be considered members of the Church.

Again, it is the teaching of the Fathers that the Church brings forth children from Christ, that the womb of the Church is in the waters of baptism, that the same Spirit who filled the Virgin fills the font, that those born from the womb of the Church are brought forth by the hands of the baptizing priest—but with faith as the bridesmaid, that is, faith must precede so that one may be born; or in other words, that children are conceived in the bosom of the Church by the instruction of faith, but are born and brought to light by baptism (Augustine, *De*

Symbolo ad Catechumenos, bk. 4, ch. 1; Optatus, bk. 2, ch. 10; Pacianus, *Sermo de Baptismo*, n. 6). But those who are members of the Church are counted among her children and those born of her. Therefore the Roman Ritual in the rite of adult baptism—the adult having first been instructed and having made profession of belief—prescribes a prayer in which God is entreated that he may be renewed by the font of baptism and numbered among the members of the Church of God. Eugene IV, moreover, in the *Instructio pro Armenis*, teaches that men are made members of Christ and of the body of the Church through baptism. Therefore.

§ L

The second property of the Church is Holiness, and this is both essential to the Church herself and such that by divine promise it will always be present in the Church; and this holiness is necessarily connected with the authority instituted by Christ as with a subject principle, and cannot be had apart from it.

I. In creatures, that which is dedicated to God is called holy. Ethical holiness, proper to persons, cannot be had without assimilation to and union with God: it is generally the moral rectitude of a person before God. It is both habitual and actual; and indeed the intrinsic principle of actual rectitude, consisting in the exercise of the virtues, is contained in habits, which in the present supernatural order are the infused habits and sanctifying grace. This is personal holiness.

Real holiness can be distinguished as threefold: insofar as a thing is called holy because it is dedicated to divine worship, as temples and altars; or because it is in some way the principle of personal holiness, as sacraments and laws; or because it is the effect and sign of interior holiness and of the indwelling Holy Spirit, as the charisms of miracles are.

We claim both kinds of holiness—real and personal—for the Church: real holiness not only insofar as she is dedicated to God, but insofar as she is the principle of personal holiness; personal holiness not only insofar as there can be holy persons in her, but insofar as there actually always are. We call this holiness a property of the Church, but

with some distinction; for we call real holiness an essential property, such that the Church cannot exist or be conceived without it. Personal holiness, however—whether complete habitual holiness or actual holiness consisting in the exercise of the virtues—insofar as each of these is present not only in power (which is essential) but actually, we call a necessary property or rather quality, in that God willed and promised that it would be in his Church. We further assert that the holiness of the Church consisting in charisms is likewise a necessary property or quality for the same reason.

Moreover, with respect to holiness, it must be noted that the subject of which we predicate holiness is the Church as she is one society. But for the universal society to be called holy with actual personal holiness, 1° it is not necessary that individual members be holy or that they be holy with the perfect holiness that proceeds from habitual charity, or that all who are holy should persevere; but it suffices that there should perennially flourish in her, to a greater or lesser degree, the culture of the virtues—whether perfect virtues as in the just, or imperfect virtues as in those disposing themselves to justification—and that this holiness depend on an intrinsic principle of the society. 2° Nor is it necessary that in each and every age of her history there flourish an eminent and widely diffused culture of the virtues; it suffices, granted the continuation of the virtues in each individual age, that when all her ages are considered together, holiness can be predicated of the Church viewed as a whole. Nor 3° in order for the universal Church to be said to flourish in the culture of the virtues, is it necessary that there be in her more good members than bad; it suffices of itself that there absolutely be many who are good and that the exercise of the virtues be frequent, and that this proceed from the intrinsic principle of the Church that lays down the norm of holiness and supplies the means for attaining it. Hence the objection cannot be raised against what we are to demonstrate that perhaps, especially in certain ages, there are more evil than good. The reason for all of this is that the holiness asserted is the holiness of the whole body; and the denomination that is attributed to a society by reason of actual perfection need not be taken from the majority, but ought rather to be taken from that which, while being absolutely ample enough to pervade all ranks and conditions of the

society, coheres with the intrinsic principle of the society itself. We do not, however, concede that in the Church there are more who do evil than those who do good, whether perfectly or imperfectly. Moreover, since human virtue cannot be exercised without outwardly manifesting itself, and the Church is visible, this culture of the virtues must be outwardly manifest. We therefore maintain that the Church is holy both by reason of her essential nature and on account of the manifest culture of Christian virtues and on account of the heavenly charisms with which she will always shine. This is the first part of the thesis; and so:

II. The Church is essentially Holy. For all her intrinsic constitutive elements are holy: holy is the ministry given for the perfecting of the saints (Eph. 4:11); holy are the bonds by which the faithful are bound—the bond of faith, by which we please God; the bond of social unity, which proceeds from charity or leads to charity; the bond of the sacraments, by which worship is rendered to God and holiness is acquired by us; furthermore holy is the norm of morals, that is, the Gospel and the laws consonant with it proposed by infallible authority; holy is the material cause of the Church, namely the baptized, cleansed by the washing of water, children of God, who are therefore called holy. The final cause is holiness itself, begun in this life and consummated in the next; for this is why Christ gave himself for the Church, that he might sanctify her, that he might present to himself a glorious Church without spot or wrinkle. The Church, therefore, insofar as she is a society ordering individual men to a certain end and possessing within herself the means for this ordering and for the attainment of her end, is by her very essence holy. And insofar as holy is what is dedicated to God and consecrated to his worship, the Church is again essentially holy, because she is the temple of God, the house of God, the body of Christ, and the spouse of Christ.

III. Holiness consisting in the culture of the virtues can be distinguished as twofold, as we have already indicated. Namely, 1° that holiness, or that culture of the virtues and exercise of good acts, which faith and hope alone can produce; for these are truly virtues and can be the principle of other good acts, for example of penance. 2° That holiness, or that exercise of virtues and good acts, which presupposes habitual charity. These acts, if viewed externally, are difficult to

distinguish from the former; but they differ intrinsically, and not rarely can knowledge of them—or of the charity present inwardly—be obtained with human certainty, as is clear, for example, from the examination of virtues for canonization. Now we thus claim this second actual perfect holiness for the Church, so as not to exclude the former from our demonstration, nor to assign to the former the same amplitude as to the latter. For even by virtue of the former it can truly be said that the culture of the virtues flourishes in the Church. And this can certainly have its place in very many people; for many among those who sin continually do penance, the acts of which, in so many of the faithful, are certainly an ornament of the Church.

Christ indeed willed to permit it and foretold that evil men—and not a few of them—would be in his Church (but beware of confusing them with those who have been separated from it either by apostasy or excommunication); yet this does not prevent the holiness described from being present in the Church. Now it is necessary that the Church be not only by right but also in fact always such as God foretold and promised she would be; for prediction and promise refer to a fact, and this prediction and promise are a sign of the consequent and efficacious will of God. But it is necessary that the Church be such as God wills her to be by his consequent and efficacious will.

Now let these things be considered: a) 1 Tim. 4:10: *Christ is the savior of all men, especially of the faithful.* Eph. 5:23: *He is the savior of his body.* That is, all men indeed can be saved through Christ, and he wills by antecedent will that all be saved; but he actually saves the faithful. Now the salvation which Christ conferred on men, and which is properly called salvation, is perfect salvation; but this cannot exist without holiness and the exercise of the virtues. Therefore, just as it is certain that there will be those saved, so it is certain that there will be those who are actually perfectly holy. But how many does Christ save?—enough that he may be called the savior of his body. Therefore there will be so many holy persons that, on account of them and by reason of the actual exercise of the virtues, the universal Church considered according to the full extent of her duration can be called holy.

b) Matt. 13:24 ff. compared with vv. 35 ff.: from the parable of the weeds it is established that until the end of the world there will be good

seed in the field together with the weeds, that is, in the kingdom of Christ there will be sons of the Kingdom together with the evil. Now these sons of the Kingdom are the just, who at the consummation of the age will be separated from the evil through the ministry of the angels and will shine like the sun in the kingdom of God. Therefore until the end of the world those holy with perfect holiness will be in the Church. And they will be present always in an unbroken series, just as the good seed always grows in the field; for both begin to grow from the time they are sown and grow until the harvest; and it is the Son of Man who sowed the good seed, and the harvest is the consummation of the age. Therefore in every age the Church of Christ will flourish in the saints: "It is necessary therefore," says Augustine (*De Unitate Ecclesiae*, n. 33), "that both should grow throughout the world until the end of the age. Hence they are no longer permitted to suspect or assert what they say—that all the good have failed, so that only the party of Donatus remains." And indeed with regard to numbers, the proportion of the good to the evil will be as the proportion of the seed sown throughout the whole field to the weeds sown on top; which, when collated with the testimonies cited above, manifestly teaches that the multitude of the good seed, or the sons of the Kingdom, will always be such that, on account of the exercise of the virtues, the universal Church can be called holy.

Ephesians 5:23 ff.: having made a comparison between the love of Christ for the Church and the love of a husband for his wife, the Apostle among other things says (vv. 28–29): *he who loves his own wife loves himself. For no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, as Christ does the Church.* Now the love of Christ consists in this: that he gave himself for the Church, in order to sanctify her and to present her to himself glorious, without spot or wrinkle. Moreover, Christ nourishes and cherishes the Church because he loves her; he nourishes and cherishes her always, because he never hates her. And this nourishing and cherishing signifies the actual communication of the Spirit and of the gifts by which the flesh of Christ—that is, the Church—is actually animated and flourishes, that is, actual holiness unfolding itself through the exercise of the perfect virtues. Therefore the Church will flourish in every age in the culture of the virtues.

For indeed, according to the Fathers, the Church is the garden and paradise of God spread far and wide (Optatus, bk. 2, n. 11); she is the mountain containing many thousands of saints as cedars and lofty trees planted beside the streams of intelligible waters (Cyril of Alexandria, *In Amos*, 9:13, 15); she is the city of God, which in her better part has always remained with her author (Augustine, *In Psalmum* CXXXI); she is the winepress of the eternal fountain, in which the heavenly fruit overflows (Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto*, bk. 1, n. 1); and she is also called Catholic by this title, that she generally heals and cures every kind of sin committed through soul and body, and likewise possesses every kind of virtue in deeds and words and spiritual gifts of every sort (Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis* 18, n. 23).

The designation Holy given to the Church in the Creed signifies not only essential holiness but also this holiness consisting in the exercise of the virtues: "Honor, love, and proclaim the holy Church, your mother," says Augustine in expounding the Creed (*Sermo* 214, n. 11), "as the heavenly Jerusalem, the holy city of God. She is the one who bears fruit in this faith that you have heard and grows throughout the whole world; who tolerates in the communion of the sacraments the evil who are to be separated at the end, from whom she meanwhile departs by the dissimilarity of her conduct." And the author of the fourth *Sermo de Symbolo ad Catechumenos* (among the works of Augustine, vol. 6), n. 13: "The holy Church: the Church is the spiritual mother, the spouse of Christ, made white by his grace, endowed with his precious blood. She possesses in full all that she received from her husband as a dowry." And Cyril of Jerusalem in the cited catechesis, explaining the force of the words *the holy Church*, says: "For in the second Church—namely the Catholic Church—after the first (the Synagogue) was repudiated, God, as Paul says, appointed first Apostles… then gifts of healing… and every kind of virtue: wisdom, I mean, and understanding, temperance and justice, mercy and humanity, and invincible patience under persecutions." Cf. the Tridentine Catechism on this article in the Creed.

IV. But moreover, not only must perfect holiness generally be present in the Church; in addition, a certain eminent holiness, or an eminent culture of the virtues, which is proper to the Church and perseveres perpetually in her—though with lesser amplitude—must also

be present. This is clear from the fact that Christ willed that the culture of the counsels should also be present in his Church. Discussion of the principal counsels occurs in Matt. 19:12; 1 Cor. 7:23, 38; Matt. 10:9; Acts 2:44; Matt. 16:24; 19:21 (cf. Bellarmine, *De Monachis*, ch. 9). Now the following considerations persuade us that Christ wills the observance of these to flourish always in the Church—though not with the same amplitude as holiness in general, as the very nature of the counsels makes clear—and wills this not indeed by the force of an imposed obligation, but by a gentle and efficacious providence that brings it about. Christ, who loves his bride and nourishes and cherishes her, brings it about that she is holy according to the norm proposed by him in the Gospel; but this norm also embraces the counsels. Therefore. And in truth it is necessary that the Church, which is the body of Christ, should perennially reflect the life of its head; but Christ was the most perfect exemplar of all the counsels, and his entire life was woven through with their exercise. Therefore. Hence from the beginning of the Church the observance of the counsels has existed and has persevered without interruption, as the spontaneous effect of the Christian institution.

V. By charisms we understand the graces freely given, several of which the Apostle enumerates in 1 Cor. 12:28–30 and Christ in Mark 16:17–18, and which pertain especially to miracles. Concerning their possibility there is no need here to dispute philosophically. The rationalist Protestants who deny this possibility and therefore deny that miracles will be present in the Church of Christ do not deserve to be heard. The absence of miracles in their own assemblies has contributed not a little to their denial. Now there can be a double question: the first, whether there must simply be some charisms at least in the Church; the second, whether they must persevere with a certain continuity in her. Regarding this second question, there can certainly not be required a physical continuity without interruption, which the very nature of miracle—as something extraordinary—excludes, and which the end of these charisms in no way demands. But if the existence of such signs is connected by God with the supernatural life of the Church herself, that perseverance of them can be required by reason of which it may be said that the life of the Church is always the same and that she is thus the

same Church; and to obtain this it suffices that from time to time, according to the counsel of divine Providence, such signs should occur in the Church as occasion demands.

Now 1° it is certain that God willed that there should be such signs in the Church, by which her divine character would be proved; and for this to be true, it suffices that they existed from the origin of the Church by the divine will. Indeed the preaching of the Apostles was *not in the wisdom of men, but in the demonstration of the Spirit and of the power of God* (1 Cor. 2:4–5); and the powers of God are miracles (Matt. 11:21 and elsewhere). The Apostles preached everywhere, *the Lord working with them and confirming the word with the signs that followed* (Mark 16:20). And Christ foretold that this would happen (Mark 16:17 and John 14:12) and that he himself would do it; for miracles are effected efficiently by God alone. 2° From the same testimonies it is clear that the promise of signs made by Christ to his Church is not determinately bound to the origins of the faith but simply to the faith itself, by which the Church lives, as their divine confirmation. Now this bond requires that, with the same faith persevering, the working of signs should also persevere; for miracles have been established by God as signs of this supernatural life, and this life must always be manifest and in those ways in which God willed it to be shown. Therefore.

VI. We finally affirm that there exists by the institution of God a bond between the holiness we have described and the authority established by him in the Church, such that this authority is under God a certain principle of that holiness and holiness cannot be had apart from it. For the power instituted by Christ in the Church has been placed for the perfecting of the saints (Eph. 4:11); through it alone is true faith had, which is the beginning of holiness; from it alone are the sacraments legitimately received, by which legitimate reception interior holiness is obtained; it alone proposes in God's name and infallibly the certain norm of living according to the Gospel, so that the faithful may attain holiness and make progress in it; and the promise of the graces freely given has been made to that faith alone which the magisterium instituted by Christ teaches. Therefore, in order that all these goods may be had, they must be obtained through the mediation of this ministry

instituted by Christ, and apart from it they can only be had in appearance; just as apart from it there is no Church of Christ. Therefore.

§ LI

It is likewise a characteristic property of the Church of Christ that she be catholic not only by right but also in fact—that is, that she be contained within a communion that is absolutely broad and, relatively speaking, broader than any assembly that wrongly appropriates the name of Christian. Now, since in catholicity a material and a formal element are to be distinguished, the formal principle of catholicity must be the ecclesiastical power instituted by Christ.

I. Ὅλον means the whole, or the full and complete thing, when referred to its parts; and it means the whole, or the universal, when referred to species or individuals. Καθολικόν therefore signifies universality or fullness. Indeed, a manifold fullness and universality may be distinguished in the Church: namely, the fullness of saving doctrine, of sanctifying means, of the remote matter which is the human race, of the proximate matter which embraces all the orthodox; the fullness or universality of times; and finally the fullness or universality of places and nations—that is, chorographic and ethnographic fullness. We are not speaking here of the former kinds, which the Fathers repeatedly include in the term catholic, yet without excluding the last kind, which is indeed presupposed and implied. The question at hand is directly concerned with the last kind, with the second-to-last included as well: namely, whether it is proper to the Church of Christ that she be catholic by universality of places and nations, and indeed always so.

In order that the concept of catholicity may be clear, the following points must be noted. 1° Catholicity is of two kinds, one of right and one of fact: the former is the power and destination to occupy all places and to embrace all nations and all persons; the latter is the actual occupation of places and the actual embrace of persons. 2° It must be noted that on account of the malice of men, unbelievers entirely foreign to the Christian name, as well as heretics and schismatics, will always

exist to a greater or lesser degree until the final times (Matt. 16:18; Rom. 11:25; 1 Tim. 4:1; 2 Tim. 3:1; 2 Pet. 3:3; 1 Cor. 11:19). Therefore, in order for the Church truly to enjoy that catholicity which she has always claimed for herself, it cannot be required that absolutely all human beings belong to her in physical universality; for she never would have been, and perhaps never would be, truly catholic. 3° Just as the Church is sufficiently distinguished from the Synagogue and from all other sects of the gentiles by the fact that she is Christian, so she is specifically set apart from heretical and schismatic sects by the fact that she is catholic. Hence the Fathers frequently used this mark to distinguish her from heretical and schismatic sects. And indeed catholicity, having regard to the conditions of the Church, manifestly shows that the Spirit of God dwells in her and that she lives the divine life.

These things having been established, it must be said that catholicity negatively consists in this: that the Church neither by right nor in fact be restricted to a certain place and a certain nation, as was the Synagogue. Positively, it consists in this: that by right and capacity she extend herself to all places, all nations, and all persons; and that in fact she obtain a breadth that is morally universal. In order to explain this moral universality, absolute and relative catholicity must be distinguished. Relative catholicity consists in this: that the Church, which is called catholic, be broader than each of the other assemblies that appropriate the Christian name. Absolute catholicity consists in this: that the Church be so diffused throughout the world as to be visible in all places, and thus may morally be said to occupy τὴν οἰκουμένην. Thus the Church was called catholic by the Fathers, not because she was in all places and embraced all human beings, but because there was no principal part of the earth in which she did not exist, and she was conspicuous to all and easily accessible. It is clear, moreover, that the discussion concerns those places and nations that are known—those, namely, in regard to which the Church, which consists of human beings and acts in a human manner, is capable of exercising her mission. Furthermore, for the Church truly to embrace some nation, it is not necessary that all the persons of that nation belong to the Church. Nor therefore does the name of a place signify any smallest portion of the earth whatsoever, but that which corresponds to a people,

tribe, or nation. Nor is it necessary that the ruler or government be subject to the Church; nor consequently is account to be taken of that religious designation which is attributed to a nation on account of its government; rather, account must be taken of those who constitute that nation. Moreover, it must be recalled that all infants legitimately baptized among heretics and schismatics belong to the true Church; and that the same persons, when grown to adulthood, who hold the first rudiments of faith, so long as they are in good faith, are only apparently reckoned among heretics or schismatics, but in actual fact belong to the true Church of Christ—by desire, indeed, with respect to the external and visible society, but in act with respect to her interior soul (§ XI).

But since the Church exists through successive ages, catholicity is further distinguished into successive and simultaneous. It is successive if the Church obtains all nations one after another, so that receding from one she extends herself to another; it is simultaneous when she holds all nations, whether physically or morally all at once. Simultaneous catholicity, again, may be had either for one age only, or for several, or for all the ages in which the society exists. One would wrongly demand that actual catholicity be simultaneous with the very beginnings of that society which must be constituted from the union of human beings gathered by a few men chosen by God through the preaching of the word, which those few carry to all nations. But it suffices that actual catholicity be present when that first universal preaching has already taken place, which would have been sufficient for the attainment of this effect. This above all must be kept in view: that a catholic society cannot exist unless it is one and the same society diffused everywhere. Hence when catholicity is distinguished into material and formal—so that it is material if only extension is considered, formal if that which is extended is one and the same—this must be understood in such a way that what is called material catholicity is itself the matter of the catholic society. But if the matter is examined more deeply, it easily appears that catholicity is the terminus of that vitality by which the Church flourishes, through which she obtains an inexhaustible fecundity from herself, by which, in begetting children, she is able to enlarge herself without limit.

We say, therefore, that simultaneous and perennial catholicity both of right and of fact is a property of the Church—and indeed that catholicity of right is an essential property. For although Christ could have instituted the Church for some one nation or part of the human race alone, just as he could have willed of himself to redeem only certain human beings; yet, having regard to the proper end of this Church, which is the application of the fruit of redemption and the salvation of those who have been redeemed by Christ, it is clear that the Church of Christ is intrinsically such that she is destined for absolutely all human beings; hence she is necessary for all. Actual catholicity, however, which depends also upon the free will of human beings, could be absent while the same essence of the thing remained—just as universal diffusion with physical universality is absent. But it is the will of God that his Church be actually catholic as well; and this divine will does not injure human freedom, just as the will for the perpetuity of the Church does not injure it (§ 8). Actual catholicity is therefore a necessary property of the Church, and this we now defend. It must therefore be proved that actual catholicity, both absolute and relative, simultaneous and perennial, is a necessary property of the Church.

II. Indeed, if we consult the Scriptures, following the lead of Augustine in his *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, the Church must be such as she is described and promised in the law, in the Psalms, and in the Prophets; but there she is described and promised as simultaneously and perennially existing throughout the entire world: therefore. The testimonies are: Gen. 17:18; 22:18 (cf. Gal. 3:15); 49:10; Ps. 11:8; 21:28-29; 72:8; Isa. 2:2; 9:6; 18:6; Dan. 6:27; Mal. 1:11. In these, mutually compared, the following must be noted: 1° that the discussion is not only about right but also about fact, and this is stated expressly in many of them; 2° that the kingdom of Christ is presented as diffused everywhere and indeed simultaneously: *He shall rule from sea to sea and from the river to the ends of the earth* (Ps. 71:8); *All the ends of the earth shall remember and turn to the Lord* (Ps. 21:29); *I will give you the nations as your inheritance and the ends of the earth as your possession* (Ps. 2:8); *Their sound has gone forth into all the earth and their words to the ends of the world* (Ps. 18:3, cf. Rom. 10:18); *To the right and to the left you shall break forth, and your seed shall inherit the nations* (Isa. 54:3); 3°

this diffusion is presented as a proper endowment of the kingdom of the Messiah and as a sign that the Messiah has now come. But a) a sign of the coming of the Messiah cannot be referred to the end of the world; it must be morally conjoined with the very coming of Christ. b) Because this broad and simultaneous diffusion is presented as a quality proper to the kingdom attributed to the merits of Christ, it must, like the kingdom itself, be perennial; for the kingdom which Christ acquired for himself must endure with those endowments in which the character of reward chiefly consists. Again, the permanence of this universal diffusion is also indicated by Daniel 2:34-35, 44-45, where the stone that grew into a great mountain and filled the whole earth is Christ with his Church. Moreover, this vision signifies a kingdom that the God of heaven will establish, a kingdom that shall stand forever. That great mountain which fills the entire earth shall therefore stand forever: therefore. Furthermore, this diffusion of the Church (Mal. 1:11) is represented as being in every place (*in every place sacrifice is offered and made*), as simultaneous (*from the rising of the sun to its setting*), without any limitation of time (*sacrifice is offered and made*); but this is simultaneous and perennial diffusion: therefore.

Note that since the formulas *all nations*, *all peoples or tribes of the earth*, and the like, can be taken with either physical or moral universality, and since physical universality is excluded by other scriptural testimonies, it follows that they must be taken of moral universality.

If moreover we consult the sense of the Christian assembly, the same point will be established still more clearly. For the Church was always proclaimed by the Fathers as one that would be universal everywhere with regard to peoples and places, and was therefore called catholic under this explicit signification of being diffused everywhere, and was set in opposition to heretical and schismatic sects under the aspect of catholicity. Already in Ignatius, writing to the Smyrnaeans, no. 8, and in the letter of the Smyrnaeans on the martyrdom of Polycarp, the title of "catholic" appears. Its force is explained by the Fathers when they propose against heretics the faith of the whole Church and its catholicity. Thus Irenaeus, book 1, chapter 10: "This faith, having been received by the Church scattered throughout the whole world, she

guards diligently as if inhabiting one house, and believes these things alike as if having one soul and one heart, and she preaches and teaches these things harmoniously as if possessing one mouth. For although the languages in the world may differ, the power of tradition is one and the same. And neither the Churches established in Germany believe otherwise, nor those in the Iberias, nor those among the Celts, nor those in the East, nor those in Egypt, nor those in Libya, nor those established in the middle of the world; but as the sun in the whole world is one and the same, so also the preaching of truth shines everywhere." Optatus, book 2, no. 1: "So, that in a corner of Africa, in a nook of a little region, among you Donatists it can exist, will it not exist among us in another part of Africa? In the Spains, in the Gauls, in Italy where you are not, will it not exist? If you want it to be only among you, in the three Pannonias, in Dacia, Moesia, Thrace, Achaia, Macedonia, and in all of Greece, where you are not, will it not exist? That it may exist among you, in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Pamphylia, Phrygia, Cilicia, and in the three Syrias and in the two Armenias and in all Egypt and in Mesopotamia, where you are not, will it not exist? And through so many countless islands and the other provinces which can scarcely be numbered, where you are not, will it not exist? Where then will the property of the name be, since it is called catholic for this reason, that it is reasonable and diffused everywhere?"

Hence Augustine, *De utilitate credendi*, chapter 8: "Among the same Christians, although there are many heresies and all wish to appear catholic and call others besides themselves heretics, there is one Church, as all concede if you consider the whole world, more abundantly filled with multitude, and as those who know affirm, also more sincere in truth than all others. But the question of truth is another matter; as to what suffices for those who are seeking, there is one Church that is catholic, to which other heresies give diverse names, while each of them is called by its own name which it dare not deny." Wherefore, "If at any time," says Cyril of Jerusalem (*Catecheses* 18, no. 26), "you are a stranger in a city, inquire not simply where the Lord's house is, for the other sects of the impious and heretics too try to dignify their dens with the name of the Lord's house; neither inquire simply where the Church is, but where the Catholic Church is; for this is

the proper name of this holy Church and Mother of us all." Pacian, in his first letter to Sympronian who objected to the appellation of "catholic," notes that this name is used in order to distinguish the Church from other sects, and proves this usage from the practice of the ancients, adding: "Christian is my name, catholic my surname; the former designates me, the latter distinguishes me."

Hence Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, book 13, chapter 13, notes that Christ warned us not to listen to those who lead us into religious divisions, saying: *behold, here is Christ, behold there;* for they point to parts; whereas that city is set upon the mountain which was made a great mountain so as to fill the whole earth.

It follows therefore that whoever, after the preaching of the Apostles, does not show the Church of Christ to be diffused everywhere, does not show the Church of Christ. In this line of argumentation of the Fathers against heretics, the concept that the true Church always is and must be catholic is manifestly apparent. This doctrine is rendered evident, as I think, by Augustine's disputation with the Donatists. For they asserted that the true Church, which had previously been catholic in act, had been reduced in their time to a minimal portion of the world. Now, from the very fact that their sect was not then actually catholic, Augustine demonstrates that it was not the true Church of Christ. Nor does he argue only from the fact that their sect was confined to one corner of the world, but from the fact that it did not occupy the whole world; for such, he contends, the Church of Christ must be. But if it were possible for the true Church to cease to be actually catholic, Augustine's argumentation would rest on a false premise and would prove nothing. Yet Augustine's demonstration has always been approved by all Catholics. It is therefore true and catholic, as Augustine presupposed, that catholicity must belong to the true Church at every time. This was also presupposed by Epiphanius, *Heresies* 61, no. 2, who argues thus: "Is then the Church, which extends to both ends of the earth, cut off, and has it no longer gone into all the earth as their sound, and to the ends of the world their words; and does the saying of the Savior no longer hold good: you shall be my witnesses to the uttermost part of the earth?"

Moreover, the symbolic profession of faith is that we believe the Church to be catholic; this profession is found in several formulas of the creed and in the Nicene creed and those that follow it. What is signified by this appellation is established from the Fathers, who showed that they held catholicity to be a characteristic prerogative that would never be lacking to the true Church. Therefore, in that profession of faith, just as we believe in the Church not only as she was and will be, but also as she is present, so we believe the Church to be catholic not only as she was or will be, but as she presently is.

III. Since catholicity cannot exist unless there is one and the same society existing everywhere, nor therefore can it exist without a principle of unity, the catholicity of the Church cannot exist without that principle of its unity which Christ instituted. Now this is the very ecclesiastical power instituted by Christ in the Apostles, as is already clear from what has been said above. Therefore, apart from this power, with formal catholicity lacking, either there is in reality no catholicity at all or it is not the catholicity that Christ willed to exist. This same formal principle of catholicity is likewise the principle of the Church's fecundity; for only to those Pastors, Teachers, and sanctifiers sent by himself did Christ promise his perennial assistance in the preaching of the word and the propagation of the Church. Therefore only that Church which obeys the ministry instituted by Christ can be catholic.

Note. Although, on the hypothesis that the Church which was actually catholic were, by some accident, in some age restricted to a small number, she might still be said to be the catholic Church—that is, to be that very same Church which was actually catholic and which by right always remains catholic (which appears to be the opinion of Bellarmine, *De Ecclesia*, book 4, chapter 7, following others)—nevertheless, from what has been said, it must be denied that in this case the Church is catholic in the manner that Christ willed, which consists in this: that the Church be always actually such, not merely be that which once was such or is capable of being and ought to be such.

§ LII

Among the properties of the Church must be counted this: that she be Apostolic—that is, founded by the Apostles, governed by the successors of the Apostles who are such not merely materially but formally, in such a way that her authority is traced back to the Apostles through an unbroken succession of Pastors.

I. The Church is called Apostolic on three grounds: by reason of origin, insofar as she proceeds from the Apostles; by reason of doctrine, insofar as she professes the faith handed down by the Apostles; by reason of ministry or governance, insofar as she is governed and pastored by those who are the successors of the Apostles in a continuous series. If this third element is present, the first two are also present: for apostolic origin is certainly present, since the series of succeeding Pastors began from the Apostles; and apostolic doctrine is also present, since infallibility has been promised to the continuous series of the successors of the Apostles.

But for these elements to be present, it is necessary that the third element exist not only materially but also formally—that is, that there be a formal succession of Pastors. Material succession is the mere successive series of Pastors or Bishops uninterrupted back to the Apostles or to one of the Apostles from whom it began. Formal succession is this series which, moreover, possesses the authority derived from the Apostles into each individual successor; for by this authority the successors are formally constituted such, and therefore each of them individually receives the authority derived from the Apostles from those who hold and can communicate this same authority in act. For it is in this way that authority formally perseveres through succession. Both kinds of succession are necessary, and one cannot exist without the other; yet the former is the better known, while the latter is known when the true Church is known. Since we are here treating of a property, we consider and vindicate it in its fullness.

Omitting the special discussion of apostolicity by reason of origin and doctrine, which Socinians and Protestants do not deny, we prove apostolicity by reason of ministry, which the same deny, contending that

once the Word of God has been preached in the world through the Apostles and committed to writing, whoever understands it has the faculty of teaching it to others and of gathering communities of the faithful which constitute the Church of Christ.

II. Indeed, 1° material succession is required. For Christ instituted the Apostolic ministry and willed it to be perpetual: *behold*, he said, *I am with you all days*, etc. But it would not be perpetual if the ministers of the Church were not the successors of the Apostles in a continuous series: therefore. Likewise, the Church must be one and always the same. Now the principle of the unity of the Church is the ministry instituted by Christ; therefore one ministry must always exist in the Church. It is necessary therefore that the Church be governed by that ministry which Christ first entrusted to the Apostles. But this cannot come about unless she is always governed by those who derive in a continuous series from the Apostles; for if she is governed by others who cannot be traced back to the Apostles, she is in reality governed by a ministry that begins from itself, not by that which Christ instituted. There would accordingly be a multiplicity of authorities, and the Church would cease to be one and would become manifold, the principle of unity being multiplied. From this it is also clear that the series of successors must never be interrupted; for if it ever ceases, that ministry by which the Church is to be governed ceases, the principle of her unity ceases, and consequently the Church herself ceases. But if the Church ever ceases, she can no longer be restored; for the efficient principle of her existence is the Apostolic ministry of teaching, governing, and sanctifying, which in this hypothesis would no longer exist. Now, ministers cannot be born from themselves; for the ministry must be Apostolic, and in order to be Apostolic it must be derived through the channel of succession: "If they were contaminated by association with the wicked, then even at that time," he says to the Donatists, "there was no Church; tell me: from where did you come? Where did the origin of Donatus spring? Where was he baptized, where ordained?"—so Augustine addresses the Donatists in *De Baptismo*, book 2, chapter 6.

2° Moreover, this succession must be formal. For formal succession is the true succession, so that material succession alone is succession only in appearance. The Church must be governed, as we

have said, always and by that authority alone which Christ instituted; for authority in the Church is supernatural and can proceed from God alone. And in order that the Church may be perpetually governed by this authority, there exists a perpetual series of successors. It is therefore necessary that successors receive from those who hold this authority—derived in themselves from the Apostles—the same authority which the Apostles possessed. Now for one who succeeds to possess authority, it is necessary that he receive it from those who hold it as derived from the Apostles into themselves and can communicate it; for he cannot acquire it from himself, since then he would not be a successor; nor can he borrow it from one in whom it has not been derived from the Apostles, since then he would not be receiving Apostolic authority; nor does it suffice that he be said to receive it from one who once held it, since authority itself can be lost; nor does it suffice that he be said to receive it from one who holds it but cannot communicate it, since then he would receive nothing in reality. Therefore. Now this is formal succession. For in order that anyone may have authority in the Church, a mission is required (Rom. 10:15, cf. 1 Tim. 5:22; 2 Tim. 2:2; Tit. 1:3); and only one who both holds Apostolic authority in act and can communicate it to others can send; hence authority must be received from him; hence a successor must succeed formally. Therefore those alone who succeed in this way can truly be called successors of the Apostles, since they alone possess the authority which the Apostles received from Christ.

The necessity of Apostolic succession was demonstrated with great clarity by our Fathers, who held it as the hallmark of true doctrine, which can exist only in the Church. Thus Tertullian, *De Praescription-ibus*, chapter 32: "But if any heresies dare to insert themselves into the Apostolic age, so that they might appear to have been handed down by the Apostles because they existed in the time of the Apostles; we can say: let them then produce the origins of their Churches, let them unroll the order of their Bishops running down from the beginning in unbroken succession, so that that first Bishop had as his author and predecessor some one of the Apostles or of Apostolic men who persevered with the Apostles. For this is how the Apostolic Churches present their records." Hence, besides this, they preserved catalogues of successions with the utmost care, in order to protect the true Church

and the true tradition: "We are able," says Irenaeus, book 3, chapter 3, "to enumerate those who were appointed Bishops by the Apostles and their successors down to our own time, who taught nothing of this kind." And Optatus, in the controversy about the true Church, appeals to the Roman succession and enumerates its Bishops one by one down to his own time, book 2, chapter 2. So too Augustine in the *Psalm against the party of Donatus*. Nor does it stand in the way of this succession that valid ordination is required, whose validity in individual cases may not be certain. For even if it is not certain in individual cases, it is nevertheless certain in the assembly as a whole (§ X); and jurisdiction, moreover, can be had even without the episcopal character.

Now the succession which the Fathers declared necessary is not merely material but formal. For Cyprian argued from it in *Letter* 76: "The Church is one, which can be both within and cannot be without. For if it is with Novatian, it was not with Cornelius. But if it was with Cornelius, who succeeded Bishop Fabian by lawful ordination, Novatian is not in the Church; nor can one who has not been ordained in the Church be counted as a Bishop, who, despising the evangelical and apostolic tradition, succeeding to no one, arose from himself. For one who has not been ordained in the Church can in no way possess or hold the Church." And Gregory of Nazianzus, in his *Oration in Praise of Athanasius*, no. 8, distinguishes between succession in name only and true and real succession: "For one who has forced his way in is not to be reckoned a successor, but one who has suffered violence; not one who has violated the laws, but one who has been legitimately elected; not one who holds contrary doctrines, but one endowed with the same faith; unless perhaps someone would say successor in the sense in which we say that disease succeeds to health, darkness to light, storm to tranquility, and madness to wisdom." And indeed even Bishops among the schismatics and those outside the Church were reckoned as such, although they had been initiated in the sacrament of orders and appointed in place of those who had died—because, namely, they were not legitimately called, not sent by legitimate authority; because, as Cyprian says in *De Unitate Ecclesiae*: "with no one conferring the episcopate, they assume the name of Bishop."

Wherefore the Church always took the greatest care that formal succession should be secure. To this end there tend: 1° the Apostolic Canon 4 and the Nicene Canon 2, prescribing that the election of a Bishop be made by the Bishops of the Province and that the Metropolitan confirm the election. 2° The practice of synodal letters, which elected Bishops of the primatial sees sent to their colleagues and especially to the Roman See, also making profession of their faith, so that it might be established that they were in communion with the Catholic Church and their names might be entered in the diptychs. 3° The confirmation of the election of Bishops of the primatial sees, which was performed by the Bishop of Rome, an example of which is furnished by Damasus, *Letter* 5 to Ascholius, Leo in the case of Anatolius, *Letter* 104, and Simplicius in the case of John, elect Bishop of Alexandria, *Letter* 17 (cf. Leo IX, *Letter* to Peter of Antioch), which primatial Bishops in turn confirmed the other Bishops subject to themselves, as is established from the letter of Innocent 24 to Alexander, Bishop of Antioch, no. 1. See also for subsequent ages Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida, *Against the Simoniacs*, book 3, chapters 10 and 11, disputing against the investitures which secular Princes usurped in the appointment of the ministers of the Church.

And indeed from this property of the Church—that she must be Apostolic—it necessarily follows that Princes have no right whatsoever in appointing Bishops and the other ministers of the Church. For those who would be appointed by them would not receive Apostolic authority and hence would not be successors of the Apostles. Even if Princes do not arrogate to themselves the right of instituting the ministers of the Church, but merely act to hinder ecclesiastical freedom in their election and institution, they sin in the first place against the freedom of the Church, which is entirely independent of them in this matter (§ XVIII); and they also oppose the Apostolicity of the Church, for Bishops so elected against the will of the Church cannot be reckoned among the successors of the Apostles, since they are not to be considered as having received Apostolic authority from those who hold it and can communicate it. Hence the abuse of such investitures of itself tended to subvert the entire Church completely; for there is no Church that is not Apostolic.

What has been set forth thus far we judge to be sufficient for obtaining a distinct notion of the Church of Christ, such as is required for the treatise that follows. If you desire a treatment of the Notes of the Church, we shall give it after the completion of the following treatise; for we consider the first note to be the Primacy of Peter and his successors.

END OF THE PROLEGOMENON.

ON THE ROMAN PONTIFF

PROOEMIUM
ON THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH, OR ON THE ROMAN PONTIFF

In the prolegomenon we saw that the entire Church of Christ is originally grounded in the authority established by Christ himself. This authority—whether for enacting laws, for teaching, or for sanctifying—is found distributed among several persons, that is, among the bishops. There remains, therefore, one further and supremely important question. For in order to have a true notion of the Church, which depends entirely on authority, it is necessary to know more precisely the subject of jurisdictional authority in the Church. The question is, specifically, whether all bishops participate in authority equally, whether one among them excels—whether in honor alone or also in jurisdiction—and indeed in such a way that he holds merely a pre-eminent share, or in such a way that the whole of jurisdiction originates from him. The question is whether the faithful are subjects immediately of their individual pastors and mediately, through those pastors, of that one supreme head, or whether all alike—both the sheep and the shepherds—are equally and immediately subject to that one head; so that, just as we have seen that the authority instituted by Christ is in general terms the efficient principle of the unity and other properties of the Church under God, so when this is grasped more distinctly, that very thing must be affirmed as such of the supreme authority of the one head. In other words, the question that remains concerns the authority that is to be claimed, by the institution of Christ, for the Roman Pontiff as the

successor of Peter. It is therefore impermissible to tear the treatise on the Roman Pontiff away from the treatise on the Church, as though these were two separate subjects, independent of each other—whereas on the contrary nothing belongs more essentially to the Church than its very Foundation and Head; and just as, in the teaching of Augustine in *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, chapter 4, the whole Christ is head and body, which body is the Church, so conversely the whole Church is body and head—the head being Christ invisibly (cf. 1 Corinthians 12:12), and his Vicar visibly.

No one is unaware of how great the importance of this treatise is. "The privilege of the Roman Church," St. Peter Damiani wrote in his letter to Hildebrand the archdeacon, concerning his legation to Milan, "its immense power for preserving the rule of canonical equity and justice, and the vigor it contains for ordering the discipline of the ecclesiastical state, is clearly grasped only by one who has been accustomed to laboring in ecclesiastical affairs. Whoever has no experience of it will think little of it; one who has exercised himself in it will embrace it… I would not inappropriately compare the privilege of the Roman Church to weapons; for while this one Church, made the head of all the Christian religion through the chair of Blessed Peter, governs all the churches throughout the world—like a commander standing before the ranks of the faithful, fortified by squadrons and secured by the authority of a special prerogative—it both cuts off with the evangelical sword the necks of those who resist the truth, and rallies the entire army of Christ to fight invincibly in the unity of one charity and one faith. You, pondering this subtly, as you ponder many other things, often asked me out of charity, which surpasses all things, that as I went through the decrees and acts of the Roman Pontiffs, I should diligently excerpt from various places whatever seemed to belong specially to the authority of the Apostolic See, and gather it into a small volume in the manner of a new compilation." Now this counsel of the most holy Archdeacon, which St. Peter had at first disregarded, he at length most fully approved, when, as he himself relates, in the course of his Milanese legation "he clearly perceived how much it avails, in ecclesiastical affairs, to know the privilege of the Roman Church." We are taught this even by the enemies of Religion. For following Marsilius

of Padua, Luther, Richer, De Dominis, Salmatius, Febronius, the Jansenists, and the Regalists, they have combined their forces and are now making an assault upon the one chair of Peter, striving either to utterly overthrow its jurisdiction or at least to diminish it. For this reason we shall set ourselves to declare and to vindicate, each in its turn, the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff and his prerogatives, to the best of our ability. (The name "jurisdiction" is rejected by Febronius along with others in *De statu Ecclesiae*, chapter 2, §1, who prefers to use the word "authority," supporting himself with the example of the Council of Trent, Session 6, preface on Reform, and Session 25, chapter 21. Those who know Latin and are not ignorant of the system of Febronius will understand why one term rather than the other is preferred by persons of this kind. We therefore shall prefer to use the term "jurisdiction": because it is established by ecclesiastical usage, because it expresses the truest meaning, and because it does not please the heretics.)

Since all the prerogatives of the Roman Pontiff are those which Christ conferred upon Peter, and since these are most certainly known to us from Scripture, we shall begin the treatise with the Primacy of Peter itself, which we shall demonstrate from Scripture. For two questions are to be distinguished, if the inquiry into truth is to be full and accurate: the first asks whether the Primacy was promised and conferred upon Peter personally; the second asks whether Peter ought to have perpetual successors in the Primacy. Dr. Langen, however, preferred to confuse these two questions, in order more easily to cast darkness over the truth. We shall demonstrate the Primacy of Peter from Scripture, making use also of the exegetical tradition of the Fathers, according to whose norm Catholics are bound to expound the oracles of Scripture. This exegetical tradition, therefore—that is, the interpretive tradition of the Fathers—will serve us as a rule for expounding the testimonies of Scripture; yet in such a way that simultaneously, by applying certain definite principles of interpretation, we shall demonstrate scientifically (for this is the proper work of the theologian) that the oracles of Scripture agree with the tradition of the Fathers, and that the interpretation of the Fathers is altogether legitimate. We note, moreover, that the principal difficulties which are drawn from ecclesiastical history, from the opinions of certain Fathers,

and from the acts of certain Pontiffs, we defer to the second part, in which we treat of the Roman Pontiff directly—both because that is the proper place for them, and so that we need not repeat the same things twice.

WE NOW TURN TO PART ONE OF THIS TREATISE

PART ONE
ON THE PRIMACY OF BLESSED PETER

CHAPTER ONE
THE INSTITUTION OF THE PRIMACY OF THE MOST BLESSED SAINT PETER

THESIS I

It is to be maintained that, "according to the testimony of the Gospel (Matt. 16:16-19), the primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church of God was promised immediately and directly to the blessed Apostle Peter by Christ the Lord" (First Vatican Council, Session 4, chapter 1).

DECLARATION. By these words the Fathers of the Vatican Council testify: 1° that in the cited scriptural testimony there is contained the promise of the primacy of jurisdiction made to Peter by Christ, and that this promise can and must therefore be proved from Scripture; 2° that this primacy is a primacy not merely of honor but of jurisdiction over the universal Church of God; and 3° that this same primacy was promised immediately and directly to blessed Peter. To explain this third point: the words of Christ containing the prerogative of the primacy are referred to the singular person of Peter and to him alone, not to the other Apostles together with Peter; and therefore the promise of the primacy was made to the singular person of Peter alone. Hence the primacy promised to Peter was promised immediately—that

is, not through the mediation of the Apostles or of the Church, to whom it was first promised—and directly—that is, to him alone, not insofar as he was one thing together with the others, but insofar as he was a person distinct from the others. Now when it is said that the primacy was promised to the singular person of Peter alone, his successors are not excluded—who are from him and are virtually contained in him (though we are not yet disputing about this succession)—but the other Apostles who were with him are excluded, as are the rest of the faithful, as if the power of jurisdiction had been promised to them together with him and in him. Likewise, when it is said that it was promised to the singular person of Peter alone, it is not meant that this person, according only to what he naturally has, received the promise of the primacy, or that the primacy is to be a gift belonging to a private person; rather, it is meant that the unique person of Peter, endowed indeed with his own faith, and this person who is antecedently by himself a private person, is consequently to become through the primacy also a public person in the society of which he is to hold the supreme power. Finally, when it is said that the primacy was promised immediately and directly to blessed Peter—which certainly had to be promised immediately and directly either to one singular person or to several—account is taken of the subject in whom the primacy is to inhere, not of the subject for whose benefit and welfare it was promised, which subject is the universal Church and each of the faithful. Accordingly, we do not deny that the promise was made mediately—that is, through another—and indirectly—that is, by reason of another for whom the primacy was promised—to the Church, for whose benefit it was made and in which the one who would hold the primacy was to be as its principal member.

There are, moreover, those who contend that the words of Christ which they concede were addressed to Peter were spoken to Peter insofar as he represented the entire college of the Apostles, indeed the entire Church contained in him, and therefore that whatever power is expressed in the words of Christ was promised immediately and directly to all the Apostles together or to the universal Church. Whence it follows that no special power above the other Apostles was promised to the singular person of Peter, and that it is false that the primacy of jurisdiction over the Apostles and the universal Church was promised

to him. The Catholic doctrine is to be defended by an accurate interpretation of the words of Christ, and we shall expound all parts of Christ's speech one by one.

DEMONSTRATION I. Matt. 16:13 seq. Jesus came into the parts of Caesarea Philippi and asked his disciples, saying: *Who do men say that the Son of man is? But they said: Some John the Baptist, and others Elijah, and others Jeremiah or one of the prophets. Jesus says to them: But who do you say that I am? Simon Peter answered and said: You are the Christ, the Son of the living God.* The interpretation which several heretics apply to these last words is that Peter answered in the name of the other Apostles, inasmuch as he either spoke for all as delegated by them, or at least inasmuch as he, more fervent than the rest and understanding the common sentiment of the Apostles, gave expression to it before them. Catholics deny this and contend that this confession was Peter's own, entirely independent of any delegation or of a previously known sentiment of the Apostles—which may be true even if the Apostles had already previously known the truth which Peter now confesses. It is not said, therefore, that knowledge of this truth was first obtained at that moment and its confession first given, but it is said that on this occasion Peter's confession proceeded from him independently of any delegation by the Apostles or of any sentiment previously known from them.

For 1° what they imagine, the words of the Evangelist do not explicitly say; indeed 2° they most evidently implicitly deny it. For the whole context is opposed to this interpretation. a) Christ first asks all his disciples in general: *Who do men say that the Son of man is?* and likewise asks all of them a second time: *But who do you say that I am?* Now to the first question all of them answer without distinction: *But they said*, etc. And it makes no difference whether by the distributive *some* the Evangelist distributes the Apostles—which is the more probable—or the men whose various opinions the Apostles collectively report. No one therefore had been appointed by them to answer in the name of all, and it is a fiction that this was the Apostles' custom. Did they, on this occasion, after the first question of Christ, to which they answered in common, delegate their turn to Peter? But this is to divine,

not to interpret. The hypothesis of delegation is therefore excluded by the antecedents.

But both this hypothesis and the other are also excluded by what follows. b) Having received Peter's response, 1° Christ declares Peter blessed: *Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona*, by which words Peter is greatly praised—μακάριός ει; for μακάριος is truly said of one who is beyond all praise (Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, book 1, chapter 12: τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλά μείζον τι καὶ βέλτιον· καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται, τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν, καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν). But Christ does not say that the other Apostles are blessed; yet if this confession belonged to all the Apostles, there would be no reason why Peter alone should be called blessed; for it is not the outward expression of the confession by word of mouth that is praised, but the confession itself. Peter therefore did not speak as the delegate of the others. 2° Christ, giving the reason for Peter's blessedness, says: *because flesh and blood* (flesh in Scripture, beyond its primary and proper meaning, signifies also the whole man (Gen. 6:12; John 1:14), human nature as corrupted and vitiated, the fount of all sin and baseness, or the very principle in man inclining to sin—whether conjoined with the act (Gen. 6:3) or viewed as in potency—whence the works of the flesh are described in Gal. 5:19, and the phrases to be in the flesh (Rom. 7:5), to walk, to live, to think according to the flesh (2 Cor. 10:2; Rom. 8:12; 2 Cor. 1:17), and the prudence and wisdom of the flesh (Rom. 8:6-7); and it also signifies human nature as in itself powerless and weak (Jer. 17:5), and generally what is weak, as Isa. 31:3, being opposed in both these latter meanings to the spirit (Gal. 6:16-17), to the prudence of the Spirit, to the law of God (Rom. 8:6-7), to divine wisdom and power (Jer. 17:5, cf. Job 10:4). Likewise, the phrase flesh and blood signifies human nature simply viewed physically (Heb. 11:14), or human nature as vitiated and the doer of evil works, and those evil works themselves (Eph. 6:12; 1 Cor. 15:10; Gal. 1:16), or that same nature as viewed in itself without divine aid, as infirm and weak. In this sense Lightfoot testifies that this phrase was frequently used by the Talmudists in their commentary on this passage, using it to oppose man to God. And this is its sense in this passage of Matthew; for it signifies human nature according to its purely natural powers, as is clear from its

opposition to God and his supernatural illumination) *has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven*, by which words there is excluded even the manifestation of the truth made through the Apostles; for since at that time the Apostles had not yet been endowed with the charism of infallibility, their authority was still human and weak—flesh and blood; and at the same time the heavenly manifestation of the truth made to Peter is asserted, a manifestation moreover that was immediate: *My Father has revealed it to you;* he does not say to you all but *to you;* where the one manifesting the truth is presented as the Father alone, not the Apostles, and the one to whom the revelation was made is presented as Peter alone. Peter therefore did not receive this knowledge from the Apostles, nor did the Father reveal it to the Apostles and through them to Peter; rather, the Father revealed it to Peter immediately. 3° This revelation is presented as the cause of Peter's confession; for this revelation is the reason why Peter is praised. But the mere revelation of the Father without the faith applied by Peter to the revealing Father would not have been the reason why he was praised, if he had not believed; since therefore Peter is praised, he is also praised on account of his own faith and confession. He is praised because the Father revealed it to him; he is therefore praised on account of the revelation together with its effect—that is, united with his faith. Thus the faith and confession of Peter are presented by Christ as the effect of the Father's revelation. If therefore the Father's revelation was made to Peter and was made to him immediately and was the cause of his confession, the confession of Peter is presented as having been his own. Therefore it was not given by him in the name of the other Apostles, from whom he had received a delegation, or whose previously known sentiment Peter expressed.

Nor are those to be heard who trace the reason why Peter himself answered to his fervor; for 1° there is no mention of this fervor here; 2° Christ expressly teaches another cause, namely the revelation of the Father; 3° natural fervor could contribute nothing to the having of supernatural knowledge; and a certain supernatural fervor presupposes knowledge received by revelation, whence such fervor could have accompanied the confession as its mode, but not preceded it as its cause. Certain Fathers, moreover, speak of such fervor. But if it is said that the

supernatural fervor was the cause of Peter's answering first before all, who could equally have answered, and of his being the one to answer—we reply that this is not relevant to the question we are treating, namely whether the confession of Peter was his own; as is clear from the following remark, which we have already anticipated above.

For it is established that the demonstration given of our interpretation is independent of the question whether before this occasion someone else knew and confessed what Peter now confesses (John 1:49), or whether the Apostles themselves already believed it and were prepared to confess it now; for in order that the confession given by Peter should have been his own, this alone is required: that Peter gave his confession not in dependence upon the delegation or knowledge received from others at that moment, but in dependence only upon the impulse of the Holy Spirit, or the revelation of the Father, in whom he then actually believed. And this is clearly established from the words of Christ.

Moreover, even granted the hypothesis that someone else had previously known and confessed what Peter now confesses, it is not our task to investigate why Christ, in recompensing Peter and not another, conferred upon him those prerogatives which we shall see in what follows; for God is the master of his gifts, and the ultimate reason for conferring them is always the generous goodness of God.

The interpretation we have given is confirmed by the Fathers, among whom are Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catecheses* 11, *On the Only-begotten Son of God*, no. 3; Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, book 6, no. 37; Basil of Seleucia, *Oration* 25 on the text *Who do men say that the Son of man is;* Asterius, *Homily on the Holy Princes of the Apostles*—all of whom say that Peter, while the other Apostles were hesitating and silent, understood the divinity of Christ beyond the measure of human infirmity through the revelation of the Father; and they agree with Ambrose, who says in *In Lucam*, book 6, no. 97: "Peter did not wait for the opinion of the people, but put forth his own, saying: You are the Christ the Son of the living God."

Thus the confession given by Peter was his own, and was not a confession given in the common name of the Apostles—that is, Peter

gave his confession neither in dependence upon their delegation nor upon any knowledge communicated by them.

Must we therefore grant in no sense that Peter gave his confession in the common name, as sustaining the person of all the Apostles, which certain Fathers seem to assert?

A twofold representation must be distinguished. The first is simple, which may be called symbolic, consisting in the fact that a sign is substituted for the thing signified: according to this Peter would have represented the Apostles in the sense of being as it were a sign substituted for them both by them and by Christ, so that whatever he himself says and whatever Christ says to him pertains in reality to all the Apostles. The other representation is said to be from authority or juridical, by which the head of some society, as head, 1° represents the society itself, which it contains virtually, 2° also represents its own successors, who by reason of the same power are one moral person together with it. Now when the question is asked whether Peter represented the Apostles and the Church, a twofold moment must be distinguished: when he was giving the confession, and when he was receiving from Christ the promise of the primacy. If the question concerns the representation at the time of receiving the promise of the primacy, this question will be dealt with at the end of this thesis. If, however, the question concerns the representation he bore when he gave the confession, the answer must be: 1° it was not a purely symbolic representation, for he did not speak in the name of the Apostles nor did Christ ask one person to answer for all, but asked all indiscriminately; 2° juridical representation, which belongs to the head of a society with respect to the society itself and its successors, cannot be conceived as actually present in the person of Simon except after he has been endowed with the primacy, and in potency only after the very promise of the primacy itself; though it can be conceived as present in the person of Simon by a certain divine designation already at this point: 1° because the imposition of the name Peter, in which the primacy is contained, had already been promised to the person of Simon; 2° on account of the confession itself, insofar as it proceeded from the revelation of God the Father; for the revelation was directed, by divine intention, toward this end: that Peter, confessing the divinity of Christ,

should receive the promise of the primacy and should finally be endowed with it—"so that, prepared for the governance of the whole Church, he might first learn (with the Spirit of the Father working in the heart of the believer) what he would teach, and that, for the sake of the solidity of the faith which he was to preach, he might hear: *You are Peter*, etc."—Leo the Great, *Sermon* 62 (or 60). Wherefore when it is said that Peter, as the prince of the Apostles and the supreme herald of the Church or the mouth of the Apostles, gave his confession (Cyril of Jerusalem, *loc. cit.;* Chrysostom, *Homily on the words: I withstood him to his face*), this is affirmed either by reason of the designation, or by a kind of anticipation.

II. *And I say to you, that you are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church.* Κἀγὼ δέ σοι—*but I also to you;* in which words the particle *and* retains its generic force of coupling, while at the same time signifying a return and recompense, being equivalent to *in turn.* The phrase *and I say* is either opposed to the Father as revealing, and the sense is what Leo the Great expressed in *Sermon* 3 of his consecration: "As my Father has manifested to you my divinity, so I make known to you your own excellence"; or it is opposed to Peter as confessing, and the sense is: as you, with the Father revealing, have declared my divinity, so I declare to you your own dignity. Both senses are legitimate, and each is contained within the other, as is easily apparent.

By these words therefore—*And I say to you, that you are Peter*—Christ affirms that Simon is Peter; and just as he had previously promised him this name (John 1:42), so now he actually imposes it; and because the imposition of a name by God is not empty and sterile, but efficacious and connected with reality (cf. Gen. 17:5; 32:28), Christ therefore says that Simon is Peter—that is, that he is what is metaphorically signified by the name Peter. The understanding of this name as imposed, however, depends upon the understanding of the words that follow, in which Christ explains the force of the name.

The question therefore concerns the words *And upon this rock I will build my Church.* The question is: 1° what is the subject to which the word *rock* refers; and 2° what is signified by this metaphor. The adversaries are divided into several opinions. Some 1° hold that Peter and the rock are different subjects, that Peter is indeed Simon, but as to

who the rock is, their opinion is not uniform. Their interpretations come down to the following: some interpret it of the very person of Christ (1 Cor. 10:4; 3:11); others of the subjective, solid, and divine faith and its confession, such as was Peter's, upon which the Church rests and which is common to many; others of the objective faith or the doctrine of Christ, upon which the Church likewise rests, and specifically of the doctrine about Christ's divinity; others of Peter's confession taken both objectively and subjectively—that is, of Christ as the foundation of the Church and his proclamation through Peter; others of all the Apostles together with Peter (Eph. 2:20). Those who 2° concede that Peter himself is the subject mean by it that prerogative of Peter by which he was chosen before others to begin the preaching first and to open the door of the Church first to the Hebrews and to the Gentiles. There are also those who note that πέτρα is a stone that is thrown and rolled, and that the metaphor therefore signifies the faith of Peter, which was to be spread throughout the whole world—first by Peter himself and then by others preaching after him.

The Catholic interpretation is that the subject immediately designated by the word *rock* is the same as the subject designated by the word *Peter;* and therefore Peter and Rock are taken for the same subject, and this metaphor signifies that the same relationship of Peter to the Church is that of a foundation to a building, as will be explained below. As to the first point, therefore, it must be held that the question is not merely about where Simon derives the dignity and name of rock, but only about to whom the words *upon this rock* immediately refer. Now that it is Simon Peter himself is demonstrated as follows.

a) Christ spoke in Aramaic or Syriac; and in that language there is but one word, כֵּיפָא, corresponding to both Peter and Rock. Christ therefore used the same word: *you are Kepha* and *upon this Kepha;* and accordingly the Syriac translator of Matthew also used the same word: ܐܢܬ ܗܘ ܟܐܦܐ ܘܥܠ ܗܕܐ ܟܐܦܐ. In Greek, moreover, πέτρος and πέτρα differ not in substance but in ending, and both words signify a stone, rock, or crag, although πέτρα is more common. There was indeed a reason why the Greek translator of Matthew used the masculine ending in the first instance; for Simon was commonly called Πέτρος by

Greek speakers (John 1:42), which was the rendering of the name Kepha (the reason why the Greeks translated the name Kepha as πέτρος rather than πέτρα is to be traced to the fact that, since both words signify the same thing, the former nevertheless agreed better with the masculine gender of a man's name). It was necessary, however, to show that the name Πέτρος contains a mystery, and that this mystery is what Christ signified by the words ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ οἰκοδομήσω μου τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν; and in order to set this before the eyes, it was necessary to use the name Peter in the first instance, so that it might be understood that what follows is the interpretation of this man's name. Thus, if we consider the meaning of the words (for of this account must be taken in interpretation), the words of Christ are equivalent to saying: *you are Rock, and upon this Rock*, etc. If this is so, 1° all grammatical reason for doubting the identity of the subject ceases, and 2° there is reason for affirming that the subject is the same, since the same name occurs.

b) The demonstrative pronoun *this* denotes a present thing, either present in reality or made present to the hearers through speech. This can happen in two ways: either by immediately appending what the speaker wishes to present (Lev. 14:2: *This is the rite of the leper when he is cleansed: he shall be brought to the priest*, etc.), or by first expressing the name of the thing which is then brought again before the hearers by the demonstrative pronoun (John 1:1-2: *The Word was God, this one was in the beginning with God*); and this can again happen in two ways: either with the demonstrative pronoun alone, or with the prior noun repeated at the same time; the latter indeed serves for emphasis, but does not really differ from the former, since such repetition can always be done and is always implied. Now in these words of Christ the second mode occurs; for nothing is appended to indicate what this rock is. Certain Protestants say that Christ pointed to himself with his finger extended; but where is this written? We must interpret, not divine. It remains, therefore, that the pronoun *this* refers to its immediate antecedent; for the demonstrative regularly refers to what immediately precedes, which here is none other than Peter-Kepha, whose name is repeated together with the pronoun. The subject Peter and the Rock are therefore the same.

c) And in fact, if these two clauses are compared with each other: *You are Peter*, and *upon this Rock I will build my Church;* it is manifest that the second gives the reason why Christ called Simon Peter, and that the particle *and* joins the two with a causal connection (although the particle sometimes carries an adversative meaning, in this case such a meaning would be invented, to say the least). For when God imposes upon someone a name signifying some office or dignity, he is accustomed to give the reason for imposing that name (Gen. 17:3, 13; 32:28; Matt. 1:21; Luke 1:13, 31); and therefore Christ too is to be understood as having done this here. Indeed, Christ affirms that Simon is Peter; Simon is therefore truly Peter or Rock—he is not merely called so but is so. But if the following words do not refer to him, how is he truly Rock? For it is clear that Christ here uses the name of rock to signify that upon which the edifice of the Church is built (*upon this rock I will build my Church*); if therefore Simon is not the one upon whom the Church is built, he cannot be called rock—unless you wish the same word, repeated immediately in the same context, to take on a different meaning, without any indication of such a change being present; which cannot be admitted.

d) Moreover, if the Rock is not Peter but Christ, the sense of Christ's words would be: *You indeed, Simon, are Rock; yet not upon you but upon me, the Rock, will I build my Church.* Now it must be noted that Christ is making this speech as a recompense to Peter, promising him some dignity in return for his solemn confession of Christ's divinity. *You confessed the revelation of the Father to you of my divinity, or the Father revealed to you who I am; but I too say to you who you are to be, and by saying I bring it about and shall continue to bring it about; for I am the efficacious Word: because you are Peter*, etc. This is the obvious and immediate sense of Christ's words. But it would be an absurd and ridiculous recompense if Christ, intending to reward Peter, had said: *you are Peter, yet not upon you but upon me will I build my Church*—that is: *you are Rock, but you are not Rock;* for rock here is nothing other than that upon which the Church is built. What benefit, then, would Christ be conferring upon Peter? An empty name without reality. But the imposition of a new name without the thing signified by the name is bitter mockery and nothing more.

e) Finally, Christ also prevents the subject immediately expressed by the name of Rock from being understood as himself, by the form of the future verb *I will build;* for if he were speaking of himself, he would not say *I will build* but *I am building;* for he had already begun to build his Church upon himself, who was from himself the Rock.

It has therefore been demonstrated that one and the same subject is immediately designated by the name Peter and the name Rock; and because Peter is the very person of Simon (*I say to you: you are Peter*), the subject for whom the name Rock immediately stands in the words of Christ—*upon this Rock*, etc.—is the very person of Peter.

Therefore the words of Christ—*upon this Rock I will build my Church*—refer to the one person of Peter, not to the other Apostles together, because this Rock is the one Simon Peter (*You are Peter*), because Christ addresses him alone (*I say to you*), because the words of Christ are a recompense for the confession which Peter alone gave from himself.

Now it is manifest that in the words of Christ one thing is affirmed in the present: *You are Peter*, and another in the future: *upon this Rock I will build my Church;* for Simon is called and is Rock, because he is already destined for the purpose of having the Church built upon him—just as Abram was called by God, his name being changed, Abraham (Gen. 17:5: *Neither shall your name be called any more Abram, but your name shall be Abraham, because I have made you the father of many nations*), which name was prophetic; for Abraham was not yet a father.

COROLLARY I

It is therefore false that Simon is here called πέτρον by an allusion to Christ, who is here said to be πέτρα, so that there would be two subjects—Peter and Rock—and Simon would be called Peter because he is in a certain way related to the Rock who is Christ, without however Simon's participating in the property of Rock. For 1° in an allusion there are two subjects, one related to the other; but here, having regard to the immediate meaning, there is one subject; hence we have identity, not allusion. As for the mediate or oblique sense, we shall speak of this later. 2° Even if Simon is called Peter through a relation to Christ the

principal Rock, it does not follow that he does not intrinsically participate in the character and dignity of Rock communicated to him by Christ; and that he does so participate is attested by Christ himself, who affirms that he truly is Rock, upon which Christ is to build the Church.

COROLLARY II

Those who, granting that the rock is referred by the demonstrative pronoun *this* to some antecedent, contend that this antecedent is not Peter but only Peter's confession or the divinity of Christ which Peter confessed, are mistaken; for the demonstrative pronoun regularly refers to the nearest antecedent, and certainly so when the same name is repeated together with the pronoun. How, however, even those things are referred to in the oblique sense, with Peter as the direct subject being included in the proper sense, we shall say below.

COROLLARY III

The claim that Peter is a name imposed, while Rock is a common noun, and that common nouns when they become proper nouns do not retain the same meaning or reference, is mistaken. For 1° Christ always said Rock in the same way; 2° the name Peter is indeed an imposed name, yet it simultaneously embraces the quality expressed by the common noun Rock, as is explained by the words that follow: *and upon this Rock*, etc.

COROLLARY IV

Some wrongly invoke the figure of ἀντανάκλασις (which is that figure in which the same word is repeated but in a different meaning, examples of which are Matt. 8:22; Luke 9:60; John 2:23-24; 3:6). For everything that demonstrates the identity of subject of Peter and Rock excludes this figure, nor are the cited passages similar; for here, among other things, we have: *Peter* and *upon this Rock:* yet such a conjunction of the same words does not occur in the cited passages—from Matthew:

Let the dead bury their dead; from Luke: *Whoever is ashamed of me, of him shall the Son of man be ashamed;* from John: *Many believed in the name of Jesus, but Jesus himself did not trust himself to them;* and *What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the spirit is spirit*—in which the somewhat different reference of the words in context is easily elicited either from what is joined to them, or from the nature of the subject about which they are said.

COROLLARY V

Although the name Peter or Rock is a relative name—relative, namely, to that of which it is the Rock—there is nevertheless no need to divine what is designated in Christ's words as the terminus of this relation, for the sake of which Simon is called Rock. For Christ expressly designates that terminus when he says: *upon this Rock I will build my Church.* The Church is therefore the terminus for which Simon is called Rock by Christ.

COROLLARY VI

It is futile for some, in defense of their conjecture that Christ, when uttering the words *and upon this Rock*, extended his finger toward himself, to appeal to the words of Christ in John 2:19: *Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up*, which Christ, as they say, uttered while extending his finger toward his own body. "When Christ said," (Salmasius, a man of the greatest authority among Protestants, says in his *Apparatus ad libros de Primatu*, page 8 of the Elzevir edition) "you are Peter and upon this Rock I will build my Church, he was not designating Peter by sight or touch, as some learned men here fancy, but was touching himself as he said these things. He did the same also when he said: destroy this temple," etc. But who are those who fancy this? For it is Catholics, not by sight or touch, but by the very word *Rock,* who say that Christ designated Peter. Are you not rather fancying that Christ touched himself when he said: *upon this Rock*, and when he said: *destroy this temple*? For this is another conjecture, which the context of John sufficiently refutes. For if Christ pointed with his finger to show that he

was speaking of his own body, how could the Jews have immediately replied: *forty-six years was this temple in building, and will you raise it up in three days?* But in order for Christ to rightly say *this*, it was sufficient that the temple about which he was speaking was present; and his body was present to all. Moreover, John, relating the words of Christ, which he had indeed already understood, immediately alerts the reader that Christ was speaking of the temple of his body; why did Matthew not use a similar notice? Furthermore, the reason for Christ's words is not the same in both places, and the parallel is rejected. For in Christ's discourse, before the words *destroy this temple*, there does not occur, as designated by Christ himself, any material temple, as the Rock occurs before the words *this Rock;* therefore in Christ's words in John there is no relation to a material temple, as in Christ's words in Matthew, *upon this Rock*, there is a relation to the already-named rock which is Simon.

But we say all this supposing, together with the Protestants, that Christ spoke immediately and directly of his own body under the name of the temple; but this is a gratuitous supposition. Christ spoke in the literal immediate sense of the temple, but understood typologically—namely, as bearing the type of his body, which typological meaning the Apostles afterward understood. And so the difficulty itself has no foundation.

COROLLARY VII

It is also futile, in order to prove that Peter in Christ's speech is one thing and Rock another, to note that the Syriac translator prefixed to the former a personal pronoun masculine ܗܘܐ which does duty for the verb *are,* while to the latter he prefixed a demonstrative pronoun feminine ܕܐ meaning *this;* whence they conclude that Peter and what is called Rock are different. But it is manifest that such pronouns, which do duty for the substantive verb, agree in gender and number with the subject, just as verbs do; and since in the first instance the subject is masculine ܟܐܦܐ, the masculine pronoun was placed.

Now what we have thus far accomplished through interpretation is confirmed by the express authority of the whole ecclesiastical Tradition,

which is found both in the works of the Fathers, in the acts of the Councils, and in liturgical monuments. For there Peter the Apostle is most frequently called *the Rock of the Church* (Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, book 6, no. 20; Ambrose, in Hymn 1; Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oration* 26), *the rock lying beneath the edifice of the Church* (Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, book 2, no. 4), *the rock against which the proud gates of the underworld do not prevail* (Augustine, *in Psalm, against the party of Donatus;* Leo the Great, *Sermon* 98, chapter 1), *the most solid rock, to which the Lord granted the fellowship of his own name, by which name it is called rock* (Maximus of Turin, *Sermon for the Nativity of Peter and Paul*), *foundation* (Synod of Ephesus, Act 3), *founding the Church with his own firmness* (Chrysologus, *Sermon* 154), *firmament of the Church* (Ambrose, *De Virginitate*, chapter 16), *foundation of the divine house* (Epiphanius, *Heresies* 59, nos. 7-8), *firm and most solid rock upon which Christ built the Church* (Gregory of Nyssa, *In the second panegyric of St. Stephen*, in Gallandius, vol. 6, page 600), *foundation stone of the Church* (Synod of Chalcedon, Act 3), *ruler of Rome and keeper of the royal treasury, rock of faith, firm foundation of the Catholic Church* (Hymn in honor of St. Peter by St. John of Damascus, published by Mai, Migne *P.G.*, vol. 96, page 1394), *the supreme foundation of the Apostles, the base and foundation of the Church* (Liturgy of the Russian Church; cf. the work of Fr. Caesar Tondini, in the book *Omaggio Cattolico*, etc., published at Rome 1867, page 433, titles 1, 2, 8), and many others. (An epigram in honor of St. Peter, inscribed to Bishop Achilleus of Spoleto, published by J. B. de Rossi in the *Bullettino d'Archeologia cristiana*, 2nd series, year 2, no. 3: "For God himself, who stands as the head of the body, therefore gave him the name of Rock—saying: be Peter; for I will build upon you the house which I am now raising throughout the whole world. In you the Church stands fast among all peoples and conquers the power of the prison of hell.") Likewise in the liturgical books of the Chaldeans (cf. Joseph David, *Antiqua Chaldaeorum Traditio circa Primatum b. Petri*, Rome 1870), in the office of the Apostles Peter and Paul, in Compline, the following occurs: "Peter, who is the head of the Apostles, upon whose firmness our Savior built his faithful Church." Likewise in the Armenian Menologion (in Galano, *Conciliatio Ecclesiae Armenae cum Romana*, vol. 2, *On the head of the Church Militant*,

question 1) on the 27th of December the following is read: "Today the feast of the holy princes of the Apostles Peter and Paul is celebrated. The great Peter, the Rock of Faith, traversed east and west. Peter, who was called Rock and was placed as the foundation of the Church." And in the Book of Canticles: "You who willed blessed Peter to be superior in the gathering of the chosen Apostles, the head of holy Faith and the foundation of the Church."

The same is unanimously transmitted by those pre-Nicene Fathers who expounded the words of Christ, namely Tertullian, who says (*De Praescriptionibus*, chapter 22): "Did the Rock, named for the purpose of building the Church, hide something from Peter?" Cyprian (*Letter* 71): "Peter, whom the Lord first chose and upon whom he built his Church"; Origen (*In Exodum*, homily 5, no. 4), calling Peter "the foundation of the Church and the most solid rock upon which Christ founded the Church"; Hippolytus (*In s. Theophania*, no. 9), saying: "Moved by this Spirit, Peter raised up that blessed voice: You are the Christ, etc.; by the power of this Spirit the rock of the Church was consolidated"; and in the pseudo-Clementine *First Letter to James*, no. 1, the following is read: "Simon, who because of his true faith and the most firm foundation of his teaching has been defined as the foundation of the Church, and for this reason was renamed Peter by the very mouth of Jesus that cannot deceive, the firstfruits of our Lord, the first of the Apostles, to whom the Father first revealed the Son," etc. Add St. James surnamed the Great, Bishop of Nisibis, who in his *First Sermon on Faith* says: "Simon who was called Rock, was deservedly called Rock because of his faith."

Moreover, the ancient Syriac, Arabic, and Persian versions render Peter and Rock with one and the same word. In the version of St. Cyril, the Apostle of the Slavs, of the ninth century—that version, namely, which is the earlier one and has the said Cyril as its author—the words of Matthew are thus rendered: *TU ESI PETR I NA SEM PETRE—you are Peter, and upon this Peter*—which could not have arisen from a defect or ignorance of a Slavonic term corresponding to τῇ πέτρᾳ, since not infrequently the word *rock* occurring in the Gospel is there rendered by the proper Slavonic word *KAMEN* (cf. the work of Fr. John Xavier Gagarin, published in the book *Omaggio Cattolico* mentioned above, page 296).

Doctors of the ancient sects agree. Elias, Bishop of Anbara, a distinguished theologian among the Nestorians, in his work *Exercitationes*, century 2, part 2, *Sermon* 3 (in George Ebedjesu Khaggath, *Syri Orientales*, etc., pages 9, 11): "Now the Lord called Simon Rock with economy and mystery. Namely, that what is built upon the Rock may be safe and stable; that upon it the construction may be placed and securely raised to the height of the roof; he said Rock, as if to say base, foundation and corner-stone... He said Rock finally to signify the firmness of faith." And Benattibus Abulpharagius, a Nestorian Presbyter of Baghdad, in his *Commentary on Matthew* (loc. cit., page 15): "That *you are Rock* signifies the foundation of Faith and Confession, and this is the recompense for that confession. And saying *upon this Rock I will build my Church*, he means: the congregation (of the faithful) will follow you in faith and in confession and you will be its leader," etc.

III. We now come to the second question—that is, the sense of Christ's words: *and upon this Rock I will build my Church.* It is clear that Christ assumes the role of an architect (*I will build*); the Church is exhibited under the image of a building, as it is represented in most scriptural passages under the figure of a temple or house; while Peter is exhibited under the image of a rock upon which the edifice is built—that is, under the image of a foundation, and indeed one that is truly firm, such as a crag or cliff, upon which solid buildings are accustomed to be erected. Do not say with Salmasius (loc. cit., page 7) that rock is not the foundation but that upon which the foundation itself rests, so that we may conclude from this that rock here is nothing other than Christ. For in reality, when a house is built upon a crag or rock, no other foundation is laid, and the very crag serves in place of a foundation, which is only used to supply the deficiency of rock. Now this rock upon which Christ is to build the Church is a rock that he did not find but himself established and made firm. Peter is therefore said to be that rock upon which the Church is built by Christ.

Now Rock by itself conveys firmness and stability; and the rock upon which a building is constructed is the base or foundation, which by its firmness and stability supports the building and causes all its parts, resting upon it and upon each other, to cohere together and constitute one solid edifice. It is manifest that Christ's speech is

metaphorical; but when a metaphor is clear, it does not obscure the transparency of the speech but rather aids it. Now a metaphor is clear when all its ideas are clear and obvious, when the reason for the transference is known. But the notion of a foundation, of a building, and of the relationship of a foundation to a building is clear and obvious; and this relationship is the reason for the transference; for Peter is called Rock because the Church is founded upon him, and he therefore stands in relation to the Church as a foundation to a building. It is easy therefore to substitute the proper meaning for the metaphorical one. But before we do this, the question about the scope of the word *Church* must first be dealt with.

Now although the name of Church sometimes designates some particular assembly, which indeed is discerned from the adjuncts of the speech or from the circumstances by which it is defined (cf. Acts 8:1; 1 Cor. 1:2; Rev. 1:4), yet when it is used indefinitely it extends indefinitely and signifies the universal Church; as is consistent with reason, since the universal assembly of Christians is the Church itself, nor is there any reason why this rather than that particular assembly should be understood; and the same is established by usage (cf. Eph. 1:22; 5:23-32; Col. 1:18-24; 1 Tim. 3:15). Moreover, here the Church is called *my Church*—the Church of Christ; but the Church of Christ is the universal Church; and therefore by the adjunct *my*, the meaning of the name Church is positively extended to the universal Church. Since therefore the Church of Christ contains all the faithful of Christ and those gathered into the unity of society, each and all who enter into society, and their society, are contained in the name of Church; and because the Apostles also belong to the Church of Christ, they too are represented in the name of the Church built upon Peter.

Peter therefore stands in relation to the universal Church as a foundation to a building. Now Church is the name of a society and represents it immediately under this formal aspect; when therefore Christ said *my Church*, he had in mind the society he was about to institute, the unity of which he also represented under the image of a building. Now a foundation 1° is the most necessary part of a building; 2° is the part which gives firmness and stability to the building; 3° is the part without which the building or any part of the building cannot exist;

4° is the part which, by supporting all the parts of the building, holds them all together and bound with itself, so that they are able to cohere as one solid building (cf. Matt. 7:24). Into these notions the notion of foundation is resolved by immediate analysis; and what is elicited from the words of Scripture by immediate analysis must be held as immediately said and revealed.

You will say: a foundation is something extrinsic to the building, especially if it is a crag that someone uses in place of a foundation. I answer first: the crag or rock upon which Christ built the Church was itself placed or built by Christ, who made Simon to be rock. Then it is false that a foundation is something extrinsic to the building; it is indeed outside the other parts, but if it is in place, it is a part of the whole structure, and the relationship of dependence of the building upon the foundation is intrinsic to the building itself. When therefore the rock is considered formally according to its relationship to the building, it is considered as something most intrinsic to the building. If therefore we transfer to Peter the foundation of the Church, we shall have: 1° that he is the most necessary part of the Church; 2° that he is the part from which the entire Church derives firmness and stability; 3° that he is the part from which the entire Church derives its unity; 4° that he is the part without which the Church cannot exist, and from which, if anyone is separated, that person ceases to be in the Church. But what is most necessary in a society, what is the principle of stability and unity in a society, to which all who wish to be in the society must adhere, is the authority from which the entire society depends and is governed—that is, the supreme authority in society, which is the effective principle of unity in society and from which alone, if it is firm and stable, the society can have firmness and stability. That person therefore who is in the Church what a foundation is in a building possesses the supreme authority in the Church.

Therefore the Rock of the Church is not merely the faith which Peter professed, nor merely that profession of faith which Peter made, but is the very person of Peter endowed with faith; for Christ said *upon this Rock*, and Rock and Peter are the same subject, as we have proved. Moreover, the relationship of rock to building is such that rock and building are permanently together; but the profession of faith made by

Peter was something transient; it cannot therefore be the Rock of which Christ speaks.

Having therefore distinguished between that which Peter might have deserved and the dignity of Rock, and that by which he is formally constituted Rock and the subject directly called Rock by Christ; although the confession of Peter may be considered that by which Peter merited this dignity, and the faith of Peter remaining in him may be regarded as the formal cause (even if partial, as we shall say presently) by which he is constituted Rock—the subject which stands in the proper case as Rock, according to the words of Christ, is the very person of Peter.

Therefore, since the words *upon this Rock I will build my Church* signify that supreme power in the Church is to be conferred upon someone, and since these words were said to Peter alone, the supreme authority in the Church was promised to Peter alone—authority, namely, over the universal Church and over all and each who belong to the Church.

Therefore, since the other Apostles also, even taken collectively and joined together, belong to the Church and are distinct from Peter, over them too the supreme authority was promised to Peter.

Therefore the primacy of Peter is not merely one of honor but of jurisdiction; for such is the authority by which a society is governed. It is not merely an archetype by which the unity of the Church is demonstrated, but is ἐνεργητικός, by which the unity of the Church is produced; for authority is active and by its efficacy brings the members of the society into unity.

IV. The Protestant interpretation must therefore be rejected as entirely foreign to the words of Christ. Indeed, that interpretation of the metaphor of rock which places the ground of the transference in the fact that πέτρος is a stone that is rolled and thrown is not even worthy of refutation; for it is at odds with the words of Christ, who views the rock as that upon which the building is constructed. This stone is not one that is thrown, but one that remains and by its firmness and stability supports the building. The interpretation most favored by the Protestants is the one we mentioned in the first place: namely, that Christ was to build his Church upon Peter because Peter was to be

chosen before the others as the one who would first of all preach the Gospel to the Jews and Gentiles and gather them into the Church.

But 1° this interpretation never occurred to the Fathers; 2° it is at odds with the concept of Christ the Lord. For he presents Peter under the notion of a rock upon which the edifice rests, or of a foundation; but the notion of a foundation necessarily contains the notion of stability—something stable and persevering is a foundation, for the foundation remains that the building may remain. But the first preaching of Peter was a transient act; the doctrine indeed remained, but the first preaching, which was an act, entirely passed away. This prerogative of priority in preaching therefore does not correspond to the image of a foundation. Surely if the foundation fails the building collapses; but when Peter's first preaching ceased, the Church persevered. Therefore the fact that Peter was the first of all to preach to Jews and Gentiles was indeed an exercise of that authority with which he was endowed when he was constituted rock of the Church; but that alone could not be the sufficient reason for his being called the foundation of the Church.

Dr. Langen preferred a similar interpretation, holding that the rock or foundation of the Church is the faith or confession of faith of Peter—in this sense precisely: insofar as that faith or that profession of faith was the foundation upon which the single and eternally valid building of the Church rested. He bids us consider that Christ is speaking here not of the duration of the Church but of its institution, which was once made once for all (part 1, § 3). He therefore concedes that the Church must have a foundation until the end (ibid., page 14), but denies that it follows that the foundation too must endure (§ 7, page 49); for this foundation, for the Church that is to endure forever, is the confession of Peter existing from the beginning and presupposed to the building of the Church (pages 14 and 51-56). The true concept of the Church is this: the whole Church from beginning to end is considered as existing as one house, one building, for which therefore one foundation suffices—one that is laid from the beginning; and this was the confession or faith of Peter (page 14, note).

But 1° it is false that Christ here speaks without reference to the duration of the Church, or does not conceive and present the Church as permanent; for he says: *and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it*—

against it, that is, as founded upon the rock. The speech is evidently about a house built to last forever. Then 2° it is intrinsic to the notion of a foundation and to the very relationship of the foundation to the building that the former endure as long as the building stands; when therefore we speak of a foundation of a building, it is necessarily conceived as persevering. Now the confession of Peter could indeed be something first in the Church; but it is one thing to be first in some series, another to be the foundation of a house. The same must be said of the preaching of Peter, to which this author also seems to allude (page 14) as the foundation of the Church. This interpretation is therefore gratuitous and contrary to the words of Christ.

The reason which moved the Protestants to attack the Catholic interpretation and to defend their own is in reality a dogmatic one. For they start from the principle that there is no one who holds the primacy in the universal Church of Christ; having established this, which they think they have already demonstrated, they conclude that the words of Matthew must say something other than what the Pontificals want. To demonstrate with arguments what they establish, they appeal chiefly to three things: a) 1 Cor. 3:11, where we are taught that there can be no other foundation of the Church apart from Christ; therefore neither Peter nor anyone else, and therefore neither Peter nor anyone else, has been endowed with the power which Catholics derive from the notion of foundation; b) Eph. 2:20, where all the Apostles together are called the foundation of the Church; nothing therefore was conferred specially upon Peter and his successors (cf. Rev. 21:14); c) they appeal to the authority of the Fathers, whose consensus in the interpretation of the words *upon this Rock* is non-existent and the greatest and most distinguished of whom understand the rock as either Christ or the faith of Peter taken objectively; the interpretation of the Pontificals may therefore be rightly rejected.

But to the first objection we respond in two ways. 1° Even granted that Paul in that place calls Christ the foundation of the Church under the same generic notion under which Catholics hold Peter to have been called the foundation of the society which is the Church, it does not follow that Peter is not the foundation of the Church. For all Catholics hold that Christ is the first rock, the principal foundation, who is rock

and foundation from himself, by his own power; while Peter is rock and foundation, a second one, only by participation in and communication from Christ, under him and through him—not the first or only foundation. This the Catholics expressly profess together with Leo in *Sermon* 3 of his consecration. When therefore Christ is called the foundation of the Church, it is understood, and must be understood according to the nature of the subject, as the principal foundation, from itself; and besides Christ no other of this kind can be posited. But a principal foundation does not exclude a secondary one, just as from the fact that Christ is light it does not follow that the Apostles are not through him the light of the world. Wherefore, since that is the truest meaning and the words of Paul taken in isolation may present that meaning, the Fathers use those words of Paul to inculcate this point of doctrine—especially since the personal dignity of the principal foundation in the Church is associated there with the dignity asserted for Christ by Paul.

But 2° we deny that this is the meaning in Paul's words which the Protestants suppose. For here the Apostle calls Jesus Christ foundation insofar as the doctrine of Christ's divinity is the head and principle of the whole Christian institution, upon which the whole must rest. Wherefore Gregory the Great interprets this foundation, which is Christ Jesus, as faith in Christ (*Moralia* 25, no. 26; *Letter* 46, book 11). So too Adrian I in his letter to the Bishops of Spain. And indeed this foundation Paul himself, as a wise architect, laid; but he himself could do this only by teaching. The discussion is therefore of the foundation of doctrine. Now it is one thing to be called the foundation of an institution or doctrine, another to be called the foundation of a society; these are different notions; for the former is a certain principal truth, the latter a certain principal authority. When Paul therefore affirms that no other foundation can be laid besides Christ Jesus, the dignity of the foundation of this society which is the Church is not denied to Peter.

To the second objection, Eph. 2:20, the faithful are said to be built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, Christ Jesus himself being the chief cornerstone. It may first be asked of which prophets the discussion is. There are some who think the prophets are of the New Testament, which they prove from the comparison of the following

chapters. For in chapter 3:3 it is said that the mystery of Christ, which was not made known to the sons of men in other generations, has now been revealed to his holy Apostles and prophets in the Spirit. And in chapter 4:11 the Apostle says that God gave some as Apostles, some as prophets, others as evangelists, others as pastors and teachers (cf. 1 Cor. 12:28). But the immediate context of Eph. 2:20 itself is opposed to this view. For Christ is said to be the chief cornerstone ἀκρογωνιαῖος, and Paul alludes to Isa. 28:16 and Ps. 117:22, and the stone is presented as having become רֹאשׁ פִּנָּה, εἰς κεφαλὴν γωνίας, which Augustine explains, *De Verbis Domini*, *Sermon* 49: "Did not the Lord come to instruct his Church and to separate those Jews who believed well and hoped well and loved well from the chaff, like grain, and to make one wall from the circumcision, to which another wall should be joined from the uncircumcision of the Gentiles—walls coming from different directions, for which two walls, he himself being the cornerstone?" Under the image of the cornerstone, Christ is therefore represented as the one who, joining to himself both peoples—Jewish and Gentile—gathered them together into one house which is his Church. This interpretation is required by the preceding verses: for he says that the Gentiles were once without Christ, alienated from the commonwealth (πολιτεία) of Israel, strangers to the covenants, having no hope of the promise (v. 12); but now they have been brought near in the blood of Christ, who made both (Jews and Gentiles) one (vv. 13-14) and reconciled both in one body to God through the cross (v. 16), and coming preached peace to you who were far off (to the Gentiles) and peace to those who were near (to the Jews) (v. 17); whence he concludes: therefore you are no longer strangers and sojourners (as he had said of them above in v. 12), but you are fellow citizens of the saints and members of the household of God, built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, Christ Jesus himself being the chief cornerstone. Since therefore the image of the cornerstone presents Christ as joining two peoples, those coming from the circumcision and those from the uncircumcision, and here Christ is said to be the cornerstone for the very foundation (for in the foundation itself the cornerstone is placed, as Augustine notes in *In Psalmum* 86) of the Apostles and Prophets, it is clear that the prophets of the Old Testament are designated, who in

Christ are joined to the Apostles; for the preaching of both concerning Christ is one.

These things having been established, we note that if the words of Paul are compared with the words of Matthew, they differ both verbally and really. Verbally they differ; for among other things, in Matthew Peter is called rock or foundation, while in Paul the Apostles are not called foundation, but the foundation *of the Apostles* is spoken of. Now the foundation of the Apostles can be the foundation laid by the Apostles—for example, the doctrine, which is the foundation of the Christian institution (cf. Paul's words to the Corinthians, loc. cit.: *as a wise architect I laid the foundation*). They differ really, because: a) the words of Matthew are addressed to Peter alone, while Paul's words are spoken of all the Apostles together; and at the very least the same prerogative differs in intensity when attributed to one and when attributed simultaneously to many; b) in Paul, it is said of the faithful that they are built upon the foundation of the Apostles; while in Matthew it is affirmed of the universal Church that it is built upon Peter; but the universal Church includes the Apostles themselves, who are therefore built upon Peter—the dignity of Peter therefore differs both in intensity and in extension; c) the dignity asserted by Paul of all the Apostles is also asserted of the Prophets of the Old Testament; but the Prophets can be the foundation of the Church only by reason of doctrine.

From these things it follows: 1° even granting that the Apostles are called the foundation of the faithful, it does not follow from this that they are called and are foundation in the same way as Peter. This is clear from remark a) and b). It follows 2° that in this passage the dignity of foundation is not directly predicated of the Apostles themselves but of the doctrine preached by them—this is clear because they are associated with the Prophets of the Old Testament, of whose doctrine alone the dignity of being the foundation of the faithful can be directly predicated. Indirectly, however, and in an oblique sense, they too are called foundation on account of the doctrine they preached.

To the passage adduced from Rev. 21:14, we give the same response: namely, that by the symbol of the names of the twelve Apostles inscribed on the twelve foundations it is signified that the faith

of the Church rests upon the doctrine or preaching of the Apostles, and that through them human beings are led into that city. And indeed, to close the door on this whole difficulty and similar ones: the Apostles are called foundations of the Church either by reason of the doctrine they first preached, or by reason of jurisdiction—and of this either extraordinary or ordinary. If the first: you have the distinction between Peter and the other Apostles. If the second: the extraordinary jurisdiction of the individual Apostles could not be called the foundation of the Church; for that has ceased, while the foundation must persevere. There remains therefore the ordinary jurisdiction, which is common to Bishop-successors—whether partial in each individual or complete in the whole body, presided over nonetheless by the successor of Peter. But by reason of this authority one cannot say that the Apostles are presented in Revelation under the image of a foundation; for it is sufficiently evident from the inscription of the individual names that there the Apostles are viewed according to what they have that is proper to them above other members of the Church, whereas ordinary jurisdiction is common to Bishops and the episcopate. It remains therefore that as foundations of the Church the Apostles are represented by reason of their doctrine, insofar as the faith of the Church rests upon the doctrine preached by them.

But here is another difficulty: if through the metaphor of foundation, under which someone is represented, only his doctrine—which is the foundation of the Church—can be designated, why will it not be equally permissible to take the words of Christ *upon this Rock* in the same way, understanding thereby that the Church is built upon the doctrine preached by Peter?

I respond first. Even allowing this interpretation of the words of Christ, since nonetheless it is certainly the same subject Peter and Rock throughout, it is necessary to understand that the doctrine is the foundation of the Church in such a way that it is the doctrine handed down by Peter and insofar as it is handed down by him—that is, Peter as teaching is the foundation of the Church. And because the entire Church, including even the Apostles, rests upon Peter alone, it follows that the supreme authority of teaching for the entire Church is promised to Peter. But because the supreme authority of teaching in the Church

cannot be separated from the supreme jurisdiction, as we shall say shortly, the same consequence would ultimately follow—namely, that the supreme jurisdiction over the Church was promised to Peter by Christ in these words.

I respond second. That in the cited passages through the metaphor of foundation doctrine is to be taken directly—this we do not gather from the appellation of foundation alone, but from all the attendant circumstances of the speech taken together, as is clear from the responses already given. It does not follow, therefore, that what is understood in those passages can be understood everywhere.

I respond third. If it is said directly of a person, without any limiting addition, that it is the rock of a society, we contend that this must be understood as meaning that that person is the rock of the society by reason of authority or jurisdiction; and this is proved by the analysis we have instituted of this metaphorical expression. And indeed the jurisdiction must be understood as full and universal—that is, of teaching, governing, etc., for the whole Church—if one person for the whole Church is said to be Rock; while less complete and subordinate in individuals if it is said of several simultaneously, especially when the same has separately been said of one person for the whole Church itself. Cf. the response given to the second testimony. Wherefore even if all the Apostles together were called in the Scriptures directly the rock of the Church, or were so called by the Fathers, this would in no way prejudice the proper prerogative of Peter, which is supreme jurisdiction in the Church, to which jurisdiction all who are in the Church, including the Apostles, are subordinated—because Peter is the Rock upon which Christ builds the entire Church.

V. There remains the more serious difficulty drawn from the interpretation of the Fathers. For whatever may be said of the interpretation of this passage according to the intrinsic laws of interpretation, if nevertheless an extrinsic norm is applied—which for Catholics ought to be of greater weight, namely the common interpretation of the Fathers—it seems not to favor us but rather to oppose us. For in the Fathers not one but multiple interpretations of this passage are found, which Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, centuries 15 and 16, dissertation 4, reduces to four.

Namely, the 1st is that in which Rock is understood as Peter himself; and in support of it he cites Tertullian, *De Praescriptionibus*, chapter 22; Origen, *on Matt.*, chapter 17; Cyprian, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*; Hilary, chapter 16 *on Matthew;* Basil, *on Isaiah*, chapter 2; Ambrose, *In Lucam*, book 6, no. 97; Epiphanius, *in the Ancoratus;* Jerome, *on Matt.* chapter 16 and *Letter* 57 to Damasus; Augustine, *in Psalm* 30 and *Retractationes* book 1, chapter 21; Cyril of Alexandria, book 2 *on John*, chapter 12; Leo the Great, *Letter* 125; Maximus of Turin, *Homily* 1 *on the Nativity of SS. Peter and Paul;* Theophylact and Euthymius *on Matt.* chapter 16, etc. To whom could certainly be added Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oration* 32; Gregory of Nyssa, in the passage cited above; Chrysostom, *Homily* 4 on the words *I saw the Lord;* Nilus the Abbot, *Letters*, book 2, letter 261; Asterius, Bishop of Amasea, *Homily on the Holy Princes of the Apostles;* Chrysologus, *Sermons* 107 and 154; Gregory the Great, book 5, *Letter* 20 to Emperor Maurice; Innocent III, *Letter* 208, and others whom we shall indicate in the examination of these patristic interpretations; as well as the celebrated Councils of Ephesus, Act 3, and Chalcedon, Act 3, and the Council of Nicaea according to the testimony of Gelasius I, *Letter* 17; and liturgical books, whether Western—as is evident from the Gregorian Sacramentary published by Menard, the Gallican one by Mabillon, and the Gothic Missal published by Cardinal Thomasius—or Eastern, as is evident from the testimonies cited from the Russian Church which received its liturgy from the Greek, and from the Liturgy of the Apostles according to the rite of the Maronite Church, in Abraham Ecchellensis, in the work *Euthychius vindicatus*, part 2, chapter 23.

The 2nd interpretation is that Rock is all the Apostles, upon whom the Church is built. In support of this are cited Origen, *on Matt.* chapter 16, tractate 3 (Huet's edition); Cyprian, *Letter* 27, *De Lapsis;* Jerome, *Against Jovinian*, book 2; Cyril of Alexandria, in the passage to be cited below; Augustine, *in Psalm* 86; Theodoret, on the same Psalm; Eterius and Beatus, book 1, *against Elipandus;* Paschasius Radbertus, book 4 *on Matthew.*

The 3rd interpretation is that Rock is that faith which Peter confessed or that profession of faith first made by Peter. In support of this, very many are cited: Hilary, book 6 *De Trinitate;* Gregory of Nyssa,

On the Coming of the Lord; Ambrose, loc. cit.; Hilary the Deacon (in the Appendix to the works of St. Ambrose), *on* Eph. 2:20; Chrysostom, *Homilies* 54 and 83 *on Matthew;* the Author of the *Opus Imperfectum on Matthew*, homily 20, who however rather interprets Christ's words in Matt. 7:24 seq.; Isidore of Pelusium, *Letters*, book 1, letter 235; Augustine, *Tractate* 7 *on John;* Cyril of Alexandria, book 4 *on Isaiah*, chapter 44:23; Palladius, *Dialogue on the Life of John Chrysostom*, chapter 19; Juvenal of Jerusalem in his synodal letter to the Presbyters; Leo the Great, *Sermons* 2 and 3 on the anniversary of his consecration; Chrysologus, *Sermons* 53 and 74; Theodoret, *Letters* 77 and 146; Basil of Seleucia, *Oration* 25 on the words *Who do men say that the Son of man is;* Eucherius of Lyons, or another under his name, *Homily on the Nativity of St. Peter;* Felix III, Pope of Rome, *Letter* 3; Cosmas Indicopleustes, *Topographia Christiana*, book 5, where he treats of Peter; Gregory the Great, book 4, *Letter* 38; Procopius of Gaza, *on Exod.* 33:21; Maximus the Confessor, *Letter* 13 to Peter the Illustrious; Bede, *on* John chapter 21; John of Damascus, *On the Transfiguration of the Lord*, no. 6; Adrian I, in the letter read at Act 2 of the Second Nicene Council; Christian Druthmarus, *on the Gospel of Matthew* at this passage; Jonas, Bishop of Orléans, book 3 *On the Cult of Images;* Hincmar of Reims, work 33 *Against Hincmar of Laon;* Nicholas I, *Letters* 2 and 6; John VIII, *Letter to Count Peter;* Theophanes Kerameus, *Homily* 43; Theodore of Abu Qurra, *in the Orthodox Letter;* Stephen VI, *Letter* 11 to the Orientals in the case of Photius; the Council of Trosly, canon 15; Odo of Cluny, *Sermon on the Chair of Peter;* Rupert of Deutz, book 3 *on Matthew;* Innocent II, *Letter to the Council of Sens;* Adrian IV, *Letter to Emperor Frederick;* Urban III, *Letter to the Bishops*, etc.; St. Thomas, question 25 of the Supplement, article 1, *sed contra* argument; Stephen of Paris in the letters in which he commends the doctrine of St. Thomas; Alphonsus Tostatus, *on Matt.* chapter 16; Jodocus Clictoveus, *in the Compendium of Truths;* Johann Eck, *On the Primacy of Peter;* Renatus Benedictus, *in the Panoplia against the New Heresies*, dedicated to Gregory XIII.

The 4th interpretation is that the rock is Christ. In support of this are cited Jerome, *on Matt.* chapter 7; Cyril of Alexandria, loc. cit.; Augustine, *Retractationes*, book 1, chapter 21; Theodoret, *on* 1 Cor.

chapter 3; Primasius, *on Apocalypse*, chapter 21; Cassiodorus, *on Psalm* 45:5; Pseudo-Gregory the Great, *on the fifth Penitential Psalm*, no. 36; Bede, *on Matt.* chapter 16; Paulinus of Aquileia, *book against Elipandus;* Dungalus the Deacon, *against Claudius of Turin;* Rabanus, book 4 *De Universo*, chapter 1; Anselm, *on Matt.* chapter 16; Peter Lombard, *on* Eph. 2; John of Salisbury, *Letter* 166; Celestine III, *Letter* 14; Innocent III, *Sermon* 2 *on his Consecration;* St. Thomas, *on* 1 Cor. 3.

Now from these it is concluded that it is not certain that Rock is Peter himself, and that it is free for a Catholic to embrace another interpretation—indeed that the more probable one is that recited in the third place, which seems to be commended by the authority of more authors.

But the matter does not stand thus, and we now demonstrate this. First, the second interpretation must be excluded. The interpretation of Origen, who is cited first at this passage, is not a literal interpretation. For 1° he himself elsewhere teaches that those words *upon this Rock*, etc., refer to Peter alone; 2° here he teaches that not only the Apostles individually but also the perfect are the rock upon which the Church is built, and that against each of them the gates of hell shall not prevail: "But if you think that the whole Church is built upon Peter alone, what will you say about John the son of thunder and each one of the Apostles? Shall we dare say that against Peter alone the gates of hell shall not prevail, but against the other Apostles and the perfect they shall prevail? Is it not rather in all and each of them of whom it is said—and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it?" Now if the Church is built upon all the perfect too, if they themselves are the foundation—of what, in the end, will the superstructure consist? Only of the imperfect and sinners?

So, as is Origen's custom, these things are said by way of accommodation and in an analogical sense: just as Peter, because of the faith he confessed, was called blessed and was made firm and stable, so whoever confesses the same faith will also be called blessed and will be firm against the assaults of hell and will be a stone belonging to the Church's edifice: "If we say that same thing that Peter said... perhaps we also become what Peter was, and we shall be similarly proclaimed blessed as he was... but if we also, having said what Peter said, become

Peter, then the Word can say to us: you are Peter, and the rest that follows. For whoever is a disciple of Christ is a rock, from which they drank of the spiritual Rock that followed. And upon any such rock every ecclesiastical doctrine and rule of life is built. For in any perfect person who has a gathering of those words which fulfill blessedness in works and thoughts, there is the Church which is built by God." Not truly built upon each of them, but *there is*—that is, from them as living stones it is composed. Note moreover that Ambrose made this Origenian interpretation his own in *In Lucam* 6, nos. 97-98.

Cyprian, however, in order to prove that Bishops must be obeyed (loc. cit.), appeals to the words of Matt. 16:18: "Our Lord, whose precepts we must fear and observe, setting forth the honor of a Bishop and the order of his Church, speaks in the Gospel and says to Peter: I say to you: because you, etc. Thence through the changes of times and successions, the ordering of bishops and the administration of the Church flows, so that the Church is constituted upon bishops and every act of the Church is governed by these same presiding officers." The sense of these words is not that the dignity and power conferred upon individual Bishops is the same as that given to Peter, which would be far too absurd and entirely foreign to the mind of Cyprian (*De Unitate Ecclesiae*); but the argument contained in these words proves that the governance of the Church immediately belongs not to the people but to the one institution established by Christ, which for the universal Church is Peter—and therefore in individual particular Churches, the governance belongs to individual Bishops, for whom Peter was then receiving the keys to be communicated to others. Hence this testimony pertains to the first interpretation.

Jerome does not deny at this passage that the rock in Matt. 16 is Peter—indeed he affirms it, furthermore teaching that Peter surpasses the other Apostles as head: "If John was not a virgin, why was he loved more than the other Apostles? But you say the Church was founded upon Peter (which even heretics knew), although the same thing is done in another place (not in this passage of Matthew) upon all the Apostles, and all receive the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and the strength of the Church is equally built upon them all; yet for this reason, among the twelve one is chosen, that with a head appointed the occasion of schism

may be removed." This testimony therefore must also be assigned to the first class.

Augustine, on the words *His foundations are in the holy mountains* (Ps. 86), teaches only that the Apostles are the foundations of the Church, appealing to Eph. 2:21, and makes no mention of Matt. 16. Augustine says nothing here, therefore.

Theodoret, however, on the same passage says: "The holy mountains upon which he laid these foundations are the Apostles. Of them the Apostle said: built upon the foundation, etc.; and the Lord said to Peter after that true and divine confession: You are Peter and upon this Rock, etc.; and again: you are the light of the world. Upon these holy mountains Christ laid the foundations of religion." It is clear that all the Apostles are called those mountains upon which the Church is built; but it is equally clear that the words of Christ in Matt. 16 are referred to Peter alone, and that not from this passage but from another (Eph.) the Apostles are proved to be such mountains or foundations. Theodoret does not say, moreover, that the Apostles are foundations in the same way as Peter. This testimony therefore also pertains to the first interpretation. Cyril of Alexandria too alludes to the words of Ps. 86.

Eterius and Beatus (loc. cit., no. 3) say that what was said to Peter —*upon this Rock I will build my Church*—was said not to Peter alone but to all of us; and they affirm this in the same sense we heard from Origen. The same authors, however, say of Peter who confessed Christ in the same passage: "Then he was also called Rock, after he first acknowledged the cornerstone. This is the Rock of which the Father had said through the holy Isaiah: Behold I lay in the foundations of Zion a tried stone... and everyone who believes in him shall not be confounded. And surely the stone in which he commands us to believe is God. The Rock, that is, is Christ; yet so that under him Simon is also Rock." Hence if any difficulty is in this, it pertains to the 4th opinion.

Paschasius Radbertus (loc. cit.), commenting on Matt. 7:24—*Everyone who hears my words... shall be likened to a wise man who built his house upon rock*—says that whether it is Peter or Paul who builds, Christ is the wise man who builds the heavenly house upon himself, who is rightly called Rock, which is placed in the foundation of faith. Whence in this same Gospel it is said to Peter: You are Peter and upon,

etc.—that is, *from which you, Peter, take your name because of the firmness of faith, upon that same Rock will I build the Church in the foundation of faith.* Here the rock is Christ. He teaches the same in book 8 on Matt. 16:18, appealing to 1 Cor. 3:11. When, however, he shortly after says "not upon one Peter, but upon all the Apostles and successors of the Apostles is the Church of God built," appealing to the words of Ps. 86:1, he sufficiently indicates that he derives this rather from the words of the Psalm than from the words of Christ.

There is therefore nothing in the cited testimonies by which the second interpretation of the words of Christ in Matt. 16 can be established. Although there was a certain Catholic commentary which teaches that the power conferred on Peter was conferred also on the other Apostles and on the Church; but this properly refers to the following: *to you I will give the keys*, and we shall speak of it under those words.

There remain therefore interpretations 1, 3, and 4. Note, however, that among those cited under the 3rd interpretation, some must be removed—such as Chrysologus, Theophanes Kerameus, and Odo of Cluny, who in the cited passages give the first interpretation. Now we concede that the 3rd and 4th interpretations are not interpretations by way of accommodation but are true and real; for this is demanded by their universality and frequency, their use for establishing dogmas even in questions of faith against heretics, and finally the reason which we shall shortly adduce. The response, moreover, to this difficulty is the following: these interpretations are not opposed but mutually coordinated, they do not exclude each other but fully cohere with each other, and from all of them one adequate interpretation is formed. This can be demonstrated by both an extrinsic and an intrinsic argument.

The extrinsic argument is: It was always the persuasion of the Fathers and of the universal Church—as is established from so many monuments—that Peter is the Rock of the Church; the Fathers, therefore, so very many of them, could not in this common conviction of the Church have applied to the words of Christ that interpretation which would be opposed to it. Moreover, several of those Fathers who present the 3rd or 4th interpretation also assert the 1st; they therefore did not think they were opposed to each other.

To offer the intrinsic argument: it must be noted that when Peter is called Rock upon which the Church is built, a double relationship must be considered in Peter—the relationship to the terminus for which he exercises the function of Rock (and this terminus is none other than the Church), and the relationship to the cause by which he is made and constituted the Rock of the Church. Now the cause, leaving aside the meritorious cause, must be distinguished as twofold: efficient and formal. The efficient cause is Christ himself, who communicates to Peter this supernatural dignity and who is thus introduced by Leo, *Sermon* 3 of his consecration: "Since I am the inviolable Rock, I the cornerstone who make both one, I the foundation, besides which no one can lay another; yet you too are Rock, because by my power you are made solid, so that what are mine by power may be yours and mine in common by participation." Peter therefore cannot be conceived as Rock of the Church except insofar as he is constituted such by Christ—who is the first and self-subsistent Rock—that is, is made solid by the power of this first Rock, and exercises, together with Christ upon whom he rests, the function of Rock (*may they be yours and mine in common by participation*). Hence when Peter is called the Rock of the Church, Christ too is understood—through whom and with whom Peter is Rock, and without whom he cannot be nor be conceived as Rock of the Church. Whence it is common for the Fathers to note that Simon was called Peter by Christ who is Rock; which is not to be understood of a grammatical derivation, which there is none, but of an ontological one —insofar as Peter really participates in the dignity of Rock, which belongs primarily and of itself to Christ. "Having taken him into the fellowship of indivisible unity, he willed him who is Peter to bear the name which he himself is, saying: you are Peter, etc."—St. Leo, *Letter* 10. And Augustine, *Tractate* 124 *on John*: "The Church was founded upon the Rock from which Peter took his name; for it is not Peter from the Rock, but the Rock from Peter that received the name; just as Christ is not called so from the Christian, but the Christian from Christ."

The formal cause by which Peter is constituted—in himself, albeit participatively, yet truly and ontologically—the Rock of the Church is the very authority of the Primacy, signified by the metaphor of rock, which is the supreme power of jurisdiction in the Church. Now this

power also contains the power of teaching; for the kingdom of Christ is a kingdom of truth (John 18:37), and the Apostles were sent to teach (Matt. 28:19), and it contains it in such a way that the supreme power of governing cannot be had except in that subject which possesses the supreme power of teaching, and the latter power existing in some subject is the reason why the former power of jurisdiction also belongs to the same subject. The reason for the first is that a legislative, judicial, and coercive power existing in the Church, separated from an infallible magisterium which can by right pass judgment on it, is by that very fact not supreme; the reason for the second is that if the power of teaching and the other power of governing are compared with each other, the former is naturally prior to the latter, because truth and doctrine in the Church is the norm of all laws and rights. Wherefore the formal cause by which Peter is constituted Rock of the Church is primarily the faith of Peter itself, insofar as this faith is the principle of firmness and unity of faith in the Church—insofar, namely, as it, being proposed as a norm to others, is the cause of stability and unity in faith; or in other words, it is the supreme magisterium of Peter itself. The Church founded upon Peter is therefore founded upon Peter as believing and teaching, and the faith of Peter and his confession or magisterium—by which he is formally Rock—cannot be separated from the concept of Rock of the Church. And indeed the words of Christ were said to Peter as believing and confessing, and therefore come down to this: *I say to you, believing and confessing my divinity, that you are Peter, and upon this Rock, believing and confessing, I will build my Church*—that is, *by your Faith you will be the foundation of my Church, the principle of unity and firmness:* "For it was not said of the flesh of Peter, but of the faith (of Peter), that the gates of death would not prevail"—Ambrose, *De Incarnatione*, book 5. Cassian, *De Incarnatione*, book 3, chapter 12, thus introduces Peter (whose testimony he weighs) as speaking: "Read the Gospel, and you will not need my person when you have my confession. Indeed you have my person there where you have my confession; because since my person has no authority without my confession, the authority of my person is the confession itself." Therefore in the same place Cassian says of the same Peter that governing the helm of the

Roman Church, as he had the principate of faith, so also had the principate of the priesthood.

Moreover, this coheres in turn with the fact that Christ is the Rock of the Church: for if Peter is the Rock of the Church through faith, and the object of this faith is Christ, he is therefore Rock through faith in Christ; therefore Christ believed in is the Rock of the Church. For because of that by which each thing is what it is, that further cause is more so. Thus Simon Peter, leaning upon Christ and made solid by his power, endowed with faith and himself proclaiming it, was constituted the foundation of the Church.

Therefore 1° in the words of Christ three truths are contained. 1st: Peter is the Rock of the Church—that is, the very person of Simon, made Rock or endowed with the Primacy, is the subject upon which the Church rests. 2nd: Faith is the Rock of the Church—that is, the faith of Peter is the formal cause, though partial, why the person of Peter is the foundation of the Church. 3rd: Christ is the Rock of the Church—that is, he is the principal Rock, upon whom Peter himself rests. Christ therefore is the first and self-subsistent Rock, upon whom both Peter himself and the entire Church rest.

From this it is clear that these interpretations are not opposed nor does one exclude another, but they are mutually coordinated, each inferred from the other, and each singly completing the others. It would be wrong to institute a comparison between the number of writers who made use of this rather than that interpretation. For no interpretation is exclusive, and each of them presupposes the first; given this, the reason for using one rather than another depends only on the occasion of the speech and the necessity of refuting some error that has arisen, or of declaring a truth whose knowledge is here and now more opportune. Had Dr. Langen noticed this, he would easily have understood that his efforts were wasted when he assembled, from the fourth century onward, not a few testimonies in book 1, § 7; book 2, § 7; book 3, § 1; book 4, § 1, in which Rock is asserted to be Christ or faith in Christ. He ought rather to have shown that our interpretation is not literal nor primitive—which these citations neither accomplish nor can accomplish for Dr. Langen, who frequently does not understand even what he cites. For does not, for example, what he himself relates in book

2, § 1 from the Mozarabic liturgy in the Mass of the Chair of Peter confirm our interpretation: "You, O Christ, who upon yourself as the most firm Rock, built Peter and through Peter the Church"? Does not what he cites in book 3, § 1 from St. Thomas's commentary on Matt. 16:18 cohere with our interpretation—especially if cited completely? On the words *And I say to you, that you are Peter*, St. Thomas says: "Here he gives the recompense of the confession... first he gives the name, secondly the reason for the name: *and upon this Rock*, etc. He came into the world for this purpose: to found the Church—Isa. 28:16: *Behold I lay in the foundations of Zion a tried stone*, etc. This stone is Christ... whence we are called not only Christians from Christ but from Rock. Therefore he specially imposes the name: *you are Peter*, from the Rock which is Christ, as a sign of this thing: *upon this Rock*, etc. The property of rock is that it is placed in the foundation and that it gives firmness. Whence it can be expounded of Christ." He cites Augustine and 1 Cor. 10:1 and 3:11. He continues: "Another exposition: *upon this Rock*—that is, upon you as rock; because from me as Rock you will draw what it means to be Rock. And as I am Rock, so upon you as Rock I will build, etc. But what then? Are both Christ and Peter the foundation? It must be said that Christ in himself, but Peter insofar as he has the confession of Christ, insofar as he is his vicar?" Although St. Thomas then, having cited Eph. 2:20, says that the Apostles are foundation by the concession of Christ, he nonetheless distinguishes Peter from the other Apostles; for he says: "But specially Peter's house, which is founded upon rock, will not be destroyed... And although other Churches can be reproached by heretics, yet the Roman Church was not corrupted by heretics; because it was founded upon rock... Peter's Church alone remained inviolate"—which St. Thomas confirms by appealing to Luke 22:32: *I have prayed for you, Peter*, etc. And enough on this disorganized collection of testimonies by Langen.

It may be asked, however, whether all these interpretations are immediate. As for the first, the matter is evident; for Peter and Rock are the same subject. As for the other two, there may be difficulty. Regarding the first it must be noted that since the expression is metaphorical, the proper meaning signified through the metaphor is both literal and immediate; and when Peter is called Rock of the

Church, the proper meaning is that Peter is the effective principle of firmness and unity of the Church. Now the things gathered by simple analysis of something, without the aid of real reasoning, together with that thing itself, even if confusedly, are immediately signified with it—by an immediacy not verbal but real, by reason of the thing signified. Just as when I say: *Christ is man*, I immediately verbally signify that Christ subsists in human nature; but because man has body, soul, intellect, will, etc., these too are immediately signified in a real way by that proposition. Now the analysis of the principle of unity and firmness of the Church yields among other things this element: the principle of unity in faith; and a principle of unity in faith in a society, which would be without faith to teach, cannot be conceived. When therefore Peter is presented as the principle of unity of faith, he is presented along with the faith by teaching which he brings about unity. The faith of Peter therefore is an element contained in the thing signified by the Rock of the Church and which is gathered by analysis. It must therefore be said to be immediately signified in a real way. And if moreover these words of Christ are viewed together with the whole context, it is again clear that the faith of Peter—on account of which he is formally Rock—is immediately signified from the words of the whole context. For it was said to Peter—not insofar as he is flesh and blood, but insofar as he believed in his heart and confessed with his mouth, with the Father revealing: *you are Peter;* and upon this Rock—namely, believing and confessing—Christ promised to build his Church. Wherefore the Rock of the Church is represented with faith and through faith as Rock.

As for the other interpretation, it must be noted that when a man is presented as the Rock of the Church and is at the same time composed with Christ God, who presents himself as the author and head of the Church and therefore as the principle of all its unity and stability, constituting this man the principle of firmness and unity of his Church—the dependence of this man upon God and his participation in his dignity from the dignity of Christ at the same time become apparent; whence that man cannot be conceived as Rock except as a secondary rock, drawing his firmness from Christ who is Rock of himself. Immediately therefore in these words *and I say to you*, etc., Peter is represented as a secondary Rock resting upon Christ.

Yet these interpretations differ in that the first is immediate in such a way as to be also explicit; the others are more or less implicit. The first, if only the words *upon this Rock I will build my Church* are considered, is verbal—that is, immediately conveyed by the very words themselves; the other is real—that is, immediately unfolding from the analysis of the thing signified by the words. Moreover the first presents the subject upon which the Church is built; the others present the causes on account of which that subject is the foundation of the Church.

They also differ in that the first interpretation is the most ancient and the only one existing in the ante-Nicene age, while the others are later; the former is more obvious, the latter the fruit of deeper analysis. The reason why, after the Arians, the third interpretation was especially pressed is to be traced to the very Arian controversy. For the antithesis of the Arian error is most fully contained in the confession of Peter; and if this confession is the rock of the Church, it is most manifestly shown that the Arians are entirely alien from the Church.

Thus when the Fathers teach that the Church is built upon the Rock of Peter's confession, upon the faith of Peter's confession, upon the immovable faith of the disciple, upon the Rock of right faith which Peter confessed, upon the firm and solid confession which Peter confessed, upon this firmness of faith which Peter confessed, that Peter's confession is the basis of the Church, that in this stable confession of faith is the foundation of the Church, that in the firmness of this confession the edifice of the Church rises—these being the formulas found in the cited Fathers—they are indeed giving a most true commentary, but one that in no way excludes the first interpretation.

This is evident, beyond the arguments both extrinsic and intrinsic already adduced, from this too: 1° that faith or confession of faith is viewed by these Fathers in relation to Peter—they say *this faith*, *this confession*, *which Peter confessed*, *the faith of Peter*, *the confession of Peter*, *Peter has founded the Church in his confession*, and the like; and 2° that faith or confession of faith is viewed by the Fathers as persevering in the rock and through it in the Church founded upon the rock. "For the solidity," says St. Leo, *Sermon* 3 *at his anniversary,* "of that faith which was praised in the Prince of the Apostles is perpetual, and as what Peter believed in Christ endures, so what Christ instituted in Peter endures."

Likewise, those who teach that the faith viewed objectively or Christ whom Peter confessed is the Rock of the Church interpret most truly, nor do they exclude the first interpretation. And indeed those who embrace this interpretation also receive the other, like Augustine, who interprets Rock as Christ in the last *Tractate on John*, as Peter in the *Psalm against the Donatists*, and permits both in *Retractationes*, book 1, chapter 21; Theodoret, who understands Peter in Ps. 86 and Christ in 1 Cor. 3; Paulinus of Aquileia, who seems to interpret it as Christ in the book *against Elipandus*, but interprets it as Peter in the *Hymn on the Chair of Peter;* Innocent III, who in *Sermon* 2 *on his Consecration* interprets Rock as Christ, but in *Letter* 209 as Peter.

The reason, moreover, why this interpretation was sometimes preferred is that the Fathers, following Augustine, conceived the rock as that which most absolutely and in the most perfect manner is the Rock of the Church. This is clear from their manner of speaking. Thus Rabanus Maurus, *De Universo*, book 4: "Peter received his name from Rock—that is, from Christ, upon whom the Church is founded. Not from Peter the Rock, but Peter from the Rock received his name... And therefore the Lord says: you are Peter, etc. Upon this, he says, Rock which you confessed, I will build my Church. For Christ was the Rock, upon which foundation even you, Peter, are built." These words contain an emphasis and show that the discourse is about the principal Rock. So too Paschasius Radbertus, book 8 *on* Matt. 16, on the words of Christ *And I say to you*, etc., says: "As if openly saying, not in empty words and in words having no effect of work, but I say to you—I, whose saying is doing, because my word is full of omnipotence: *Because you are Peter*—which name is derived from Rock, that is from me, upon whom the whole Church is built. For it is not, he adds, as some wrongly think, that Peter is the foundation of the whole Church; because no one can lay another foundation, etc. (1 Cor. 3), although he is rightly believed to be set first upon the same and thus as head, yet in that rock from which he took his name as a gift, etc." It is clear that the dignity of the principal Rock, which is proper to Christ, is denied to Peter, and only in this sense could Paschasius have legitimately affirmed that some wrongly thought Peter to be the foundation of the whole Church.

Something special is found in Augustine, *Retractationes*, book 1, chapter 21: "In this book (against the letter of Donatus) I said in a certain place of the Apostle Peter that in him as in a Rock the Church was founded—which sense is also sung on the lips of many in the verses of the most blessed Ambrose, where he speaks of the cock: *This is the Rock of the Church, crowing, who washes away guilt.* But I know that I afterward most frequently expounded what was said by the Lord: *You are Peter*, etc., in this sense: that the Rock which Peter confessed is to be understood as that upon which Peter is built, saying: *You are the Christ the Son of the living God;* and so Peter, named from this Rock, figured the person of the Church (which as head he juridically represented—on this special interpretation, more below), which is built upon this Rock and received the keys of the kingdom of heaven. For it was not said to him: *you are Rock*, but *you are Peter;* the Rock was Christ, confessing whom Simon, as the whole Church confesses him, was called Peter. Of these two opinions, let the reader choose which is the more probable." Here you see that the reason for the other interpretation is partly dogmatic (because the rock was Christ) and partly philological (because it was said *you are Peter*, not *you are Rock*); but if you consider this reason, which seems to have inclined Augustine toward that interpretation though not with certainty to himself, it is, as we have already proved, of no force. And if you seek Augustine's settled opinion, it has nothing certain; yet it is certain that it does not exclude the first interpretation. It is easy, however, to note that Augustine can be distinguished from Augustine—the one who interprets by applying intrinsic rules (which however fail him) and the one who interprets according to the common sense of the Church. The former denies that Peter is the Rock, the latter, as in the cited passages where that observation about the difference between the names Peter and Rock does not occur to him, holds that Peter is the Rock. Now it is better to follow Augustine interpreting according to the common sense of the Church than according to certain not sufficiently reliable rules. Bede transcribed Augustine in his commentary on John chapter 21.

VI. *And the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.* The question 1° is: what are the gates of hell, πύλαι ᾅδου? Ἅδης among pagan writers is the abode of souls after death; by this word the Septuagint renders the

Hebrew שְׁאוֹל, which does not signify a tomb (which is קֶבֶר) but the abode of souls after death and especially of the impious—a point that the learned Fr. Patrizi has appeared to establish beyond all doubt (*De Interpretatione Scripturarum Sacrarum*, book 2, question 10, article 3, section 1, argument 2). Now ᾅδης, שְׁאוֹל, is represented as a city, which is clear from this passage too; for it is said to have gates, πύλας, which are proper to the walls of a city—and it is represented in the same way by the pagan poets. The prosopopeia of its inhabitants is found in Isaiah 14:9-20; cf. Job 38:17, *gates of death*, *gates of the shadow of death.* This is the abode of evil Angels and of Satan, who is their prince (Matt. 25:41; Rev. 12:7); this Satan is therefore king of this city; for men conquered by him are his slaves (2 Pet. 2:9). This is the power of darkness—τοῦ σκότους, which is ᾅδης—from which Christ has snatched us (Col. 1:13), which fights against God by inciting men to rebellion against him and by persecuting the just (Gen. 3:1 seq.; John 8:44; 13:2; Eph. 6:11; 1 Pet. 5:8; 1 John 3:8; Rev. 12:9-12; Luke 22:53), and to whose power evil men on earth are compliant and are its ministers—especially those who persecute the just (John 8:44; Rev. 2:13; 3:9; 9:11). Now πύλαι ᾅδου tropically signify this power. This manner of speaking is derived from the fact that among the Orientals, jurisdiction was exercised in the gates of cities (Deut. 21:19; 22:15; 25:7; Ruth 4:1 seq.; Job 5:4; 31:21; Prov. 22:22; Isa. 29:21; Amos 5:10, 15). Wherefore by synecdoche the gates of a city signified the power, or those who hold power in the city. The continuator of Gesenius's Lexicon notes that שַׁעַר הַמֶּלֶךְ is the royal citadel of the Persians itself in Esther 3:2-3; 4:2, 6; 5:9, 13; 6:12. Stephanus also notes in his annotations on Xenophon (cf. his Lexicon, s.v. θύρα) that repeatedly τὰς θύρας (which properly are the gates of a house) denotes the royal court of the Persians itself (cf. also Dan. 2:49), and even now we are accustomed to say *the Ottoman Porte* for the royal court—indeed for the empire—of the Turks.

Dr. Langen (ibid., part 1, page 11, note) denies that the term πύλαι was used in the usage of Christ's age to signify force or power. But we do not contend that this term taken in isolation had this meaning, but only that it had it when used in construction with a term denoting a city or something similar; nor do we contend that it always signified this—for

who would deny that the gates of a city could be and were spoken of in the proper sense? We say, rather, that this metaphorical meaning too was included in this complex term, and that when the gates of a city are represented after the manner of a person—namely, as fighting and opposing others—they can only be taken in this metaphorical signification. As to whether this complex term lost its metaphorical signification in the age of Christ, I do not know where that author learned this. Certainly this was a metaphor used by the Chaldeans, as is clear from the cited passage of Daniel.

The same writer teaches that ᾅδης and שְׁאוֹל is not hell—the abode of demons and the wicked—but a dark place or kingdom of the dead, to which souls went before ascending to heaven. This interpretation, at least as exclusive, is contradicted by the very usage of the word ᾅδης among the pagans, by Isaiah loc. cit., and by Christ who mentions the power of darkness rising against him and the good. This author, however, holds that the gates of hell are nothing other than the laws of death, so that Christ here predicted that the Church would never be subject to the law of death—that is, would never fail. This he poorly proves by adducing the authority of Leo the Great from *Sermon* 51:1 and 52:2, who in the second passage only calls them the gates of death, taking death for hell, and in the former simultaneously combines the gates of hell and the laws of death. But it is one thing to gather from the words of Christ that the Church will not be subject to the laws of death —which Leo and other Fathers do; another to affirm that the gates of hell and the laws of death are entirely equivalent to each other—which no one of the Fathers has said.

Christ therefore predicts that the kingdom of hell—that is, its power, or Satan and his angels together with impious men—will fight against his Church. For force and violence to be deployed by the powers of hell against the Church is implied not by the formula πύλαι ᾅδου but is gathered from the combat implied by the words *shall not prevail* and from the very nature of this power which is adversarial to Christ and his saints. At the same time, however, Christ promises that these enemies shall not prevail.

The question 2° is: what is the subject to which the pronoun *it* refers—whether it is the rock or the Church. A double terminus of the

relation must be distinguished: one grammatically represented by the pronoun, the other logically and really connoted by it. If we speak of the first, since the immediately preceding term is *Church*, it is the Church that the pronoun *it* grammatically represents. But the Church spoken of here is the Church founded upon the rock, drawing its firmness from the rock; if therefore the Church is to be stable against the assaults of hell, it is necessary that the rock which gives firmness to the edifice be stable against the same assaults, and therefore the rock itself is the connoted terminus, against which the gates of hell are not to prevail. Now this connotation is directed toward this end: that it may be signified that the rock is the cause why the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church. For it is manifest that Christ conducts himself in the building of his Church as that wise man whom he himself describes in Matt. 7:24: *Everyone therefore who hears these my words and does them shall be compared to a wise man who built his house upon a rock. And the rain fell and the floods came and the winds blew and beat upon that house, and it did not fall, for it was founded upon a rock.* The reason why the house resists all assaults Christ draws from the rock upon which it is founded. Therefore the rock upon which Christ founded his Church is, by Christ's intention, the reason why the Church perseveres steadfastly against all hostile assaults. And indeed the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church because it is in itself a firm edifice on account of the rock; for the edifice draws firmness from the rock. The gates of hell shall therefore not prevail against the Church because it is founded upon the rock; therefore the rock is the reason why the gates of hell shall not prevail. Hence Origen (*on Matthew*, in the passage cited above) refers the pronoun *it* to both—rock and Church—as to one thing: "Against which *it?* The rock upon which Christ builds the Church? Or the Church? The expression is ambiguous. Or does he treat the rock and the Church as one and the same thing? This I believe to be true. For neither against the rock upon which Christ builds the Church, nor against the Church, shall the gates of hell prevail." Leo, however, in *Letter* 10 *to the Bishops of the Province of Vienne*, chapter 1, refers it expressly to Peter: "Having taken him into the fellowship of indivisible unity, he willed him who is Peter to bear the name which he himself is, saying: you are Peter and upon this Rock I will build my Church: so that the building up of

the eternal temple might rest by the gift of God's grace upon the solidity of Peter; strengthening his Church with this firmness, so that neither human rashness might assail it nor the gates of hell prevail against it." (It will not be out of place to note that Cassian, *De Incarnatione*, book 3, chapter 13, in expounding Christ's words to Peter, reads them thus: *and the gates of hell shall not prevail against you.*)

VII. *And I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed also in heaven.* The principal question is twofold: concerning the thing or power signified by these words, and concerning the subject to whom that power was given. The former question is resolved into these: 1° what is the kingdom of heaven; 2° what is signified by the allegory of the handing over of the keys; 3° what is binding and loosing; 4° whether or not there is a difference, and what difference, between what is expressed by the words *to you I will give the keys* and what is expressed by the words *whatever you bind*, etc.; 5° how this second part of the testimony coheres with the first already explained.

Thus 1° the kingdom of heaven, which occurs in Matthew, is the same as the kingdom of God, which is found in the other Evangelists and in Matthew himself. This is clear from the parallel passages: Matt. 4:17 and Mark 1:15; Matt. 5:3 and Luke 6:20; Matt. 13:11 and Luke 8:10, and others. It is also called simply the Kingdom. For what Mark 1:14 called the *Gospel of the kingdom of God*, Matthew 9:35 called the *Gospel of the Kingdom.* And indeed already in the age when Matthew was writing, the custom had been established among the Hebrews of signifying God himself by the name of heaven, שָׁמַיִם (Lightfoot, *Horae Hebraicae et Talmudicae* on Matt. 3:2; Buxtorf, *Lexicon Chaldaicum*, s.v.). Now this kingdom of God of which the Evangelists speak is a spiritual and supernatural kingdom (cf. the learned Patrizi, *De Evangeliis*, book 3, dissertation 46), which is the Church of Christ. The appellation *kingdom of heaven* indicates both its origin (cf. John 18:36; Rev. 21:2), the seat of its king, and the terminus toward which it tends, which is eternal life, in which its other state and its consummated perfection consist.

Now just as the name of kingdom can be used sometimes in the adequate signification to designate the kingdom itself fully considered, sometimes inadequately to designate some one of its elements—such as the royal power, the people governed, the territory, the administration and governance, the very form of rule—so also the name of the kingdom of heaven, of the kingdom of God or of Christ, is used mostly in the adequate sense according to the universal notion of this kingdom, and sometimes inadequately to signify some element contained in that notion; whence it sometimes directly signifies the kingdom in the state of this life, as frequently in the parables, or the same in the state of the next life (Matt. 13:43; 14:34; Mark 9:16; 2 Pet. 1:11).

We say, moreover, that in this passage, Matt. 16:19, the kingdom of heaven stands directly for the Church existing on earth; which is demonstrated as follows. For it is manifest 1° that such formulas are most apt for representing the Church instituted by Christ on earth; for it is itself the kingdom of Christ promised through the prophets (Dan. 2:44). It is manifest 2° that in the Gospels the kingdom of heaven, the kingdom of God, and the kingdom most frequently signify the Church instituted by Christ on earth. This is clear from so many parables in which the idea of the kingdom of heaven is presented by Christ, which can only apply to the Church militant on earth; and it is most aptly understood in the phrases *Gospel of the Kingdom*, *of the Kingdom of God*, *the kingdom of heaven is at hand.* Most especially 3° it is manifest that here that kingdom is signified in which the power of binding and loosing is to be exercised; for this power, as we shall see, is a royal power to be exercised in some kingdom; and that kingdom, by reason of the immediate connection of the words, cannot be conceived as other than the one immediately mentioned above, which is called the kingdom of heaven. But since this power is to be exercised on earth, the kingdom of heaven is therefore that which exists on earth, which is certainly the Church militant. Thus in the words of Christ, the kingdom of heaven is most rightly understood as the Church instituted by Christ on earth, about which he spoke immediately above.

VIII. The keys of a house handed to someone are the sign of the right and power over the house conferred upon him. This phrase occurs in Isa. 22:22: *And I will lay the key of the house of David upon his*

shoulder; and he shall open, and none shall shut; and he shall shut, and none shall open. The discussion is about the removal of Shebna from a certain prefecture and the substitution of Eliakim. It is disputed what prefecture this was—of the temple or of the king's palace? For Shebna is said to be עַל הַבַּיִת—over the house. Jerome on this passage thinks it refers to the house of the Lord and wants Shebna to be the superintendent of the temple, whom he then seems to regard as a Pontiff. Cf. Gaspar Sanchez on this passage. Perhaps the other view is more probable—that בַּיִת here is the king's palace; cf., if one may, Rosenmuller on this passage. The phrase occurs again in Rev. 1:18: *I am the first and the last... I have the keys of death and of hell.* Rev. 3:7: *These things says the Holy One and True, who has the key of David, who opens and no one shuts, and shuts and no one opens.* It is manifest that in these passages some power is designated by keys—and indeed a power which is principal in its own order, though subordinate to a higher one and quasi-vicarious. Such was the power of Shebna and Eliakim: for the prefecture of the palace is by its nature subordinate to the royal power; yet it was principal in its own order, as is clear from the declaration: *shuts and no one opens, opens and no one shuts.* But the power of Christ signified by the keys of death and of hell (recall what was said above about ᾅδης) and by the key of David or of the house or kingdom of David—by which the Church is metaphorically represented (Luke 1:32) —cannot be other than a wholly supreme and independent power. By this allegory therefore a certain principal power is signified: but how great it is and how independent must be gathered from the object with which it is concerned and also from the subject to whom it is conferred.

Keys as signs of power were suspended from the shoulder: this is clear from the cited passage in Isaiah, from which another of the same (Isa. 9:5) can also be explained: *For a child is born to us, and a son is given to us, and the government is upon his shoulder.* For it is evident that here the thing signified is put in place of its sign or token, than which no more apt sign could be devised than keys, which were suspended from the shoulders; as we also learn from Callimachus, who in his *Hymn to Ceres*, 44, says of her that κατωμαδίαν δ' ἔχε κλᾶδα. Whence, employing this metaphor, Suleiman the Turkish emperor replied to the

ambassadors of Ferdinand I: "I will hang the keys of Hungary from my shoulder." From the cited examples it is clear that keys are used metaphorically to signify power not only over a house and a city, but also over a kingdom.

When therefore Christ promises Peter that he will give him the keys of the kingdom of heaven, he promises him some power or principate. But how great is this power? It must be gathered from the object subject to the keys, from the subject to whom they are promised —namely the Rock of the Church—and also from the dignity of the one who confers the keys, with whom Peter is compared. 1° The object subject to the keys is the universal Church, for this is the kingdom of Christ. Since by the handing over of keys a power or principate is signified, Peter is therefore established as having power over the universal Church. Since moreover that society is one into which power can only be one of jurisdiction, Peter is therefore established as the prince of the universal Church. And indeed, as is clear from the cited testimonies, one who has the keys is such that if he shuts, no one can open; if he opens, no one can shut; and to shut and to open is the entire function of the one who has the keys. Just as power is metaphorically signified by the keys, so by the shutting and opening is metaphorically signified the exercise of that power with which Peter is invested in the Church, and the character of this power as it exercises itself is signified in the manner of shutting and opening. From these things it is clear that the power of Peter in the Church is supreme, entirely independent of everyone who belongs to the Church, who must be its member. For the power of the one who has the keys, such that it can a) open and shut; b) such that when the one who has the keys opens, no one can shut, and when he shuts, no one can open—is a power that can perform all acts belonging to the keys and is a power upon which depend all who enter the house, while it itself depends upon no one. Therefore the power of jurisdiction in the Church represented by the keys will also be such that it can perform all acts belonging to jurisdiction in the Church, that all in the Church are subject to the one who has it, that it is subject to no one, that no one can make void what it decrees, and no one can make legitimate what it nullifies.

And this is what Christ must be said to have wished to set before our eyes when he represented the Church under the formal aspect of a kingdom. For if the handing over of keys signifies the conferral of power over what is subject to the keys, the handing over of the keys of the kingdom signifies of itself the conferral of power over the kingdom; which can only be royal power—that is, the power of supreme jurisdiction.

If one considers the one to whom the keys are promised, it is the one who is to be the Rock of the Church—that is, who is to be the effective principle of the unity and stability of the Church; and to this subject belongs that power which is supreme jurisdiction in society.

If moreover account is taken of the one who confers the keys to Peter, it is Christ himself, who is the author, prince, and lord of his Church; whose right and power is signified by the words of Rev. 3:7: *who has the key of David* (that is, of the house or kingdom of David, by which the Church is metaphorically represented—Luke 1:32), *who opens and no one shuts, and shuts and no one opens.* Christ therefore, handing the keys to Peter, communicates to him his power over the universal Church—not by abdicating it from himself, which cannot be done, but by calling him into the fellowship of his power and committing his own role to him. And this Christ did entirely independently of the will of his subjects, of whose king and lord he is essentially supreme. Peter therefore is invested with the vicarious power of Christ over the universal Church, and his power depends indeed upon Christ, but is independent of the Church, which is itself subject to Christ. The power of Peter over the Church is therefore the power of Christ, with this distinction: that Christ is the one who *has* the keys, possessing them from himself, while Peter receives them from Christ; and because all things and all persons in the Church are subject to the keys of Christ, so also all things and all persons are subject to the keys of Peter.

IX. The force of the words *whatever you bind on earth*, etc., must now be expounded. Note therefore 1° that this complex phrase *bind and loose* occurs only twice in all of Scripture—namely here and in the following chapter 18:18; 2° that binding and loosing, of which Christ speaks, can only refer to the moral order, which is proper to a free

being; 3° that a certain bond corresponds to it: and there is a triple bond by which a free being can be morally bound and from which it can be morally loosed—namely the bond of law, the bond of guilt, and the bond of penalty (cf. what we said in the *Prolegomenon*, § 19, no. 2); 4° that the universal formula *whatever you bind*, *whatever you loose*, ὃ ἐὰν δήσῃς, ὃ ἐὰν λύσῃς, embraces not only things but also persons; for it is established usage that when the speech is general, the universal subject is indicated by the neuter, and moreover the binding and loosing of a moral bond cannot exist without a person who is bound and loosed; when therefore something is bound or loosed, some person is certainly bound or loosed.

Furthermore, it must be considered that when Peter loosens or binds, God ratifies Peter's act—and ratifies it not in some general manner, but insofar as God himself looses and binds what Peter looses and binds: *it shall be loosed, it shall be bound in heaven*. By this is signified 1° the efficacy of Peter's act as imposing or removing a bond or obligation; 2° his independence from any power other than God's; for when God looses or binds, what creature can make his act void?

This power of binding and loosing taken in its full breadth is the power of making laws both prescribing and forbidding, the power of judging, the power of decreeing and inflicting penalties, as well as the power of abolishing laws and dispensing in them, the power of pardoning offenses and penalties. This is clear because in all of these something is either imposed or relaxed as a moral bond. Now this most ample power is royal power or the power of supreme jurisdiction, embracing all the rights necessary for governing and administering a commonwealth. We say moreover that this most ample power in the Church is signified by the words of Christ *whatever you bind*, etc. This may be proved by the usage of speech both secular and among those who spoke the same language as Christ, by comparison with similar phrases in Scripture, by consideration of the universal object *whatever*, and by ecclesiastical interpretation. a) As for secular usage of this phrase *bind and loose*, Diodorus Siculus reports an inscription placed upon the tomb of Isis, which he interprets thus: "I am Isis, queen of this region, instructed by Mercury: ὅτι γὰρ ἐγὼ δήσω, οὐδεὶς δύναται λύσαι—for whatever I bind, no one can loose"; by which words the reason for her

being queen is stated. This formula therefore signifies royal power. Now this is the same as what Christ says to Peter; for when he says *whatever you bind on earth, it shall be bound in heaven*, he simultaneously says that whatever Peter binds on earth, no one on earth can loose; for who can loose what God binds? And if the formula has such force, the other corresponding formula will have equal force: *whatever you loose*, etc.

Among those closest in time to Christ is Flavius Josephus. He, in his *Jewish War*, book 1, chapter 5, says of Queen Alexandra: "The Pharisees associated themselves in the partnership of power with Alexandra... They gradually insinuated themselves into the customs of a simple woman, γδε καὶ διοικηταὶ τῶν ὅλων ἐγένοντο, διοικεῖν τε καὶ κατάγειν οὓς ἐθέλοιεν, λύειν τε καὶ δεῖν—and they became the administrators of all affairs, able to administer them, to drive out and to recall whomever they wished, to loose and to bind." And so according to Josephus, λύειν καὶ δεῖν belongs to those who are sharers of royal power and who administer all the affairs of the kingdom by their authority. "They differed in nothing from the masters of affairs," says the same author, reporting it in *Jewish Antiquities*, book 13, chapter 16, no. 2.

b) A phrase similar to that in Matthew occurring in Scripture is the one we cited above, by which the power of the keys is explained: *who opens and no one shuts, shuts and no one opens.* That these two formulas come down to the same thing is clear from the fact that both this and the Matthean formula signify the exercise of some power, and both are subject as an explanation of the power of the keys. The Matthean formula may also be stated thus: if Peter looses, no one (besides God) will bind; if he binds, no one (besides God) will loose; or: he who (Peter) binds and no one looses, he who looses and no one binds. But that formula in Revelation, said of Christ in chapter 3:7, signifies his universal and independent power in the house of David or the Church; therefore the Matthean formula also signifies the universal and independent power of Peter in the Church—with this one distinction only: that, since this is a power participated from Christ, it is a power dependent upon him and vicarious. I said with this one distinction only, because no other reason for limitation besides dependence upon the giver is found in the words of Matthew.

c) Moreover, if one considers the word *whatever*, repeated twice (*whatever you bind, whatever you loose*), the same is equally demonstrated. For to bind and to loose signifies the imposing and relaxing of some moral bond; and the term *whatever* is universal and excepts nothing. Some limitation is indeed to be implied—namely, that these things must pertain to this kingdom and to its end; for the discussion concerns power within this kingdom. Those things which do not pertain to this kingdom and its end are therefore excepted; but as regards those things that can pertain to this kingdom, nothing is excepted. Peter can therefore impose any obligation whatsoever (in keeping with the nature of the kingdom) and can also remove it; and what he himself imposes, no one can remove; for this, as we have said, is the meaning of Christ's words: whatever Peter looses, no one binds on earth; whatever Peter binds, no one looses on earth. The power of Peter is therefore universal and independent.

d) The ecclesiastical interpretation puts the matter beyond all doubt. For whether the Fathers wish to prove in general that supreme authority belongs to the Roman Pontiff, to whom every creature must be subject; or whether they wish to prove specifically that every right necessary for the governance of the Church belongs to the Roman Pontiff—such as the power of making laws, prescribing the norm of faith, judging all cases, excommunicating, etc.—they appeal to this testimony and by it decide the question. Let us produce some testimonies. In the Monothelite controversy, Maximus (letter to Peter the Illustrious, in the *Collectanea of Anastasius the Librarian*, in Sirmond's works, vol. 3, page 310) says of the steps which Pyrrhus, having been challenged about heresy, should fulfill: "Let him hasten before all else to satisfy the Roman See. For once this is satisfied, from all sides and everywhere all will proclaim him pious and orthodox"—and he adds the reason: "because the Apostolic See, from the incarnate Word of God himself and also from all the holy Synods, according to the sacred canons, has received and holds in all matters and throughout all things the empire, authority, and power of binding and loosing over all the churches in the whole world." Gregory VII, book 8 of *Letters*, letter to Bishop Herman: "Who does not know the voice of the Lord our Jesus Christ saying in the Gospel: *You are Peter*, etc.? Are kings excepted

there? Are they not among the sheep which the Son of God committed to blessed Peter? Who therefore in this universal concession of binding and loosing considers himself excluded from the power of Peter?... The holy Fathers, receiving this institution of the divine will with great reverence, were pleased that... all the greater matters and the principal affairs, and indeed all judicial cases of all churches, should be referred to it (the Roman See) as to mother and head, and that it should never be appealed from, and that its judgments should be retracted or refuted by no one." Boniface VIII promulgated this definition in the Bull *Unam Sanctam*, of whose infallibility no one can any longer doubt: "This authority, although given to a man, is not human but divine power, given by the divine word to Peter... the Lord saying to Peter himself: *whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.* Whoever therefore resists this power thus ordained by God, resists the ordinance of God... We declare, say, define, and altogether pronounce it to be necessary to salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman Pontiff." Hence when Silverius was sent into exile, the Bishop of Patara, going to Emperor Justinian, freely argued, "saying that there are many kings in the world but only one is Pope over the Church of the whole world"—Liberatus, *Breviarium*, chapter 22. Thus from every legitimate source of interpretation the meaning we have declared is established as residing in the words of Christ, *whatever you bind*, etc.

X. The Protestants, however, contend that *bind* and *loose* mean nothing other than: the former—to forbid or to declare forbidden and illicit; the latter—to permit or to declare licit and permitted; and they appeal to the Talmudic writers, with whom the words אָסַר—*bind*, שָׁרָא and הִתִּיר—*loose*, אָסוּר—*bound*, מוּתָּר—*loosed*, are most frequently used (cf. Buxtorf, *Lexicon Chaldaicum*, s.vv., and Lightfoot on this passage) in the signification of forbidding and permitting, of the forbidden and the permitted; for when they wish to say that their doctors permit or forbid something, or teach that something is licit or illicit, they say that these doctors loose or bind this, or that it has been loosed or bound by them. And in Daniel too, chapter 6, אסר or אסרא occurs mostly for an interdict. Wherefore, just as the Rabbis in the

Talmud loose and bind insofar as they teach something to be licit or illicit, so by Christ a power was given to Peter of teaching and declaring, as teachers are accustomed, what is licit and honest and what is illicit and dishonest—which is something entirely different from the power, and that supreme and universal, of making laws and governing a commonwealth.

A twofold response may be made. 1° Accepting the Protestant interpretation, the consequence is that a power was given to Peter of infallibly teaching what is true and right; for what Peter binds or looses on earth is ratified in heaven. The axiom of infallibility would therefore be asserted in these words for Peter. But since from the whole of Tradition and from the very nature of the matter—as we shall demonstrate—it is clear that Christ willed what he stated in these words to be perpetual in the Church, there would therefore exist in the Church an infallible magisterium of Peter, or at least of all the successors of the Apostles (if these words, as Protestants hold, were said to all the Apostles), which must be obeyed—which however the same Protestants deny. Therefore this very interpretation, even if diminished and deficient, refutes the Protestants.

But 2° we deny that this limited sense resides in Christ's words, and that this can be inferred from the usage of the Rabbis. For it is directly established from Diodorus Siculus that the Greek words which the translator of Matthew used—λύειν καὶ δεῖν—have a broader signification; and equally directly from Josephus that the same Greek words and the corresponding Hebrew or Aramaic words which he himself expressed in Greek have a broader signification; and the same is established from the ecclesiastical interpretation of the Fathers, to whom this diminished and limited interpretation never occurred. The appeal to the usage of the Talmud is made wrongly; for thereby that which needs to be established is not established. For it would have to be proved that this limited sense is exclusively the only sense residing in these words. But this is not established; it is only positively proved that *bind* and *loose* can mean *forbid* and *permit*, or to declare something forbidden or permitted. But when the doctors whose authority is adduced in the Talmud are mere simple doctors, the words *bind and loose* by reason of the subject cannot but take on that diminished

signification of declaring what is licit and what illicit; but if they are predicated of another subject, especially of one to whom the keys of the kingdom have been given, nothing prevents them from taking on a broader signification—namely, of commanding with authority, of imposing obligation, of making laws, and the like. And indeed the same word N—interdict—in Daniel loc. cit., since it is said of the king, means a law in the proper sense, a decree of the king (cf. John Morin, *De Administratione Sacramenti Poenitentiae*, book 1, chapter 8).

The Protestants are also wrong when they contend that in these words of Matthew nothing more is said than what is said in John 20:23: *Whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you retain, they are retained.* For 1° verbal parallelism is absent, as is immediately apparent; and 2° real parallelism is also absent; for a) in John the speech is directed to all, and therefore the power is presented as common to all; in Matthew Christ speaks to one, and therefore the power is presented as belonging to one; b) the object of the power in John is sins; in Matthew it is all matters, *whatever*—which is broader than that; c) to loose and to bind, as is established from what has been demonstrated, comprehend any act of supreme authority—which is again broader than the simple remission and retention of sins. It must be conceded therefore that these testimonies correspond to each other insofar as the words of Matthew contain what is stated by the words of John (though not yet clearly and distinctly for us); but not insofar as they contain only that, for there is an excess in the words of Matthew. Hence when the Fathers take the power of the keys and the power of binding and loosing as referring to the power of remitting and retaining sins, their interpretation is not exclusive; when the same Fathers interpret these same words of Matthew also of the power of making laws for the universal Church, of requiring obedience from all, of judging all cases without appeal, of excommunicating, etc.

XI. The question is whether and what difference there is between what is expressed by the words *to you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven* and what follows: *and whatever you bind*, etc. It must be said that these stand in the same relation to each other as the words of Rev. 3:7—*who has the key of David: who opens and no one shuts, shuts and no one opens*—namely, that the one is an explanation of the other. That is:

the prior words exhibit the power as it were in first act, habitually; the other words exhibit the exercise of the same power, or the same power in second act. Since moreover one of these two contains the other, what is stated in the prior words can also be gathered from the subsequent, and what is expressed in the prior can be gathered from the later—provided always that account is taken of the subject to whom these things are said, about which we treat in the following question, in which we shall deal with the subject of this power.

XII. Finally the question is how this second part of the testimony, *to you I will give the keys*, etc., coheres with the first. That they cohere is manifest. This is clear from the particle *and*, from the identity of the speaker Christ and of the one to whom the words are addressed (*to you I will give*, etc.), from the identity of the object upon which the power is conferred—which in the first part is the Church, while in the second is said to be the kingdom of heaven, which is the Church. They differ, however, by reason of the different image under which the Church, Peter, and Christ are represented. For in the first part the Church is exhibited as a building, Peter as its foundation, Christ as the architect. In the second, however, the Church is represented as a kingdom, Peter as its prince and head, Christ as its supreme king, head, and lord. These two parts therefore cohere as the continuation of a speech made by the same person to the same person about the same matter but under a different image, so that in the second part the rights and functions of the one who has been constituted Rock of the Church are more explicitly explained. These things are sufficiently established from the interpretation of the whole testimony as given.

XIII. But the question remains about the subject to whom the words of the second part were said—to whom, namely, the keys were given and the power of binding and loosing was given. For several Protestants contend that the words were indeed directed to Peter, but insofar as Peter represented all the Apostles, and therefore that the keys were given to the other Apostles no less than to Peter; and that nothing special above the other Apostles was conferred upon Peter. They prove this both from the fact that Peter answered in the name of all, and from the comparison with Matt. 18:18, and also from the authority of the Fathers.

But these words of Christ were both spoken singularly to Peter and promise him something singular. That these words refer to Peter alone is evident from the same subject always repeated in the singular throughout the connected speech (I say to you; you are Peter; and to you I will give; whatever you bind; whatever you loose), joined in their parts by the copulative particle *and.* Moreover, these words refer to the one who made the confession of Christ's divinity; but it was Peter alone, not in the name of all but in his own name, who said: *You are the Christ*, etc., as we proved at the beginning of this Thesis. And indeed it is necessary that the same subject be Rock of the Church and have the keys of the Kingdom; for by both images the same power is signified. But the Rock of the Church is Peter alone, as we proved; therefore. Nor may one suppose that Christ gave the keys to Peter in such a way that Peter received them from some kind of consent of the Church, to which the keys of themselves pertain, and that Peter therefore administers them by some kind of delegation from the Church. For 1° there is no indication here of any such consent, and nothing even remotely indicates that the keys, which Christ holds by his supreme right, were given first to the Church. Indeed 2° this hypothesis is directly excluded a) by the antecedents, in which Peter is constituted Rock of the Church to be built; and b) by the very dignity of Christ. For when someone receives power over a society from one who is its supreme King and Lord by native right, not from the consent of the subjects, he too is understood to possess power over the society without the consent of the subjects—from which consent the validity of the act of the supreme Lord cannot in any way depend. Cf. *Prolegomenon*, § XIII.

Now that something singular was promised to Peter—which is precisely what Protestants deny, relying chiefly on the argument that the same power was conferred on the other Apostles in Matt. 18:18 and John 20:21 seq.—we have already said enough about the testimony of John, and no difficulty can remain from it. The other testimony from Matthew remains. If therefore we demonstrate that the words of Christ in Matt. 18:18 are not parallel to the words of Matt. 16:19—that is, do not assert the same dignity and power to the other Apostles as was promised to Peter—and that the very words of Matt. 16:19 exclude the participation of another in the dignity and power of Peter, it will be

manifest that by these words of Christ some singular dignity and power was promised to Peter.

XIV. Thus 1° let both testimonies be compared in full. Peter is told these three things: 1st *You are Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my Church;* 2nd *to you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven;* 3rd *whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.* But to the Apostles in Matt. 18:18 only this third is said: *Amen I say to you: whatever you bind on earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed also in heaven.* That is: the dignity of foundation of the entire Church is conferred upon Peter alone; the keys of the kingdom are given to Peter alone; these two are not made common to the other Apostles. But this alone already shows that the dignity of Peter and of the other Apostles is not the same. And indeed by the metaphor of the handing over of the keys of the kingdom, something greater is signified than by the simple power of binding and loosing given: namely, the power of binding and loosing itself as at its source and principle, residing in the one who has the keys, so that others can obtain the power of binding and loosing only in dependence upon the one who has the keys of the kingdom. For the one who has the keys of the kingdom is himself the principle and source of all power in the kingdom. Wherefore keys in the Scriptures are attributed only to Christ and to Peter his vicar. Hence the power of binding and loosing given to the one who has the keys of the kingdom is a power entirely independent of any member of the kingdom; whereas the power of binding and loosing simply given to those to whom the keys were not given, who have a dependence upon the one who holds the keys of the kingdom, is otherwise. From these things it is clear that the dignity and power conferred on the Apostles in Matt. 18:18 is not the same as that promised to Peter in Matt. 16:19.

Nor say that keys were given to the Apostles as well by the very fact that power of binding and loosing was given to them; for they bind and loose by the power of the keys. For two things must be distinguished. For in the concept of the keys of the kingdom two things are contained: the power of binding and loosing in general, and the supreme grade and independence of this power. Now the latter is

directly signified when the keys are handed over—namely, the supreme and independent power is signified. But they are not signified when the power of binding and loosing in general is merely given, unless it is given with regard to all who are in the kingdom—which was not done for the individual Apostles. Wherefore under a different respect one must both concede and deny that the keys were given to the other Apostles. They were given to them, because the power of binding and loosing in general with regard to the other faithful—which power is contained in the power of the keys—was given to them. They were not given to them, because this wholly supreme and independent power was not given to them. Since therefore this supreme and independent power is directly represented by the metaphorical handing over of the keys of the kingdom, Christ promised to Peter alone that he would give him the keys, which, as Optatus says, were thereafter to be communicated to others—not by identity, but by participation in power.

2° If both testimonies are again compared, it is manifest that Christ in the second passage in Matt. 18 addresses all the Apostles together, among whom Peter is also included; while in the first passage he addresses Peter alone. Wherefore the power promised to the Apostles is: a) a power given to the college of the Apostles; and b) a power conferred upon individuals insofar as they belong to that body, but not over the other Apostles—otherwise the same person would be both subject and superior with regard to the same things; for Christ addresses all equally and grants power over all things. And much less is it a power conferred over Peter, to whom the keys of the kingdom have already been promised. "To Peter alone (thus that which was singularly said to no other: to you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind, etc.—John XXII, in the Constitution *Licet* against Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun, 1327). But this demonstrates that the power of Peter surpasses the power of the Apostles both in extension and in intensity. In extension of subjects: for the subjects of the Apostles with regard to the power of binding and loosing are the other faithful, while the subjects of Peter are the universal Church, and therefore the Apostles themselves who are members of the Church. In extension of matters—which follows from the former: for of the cases that could arise between Apostles, the

supreme judge was Peter himself. In intensity: for in a kingdom that power is greater in intensity which can act over all and over which no one can act; it is the supreme power differing in species and exceeding other powers. Such is the power of Peter. Therefore.

And if 3° the words spoken by Christ to Peter are considered in themselves, it is equally clear that by them any other person is excluded from the fellowship of the dignity and power promised to him. For Peter alone is the foundation of the whole Church, to which Peter therefore even the other Apostles are related as those founded in him, not as co-founders on an equal footing; Peter alone has the keys of the whole kingdom of heaven, to which therefore whoever belongs to the kingdom—and therefore the other Apostles—are subject. Since therefore the power of binding and loosing is proper to the one who is Rock of the Church and has its keys and corresponds to the dignity of the Rock and the keys, since Peter in this twofold dignity has no equal nor can have any equal, he can have no equal in the power of binding and loosing.

Toward this 4° the ecclesiastical interpretation also concurs, from which we are taught not only that the words *to you I will give the keys*, etc., were said to Peter alone, but moreover that through them a singular dignity and power above the other Apostles was promised to him. Optatus, *Contra Parmenianum*, book 7: "Behold, as has been said above, while the others (Apostles) did not acknowledge (Christ), he alone acknowledged him (Matt. 16:16); while the others did not promise (Matt. 26:33), he alone promised; while the others did not deny even once, he alone denied three times. And yet for the good of unity he did not deserve to be separated from the number of the Apostles... The way of malice was cut off, lest the Apostles take in their minds the license of judging and harshly despise him who had denied Christ. The many innocent stand there, and the sinner receives the keys, that the business of unity might be formed. Provision was made that the sinner should open to the innocent, lest the innocent close against sinners." And what was the subordination of the Apostles to Peter he teaches in book 2: "You cannot deny that you know that in the city of Rome the Episcopal chair was given first to Peter, in which sat Peter, the head of all the Apostles (whence he was also called Cephas—some ancients appear to

have thought Cephas was derived from κεφαλή), in which one chair unity was to be maintained by all, lest the other Apostles might claim each his own separate chair; so that now he would be a schismatic and a sinner who would set up another chair against the single chair." Stephen of Dora in his libellus presented to Martin I: "Without doubt the keys of the kingdom of heaven were entrusted to Peter, and he alone, great according to the truth and the prince of the Apostles, merited to open and to shut them." Bernard, *De Consideratione*, book 3, chapter 8, addressing Eugenius III, the Roman Pontiff: "You are the prince of Bishops, you are the one to whom the keys were handed over, to whom the sheep were committed. There are indeed others who are doorkeepers of heaven and shepherds of flocks; but you are the more glorious in proportion as you have inherited both names more distinctively before all others. They have flocks assigned to them, individuals their own individual ones; to you all are entrusted, one flock to one shepherd. And not only of sheep but also of shepherds you alone are the shepherd of all." Besides, nothing manifests the sense of the Church more than that symbol by which Peter is customarily represented—namely, the keys which he holds in his hand; and by this symbol, which is conceded to no other Apostle, the proper prerogative and special dignity of Peter is placed before the eyes.

Note that in the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers and in the sacred liturgy itself, the paraphrase of the keys delivered to Peter is by no means rarely found to the effect that because of them he is said to be the doorkeeper of heaven, to open heaven to the earth, and to close what is open. Now this explanation does not exclude the one we have given, but rather presupposes and depends upon it. For since the Church is directed toward leading human beings into heaven, the power governing the Church, considered in its final aspect, ultimately pertains in all its extent to opening heaven to human beings and closing it to the unworthy by repelling them from the Church or from participation in the sacraments. Viewed formally, however, as the power of remitting and retaining sins—which power is a part of the power of the keys, of loosing and binding—it pertains immediately of itself to opening heaven to the penitent, or making them worthy of heaven by the grace of remission granted, and to closing it to the unworthy, the grace of

remission being denied them. Cf. the response of King Oswiu in Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, book 3, chapter 25.

XV. The interpretation we have hitherto defended is not contradicted by the commentary of those Fathers who, after the heresies of the Montanists and Novatians had arisen, contended that the keys of the Church were entrusted in Peter—as Augustine, *last Tractate on John*: "The Apostle Peter, on account of the primacy of his Apostleship, bore in a figured universality the person of the Church... when it was said to him: to you I will give the keys, he represented the whole Church." For it must be considered: 1° that this interpretation was made use of on the occasion of those heresies; 2° that those heretics, who denied that there was power in the Church to remit sins, taught that the keys were given to Peter alone as a private person and that they ceased with him; 3° that the Fathers therefore in opposition contended: a) that the power of binding and loosing, of remitting and retaining sins (which was the only power in question), was not given to Peter alone, which they proved from Matt. 18 and John 20; b) that to Peter the keys and to all the Apostles the power of binding and loosing and of remitting and retaining sins were given for the good of the Church, and therefore that they were given in Peter and in the Apostles to their successors; this is to say that this power always perseveres in the Church—therefore that this power did not cease with Peter and the Apostles, but that it perpetually perseveres in the Church, insofar as it is derived into their successors. The keys were therefore given to the Church: because they were given to Peter and his successors; the power of binding and loosing was given to the Church, because it was given to all the Apostles and their successors, who constitute the governing Church and who use this power for the benefit of the whole Church. This is the meaning of the Fathers. Wherefore if you consider the terminus for which this power was given, it is the totality of the faithful; but if you consider the subject of inherence, this power was given to the whole governing Church, which is contained in Peter and the Apostles and their successors.

When therefore it is said that Peter, receiving the keys, represented the Church, the juridical representation must be thought of—by which Peter represented his always-future successors in the Church and the Church itself, whose head he was being constituted. For the juridical

representation of the whole society is proper to the one who is the head of the society; when such a one is constituted and endowed with power, he receives it also for his successors and receives it for the benefit of the society and so that he may communicate it in part to inferior ministers if need be; whence when he receives authority as a juridical person, the whole society, present or future, is understood to receive it in its head—but to be held and exercised by its head, which perseveres in successors. As for symbolic representation, by which a sign is simply substituted for the thing signified, this is entirely foreign to this passage, as the whole analysis carried out thus far demonstrates.

Wherefore to those who object, from the doctrine of the Fathers, that Peter in receiving the keys represented the Church, the response must be made with a distinction: *He represented his successors to whom the Church was always to be governed*—granted; *he represented the universal Church*—subdistinguished: *as the one for whose benefit he was receiving the keys*—granted; *as the one which was the subject of the power of the keys*—subdistinguished: *as subject by reason of itself*—denied; *as subject by reason of its head, which was immediately invested with this power by Christ*—granted.

Peter, constituted head of the Church and endowed with supreme power, which in part was also to be participated in by lesser officers, was thereby constituted the type and exemplar of all pastors in the Church: "the form of Peter is set before all the rulers of the Church" (St. Leo, *Sermon* 4 *at his consecration*), as that which is first in any genus is the norm of the others. He was therefore made not an empty type without reality, but a full and efficacious type.

Wherefore in this typical and juridical sense it can be said that the power of the keys (Matt. 16:19) was conferred in Peter upon the other Apostles and upon the Church. But is this sense immediate or mediate? A multiple question can be raised here. For if when the Church is spoken of, it is understood as the final object for whose benefit the power was given and in which it is to be exercised, then it can be said to be immediately signified by the words of Christ—both verbally and really (cf. what was said above, no. 5). Verbally by the words *kingdom of heaven*; really, because in the very concept of jurisdiction the terminus of it—which is some society, without which it cannot even be conceived

—is contained. But if when the Church is spoken of, it is understood as the one which exercises power, which is the governing Church and which is contained in the Apostles and their successors, then again a distinction must be made: if you understand the successors of Peter, it must be conceded that the words of Christ immediately pertain to them; for they were said to the Rock of the Church—firm and stable, to endure perpetually, against which the gates of hell shall never prevail. If, however, you understand the other Apostles and their successors, then only a mediate sense can be said to be that in which it is understood that the power of the keys was given to them in Peter by the words of Christ in Matt. 16. For from those words you have only this: that to Peter alone, distinct from the others, was the power of the keys over the universal Church conferred. Hence 1° the other Apostles are directly excluded from parity of power, since they themselves also are subject to Peter. As for 2° the fact that they themselves and their successors received in Peter a certain participation in the power conferred upon Peter, this you gather from the words of Christ only insofar as you know from elsewhere that the Apostles and their successors were themselves also called by Christ to share in responsibility together with Peter, and therefore that they represented Peter as participants in his power; but the sense which is reached by employing a middle term is a mediate sense.

COROLLARY I

Therefore the prerogatives promised to Peter contained in these words of Christ come down to this: that he is the Rock of the Church, the effective principle of its unity and stability; that from its cohesion with this Rock the Church derives its firmness against heresies and schisms and the other assaults of hell; that Peter holds the supreme power in the Church under Christ and the supreme right of binding and loosing all things that conduce to the good governance of the Church. Now this is the primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church; therefore this primacy was promised to Peter.

COROLLARY II

Therefore the primacy was promised immediately and directly to blessed Peter. For as is established from the whole demonstration, the words of Christ containing this promise—*You are Peter, upon this Rock I will build my Church; to you I will give the keys... whatever you bind*, etc. —were not said to all the Apostles together, not to the Church (which was rather to be built upon the Rock), not therefore to Peter insofar as he bore some figure of the Church or of the Apostles as if substituted for them by Christ; but they were said to the one person of Peter, distinct from the other Apostles and the rest of the Church—because he had given the confession not from a delegation but in his own name, to whom the name Cephas had already been individually given, who throughout this speech of Christ is always addressed individually; and moreover Christ himself, not from the consent or supposed consent of his subjects, but from his own supreme and divine authority and supreme dominion, willed to build his Church upon Peter and to entrust to him his own keys with vicarious power.

COROLLARY III

Therefore the Apostles too are founded upon Peter and are subject to his power of the keys. Do not say that the Apostles had already been called before these things were said to Peter, and had therefore already been founded in Christ, so that they no longer needed Peter as their foundation. For a twofold state of the Church must be distinguished: the former, when Christ existed as its visible head on earth; the latter, after Christ had been taken up into heaven. In the first state the Church, gathered from a few faithful, was one because of the immediate subjection of each individual to Christ, in whom alone all power resided. But provision had to be made for the unity of the visible body of the Church after Christ had departed from the earth. For this state, therefore, Christ instituted the hierarchy, communicating his power to the Apostles to endure perpetually; and among the Apostles he chose one to hold the first place, to be the effective principle of unity, to whom

all—the one who has the keys—would be subject. He therefore willed that not only those who were to believe in the future, but also those who had already believed and adhered to him, should be subject to this one who represented his role, so that the Church which had begun to be one under him should continue to be one under Peter. Peter therefore was not the foundation of the Apostles, nor did he hold the keys for them, so as to call them to faith and the Church and to Christ; but he was their foundation and held the keys for them insofar as Christ, having withdrawn, Peter stood in his place as head of the Church, as the principle of their unity, endowed with supreme power even over them.

Moreover, from the observation just made you will understand what Christ implied when he said in the future *I will build my Church.* For he did not mean to say that his Church at the time he spoke was in no way existing; but he implied a different future state of it, in which it would rest not only upon himself alone as its invisible foundation, but also upon a secondary and visible foundation, and would be governed by the same with Christ's vicarious power.

XVI. There remains to be explained a certain passage of Cyprian, *De Unitate Ecclesiae,* which, after mentioning heresies and schisms and about to explain their cause, continues: "This happens because men do not return to the origin of truth, do not seek the head, do not keep the teaching of the heavenly Master. If anyone considers and examines this, there is no need for a long treatment and arguments. The Lord speaks to Peter: And I say to you... loosed also in heaven. And again he says to the same after his resurrection: Feed my sheep. Upon that one he builds his Church, and to him he commands the sheep to be fed. And although after his resurrection he assigns equal power to all the Apostles and says (John 20:21): Receive the Holy Spirit, etc.; yet in order to make manifest unity, he disposed by his authority that the same unity should take its origin from one. The other Apostles were indeed what Peter was, endowed with equal fellowship of honor and power; but the beginning proceeds from unity (the words that follow are deleted in some English editions and by Baluze, as lacking the support of many manuscripts; but they are found in several others and are cited in the sixth century by Pelagius II in his letter to the Bishops of Istria, and Jerome seems to have read them in book 1 *Against Jovinian*, and they fully cohere with

the doctrine handed down here and elsewhere by Cyprian) and the Primacy is given to Peter, that one Church of Christ and one Chair may be shown."

Cyprian notes two things regarding Peter: 1° that power was first conferred upon him alone, then upon the others—*the beginning proceeds from unity;* 2° that the Primacy is given to Peter. The reason for this, he teaches, is so that unity might be made manifest, so that one Church and one chair might be shown. But these contain the notion of the primacy of jurisdiction. The words *so that unity might be made manifest, so that one Church and one chair might be shown* are not to be understood as meaning that in Peter there was merely an exhibition of unity, or that he was taken only as a type of the unity of the Church; rather they must be understood to mean that Peter is such a type as to be at the same time by his authority the efficient principle of unity. That is, the words *so that unity might be made manifest, so that one Church and one chair of the Church might be shown* are equivalent to saying: so that it might be manifest that unity, and therefore one chair, ought to exist in the Church by Christ's institution—a chair that exercises supreme jurisdiction so as to produce unity. For 1° that this is the sense —namely, that it should be manifest that one chair ought to exist in the Church—is clear to one who considers the words *so that one Church of Christ and one chair may be shown;* for the unity of the Church is real, and Christ willed it: the words *so that one Church of Christ may be shown* therefore signify *so that the Church may be one*, or *so that Christ may show that he wills his Church to be one.* By the same token, the words in the same context *so that one chair may be shown* signify *so that there may be one chair in the Church*, or *so that Christ may show that he wills one chair in the Church.* Equivalent to these words are the preceding ones in the same context: *so that he might make manifest unity*, which must therefore be taken in the same way. 2° That moreover this chair—which is the chair of the Primacy—exercises supreme jurisdiction for the production of unity, according to the mind of Cyprian, is clear from what he teaches in this very passage. For he says that the origin of unity (of the Church, namely) begins from one—that is, from Peter. The origin of the unity of the Church is therefore from Peter; but in a society the principle of unity is nothing other than

supreme jurisdiction; therefore, on the authority of Cyprian, Peter was endowed by Christ with supreme jurisdiction. Again, he says that the Church is built upon Peter alone, or as he says a little below: the Church is founded upon the chair of Peter, that the sheep were committed to Peter by Christ to be fed, and in the same place shortly after, that whoever forsakes the chair of Peter is not in the Church. But all these things sound of the primacy of jurisdiction. For if the Church is founded upon Peter, it therefore necessarily depends upon Peter so as to exist and persevere; but a society has its necessary dependence for existence and perseverance only from the authority of jurisdiction by which it is governed. Then, the chair in the Church according to Cyprian is the seat of those who preside with power (*Letter* 65 to Rogation), or is authority itself governing; pastors in the Church are princes by the authority of governance (*Letter* 27 to the Lapsed). That one chair, therefore, upon which the whole Church is founded and by forsaking which one by that very fact withdraws from the Church, is the chair of supreme governance and supreme power; for it is one authority to which the whole Church is subject. The Primacy therefore which Cyprian ascribes to Peter is a primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church. The opinion of Cyprian was expressed by Pacian, *Letter* 3 to Sympronian: "Matthew himself relates that a little above the Lord spoke to Peter—to one, so as to form unity from one; soon afterward the same thing (Matt. 18) he disposed in common"; and by Jerome, *Against Jovinian*, book 2: "Therefore among the twelve one is chosen, so that with a head appointed the occasion of schism may be removed."

What then do the words mean which assert that the Apostles were what Peter was and that they were endowed with equal fellowship of honor and power? We respond that they must be taken in such a way as to be composed with those by which the primacy of jurisdiction is ascribed to Peter. Thus they either refer to the time preceding the institution of the Primacy, or if they also allude to the subsequent time, they speak of simple Apostolic dignity, which was common to all. For the other Apostles were equal to Peter in the dignity and rights of the Apostolate, under which common appellation all are counted equally; but Peter moreover was the head, summit, and prince of the Apostles, holding the primacy of jurisdiction in the Church—a primacy in which

he had no sharer. "For the union of the whole body," says Leo, *Letter* 14 to Anastasius of Thessalonica, chapter 11, "makes one health, one beauty; and this union of the whole body requires unanimity, but especially demands the harmony of the priests, who, though they share the same dignity, do not all have the same rank (for a subordination among them exists); since among the most blessed Apostles too, in similarity of honor, there was a certain distinction of power, and although the election of all was equal, yet to one alone it was given to be eminent over the others." For the rest, about the inequality of Peter and the Apostles, having regard also to their extraordinary charisms, we shall speak more conveniently below in Thesis VI.

It may be asked whether Peter and the other Apostles grasped the sense of the words spoken by Christ to Peter; for they seem even afterward to have been ignorant of which of them was the greater (Mark 9:33; Luke 9:46; 22:24). I respond that since the matter was not to be fulfilled then but in the future, there was no need that the sense of Christ's words be distinctly understood at that time (cf. John 2:22). Now the contention of the Apostles about the primacy either proves that the Apostles did not clearly and distinctly understand, or that they did not understand that the promise made to Peter was absolute—which afterward was certainly established. Indeed the very contention suggests that in some way at least the words of Christ had been understood; for the occasion seems to have been that the Apostles knew that one of them was to be their head, and they saw that some of them were preferred by Christ to the others by special tokens of love.

THESIS II

In the words of Christ in Luke 22:31-32, there is contained a divine promise of the infallible magisterium of Peter and of the divinely entrusted office of confirming the brethren.

I. Dr. Langen (op. cit., part 1, page 16) says that infallibilists agree that Christ in this passage expressed in proper terms what was promised by him metaphorically in Matthew and finally conferred upon Peter in John. Whence he concludes that the whole question depends upon the correct interpretation of this passage. But he is badly mistaken himself

or willfully deceives his readers. For first, it is not the Catholic view that as much is said in Luke, though in a different manner, as is said in Matthew; for from Luke the Catholics gather the prerogative of Peter's infallible magisterium and of the office of confirming the brethren in faith, while from Matthew they derive besides these other principal prerogatives of Peter as well. Then, it is not the intention of Catholics, as this Doctor supposes, that the interpretation of Christ's words in Matthew is not also certain with respect to the prerogative of infallibility, unless it is also certain that this prerogative is signified by Christ's words in Luke. For the interpretation of the words of Matthew is entirely independent and self-consistent, with complete abstraction from the words of Luke. It is therefore manifestly false that the whole controversy about the Primacy of Peter and his infallibility depends upon the interpretation of the words of Christ in Luke. With these premises, we proceed to the exposition of these words.

It was at one time doubted, and even denied by some, that the words of Luke 22:31 refer to the Primacy of Peter; but all doubt for Catholics was removed by the First Vatican Council, Session 4, chapter 4, saying: "The apostolic doctrine of the Roman Pontiffs has been embraced by all venerable Fathers and venerated and followed by all holy orthodox Doctors, knowing most fully that this Holy See of Peter always remains uncontaminated by any error, according to the divine promise of our Lord and Savior made to the prince of his disciples: *I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail; and you, when once you have turned back, strengthen your brothers.*" A double question must be resolved: 1° whether the words of Christ refer to Peter alone; 2° whether a special prerogative above the others was conferred upon him and what it is.

II. The words of Christ refer to the one person of Peter. a) A contention having arisen among the Apostles (Luke 22:24 seq.) as to which of them seemed to be the greatest, Luke reports first that Christ addressed all of them: *He said to them: The kings of the Gentiles*, etc.; but when this first part of the speech was finished, the same Luke notes that Christ turned his speech to one—namely, Simon: *And the Lord said: Simon, Simon*—so Christ no longer addresses all of them directly but only Simon, although he speaks about all of them or addresses them

also indirectly by the words *he has demanded you.* b) The one whom Christ addresses is the one who responded to Christ that he was ready to go with him to prison and to death—who said to him: *Lord, I am ready to go with you*, etc.—and to whom Christ immediately subjoined: *I tell you, Peter: the cock will not crow today*, etc. Now this is Peter alone. c) In the words *I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail* (in the longer letter of Ignatius to the Smyrnaeans, no. 7, the reading is: "who [Christ] prayed that the faith of the Apostles might not fail"—but this can readily be taken of the final cause of Christ's prayer; unless perhaps that writer had before him a manuscript in which *your faith* was written in the plural) *and you, when once you have turned back, strengthen your brothers*, the personal pronoun *you*, repeated twice, designates one person—that Simon to whom he had said: *Simon, Simon, behold Satan has demanded you that he might sift you like wheat.* d) Now the person of Peter is designated as distinct from the other Apostles, to whom he is opposed, and he is exhibited as the one who confirms while they are to be confirmed: *and you, when once you have turned back, strengthen your brothers.* The words of Christ are therefore directed to Peter alone as distinct from the others, not as representing the others. What is therefore contained in the words of Christ pertains to Peter alone.

III. Now what does Christ say to Peter? Σίμων Σίμων, ἰδού, ὁ σατανᾶς ἐξητήσατο (ἐξαιτέω is used of one who demands for questioning, who claims for punishment and torment) ὑμᾶς, τοῦ σινιάσαι (which according to Suidas is σείσαι, κοσκινεῦσαι, θορυβῆσαι, ταράξαι), ὡς τὸν σίτον. "In sifting" (as John Cameron says in *Myrothecium Evangelicum* on this passage) "there are two things: the one is the shaking and agitation by which everything is thrown into turmoil; the other is the separation and sorting. In the first meaning it is used here, so that Christ meant nothing other than that Satan wished to have the Apostles and Peter delivered to him, so that he might confuse them." A great temptation was imminent for the Apostles, whom Satan wished to disturb and destroy by tearing them away from Christ, thus assailing their faith, which is the principle of union and fellowship with Christ. That it was especially their faith or unity in faith that Satan was to assail, is clear from the words of Christ, by which he says that he prayed to counteract this evil for the faith of Peter. Christ does not

determine the time of the temptation, nor whether Satan was to encounter the Apostles once or on several occasions, but speaks indefinitely; the present will of Satan is indeed signified, but the term of this will is not limited to the present or imminent time; indeed, such a limitation is foreign to the very character of Satan. With this prediction therefore of the temptation of Satan, by which all the brethren were to be assailed, Christ immediately subjoins: *But I* (by which particle opposition was signified: namely, Satan and I are enemies; he demanded you to sift you, I on the contrary have prayed) *have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail.* Although all the Apostles were being demanded, Christ says that he prayed for one, *for you:* ἵνα μὴ ἐκλείπῃ ἡ πίστις σου. Ἔκλειψις is said of any defect whatsoever: Christ therefore prayed that the faith of Peter suffer no defect; for the negating proposition is taken universally: he prayed, namely, that his faith remain firm, stable, and unconquered.

IV. The question is whether the prayer of Christ for the indeficiency of faith refers to Peter only for the time of his imminent lapse or denial, or whether it extends indefinitely and begs for the perpetual constancy and firmness of Peter in faith. "Christ here," says Dr. Langen (loc. cit., pages 16–17), "speaks immediately of his arrest, of the imminent dangers, and predicts to Peter his denial. The flight of the disciples and Peter's denial would have been followed by at least a certain transitory interruption of the arising kingdom of God, unless the unfaithful had been reunited and confirmed by the Lord. Wherefore Christ prays for Peter, that he at least may not lose faith in his denial, even if he outwardly withdraws from him. And to him, as one stronger than the others, he moreover entrusts the office of confirming the others after his conversion—that is, after he has raised himself from his lapse. Those words of Christ therefore have a special relation to the conditions of that time; indeed the possible omission of faith in Peter, the prayer of the Savior for him, his conversion—all this refers to his imminent denial, and the brethren—that is, the other Apostles—were in need of confirmation at that time because they all for a while forsook the Lord. As to any grant of ecclesiastical dignity, as anyone can see, not a word is said here." He moreover says (ibid., page 19) that in the whole context of Christ's words the discussion is not of a singular knowledge of faith but

of the virtue of faith in opposition to apostasy from Christ… Peter was to gather and stabilize afterward the fallen and scattered Apostles in the faith of Christ and in confidence in him; Peter was to establish them firmly if the Apostles had in any degree wavered out of fear of danger, and to keep them immune from lapse and denial of faith. For this reason it was said: *I have prayed, that your faith may not fail*, not *that your faith may not err.*

Before refuting this inept interpretation, it is necessary to establish the meaning of the term *faith* and the phrase *may not fail*, which this Doctor seems not to have grasped sufficiently. The following points must therefore be noted. 1° πίστις (from πέπεισται—he is persuaded, he believes) among classical authors is properly a firm assent of the mind, persuasion, certitude—both subjective and also objective, that is, the certain matter itself. At the same time among the same authors πίστις is also at times confidence, θάῤῥος. 2° In the New Testament, πίστις-faith is beyond all doubt very frequently faith in the proper sense—sometimes viewed subjectively for the firm assent of the mind to God revealing, sometimes objectively for the revealed truths themselves. There is no need to accumulate testimonies on this point; they abound in all the Gospels, Acts, and Letters. Moreover 3° when faith is defined in Heb. 11:1, its essence is so exhibited that it is presupposed to confidence and pertains to the intellect: *the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.* Again 4° faith is accurately distinguished from hope, and therefore from confidence—which is hope strengthened—in 1 Cor. 13:13: *And now there remain faith, hope, charity: these three.* From these alone it is already permissible to conclude that we have the right in the passage of Luke 22 to interpret faith in that sense which is proper and common in Scripture itself and which the very definition provided from Scripture supplies.

But other things may be added. For 5° we deny that when faith in Scripture is exhibited as the reason for obtaining something from God, or for miracles wrought by the power of God, thereby immediately and directly is signified confidence—a distinct act from faith—and not faith itself. This can be proved both by reason and by the very usage of Scripture. As for reason: since confidence cannot exist without the firm assent of the mind which is faith, and since the former is greater the

more firm the latter is, if confidence is required, faith is also required; and if confidence is the reason why something is obtained or done, faith too—upon which confidence rests—can be said to be the reason for the same thing. When therefore Christ said that faith was the reason for obtaining something from him, he could have directed his thought to faith itself as the root of confidence, considering it together with the other necessary conditions but signifying it directly and not only indirectly, and signifying the other conditions only as effects of faith. As for the usage of Scripture, it suffices to compare Heb. 11:31 seq. and 1 Cor. 13:2. In the former passage, faith is said to be that by which benefits were obtained from God and miracles wrought: *By faith the walls of Jericho fell down; by faith Rahab the harlot did not perish with the unbelievers, having received the spies with peace… Who through faith conquered kingdoms, wrought justice, obtained the promises, stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire*, etc. Now the faith discussed here is always that which was defined at the beginning of the chapter—faith in the proper sense. In the second passage Paul says that *if I have all faith so as to move mountains, but have not charity, I am nothing:* that faith in the proper sense is here signified is clear from the fact that in the same chapter he distinguishes faith from the other two virtues, hope and charity. Indeed 6° Christ himself declared what is the faith he required for conferring the benefits of healing: for in Matt. 9:28, when the blind came to him, Jesus said to them: *Do you believe that I can do this to you?* And when they affirmed, he touched their eyes saying: *According to your faith be it done to you.* Now the power of God is the object not of confidence but of the assent of the mind which is properly faith. Cf. also John 11:25–27, 40.

As often therefore as the formula *your faith has made you whole* occurs (Matt. 9:22; Mark 5:34; Luke 7:50; 8:48; 17:19; 18:42), it can be taken of faith in the proper sense—though not separated from confidence, which spontaneously arises from it. Indeed it can and must be affirmed that whenever in the New Testament there occurs—and most frequently occurs—the name of faith predicated of human beings, directly signified is always faith in the proper sense, namely the firm assent of the mind toward God; with the exception of Rom. 14:23, in which however that faith is implied. This will become clear from all and

each testimony taken together. The same must also be affirmed of the verb *to believe*, when it signifies the supernatural act by which we are borne toward God; with the exception of Mark 11:23–24, in which *to believe* seems to directly signify confidence—certainly resting on faith, which is surely implied. It is permissible therefore to conclude that this is the true and most common meaning of the word faith in the New Testament—as the firm assent of the mind to truths revealed by God—when it is taken subjectively. Wherefore the very Protestants who substituted for the Catholic's justifying faith a certain confidence define it nonetheless as a certain persuasion of salvation promised to us in Christ and applied to us through faith itself (cf. Stephanus, s.v. πίστις).

Now the indeficiency of faith which Christ prayed for: is it to be placed only in this, that the virtue of faith is not lost—which can happen even if someone errs in faith, insofar as he either errs in matters not yet defined or dissents without pertinacity from the norm of truth out of ignorance—or is it also placed in this, that Peter is not to err or waver in matters pertaining to faith? The latter must be held. First, the words of Christ—*that your faith may not fail*—as regards the defects that can be excluded, are unlimited and universal; there is therefore no reason why only the moral defect should be excluded and not also the defect of knowledge or certitude, for if this were allowed, faith would in some true sense be failing. Second, account must be taken of the end for which this indeficiency of faith was prayed for by Christ. It was prayed for so that Peter might confirm the brethren against the assaults of Satan seeking to destroy the brethren; but the brethren of Peter and Peter himself embrace the whole Church of Christ either formally or virtually; and the firmness of the whole Church against Satan requires not only that the moral defect of faith be excluded but error in faith simply; therefore even if the confirmation by Peter be limited to some time only, for at least that time his faith must be indeficient in such a way that all error is excluded. Finally this is in the Church of Christ the common interpretation of this passage, whose testimonies we shall nonetheless cite elsewhere—namely when we speak of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff.

V. With these premised, judgment must be passed on the Langenian interpretation. The indeficiency of faith was obtained from

Christ for Peter only for the time of his lapse, lest by denying faith outwardly he might also inwardly cast it away; and it was obtained for him so that, being converted, he might in that common disturbance confirm the brethren—since he was stronger and more steadfast than the others. That is: to confirm others in following Christ for that time, the one is chosen who at that same time was less steadfast than the others and had receded most from Christ, and is called stronger and more firm than the others, although the others did not deny while he alone did. Was not John stronger and more firm, who openly followed the Master all the way to the cross? If this was Christ's plan—that for that time one of the disciples should be chosen to confirm the others in following him—none could be said to be more unsuitable for obtaining this than Peter. Moreover, this Doctor supposes that the other Apostles lost their faith when they forsook the Lord; otherwise the plan he attributes to Christ is not understandable; but who taught him this?

From the observation just made it is clear how wrongly it is demanded that the words of Christ be taken as if they referred only to the imminent temptation. Appeal is made to the so-called parallel passages, namely Matt. 26:31 and Mark 14:27, where Christ predicts to the Apostles that they will all take offense at him that very night; but Peter, responding to those words of Christ, says that even if all are scandalized, he himself will never be scandalized, and then hears from Christ the prediction of his own lapse. Whence it is concluded that this scandal is that temptation of Satan of which Christ speaks in Luke: *behold, Satan has demanded you that he might sift you like wheat*—especially since in Luke the same is immediately followed by Peter's response: *Lord, I am ready to go with you to prison and to death,* and the prophecy of his own lapse. But if this is so, since that temptation or that scandal was temporary, the confirmation of Peter too could only have had its place for that time.

Yet it must be denied that the passages of Matthew and Mark speak of the same thing as Luke 22:31–32, which is evident from the very analysis of the matters themselves. For in Matthew the speech is about the scandal which all will suffer and Peter especially, who will not only be scattered but will deny Christ: and therefore, if a temptation of Satan intervened there, the speech is about a temptation to which all

will succumb and Peter most of all. But in Luke the speech is about that temptation by which Satan will not prevail against the Apostles, and least of all against Peter: for Christ established an effective safeguard against it in the faith of Peter, which was not to fail and by which the other brethren would be confirmed. I say an effective safeguard: for the prayer of Christ is absolute, not to be lacking its effect; and that it was absolute is clear from the following words *and you, when once you have turned back, strengthen your brothers,* by which Peter is presupposed and represented as firmly established in faith; for only on this hypothesis can the office of confirming the brethren be imposed upon him. Therefore Luke speaks of an entirely different matter than Matthew. Wherefore what Luke narrates in 22:33 is not to be connected immediately with the preceding speech in 22:31–32; rather, what Matthew narrates in 26:31—which was omitted by Luke and likewise omitted by John—must be supplied. Although the same saying of Christ occurs in John at 16:32, that same speech of Christ which is in Matthew is not reported there; for the speech necessarily preceded Peter's response, with which it coheres logically: but Peter's response is reported by John in 13:37, after some prior words of the Lord which are omitted by Matthew and Mark.

Therefore Peter was not constituted the confirmer of the brethren for the time of the scattering of the Apostles, when the bridegroom was taken from them. Nor for the time following upon the resurrection of Christ: for then Christ himself was evidently performing the role of confirmer immediately and in person.

VI. To what then do the words of Christ refer: *and you, when once you have turned back, strengthen your brothers?* Since στηρίζω (which means to stabilize, make firm, support—στερεόω, whence στήριγμα and στερέωμα, meaning firmament, prop, support, which is the same as ἑδραίωμα; cf. Suidas, s.v. στηριγμός—base, foundation, prop) is used with its derivatives also in a moral sense, it is clear that only this sense has its place here. Therefore ὁ στηρίζων in the moral sense is one who stands in relation to the souls of others as a base or support, lest they slip or waver, who renders them firm, stable, and safe against hostile assaults. But this office of confirming the brethren—is it to be fulfilled in a single act, or is it something habitual proceeding to acts when the

occasion demands? A doubt can arise on account of those words of Christ: καί σύ ποτέ ἐπιστρέψας στήριξον—*and you, when once you have turned back, strengthen.* For it may be asked whether that ποτέ refers only to the term *when once you have turned back,* or also to the verb *strengthen*; and in order that this question may be resolved, it must also be inquired what the meaning of that term *when once you have turned back* is. Now there are several who think this term signifies conversion from the imminent lapse; others take the term ἐπιστρέψας adverbially, as equivalent to πάλιν—again—or ἀμοιβαίως—in turn—or to designate a benevolent disposition toward someone, which also frequently occurs in the Scriptures. To speak the truth, we find the other interpretation more pleasing, which is of itself very consonant with the manner of speaking in the Scriptures: cf. for example Ps. 6:5; 70:20–21; 79:15; 84:7; 2 Par. 33:3; Jer. 12:15; Hos. 2:9 (Heb. 11), etc. And 1° indeed for this very conformity with the Hebrew manner of speaking, which also occurs in the Aramaic language, whose dialect Christ used; 2° because no mention of Peter's lapse had yet occurred; and therefore the words of Christ in the determined sense of conversion from a lapse would not then have been understood by Peter, who accordingly was bound to take the term *when once you have turned back* spontaneously in that other sense, which we have shown to be sufficiently common; and there is no reason why we should believe that Christ uttered words which could not be understood in the act of speaking but only afterward—though we do not deny that this can sometimes happen. 3° Because the mention of conversion from a lapse would have to be said to refer to this: that the starting-point should be designated, from which the office of confirming the brethren would begin; but this cannot be admitted; for the office of confirmer had to begin after it was actually imposed upon him: and indeed this was done after the resurrection, when the Primacy was actually conferred upon him. It is therefore more probable that the words of Christ convey this meaning: *and you in turn*, or *and you with a benevolent disposition, strengthen your brothers.* This is certainly how George of Trebizond, a Greek, understood it in his letter to the Cretans on the one holy catholic and apostolic Church (in Leo Allatius, *Graeciae orthodoxae*, vol. 1), saying in no. 7: "Οὕτως ἡ μὲν τῆς Ρώμης (Ἐκκλησία) πολλάκις ἐπιστραφεῖσα ἐστήριξε τὰς ἑτέρας."

And so that ποτέ must also be taken together with the verb *strengthen*. What then—is Peter to confirm the brethren only on some one occasion? Note that the word ποτέ not only means *sometimes* but also not rarely means something pleonastic, or an indeterminate time: so that the legitimate meaning here can be: *and you in turn, at the opportune time or when the occasion presents itself, strengthen your brothers.* That this interpretation is demanded is clear from the following observation. For the wicked will of Satan to assail the brethren, against which the indefectible faith of Peter is established, was not limited to one certain time—indeed, it was never to cease. This will become more evident if it is noted that there is a real parallelism between Satan demanding to agitate the Apostles and the gates of hell that are to fight against the Church. Now just as these are known historically always to fight—and this continual combat is indicated by the very words of Christ—so that effort of Satan to agitate the Apostles is not represented to Christ as defined for one or two occasions, but as indefinite or continuous. Therefore the confirmation of Peter set in opposition to it is likewise such. Namely, Christ does not define the number of times Peter must confirm the brethren, but speaks indefinitely—that is, whenever confirmation shall be needed. Wherefore this office of confirming the brethren, which carries with it the right conferred on Peter to confirm and the corresponding duty of others to subject themselves to Peter as their confirmer, entails a habitual and stable right in Peter to confirm the brethren. Wherefore Peter is the permanent στήριγμα of the brethren, and stands in relation to them as their base, their prop, their firmament—that is, the principle of their firmness and immovable constancy.

But in what matter is he to confirm them? He himself is their στήριγμα by reason of his indefectible faith; therefore the terminus of the confirmation is certainly at least their faith; and it is to the confirming of faith that the faith of the confirmer properly belongs. Peter therefore confirms the brethren in faith, which is the foundation of the whole Christian edifice constructed in every human being, which is the first bond by which human beings are united to Christ and incorporated into his body: Peter, namely, teaching infallibly, is the principle of the stability and constancy of the brethren in faith. Namely,

just as the Church is called in 1 Tim. 3:15 στῦλος καὶ ἑδραίωμα τῆς ἀληθείας, so by a not dissimilar appellation Peter is called στήριγμα of the faith—that is, τῆς ἀληθείας of the brethren or of the Church—so that the Church is the ἑδραίωμα of truth because it rests upon Peter as στήριγμα. Wherefore it is manifest that these words of Christ correspond to the preceding ones in Matt. 16 seq. and mutually illuminate each other. For here Satan is to assail the Apostles, there the gates of hell are to assail the Church; there Peter is the πέτρα of the Church, here Peter is ὁ στηρίζων or τὸ στήριγμα of the brethren; there the gates of hell do not prevail against the Church because she is founded upon the rock, here the brethren are rendered safe against the snares and assaults of Satan because they are confirmed by Peter. The difference is only that there the language is allegorical, here it is proper; there the Primacy of Peter is presented in general, here specifically the Primacy of faith or in the magisterium of faith.

Therefore the faith properly so called of Peter is that for whose indeficiency Christ prayed. Since therefore the prayer of Christ cannot fail of its effect, the faith of Peter will never suffer any defect; and given this efficacious prayer of Christ and his promise, it cannot come about that the faith of Peter by which he can and must confirm the brethren should ever fail—and this comes down to infallibility: therefore it is promised to Peter by Christ. And it is the infallibility of a teacher; for such is the one who confirms others. For it is clear from the words of Christ that the indeficiency of the faith of Peter is ordained as an effective means for obtaining the firmness of the brethren against the assaults of Satan.

COROLLARY I

Those among the Protestants therefore err who place the confirmation of Peter in this: that having done penance for his sin, he gave courage to sinners by his own example of hoping for pardon from God. For here the speech is not specifically about confirming sinners but about the brethren; nor is such confirmation of an active and efficient kind, such as is signified by the verb στήριξον; and moreover the speech here is about a confirmation by which the brethren may be

able to stand firm against the assaults of Satan, not merely one by which they may be able to free themselves from the bonds of Satan. Dr. Langen moreover abuses the trust of his readers (loc. cit., page 70 seq.) when he submits to them certain moral expositions of the Fathers accommodated to the instruction of the faithful, which in no way exclude the literal interpretation.

COROLLARY II

Those also err who think that the office of Peter as confirmer had reference only to that time after his repentance from the lapse, when he announced the resurrection of Christ to the brethren; who therefore said: *The Lord has risen indeed and has appeared to Simon.* For at that time Christ himself visibly performed the role of confirmer as well as of Shepherd, and he himself truly and actually confirmed all the Apostles and the others. Cf. what was said above.

Those are moreover inept who say that the promise of indefectible faith is not proper to Peter, because he shortly afterward lost faith by denying Christ. For 1° this promise does not pertain, as we said, to the present time; 2° nowhere is it written that Peter cast away faith; a certain due confession indeed failed; but the interior faith remained in the heart. Prudentius sings in his *Hymn at Cockcrow* about Peter: "The sinner wept at last the sin that from his lips had slipped; while his heart remained innocent, and his soul preserved faith."

VII. There remains, however, the question of who are to be understood by the name of Peter's brethren: *strengthen your brothers*—for it is disputed whether the Apostles themselves are included, who, being themselves also infallible, do not seem to have stood in need of Peter as their confirmer. First of all, it is certain that, even if the Apostles are excepted by reason of some extraordinary prerogative, the other pastors and the faithful are nonetheless included—who in a true sense were brothers of Peter, as they are also called by him in his letters, and whom Satan was already at that time seeking to agitate and destroy. But that the Apostles too are comprehended in the words of Christ—indeed that they are comprehended first, having regard to the meaning of Christ's words—and through them also others, if the hermeneutical

rules are consulted, must be certain; and the difficulty arising from this, namely that it is not easy to reconcile this with the other point of doctrine about the infallibility of the individual Apostles, is not in the first place a sufficient reason in itself for rejecting the clearest interpretation; and then, what is sufficient, it will be resolved.

For a) the brethren of Peter are most especially those who, sharing the same Apostolic dignity, have been co-opted with him into the same College. b) From the words of Christ it is manifest that those are to be confirmed by Peter whom Satan demanded to sift like wheat; and these are those whom Christ addresses as *you*; upon whom the danger from Satan's assault could hang: and he prayed for the faith of Peter so that the brethren might be confirmed by it; therefore those were to be confirmed against the assault of Satan of whom mention was made; they are therefore the same who are represented by the term *you* and by the term *brethren*; but those to whom *you* is said are certainly the Apostles present with Christ together with Peter: therefore.

The learned Patrizi (*De Evangeliis*, book 1, question 5, no. 42) notes that the name *brethren* used without an adjunct in the New Testament always signifies Christians or the faithful—whether they be Apostles, Bishops, or laity—so that they are represented under this common aspect. This does not please us: they are rather associates in the Apostolate and co-workers, at least in Paul's usage. Cf. Phil. 4:22, where brethren are distinguished from the saints, who are certainly Christians. Cf. 1 Cor. 1:1; 2 Cor. 1:1 compared with 1 Thess. 1:1.

How then are the Apostles to be confirmed? It must be noted 1° that comparing this passage with the preceding one in Matthew, it is clear that the one who is στήριγμα and πέτρα is the same; and that Peter is that rock upon which the Apostles themselves together with the Church are founded, and therefore that rock from which the Apostles too together with the Church draw firmness, on account of which the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church and the Apostles themselves. But nothing other is said in Luke than that the speech here is specifically about faith, of which however the speech is simultaneously in general together with other things in Matthew: for Peter is the rock of faith, as we have explained together with the Fathers. It must be noted 2° that in the Apostles a twofold kind of office must be

distinguished—one ordinary, which was to persevere in their successors the Bishops, and another extraordinary, to which belonged the charism of infallibility given to each individually, which other office was to expire with the Apostles themselves. It must be noted 3° that whenever Christ endows the Apostles with some prerogative for the governance of the Church, he always addresses them in common, Peter excepted, to whom he speaks individually. It must be noted 4° that from all the words of Christ addressed to the Apostles in common, the extraordinary prerogatives of the individual Apostles cannot be gathered, but the prerogatives of the whole assembly and the ordinary ones of individuals—without which that assembly of Apostles could not even have existed. Indeed 5° when Christ was constituting his Church in the Apostles—which Church was to be perennial and was to exhibit the form of power which he willed to exist in the Church—it was fitting that by the words addressed by him to the Apostles he should represent that power which was to be ordinary in the Church, and accordingly express those prerogatives which were to be ordinary, not extraordinary. From these things we gather that when Christ here in Luke 22:31 speaks of the Apostles, he considers them according to their ordinary prerogatives, which are common to Bishops as well. This being posited, it is clear that they truly stood in need of the confirmation of Peter, no differently than their successors do. And although Christ by a special arrangement—which is known to us from elsewhere—decreed something extraordinary for the Apostles themselves, he most rightly abstracts from it here; for the question was about establishing the form of the magisterium that would be perpetual in the Church—that is, the ordinary relation which his brethren ought to bear toward Peter.

COROLLARY I

Therefore the end of Christ's prayer was equally the good of all the Apostles, yet to be obtained in a different manner: namely, the constancy of Peter against the assault of Satan was to be obtained through his indefectible faith confirmed immediately by God alone; the constancy of the others through faith confirmed also by Peter. Dr. Langen therefore wrongly appeals to Fathers who teach that Christ

prayed here for the faith of the Apostles: for who denies this? but the question is how he provided for the firmness of their faith.

COROLLARY II

Therefore these words of Christ addressed to Peter cohere with Christ's own preceding words in Luke: namely, Christ indicates to the Apostles who among them is to be the greater—a matter about which they were contending. For Christ, first responding to all, does not deny that there will be a greater among them—which Protestants contend, on the grounds that Christ says in v. 26: *but not so with you*—although this form of speech sometimes denies the very thing of which mention was previously made (as we grant to Francis Turretin, *loc.* XVIII, q. 16); yet here it is manifest that only a certain manner of the thing is denied. For given this negation, Christ still presupposes that there is someone greater and a leader (ὁ μείζων καὶ ὁ ἡγούμενος) among the Apostles, and compares him to himself, or sets himself before him as an example, so that that one should conduct himself as Christ himself did—who was certainly greater in authority and presents himself as such there, and so conducted himself toward the Apostles. Therefore in these words Christ affirms that there will be someone among the Apostles who will excel the others in authority and will be ἡγούμενος. Wherefore the words of Christ: *let him be as the lesser*—in Greek ὡς ὁ νεώτερος, as the younger—do not tend to indicate that the primacy among them will be only a certain honor to be accorded to the elder; but since what is proper to τοῦ νεωτέρου is to be subordinate and to obey, there νεώτερος is taken for the inferior, the lesser: for Christ did not conduct himself simply as a younger person, but as an inferior—namely, by ministering. And so these words tend to teach the manner in which the one who is greater ought to conduct himself—namely, as Christ conducted himself: *let him be,* he says, *as the lesser*—not: *let him be lesser*; for Christ was not lesser. And having thus declared the nature of the greatness among the Apostles, Christ proceeds to Peter and promises him with the words we have explained the primacy in the magisterium of faith. But this is equivalent to declaring who among them is to be the greater—directly as regards the magisterium, indirectly as regards other things. The

Protestants therefore have what they demand (loc. cit.)—namely that Christ declared who was to be the greater; which, they say, he ought to have done, if he did not simply deny that someone was to be greater.

COROLLARY III

Therefore in these words of Christ a special prerogative of Peter is contained; for the office of confirmer is a special excellence over those who are to be confirmed—an excellence of magisterium, and therefore of authority, to which others must be subject: and this special excellence has been conferred upon Peter alone, the others being subject to him as those who are to be confirmed.

The interpretation of the words of Christ established thus far is confirmed by Leo the Great in *Sermon* 4 of his assumption: "The danger from the temptation of fear was common to all the Apostles, and they equally needed the help of divine protection, since the devil wished to agitate all, wished to crush all: and yet a special care for Peter is undertaken by the Lord, and it is for Peter's faith specifically that supplication is made—as though the state of the others would be more certain if the mind of the Prince had not been overcome. In Peter therefore the fortitude of all is strengthened, and the help of divine grace is so ordered that the firmness which is bestowed upon Peter through Christ may be conferred through Peter upon the other Apostles." Consistent with this is Bernard's letter to Innocent: "Every danger and scandal of the kingdom of God ought to be referred to your Apostolate, especially those which arise concerning faith. For I judge it fitting that the losses of faith be repaired above all there where faith cannot experience defect. To which other See was it ever said: *I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail?*" Cf. what we shall give in Thesis 24.

The interpretation moreover of Augustine (*De Correptione et Gratia*, no. 10)—"For what did he pray for him [Peter] if not perseverance [namely of faith] to the end?"—touches only the first part of the testimony: but the primacy of Peter is gathered from the complete saying of Christ, by which the office of confirmer is conferred upon Peter. For the rest, Christ promised not merely perseverance to the end

—which can be composed with intervals of lapsing—but perennial constancy or indefectibility. But a fuller commentary was not needed by Augustine when he was then arguing against the Pelagians. As for what the author of the *Quaestiones Novi Testamenti*, question 75, asserts—namely that Christ prayed also for the other Apostles and that they were comprehended in Peter, because the multitude is contained in the one who presides—I do not know in what way it is adduced by Dr. Langen, for it does not favor him but harms him. Cf. what was said in no. 6.

We said in the statement of the thesis that the words of Christ contain the promise of the infallible magisterium; we did not affirm that it was conferred upon him at the time Christ uttered these words. For the words of Christ do not by themselves require that it be understood that the right of confirmer was immediately conferred upon Peter at that time: but since the dignity of the Primacy was in fact conferred upon him, as we shall see, after the resurrection, and the prerogative of confirmer pertains to the Primacy, the words of Christ in Luke exhibit the prerogative with which Peter was to be honored afterward, not one with which he is honored here and now—and therefore they are equivalent to a promise.

THESIS III

The pledge given in Matthew 16 and Luke 22, Christ after his resurrection redeemed in John 21:15 seq., and conferred the primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church upon Peter alone.

I. The words of Christ having first been explained, two things must be proved: 1° that they refer to Peter alone; 2° that by them the primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church is conferred upon Peter. As to the first, the words are: *When therefore they had dined, Jesus says to Simon Peter: Simon, son of John, do you love* (ἀγαπᾷς) *me more than these? He says to him: Yes, Lord, you know that I love you. He says to him: Feed my lambs* (Βόσκε τὰ ἀρνία μου). *He says to him again: Simon, son of John, do you love* (ἀγαπᾷς) *me? He says to him: Yes, Lord, you know that I love you. He says to him: Feed my lambs* (ποίμαινε τὰ πρόβατά μου). *He says to him the third time: Simon, son of John, do you love* (φιλεῖς) *me? Peter was grieved because he said to him the third time: do*

you love me? and he said to him: Lord, you know all things; you know that I love you. He said to him: Feed my sheep (Βόσκε τὰ πρόβατά [alt. προβάτια] μου). The manuscript which St. Ambrose read preferred first *lambs* (ἀρνία), then *little sheep* (προβάτια), then *sheep* (πρόβατα). For in *In Lucam*, book 10, no. 173, he says: "Peter is grieved because he is asked the third time: do you love me?… At last the Lord asks not *do you love* but *do you love me*; and now he is commanded to feed not lambs, as it were those who are to be nourished with a first milk at the first time, nor little sheep as at the second time, but sheep—more perfect ones."

The question is: what are the lambs and sheep of Christ? It is evident that these are spoken metaphorically. The lambs and sheep of Christ are his faithful, who believe in him and follow him. Indeed it was foretold that Christ would be the Shepherd (Ezek. 34:27; Mic. 5:2), and Christ calls himself the Shepherd (John 10:11 seq.) and says he has his sheep and lays down his soul for them and gives them eternal life, and that he knows them and is known by them. In Acts 20:28, Paul calls the multitude of the faithful a flock, which the Bishop presides over and which wolves are to invade; Peter uses the same appellation in his first letter, 5:2. Moreover, the lambs and sheep who are committed to a man to be fed must be visible; and therefore the appellation of sheep here is not to be taken in the stricter sense equivalent to the predestined or the just alone, but in the broader and true sense which embraces all who profess the faith of Christ. Furthermore, lambs and sheep not of this or that inferior pastor—as in the passages cited from Acts and Peter—but the lambs and sheep of Christ (*my lambs, my sheep*) are all the faithful without exception, however they may be distinguished among themselves: for compared to Christ each one is nothing but a sheep or lamb, who are fed by Christ; the lambs and sheep of Christ therefore extend as far as the universal Church. A certain distinction, however, is signified by the different designation of lambs and sheep. For sheep are the mothers of lambs: insofar therefore as sheep are compared with lambs and distinguished from them, it is signified that the fold of Christ is not composed of equals but of those who are unequal—that is, in his Church some are Fathers, while others are counted only in the rank of children. Hence Bruno, Bishop of Segni, in his *Commentary on John* at this passage (Migne, vol. 165): "He committed to him first the lambs,

then the sheep; because he constituted him not only a shepherd but the shepherd of shepherds. Peter therefore feeds the lambs, feeds also the sheep, feeds the children, feeds also the fathers, rules both the subjects and the prelates. He is therefore the shepherd of all; because in the Church there is nothing besides lambs and sheep." All therefore are the sheep or lambs of Christ, because they are fed and governed by him; but insofar as they are compared among themselves—since some are so fed by Christ as to also feed under him, while others are only fed—the entire fold of Christ is divided into lambs and sheep.

Moreover, the words *to feed*—βόσκειν and ποιμαίνειν—are used metaphorically as well. And although, from the usage of speech when they are employed separately, the signification of βόσκειν is less ample and less noble than that of ποιμαίνειν, yet since here they are used of the same subject and object, it is necessary to take these words in this passage as synonyms, so that the signification of βόσκειν is equated with the proper signification of ποιμαίνειν. Now the metaphorical signification of ποιμαίνειν, when its object is human beings, is such as to embrace the functions and offices both of those who preside with the authority of the magisterium (Jer. 3:15) and of those who also exercise the power of jurisdiction over the people. This is clear from both secular and sacred usage. Homer not infrequently calls those who are kings ποιμένας λαῶν; whence in Hesychius ποιμήν is explained as βασιλεύς. In Isaiah 44:28, Cyrus is called by God רֹעֶה—shepherd. In 2 Samuel, kings are said to feed the people: 5:2, *The Lord said to you [David]: you shall feed my people Israel and you shall be prince over Israel.* 7:7: *Did I speak [says the Lord] to any one of the tribes of Israel to whom I commanded to feed my people Israel, saying,* etc. Ezek. 37:24: *And my servant David shall be king over them, and one shepherd* (רוֹעֶה) *shall be over them all.* And God himself, having regard to his power, is called our shepherd. Ps. 22:1: *The Lord rules me and I shall want nothing*—in Hebrew יְהוָה רֹעִי—*The Lord is my shepherd.* And Mic. 5:2: *From you there shall come forth for me one who is to be ruler* (מוֹשֵׁל) *in Israel*—which words are reported thus in Matt. 2:6: "Εκ σοῦ γὰρ ἐξελεύσεται ἡγούμενος, ὅστις ποιμανεῖ (who shall feed, that is, govern) τὸν λαόν μου τὸν Ἰσραήλ." Therefore ποιμαίνειν and מָשַׁל—from which some

derive βασιλεύς—which certainly means to dominate with royal authority, are equivalent.

II. With these premised, it is easy 1° to demonstrate that the cited words of Christ (this chapter must be noted as having been written by John—for he wrote his Gospel late—after the death of Peter, whose death he foretells, doing so as historian; cf. Patrizi, *De Evangeliis*, book 1, ch. 3, question 5, § 1. But why did the Evangelist add this chapter? The matter that stands out here, although Patrizi thinks otherwise, is precisely the commendation of the whole flock to Peter. We shall therefore not err from the truth if we think the Apostle wrote these things in order to impress upon readers the binding force of Peter's privilege, the permanence of which it was then of the greatest importance to know) refer to Peter alone. For he alone is addressed by his proper name, and while Christ had previously addressed all of them in common, turning his speech he turns to Simon alone. He is moreover separated from the others when he is asked: *do you love me?* for love is a personal act proper to each individual, and especially when he is asked: *do you love me more than these* (πλεῖον τούτων)—that is, more than these love me, not more than these things or more than the boat and the fish, which occurred to a certain Protestant. For this interpretation, according to which objects and not subjects are compared, a) contradicts the exegetical tradition of the Fathers and b) gives no certain sense. For on this hypothesis Peter would be asked whether he simply had the love of God, which requires that God be loved above all things; but then it should have been said πλεῖον πάντων; for although someone may love some people or some things less than God, he can still love certain other things above God and thus lack the love of God. The interrogation of Christ would therefore be inept according to this interpretation; for the question would not concern an excess of love—namely one that is greater than the love of the others—but love itself simply, which must not be above only some things but above all things: what therefore did Christ ask? Furthermore, it must be recalled that Peter before the passion of Christ had professed his love toward Christ in such a way as to prefer himself above the others in loving Christ (Matt. 26:33), had afterward experienced his own weakness and was raised up from his lapse by the gaze of Christ: to this therefore Christ

now seems to be looking when he asks Peter whether he truly now burns with that love toward him which he had previously pledged. Nor does it matter that Peter could not have known whether or not he exceeded the others in love for Christ—from which it seems to follow that the interrogation would have been inept, since Peter could not answer it. For Christ did not ask in order to learn from Peter's report, but in order to indicate to him and to the others what degree of love he was demanding of him—or as Ambrose says in book 10, no. 175: "The Lord asks not to learn but to teach, and left to us as it were the vicar of his love one who was to be taken up into heaven." And by subjoining: *Feed my lambs* as it were as the consequence of an affirmative response to his question, Christ also signified that that love toward him which he had asked about truly existed in Peter. From this it is clear that the interrogation of Christ was not a rebuke of recent self-confidence (as Lightfoot wishes, op. cit. at this passage); for the words of Christ breathe nothing but love and benevolent willingness to recompense the supreme love of Peter. Now if Peter is asked whether he loves Christ more than the other Apostles do, he is considered as entirely set apart from them, not as representing them and responding in their name; for the interrogation done in any other way would in reality be addressed to all: but an interrogation addressed to all the present—whether they love Christ more than these present ones do—is absurd. And therefore because he alone of all professes this, he is preferred above all; for his charity is greater than all, says Ambrose ibid. Finally, these words of Christ are referred to the one to whom the immediately following words directly pertain: *Amen, amen I say to you: when you were younger,* etc.; but these are proper to Peter alone: therefore.

III. By these words of Christ 2° the primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church was conferred upon Peter. For 1° it must be noted that a missionary charge and apostolic power had already been conferred upon Peter together with the others in John 20:21; but now again the office of feeding the sheep and lambs of Christ is attributed to Peter alone, and indeed on account of the special love with which Peter followed Christ above the other Apostles; therefore a special prerogative is conferred upon him beyond that which he received in common with all. Proof of the consequence: because since this office is connected with

a special love, it takes on the character of a recompense or reward conferred upon him above the others; a reward conferred upon special love as such is a special reward exceeding the gifts conferred upon those who love less. Therefore the office of feeding the sheep and lambs of Christ is something more excellent than the office of the Apostolate common to all, which can be nothing other than the Primacy: therefore.

On this point it is worth noting that Christ demanded from Peter alone, before the conferral of his offices, some act of faith or charity—so that he might merit these things by way of congruence—distinguishing him thereby too from the other Apostles, so as to signify that he was to be heaped with special gifts and prerogatives.

2° To feed, when its object is human beings, is to govern with authority, with dominion, with the power of jurisdiction; therefore such power is conferred upon Peter when the office of feeding is imposed upon him. How far that power extends and how great it is, is established from the object, which is the sheep and lambs of Christ—that is, all the other faithful besides Peter himself; among whom the Apostles are also comprehended, who are distinct from Peter and are regarded as such here, and who are the sheep of Christ. The object therefore is the universal Church. The power is therefore the greatest in extension and also in intensity, since it exercises authority over the Apostles themselves, and can therefore do certain things which the power of the Apostles cannot (cf. Thesis I). It is therefore the primacy of jurisdiction.

Nor should you say that *to feed* can also be taken of the office or authority of teaching alone: for a) this verb used without an addition does not have that limited but the more ample signification we have described; and when that limited signification is implied, it is declared by express added words (cf. Jer. loc. cit.); b) even accepting this interpretation, the same conclusion is gathered mediately. For it follows that the supreme magisterium of Faith belongs to Peter; but the supreme power of the Church must reside (cf. Thesis I) where the supreme magisterium resides. Since therefore in the Church there is the power of binding and loosing, which certainly was conferred upon the Apostles, the supreme power of this kind will be in Peter.

3° It is certain that the primacy of jurisdiction was promised to Peter and that this promise was absolute. The first is established from

Matt. 16. The second is also proved: both because no condition is placed in the promise but it is made absolutely; and because the promise concerns something instituted for the common and necessary good of the Church—for what is more necessary to a building than its foundation? and such things are not removed on account of the sins of anyone. Therefore the promise was absolute. And indeed, if the promise was conditional, the condition would have to be posited either by God or by man. If by God: since he himself promised the primacy to be conferred by himself, he also promised the condition which would depend on himself. If by man: this can only be conceived as the condition that Peter would not sin; but that this condition was not appended is clear from the fact that with the lapse imminent and foretold, the promise in Luke 22 is confirmed: therefore. And in fact in the words of Christ in Matt. 16 two things are contained—one specific, namely that the Church is to be built upon Peter, and another less determined but contained in the former: namely that the Church is to be built upon some rock. If therefore Peter fell from the dignity of the rock, some other person would have had to be substituted for him. But who was substituted for him? No one can be designated. Therefore the promise made to Peter himself was absolute. Hence the Primacy was conferred upon him at some point: but when did this occur? When it was said to him: *Feed my lambs, feed my sheep*, these words are by themselves most apt for signifying the conferral of the Primacy. Since therefore the Primacy had to be conferred upon Peter, and therefore was conferred at some point, and the words of Christ in John are most suitable for signifying this Primacy as conferred, it must be said that through them the primacy was in fact conferred. For a) these words by themselves bear that sense of signifying supreme power over the universal Church (cf. argument 2); and this is the primacy. b) Having regard to the preceding promise, the words of Christ addressed to Peter in John must take on that signification which is determined by the quality of the subject to whom they are addressed, and therefore the words of John must be compared with the words of Matthew as the execution of a promise is compared with the promise itself. It is therefore fitting to expound them both absolutely and comparatively—that is, in relation to the words of Matthew. If they are considered

absolutely, it is clear (argument 2) that they by themselves signify supreme jurisdiction in the Church. If however they are considered comparatively, the same is equally clear. For it must be said that by these words there is conferred upon Peter what was once absolutely promised; but we have demonstrated that the words of Matthew 16 contain the promise of the primacy of jurisdiction over the universal Church: therefore in John it is not any authority or power whatsoever, but the supreme power—that is, the promised primacy of jurisdiction—that is actually conferred.

Dr. Langen, following Salmasius (loc. cit., page 9), says that these words of Christ to Peter tend to this: that Peter be counted again among the Apostles, from whom he seemed to have withdrawn on account of his sin (loc. cit., § 3). But the sin had already been remitted and Peter was counted together with the other Apostles before he heard these things from Christ. Moreover, the Apostolate of Peter, to which he had been elected by Christ, is itself the primacy. Wherefore these words of Christ do indeed tend to this: that Peter may be made more certain that the promises of Christ will finally attain their effect, and that accordingly he is actually constituted an Apostle; but by this very fact they tend to this: that the Primacy over all is conferred upon him.

And 4° this is the interpretation of the Fathers. Thus Leo the Great, *Sermon* IV: "From the whole world one Peter is chosen, who is to be set over both the calling of all nations and all the Apostles and all the pastors of the Church; so that although there are many priests and many pastors among the people of God, yet Peter himself properly governs all those whom Christ also principally governs." Bernard, *De Consideratione*, book 6, chapter 8: "You are the shepherd not only of the sheep but of the shepherds. You are the one shepherd of all. You ask me to prove it. From the word of the Lord: *feed my lambs, feed my sheep.* Whose? Of this or that city or region or kingdom? *My sheep*, he says. To whom is it not plain that he designated not some but assigned all? Nothing is excepted where nothing is distinguished."

IV. From these things it is clear moreover that those err who so interpret the words of Christ to Peter as to make them a simple conditional exhortation: *if you love me, show this love by feeding my sheep.* For 1° since to feed is to govern with power, Christ cannot exhort

Peter to feed the sheep without conferring upon him power over them. Power over the sheep of Christ is therefore conferred upon Peter. 2° An exhortation to teach without jurisdiction being conferred is not consistent with the preceding promise of the Primacy. 3° The proposition of Christ is not properly conditional but absolute; for Christ does not say: *if you love me, feed*—leaving the truth of the condition as it were in suspense—but having first required love and known its existence with certainty, he then says absolutely: *feed my sheep*; so that even if love were a condition, with the condition verified the conditional proposition passes into an absolute one: it is equivalent, that is, to: *because you love me, feed my sheep.* For the rest 4° the love of Peter was a certain merit which Christ demanded in Peter in order to commit to him rather than to others the feeding of the sheep, and it was and is a condition for their being fed rightly; but it was not the condition to which the institution of the Primacy and the power of feeding were bound; for these, since they look to the very constitution of the Church which Christ acquired for himself by his blood, neither began on account of the merits of men nor cease on account of the vice of those who hold them.

COROLLARY

From what has been demonstrated in these three theses it follows of itself that Peter was constituted by Christ his true Vicar for the universal Church—which the Council of Florence also openly defined. For the jurisdiction of Peter is a participated jurisdiction of Christ, who remains always the prince, the rock, and the supreme head of the Church, holding the keys of this kingdom; and it is moreover a jurisdiction by which Peter is constituted the visible head of the visible Church, enjoying in it supreme and universal power: and such a power is the vicarious power of Christ, insofar as Christ is the head of the whole Church; and therefore it is a full and immediate vicarious power: whence it comes about that Peter is the true Vicar of Christ, and he alone deserves to be called absolutely the Vicar of Christ—just as he alone is the head of the entire visible Church. Which Leo the Great had in view when he said (*Sermon* IV on the anniversary of his assumption)

that Peter himself properly governs all those whom Christ also principally governs; and that the divine condescension bestowed upon this man a great and wondrous fellowship of its own power, so that what belongs to Christ by power may be held in common by Peter with Christ by participation.

THESIS IV

With the testimonies cited there cohere both the special formulas used by the Evangelists when speaking of Peter—from which it is apparent that they believed him to be nobler and more eminent than the other Apostles—and what is narrated in the first chapters of Acts, by which the exercise of the Primacy is not obscurely signified.

I. We do not contend that these testimonies alone, which are adduced in this thesis, evidently prove the Primacy of Peter; nor do we have need of this demonstration. But because in very many other places of the New Testament there occurs mention of Peter, if it is proved that these harmoniously concur with the earlier ones explained and compose as it were one whole with them, the preceding demonstration will be illustrated by new light; and just as parts—even less principal ones—adhering to others in a whole both complete and are completed, so by the synthesis of all these passages of Scripture the testimonies already declared will be placed in clearer light, and the testimonies yet to be adduced will also draw from these a more splendid light. This comes down to a confirmation of the proof—which is not a proof sufficient of itself, but one that increases the certainty and evidence of the proof already given. It is moreover necessary to weigh these other testimonies as well; because if anyone were to persuade himself that they contain something adverse to the interpretation already given of the earlier ones, that same interpretation could no longer be certain for him.

There is a twofold class of testimonies which we adduce here: what we gather from the first class is not immediately the Primacy of Peter, but is that which could not but be so, given the persuasion of the Evangelists about the Primacy of Peter, and which—when the earlier testimonies have been compared—can only be understood as referring

to the Primacy. What is gathered from the other class is that which—the Primacy of Peter being supposed—certainly had to be the case, and which, though considered separately it could be understood of a certain primacy of honor, when compared with the earlier testimonies represents the very Primacy of jurisdiction in act.

II. Thus a) the catalogue of the Apostles is recorded four times: Matt. 10:2, 5; Mark 3:16, 20; Luke 6:14–16; Acts 1:13. Now, although with respect to the other Apostles the same order is not always observed —not even by the same writer, as one may see by comparing the two texts of Luke—all the Evangelists nonetheless always give the first place to Peter, calling him by his original name and at the same time making mention of the name Peter imposed by Christ, as if giving the reason why he is named first. Matthew says: *first Simon, who is called Peter*, etc. Mark: *he made twelve to be with him, and he imposed upon Simon the name Peter, and James the son of Zebedee, and John*, etc. Luke in the Gospel: *he chose twelve from them, and he named them Apostles: Simon, whom he surnamed Peter, and Andrew his brother,* etc.

The Protestants say that he is named first either by reason of his calling, because he was called first, or by reason of age, because he was older. But from where did they learn this? And indeed the former reason is false. For if we consider that calling by which Peter finally adhered to Christ immovably (Matt. 4:18), he was called at the same time as his brother Andrew; but if the preparation leading to this calling is considered, Andrew was first, who brought his brother to Christ (John 1:40 seq.). The latter reason, however, is most futile. For 1° if Peter is counted first because he is the elder, then the intention of the Evangelists was to list the Apostles in order of age; why then is John, who was certainly not older than so many others, placed in the fourth and even the second position? 2° How can it be proved that Peter was older than the others, and even than his own brother Andrew? There is nothing to suggest it. 3° The Evangelists, honoring Simon with a mark of honor and dignity and giving as it were the reason why he is listed in the first place, do not say: *who was the elder*, but *who is called Peter, whom he surnamed Peter.*

b) The Evangelists, when introducing Peter and the Apostles, speak in this way: ὁ Σίμων καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ (Mark

1:36; Luke 8:45; 9:32)—which is the form of speech customarily used when a prince or leader is mentioned together with those who are inferior to him; or, with Peter named distinctly, they add the rest to him under a common appellation: Mark 16:7, *Tell his disciples and Peter;* Acts 2:14, *Peter standing with the eleven;* 2:37, *They said to Peter and to the rest of the Apostles;* 5:29, *Peter and the Apostles answered and said*—which form of speech exhibits the one who is named by name as more eminent than the others. This twofold manner therefore of representing Peter in comparison with the other Apostles argues that a certain preeminence of Peter over the other Apostles was known to the Evangelists.

c) Matthew 10:2 begins the catalogue of the Apostles thus: *first Simon who is called Peter, and Andrew his brother, James*, etc. Now *first* here does not have a numerical signification, for *second, third*, etc. do not follow; nor can it signify first by calling or by age, as we have already proved; it has therefore the signification of dignity and preeminence, and is equivalent to *foremost, prince of the Apostles.* It is therefore sufficiently clear that the Evangelists believed Peter to be nobler and more eminent than the other Apostles.

It is objected that elsewhere the order is changed and Peter is placed after others. Thus 1 Cor. 1:12: *Each one of you says: I indeed am of Paul, and I of Apollo, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ;* and 3:22: *All things are yours, whether Paul, or Apollo, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death… but you are Christ's and Christ is God's;* and 9:5: *Have we not the power to travel with a woman who is a sister, as do the other Apostles and the brethren of the Lord and Cephas?* But by these our assertion is confirmed; for in these passages there is a manifest climax, so that the nobler is placed last—as God and Christ in the two former testimonies: Peter therefore always occupies the nobler position above the others.

But Gal. 2:9 has another order: *When they recognized the grace that was given to me, James and Cephas and John.* For 1° this reading is not certain; for the manuscripts which several ancient Fathers used—such as Tertullian (*Contra Marcionem*, book 3, ch. 3), Ambrosiaster ibid., Ambrose (*De Interpellatione Iob*, book 1, ch. 5), Augustine (on ch. 2 of the *Epistle to the Galatians*), Theodoret (*on Ps. 86:1; on Cant. 3:10; on Rom. 15:26; on 2 Cor. 8:18*)—placed Peter first; and Jerome himself in

both the text and the commentary has *Peter and James and John* and makes no mention of any other reading. 2° Since every most universal law is subject to certain exceptions and anomalies on account of contingent reasons, this also constant law of speaking about Peter among the inspired writers could have suffered some anomaly on account of a special reason. The reason for departing from the common law of speaking could have been for Paul: either because James was the Bishop of that city; or because Paul enumerates the Apostles in the order of the time in which he saw them, and James was seen by him first; or because, since Paul in this passage is discussing the office of the Apostolate and is wholly intent on persuading the Galatians that he is equal to the other Apostles, the mention or intimation of the primacy was not in this series of ideas sufficiently opportune.

III. As for the other part, it suffices to note these principal passages. Acts 1:13 seq.: Peter proposes to the college of Apostles the substitution of another in the place of Judas and himself directs the first common act of the Apostles. 2:14: Peter standing with the eleven is the first to evangelize the Jews and speaks alone while the others are silent, and defends the good name of the Apostolic college. 4:8: When Peter and John were questioned before the council of the rulers and elders, Peter alone speaks and defends the ministry of all the Apostles. 10:1 seq.: Peter is the first to open the door of the Church to the Gentiles and the first to exercise the mission received from Christ for them. 15:7 seq.: Peter is the first to give his opinion in the Council—namely, he defines. 9:32: Peter visits all the churches, etc.

Now in order for there to be an exercise of the primacy, it is not necessary that all the functions proper to the primacy be exercised, and much less is it necessary that those functions be exercised by Peter which, on account of the special authority and power of the Apostles, were not then necessary at the time. But it suffices that Peter exercised some functions—and those which are proper to the one who holds the primacy among the Apostles and whose sufficient reason can be found only in the dignity of the Primacy. But the functions reviewed above are indeed such and present Peter to us as exercising the primacy among the Apostles themselves. Now of what kind was this primacy? Certainly that which is described in the first three testimonies. But this is a

primacy not only of honor but also of jurisdiction; therefore the exercise of this primacy is described in Acts. To this also pertains the fact that Peter was held in greater esteem than the other Apostles by the crowds, and the crowds had recourse most especially to him—as is clear from the history of Acts—and that prayer was made by the Church for him when he was arrested, which is not mentioned as having been done for James. To this also pertains the fact that Luke in the first twelve chapters of Acts, in which he treats of the founding of the Church by the Apostles, chiefly considers Peter alone: he gives a special account of his sermons and miracles (3:4 seq.; 8:33–39; 5:15), presents him as the one who repulsed the first heresy (8:19 seq.), and also offers a specimen of his judicial power (5:3, 10). For these things show the persuasion of the faithful people and of the inspired writer himself about the excellence and a certain primacy of Peter above the other Apostles.

IV. Three things are objected, however: namely the sending of Peter by the Apostles to Samaria (Acts 8:14), the dispute of the faithful from the circumcision against Peter on the grounds that he had entered in with the Gentiles and admitted them who still had the foreskin into the Church (Acts 11:2 seq.), and the fact that Paul equates himself with Peter in Gal. 2:7, saying that the Gospel of the uncircumcised was entrusted to him just as the Gospel of the circumcised was to Peter: *for he who worked for Peter in the Apostolate to the circumcised worked also for me among the Gentiles.* But 1° were Peter and John sent by the Apostles with a mission of power? How do the Protestants prove this? Since a mission may be of multiple kinds, that one must certainly be understood which is reconcilable with the already-known dignity of the person. They were therefore sent either with a mission proceeding from a common council, to which Peter himself gave his consent, or with a certain so-called economic mission proceeding from a request—and even a superior can be sent by an inferior in this way. But it may be asked why the Apostles requested Peter to go there: because they were persuaded that the founding of the Church could be better provided for by none other than by Peter; because he was the head of the universal Church, to whom they join John as his companion—who, just as on other occasions too (3:4 seq.; 4:7 seq.), would play a secondary role.

2° Complaints were raised not by the Apostles, who knew that all nations were to be evangelized (*Go, teach all nations*), but by the faithful —who were not judging according to the norm of Faith but out of prejudices and somewhat perverse affections; for the Jews gloried too much in circumcision and the law and despised the Gentiles who were strangers to it. Some think that the Apostles were still ignorant of what Peter had been taught by that vision (Acts 10:10 seq.); but about this matter we have already spoken in the *Prolegomenon*, § XXIX. Peter, however, not out of obligation but out of the proper charity of the Shepherd, disabuses the brethren of their false opinion. He thus conducted himself as Christ had prescribed in Luke 22:26, and thereby gave pastors an example of how they ought to conduct themselves toward the weak.

3° Paul compares himself with Peter in the office of the Apostolate, as his own express words indicate, and specifically in the office of preaching; for although all the Apostles were sent to all nations and each had the right to evangelize any nation, yet since it was not possible for the individual Apostles each by himself to instruct the whole world, God by a special providence arranged things so that the Jews were especially committed to Peter and the Gentiles especially to Paul— though by reason of his Primacy Peter had priority in admitting the latter to the Church. It is of this special destination that Paul speaks here, which on account of the multitude to be instructed was also greater in Paul. But Paul does not compare himself with Peter as regards authority and that order in which he stood in relation to Peter together with the other Apostles; nor were those evangelized by Paul any less subject to Peter than the other faithful.

THESIS V

The Primacy of Peter is excluded neither by the enumeration instituted by Paul in 1 Cor. 12:28 and Eph. 4:11 of the charisms and offices which obtain in the Church, nor by that rebuke by which Paul withstood Peter to his face in Gal. 2:11 seq.: indeed the history of this rebuke, accurately examined, most manifestly proves the Primacy of Peter.

I. The words of Paul in 1 Cor. 12:28 are these: *And God indeed has placed some in the Church, first Apostles, second prophets, third teachers, then powers, then gifts of healing, helps, governments, varieties of tongues, interpretations of speeches* (this last is absent in the Greek text). And in Eph. 4:11: *And he himself gave some indeed as Apostles, and some as prophets, others as evangelists, and others as pastors and teachers.* From this the Protestants argue: if Christ had established some monarch and ecumenical pontiff, Paul ought to have made mention of him in those places where he enumerates the orders and offices in the Church instituted by Christ; for it was of the greatest importance that the Church know this, nor could the first and most eminent thing have been passed over in silence in a complete enumeration of offices.

But 1° the argument is negative. 2° It is false that Paul's intention in these passages was to enumerate distinctly all the offices that obtain in the Church. This is manifest with respect to the passage in Ephesians; for if that passage is compared with the earlier one, it is clear that several things are lacking in it; if therefore the enumeration in this one is complete, it will certainly be incomplete in that one. But even in the former passage, not all things—at least distinctly—are enumerated: for elsewhere Paul mentions not only Bishops but also presbyters and deacons; and though you may wish the *teachers* in the words to the Corinthians to be the Bishops, where will you find the presbyters and deacons distinctly placed? Nor was it Paul's intention to give a distinct account of the ecclesiastical hierarchy; for this distinct account was considerably hindered by the simultaneous listing of the gratuitous graces, which are not proper to the sacred principate and confer no jurisdiction: yet these are enumerated in continuous discourse together with the others and intermingled with them—such as prophecy, powers,

the gift of healing, etc. It is therefore wrongly demanded that Paul should also have made mention of the primacy of Peter. Nor 3° does the scope of Paul's discourse require this. For his scope is not to report the order of governance by which Christ willed his Church to be governed —as is clear from what has already been said; nor to teach some point of doctrine which he could not have explained without explicit mention of the primacy; rather, if what precedes and follows is considered in the epistle to the Corinthians, it is clear that the Apostle's scope was to show that not all in the Church are equal but that there are distinct orders and different offices, just as in the body there are distinct and different members. But this scope is abundantly satisfied by that enumeration, even with the primacy of Peter passed over in silence. These things are sufficient to break the force of the negative argument of the Protestants.

To which these things may be added. For 4° Paul indeed affirms that the Apostles are first—first among the others subsequently enumerated; but he does not deny that among the Apostles themselves there is someone first, or does not affirm that all the Apostles are equal. Paul speaks, namely, as the Council of Trent does when it says that in the Church there is a Hierarchy consisting of Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons; from which words would anyone seriously infer that in the opinion of the Council itself there is no Bishop superior to the others? The order of the Apostles is therefore first above the others in the Church; but whether or not there is among them someone first—this is neither said here nor denied. Therefore 5° nothing about the order among the Apostles themselves is affirmed or denied by Paul in these passages; but the knowledge of this order must be sought from other passages of Scripture: which, if compared, will make the primacy of Peter clear, as we have demonstrated above. Indeed 6° Paul himself not obscurely testifies to the primacy of Peter in Gal. 1:18, where he narrates that three years after his conversion he came to Jerusalem to see Peter (ἱστορῆσαι Πέτρον—or as the Vatican reads, Κηφᾶν). But why was Paul's concern to visit Peter, not to visit the other Apostles? The Fathers give the reason. Chrysostom at this passage says: "After such great and glorious deeds, when he had no need of Peter nor required his instruction but was equal to him in honor—for I will say nothing more than this here—he nevertheless ascended as if to one greater and elder.

He went, but for this reason only: to see him and show him honor by his presence. 'I went up,' he says, 'to see Peter.' He did not say ἰδεῖν Πέτρον, but ἱστορῆσαι Πέτρον, in the manner in which people are accustomed to speak when they visit great and splendid cities for the sake of knowing them. So much did he judge it worthwhile even simply to see the man… For he both pays him honor and loves him above all; for he writes that he came for no other one of the Apostles but for him alone." Victorinus at this passage (in Mai, *Scriptorum Veterum Nova Collectio*, vol. 3): "After three years, he says, I came to Jerusalem, and then adds the reason: to see Peter. For indeed if the foundation of the Church has been placed in Peter, as was said in the Gospel, to whom all things had been revealed, Paul knew that he ought to see Peter, as one to whom such great authority had been given by Christ—not in order to learn anything from him." Jerome at this passage says: "Paul went for this purpose—to see the Apostle, not out of eagerness to learn, since he too had the same author of his preaching, but to pay honor to the chief Apostle."

II. Gal. 2:11 seq.: *But when Cephas* (the same one as in v. 9 and ch. 1:18) *came to Antioch, I withstood him to his face, because he was reprehensible. For before some persons came from James, he used to eat with the Gentiles; but when they came, he withdrew and separated himself, fearing those who were of the circumcision. And the rest of the Jews joined in his dissimulation, so that even Barnabas was led away by them into that dissimulation. But when I saw that they were not walking rightly according to the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas before all: If you, being a Jew, live in the Gentile manner and not in the Jewish manner, how do you compel the Gentiles to Judaize?* Now 1° did Paul rebuke Peter and withstand him to his face with a rebuke of authority or of charity? The former no Protestant can rightly affirm, since according to them all the Apostles were equal. The latter therefore remains. Moreover, did Peter err in faith or not? The Protestants equally will not affirm the former—who teach that all the Apostles were equally infallible; the act of Peter, therefore, for which he merited rebuke, was a certain sin of conduct contrary to prudence in the manner of conducting himself with Jews and Gentiles (which sin could indeed have proceeded from inadvertence, even non-culpable, and could have been merely material;

but Paul was looking at the act in itself as it externally appeared, not at its interior principle)—it was not a sin against faith. Thus Paul used fraternal correction on account of a certain sin of conduct; and this can be done not only by an equal but even by a lesser: for it rests upon the motive of charity, by which we are equals, not upon authority, by which we are distinguished in society. Wherefore *not walking rightly according to the truth of the Gospel* is not committing an error regarding faith, but failing to conduct oneself in one's manner of life as faith requires—which will become more evident from the following explanation.

2° Of what kind therefore was this sin of Peter? Peter certainly knew most perfectly, and had been the first in the Council to teach, that neither the Gentiles nor the Jews needed to live according to Jewish custom for the attainment of salvation—and Peter too so conducted himself, as Paul objects to him: *you, being a Jew, live in the Gentile manner and not in the Jewish manner.* Yet when Jews came from James —of whom he himself was the special Apostle—lest he give scandal to those weak Jews, he used an economy of charity, withdrawing himself from the Gentiles and no longer eating with them, *fearing those who were of the circumcision*—that is, fearing lest he have them as adversaries, alienate them from himself, and thus his preaching could not be useful to them. The interpretation *fearing them* is not approved, and you appeal in vain to 4:11, where there is a certain attraction from what follows. Now in this matter it must be noted that if one considers the intention of Peter, it was most excellent and worthy of praise; for it was an act of charity which his Apostolate in a special way required. If one considers the external act: first, although the legal customs had already been defined as no longer necessary, yet by a kind of economy they were still tolerated in the Jews—wherefore this in itself was no sin, so that Paul himself circumcised Timothy led by the same reason, lest the Jews despise him (Acts 16:3). Then, Peter said or affirmed nothing by which he taught that one ought to live in the Jewish manner; finally, the act in itself did not tend to teach by deed that one ought to live in the Jewish manner, as if that act admitted of no other interpretation; for this other interpretation was also an easy one: people could see in that act a certain economy of Peter, who was withdrawing from the Gentiles not because he thought the legal observances still necessary but in order

to provide by condescension (συγκατάβασιν) for the infirmity of the Jews.

Nevertheless Peter, as Paul attests, was κατεγνωσμένος (καταγιγνώσκομαι means not only *I am condemned* but also *I am reprehended*; and the participle, which would of itself mean *one who has been reprehended*, here is equivalent to καταγνωστός—*reprehensible*, *worthy of blame*, following the imitation of Hebrew writers, who are largely without adjectives signifying the worth of a person). Peter was reprehensible, however, because he was not walking rightly according to the truth of the Gospel, and his deed, which was not right, is called dissimulation, ὑπόκρισις. Now to not walk rightly according to the truth of the Gospel is not an error against the truth of the Gospel, but an action or omission which is not conformed to the doctrine of the Gospel—as any sin whatsoever is. Dissimulation, moreover, is said to be an act by which someone presents externally a different appearance from what he truly has within. It is a kind of real lie. But formal and material dissimulation must be distinguished. The former is when someone by his act intends to signify to others that he holds in his mind what he does not hold; the latter is when, while there exists some cause for doing something, what is done is taken on account of the circumstances of the act—against the will of the agent—as signifying a state of mind or intention in the agent which is not in fact present. There is nothing in Paul's words by which it is permissible to suspect that Peter sinned by formal dissimulation—namely, that knowing the legal observances to be not necessary, he nonetheless willed by his deed to signify that they were necessary: which would have been against the infallibility of his magisterium, for not only the interior faith of Peter was indefectible but the external magisterium also infallible. It was therefore only material dissimulation. But this, when it is employed for a cause that appears just, cannot be a sin except of imprudence—insofar, namely, as one does not sufficiently weigh the consequences that will follow and thus exposes oneself to the danger of giving others occasion to judge differently about one's view than is in fact the case. Wherefore the sin of Peter, if there was any (for since it depended upon his mental habit, Paul could not judge it with certainty), consisted in this: that while doing something which was not evil in itself and forbidden by no

law, he did not sufficiently consider what others—contrary to his own wish—would have drawn from it. But such a fault, even if it be judged such, is not one by reason of which Peter is to be believed either to have erred in faith or to have been wanting in the dignity of supreme teacher. Wherefore Paul, in rebuking him, makes use of nothing other than Peter's own authority—so that it appears to have been not some error of the mind but a certain imprudent inconsiderateness.

But 3° by this very act the Primacy of Peter is manifestly revealed. For although Paul was teaching by words that there was no need to Judaize, while Peter seemed by the example of his conduct alone to be teaching that one ought to Judaize, yet the latter was compelling the others and Barnabas himself—not merely attracting them—to Judaize. Whence comes so great an efficacy of the silent example of Peter as to prevail over the preaching doctrine of Paul, unless from the fact that Peter was regarded by all as superior to Paul and his authority was believed to be supreme in the Church? Wherefore whoever denies that Cephas, of whom Paul is here speaking, is the same as the one to whom Christ said *you shall be called Cephas* (which opinion is entirely at variance with the context) must provide a sufficient reason for this fact, which he will never find; as Chrysostom already noted in the homily to be cited below, no. 13, saying: "If there had been some other Peter (which was the opinion of Clement of Alexandria in the *Hypotyposeis* according to Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, book 1, ch. 12), his change of conduct would not have had so much force as to draw the other Jews as well. For he did not urge or counsel, but only withdrew and separated himself—and that withdrawal and separation was able to attract all the other disciples because of the dignity of the person." Cf. what we have discussed at greater length in our *Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* at this passage.

The interpretation of the Fathers in this matter confirms the Catholic doctrine. For the Fathers are wholly concerned to place the excellence of Peter over Paul in safety and to show that Paul's rebuke does not oppose the dignity of Peter; although not all the Fathers tend toward the same goal by the same path. Cf. Clement of Alexandria as reported by Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, book 1, ch. 12; Chrysostom's homily *On the words: I withstood him to his face;* Jerome,

book 1 *on the Epistle to the Galatians*, at 2:12, and in the letter to Augustine on this matter, which is letter 75 among the Augustinian letters; Augustine *on the Epistle to the Galatians* and letter 82.

THESIS VI

Having briefly sketched the dignity of the Apostolate, we teach that the extraordinary power common to the individual Apostles did not prevent Peter from excelling among the Apostles and enjoying the primacy of jurisdiction over them as well.

I. The Apostolate is taken in both a broader and a narrower signification. Here it is taken in the narrower one. We mean, namely, those Apostles who were the first ones, through whom the universal Church was founded—or those who are called Apostles in the Gospel—and those who are their equals.

The dignity of the Apostolate is contained in the following notes, which are: 1° the office and power of proclaiming the Gospel everywhere on earth; 2° the power of jurisdiction everywhere on earth —namely the power of founding churches, instituting Bishops, and the legislative, judicial, and vindicative power over all (except the Apostles themselves) in all their causes; 3° infallibility of the magisterium; 4° an immediate mission—or the power of preaching and the power of jurisdiction conferred immediately by God; 5° the supreme power of order or the Episcopal grade, which was necessary in order that they might fully and perfectly discharge the office of the Apostolate. Not all agree, however, concerning these notes of the Apostolate. The first three are conceded by all and are sufficiently clear from the constant sense of the Church.

II. There is, however, a question about the other notes. Petavius (*De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, book 1, ch. 5) denies that an immediate mission is an essential note of the Apostolate—moved by this reason: that Matthias and Paul were true and primary Apostles, yet neither was immediately sent by Christ, since they were advanced to the Apostolate after his death. But as for Matthias, most true is the observation of Bellarmine (*De Romano Pontifice*, book 4, ch. 23): "Matthias the Apostle was not elected by the Apostles, nor was any authority given to him by

them, but having been divinely invoked and his election obtained, he was then numbered among the Apostles"—by which argument Bellarmine proves that the Apostles received all jurisdiction from Christ. And indeed it is one thing to designate certain persons who could be sent, leaving to another the power of sending one of them—or even none, if he should wish; another thing is to send with authority conferred: the former the Apostles did with respect to Matthias and Barsabas, who, though they set up two and prayed that God might show which of the two he had chosen, are nonetheless to be considered as having also permitted—at God's discretion—the rejection of both, unless the divine will had already been made known to them concerning the condition set forth by Peter for substituting another in the place of Judas, and that condition had been met by no one else—in which hypothesis the whole matter still depended on the divine will. The latter was accomplished by Christ, divinely guiding the lots by which his will was manifested concerning Matthias. Hence God is said to be the one who chose, and by the Apostles only the manifestation of this divine choice is implored. And indeed this special mode of acting, employed by the Apostles only in the election of Matthias, sufficiently shows that they were persuaded that it was not in their power to confer upon anyone that dignity of the Apostolate with which they themselves were distinguished. Nor for someone to be sent by Christ was it necessary that he receive the power from Christ while he was still dwelling on earth: for Christ is the same on earth and in heaven, yesterday and today. Perhaps it could more probably be said that Christ by an absolute will decreed that there were to be twelve Apostles when he chose them—which will also persevered when Judas fell away; and the knowledge of this divine will Peter showed when he said: *it is necessary*, etc. For why was it necessary, if Christ had not willed it? By virtue therefore of this will of Christ, Matthias, once designated, obtained the Apostolate—that is, was made an Apostle by divine right by succeeding to the place of Judas, in the same manner in which a Roman Pontiff designated by the Cardinals succeeds to his predecessor.

As for Paul, the words of his own in Gal. 1:1 are sufficiently clear: *Paul, an Apostle not from men* (οὐκ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων), *nor through man* (οὐδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπου), *but through Jesus Christ*—by which words is

excluded not only a mission that is from a man, but also one that is from God through the mediation of a man; and an immediate mission from Christ is asserted—by whom he was also immediately instructed, as he testifies in the same place, saying: *I make known to you, brethren, the Gospel which was preached by me, that it is not according to man; for I neither received it from man, nor was I taught it, but through the revelation of Jesus Christ.* Hence, in order to show the Galatians that he had not received authority from Peter or the other Apostles, he reminds them that immediately upon his being called by Christ to evangelize him among the Gentiles, he did not come to Jerusalem to the Apostles his predecessors but went to Arabia, and returned again to Damascus (Gal. 1:15–17)—in which city he was preaching Christ before he came to Peter (Acts 9:19, 22). The power of preaching therefore Paul received immediately from Christ; why then should one not also say that the power of jurisdiction—of which the power of preaching is a part, and which is proper to the Apostolate—was immediate? And Paul moreover says of himself that he is an Apostle not from men nor through man; and furthermore affirms himself that the Apostles conferred nothing upon him (Gal. 2:6)—but they would have conferred much if they had given Paul the power of jurisdiction either through themselves or through others. Cf. our cited *Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*, ch. 1, v. 1.

Let it therefore be certain that the primary Apostles, whom the Church reveres as such, were sent immediately by Christ, according to the words of Christ in John 20:21: *As the Father has sent me, so I send you.* And indeed an Apostle is the same as one who is sent: no one in the Church is an Apostle unless sent by Christ—the founder and head of his Church; but one who is called an Apostle in the proper sense (κατ' ἐξοχήν) must have been sent immediately by Christ; otherwise there is no reason why he should be honored above the others with this name as if proper to him.

III. As for the last note, it is indeed certain that all the Apostles were Bishops, and equally certain that the Episcopal grade was necessary for them in order to discharge their office; for how did they found churches if they could not institute Bishops, presbyters, and other ministers? But there can be a question about the manner in which the

Apostles were raised to the Episcopate. For some think that they were Bishops by the very fact that they were Apostles, and therefore that they were made Bishops immediately by Christ just as they were made Apostles—that is, that the Episcopate is essentially contained in the dignity of the Apostolate. Bellarmine thinks otherwise: who in the passage cited above, also having regard to the arguments he produces, teaches that all the Apostles were immediately instituted by Christ, but at the same time contends (*op. cit.*, book 1, ch. 23) that Peter alone was ordained Bishop by Christ and the other Apostles were ordained by Christ through Peter—and therefore that the Apostolate indeed, in order to be fully exercised, requires the Episcopate, but that someone can already be an Apostle without yet being a Bishop, and therefore that the Episcopate is not inseparable from and in this sense essential to the Apostolate. He proves this by a double argument.

The first is drawn from the example of Paul, who was immediately chosen as an Apostle by Christ and yet was not afterward a Bishop, but was ordained after eleven years—Acts 13:1–3 (cf. Patrizi, *Commentary on Acts* at this passage and in the *Chronicle*). In this argument we think the following must be noted: it is certain for us that Paul did not receive the Episcopal character immediately from Christ—just as he did not receive the character of baptism; but we doubt whether when the events narrated by Luke in ch. 13 occurred, he was then ordained Bishop. For 1° who ordained him? the prophets and teachers, whom Luke alone names: they therefore were Bishops—at least those called *teachers*, who seem to be the same as the *pastors* of Eph. 4:11. But among them Luke enumerates together with others, making no distinction, Barnabas and Saul; therefore they too were already Bishops. And indeed 2° if those prophets and teachers—such as Simeon called Niger, Lucius the Cyrenian, and Manahen—had already been ordained Bishops by the Apostles, why shall we think that Paul had not yet been ordained Bishop by the same, since they already knew him (Acts 9:27–28; Gal. 1:15) as one called by God to the Apostolate? 3° The words of Luke 13 do not require that they be interpreted as referring to a sacred and episcopal ordination. For the Holy Spirit said to those prophets and teachers who were ministering to the Lord and fasting: *Set apart for me Saul and Barnabas for the work to which I have taken them.* Then they—having

fasted and having prayed and having laid hands on them—released them (ἀπέλυσαν—they let them go). And they indeed, sent by the Holy Spirit, went to Seleucia, etc. Now the work to which the Holy Spirit had taken them, as is clear from what follows, was to preach the Gospel to other peoples and nations outside Antioch. For this work they were to be set apart—that is, separated from the others remaining at Antioch—and they themselves were to be sent off for that work, as indeed they were sent off. If these words are taken in this way—and every reason counsels taking them so—there is in them no speech about an episcopal ordination which those men were commanded to confer upon Paul and Barnabas. Nor is this established by that rite of the laying on of hands (ἐπιθέντες τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῖς); for although that rite is the rite of ordination, it was not only the rite of ordination but was also the rite of those invoking good things and blessing. It is therefore permissible for us to hold that Paul was ordained Bishop at the time when, coming to Jerusalem, he visited Peter, who, recognizing his divine mission—Barnabas also bearing witness—conferred upon him the Episcopal grade, so that he could fully and perfectly discharge his ministry. From all of these things, however, it is sufficiently clear that the Episcopate is not so essential to the Apostolate that by the very fact of being an Apostle one is also a Bishop—although the Episcopate is necessary for an Apostle in order that he may be able fully and perfectly—that is, integrally through himself—to exercise the whole power which he received in the Apostolate, in which there is certainly the power of founding churches.

From this it is clear—to note this in passing—the distinction between the power of order and of jurisdiction. It is therefore probable—and it is confirmed also by the tradition of certain ancients—that Peter, having been ordained Bishop by Christ, ordained the other Apostles. The other argument of Bellarmine in the same place may be consulted there; what we have said thus far in this digression is enough for us.

IV. Dr. Langen (loc. cit., § 6, where he treats of the relation of Peter to the other Apostles) first establishes that it is certain that Peter had a primacy over the Apostles. But of what kind was it? Its notion, he says, is wrongly gathered from the fact that Peter is the foundation of the

Church, that he had the keys of the kingdom, that the flock was committed to him to be fed; for these things were common to the other Apostles. And indeed Peter himself calls himself a co-elder (συμπρεσβύτερον) of all the pastors of the flock (1 Pet. 5:1); he did indeed speak at times in the name of the others, but this is perhaps to be traced to his fervent character. Nevertheless it is certain that Peter had the Primacy, which is clear from the history of the Apostolic period. But what kind of Primacy was it? Not one, certainly, by which the Apostles were subject to Peter; for Scripture does not speak of this subjection; indeed Paul makes himself equal to Peter in the Apostolate and denies that he received power from him and depended upon him; and implies rather the opposite by rebuking Peter at Antioch. All the Apostles, that is, were endowed with equal power, the same mission was common to all, all were essentially equal. Peter therefore was nothing but the first among equals. He then confirms this in § 10 from the doctrine of the Fathers, which we shall examine afterward. Now as for Scripture, the argument of this Doctor comes down to this. It is established from the Scriptures that Peter had a Primacy among the Apostles; it is equally established from the Scriptures that all the Apostles were equal: therefore Peter was nothing but the first among equals.

But 1° we deny that it is established from the Scriptures that the Apostles were equal to Peter in all things: they were indeed equal in the Apostolate insofar as all were equally the first ones sent immediately by Christ to all nations; but Peter was moreover the Rock of the Church, held the keys of this kingdom, was the confirmer and shepherd of the whole flock—and how poorly it is demonstrated from the Scriptures that these things were common to the other Apostles, we showed both in the first Thesis (where we answered the Protestants arguing from Scripture) and in the second and third (where we showed that the dignity of confirmer of the brethren in faith and of shepherd of the whole Christian flock was conferred upon Peter and was proper to him). But never, he says, are the Apostles said in the Scriptures to be subject to Peter? If he seeks these very words in the Scriptures, we concede that; but what follows from it? Has he perhaps found it written that Peter is the first among equals? Now if he seeks the thing itself: is not the one who must lean upon Peter as rock, who is to be confirmed

by him, who is in the Church but does not have the keys, who is not the Shepherd of the whole flock—is such a one not obliged to be subject to the one who is the Rock, the Confirmer, holds the keys of the kingdom, and is the Shepherd of all? Paul moreover makes himself equal to Peter in the Apostolate—but this does not exclude the Primacy of Peter, nor does his rebuke suggest it, as we have already seen.

2° We say that if the Primacy of Peter is established from the Scriptures—as this Doctor himself testifies—then the Primacy of jurisdiction is equally established. For from where does he prove that it is established from the Scriptures? From the history of the Apostolic period, namely. For Matthew, listing the Apostles, calls Peter the first. Then Peter directs the election of Matthias, is the first to teach on the day of Pentecost, and things of this kind which are found in Acts. But first, who would not be surprised that the Primacy of Peter is proved not from the words of Christ addressed to Peter—in which the dignity of Peter must certainly be contained—but from certain narratives which can only represent some exercise of that right which Christ conceded to Peter? If the words of Christ addressed to Peter do not show his Primacy—because, as the adversaries say, they were said to Peter on behalf of all the Apostles and therefore exhibit a power common to all the Apostles—why, applying the same law of interpretation, will it not be permissible to affirm that whatever Peter did was done by him in such a way that it could equally have been done by any other Apostle, and that he acted in the name of the others and as it were as their delegate—as his mission to Samaria seems to suggest? But Matthew calls him the first. This of course ought to teach this Doctor that the proof of the Primacy of Peter depends upon the words of the Lord addressed to Peter, and because by these words the power promised and conferred upon Peter is signified, the Primacy of Peter therefore does not come down to his being the first among equals but to his excelling the others in authority. Indeed Matthew not obscurely signifies why he calls Simon first: because he is Peter—*first,* he says, *Simon, who is called Peter*; the reason therefore for his primacy is in this, that he is called Peter. The signification of this appellation must therefore be sought; but where will you find it if not in the same Matthew 16, in the words of the Lord? From these therefore the Primacy of Peter must be gathered. Now there

the speech is not about some simple honor but about authority and jurisdiction: therefore if Peter obtained the Primacy, he obtained the Primacy of jurisdiction.

3° Nor is this Doctor more fortunate in adducing the authorities of the Fathers in § 10, from which, as he himself says, it is established that Peter was the first among equals—nothing more and nothing less. The testimony of Cyprian is brought forward in the first place, which we have already examined in Thesis I, p. 348. From the interpretation we gave of Cyprian's words, it is sufficiently clear how ineptly he is appealed to. But to make the ignorance of the arguer more apparent, we wish to add this observation. What is the scope of Cyprian when he appeals to the words of the Lord *You are Peter*, etc. and the institution of the Primacy? namely to show that from Christ's institution there is one—in the universal Church as well as in the individual churches—to whom all must be obedient, and that heresies and schisms arise from the fact that this institution of the Lord is not observed. Thus according to our Doctor, Cyprian's argumentation is this: From Christ's institution there is one to whom all must be subject—namely the Bishop; for Christ constituted Peter the first among equals. Excellent argumentation indeed, from which precisely the opposite follows; for from equals no subjection is owed in the first place.

By the same reasoning, he says, the words of Optatus are to be understood—which we gave in Thesis I, p. 344. They must certainly be understood as we have demonstrated that the words of Cyprian must be understood; but if you wish to understand them otherwise as referring to some primacy of honor only—first, how do you demonstrate this? You will seek in vain from this Doctor for a demonstration of this matter; it perhaps suffices for him that the words of Optatus can be taken in this way. But can they in fact be taken in this way? St. Optatus speaks of the episcopal chair: but by the name of the episcopal chair, at least in the age of Optatus, was understood the chair of authority and governance; he teaches that this singular chair of Peter was established so that unity might be maintained by all; this chair is therefore the principle of unity; but the principle of unity in a society such as the Church is—what else is it but authority? Moreover, the Apostles themselves had to adhere to this chair; and would have been schismatics

if they had set up their own chair against it: but who was ever considered a schismatic in the Church unless one who withdraws from the due subjection to Pastors? Therefore Optatus speaks of a chair of power, to which the Apostles themselves would have had to be subject: the Primacy therefore that is asserted of Peter is not merely one by which he himself is first among equals.

The testimony of Leo the Great is also brought forward, from *Sermon* IV on the anniversary of his assumption, where it is said that although there are many priests (this Doctor wrongly translates *Priester* —priests—for Bishops are meant) and many pastors among the people of God, yet Peter himself properly governs all those whom Christ also principally governs. Is one who properly governs others merely first among equals? Who is so senseless? He also adduces the words of Jerome from the testimony cited by us on p. 350, where he says that Peter was chosen from the Apostles so that, with a head appointed, the occasion of schism might be removed. Is such a head merely one who is the first among equals and does not rather exercise jurisdiction over all? Let him hear Jerome interpreting himself in his *Contra Luciferianos*, no. 9: "The salvation of the Church depends upon the dignity of the Supreme Priest; to whom if there is not attributed some prerogative that is peculiar and eminent above all, there will arise in the Church as many schisms as there are priests."

Then Dr. Langen recites not a few testimonies from the Fathers, whether Latin or Greek, in which parity is asserted between Peter and Paul—but parity by reason of merits, labors, and martyrdom: but what does this have to do with our question? As for the opinion of Gregory the Great refusing the title of ecumenical Bishop, we shall dispute about it in its proper place below. It would have been better to abstain from citing Ambrosiaster, who carries no authority—just as there is no certain knowledge available as to whether what is cited from him came from some Catholic or from a schismatic (cf. the admonition of the Maurists prefixed to this commentary in the fourth volume of the works of St. Ambrose). And we judge these things sufficient for understanding the weight of arguments with which this Doctor attacks the Catholic position.

V. Let us therefore consider the difficulty which arises of itself against the Primacy of Peter over the Apostles themselves from the proper prerogatives of the Apostles. Let us compare Peter simultaneously with any other Apostle. Both were immediately sent by God; both were endowed with the power of preaching authentically and infallibly everywhere; both were endowed with the power of binding and loosing wherever and whatever they might wish—and these are of the essence of the Apostolate; moreover both were endowed with the power of order, which, though one may receive it from another, does not thereby make one lesser than the giver. In what therefore does Peter excel the other Apostles? To what does his primacy over the Apostles themselves come down?

The response consists of two parts. We respond first, namely, that the power of Peter was ordinary while that of the other Apostles was extraordinary—which indeed must be demonstrated. We contend, that is, that the power of the whole Apostolic college was ordinary, and the power of Peter also ordinary; and the Gospels make no mention of any other authority instituted by Christ, in which Christ addresses either all the Apostles together or Peter alone. We contend, however, that that power which is believed to have been conferred upon the individual other Apostles—which comes down to this: that it was universal jurisdiction over all the faithful and infallible authority of the magisterium—was extraordinary. Wherefore we defend as the only ordinary power in the Church that which we know from the evangelical history of the institution of the Church to have been instituted by Christ—and I do not see why this should not be approved by Protestants. For let a testimony be produced by which it is demonstrated that Christ conferred some authority upon the other Apostles individually and severally taken.

Now that the power of the whole Apostolic college—in which Peter was also included—is ordinary, all will readily grant, including the heretics who teach that it perseveres in the universal Church. That the power given to Peter was also ordinary, we are about to demonstrate in the following Thesis and so it is permissible to suppose it now. But that universal power and infallible authority of the individual Apostles was certainly extraordinary. For historically it is established that there were

no successors of these individual Apostles who individually obtained it. For Bishops who preside must each individually feed their own flocks, as Peter commanded in his first letter 5:2 and Paul commanded in Acts 20:28, and as was established by the Apostolic Canons (cf. Canons 14, 32, 35) and the earliest Councils. Furthermore, no individual Bishop is by himself infallible; otherwise so many Bishops would not have been heretics: for suppose, for example, that Nestorius was infallible—then Cyril was wrong in condemning him, and Celestine was wrong; therefore someone was fallible. Thus that universal power of jurisdiction and the infallibility of the magisterium conceded to individuals was proper to the Apostolate; but this ceased with those first ones immediately sent by God; for the rest were no longer the first but the second. And these things must be understood of individual Bishops compared with the individual Apostles: for if the whole assembly of Bishops is considered, it enjoys the same power and authority as the Apostles—which must be perennial in the Church. It is therefore most true what is said: that the power of Peter was ordinary and that of the others extraordinary.

This already establishes a certain distinction between the power of Peter and that of any other Apostle; but it does not yet plainly resolve the knot of the difficulty; for if you consider the persons holding the power, any other Apostle and Peter still appear to be equal. Namely, a distinction is certainly established between the successors of the Apostles and the successors of Peter; but between the Apostles themselves and Peter, the distinction seems to exist at most with respect to a certain mode in which that power inheres in individuals: namely, it inheres in the Apostle in such a way as to have to expire with them and they cannot derive it into their successors—it inheres, that is, not as perpetual but as eventually to cease; whereas on the contrary it inheres in Peter in such a way as to be perpetual and inalienable. But if account is taken of the power as considered in itself, and the Apostles themselves who enjoy it are compared with Peter, no real distinction between the Apostles themselves and Peter seems to arise from the fact that that power was extraordinary in the Apostles and ordinary in Peter. Wherefore that response does not suffice for explaining the excellence and primacy of Peter over the Apostles themselves. And yet the

distinction between the Apostles themselves and Peter, and their subjection to him as head in the governance of the universal Church, is a truth of Faith defined—as is clear from the propositions to be adduced at the end of the Thesis.

VI. Therefore this must be demonstrated. In order therefore that the primacy of Peter over the Apostles themselves be true, it was required that the jurisdiction of Peter should be specifically more perfect than the jurisdiction of the Apostles and therefore greater in extension and intensity, and that the Apostles themselves should be subject to the jurisdiction of Peter. Now the jurisdiction of Peter was specifically different and more perfect: for it was the power of the rock, the power of the one holding the keys of the Church, the power of the confirmer; now to be the rock of the Church, to hold the keys of the Church, to be the confirmer of the brethren—this dignity is specifically different from that dignity which is common to the other Apostles, which is subordinated to the rock, to the one holding the keys, to the confirmer: since therefore the power of Peter corresponds to his dignity and is the power of the rock of the Church, of the one holding the keys of the Church, of the confirmer of the brethren, it is necessarily a power specifically more perfect than the power of the other Apostles. Hence it was a power greater in extension, for it extended even to the Apostles themselves, over whom no other Apostle had power; and it was greater in intensity, for it could perform 1° more and nobler acts than the power of the Apostles—those acts, namely, which would be exercised over the Apostles themselves; 2° with respect to the faithful themselves it could do more than any other Apostle could; for in disciplinary matters it could loose what an Apostle had bound, bind what he had loosed—whether by dispensing the faithful from a law made by the Apostle, or by abrogating his law, or by making a law without the consent of the Apostle and even against his approval; for all the faithful were first committed to the care of Peter and the Apostles were subordinated to Peter. Whence only the power of Peter was truly full—which must be noted. Thus the power of jurisdiction of Peter embraced even the Apostles endowed with their extraordinary power; for that extraordinary power, however ample, was inferior to the power of the rock of the Church, of the one holding the keys of the kingdom and the

confirmer, and was subordinated to it. Thus at least in first act, the power and jurisdiction of Peter was greater than the power and jurisdiction of the other Apostles.

As for second act—that is, with respect to its exercise and effects—it may be noted that the power of Peter regulated the actions of the Apostles in a twofold manner. First indirectly: insofar, namely, as since Peter had the right to require the Apostles to adhere to him as their head, they could legitimately exercise all their ministry of teaching and governing only by adhering to Peter as head and gathering all the sheep to him as the supreme visible shepherd; hence although the Apostles did not have their mission from Peter and Peter was not actually commanding them anything, yet the subordination of the Apostles to Peter—whom they revered as the foundation and head of the universal Church—was a necessary condition of the Apostolic ministry. Then moreover the jurisdiction of Peter was also directly exercised or could be exercised over the Apostles: for he could truly command them 1° certainly as regards those matters which would have been beyond the universal mission of the Apostles—such as the election of Matthias—or which had to be done by their whole assembly or by several of them simultaneously, such as, for example, the celebration of a Synod, which in disciplinary matters could have been useful; 2° also as regards those disciplinary matters which, not having been determined by Christ, were left to the discretion of the Apostles and especially of Peter: for by the right of supreme and universal Shepherd Peter could have made laws for the universal Church which no Apostle could have dissolved—indeed whose observance he would have had to urge lest he become a schismatic—and by the same right he could have obligated the Apostles to establish certain disciplinary laws. Therefore the Primacy of Peter is most fully reconcilable with the extraordinary power of the Apostles, and Peter truly enjoyed the power of jurisdiction over the Apostles themselves and he alone had the fullness of power.

Thus to those who object that the universal power of binding and loosing was also conferred upon the Apostles and the charism of infallibility was conferred upon them, the response must be given: as to 1°—with a distinction: ordinary power—denied; extraordinary power—subdistinguished: power equal in extension and intensity to the power

of Peter—denied; power unequal—subdistinguished: power which therefore required the subordination of the Apostles to the chair of Peter and which did not exclude the power of exercising jurisdiction over them by Peter—granted; power disposed otherwise—denied.

As to 2°—namely the charism of infallibility—the response must be: it was extraordinarily conferred upon the individual Apostles without any subordination to Peter—denied; with this condition, that while teaching they should adhere to Peter as rock and head, and gather all the sheep to him as the supreme visible shepherd under Christ—granted.

Nor does what Paul says in Gal. 2:6 oppose these things—that those who seemed to be something (οἱ δοκοῦντες—some add τι εἶναι, which appears in the foregoing—namely the Apostles who manifestly were, that is, were columns, v. 9) conferred nothing upon him. For Paul speaks of his mission and specifically of the authority of teaching or the magisterium, which he received immediately from Christ, by whom he was also immediately instructed (1:11–12).

VII. In this matter it is striking that Protestants—and even certain older Catholics—are unwilling to understand what the Scriptures so clearly teach. When we set before them the words of Christ addressed to Peter, they immediately reply that the same power was conferred upon the other Apostles. But by what argument do they prove this? Because, namely, the power of binding and loosing was also conferred upon them and they were sent to teach and to found churches throughout the whole world. But where is it written that to the other Apostles too was given the appellation of rock by Christ, that to the other Apostles too were given the keys of the kingdom? These things were said to Peter alone—not to the other Apostles even taken together. Is the same signified by these phrases as by those: *whatever you bind*, etc.? But we have shown above that the difference between them is not small. Again, why do they not notice that it is not the same thing for some power to be conferred on one person and for the same power to be conferred on many who are collegially united—among whom is also that one person? which indeed we have already examined above. Why are the Protestants never concerned to give account of this fact: that Christ promised and gave the power to Peter alone individually and separately from the

others—not to John, not to Andrew, etc.? If no power was to be instituted other than a certain common one, why was Christ not content with the words addressed to all the Apostles? Let the Protestants therefore see who it is that does violence to the Scriptures—they or the Catholics.

VIII. The doctrine establishing an absolute equality between blessed Peter and the other Apostles, without any subordination and subjection of them to Peter in supreme power and the governance of the universal Church, was declared heretical by Innocent X by a decree of the Holy Inquisition on January 29, 1647. And already John XXII had proscribed as heretical the second proposition of Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun: that blessed Peter had no more authority than the other Apostles had and was not the head of the others (Constitution already cited). After whom, Clement VI in a dogmatic letter to the Armenians who desired unity with the Roman Church (Odoric Raynaldus, year 1331, no. 3), proposing the things to be believed, asks first: "Whether you believe that blessed Peter received the fullest power of jurisdiction over all Christian faithful from the Lord Jesus Christ, and that all the power of jurisdiction which in certain lands and provinces and different parts of the world Judas Thaddaeus and the other Apostles had in a special and particular manner, was subject to the fullest authority and power which blessed Peter received over all those believing in Christ in all parts of the world from the Lord Jesus Christ himself; and that no Apostle or anyone else received the fullest power over all Christians except Peter alone."

CHAPTER TWO
ON THE SUCCESSION TO THE PRIMACY OF THE MOST BLESSED SAINT PETER

THESIS VII

"What the Lord Christ Jesus established in the blessed Apostle Peter as the prince of pastors and the great shepherd of the sheep, for the perpetual salvation and lasting good of the Church, must by the same Author's design endure without interruption in the Church, which, founded upon the rock, shall stand firm until the end of the ages" (First Vatican Council, Session IV, Chapter 2).

I. The meaning is not that the power conferred by Christ upon Peter must thenceforth exist in the Church in such a way that the Church as such would succeed Peter in that power; rather, the meaning is that Peter in the primacy established by Christ must, by the very same institution of Christ, have perpetually individual successors in the Church, which, founded from the beginning upon the rock, shall stand firm upon that same rock until the end of the ages. So taught Pius VI in the letter *Super Soliditate*, by which he condemned the book of Eybel entitled *Quid est Papa?*: "That the Church was founded by Christ upon the solidity of Peter, and that Peter was chosen by the singular gift of Christ above all the rest to stand as prince of the apostolic choir by vicarious power, and thereby to take upon himself and transmit to his successors in every age the supreme care and authority of feeding the whole flock, confirming his brethren, and binding and loosing throughout the entire world, is a Catholic dogma which, received from the mouth of Christ and handed down and defended by the perpetual preaching of the Fathers, has been held most inviolably by the universal Church in every age and confirmed again and again against the errors of innovators by the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs and of Councils."

II. The perpetual succession in the Primacy of Peter is denied not only by those who are unwilling to admit that anything peculiar was attributed to Peter above the others by Christ, but also by those who, while granting this, contend that it was private and personal to Peter.

Among these, Dr. Langen marshals his arguments as follows. The words of Christ (Matthew XVI:18), in the opinion of the Fathers, bear upon Peter personally, and are never referred by the Fathers in their commentaries to his successors. And indeed, the promise of Christ is necessarily bound up with the merit of the confession of faith made by Peter; but that was proper to Peter and not to be derived to any successors; therefore the reward rendered in return for it was likewise proper to Peter alone. In like manner, the charge of confirming his brethren presupposes the conversion of Peter from his fall and the fall itself; but these again are proper and private to Peter. If, on the other hand, the words of Christ—"and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren"—pertain also to certain successors of Peter, it will be necessary that these successors first fall and then be converted, so that the words of Christ may be truly verified in them (at the cited location, §7). Again, if there is a Vicar of Christ in the Church who stands above the other bishops, it will be permissible to arrange matters in such a way that on one side are placed Christ and his Vicar, and on the other the Apostles together with the bishops; the Vicar of Christ will therefore be able to address the bishops in these terms: "As the Father sent me, I also send you"—which everyone sees is absurd. Furthermore, if the Vicar of Christ exists alongside Christ, why does Christ, in addressing the Apostles, embrace all of them together, including Peter among them? For in that case Peter as Vicar of Christ would be conferring authority upon the others together with Christ while at the same time receiving it from Christ together with them, which is contradictory (§6).

Others, following Salmasius (in the *Apparatus*, cited, pp. 16–17), deny that Peter can have a successor, on the grounds that there is no succession to the Apostles; for the authority of the Apostles was extraordinary and was bound to cease with them. And indeed, who would succeed, if not some bishop? But a bishop cannot succeed an Apostle, because an Apostle was not a bishop; and succession does not hold between different kinds of office. We shall first demonstrate the truth asserted in the Thesis, and then give a sufficient answer to these arguments.

III. Now, the perpetuity of the Primacy, that is, the perpetual succession to Peter in the primacy by the very institution of Christ our

Lord, in other words by divine right, is demonstrated by those arguments which are suggested by the Fathers of the Vatican Council. For, first, Peter stands in relation to the Church as a foundation to a building: the stability and strength of Peter are the reason why the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church; Peter is the one who confirms his brethren in the faith against the temptations of Satan. But this building, which is the Church, must not cease with the person of Peter but must endure unto the end of the age; then, too, the gates of hell must never prevail against the Church, and the brethren must always be confirmed in the faith, because the temptations of Satan will never be lacking. Moreover, the building cannot endure without a foundation, nor will it stand firm against the assaults of hell except as supported by it, and the brethren cannot be confirmed if the one who confirms them is absent. Therefore the Rock of the Church and the perpetual Confirmer, the support (στήριγμα) of the brethren, must exist without ceasing.

And indeed, the supreme jurisdiction entrusted to Peter alone, by which all things are recalled to unity, is an intrinsic constitutive element of the Church as established by Christ, because the form of governance belongs to the essence of a society. But the Church must persevere with those intrinsic elements with which it was established by Christ. Therefore. Moreover, from this argument it is evident that all the rights promised and conferred upon Peter were not extraordinary but ordinary. For that right is here called ordinary which must always exist in the Church; but all those rights pertain to the essence of the Primacy of Peter as established by Christ, and this Primacy must, by the same institution of Christ, always exist in the Church. Therefore.

Furthermore, second, in Matthew XXVIII:20, Christ in addressing all the Apostles promises that he will always be with them—namely, with them insofar as they were endowed with divine rights—that is, he promises that he will remain always as their protector and that the social state constituted by those rights will always endure. But Peter, endowed with the Primacy, was also present with the Apostles; therefore the Primacy of Peter too must be perpetual. You will say: the rights proper to each Apostle individually ceased with the Apostolate when they died; why then should the Primacy of Peter not cease likewise? I

reply: a) Christ addresses all the Apostles together; hence he promises perpetual continuance to those rights which pertain to the body of Apostles, not to individuals; but those singular prerogatives of the Apostles did not pertain to the body. The Primacy of Peter, however, did pertain to the very body of the Apostles; for it was the principle of unity of the apostolic body, which by reason of it was recalled to unity; if therefore all the rights of that body must endure and the same social state must remain, then the right of the Primacy too must be perpetual. b) There is a further distinction in that the power granted to each of the other Apostles individually was not specifically different from the power of all of them taken together, nor as it was found in the individuals was it necessary to the Church; therefore even when those special prerogatives ceased, the same rights remained in the Church and the same social state remained. But if the Primacy of Peter had ceased, some right—and indeed the chief right—which was found in that apostolic body as it resided in their head would have ceased, and the same social state by which the body of the Apostles was held together would no longer have remained. Therefore it is necessary that, if Christ is to be always with the Apostles, he must also be always specially with Peter.

Furthermore, third, from the teaching of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians XII:12 ff., it is clear that the Church is one body and has one head that is homogeneous with it, besides Christ. For Paul says at verse 21 that the head cannot say to the feet: "I have no need of you"; but Christ can rightly say this to all the faithful; therefore the head of which Paul speaks is someone other than Christ and beneath Christ, belonging to the visible Church—and who can this be but Peter? Moreover, just as it is by the institution of Christ that the Church is one body, so too it is by the same institution that she has this head. Since, therefore, the Church must by Christ's institution be perpetual, by the same institution the head must also endure always together with the body; therefore as long as the Church shall exist, Peter will have successors.

Fourth, the same truth is attested by the Fathers, who teach that Peter was constituted by Christ as the foundation and most solid rock of his Church, that this rock is not overcome by the gates of hell, and that Peter lives and presides perpetually in his successors, to whom equally the words of Christ apply. Pertinent to this are the numerous

testimonies of the Fathers cited in Thesis I, under no. 2 after corollary 7 and under no. 5 in the first place; it is sufficient to have indicated them here, for in the course of the treatise and especially in the following Thesis not a few of them or similar ones will be recited, in which it will be manifest that what we are now defending is also contained. The same truth is equally established by the doctrine of the Fathers asserting that the power was conferred on Peter in order that the unity of the Church might be formed (Pacianus, Epistle 3 to Sympronian; Optatus; Cyprian, in the places already cited). The same argument is also confirmed by the interpretation applied by the Fathers to the words of Matthew in the Novatian controversy, concerning which see Augustine in the preceding Thesis.

Therefore, by divine right, that is by the very institution of Christ, the Primacy of Peter must have perpetual successors.

Moreover, from the demonstration already offered it is evident that the perpetuity by divine right of the Primacy of Peter is a truth revealed in Scripture. For this truth is gathered by means of a simple analysis of what is explicitly revealed, and is therefore to be considered as immediately revealed—not verbally, to be sure, but really, that is in consideration of the thing expressed. Certainly, upon instituting an analysis of the thing expressed in the words of Matthew XVI—"Thou art Peter," etc.—it is manifest that the Church of Christ, not of this or that age, but the Church which Christ is to build, that is, the everlasting Church, is referred to Peter as to its own foundation and its own head; and in this is contained the fact that the Church cannot exist without the Primacy of Peter, for relatives exist together, and the Rock must endure as long as the Church is to endure. Therefore.

IV. And so, in order to dispose of the arguments of the adversaries, let that childish equivocation first be removed whereby the prerogatives of Peter are called personal. They are indeed personal, in that they were proper to Peter and not common to the other Apostles and the rest of the faithful; but they are not personal in the sense that they were given to him as a private person, or were given in such a way that they were bound to cease with him. For what was given pertains of itself to the good of the Church and is a public office and charge, of which the Church can never be deprived. The connection, however, between this

authority conferred on Peter and the merit of his confession lies in the fact that Peter merited, above the other Apostles, to be marked with this public dignity; for some person had to be chosen for this; but it does not lie in the fact that just as the merit of Peter's confession is his alone and does not pass to others, so likewise the dignity conferred upon him does not pass to others. For whether this passes or does not pass to heirs must be sought from the nature of the thing itself; if it is an authority necessary to the Church by Christ's institution, it certainly must be perpetual, and it will be proper and exclusive to Peter that he was the first to hold it—a special prerogative which certainly does not pass to heirs. The same must be said in answer to the argument drawn from the words of Christ in Luke; and besides, it must be noted that without any sufficient reason it is contended that the fall of Peter and his conversion are supposed in that passage. But we shall return to these matters when we come to dispute the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff. It is, moreover, false that the Fathers never referred the words of Christ to the successors of Peter. Furthermore, in order for Peter to be the Vicar of Christ it was not necessary that he himself should send the Apostles; but even if these were sent immediately by Christ, yet if they were sent in such a way as to be subordinated to Peter, Peter was already the Vicar of Christ with respect to them. Both Peter and his successor could indeed send bishops and in fact do send them (cf. Thesis XIV); but from this it does not follow that the Vicar of Christ can appropriate to himself the words of Christ in the proper sense in which they were spoken by Christ; for the Vicar is not the equal of Christ, but is so only analogically, in which there is no absurdity. Insofar as Peter is invested with authority by Christ, he is on the side of those who receive from Christ; but insofar as, invested with this authority, he governs the Apostles and their successors and supplies them with stability and unity, he is on the side of Christ, yet exercises this function under him and through him; and therefore there is no contradiction.

The argument of Salmasius, which he himself considers most invincible, is worthless. For it is false that there is no succession to the Apostles; nor indeed was all apostolic authority extraordinary; rather, properly speaking none of it was extraordinary, but rather the manner of holding it was in some way extraordinary, insofar as the other

Apostles individually possessed it fully with respect to all the faithful and each individual Apostle was infallible. But the authority of Peter—as the Rock of the Church, as Shepherd of the whole flock, as holder of the keys of the Kingdom, as Confirmer of the brethren—as well as the apostolic authority of the whole apostolic body and the purely episcopal authority of the other Apostles, was ordinary, established, to be sure, by Christ so that the Church itself might exist. As for what Salmasius says, that the Apostles were not bishops, this rests on his imagination that bishops as they now exist began to exist in the Church by human law after the apostolic age; on which point he has been well refuted by Petavius in his books *De Hierarchia Ecclesiastica*. Cf. Prolegomenon, §§16 and 17.

Therefore the Primacy of Peter was not a personal privilege; for it was established for the good of the Church and as a perpetual institution; and though it was conferred on Peter rather than on another on account of his singular merits, it was not established for the sake of rewarding those merits, but for the sake of the Church.

NOTE ON THE FOLLOWING THESES

I. We assume here by way of anticipation the historical fact of the Roman episcopate, which Peter held until his death, concerning which there will be a more suitable occasion to discuss afterwards what kind of fact it is—whether it is a purely dogmatic fact, or a revealed fact to be believed with divine faith. As regards the historical arguments, see Peter Foggini, *De Romani Divi Petri itinere*, etc.; Gregory Cortese, Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, *De Romano itinere gestisque Principis Apostolorum*, published at Rome in 1770; to which add also the excellent little work on the same subject published a few years ago by Sebastianus Sanguineti, S.J., while teaching Church History in this College. Then, too, some learned man whose identity I do not know demonstrated the same fact by producing a larger number of witnesses drawn from the Oriental sects of the Syrians.

II. Let it suffice to meet three objections, though sufficiently inept ones. The first is that Peter could not have been Bishop of Rome, because the Roman Church was gathered from the Gentiles; but the

Apostle of the Gentiles was not Peter but Paul; therefore Paul, not Peter, was the founder and first bishop of that Church. So argues the illustrious Salmasius in the *Apparatus* cited, p. 6, against the most certain testimony of all of history and against the authority of the written Word of God. Was that distinction between the apostolate of each—that the apostolate of the Jews was entrusted to Peter while that of the Gentiles was Paul's—intended to mean that Peter could not or should not evangelize the Gentiles and gather Churches from among them? Who taught Salmasius this? If it is so, why is Peter stirred by a special vision from God to be the first to bring the Gentiles into the Church? Was not Peter sent with the other Apostles by Christ to the Gentiles, when it was said to them: "Going therefore, teach all nations..."? If that distinction is pressed strictly to the letter, as Salmasius does, let him tell us what was left for the other Apostles; but if the others, notwithstanding Paul's apostolate, could evangelize the Gentiles and found churches among the Gentiles—which no one but a madman will deny—why could not Peter, who was certainly not inferior to them? For the rest, what weight do arguments a priori carry against established facts? Was not the Roman Church flourishing and vigorous, so that its faith was proclaimed throughout the world, before Paul had come to Rome and thought of cultivating that part of the Lord's flock, as his letter to the Romans attests? You will say that it was a small Church gathered from the Jews who lived in Rome in small numbers. I reply first: granted—though I deny that the Jews, at least the proselytes, were then few in number at Rome. But even if it was drawn from Jews, it was the Roman Church in its beginnings, nor did another Church subsequently succeed it; the same Church was enlarged. Secondly, however, the very argument from Paul's epistle is sufficient to show that the Church to which he writes was gathered from both Jews and Gentiles. And yet Paul had not founded it. Salmasius, therefore, is dreaming.

The Protestants object further, saying that the Apostolate and the Episcopate cannot be combined. For an Apostle, sent to all the nations, was not to have a fixed seat anywhere, and was to devote himself to feeding not a single flock but all; whereas a Bishop has a fixed seat somewhere and a particular flock. And indeed no other Apostle is read

to have held the episcopate of any particular Church. But first, this incompatibility between the Apostolate and the Episcopate occurred to none of the ancients. Second, an Apostle was indeed sent to all the nations, but this mission is not tantamount to a command that each Apostle should betake himself to all the nations, which would in any case have been impossible. That universal mission consisted in the fact that the power was given to each to go wherever they wished, with no particular place defined for them; it was left to their own judgment which places they wished to visit and which nations they wished to instruct. Therefore the choice of places and nations depended on the prudence of the Apostle, who, if he had judged it more conducive to the glory of God to establish a fixed seat for himself in some city and had done so, would have done nothing contrary to the obligation of the Apostolate. In like manner, the nature of the Episcopate does not demand that one be so attached to a particular place as never to depart from it, especially if one can leave those who act in one's stead; but it requires that the Bishop possess the principal and ordinary right of jurisdiction over a definite flock, which, adhering to him as to its head and shepherd, constitutes a single Church. With this, however, journeys and departures to other places, even distant ones, even for a long time, are compatible, which is done honorably when there is cause.

Therefore the Apostolate and the Episcopate are not mutually incompatible.

As to the additional objection that no other Apostle is read to have been a bishop: first, this is by itself a weak argument; second, in the judgment of the most eminent critics, James, Bishop of Jerusalem, was an Apostle of the Twelve; third, even if some deny this (among them most vigorously Francis Anthony Zaccaria in his *Dissertationes Latinae De rebus ad historiam*, etc., Vol. I, Dissertation 1, who retraces the preceding arguments but without actually demonstrating what he contends), it must be noted that those who deny that James the Bishop of Jerusalem was an Apostle of the Twelve nevertheless concede that he was of the foremost Apostles, in the same category as Paul (cf. the cited dissertation). But since Paul was no less an Apostle than any of the Twelve (Thesis 6), if it was permissible for Paul himself, or for James his equal, to take up the episcopate of some Church—as is supposed in that

opinion—then it was permissible for the other Apostles as well. Furthermore, there was a special reason why Peter should claim for himself some episcopal see; for the other Apostles were not to be succeeded in the power of the Apostolate itself, which was extraordinary, but Peter was to be succeeded in the Apostolic Primacy. And this will be explained in the following Thesis.

Finally, Salmasius says (at the cited location, p. 18)—and Dr. Langen after him (Part I, §6)—that if there is a Vicar of Christ bearing the primacy over the universal Church as his kingdom, that person cannot be the Bishop of any particular Church; just as the King of the French is not King of the Parisians, and is King of the French not for that reason, but is equally and immediately King of all the cities and all the subjects of that kingdom. It is therefore rightly objected against the prerogative of the Primacy asserted for the Bishop of a determinate Church, such as the Roman Bishop.

But we are free to ask Salmasius whether he considers there to be any incompatibility in the fact that one who is Bishop of some See should also be the Vicar of Christ for the universal Church and should hold the primacy of jurisdiction over the other bishops. This incompatibility was never sensed by the Church, nor has Salmasius demonstrated it; and if the Bishop of some see can be a metropolitan or patriarch over several other bishops, it is not clear why he cannot be the supreme Pastor and Vicar of Christ. Since, therefore, no incompatibility can be shown to exist of itself, the question whether this is actually the case must be settled by historical arguments, not a priori. Although the fittingness of the same thing is sufficiently manifest even a priori. For it is most necessary for the Church that there be a determinate successor of Peter, and therefore a determinate principle of succession; and this can be rendered certain by no means more surely than by linking the succession to a determinate see.

THESIS VIII

A distinction must be drawn between the law of succession and the condition of succession in the Primacy. The law of succession is the divine institution of the Primacy itself and its perpetuity; the condition is the title by which it comes about that this particular person rather than another succeeds. Now this condition is determined by the original act of Peter, by which he raised the Roman See to the dignity of the Primacy. Therefore the Roman Bishop, who alone fulfills the due condition, obtains by divine right, in virtue of the law of succession, the Primacy over the universal Church. Accordingly, when the question is raised by what right the Roman Bishop succeeds Peter, if the question is understood not comparatively but absolutely—that is, by what right he possesses the same authority as Peter—the answer must simply be that he succeeds Peter by divine right.

I. Not all the parts of this Thesis will be proved in the order in which they are arranged, and this, as will become apparent, is for the sake of clarity. Thus, to illustrate the distinction we have handed down by means of an example: in any political society, by the law of nature, one person or several must hold supreme power; but the form of government can be determined by the will of the society or by certain facts. So in the Roman Republic the law was that the republic was to be governed by two consuls annually; the consuls, designated by a law of nature determined by social will, took up and guided the affairs of the republic. If, therefore, the question is raised by what right the Consuls existed and each year new ones succeeded the old: the answer is by the law of nature and by social law—by the law of nature insofar as they were some form of government necessary for society, by social law insofar as they were a certain definite form of government. Now the condition of succession was, for example, that a person should have held lower offices of the republic, should seek office in person, and should be chosen by the votes of the people. From these concurrent circumstances, or the absence of them, it came about that this person rather than another was consul. If, therefore, the question is asked why this person rather than that one was consul, the answer is: because this person rather than that one fulfilled the required conditions—not

because nature or the welfare of the republic demanded this, which indeed would be the answer to the former question. But because in the same subject there came together both the authority and such a form of government—which can exist only in the concrete—along with the conditions for obtaining it, the same men were consuls and administered the republic by the law of nature and by the social law determining the natural law, and by the personal right of fulfilled conditions: absolutely speaking, consuls by the law of nature determined by the will of the society, but comparatively speaking—these rather than those—by the right of the fulfilled condition.

Now, if these things are applied to the Church, the law of succession is the very law of the perpetuity of the Primacy; for by the same title by which the Primacy must be perpetual, by that same title successors of Peter must exist. The title, moreover, which determines the perpetuity of the Primacy is the will of Christ. Therefore the right by which the existence of successors in the Primacy until the end of the age is established is not human but divine, flowing from the will of Christ the founder. Furthermore, note the difference between the governance of political society and the governance of the Church in this regard; for although in political society some form of government is required by the institution of nature, nevertheless the form of government is not determined by the law of nature alone; but in the Church the same divine will which willed that there be governance in her also determined the form of governance; whence in the Church this whole thing—both governance and its form—is entirely a matter of divine right.

II. But from this divine right establishing the Primacy and its perpetuity, and therefore the perpetual succession in it, the condition of succession must be distinguished. This distinction must be made with care. For we do not wish to say either that the condition itself could not have been established by divine right—which everyone sees to be false—or that it was not in fact established by divine right; for we shall dispute about this matter below. But we say: first, that looking at the essences of things, the ground of the condition of succession—by reason of which this person rather than another succeeds—is one thing, and the ground of the law of succession—by which the perpetual existence

itself of successors is established—is another thing; and second, that it was not necessary for Christ by antecedent will to have determined the condition of succession, just as he determined the law of succession, in order that someone might thereafter succeed Peter in the Primacy by divine right.

The first point is clear from the explanation given above, from which the second is also thus proved. An antecedent will of Christ determining the condition of succession would be a will which, prior to any act or action of Peter or of the Church, would establish who among so many should succeed—whether by promulgating some universal law defining the mode of succession, or by designating the successor on each occasion. But no such antecedent determination was necessary. For even if Christ permitted Peter or the Church to determine the mode of succession (which he afterwards ratified by consequent will, Thesis 10), this determination would have had this effect alone: that comparatively speaking this person rather than another would succeed Peter and obtain the Primacy; but not that this person would absolutely succeed and hold the Primacy; for that depends entirely on the law of succession, which any determination of the condition presupposes. The law of succession not existing, no one could succeed, that is, hold the Primacy in the Church after Peter. Therefore even in this hypothesis someone would succeed Peter, that is, would hold the Primacy in the Church after him, because Christ willed the Primacy to be perpetual; he would therefore succeed by divine right.

To be precise: it is of divine right that there should always be a Primacy in the Church, that is, that there should always be some person who by divine right must be and is the Primate in the Church; but once a person has been determined by the condition, that person alone, all others excluded, holds the Primacy in the Church by that very right; for she holds it because Christ wills the Primacy to exist. Just as it is a law of nature that there must be in society an authority to govern, and therefore someone or several who possess it; but in whom it resides is left to the determination of men or of some event. Now Robert, made King on the death of his father, by what right is he King? Insofar as he holds authority absolutely, by the law of nature, and by that law he can enact laws by which he punishes criminals with the penalty of death,

etc. That is to say: the right by which something is obtained is of the same genus as that which decrees that the thing is to be obtained.

Note finally that, since the condition for succeeding Peter is, as we shall see, the Roman Episcopate, it is one thing to ask what the condition is for someone to exist as a successor of Peter, and another to ask what the condition is for this or that person to become the Roman Bishop. To the former question we answer that the condition is the Roman Episcopate, and therefore only Roman Bishops are successors of Peter in the Primacy; to the latter question the answer is: it is those laws by which the election of the Roman Pontiff is governed. But we do not dispute about this remote condition.

III. We prove, therefore, first that Roman Bishops alone are the successors of blessed Peter in the Primacy; then we shall prove that they succeed in the Primacy by divine right. To succeed blessed Peter in the Primacy means nothing other than to hold after Peter the Primacy of Peter in the Church. As to the first, the arguments are as follows. a) The argument from exclusion. By the agency of Christ and by divine right, for as long as the Church endures, a successor of Peter in the Primacy must always exist; this successor must at any given time be a single individual; but up to the Council of Florence, no one other than the Roman Bishop was ever held in the Church to be the successor of Peter; therefore the Roman Bishop is and is himself alone the successor in the Primacy of Peter. The inference is evident; for it cannot be that no successor in the Primacy existed, unless the Church too, founded upon the Rock, has ceased to exist and the promise of Christ has turned out to be false—"Behold, I am with you all days," etc.—nor can the Church have erred in this matter. Furthermore, the major premise of the argument is certain from the preceding Thesis; the minor is most evidently established by history. Indeed, to touch briefly on what is sufficiently known: there was no doubt whatever about this matter up to the seventh ecumenical Council of 787; at the eighth ecumenical Council this was expressly declared, when it was decreed in the profession of faith subscribed by all in the First Action. At the Second Council of Lyons it was proclaimed in the profession of faith presented by Michael Palaeologus to Gregory X at that same Synod; and this was

defined by both the Latin and the Greek Church at the Council of Florence. Therefore.

b) The argument from the nature of succession. Peter had to be succeeded; but he who fulfills the conditions of succession is to be regarded as the successor of Peter; and this person is uniquely the Roman Pontiff. Therefore. The major is evident; the minor is proved. The determination of who was to succeed could have been effected in one of these ways only: first, by a continuous immediate revelation of God, by which the successor of Peter would be declared on each occasion; second, by the consent of the Church, whether gathered together or dispersed, which as often as necessary would designate the successor of Peter; third, by some original act by which from the beginning it would be established who was to be the successor thereafter. Now such an original act was either some act or decree of the Church apart from Peter, or an act of Peter—and this either with or without the consent of the Church—or some immediate act or decree of God. But although successors of Peter have always existed, the first and second modes have never been in use; the third therefore remains.

Now it is inconceivable that a decree should have been issued by the Church apart from Peter during Peter's lifetime; for a decree issued by the body without the consent of the Head would have had no validity; nor can any decree enacted by the Church after the death of Peter be imagined; for the memory of so fundamental a fact would have had to exist, yet it is entirely absent; and besides, if this had once been done, the Church would now be equally entitled to change the mode of succession and would hold this with certainty. But, to say the least, the Church lacks this certainty. Likewise, some act of Peter to which, however, the consent of the Church attached as if by necessity, is wrongly imagined; for this necessity of consent is incompatible with the supreme and independent authority of Peter, whose Primacy was indeed for the good of the Church but was in no way subject to her power. There remains, therefore, some original act proper to Peter himself; for an immediate decree of God, if there were one, can be conceived as nothing other than that whose terminus was the very act of Peter.

But the original act of Peter can be nothing other than his Roman Episcopate, which he held until his death, by which Peter raised the

Roman See with the rights of the Primacy. For first, whatever other act you might imagine, you fall back into one of the ways already excluded; second, this act was eminently suited to determining the mode of succession in perpetuity, since a see is by its nature perpetual, and with the rights of the Primacy attached to a single see, perpetual succession was secured without any new determination. Indeed, third, this is the only act of his own by which one may think he determined the mode of succession. For if you think of some simple decree of Peter concerning the election of a successor to be made by the Church after him, you return to what has already been excluded. If you think of some decree of his own by which, while still living, he designated who would succeed him in the Primacy—first, concerning this decree there is complete silence in history, unless it be the very act of the freely undertaken Roman Episcopate; then, either Peter designated only his immediate successor, or the perpetual series of successors. If you say the former, we return again to the other ways already excluded; if the latter, this could not have been done except by designating some episcopal see in which the series of successors would be perpetual. But what other see could this have been than the very see in which he himself sat until his death? And indeed, succession to Peter in the Primacy could only come after his death; if therefore a see was to be designated, that see had to be designated in which succession to Peter after his death would be possible; but this was none other than the Roman see. Therefore the condition of succession in the Primacy depends on the original act of Peter; that act is the Roman Episcopate which Peter undertook and never relinquished; therefore the condition of succession is that someone succeeds Peter in the Roman chair. Therefore the Roman Bishop alone fulfills the condition of succession.

From this argument you understand that we look not only at the fact of Peter—that is, his sitting in the Roman chair—but also at the will or decree of Peter (whether this is from divine right or from Peter's own authority alone, we shall say later) by which he attached the rights of the Primacy to the Roman chair. And indeed we think that the fact must be considered in this way. For if Peter could have held no episcopal see at all, it was also in his power to hold some see in such a way that the rights of the Primacy were not attached to the see—that is, were not to

be held by successors. For the argument is invalid: the Roman Bishop succeeds Peter in the episcopal chair, therefore he succeeds in the Primacy—just as if some bishop were also an abbot, it would not follow that one who succeeds him at his death in the Episcopate also succeeds in the abbacy. Succession, that is, takes place only in what is proper to the see. That argument, therefore, presupposes that the rights of the Primacy were proper to the Roman See while Peter sat at Rome. But from this material fact alone that conclusion certainly cannot be drawn; for there is no necessary connection between these two things; a bishop of some Church can hold certain rights that are not communicable to successors. The act of Peter, therefore, to which appeal is made is the sitting of Peter in the Roman Chair, conjoined with the will or decree to communicate the rights of the Primacy to that chair.

That the Roman Pontiff is the successor of blessed Peter in the Primacy is proved by the consensus of the whole Church. For the Roman chair has always been called and held to be the Chair of Peter, insofar as Peter himself is the Head of the whole Church, and to the Roman Pontiff himself all those prerogatives have been attributed which are predicated of Peter. St. Irenaeus, Book III, Chapter 3, in order to confound all heretics, appeals to the doctrine of the Church founded and established at Rome by the two Apostles Peter and Paul, asserting that it is necessary for every Church to converge upon this Church on account of its more powerful principality; and that amounts to saying that the Roman Chair is the Chair of the Primacy of Peter, by which the universal Church is governed. Cyprian, in the epistle to Antonianus, calls the priestly chair at Rome the place of Peter; and in the epistle to Cornelius (Ep. 33), speaking of the followers of the pseudo-bishop Fortunatus, he says: "They dare to sail and to carry letters from schismatics and profane persons to the chair of Peter and to the principal Church, from which priestly unity took its rise." The chair from which priestly unity took its rise, which is the principle of the unity of the episcopate, is indeed the singular chair of Peter, but of Peter bearing the Primacy of the whole Church. Optatus, Book II, testifies that at Rome the episcopal chair was conferred on Peter, in which unity was to be maintained by all, and he teaches that this chair alone is "the first among the gifts of the Church" and that "through it the other gifts

are ours." But the episcopal chair in which unity is to be maintained by all, which is the principle and source of all the prerogatives of the Church, is the chair of Peter insofar as he is the Rock of the Church. Ambrose affirms in his commentary on Psalm XL, 30, that the Church is where Peter is; and in Epistle XI to the Emperors Gratian etc., that the Roman Church is the head of the whole Roman world, and that from it the right of venerable communion flows forth to all; and in the hymn on the Princes of the Holy Apostles, composed after the description of the martyrdom of Peter, he sings: "Hence Rome has raised its lofty summit of devotion—founded on such blood and renowned for so great a Bard—through the circuit of so great a City the cohorts press in throngs—the feast of the sacred Martyrs is celebrated on three roads—Who would think it: the world goes forth! The people of heaven run together—Elect head of the nations, seat of the teacher of nations!" From which it is clear that the prerogatives of Peter's Primacy pertain to the Roman Church according to Ambrose. Jerome, writing to Damasus (Ep. 15): "I speak with the successor of the fisherman and disciple of the cross. Following no one as first save Christ, I associate myself by communion with your Beatitude, that is with the chair of Peter. I know that upon that Rock the Church is built... I know not Vitalis, I reject Meletius, I ignore Paulinus; whoever does not gather with you scatters—that is, whoever is not of Christ is of Antichrist." That is to say, the chair of Damasus, distinct from the chair of Meletius or Paulinus or others, is the chair of Peter; moreover it is that above which the Church is founded, to which whoever adheres is of Christ, whoever does not adhere is of Antichrist; it is therefore the Chair of Peter insofar as he is the Head of the whole Church.

Augustine, Epistle 162, warns that in the Roman Church the principate of the apostolic chair has always flourished, which is none other than the Primacy of Peter. Chrysologus, writing to Eutyches: "In all things we urge you to give obedient heed to those things which have been written by the most blessed Pope of the Roman city; for blessed Peter, who lives and presides in his own see, provides those who seek it with the truth of faith. For we, out of concern for peace and faith, cannot hear the causes of faith apart from the consent of the Bishop of Rome." Therefore the Roman see is the proper see of Peter, in which he

himself always lives and presides, insofar as he is the universal teacher and supreme judge in matters of faith.

In the formula proposed by the holy Pope Hormisdas and subscribed by the Eastern Bishops, it is affirmed that the sentence of the Lord cannot be passed over—"Thou art Peter," etc.—and that this is proved by the effect of events, because in the Apostolic See (the Roman one) religion has always been preserved immaculate. From this faith the bishops are unwilling to be separated, following in all things the Apostolic See, in which the wholeness and truth of the Christian religion is firm and solid. Ennodius, Bishop of Ticinum (in the *Libellus apologeticus* for the Synod in the case of Symmachus the holy Pope): "God has willed perhaps that the causes of other men be settled through men; but the presul of this see he has reserved without question to his own judgment. He has willed that the successors of blessed Peter owe their innocence to heaven alone... I will repeat the single saying: 'Thou art Peter,' etc.; and again, by the voice of holy Pontiffs, the dignity of his see has been made venerable throughout the entire world, since whatever belongs to the faithful everywhere submits itself to him, and he is designated as the head of the whole body."

The epistle of Sergius, Bishop of Cyprus, read in the Lateran Council under Martin I, Second Session, which had been sent to the holy Pope Theodore, begins: "Christ has established your Apostolic See, O sacred summit, as a support fixed by God and immovable, and as a most luminous form of the faith. For you are, as the divine Word truly declares, Peter, and upon your foundation the pillars of the Church have been confirmed. To you he entrusted the keys of the kingdom of heaven, etc." So likewise Theodore the Studite writes to the holy Pope Paschal (Ep. I, Book II, Ep. 12): "Hear, apostolic head... rock of faith upon which the Catholic Church is built. For thou art Peter, adorning and governing the see of Peter." Cf. the epistle of Ignatius, Bishop of Constantinople, to Pope Nicholas, given in the last year of Nicholas. Therefore the prerogatives of Peter and of the Roman Bishop are one and the same.

So also the Councils manifest the same opinion. The Fathers of the Council of Ephesus, Act I, testify that they were compelled by the sacred canons and by the letter of their Father and fellow-minister Celestinus, Bishop of the Roman Church, to pronounce sentence against Nestorius.

They therefore acknowledged in the Roman Bishop that supreme power which was proper to Peter. And in Act III, Philip, Legate of the Apostolic See, with no one contradicting, declared that "Peter the prince of the Apostles, the column of the faith and the foundation of the Catholic Church, who received the keys of the kingdom... lives and exercises judgment to this day and always in his successors" (he was speaking of the Roman Bishops). The Fathers of the Sixth Synod, after hearing the letters of Agatho, exclaimed that Peter had spoken through Agatho. This was professed at the Second Council of Lyons, an ecumenical council, by Michael Palaeologus—that the Roman Church holds the supreme and full primacy and principality over the universal Catholic Church, and that it received this from the Lord himself in blessed Peter, whose successor is the Roman Pontiff. The same was defined at the Council of Florence: "That the Holy Apostolic See and the Roman Pontiff holds the primacy over the whole world, and that the Roman Pontiff himself is the successor of blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and the true Vicar of Christ and the head of the whole Church, etc."

From these testimonies it is also evident whether Dr. Langen truly asserted (op. cit., Part I, §7) that none of the Fathers up to Gregory the Great referred the words of Christ in Matthew XVI:18 ff. to the successors of Peter, except the Roman Bishops themselves and those who wrote to them by way of flattery, among whom Jerome stands out. For Chrysologus, Ennodius, and all the Eastern Bishops subscribing to the formula of Hormisdas, and the Bishops of the Ephesian Synod approving the words of the Pontifical Legate, belong to neither of these classes. Moreover, by what right does Dr. Langen reject the testimonies of the Roman Bishops? Have not they too always been received by the Church among the witnesses of tradition? Furthermore, in the words of Cyprian, Optatus, Ambrose, and Irenaeus, is there not an implicit but manifest application of the words of Christ to the Roman Bishops?

Moreover, from these testimonies it is also evident that the Church consents to what we said earlier, namely that the act of Peter determined the mode of succession; for the Roman Pontiff is held to be the successor in the Primacy of Peter because he sits in the Chair of Peter, which Peter founded and consecrated with his own blood, as the Fathers

of the Vatican Council also say (Session IV, Chapter 2). For having established that Peter founded the Roman See and consecrated it with his own blood (that is, held it until his death), they conclude: "Wherefore whoever succeeds in this chair of Peter obtains by the very institution of Christ himself the Primacy of Peter over the universal Church." That act of Peter, therefore, established the condition of succession in the Primacy.

IV. Now it must be proved that the Roman Bishop succeeds Peter by divine right, that is, holds the Primacy over the universal Church by divine right. Thus, in order for someone to be said to succeed by divine right, it is sufficient that divine right should have determined the succession, willing, namely, that there should always be one who is endowed with the Primacy of Peter; for then he who succeeds and holds the Primacy does so and holds it because God wills it, and what is proper to the succession considered in itself is proper to one who fulfills the conditions of succession. For suppose, for example, a law is enacted that whoever has made the greatest progress in studies shall be given a certain office. Titius surpasses all the others and obtains the office. By what right? By right of the law. But the law does not have Titius in view, but the more worthy person in general. Precisely; but once the condition which is found in Titius alone is fulfilled, that right which the law conceded to the more worthy resides wholly with Titius and Titius alone.

Now, the divine law has been enacted: someone must always succeed Peter in the Primacy, that is, someone must always exercise the Primacy first conferred on blessed Peter; who of all those who might do so actually succeeds is determined by the original act of Peter; therefore the Roman Bishop alone fulfills the condition; that divine right of succession therefore resides in the Roman Bishop and in him alone.

Certainly the right of the Primacy does not proceed from the Church, which neither established the Primacy nor its perpetuity; therefore the Roman Pontiff does not hold the Primacy by ecclesiastical right. Nor has the same right been conferred by any human power, since it is a supernatural right exceeding any natural or royal power; it remains therefore that the Roman Bishop succeeds in the Primacy of

Peter by divine right, distinguished by the same authority as Peter himself.

This is the doctrine of the Church. For she testifies to it both when, in affirming the rights of the Roman See, she appeals immediately to the words of Christ spoken to Peter and says with the Fathers of the Council of Florence that the power of governing etc. was handed on to the Roman Pontiff by Christ the Lord in blessed Peter; and also when she explicitly teaches that the Roman Church has been endowed by God himself with supreme power. So Gelasius, in the Roman Council *On sacred and apocryphal books* (Migne, P.L., LIX, p. 159): "The Holy Roman Church was not placed before the other Churches by any synodal constitutions, but obtained the primacy by the evangelical voice of the Lord and Savior." And Julius, writing to the Orientals (preserved in Gregory VII, Epistle I, Book VIII, Ep. 21): "It was fitting, brethren, that you should speak to the holy Roman and Apostolic Church with refinement and not with irony; since our very Lord Jesus Christ himself fittingly addressed it, saying: 'Thou art Peter... and to thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven.' For it has the power singularly and by special privilege granted to it to open and close the doors of the heavenly kingdom to whomsoever it wills." Nicholas I, Epistle 8 to Michael: "The privileges of that (Roman) See or Church are perpetual, divinely rooted and planted." Peter Damian, in a speech addressed to the Milanese schismatics: "The other churches, of whatever dignity they have been, were founded by one who was a mere man; but the Roman Church alone was founded by him who, while being the key-bearer of earthly and heavenly rule alike, was no mere man, and he built it upon the rock of the nascent faith. Therefore the Roman Pontiff enjoys that privilege and is upheld by that authority." And the Fourth Lateran Council, Chapter 5, testifies that by the Lord's arrangement that Church holds "the primacy of ordinary power over all others." From this learn how certain formulas are to be taken, which appear to derive this power from Councils. The Councils, that is, sanction this truth by their infallible authority. And Lanfranc, Bishop of Canterbury, teaches in an English synod that this is the conviction of all Christians: "When our Lord Jesus Christ said to Peter: 'Thou art Peter,' etc., he could have added, had he wished: 'I grant the same power to thy successors.' But

the omission of what was said diminishes nothing of the reverence owed to the successors of Peter... For indeed it is instilled in the consciences of all Christians that they tremble no less before his successors when they threaten than they did before blessed Peter himself, and joyfully applaud them when they grant serene dignity; and it is only when it has been approved by the judgment of the successors of blessed Peter that any transaction of ecclesiastical affairs is regarded as settled. What does this indicate, if not the force of divine liberality diffused through the Lord Jesus from blessed Peter into his vicars?"

Therefore the Roman Bishop is the successor of Peter in the Primacy by divine right. A successor, I say; for although he is sometimes called by some the Vicar of Peter, as in the testimony of Lanfranc just cited, it is manifest nonetheless that this term is used in a less proper sense to mean successor. For he is called the Vicar of Peter insofar as the Roman Bishop holds the place of Peter; but he governs the Church not by an authority delegated to him by Peter, but by an authority delegated by God transmitted to him through Peter. Moreover, the term vicar is used in this sense too among Latin authors.

V. When the question is raised by what right the Roman Bishop succeeds Peter, a double question can be instituted. An absolute question: by what right does the Roman Bishop, who fulfills the condition of succession, hold the Primacy of Peter? A comparative question: by what right does he rather than another bishop succeed Peter in the Primacy? The former is the one we have already resolved in this Thesis, and therefore it is clear what answer is to be given. To the latter question not all reply in the same way. For many, and those among the most eminent Scholastics, reply that the Roman Bishop succeeds before the others by divine right, insofar as it came about by the will of God that Peter should take up the Roman Episcopate and leave in it the rights of the Primacy. Others reply that the Roman Pontiff succeeds by what we may call Apostolic right, flowing, that is, from the original act of Peter, who could of himself have attached the rights of the Primacy to a different chair. We find this latter reply—which denies any divine right—insufficiently convincing, and prefer the former; and in order to explain this, because the matter is of great importance, we establish the following Theses. In the meantime we note what those hold who

embrace the latter reply. They say, namely, that even if the result of Peter's act is that his successor is the Roman Pontiff, it does not follow that that right which Peter enjoyed of determining the mode of succession also remains in effect in his successors; for this right pertained to him insofar as he was the first, and the whole right was exhausted in its exercise by Peter. But something more can be said, as will appear from the two following Theses, in which we dispute directly with Catholics.

THESIS IX

That the Roman Pontiff before all others is the one who succeeds Peter in the Primacy is an immutable truth in the Church, and there is nothing to prevent this truth from being regarded as revealed.

I. Certainly, as to the first matter, among the dogmas to be believed defined by the Florentine Fathers is this: "That the holy Apostolic See and the Roman Pontiff holds the primacy over the whole world, and that the Roman Pontiff himself is the successor of blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and the true Vicar of Christ and the head of the whole Church and the Father and Doctor of all Christians, and that to him in blessed Peter was handed by our Lord Jesus Christ the full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church." Now the subject of this definition is directly the Roman Pontiff himself. Moreover, by this definition there is affirmed not only that by the institution of Christ there must always be one who succeeds Peter in the Primacy, and not only that he who fulfills the conditions of succession holds the Primacy by divine right—for these things are said rather implicitly—but immediately and directly it is declared who that person is who succeeds Peter in the Primacy, and which is that see in which the Primacy flourishes, namely the Roman Pontiff and his see which is called the Apostolic See. This therefore has been defined and therefore must be believed. Now what is proposed as to be believed by all the faithful by the infallible teaching authority of the Church is immutably true in the Church; and just as it was true formerly that the Roman Bishop holds the Primacy, so it must always be believed in the future; for the Florentine definition will never turn out to be false.

Shall we suppose that the complex subject-term "Roman Pontiff" refers to him who is endowed with the Primacy, so that it is tantamount to saying "the Bishop who holds the Primacy" or "the Roman Bishop insofar as he holds the Primacy"? But this supposition about the subject of the proposition is excluded by its predicate; for then it would be defined that the Roman Bishop holding the Primacy holds the Primacy —than which nothing is more inept.

Or is the definition that the Roman Pontiff holds the Primacy over the whole world to be understood with this qualification—namely, only insofar as he fulfills the conditions of succession, which conditions are in themselves mutable, so that if they changed, another would be Primate, and therefore the Roman Pontiff is understood not formally but materially as he who here and now fulfills the conditions of succession? But this qualification is excluded on more than one ground. First, because with this qualification in place, the hypothesis of a change in the conditions of succession would not contradict the definition; but in fact it does contradict the definition; therefore this qualification cannot be admitted. The minor is proved: because if this hypothesis were verified, the Florentine definition—which directly defines the Roman Pontiff as the one who holds the Primacy and as the successor of Peter—would turn out to be simply false according to what is said in the strict sense; and what makes the definition false is what contradicts the definition. Second, it is excluded by the doctrine of the Vatican Council, which is a declaration of the Florentine definition. For in the canon of Chapter 2, Session 4, two things are distinguished: "If anyone therefore shall say that it is not by the institution of Christ our Lord himself, or by divine right, that blessed Peter should have perpetual successors in the primacy over the whole Church; or that the Roman Pontiff is not the successor of blessed Peter in this primacy: let him be anathema." By the former proposition the divine right of perpetual succession and the perpetual existence of successors is established; by the latter the subject of this succession in the Primacy is established and declared to be the Roman Pontiff. The meaning of this latter proposition, though sufficiently clear in itself, is made even more evident from the preceding doctrine of which the canon is a summary. For having previously established the fact of the founding of the Roman See by Peter, who

consecrated it with his own blood and lives in it perpetually, the Council adds: "Wherefore whoever succeeds in this chair of Peter, obtains... the Primacy over the universal Church." In these words, succession in the chair is not succession in the primacy—for that would be an inept tautology—but succession in the chair which Peter founded and consecrated with his own blood, which is the episcopal chair at Rome. A necessary consequential connection is therefore established between the one and the other, namely between succession in the Roman chair and succession in the rights of the Primacy. Both therefore must be believed—both that some successor must always exist and that this successor is the Roman Bishop.

This doctrine, confirmed by these conciliar definitions, has always flourished in the Church. For not only has it been handed down by the Fathers that one must adhere to the successor of Peter, but simply that one must adhere to the Roman chair, that the Catholic faith is the Roman faith, that to communicate with the Roman Church is tantamount to communicating with the Catholic Church, that Catholics and Romans are the same, that the Roman Church was founded by the very voice of the Lord—by which and similar formulas it is signified that it is necessary to the Catholic Church that she be Roman. Cf. both the testimonies cited above and Augustine in Mai, *Nova Patrum Collectio*, Vol. I, p. 273; Jerome, *Against Rufinus*, Book I, n. 4; Hormisdas, Ep. 70 to Possessor; Ambrose, *De obitu Satyri*; the Decree of Eugenius IV for the Jacobites, etc. Among the propositions condemned by the most holy Pius IX in the Syllabus, proposition 33 reads as follows: "It is not permitted by the sentence of any general Council or by the act of all peoples for the Supreme Pontificate to be transferred from the Roman Bishop and the city of Rome to another Bishop and another city" (that such a transfer is ever possible was condemned as an error) (the theologians who were censors of the work of Peter John Olivi, that is, his *Postilla in Apocalypsim*, who had conducted their censure by the authority of John XXII, judged it to be heretical to say that the Roman Church must at some time lose the Primacy. Cf. the *Miscellanea* of Stephen Baluze, edited by Manzi, Vol. 2, *Litterae magistrorum*, etc., p. 258, nn. 12 and 18).

II. It remains, however, to inquire what kind of truth this is that is to be believed. For by the infallible teaching authority of the Church there can be proposed as to be believed not only what is contained in divine revelation, but also what is necessarily connected with it, whether it be some speculative truth or some fact. Now it does not seem that the truth that the Roman episcopal chair is the see of the successors of Peter in the Primacy can be regarded as revealed; for it is a fact depending on the free will of Peter and one that was not true in the Church for several years. We nevertheless judge that nothing stands in the way of this truth being regarded as revealed. We therefore propose our theological opinion on this matter.

Indeed, first, the revelation of God can be had both through Scripture and through simple tradition. A revealed thing can be of such a kind that it can be known only through God's revealing it, and also of such a kind that it can be known from elsewhere as well, and in addition by divine testimony. But for a fact to be regarded as revealed by God, it is sufficient that it rests on the testimony of God. Thus many facts described in the Old and New Testaments, although they could also be known in another way, since God himself is our witness of them, must be regarded as revealed to us by God. Nor is it necessary that the truth of the thing or the revelation should have existed from the beginning of the Church; for many facts narrated in the Acts of the Apostles and in the Apostolic Epistles, which you hold with divine faith, were neither true from the beginning of the Church nor handed down at that time immediately by divine testimony. Now a fact rests on divine testimony when it is handed down to us by witnesses preordained by God and proposed as to be believed with divine faith. Witnesses could hand it down either in writing or by oral tradition. Therefore, from the fact that something is a fact depending on the will of Peter (in which way we mention it provisionally, intending to dispute about this afterwards) it does not follow that it could not have been an object of divine revelation.

Nor is there anything to prevent it from being contained in Apostolic preaching. And indeed Peter himself certainly preached it. For the Church had to know who after the death of Peter was its head, to whom it must adhere; and since Peter determined that mode of

succession, an obligation lay upon him to make it known to the Church. And indeed, unless Peter made this known, how did Linus, succeeding him in the Roman chair, immediately comport himself as the Pontiff of the universal Church? And that the other Apostles too—not all, which was unnecessary, but some—preached this cannot be doubted. For who, for example, taught the Corinthians that Clement was the successor of Peter in the Primacy, to whom rather than to the Apostle John who was still living and present in Asia recourse was to be had for settling the disputes of the Church? Who taught other Churches the same thing—Churches to which the immediate preaching of Peter had not reached, yet which always, from the establishment of the Roman Episcopate by Peter, adhered to the Roman chair? For all the Churches always revered the Roman chair as the principal chair; but who taught them this, if not the one who founded them?

An indication of this Apostolic preaching the eminent John Peter Secchi judged (in the work published on the Chair of Mark) that he saw in the Second Epistle of the Apostle John, which was sent to the elect Lady ἐκλεκτῇ Κυρίᾳ. This "elect" appears to be some Church; for first, the Roman Church is honored with the same name by Peter, Epistle I, Chapter 5, verse 13: "The Church that is in Babylon, co-elect" (ἡ ἐν βαβυλῶνι συνεκλεκτή; the Vulgate adds "Church"). Moreover, συνεκλεκτή means "the one co-elect" or "the Church elect together with you." Furthermore, second, the "elect" of John is such that her children are known and loved by all who have known the truth, and this is said emphatically by the Apostle: "whom I love in truth, and not only I, but also all they that have known the truth" (v. 1); but this must be understood not of some vague love but of a specific one, since it is said in special commendation of them; but it is not probable that the children of any particular woman were so loved by all the faithful; but it could truly be said of the children of some Church, especially the principal one. Again, third, the "elect" to whom John writes has a sister of the same name: "the children of thy elect sister greet thee" (v. 13). But it is not sufficiently probable that two sisters in the same family bore the same name. Likewise, fourth, in the same passage, one whom he first addresses in the singular—"I beseech thee, lady" (v. 5)—he immediately, without any indication of a change of subject, addresses in the plural

—"as you have heard from the beginning" (v. 6), "look to yourselves" etc. (v. 8). This "elect," therefore, is not a single physical person but a moral one. The name "elect" is therefore not the proper name of any woman, but represents some Church.

Moreover, she is called "lady"—Κυρία. There was therefore at that time some Church which was a lady, that is, which held the principate over the other churches. And which one could this be but the one which Ignatius the Martyr, a disciple of John himself, in the letter to the Romans, says presides in the region of the Romans? This phrase does not mean "presides over the Romans" but "presides while existing at Rome," that is, that the Church existing at Rome is the presiding Church.

And indeed, that the Apostles, from the establishment of the Roman Episcopate by Peter, knew the Roman chair to be the principal chair, the chair of the Primacy, is indicated by Optatus when he says that "the chair was conferred at Rome upon Peter, lest the other Apostles each defend their own chairs for themselves, so that already a schismatic and sinner would be one who placed another chair against the single chair" (Book II, n. 2). That is, the Apostles themselves had to adhere to the Roman chair; they therefore knew the dignity of this chair and recalled the other faithful to it together with themselves.

The Apostles therefore preached this truth and proposed it to the faithful as to be believed; for if it is believed by the Church today, it was also handed down to be believed by the Apostles. Now nothing prevents them from having proposed it as to be believed with divine faith; for a fact known by divine testimony, that is, revealed, can be proposed as to be believed with divine faith; but we have seen that this fact, no less than others, could have been an object of divine testimony. Therefore. But how could this be done by them? The Apostles certainly taught the Primacy of Peter and its perpetuity and that Peter's successors must be adhered to; and knowing the act of Peter by which succession in the Primacy was determined, and the series of those to whom, no less than to Peter himself, adherence was owed, they also learned, under the teaching of the Holy Spirit, that this must always be believed in the Church, and preached it to the Churches, so that the faithful might infallibly know their Head. For this they had to know infallibly. Hence

Bellarmine says (*De Romano Pontifice*, Book II, Chapter 12): "Although that the Roman Pontiff succeeds Peter is not held explicitly in the Scriptures, yet that someone succeeds Peter is evidently deduced from the Scriptures; but that this one is the Roman Pontiff is held from the Apostolic Tradition of Peter, which tradition the general Councils, the decrees of the Pontiffs, and the consensus of the Fathers have declared."

Therefore nothing prevents us from holding that it is a revealed truth that the Roman Bishop is and is alone the successor of Peter in the Primacy. We do not indeed affirm as certain that this truth is revealed; that is, we do not deny that things could have been so arranged that Apostolic preaching taught the Primacy of Peter and its perpetuity, and therefore that Peter's successors must always be adhered to, but that the Church knew by historical knowledge who the future successor would be—which fact, however, as a dogmatic fact connected with the truth of the Primacy, the Church both always believed and defined as to be believed. Nevertheless we judge this to be less consistent with the Florentine and Vatican definitions. For in this hypothesis the truth "the Roman Pontiff is the successor of Peter in the Primacy" would be the conclusion of this syllogism: he who fulfills the conditions of succession succeeds at Peter's death in the Primacy; but the Roman Bishop fulfills them; therefore the Roman Bishop succeeds Peter in the Primacy. But in this syllogism the minor would neither be revealed in itself, as is supposed, nor be implicitly contained in the major in such a way that it could be gathered from an analysis of it; in no way, therefore, would it be revealed, but would be only a truth of dogmatic fact, to be believed infallibly on account of the authority of the Church, but not with divine faith. Hence not even the conclusion—which follows the weaker part (Fr. Suárez, *De Fide*, D. 19, sect. 2, n. 14)—would be to be believed with divine faith. It might therefore be proposed that this conclusion is to be believed with infallible faith, but not with divine faith. But we judge that the Florentine and Vatican definitions cited are definitions of faith as to all their parts, that is to say, definitions by which a dogma of faith is enacted; for they are universally so received, and there is nothing that compels us to interpret them otherwise.

III. Moreover, if this opinion is retained—that by Apostolic tradition from divine revelation it has been proposed as to be believed

that the Roman Bishop is the successor of Peter in the Primacy—then in this there is also contained the truth of that fact, namely the Roman Episcopate of Peter, which for that reason should be held not only as a dogmatic fact but as a revealed fact.

Indeed, as is supposed, the Apostles preached that the Roman Pontiff is the successor of Peter in the Primacy in the manner in which it has always been retained and continuously preached in the Church; for the dogma and the manner of receiving the dogma cannot differ from what the Apostles handed down. But Catholic tradition has always held and holds that the Roman Bishop is the successor of Peter in the Primacy insofar as the Roman Pontiff succeeds Peter in the Roman episcopal chair; these two things have always been thought of conjointly and the one has been held as the ground or necessary condition of the other—so that if one does not hold the episcopal chair of Peter, one does not succeed, and if one holds it, one thereby succeeds. And hence the Roman Episcopate of Peter is held by all at least as a dogmatic fact, necessarily connected, that is, with the dogma. "Peter," say the Fathers of the Vatican Council, "to this day and always lives and presides and exercises judgment in his successors, the Bishops of the Holy Roman See, founded by him and consecrated by his blood. Wherefore whoever succeeds in this chair of Peter, obtains by the very institution of Christ himself the Primacy of Peter over the universal Church." Therefore the Apostolic preaching concerning the Primacy of the Roman Bishop also contained the preaching concerning the succession of the same in the episcopal chair of Peter; for this is the necessary manner of conceiving this dogma, which has always and everywhere been invariably retained. Therefore the object of the Apostolic preaching by which the dogma of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff was proposed was of this kind: the Roman Pontiff succeeds Peter in the Primacy because he holds the episcopal chair of Peter. But in this preaching there is also necessarily contained the preaching concerning the Roman Episcopate of Peter. For both are affirmed—both the ground and the thing grounded—and both must be true if that cause is the unique one, as it is here. Moreover, to say that the Roman Bishop holds the episcopal chair of Peter is tantamount to saying that Peter was the first Bishop of Rome. Therefore by the same testimony by which the Apostles handed down the dogma

of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff, they also handed down the truth of this fact, namely the Roman Episcopate of Peter. Moreover, in handing down the truth of this fact, they proposed it as to be believed with divine faith, if they proposed as to be believed as revealed the succession of the Roman Bishop in the Primacy. For what is proposed as to be believed by divine witnesses is that which is proposed in the very preaching of the dogma as the necessary manner of conceiving the dogma; but such is the fact of the Roman Episcopate. Therefore, on the hypothesis that it is a revealed truth contained in Apostolic tradition that the Roman Pontiff holds the Primacy and is the successor of Peter, the Roman Episcopate of Peter too must be regarded as a revealed fact.

And indeed this tradition of the Roman Episcopate of Peter lacks none of the marks that follow upon Apostolic dogmatic tradition. For it is most ancient, most universal, always and everywhere retained, never doubted except by heretics, and confirmed also by the authority of Councils (cf. the preceding Thesis). And this matter is held by all as infallibly certain; the question is whether it is only a dogmatic fact, about which doubt is not permitted, or whether it is moreover a revealed fact. We believe we have demonstrated theologically that there is nothing to prevent it from being a revealed fact, to be believed with divine faith, which rests on the authority of God speaking through his witnesses.

Note with Bellarmine (*De Romano Pontifice*, Book II, Chapter 1) that there are different questions: whether Peter was at Rome, whether he died at Rome, whether he was the Bishop of Rome, whether he retained the Roman Episcopate until his death. And indeed the first two facts are not in themselves necessary for constituting the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff. For Peter could have taken up the Roman Episcopate and always held it without ever having been at Rome. Hence in this Thesis we have spoken of the Roman Episcopate of Peter, not of his arrival in the city. But in ecclesiastical tradition these two things are so joined that if the latter is denied, the certainty of the former is also shaken. Therefore at least as a dogmatic fact presupposed to the Roman Episcopate, the arrival of Peter in the city must be held.

THESIS X

Accordingly, since Peter took up the Roman Episcopate in order to have in it perpetual successors in the Primacy, God specially ratified this choice of Peter; and therefore by divine right at least of the consequent kind—consequent, namely, upon the act of Peter, but antecedent to the act of succession—it is the case that the Roman Bishop succeeds Peter in the Primacy. Moreover, we consider sufficiently probable the opinion that by the antecedent will of God Peter was commanded to establish this perpetual form of succession, namely through an episcopal see, and to choose Rome among the sees.

I. We connect this Thesis of itself with what we affirmed in the statement of the first part of the preceding Thesis. Since Christ willed perpetual successors to exist in the Primacy, but it was necessary from the beginning to establish the form of succession, Christ behaved toward Peter in one of two ways: either Christ himself prescribed to Peter a certain form in which he willed to be succeeded, or he permitted it to the judgment of Peter to prescribe whichever form he himself wished. If we say the former, we need nothing further for demonstrating the first part of the Thesis, for both it and something more is asserted. If the latter is said, we make the following observations. When Christ, having conferred power on another, permits him to act in accordance with that power, he is considered to ratify what the other does in accordance with that power. But this ratification by Christ does not prevent the same thing that was previously done from being subsequently changed by the same or by another who has the same power. There is therefore to be conceived another kind of special ratification—one that approves the act of the other in such a way as to sanction it and will it to obtain perpetual force. This special ratification by Christ we say accrued to the act of Peter.

Certainly it is established that the Roman Bishops alone are perpetually and immutably the successors of Peter; now the a posteriori reason for this immutability, for us, is that this has been defined—that the Roman Pontiff succeeds Peter—and a defined doctrine is of immutable truth. But there must be some a priori or ontological reason

for the same thing; and this we say is the will of Christ ratifying the choice of Peter and sanctioning that that form of succession should be perpetual. And indeed if this special ratification by Christ were absent, there would not be on the part of the thing itself a sufficient reason for this immutability. For suppose it absent: you will never be able to prove that there is not in the Church or in the successors of Peter the power to change that form of succession; for in this hypothesis this action would not be contrary to any will of God—for the will of God that would exist would be only this: that perpetual successors exist—and this will would be satisfied even with the condition of succession changed. But what is not contrary to the will of God and is not evil in itself, why cannot it be done in the Church? It can indeed be said that such a change would be contrary to the will of Peter; but first, the will of Peter can indeed bind the Church during Peter's lifetime, but after his death, when Peter's personal jurisdiction ceases, that will cannot prevent something different from being sanctioned by a successor. And second, the successor succeeds to all the rights of Peter, so as to be able to do everything that Peter could in those matters that pertain to the good governance of the Church; why therefore, if the good of the Church appeared to require that the see of the Primacy be moved, could this not be done either by the Pontiff alone or by the Church together with the Pontiff, just as a republic or its head can transfer governance from one family, for example from its own, to another? Such a necessity will indeed never arise in the Church; but we know this a posteriori, knowing the immutability of the chair in view of God's providence over the Church. Therefore the a priori reason of this immutability, which we believe in, is the will of God which ratified and sanctioned in perpetuity the choice of Peter. This will of God therefore presupposes the act of Peter, by which he attached the rights of the Primacy to the undertook Roman Episcopate, but precedes the act of the succession of others after Peter, and is the sufficient reason of that immutability.

Therefore by divine right at least of the consequent kind—consequent, that is, upon the act of Peter, but antecedent to the act of succession itself—the Roman Pontiff is the one who succeeds Peter. That this is indeed so can also be shown from the authority of those whom

we shall adduce in the following part, and whose opinion must at least reduce to this.

II. Hitherto we have spoken on the hypothesis that Christ permitted Peter to determine the form of succession. But the prior hypothesis mentioned above is also possible. One or the other must indeed be made, as we said; and therefore at least by consequent divine right the Roman Bishop is the one among so many who succeeds Peter. But the prior hypothesis, though not certain, is nevertheless very probable and commended itself to the ancients. Thus Innocent III (Ep. 209, Book II) reports as beyond question that Peter was transferred by divine revelation from Antioch to Rome and took with him the principate of the chair. To this some refer what Ambrose narrates (*Sermon against Auxentius on the handing over of the basilicas*, n. 13)—that when Peter was leaving Rome, Christ met him at the gate and Peter, asking him, "Lord, where are you going?", Christ replied, "I am coming to be crucified again"; whereupon Peter freely returned and immediately, being seized, honored the Lord through his own cross. Now this fact signifies a certain will of Christ that Peter should end his life at Rome and thus leave the rights of the Primacy to the Roman chair. Athanasius reports something similar (*Apologia de fuga sua*, n. 18). And indeed the prior hypothesis is probable: first, because the other hypothesis too—that Christ permitted Peter to determine the form of succession—is not certain; while the prior not only is not repugnant but is even consistent with divine providence. For a matter of the greatest and wholly capital importance for the Church was at stake—in which successors the very Primacy of Peter was to endure—and it was therefore fitting that Christ should determine this immediately. To which the authority of Optatus seems to lend support, whose memorable testimony has already been cited from Book I, Chapter 2, where he says: "You cannot deny that you know that in the city of Rome the episcopal chair was conferred on Peter first," etc. Now the episcopal chair of Peter in the city of Rome is the supreme and universal chair of jurisdiction and teaching existing at Rome, or the Primacy affixed to the Roman episcopal see. Moreover, Optatus teaches that this chair was conferred at Rome on Peter—Peter did not choose it, but it was conferred on him, namely by God; God therefore is the one who

conferred the episcopal chair on Peter in the city of Rome: that is, the terminus of the divine conferral is not only the Primacy, but the Primacy also in the city of Rome; Peter therefore received from Christ the Primacy to be established in the city of Rome. Therefore by the antecedent will of Christ it came about that the Roman Episcopate was the Episcopate of the Catholic Church, or, as the Vatican Synod says in the cited Constitution, Chapter 3, "the Roman Church, by the Lord's arrangement, holds the principate of ordinary power over all others."

III. From what has been discussed so far we therefore gather the following: first, that the Roman Pontiff succeeds in the Primacy of Peter by divine right—both by antecedent divine right, namely the law of succession establishing the perpetuity of the Primacy, and by divine right at least consequent upon the act of Peter but antecedent to the act of succession, on account of the condition of succession immutably confirmed by God, to which the Roman Bishop alone gives satisfaction. Hence, second, it is entirely false that the Roman Bishops succeed Peter in the Primacy by human right; for quite apart from the fact that the Primacy was conferred on the Roman Bishop not by the Church or by any other earthly power but by Christ, and by this very fact he truly succeeds by divine right: for it to be true in any sense that he succeeds by human right—namely insofar as what determines succession in the Roman chair rather than in another chair would be from human right—it would be necessary that the act of Peter as the act of a man should have been the sufficient reason why the Roman Bishop rather than others succeeds. But that act was not a sufficient reason. For a sufficient reason is that which suffices for what is to be explained. But that act did not suffice for this effect. For this effect is of such a nature as to be in itself immutable succession; but for this there was required divine right confirming the act of Peter and preceding the act of succession itself. But a reason that is not sufficient does not yet confer right. Therefore in the act of Peter, as an act of Peter, some element was indeed set in place for the condition of succession, but by it alone the right which the Roman Bishops now have was not established.

Therefore, third, Febronius erred most impudently (*op. cit.*, Chapter 2, §3) in contending that it was by the authority of the Church that the Roman Bishop came to succeed Peter before the others, and

that the power to change the form of succession always remains with the Church.

SCHOLION

You now see what judgment is to be made concerning the reason adduced in the dual canon of the Greeks—one from the Council of Constantinople I, the other from Chalcedon. The former, which is ranked as the third in order, reads as follows: "The Bishop of the city of Constantinople shall have the prerogatives of honor (τὰ πρεσβεία τῆς τιμῆς—this term πρεσβεία occurs in canon 6 of Nicaea and means the privileges of a see, and there represents precisely those privileges which are contained in the right and power which was later called patriarchal) after the Roman Bishop, because it is the new Rome." The other canon, which is canon 28, reads as follows: "Following in all things the decisions of the holy Fathers, and recognizing the canon of the 150 Bishops (the canon just cited) which has just been read, we also decree and ordain the same things concerning the privileges (περὶ τῶν πρεσβείων) of the most holy Church of Constantinople, the new Rome. For the Throne of the old Rome was given privileges by the Fathers, because it was the reigning city. And moved by the same considerations, the 150 most religious Bishops gave equal privileges to the most holy Throne of the new Rome, rightly judging that the city which is honored with the sovereignty and the Senate, and enjoys equal privileges with the old imperial Rome, should in ecclesiastical matters also be magnified as she is, and rank next after her; so that the metropolitans only of the Pontic, the Asian, and the Thracian dioceses, and also the Bishops of the aforesaid dioceses who are among the barbarians, shall be ordained by the aforesaid most holy Throne of the most holy Church of Constantinople, etc."

Now if we wish to subject these to examination, the following observations may be made. First, neither Canon has any authority. For the Council of Constantinople I was not ecumenical except by reason of the confirmation of Damasus which accrued to it, by which only the dogmatic decree was approved, but not any other canon. "The Roman Church," says Gregory the Great (Book VII, Ep. 34), "has not up to now

received or accepted either those canons or the acts of that Synod; but it has received that Synod in what was defined by it against Macedonius." The Chalcedonian canon, however, was enacted by the Greek Fathers in the 13th Action, in the absence of the Legates of the Roman See, who when previously asked to give their assent to the sanctioning of that canon had declared that they had no mandate to do this; and who for that reason at the following Action complained of the fraud and asked that the decree be deleted, "or else let our contradiction be inserted in these acts, so that we may know what to report to the apostolic man, the Bishop of the universal Church." Leo the Pontiff moreover utterly abrogated that decree, which was also struck from the code of canons of the Oriental Church.

Second, the Chalcedonian canon, as Patricius Murray excellently proves (*Tractatus De Ecclesia Christi*, Vol. III, Sect. IV, disp. 19, nn. 493 ff.), speaks only of the patriarchal office and principate of the Roman See, to which principate the Greeks claim an equal one for the Church of Constantinople. For a) the privileges asserted for the Church of Constantinople are only patriarchal, as is clear from the canon's own declaration; therefore the privileges of the Roman See too, to which they wish to compare the see of the new Rome, are patriarchal. And indeed the Chalcedonian Fathers say they are decreeing the same things that the Fathers of Constantinople had decreed; but those were only patriarchal rights. b) In the epistle of the Chalcedonian Fathers to Leo there exists an explicit profession of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff, whom they testify to be their head; but if the Fathers in that decree had been speaking of the Roman Primacy, to which they wished to compare the right of the See of Constantinople, the same Fathers together with their Bishop of Constantinople, Anatolius, could not simply have professed their subjection to the Roman Bishop. c) Anatolius himself, who had procured the promulgation of that canon, in letters addressed to Leo, humbly begs him to deign to confirm the canon; but in this act there is the clearest profession of the Roman Primacy over Anatolius himself the Bishop of Constantinople; moreover, it would have been impious and ridiculous to ask the Roman Pontiff to divide the rights of universal Primacy with him; therefore it was patriarchal rights that Anatolius had claimed for himself by that canon; and therefore the

rights of the Roman See too, to which he wished to compare his own see, are patriarchal. d) Leo the Great understood neither the canon nor the letters of Anatolius and the Emperor who was urging the same thing as containing any reference to the Primacy. For if he had noticed or even suspected this audacity of the Greeks—that the Bishop of Byzantium wished to make himself equal to the Roman Bishop in the Primacy which he holds over the universal Church—he would have condemned it openly as a most pernicious schism and manifest heresy; but in all the letters of Leo written on this matter there exists no such condemnation or reprobation, nor any indication that Leo appeared to think that his Primacy was being weakened by that canon; and he himself complains only of the violation of the Nicene canon VI as regards the Patriarchal Sees and of the ambition of Anatolius.

But third, that Chalcedonian canon was proposed with such ambiguity of words and supported by such a principle as to have paved the way for the schism of the Greeks and to supply grounds for suspecting that even then the Bishops of Constantinople were plotting something more than they dared to declare. For the rest, what they say is false. a) It is false that the Fathers conferred on the Roman See rights —both those of the Primacy and also the Patriarchal rights; for she holds the former from Christ, while she received the latter from the fact that she was the see of Peter and that the Roman See founded all the Churches in the West. Unless by the verb "conferred" (ἀποδεδώκασι) they wished to signify "to give what is owed," that is, that the Fathers sacredly kept and paid fitting honor to the honor of the Roman See as owed by divine right. Indeed, when they speak of the privileges of the See of Constantinople, they use a different verb, ἀπένειμαν; ἀπονέμω means simply: "I assign, I distribute, of my own accord and by my own power." By their use of these different verbs the Chalcedonian Fathers themselves would already have signified the proper prerogatives of the Roman See.

b) It is moreover false that the reason why the Roman See enjoys the Primacy over the universal Church is that the city of Rome possessed imperial power—which the subsequent Greeks, to defend their schism and to exalt the Byzantine chair, did not hesitate to affirm. On this point it must be noted that it is one thing to ask why God willed

to choose the Roman See before the others for the succession in the Primacy, and another to ask by what right the Roman Pontiff succeeds. To the latter question the simple answer is: by divine right, because God willed it, whatever may be the reason why God so willed. For this matters nothing; provided that God so willed it and willed it to be perpetual, the Roman Pontiff succeeds by divine right. To the former question the first answer is that it matters little to know this; and then a probable answer can be given by a certain analogy—that Rome was chosen at that time because at that time Rome was queen not indeed of the entire world but of a large part of the known world and the most distinguished city, "so that the light of truth, which was being revealed for the salvation of all the nations, might be more effectively diffused from the very head throughout the whole body of the world" (Leo the Great, Sermon 83, n. 3). But this reason for choosing the principal see (which was by no means a necessary reason, since the Primacy and all ecclesiastical power is entirely independent of any civil dignity or power) could have been the reason why from the beginning, as it then existed, the Roman See was first chosen; but it could not be the reason why, as it persisted, the Primacy too persisted in the Roman See. For that persistence depends immediately and adequately on the act of Peter and the will of God which attached the rights of the Primacy to this see. Cf. Leo's Ep. CIV, 3, to Marcian, and Gelasius to the Bishops of Dardania. This, however, the Greeks preferred to confuse in order to exalt the Byzantine see above the other patriarchal sees and eventually above the Roman See.

No difficulty can arise from certain formulas, such as that in Novel 113 of Justinian: "We decree, according to the decrees of the Sacred Synods, that the most holy Bishop of the old Rome is first among all priests"; and in the Fourth Roman Council under Symmachus: "The Apostolic See has received its singular power in the Churches first by the merit of blessed Peter, then by the authority of the venerable Councils." For the decrees of Councils are not decrees instituting or conferring authority, but declaring it; just as when it is decreed that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, this honor is not conferred on her but is made known to us. Furthermore, those decrees teach that obedience must be rendered to the Roman Pontiff by all, and those

decrees can also be reinforced by certain penalties. This is all that the Emperor had in view when prescribing that honor owed by divine right be paid by all to the Roman See. And the Council under Symmachus traces the first cause of the singular power to the merits of blessed Peter —that is, to the dignity of Peter who sat first at Rome.

COROLLARY

From this it is finally gathered that the Roman Episcopate and the ecumenical Episcopate are not two episcopates in act, but only in power. That is, the Roman Episcopate as such—not reduplicatively but specificatively—is the ecumenical Episcopate or Primacy. For the Roman Episcopate itself has been elevated to the dignity of the universal Episcopate, so that the Roman Episcopate as such, given the act of Peter and divine right either commanding or sanctioning the act of Peter, is the ecumenical Episcopate, though it is not ecumenical precisely insofar as it is Roman. There is therefore one episcopate in act. There would be two episcopates if either the ecumenical Episcopate were united per accidens to the Roman Episcopate, so that in the present economy they could be separated and would therefore remain distinct; or if, although by some law they were always to be conjoined in one person, the Roman Episcopate would not in the strict sense be the universal Episcopate—just as if the Bishop of Florence, having been made Roman Pontiff, were to retain the Florentine Episcopate, the Florentine Episcopate would not in the strict sense be the Roman Episcopate. But on the contrary, the Roman Episcopate and the universal Episcopate are by divine right neither separated nor separable—not only in respect of the subject insofar as they must be together in the same person, but in respect of the form; because the Roman See is itself the See of the Primacy. Now this means that the Roman Episcopate is in the strict sense the ecumenical Episcopate. They are therefore not two episcopates in act, but the Roman See itself has been elevated to the dignity of the Primacy. It is said, however, to be twofold in power, because in respect of terminus it fulfills the functions of each episcopate, and because with an abstraction made from the act of Peter and from divine right, two episcopates really and specifically distinct could exist.

Note: The Roman Pontiff is the successor of Peter in the Primacy, and of Peter alone; although in a qualified sense and under some imperfect aspect he can be and is called also the successor of Paul. Certainly the following proposition—"Saints Peter and Paul are two princes of the Church who constitute a single one, or they are two heads and supreme leaders of the Catholic Church joined together in the highest unity with each other, or they are the twin summit of the universal Church, divinely merged into one, or they are two supreme shepherds and presiders of the Church who constitute a single head"—explained so as to posit an absolute equality between St. Peter and St. Paul without subordination and subjection of St. Paul to St. Peter in supreme power and the governance of the universal Church, was declared heretical by Innocent X. The Primacy, namely, properly belongs to Peter alone; therefore the Roman Bishop, who succeeds in the Primacy, succeeds Peter alone. And indeed Peter was the ordinary Bishop of the Roman See—all antiquity testifies to this—and for this reason that see is called the See of Peter; there can be only one ordinary Bishop of any Church. Paul, however, was associated with Peter as a kind of co-adjutor who does not have a chair separate from the ordinary—or, as Gelasius says in the decree on canonical and apocryphal writings, "to Peter was added also the fellowship of the most blessed Paul the Apostle." That is to say, it must be noted that Paul by his preaching founded the Roman Church together with Peter, wherefore with respect to preaching Paul can be called together with Peter the co-founder of the Roman Church; but Peter additionally by reason of the ordinary episcopal authority assumed there. Likewise, Paul is counted with Peter among the princes of the Apostles, but the latter by reason of power, the former by reason of preaching in which he excelled the rest.

From this is understood in what sense the Roman Pontiffs are said to be the successors of Peter and Paul, are accustomed to exercise authority by the authority of Peter and Paul and to threaten the indignation of Peter and Paul, and in pontifical documents the image of each is represented. For the Roman Pontiff is called the successor of Paul both as to local succession—for he succeeds in the same Church in which Paul completed his life and Apostolate—and as to real succession—for the Pontiff inherits the same apostolic authority which was

extraordinary in Paul, indeed a greater one; but not as to personal succession, namely in discharging his office and holding his place. It is for this reason, and because Paul, as we said, founded the Roman Church by his preaching and consecrated it with his blood and was the companion and helper of Peter, that his image is joined with the image of Peter in pontifical documents, though not always; for Apostolic Briefs are sealed with the ring of the Fisherman alone. Moreover, the authority of Paul, under which the Roman Pontiffs exercise authority, and his indignation which they threaten, is to be considered rather as the power of patronage than as the power of office; and indeed they are accustomed to invoke not only his authority and indignation, but also those of the Blessed Virgin and of all the Saints.

As to the fact that in images of Peter and Paul, Paul sometimes occupies the more prominent place, this either comes from the inexperience of the artists, or was done with the intent to signify from time to time a certain primacy of Paul—namely, in preaching, or his special assignment to evangelize the Gentiles, among whom is Rome.

THESIS XI

The words of Christ to Peter (Matthew XVI; Luke XXII; John XXI) therefore apply with equal right to each individual Roman Bishop, who all receive the jurisdiction of the Primacy immediately from God himself.

I. The first part is a corollary of the preceding. For by the words of Christ the Primacy of Peter was established, and was established as perpetual; in the successors of Peter, therefore, the same Primacy of Peter perseveres; and therefore those words apply to them also. We said that the Primacy of Peter perseveres; for to this the perpetuity of the Primacy pertains, of which we have spoken—the Primacy, namely, which Christ established, which is none other than the Primacy of Peter. Hence if, for example, the Church were to confer on someone, bypassing the Roman Pontiff, some kind of supreme power over all the faithful, even if that were or were called a Primacy, it would nonetheless not be the Primacy of Peter, that is, it would not be the one which has its origin from Christ and was conferred on blessed Peter; nor would one

elevated in this way by the Church be the successor of Peter. The same Primacy once established by Christ in Peter must therefore be conceived as perpetually persevering in his successors, all of whom Christ addressed when he spoke to Peter. It is not necessary to adduce here the testimonies of Catholic tradition in this matter, since that tradition is most evidently established from the many testimonies already cited above. From this it is clear why the Roman See is called Apostolic, and why it alone is understood when simply "the Apostolic See" is said. For although there are other sees in which Apostles sat or which they established, nevertheless in the Roman See alone there flourishes the full power of the Apostolate—and indeed of the Apostolate of Peter, which is universal and supreme jurisdiction. Hence, although others, for example the Bishops of Jerusalem, succeed an Apostle, they do not succeed in the Apostolate, which ceased with the Apostle; but the Roman Pontiff succeeds Peter in the Apostolate, which was his Primacy. Therefore the office of the Roman Pontiff is called an Apostolate, as in the Council of Chalcedon, Act I, when the Fathers say of Leo: "He deigned to command that Dioscorus should not sit in the Council"—that is his Apostolate.

II. Although all power is from God, not all power is said to be immediately from God. In this matter two things must be distinguished—the immediate institution of power in general or in species, and the immediate conferral in an individual. As to the first: that power is said to be immediately instituted by God which he himself by positive will determined according to its proper species and willed to exist in society. Hence the royal power of individual temporal Princes is not immediately from God. There is indeed a law of God—not positive but identical with the natural law—that there should be power in society; but God did not and does not determine by himself any definite form of governance, nor its immutability and perpetuity. Social power is therefore said to be handed by God immediately to the community; not in the sense that the democratic form was instituted by God—for God does not determine any form of governance by himself—but in the sense that in the very nature of men living in company there is a natural ordination toward society and therefore toward the authority required for the means necessary for it and consequently also toward governing

authority, so that one, or several, or all together may be the subject of this authority, while all and each individually have the right to be rightly governed (cf. Fr. Suárez, *Defensio Fidei*, Book III, Chapter 1 ff.). But the power of the Primacy God himself by positive will instituted and determined according to its species and willed to be perpetual and immutable; therefore the power of the Primacy is immediately from God, insofar as it is immediately instituted by God; and therefore it is a matter of divine right in a special sense (§XVI).

But it can happen that some power is instituted by the positive will of God according to its species, without God himself immediately conferring the same power on individual persons. Such is (as we proved in its proper place, §XVII) the power of the Bishops; for Christ willed there to be in his Church, besides Peter, Bishops who would govern with ordinary power the sheep committed to them; hence episcopal power, which is a determinate power—though as to grades it can be more or less ample—is instituted by the positive will of Christ in the Church according to its proper species. Yet it is instituted in general; because God willed indeed that there be Bishops in the Church; but he himself immediately instituted no Bishop by conferring power on him, but leaves this to the power and judgment of the Roman Pontiff (Thesis XIV). But as regards the Roman Pontiff, he receives the power of the Primacy immediately from God; that is, each individual lawfully elected to the Roman chair obtains the Primacy over the universal Church immediately from God.

Indeed: first, they cannot borrow this power from any other; for the electors of the Pontiff and the Church herself lack this power, which Christ gave immediately and directly to Peter alone, destined to exist only in his successors. The predecessor can indeed establish the form of election to the Roman Episcopate; but from one who has died no right that is no longer possessed can be transferred to a successor. Second, Christ willed the Primacy of Peter to be perpetual through his successors; but only Roman Bishops individually can and must succeed Peter; therefore, once someone has been elected to the Roman chair, Christ—by the same will by which he wills the Primacy to be perpetual, which will is efficacious and endures always—wills this elect person to be endowed with the Primacy of Peter; but this is tantamount to saying

that Christ confers on him the power of the Primacy immediately; for he obtains it by virtue of divine right and of divine right alone, which by itself suffices and alone suffices to confer that power. Therefore.

The office of the electors therefore reduces to this: they designate the person who is to occupy the vacant Roman chair; for these individual persons God did not determine by any law. But once a legitimate election has been made—that is, according to the laws already established by Peter or his successors—both the Primacy and the Roman Episcopate itself, which is really not distinct from the Primacy, are conferred by God; that is, the determined person exists by divine right as the Roman and Ecumenical Bishop.

COROLLARY

Since therefore each Roman Pontiff receives immediately from God, together with the Primacy of jurisdiction which Christ established in Peter, the power of the Roman Pontiffs is always the same and cannot be diminished by the acts of predecessors. Indeed, since the same Primacy must always endure by divine right, no Roman Pontiff can diminish his own power.

Note: One elected as Roman Pontiff obtains universal jurisdiction immediately upon being duly elected, even before consecration; for by the episcopal character no jurisdiction is conferred, but only the power of order (cf. Thesis XIV). This character, therefore, since it confers the same effect on any consecrated person, if it does not confer jurisdiction on the other Bishops, neither does it confer it on the Roman elect—whether for the Roman Church or for the universal Church. But just as the other bishops-elect obtain jurisdiction from the Roman Pontiff when the election is confirmed by him, so the elected Roman Bishop obtains jurisdiction from God, from whom alone he can receive it and by whom alone it can, as it were, be confirmed.

PART TWO
ON THE FORCE AND NATURE OF THE ROMAN PRIMACY

CHAPTER ONE
ON THE POWER OF THE ROMAN PONTIFF CONSIDERED IN GENERAL

ARTICLE I
ON THIS POWER OF THE MOST HOLY ROMAN PONTIFF TOWARD THE CHURCH

THESIS XII

From the very nature of the Primacy instituted by Christ it is manifest that it was established precisely in order that the unity of the whole Church of Christ and also of the individual Churches, even in respect of themselves, might be effectively obtained through the jurisdiction of one head.

I. The end of a thing established by God can be discerned either from the well-known nature of the thing itself or from the manifest and express intention of its author. The end of the whole creation is known in both ways. We now investigate the end of the instituted Primacy only in the former way. In order that this may be done accurately and that

occasions of certain difficulties may be excluded, it must be presupposed, first (cf. Taparelli, *Saggio teoretico*, etc., Vol. I, Part 2, Chapter 1 ff.), that society on earth is a multitude of men conspiring together toward the attainment of a common good known and loved by all; that what is required in society therefore is a common intention, effort, and striving toward the attainment of the common good; that all social perfection is reducible to these three headings, namely unity in respect of the existence of the society, efficacy in action in respect of the means by which it tends toward the good, and possession of the good toward which it tends and which it preserves by its action; that the unity of society is determined by a double principle, extrinsic and intrinsic. The extrinsic principle is the end or the good to be attained. But this principle alone does not suffice for determining the unity of society; an indication of this truth is that there are several societies distinct from one another having the same end; the reason is that the same end can be attained in many ways and by different means, and an end does not determine the choice of one means rather than another; but a determination of certain means must exist in order for the concurrence of many toward the same good to be obtained. This is provided by the intrinsic principle, which is authority—which is the power of binding. For either individuals are permitted to tend toward the end in the manner and by the means they wish, and there will be no concurrence; or it is necessary that all tend toward the end in one certain way and by certain determined means, and such necessity—which is moral—will be obligation, which can proceed only from some authority. Authority, therefore, or the power of binding, whatever subject it may reside in, is the principle existing within society itself of the unity of many, and therefore of society itself, which is formally a society insofar as it is one. Hence the good to be attained is the final principle, and authority is the efficient principle, determining the unity of society.

It must be presupposed, second, that social unity is an external and visible unity and that authority directly tends toward this—that the external actions of many should concur toward the same thing. This presupposes that there is in each of those united some principle intrinsic to them by which they embrace and are willing to carry out what authority directs; and this principle is human nature itself, reason

and will, which is common to all. Now this principle, if it not only wills to carry out what authority prescribes but also approves and loves it, will by that very fact make the unity of the members more gentle, constant, and intense. But this principle intrinsic to each individual is not a sufficient reason for social unity; for there must be something known to all by which the actions of all are bound to one thing; and this is authority. It is, however, presupposed by authority, and aids its efficacy, if what authority prescribes is approved and loved by individuals.

Now in the supernatural society, besides nature, there is also interior grace—both sanctifying grace, though it is not required for one to be counted a member of that society nor is it common to all but only to the just; and also actual grace, by which the faithful are moved toward good. But such grace again does not suffice to effect social unity; for first, it is invisible and the unity it produces is also invisible; and second, it does not of itself determine what is to be done, but illuminates the mind and stirs and aids the will so that what a binding norm proposed to all as to be done may actually be done. This social unity, therefore, only social authority can provide. Hence, even if there is in the Church some interior principle invisibly uniting the faithful, yet for the Church to be a society, an external and visible authority is also required. In the beginning, of course, Christ himself, when he was still on earth, exercised authority of this kind; but since he is now invisible and of himself produces no visible acts by which a binding power might be exercised, it is necessary that in his stead another or others be on earth who, equipped with authority, exist as the efficient principle of social unity.

It must be presupposed, third, that in order for authority to be the efficient principle of social unity, it is not necessary that it be the author of all the laws by which the means are prescribed for common agreement toward attaining the end; for apart from the fact that in any society some means are prescribed by nature itself, if the authority be vicarious, it can happen that at least some of these means have been prescribed by the supreme Prince of the society. But this is necessary if a vicarious authority is to be called the efficient principle of unity: that all the means—whether it is their author or received them from the

supreme Prince—be coactively proposed by it to the society, so that they can be adopted only with subordination to that vicarious power and under its governance.

II. Let us therefore gather the end of the Primacy from its very nature. This nature should indeed be manifest from what has been discussed so far. Now when the end is sought of something that is ordered to something else—as the Primacy is—either some proper end of it, such as the primary one, can be sought, or the adequate end. We now abstract from this latter question, the solution of which depends on knowledge of all that the Primacy provides in the Church; but that solution will be evident afterward. We now only positively affirm the proper end of the Primacy. Now the proper end of this kind will be said to be what the Primacy necessarily provides of itself, that is, what necessarily follows from it of its own accord. But what the Primacy established by Christ necessarily provides of itself and necessarily is this: that through the jurisdiction of one visible head the unity of the whole Church and also of the individual Churches even in respect of themselves should be effectively obtained. What we mean when we say "the unity also of the individual Churches in respect of themselves" will be explained in the proof.

Since we say that unity is effected through one head endowed with jurisdiction, it is necessary to declare briefly in what sense the title of Head of the Church is applied to the Roman Pontiff. The Church's head is spoken of metaphorically. In the head (St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 8, a. 1) three things may be considered: order, perfection, and power. Order, because it is first and supreme among the members of the human body; perfection, because all the senses are active in the head; power, because the head by its power governs the remaining members, or is conceived with a real foundation to govern, insofar as in it the soul which governs the body has its seat in a special manner; for there the soul exercises all the functions of the senses by which it directs the members, and there is the organ which is externally required for the intellect which governs man to exercise itself. Now Christ is the head of the Church in respect of order, perfection, and power.

As to the third—namely power—it must be noted that in the body of the Church a double governance must be distinguished. The one is interior, through the influence of grace and gifts; the other is exterior, through the exercise of external and visible authority, by which the members of society united together are governed. The prior governance pertains to Christ alone. The latter governance also pertains to Christ; but while he was on earth he exercised it by himself; now, however, having become invisible, he exercises it through his Vicar, who therefore as Vicar alongside Christ and under Christ is the visible head of the visible Church. Therefore the Church is not without a head; for she has one supreme head, to whom the whole Church is subordinated. There is no incompatibility in the fact that besides the supreme head there should be in society another subordinate to him who fulfills his function, just as in a kingdom, when the King departs, a viceroy can be left behind to whom all must be subject and obedient. The Church indeed and Christ constitute one complete mystical body, of which Christ is the head and the others are members, but this must be accepted with some distinction. For if we consider order, perfection, and power in respect of the interior governance, Christ alone is the head, 1 Corinthians XII:11 ff.; Peter together with the others is reckoned among the members; but if we consider exterior governance, Christ together with his Vicar is simultaneously the head—both together constitute one head—just as in both there is one authority: not in the sense that the Vicar can do everything that Christ could, but in the sense that all the authority of the Vicar is the authority of Christ—original in him, derived in the Vicar; but the others are members.

III. These things having been set forth, we say that the end of the institution of the Primacy was to effect the unity of the Church. That the unity of the Church was the end of the Primacy is also taught by Febronius (*De Statu Ecclesiae*, etc., Chapter 2, §2), but in a different way from what Catholics teach. In his opinion, the power of the keys was given by Christ to the totality of the Church (Chapter 1, §6), whose form of governance is therefore not monarchical (ibid., §3); the Church itself exercises this power through its ministers, the chief of whom is the Roman Pontiff (ibid., §6), who is therefore also subordinated to the totality. Hence, since a society is constituted by authority, and since the

Church has the authority of jurisdiction independently of the Roman Pontiff, it is itself also independently of him a society, and therefore one. Gerson also conceived the matter this way (cf. if you will, *Vindiciae doctrinae Maiorum Scholae Parisiensis* by Richer, Vol. I, p. 223). Therefore, on this view, the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff presupposes the essential unity of the Church and tends only to preserve that unity, as Febronius puts it—not to effect it. Hence the same writer contends that the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff is not so much one of jurisdiction as of order and association. Now this order and association is said to be obtained, on Febronius's view, through the ministry of power, which the Church commits to its ministers—since, given that these ministers are many, they are yet so related that one excels among them and the others, at least singly taken, are subordinated to him in many matters (Chapter 2, §9). But the Catholic position is that by the institution of the Primacy Christ provided for the unity which constitutes the Church herself, insofar as the Primacy itself is what effects this unity, so that independently of the power of the Roman Pontiff there is no unity of the Church, that is, no society that can be called the Church of Christ.

The argument comes to this: the authority which is not delegated by society but which is the very primitive authority essential to society is the efficient principle of its social unity (n. 1); but such authority in the Church is the authority of the Primacy and it is proper to the Roman Pontiff such that it resides in him alone; therefore the authority of the Primacy has this as its end—that the unity of the Church be effected.

Certainly from what has been demonstrated it is established that the whole Church, as a building, is founded upon the Roman Pontiff as upon the Rock; it is established that the power of the keys, of binding and loosing, and the power of the Shepherd were conferred immediately and directly on the Roman Pontiff independently of the Church, so that subjectively it resides only in him. But from these things it follows: first, that the whole Church of Christ is one—for it is a building adhering to one Rock, it is a kingdom, it is a sheepfold subject to one King, one Shepherd; second, that the authority of the Roman Pontiff is not delegated by the Church but is the very primitive authority in this

visible society; third, that it is the authority essential to the Church herself. That is: a multitude of men is made into one society through authority—the efficient principle of social unity is authority; but the whole society is made one through that authority which does not yet presuppose the society but from which the society follows; but the authority of the Rock does not presuppose the building, rather the building follows from it; the authority of the holder of the keys of the Kingdom does not presuppose the Kingdom as already existing of itself, but effects it. Therefore. And so, independently of the power of the Roman Pontiff, there is no unity of the Church—that is, no society that can be called the Church.

But not only would the unity of the whole Church be absent if the Primacy were wanting; there would not even be any partial unity of, say, the individual Churches. That is, the unity effected by Peter is not to be conceived in such a way that he is the cause of unity insofar as he gathers all the individual Churches or Bishops into one body, yet apart from him the individual particular Churches could maintain their unity separately—which is false. For these individual Churches and their Pastors either adhere to the Rock or they do not adhere; if they do not adhere, they are in no way the Church of Christ; for outside the Rock no building or any part of it can subsist, just as no sheep of Christ can be outside the sheepfold committed to Peter, and no citizens of the saints can be outside the kingdom of heaven whose keys were given to Peter; but if they adhere to the Rock—then with respect to those Churches themselves the Rock is the principle of unity; for this is what it means to be the Rock. But the principle of unity can only be so through authority; therefore those Churches are subject to the power of the Rock. Therefore. This therefore is of itself and necessarily the purpose of the Primacy of Peter instituted by Christ; this therefore is the end of its institution.

And this is what the constant doctrine of the Fathers teaches us. Optatus hands this down most explicitly (cf. his words at p. 344): first, that Peter received the keys for the good of unity, that is, in order that the business of unity might be formed; second, that Peter was granted the chair at Rome so that in one chair unity might be maintained by all; third, that whoever placed another chair against the single Roman chair

—and therefore refused to be subject to it—was a schismatic and therefore outside the Church; fourth, that Peter alone received the keys of the Church, to be communicated to the others (Book VII, Chapter 3). That is, the Primacy was conferred on Peter, that is on the Roman Bishop, so that one Church might be formed—formed, moreover, by Peter; for for forming this unity a singular chair was granted to him and the keys were given, that is the supreme power, not as to a minister of the Church but as to a principle and source from which all authority would flow down to the other Pastors who are subject to him. But to form the Church as one through the keys—that is, through supreme authority or jurisdiction—is tantamount to saying that the same authority is the efficient principle of the unity of the Church. Therefore. And indeed the unity is formed by Peter in such a way that there is no authority in the Church by which unity can be formed independently of Peter; for ecclesiastical power—which is the power of the keys—is communicated to others by Peter, and whoever is a Pastor who is not subject to the Roman chair is a schismatic; therefore without the proper authority of Peter there is no unity of the Church, which accordingly is not presupposed by Peter but is effected.

Cyprian had already handed down the same teaching in his book *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, teaching that heresies and schisms arise because no return is made to the source of truth, no head is sought, the doctrine of the heavenly master is not observed. And what is this doctrine? It is contained in the words of Christ to Peter in Matthew XVI and John XXI. Namely: "He builds the Church upon him alone and commands him to feed the sheep... so that he might manifest unity... so that the Church might be shown to be one" (cf. his words at p. 349). Whence he adds: "Whoever resists and opposes the Church, whoever deserts the chair of Peter upon which the Church is founded, does he trust that he is in the Church?... As the rays of the sun are many but the light is one, as the branches of a tree are many but the strength is one, founded on its tenacious root, and as from one spring flow many streams, yet despite the abundance of the copious overflow the unity is preserved at the source—so too the Church of the Lord, flooded with light, spreads her rays throughout the whole world. One nevertheless is the light which is diffused everywhere... yet there is one head and one origin and one

mother abundant in the increase of fruitfulness... Whoever does not hold this unity holds not the law of God, holds not the faith of the Father and the Son, holds not life and salvation." Therefore the Church is one just as the many rays are one through the one light of the sun, and the many branches are one through the one root of the tree, and the many streams are one through the one origin of the spring. But the one origin, the one head, the one light in the Church is, according to Cyprian's testimony, the one chair of Peter upon which the Church is founded, which is founded upon him precisely in order that she might be shown to be one. And therefore, just as a branch broken from the tree no longer germinates, just as a stream cut off from the spring dries up, just as a ray torn from the sun is nothing, and just as through the sun, through the tree, through the spring there are rays and branches and streams: so through the chair of Peter there is the very society which is the Church, that is, the very social unity of the Church; and with separation from it made, there is no society, no unity of the Church. The Church therefore is one, and one effectively through Peter.

Hence in Epistle 60 to Cornelius he said of the schismatics Fortunatus and Felicissimus: "They dare to sail and to carry letters from schismatics and profane persons to the chair of Peter and to the principal Church, from which priestly unity took its rise." The Roman chair, namely, is the origin of the unity of the Episcopate; and just as, by the testimony of the same Cyprian, there is no Bishop outside unity—for the episcopate is one and undivided (*De Unitate Ecclesiae*)—so there is no Bishop torn from the origin, from his root, which is the chair of Peter. He calls it accordingly in Epistle 45 "the root and matrix of the Catholic Church," just as there is no stream cut off from the spring; and because any particular Church is, by the testimony of the same writer (Ep. 49), "the people united to the priest and the flock adhering to its shepherd," therefore there is no unity of any particular Church either if it be divided from the chair of Peter. Therefore from the doctrine of Cyprian it is established that the Primacy of Peter was established so that through it the unity of the whole Church might be effected and the individual Churches too might through it be able to preserve their unity.

Before him, Irenaeus expressed the same truth with this most noble statement (Book III, Chapter 3): "To this (Roman) Church, on account of its more powerful principality, it is necessary that every Church agree—that is, the faithful who are from everywhere—in which Church the tradition from the Apostles has always been preserved by those who are from everywhere." By these words the following things are asserted about the Roman Church: first, its more powerful (some read "more potent") principality—the reading "more potent" is perhaps more certainly correct (a certain translator, Adolphus Stieren, in his edition, holds that Irenaeus wrote ἱκανοτέραν ἀρχαιότητα; but what is ἀρχαιότης ἱκανοτέρα? Read Armellini in his *Philosophia*, Chapter 7, where by a sound argument he holds that Irenaeus wrote: διὰ τὴν ἱκανοτέραν αὐθεντίαν, "on account of its preeminent authority"); second, the necessity that the other Churches, all the faithful whatever they are, agree with it; third, that it is the center of the whole Christian society, in which all the faithful have preserved the true faith. Now what is the principality of the Roman Church? Not antiquity—if you consider the Church herself, the Church of Jerusalem excels in that (cf. what we shall say in the following Thesis on the sentence of the Fourth Lateran Council); not merely apostolic origin, which is common to other Churches as well; but it is ἀρχή, whose proper character is ἡ πρωτεία καὶ ἡ ἡγεμονία. That is, the abstract noun "principality" signifies what is original and primeval and that from which others take their beginning and origin, and especially that by virtue of which one is in society the ἀρχή—the prince, the efficient principle, and the origin of unity.

Now this is used by Irenaeus here in the adequate sense; for first, as we said, the mere notion of what is original and primeval, or the notion of antiquity, cannot underlie the term; second, the epithet "more powerful" or "more potent" suggests the same thing; and third, the same is suggested by what follows from this principality, namely the necessity of all the Churches agreeing with the Roman Church. For in a society such as the Church, the necessity by which all are bound to unite with one principal city or see on account of its being principal can only arise from the fact that there is located there the seat of authority, or it arises from the dignity of the supreme ruler who by his authority holds all together in unity. The principality of the Roman Church, therefore, is

the supreme authority of the same over the other Churches by reason of the See of Peter. Moreover, for all the Churches and all the faithful to agree with the Roman Church is not for all the faithful to converge physically on Rome; but for all of them to be united and to constitute one society with her and to agree with her as their teacher in the faith. Therefore what Irenaeus asserts is: the necessity of communion of all the Churches with the Roman Church; the necessity of this on account of her more powerful principality, that is, on account of her supreme authority; and that without such a joining of Churches and faithful to the Roman Church there is no assembly of the faithful—for it is only in this Church that those who adhere to it, the faithful, preserve the Apostolic tradition. That is: the reason why the other Churches hold the true faith and concur in the unity of faith is not in themselves individually but is in the Roman Church, constituting their unity with which they obtain the true faith. Therefore without the Roman Church there is no unity of faith, that is, no social unity of the faithful; and this is obtained through the Roman Church alone. To this end, therefore, the principality or Primacy of the Roman See tends—that the unity of all believers be effected, that the individual Churches, cohering with her, preserve the true faith and therefore be portions of the true flock of Christ.

Ambrose, commentary on Psalm XL, n. 30, says: "He is Peter, to whom Christ says: 'Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my Church.' Where therefore Peter is, there is the Church." Negatively: just as a building does not exist where there is no foundation, or a building does not exist as such if it does not rest on the foundation—so the Church does not exist where Peter is not, that is, a Church does not exist which is not united to Peter. Positively: where Peter is, there is the Church—that is, the communion that adheres to Peter is by that very fact the true Church of Christ; there is therefore in Peter a sufficient reason why the communion coherent with him is the true Church. Now if any communion is not a Church precisely because it does not adhere to Peter the foundation, and if it is a Church precisely because it does adhere; therefore Peter, insofar as he is Peter—that is, the foundation, the Rock of the Church—is the necessary constitutive principle of the Church itself, gathering all into one society which is the sole true

Church; namely the efficient principle of the unity of the whole Church. And if where Peter is not, there the Church is not: the unity of every particular Church too will depend on Peter, that is, on union with him. Therefore the institution of the Rock of the Church, that is the Primacy of Peter, has this as its end: to be the efficient principle of the unity of the Church.

And indeed this was always the most certain conviction of the Church, of which a luminous testimony is the subscription made by all the Eastern Bishops to the formula of faith proposed by Hormisdas, in order to be received into the unity of the Church—those, namely, who had fallen away from it on account of the Acacian schism. For having first cited the words of Christ to Peter—"Thou art Peter," etc.—the Greek Bishops profess that they are unwilling to be separated from the hope and faith of the Apostolic See, and therefore anathematize all heretics... they receive and approve all the letters of Pope Leo which he wrote on the Christian religion; they follow in all things the Apostolic See and profess all its constitutions, hoping thus to merit to be in one communion with the Apostolic See, in which is the whole and true solidity of the Christian religion; and they promise not to recite in the sacred mysteries the names of those who have been separated from the communion of the Catholic Church—that is, those who do not consent to the Apostolic See. Now in this profession there is contained the solemn profession of the necessity of communion with the Roman See, such that whoever does not consent to it is separated from the Church; the reason for this necessity being the words of Christ constituting Peter and his successors as the Rock of the Church. Therefore the authority of the Apostolic See is certainly a principle of unity of the Church.

Moreover it is an efficient principle; because, as it is exhibited in this formula, it is an authority not ministerial—that is, derived from the Church, which would presuppose the Church already constituted—but it is an authority constituted immediately by God in Peter and his successors, to which Bishops gathered in an ecumenical Synod—that is, the whole Church taken together—are bound to be subject, so that in no way is it free for them to withdraw from it.

Further witnesses to this faith are the ecumenical Synods. A witness is the Eighth Synod, which made the same profession just

recited in Action I. Then a witness is the Second Synod of Lyons, in which the profession of faith was approved, which also contained this: "The Roman Church holds the supreme and full primacy and principality over the universal Catholic Church, which it truly and humbly recognizes as received with the fullness of power from the Lord himself in blessed Peter the Apostle, the prince or summit of the Apostles, whose successor is the Roman Pontiff... To it any aggrieved person can appeal in matters pertaining to the ecclesiastical forum, and in all cases pertaining to ecclesiastical examination recourse can be had to its judgment, and all Churches are subject to it... It admits other Churches to a share in its solicitude." Now the efficient principle of social unity is the supreme and universal authority—not that which is delegated by society to some minister, so as to already presuppose the society as one, but that which necessarily precedes any delegation by society and is necessarily in society; but from this profession of faith it is established that such is the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff, who is said to have supreme and universal authority and to have received it immediately from God the founder of the society. Such authority, namely, is not delegated by society and is necessary in the society instituted by Christ. Equally a witness of the same matter is the Florentine Synod, defining that "the Roman Pontiff is the true Vicar of Christ and the head of the whole Church and the Father and Doctor of all Christians, and that to him in blessed Peter the full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church was handed by our Lord Jesus Christ"; for this definition teaches the same thing as and more effectively than the Lugdunensian profession.

Consistent with this doctrine, which we defend, is what is handed down in the ninth century by St. Nicephorus, Bishop of Constantinople, who, in order to demonstrate the authority of the Second Nicene Ecumenical Synod, says: "For according to the ancient divine decrees, there presided over it and held the pre-eminence from the western height—that is, from the old Rome—a not inconsiderable part, without whom (the Romans) no dogma, however much it may have been considered and ratified in the Church by canonical decrees and priestly custom, will ever be held as approved or brought into practice; for they have been allotted the principate of the Priesthood and have the dignity

of the Coryphaeus among the Apostles handed down to them" (*Petra*, *Ius ecclesiasticum*, Vol. 2, pp. 80–81).

Consistent with the same doctrine is what Abbot Abbo wrote in the tenth century (Ep. V, in Gallandi, *Bibliotheca*, Vol. XIV): "The Roman Church has this privilege by its excellence over all Churches: that as the key-bearer of the heavenly kingdom holds the principate of apostolic eminence, so the same Roman Church grants authority to all, as to its own members, throughout the four quarters of the whole world. Whoever therefore contradicts the Roman Church, what else does he do but withdraw himself from his own members, so as to become a portion of the adversaries of Christ?" Now that excellence of the see and that principate which grants authority to the others is surely the principate that efficiently effects the unity of the society over which it presides. Therefore Catholic tradition is manifest in this matter. But what could be adduced against it we shall weigh in its proper place in the following Theses.

THESIS XIII

With this dignity of the Primacy it is connected that the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff over all the faithful of Christ, both individually and all together, is ordinary and immediate.

I. This Thesis is necessarily connected with the preceding one and must be held as its explanation. For the understanding of the terms, note that in ecclesiastical usage the power or jurisdiction called ordinary is that which is annexed to a dignity, magistracy, or prefecture by the very right—whether divine or human—attached to it, and which someone therefore exercises not by virtue of special delegation but by virtue of his dignity and his office. So all the Canonists. Immediate power or jurisdiction is opposed to mediate jurisdiction. Mediate jurisdiction over some persons is that which is held over their immediate superiors, through whom as intermediaries it also reaches their subjects. Immediate jurisdiction over some persons, by contrast, is that which is directed toward them as one's own proper subjects, without the aid of any intermediary power. Immediate jurisdiction does not prevent there being several persons who immediately govern the

same people, provided that the power resides in several in a different manner and with subordination. Thus in a kingdom the subjects are immediately subject both to their own governors and to the king; in a diocese both to their pastors and to the bishop. Since immediate jurisdiction can be both primary and subordinate, if you ask for the generic notion of immediate jurisdiction, it is not that which can perform all the acts that are necessary for one's subjects to be governed —such is not the jurisdiction of a governor, who cannot enact laws; nor is it that which must of itself perform all the acts required for the governance of subjects—just as the authority of a King in his kingdom does not do this, yet is nonetheless immediate with respect to all subjects; for all are governed and bound by his laws without any other intermediate authority that first binds them. But immediate jurisdiction is generically that which governs some persons by its own acts not insofar as it governs others by whom they are governed, but insofar as it governs those persons as its own proper subjects. Specifically, immediate jurisdiction which is also primary in society can be described thus: that which governs all those belonging to the society by its own acts as proper subjects, without the aid of intermediate authority, and which can by itself perform all the acts required for subjects to be well governed. But when it is said that it can perform all the acts, distinguish between physical ability and juridical ability. Juridically, the primary immediate jurisdiction can perform all acts, so that whenever they are posited they are always valid; but as regards physical power, a further distinction must be made; for we can do some things physically by ourselves and other things through others to whom we delegate our power. If the society is extensive, it cannot happen that the supreme prince can physically by himself perform all the acts necessary for governance, but he will certainly be able to do so through his delegates; and this he must be able to do, if his jurisdiction is truly primary and immediate. Nevertheless it does not pertain to this immediate and primary jurisdiction to be obligated to perform all its acts by itself; for even without this exercise that jurisdiction remains intact, and there is no obligation to the impossible; nor does it pertain to it to be obligated to exercise itself through others delegated by it

acting in its name, if the constitution of the society is such that those acts can be exercised through others.

Furthermore, note that it is false that in an ordered series of those who exercise power in society, the one who is at the top gives orders only to those who immediately follow him in that series. This is clear in civil monarchy, in which all citizens without exception are immediately subject to the King. So too God in this universe moves and governs all immediately. Hence, when on account of an ordered series of those who preside, one who is closer to the subjects is called the immediate superior and one who exceeds by one or more grades is called the mediate superior, what is being signified is not a distinction among subjects—as if some belong to distinct superiors—but rather the order of those who preside in relation to each other and their different office in the exercise of power. The one who is lower takes care of more particular matters and what is proper to some part of society; the one who is higher must take care of more universal matters and those common to all.

II. The question now is not twofold—whether the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff is ordinary, and whether it is immediate over all—but is one single question: whether his jurisdiction is ordinary-immediate over all, that is, whether his ordinary jurisdiction is immediate over all the faithful of Christ. For that the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff is ordinary, no one denies unless he denies his Primacy; but the question is how great it is and how far it extends—whether it immediately reaches all the faithful or only mediately.

Febronius holds that the immediate care and direction of the individual sheep of the whole Christian flock does not belong to the Roman Pontiff, but only the oversight and direction of the whole—and he contends that he has proved this throughout his whole work (Chapter 7, §7). Now oversight and direction of the whole consists in the fact that the Roman Pontiff provides for the good of unity by watching over and directing, by counsel rather than compulsion (Chapter 11, §4), and that in a case of negligence or malice on the part of the Bishops he can judge the causes of their subjects even without appeal, administer and govern the dioceses of their Prelates even against the will of those same Prelates, and absolve from sins. Except in that

case, the Roman Pontiff enjoys only mediate jurisdiction over individual faithful. Hence his power is per se mediate, per accidens and as it were extraordinarily immediate. So also Eybel, condemned by Pius VI in the Brief *Super Soliditate*.

The Catholic position is that the ordinary jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff is immediate over any and all the faithful, both individually and all together, and that the institution of the Primacy has this as its purpose—that such jurisdiction obtain. Those are mistaken who suppose: first, that the Roman Pontiff is the head of the Church only because he is first among the hierarchy, and therefore second, that he is related to the universal flock only through those hierarchs themselves and to the individual hierarchs only through intermediate and interposed grades, and that he therefore third is called and is the Bishop of the universal Church only mediately. On the contrary, according to Catholic doctrine, the Church is to be viewed as one family whose one Father provides for the good of all and each, feeds and governs all and each; and just as, according to Cyprian, the Church is the people united to its priest and the flock adhering to its shepherd, so the universal Church is the whole people of the faithful united and adhering to one Priest—that is, Bishop and Shepherd—so that the whole Church is immediately subject to one Bishop. It must therefore be proved that the institution of the Primacy has this as its end—that the ordinary jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff immediately embrace both generally every individual faithful person and specifically the Bishops themselves, who are also faithful, and not only all of these individually but also all of them taken together at once; from which it follows that this jurisdiction is truly episcopal over the whole Church, and therefore that the Roman Pontiff has episcopal jurisdiction over the Bishops themselves.

III. Indeed: first, the Roman Pontiff alone has from Christ the keys of the kingdom of heaven which is the Church; he can bind and loose whatever and whomever he judges fit in the Church, and in such a way that no one can loose what he binds and no one can bind what he looses, and therefore without the concurrence of any other authority he himself can bind and loose what he judges must be bound or loosed (Thesis I on these words of Christ). But this is immediate jurisdiction

over all and every individual faithful. The minor is proved. Power that is universal in respect of all matters and all persons, and independent in its exercise, requiring no cooperation of any other power, is immediate jurisdiction over all the members of the society; but the described power of the keys of the kingdom is such. Therefore. The major is evident; for if a power extends to all things and all persons and does not need the concurrence of any other authority, whether equal or inferior, to be effective, it immediately governs all the persons of the society; the minor too is evident from what was demonstrated above. Therefore.

Second, the Roman Pontiff is indeed a Shepherd; therefore he immediately feeds some. The inference is evident even in the view of the adversaries; for unless he immediately feeds some, he cannot be or be conceived as a Shepherd. Now whom does the Roman Pontiff immediately feed? Certainly those who were handed over to him by Christ to be fed; for either these or no one—for he is not a Shepherd except because Christ commended some to him to be fed. But Christ handed over all to him to be fed—namely his lambs and his sheep; and apart from the lambs and sheep of Christ there is nothing in the Church. Therefore he feeds all immediately. And indeed according to the adversaries the Roman Pontiff immediately feeds at least some sheep; but why, except because Christ said to him "feed my sheep"? But equally Christ said to him "feed my lambs," and he did not say "some of my sheep" or "some of my lambs" but "my sheep, my lambs"—words in which all the faithful are comprehended. Therefore.

Third, you will say that the Roman Pontiff is the Rock of the Church; but in a material building not all stones immediately adhere to the foundation—apart from a few, the others are mediate; therefore in the Church too not all are immediately governed by Peter. But if you consider the matter not superficially but deeply, you will gather the complete opposite. For the nature of what is signified by the Rock or foundation must be taken into account. Now we proved this to be the supreme and independent authority in the Church. But it is the property of supreme and independent authority in society that all are immediately subject to it, such that they are bound by its laws and judgments without any other intermediate authority. Therefore such also is the jurisdiction of the Rock of the Church.

Fourth, the Fathers recognized the institution of Christ. For the Roman Bishop is frequently called by them the ecumenical Bishop or Patriarch: ἁγιωτάτῳ καὶ μακαριωτάτῳ οἰκουμενικῷ ἀρχιεπισκόπῳ καὶ πατριάρχη Λέοντι—say those offering a petition read in the Synod of Chalcedon, Theodore and Ischyrion, Deacons of Alexandria, Athanasius, Alexandrian Presbyter, and Sophronius; the same appellation occurs as given to Agapitus at the Council of Constantinople under Menna; likewise at the Sixth Council Donus is called by Constantine Pogonatus the ecumenical Pope, and at the Chalcedonian Council the Legate Paschasinus subscribed thus: "Paschasinus, Bishop of Lilybaeum, Vicar of the most blessed and apostolic Pope Leo of universal Rome," etc.; and Leo himself in Epistle 64 to Marcian attributed this title to himself: "Leo, Bishop of the Roman and universal Church." Likewise it is the opinion of the Fathers that there is one chair in the Church, which is the Roman chair or the chair of Peter, as we heard from Optatus and from Cyprian, and that all those are properly governed by Peter whom Christ principally governs, as Leo says in Sermon 3 at his assumption; and that "all the faithful however far dispersed have the care of blessed Peter present with them," as Celestine says in his letters to the Fathers of Ephesus; to which Gelasius says something similar to Aeonius, Bishop of Arles: "For as much as the principal governance of Peter has taken upon itself, by the delegation of Christ the Lord, the care of the whole flock throughout the whole world, with so much affection of piety does it embrace all the Churches and their rulers." Cf. also the testimony of Bernard to be adduced shortly. But in such titles and assertions the doctrine which we defend is evidently contained. For a chair formally considered is authority; but there cannot be one singular chair in the whole Church, that is, the Roman chair, unless all the faithful are immediately subject to the authority of the one Roman Bishop; for all must be immediately subject to some supreme authority; but if this is common to several, either there will not be one chair in the Church, or it will coalesce from, as it were, a collection of all the episcopal chairs, and will not be one Roman chair. But there is one chair in the whole Church and it is itself the Roman chair. Therefore.

And indeed fourth, a Bishop according to the ecclesiastical manner of conceiving is an immediate Shepherd; for he has his own sheep, and those are called one's own sheep over whom the authority is immediate—over whom, namely, one has the right of governing by the acts of one's power without any medium of right. But the Roman Pontiff, just as he is Bishop of the City, so likewise he is Bishop of the World; therefore. Accordingly he properly feeds and governs all those whom Christ feeds and governs, as St. Leo says in the cited passage, with vicarious power which is immediate, and all the faithful are present to his care, which expressly signifies immediate jurisdiction. Therefore. Nicolaus I expressed this universal immediate power in Epistle 8 to the Emperor of Constantinople, affirming that "he has the right not only of summoning monks but also any clerics whatever from any diocese to himself when necessary, and of inviting them as ecclesiastical needs demand."

Fifth, the same has been confirmed in the ecumenical Councils. For in the Fourth Lateran Council, Chapter 5, it is said of the Roman Church that "by the Lord's arrangement it holds over all others the principate of ordinary power, inasmuch as it is the mother of all Christ's faithful and their mistress." The Roman Church is called the mother of all the Churches by reason of the authority by which it governs the whole Christian family as a mother; for as Innocent III says (Ep. 209, Book II), "the Roman Church is called mother not by reason of time but rather by reason of dignity... since by the privilege of dignity it is set before all the faithful." Moreover by reason of origin too—if you consider it materially, as a Church founded at a certain time, it was not first nor the mother of all; but if you consider it formally in its head, who is Peter: just as the whole Church, both Jewish and Gentile, had its beginning from him—for Peter first founded both—and moreover Peter always governed as prince the individual other Churches established by the Apostles; so the Roman Church, by reason of origin too, can be called the Mother of all the Churches. Likewise at the Council of Florence it was defined that the Roman Pontiff is "the head of the whole Church and the Father and Doctor of all Christians." But the relation of children to the Father or Mother to whom they must be obedient, of disciples to the Teacher or Doctor whose doctrine they must follow, is

immediate; for parents immediately govern their own children, and teachers immediately instruct their own disciples—who are bound to learn what they teach precisely because they teach it; but all Christians are the children and disciples of the Roman Pontiff to whom they must be obedient and whose teaching they must follow. Therefore.

In the Tridentine Synod, Session 14, Chapter 7, on the reservation of cases, we are taught that "the Supreme Pontiffs for that reason—as is first said more immediately above, where the reason is given not for the power but for the honest use of the power, which notably pertains to Christian discipline—for the supreme power handed to them in the universal Church, could reserve to their own judgment certain causes of more serious crimes." The Roman Pontiff can reserve cases to himself throughout the universal Church, and this not by concession of the Bishops but for his supreme power, which was certainly handed to him by Christ. Now no one can reserve to himself the absolution of cases except the sins of his own subjects; for he himself must be able to absolve them, and no one—by the very doctrine of the same chapter of the Council of Trent—can absolve from sins except his own subjects. Therefore in the internal forum all the faithful of Christ are subject to the Roman Pontiff and he can absolve all from sins; therefore he is the immediate shepherd of all. Hence Albert the Great, *In 4*, D. 19, a. 10: "To the other matter it must be said that there is no one on earth in the place of Christ except the Pope, and he can act (that is, absolve) in all cases; but others have been called to a share of the solicitude, and therefore they are not permitted to extend their jurisdiction beyond what is permitted." And St. Thomas, *Against the Enemies of God's Service*, Chapter 4: "To the objection that everyone is bound to confess once a year to their proper priest, it must be said that the proper priest is not only the parish priest, but also the Bishop or the Pope, to whom the care of the person belongs even more than to the priest."

IV. Therefore the immediate jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff extends also to the individual Bishops. For the arguments adduced are valid whatever they are worth in the case of Bishops too. For the Roman Pontiff immediately governs all those who belong to the building of the Church which rests upon the Rock, all those who are in the kingdom and are distinguished from Peter, and he feeds all—not only the lambs

but also the sheep; but among these are also the Bishops, who as columns of the building are sustained by the Rock, who as princes in the kingdom are subject to the king, who are sheep in the sheepfold of Christ. Therefore. Hence just as the Roman Pontiff is called the universal Bishop, so too he is called the Shepherd of Shepherds, the Bishop of Bishops, the Father of Fathers. Tertullian, *On Modesty*, Chapter 1: "I hear that there has even been issued an edict, and a peremptory one at that: 'The Pontifex Maximus'—that is, the Bishop of Bishops—'issues the edict: I remit to those who have done penance the sins of adultery and fornication.'" Now the person in question was Zephyrinus the Roman Bishop. And that those titles were truly given to the Roman Bishops—not invented by the heretic Tertullian by way of irony—is manifest; for by them he proves that the edict that was issued was peremptory, which indeed was said to be so by Catholics, not by heretics. They therefore were the ones who honored the Roman Bishops with these titles.

Bernard, *De Consideratione*, Book II, Chapter 8: "All are entrusted to you, each singly to others, but all to you one. You are the one and only shepherd not only of the sheep but also of the shepherds. How do you ask me to prove this? From the word of the Lord. For to whom—I say not of the Bishops but even of the Apostles—were all the sheep committed so absolutely and without distinction? 'If you love me, Peter, feed my sheep.' Which ones? The peoples of this or that city, or region, or kingdom? 'My sheep,' he says. To whom is it not clear that he did not designate any particular ones but assigned all? Nothing is excepted where nothing is distinguished."

So also Pius VI in his Response to the Metropolitan Bishops of Mainz, Trier, etc., having first established from the words of the Lord the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff, continues: "Moreover the Fathers and Councils both before and after Gregory the Great, as if by a league among themselves, vied with one another in calling the Roman Pontiff Priest of Priests, Father of Fathers, Shepherd of Shepherds, Bishop of Bishops, and universal Bishop... This authority of feeding, joined with the power of the keys and attributed to Peter in a peculiar manner, just as it displays an ordinary and immediate authority over all the faithful, so also it displays the same ordinary and immediate authority over all

the shepherds who, whatever their dignity may be, not only are not equal to the Pontiff but are so subject to his authority that those who are called shepherds and are shepherds, if you consider their flocks, are reckoned as nothing but sheep in number if you consider the Pontiff" (John Maior—cf. the excerpts of his work placed by Richer among the works of Gerson, Part 1, p. 877—in article 10, q. 1, of the second part of the second part, says: "This question asks whether the Supreme Pontiff is above the universal Council or the universal Church which the Council represents. On the aforesaid question there are two opposing ways of speaking: one of which holds that the Pope is above the universal Council... The other mode was always followed by the University of Paris from the days of the Council of Constance").

V. It must now be proved that all the faithful taken together are also to be governed by ordinary and immediate power of Peter. All the faithful and their Shepherds can be taken together in two ways. First, simply as a collection of all of them—a multitude gathered into unity, even if dispersed throughout the world and individual Shepherds remaining in their sees. Then, secondly, as a personal gathering or union of all in one assembly, in one Synod, in which they all transact and determine something together. This latter has ever had place, and can have place, only with respect to the Shepherds themselves. Taken in both ways, all the faithful are governed by the ordinary immediate power of the Roman Pontiff. That is, the ordinary and immediate power of the Roman Pontiff was established not merely to reach these or those individually so that it can command only these or those as individuals or as individual particular Churches; but first it reaches all taken together insofar as they constitute one entire social body—even though dispersed throughout the whole world—and can prescribe laws for this whole body and exercise in it the other functions of the Primacy; and then second, it also reaches the whole body of Shepherds personally gathered in one assembly or synod.

We prove the first. Certainly the ordinary immediate power belongs to the Roman Pontiff because he is the Rock, because he has the keys, because he has the power of binding and loosing, because he is the Shepherd—this is sufficiently clear from the foregoing. Therefore it belongs to him with respect to those for whom he is the Rock, for whom

he has the keys and the power of binding and loosing, and whose Shepherd he is. But the terminus to which the Rock refers is the building—that is, one whole composed of many; the terminus to which the keys and the power of binding and loosing refer is the kingdom—that is, one society or a collection of many gathered into unity; the terminus to which the Shepherd refers is the sheep and lambs represented in the number of the multitude and gathered together under one reason and bond of union with Christ—"my sheep, my lambs"—that is, the sheepfold of Christ which is the whole. Therefore the immediate power of the Roman Pontiff is directed at the whole building, the whole kingdom, the whole sheepfold—that is, at the whole body of the Church. That is, the Church, insofar as she is one entire society, one kingdom, one sheepfold, one body, is subordinate to the immediate jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff. Wherefore the Roman Pontiff governs individuals immediately, governs all taken together immediately, and does not govern all together because he governs individuals; but on the contrary he governs individuals because he governs the whole or all together. For the immediate terminus of the Rock is presented by Christ as the building, of the keys as the kingdom; hence the power of Peter is first directed immediately at the Church, at the kingdom, at the sheepfold rather than at individuals—so that Peter immediately governs individuals because they belong to this Church, this kingdom, this sheepfold.

If you compare the doctrine of the Fathers handed down above, you will prove the same thing. For what is represented as subject to the power of the Roman Pontiff is not only individuals but the universal Church, the whole body of the Church, the whole kingdom, as is evident to one who considers the matter.

We prove the second, which—not to be too lengthy—it will suffice to demonstrate by one or two evident arguments, deferring a fuller treatment if needed to where the question of Councils will be directly discussed.

For what indeed is a universal Synod of Shepherds? It is the whole hierarchical Church gathered for deliberation; it is therefore the greater part of the building, the kingdom, the sheepfold. But the whole building, whatever it is, rests on the Rock; the whole kingdom is subject

to the one who holds its keys; the whole sheepfold obeys the Shepherd. Therefore the ecumenical Synod too is subject to the Roman Pontiff as its head, and he governs and directs it with his full ordinary and immediate power. Indeed, as we have already noted, what is immediately deduced from the words of Christ is the immediate power of Peter over the whole Church, the whole kingdom, the whole sheepfold; but an ecumenical council is nothing more than the whole Church, the whole kingdom, the whole sheepfold. Therefore. And indeed it would only be possible for the relationship of Bishops to the Roman Pontiff to be different when they are dispersed and when they all gather in a Synod—such that in the former case they would be subject and in the latter they would be equal or superior, insofar as the supreme executive power, as they say, would indeed reside with the Pontiff but not the supreme legislative and judicial power, which would reside only in the gathering of the Shepherds—if the supreme power residing with the Roman Pontiff were only the supreme executive power. But with the Roman Pontiff there resides not only the supreme executive power but also the supreme legislative and judicial power, and this is his own independently of the Church's consent and will; for such is the power of the Rock, the power of the keys of the kingdom, the power of binding and loosing all things and all persons, which was given to Peter alone (Thesis I). Therefore the relationship of the Bishops to the Roman Pontiff always remains the same.

VI. Now this power of which we have been speaking is truly episcopal power. Episcopal power is the ordinary and immediate power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, complete in its kind—namely legislative, judicial, and coercive. But such is the power of the Roman Pontiff over the universal Church; indeed, it is the most perfect power, occupying the apex of the episcopate. For his jurisdiction is legislative, judicial, and punitive—for to this the power of binding and loosing all things and all persons reduces; it is supreme, universal, and independent, because it is the power of the holder of the keys of the Kingdom. Hence, as we have already heard, he is called and is the universal Bishop, or Bishop of the Catholic Church. And because he enjoys the same power over all the Bishops, as we have proved, therefore his power over the Bishops is

truly episcopal, and for this reason he has been called the Bishop of Bishops and the Shepherd of Shepherds.

THESIS XIV

Accordingly the Roman Pontiff has over the universal Church the fullness of power, not only in the sense that he can do all things, but in the sense that all the power of jurisdiction by which the faithful are governed comes from him; and therefore Bishops do not receive ordinary jurisdiction in their Churches immediately from Christ but immediately from the Vicar of Christ, to whom moreover there belongs by divine right the power to elect Bishops and to determine the manner of their election.

I. That the power of the Roman Pontiff is truly coercive is evident from what has been said (Prolegomenon, §19); the question now is about its perfection.

The fullness of power of which we speak is not absolute but relative to the society that is governed—it is, that is to say, a fullness of power within the kingdom and for the kingdom. For the sake of clarity we say that this can be conceived in two ways: positively only, and exclusively. Positively only, if the primary power can indeed and by ordinary right do all things necessary and useful for the governance of the whole kingdom and all its subjects, yet there are others who, together with it and under it—though not having received from it—can do at least something. Exclusively, if the prince can do all things in such a way that all power by which the kingdom is governed is either his own power or derives from him, so that his power either formally or virtually contains all the other power by which the society is governed. Such is the power of an absolute monarch in political society.

That the fullness of power in the first sense belongs to the Roman Pontiff is demonstrated without difficulty. For it requires these characteristics: namely, that he can by ordinary right in all things pertaining to the governance of society with respect to all—whether in enacting laws, or in establishing judgments, or in coercively enforcing the observance of laws—and that nothing can legitimately be done against his will, so that all other power in the kingdom is directly

dependent on him (Prolegomenon, §18, 3). But such is the power of the Roman Pontiff in the Church. For one who holds the keys of the kingdom, who can bind and loose all things and all persons, and who is therefore the unique subject of supreme and universal power in the Church and immediately governs all both individually and collectively, can certainly by ordinary right do all things with respect to all—whether in enacting laws, or in establishing judgments, or in coercively enforcing the observance of laws—and directly governs all those who hold authority in the kingdom with respect to their functions of governance; for these are the properties of supreme authority in society. Therefore no act can have validity which is done against his will by any person who is in the kingdom; for to the power of binding and loosing belongs the force of making the act of a subject, if the holder of this power so wills, have no legitimate value. But with this force existing, whatever is done in disagreement with the one who holds this power over the whole kingdom is already null and void. It is therefore certain, as St. Pius V says in the Bull of excommunication of Queen Elizabeth: "He who reigns on high, to whom was given all power in heaven and on earth, entrusted the one holy Catholic and apostolic Church—outside of which there is no salvation—to be governed with the fullness of power by one alone on earth, namely to the Prince of the Apostles Peter and to the successor of Peter the Roman Pontiff."

This fullness of power was certainly asserted by Boniface I, who (Ep. 14 to all the bishops of Thessaly), affirming that the institution of the universal nascent Church took its beginning from the honor of blessed Peter, in which its governance and form consists, notes that this is also testified by the precepts of the Nicene Synod, "so great indeed as not to have dared to constitute anything above him, since it saw that nothing could be conferred above his merit; it knew that all had been granted to him by the word of the Lord." "If all, therefore nothing is wanting that was not granted to him," says Nicolaus I, Ep. 8 to the Emperor of Constantinople. With these agree the words of Zosimus (Ep. 11 to the Fathers of the Council of Carthage): "The tradition of the Fathers has attributed such authority to the Apostolic See that none dare dispute its judgment; such power, from the very promise of Christ our God, that it can both release what is bound and bind what is released—

and so, indeed, that no one can reconsider its sentence." That fullness of power was certainly defined by the Florentine Synod affirming that "to the Roman Pontiff in blessed Peter the full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church was handed by our Lord Jesus Christ." The same doctrine was confirmed by the Vatican Synod, Session 4, Chapter 3: "If anyone shall say that the Roman Pontiff has only the office of inspection or direction, but not the full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, not only in matters that pertain to faith and morals, but also in those that pertain to the discipline and governance of the Church spread throughout the whole world... let him be anathema." Indeed, compelled by universal consensus, even the Gallicans confessed this in Article 2 of their declaration, though out of their preconceived opinion they did not hesitate to assert at the same time what contradicts it—concerning which, in Thesis XIX.

II. But the difficulty is chiefly about the other sense of the fullness of power. And this question comes to this: whether the jurisdiction of the Bishops in their churches is immediately from Christ, or from Christ through the Roman Pontiff—that is, immediately from the Roman Pontiff. For no one denies that it is from Christ, from whom is all power in the Church, and also immediately from God by the immediacy of action, since God operates immediately in all things with all second causes; but the question is about the immediate principle, that is, by the immediacy of the suppositum, which excludes a second cause as intermediary between the first or principal cause and the effect.

There are therefore those who consider the ordinary jurisdiction of the Bishops to be immediately from Christ, and they use the arguments by which we already demonstrated (Prolegomenon, §17) the divine institution of the Episcopate. They explain this immediate derivation of power from Christ in a general way so as to say that it is conferred by Christ in the episcopal ordination itself, but exists only in first act and as regards exercise is bound and not reducible to act except when the Supreme Pontiff, approving the Bishop, assigns to him his territory and subjects. Thus they think the subordination of the Bishops toward the Roman Pontiff is kept safe; for even though both immediately from God obtain their jurisdiction, the Bishops nonetheless hold theirs subordinated to the power of the Roman Pontiff; nor is it necessary that

every jurisdiction proceeding immediately from God should be independent.

Others, on the contrary—and they are more numerous—consider that Christ indeed established the Episcopate and willed that the Church be governed by Bishops, but in such a way that ordinary jurisdiction is conferred on individual Bishops by the Pope, so that before this conferral by the Pope the jurisdiction of a Bishop has no force whatsoever from holy orders, not even in first act, but only an aptitude by Christ's institution to obtain jurisdiction.

In the former hypothesis it cannot be said that the Roman Pontiff can licitly and validly remove or restrict the jurisdiction of Bishops without just cause; for, once the condition of the assignment of subjects by the Roman Pontiff has been fulfilled, the jurisdiction divinely received asserts itself in the Bishops—it is indeed this very jurisdiction that is exercised; and while this can be modified and tempered by reason of dependence on the Roman Pontiff for just causes, and it will even be licit for the Roman Pontiff by way of interpreting divine right to declare that in certain cases it has been lost, it cannot directly be taken away from the Bishops; for in this subject it does not exist through him but by divine right, and divine right prevails over the right of the Pontiff. In the other hypothesis the Pope cannot indeed do this licitly, but he certainly can do so validly, such that his act has force of itself, and the Bishop cannot claim jurisdiction for himself on the pretext of a lack of just cause. From this it already begins to appear that this question is not merely verbal, as will be more evident in what follows; for the question touches on the nature of the Primacy and the whole economy of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. We are speaking of the jurisdiction of Bishops in their own churches; what is to be held about their jurisdiction in ecumenical synods with respect to the universal Church we shall teach afterwards in its proper place. The present question is one among Catholic theologians.

III. We therefore defend that the fullness of power of the Roman Pontiff over the universal Church is such that it either formally or virtually comprises all the power by which the Church is to be and is governed, and is therefore the immediate source from which the jurisdiction of the Bishops comes. This is the opinion which, together

with Cajetan in the *Tractatus de auctoritate Papae et concilii*, Chapter 3, and Domingo Soto in *In 4*, D. 20, Bellarmine follows in *De Romano Pontifice*, Book IV, Chapter 22 ff., where he says that it appears to be the opinion of the ancient scholastics Bonaventure, Albert, Durand, and others in the commentary on the *Sentences*, Book IV, D. 18 or 19 or 24; and indeed if you consult those passages you will be more assured that this is the opinion of the doctors we have named.

We therefore say first that this is required by the nature of the Primacy established by Christ; and therefore his words must be considered by careful analysis. For the Roman Pontiff has under Christ the keys of this kingdom of heaven which is the Church; now, comparing what we gave in the first Thesis, the function and power of the holder of the keys is represented in such a way that he himself opens and no one can close, that he himself closes and no one can open; and whoever has such a power of opening and closing, say a house, is by that very fact endowed with such a power that no one else can open or close except with him opening or closing at the same time, or making the power of opening or closing available. For if someone can open or close without him or without the power made by him, it could also happen that while he is opening someone closes, and while he is closing someone opens. The proper force, therefore, of this image of the keys—which the holder opens and no one closes, closes and no one opens—tends also to this: to signify that without his cooperation or without the power made available by him, no one can close or open. But if these things are transferred to the thing signified—which is power in the kingdom, that is in the Church—it is manifest that such a power of Peter is signified that no one can exercise any power in this kingdom, which is metaphorically called opening and closing, unless Peter cooperates or grants the faculty; not indeed in the sense that he cooperates with the Bishops—for this is excluded by the dignity of the Bishops, who are to be by Christ's institution the ordinary Pastors in the Church—but in the sense that they receive jurisdiction from the one who alone received the keys to be communicated to the others.

And indeed the Roman Pontiff can bind and loose all things in this kingdom. If the matter is considered of itself, an act of this power can also be this: that the jurisdiction of any Bishop may validly be

removed even without a certain cause or without a stated reason. The good of the Church—like that of no other society—does not require that the supreme power be exercised arbitrarily; but the good of the Church can require that the supreme power be such that its acts are valid even if exercised from time to time without just cause (for the frequency of such cases the very nature of the society and the utility of the supreme ruler, viewed in the light of moral laws and divine providence, will certainly prevent). This is certainly required with respect to many things that are subject to political authority, when in civil society the supreme power exercises itself—and this the social end itself, that is the tranquility of order, requires. Therefore Christ could confer on the Roman Pontiff this authority such that it is valid even without just cause to remove jurisdiction from a Bishop. But if this is so, the words of Christ—"whatsoever you shall bind," etc.—must be interpreted in such a way as to contain this power too. For Christ excepts no act of supreme jurisdiction, indeed he includes all; if therefore any limit is to be set, it must be drawn from the end, which is the good of the Church. But lest one err in using this norm, it must be applied with caution. That is, it must not be applied in such a way that only such authority is asserted as conferred by Christ on Peter as is necessary and sufficient, or as seems so to us; for it can happen that Christ wished to give something more, and the amplitude of Christ's words must be preserved as much as possible. But the norm must be applied in such a way that only that is excluded which cannot be reconciled with the useful governance of this kingdom, or which is excluded by some other known institution of Christ. But the useful governance of the Church does not exclude such power from the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, just as political societies do not exclude it from supreme authority; and the other institution of Christ, which is the institution of Bishops, is not contrary to this power of the Roman Pontiff—for with the fact that Christ willed there to be Bishops, it is fully compatible that he also willed their jurisdiction to depend entirely on his Vicar. Therefore the words of Christ spoken to Peter contain this power too. But the Roman Pontiff would not have this power if he did not confer jurisdiction on the Bishops, as we have already noted. Therefore.

And indeed the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff is the vicarious jurisdiction of Christ—it is namely the very jurisdiction of Christ communicated to the Roman Pontiff; and it is universal jurisdiction for the whole kingdom. But the institution of such vicarious power requires that whatever jurisdiction Christ exercises in the Church he exercises through his Vicar; but to confer jurisdiction is an act of jurisdiction. Therefore.

Such power was certainly understood by Optatus (Book VII, n. 3) when he says that "Peter alone received the keys of the kingdom to be communicated to the others," and by the Aquileian Council affirming with Ambrose (Ep. 11) that "from the Roman Church the rights of venerable communion flow forth to all"; and by Leo (Sermon 4 at his assumption) affirming that Christ never gave to others whatever he did not deny them except through Peter, and (Ep. 10) that he placed the sacrament of this office primarily in Peter, the head of all the Apostles, so that "as from a certain head he might diffuse his gifts as it were throughout the whole body"; and by Innocent III (Ep. 209, Book II) teaching that the other Bishops were called to a share of the solicitude in such a way that nothing of the fullness of power was subtracted from the successors of Peter, and that the Roman Church is the first and principal part of the universal Church as the head in the body, since in it the fullness of power exists and from it some portion of the fullness is derived to the others.

You will say that what is affirmed by Optatus and Leo was also said of Peter in relation to the Apostles, who did not receive jurisdiction immediately from Peter. I reply with Bellarmine (*De Romano Pontifice*, Book IV, Chapter 24) that these Fathers are speaking of the ordinary manner in which God confers his gifts on the heads of the Church, setting aside the extraordinary way which obtained for the Apostles. This reply is proved from the fact that otherwise such statements would be simply false. Nor—as Bossuet says (*Defensio Declarationis*, Part 2, Book 13)—could these things have been said on the grounds that jurisdiction was promised first to Peter as representing the other Pastors. For in this hypothesis it would indeed have been permissible to say that what is not denied to others was given in Peter, but not that it was given through him; nor would it be properly said that Peter received

the keys to be communicated by himself to the others—for in this formula some activity and authority of Peter is signified.

Another demonstration, showing that the jurisdiction of Bishops is conferred immediately by the Roman Pontiff, is deduced from an analysis of the opposing opinion, which contains a contradiction.

For it is affirmed that a consecrated Bishop has jurisdiction, and at the same time it is affirmed that subjects must be assigned by the Roman Pontiff for it to proceed to act. Therefore before the assignment made by the Roman Pontiff, there are no subjects for the consecrated Bishop, and no faithful can be designated over whom the Bishop has a right and who are bound to obey him. But these are contradictory statements; for jurisdiction is essentially something relative, requiring a terminus, namely subjects. It can indeed happen that jurisdiction exists only in habit, as in a king driven from his kingdom; but even in this case jurisdiction remains habitually, because those exist who are in themselves bound to obey him—for example the citizens of his kingdom—even though this obligation is accidentally suspended. But if those who can be called his subjects nowhere exist, neither does any jurisdiction remain in that exiled king. But the Bishop who is only consecrated is in the same position in the adversaries' hypothesis; for there are not yet, nor can there be designated, any who are subjects of the merely consecrated Bishop. For to designate them, the postulation of the people or the nomination of the Prince or the election of a chapter to some church does not suffice; it is certain that no jurisdiction is conferred on those elected or postulated by these acts, nor any obligation imposed on the faithful to obey them. Therefore the Bishop before the Roman Pontiff assigns subjects to him both has and does not have jurisdiction—which is contradictory. Therefore.

The same can be shown from the absence of a sufficient reason for what is affirmed in the opposing opinion. For it is said that jurisdiction is conferred in consecration; the question is whether it can or cannot be conferred before consecration by the Roman Pontiff. If you say it can, you must deny that such is this jurisdiction by the institution of Christ that it is immediately from God; once that is denied, there is no reason to contend that it is conferred immediately from God. If you deny it, you oppose the practice of the Roman See and the sense of the Church,

which holds those to be truly endowed with episcopal jurisdiction whom the Roman Pontiff has elected and confirmed even though not yet consecrated. It must therefore be said that one jurisdiction is different from another—that is, that its force or stability differs according to the different manner of conferral. But what is the reason for this affirmation as regards the force of jurisdiction? Since it is established that one who is not yet consecrated can in fact do the same things as one who is consecrated, as regards jurisdiction. As for stability, the reason why the jurisdiction is not so stable in the non-consecrated can be offered as follows: by Christ's institution, Bishops are those to whom the care of the Churches is generally to be entrusted; but this proves indeed that by Christ's institution Bishops must preside over the Churches; it does not prove, however, that they obtain jurisdiction immediately from Christ. Therefore.

Finally, one may argue thus with Bellarmine in the cited place, from the inequality of jurisdiction. For if God were to confer jurisdiction through ordination on Bishops, all Bishops would have equal jurisdiction, just as they have equal power of order; for God never determined the jurisdiction of Bishops in the individual (ἀτόμῳ); but all Bishops do not have the same jurisdiction—whether in extent or in intensity. Therefore.

Such, therefore, is the fullness of power of the Roman Pontiff that in him as in their source resides all the jurisdiction by which the Church is governed. This is certainly the opinion of St. Thomas, who teaches it in several places. Let these suffice to be cited. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book IV, Chapter 72: "For judiciary power two things are required, namely the authority to inquire into the fault and the power of absolving or condemning. And these two are called the two keys of the Church, namely the knowledge of discerning and the power of binding and loosing, which the Lord committed to Peter according to that text of Matthew: 'to thee I will give the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven.' But it must not be understood that he committed them to Peter so that Peter alone would have them, but so that through him they might be derived to others; otherwise there would not be sufficiently provided for the salvation of the faithful." In *In IV Sententiarum*, the last distinction, in the exposition of the text after article 3, question 2, he says: "I reply that

it must be said that a superior power and an inferior power can relate to each other in two ways. Either the inferior power proceeds entirely from the superior, and then the whole force of the inferior is founded upon the force of the superior, and then simply and in all things the superior power is more to be obeyed than the inferior—just as in natural things the first cause influences what is caused by the second cause more than the second cause itself; and as the power of God is related to all created power, so the power of the Emperor is related to the power of the Proconsul; so also the power of the Pope is related to every spiritual power in the Church, because by the Pope himself the various grades of dignity in the Church are both disposed and ordered; hence his power is a certain foundation of the Church, as is clear from Matthew XVI. And therefore in all things we are bound to obey the Pope more than the Bishops or Archbishops. Or a superior and inferior power can relate to each other in such a way that both proceed from some one supreme power, which subordinates one to the other according to its will; and then one is not superior to the other except in those matters in which one is subordinated to the other by the supreme power, and in those matters only is one more to be obeyed than the other. And it is in this way that the powers of a Bishop and an Archbishop, descending from the power of the Pope, are related to each other." Cf. also *In 4*, D. 20, q. 1, a. 4, to objection 2 and to objection 3: "Episcopal dignity as regards order is immediately from God and as regards jurisdiction from the Apostolic See." Pius VI in the Brief to the Bishop of Motula.

But just as on one hand the formula by which Bishops are accustomed to inscribe themselves as Bishops not only by the grace or mercy of God but also by the grace of the Apostolic See—a formula which first appears in the eleventh century and gradually obtained by custom in the end (cf. Francis Anthony Zaccaria, *Dissertationes Latinae*, Dissertation 12)—would be cited rather inaptly to confirm what we defend; so on the other hand it would be wrongly cited for the contrary opinion to appeal to the ancient usage of those who called themselves Bishops by the grace of God alone, by divine mercy alone, or by similar formulas from time to time. For each formula conveys a true sense in each opinion. For the origin of the more recent formula, see the author cited.

Moreover, the doctrine which we defend here must be combined with what we established in the Prolegomenon, §17, concerning the divine institution of the Episcopate. For from combining these it is established that it is not in the power of the Roman Pontiff to abolish episcopal jurisdiction or to govern the Church without Bishops who hold episcopal jurisdiction; but that he must call the Bishops to a share of the solicitude and confer episcopal jurisdiction on them over portions of the flock. And even though Christ did not determine in the individual (ἐν ἀτόμῳ) how great the episcopal jurisdiction must be, yet it is established that there must be conferred what is truly jurisdiction in the external forum—legislative, judicial, coercive—with respect to the governance of the individual church; for such is the proper jurisdiction of the Bishop or Shepherd, subordinated to the authority by which the whole Church is governed. So that individual Bishops can do nothing against the common law binding the whole Church, or in matters that of themselves pertain to the whole Church—such as the deciding of questions of faith and generally in those cases called major; but they can do in their churches all things necessary and useful for their proper governance, yet in such a way that this power is always subordinated to the power of the supreme Shepherd, who is the immediate Shepherd of all the faithful.

Accordingly, although episcopal jurisdiction is conferred through a man—that is, through the Roman Pontiff—it is nonetheless according to its institution a matter of divine right, which determined its nature according to its specific character—namely that it be a coercive power of governing, judging, and teaching portions of the flock—and its existence and perpetuity. Hence we do not deny that it can sometimes happen that the Roman Pontiff exceeds the measure in restricting the authority of the Bishops in certain accidental matters, as Bernard suggests (*De Consideratione*, Book III, Chapter 4; cf. the following Thesis), which even Nicholas V considered to have happened from time to time (in the response to the ambassadors of Germany after the beginning of his Pontificate; cf. Manetti in his life of Nicholas); for prudence is needed. But it must be remembered that the good of the universal Church prevails over the good of each individual Church, and that the union of the faithful with the Roman Pontiff who is the Rock of

the Church is more necessary than with individual Bishops; and that his acts can be valid even if perhaps less licit, as Bernard warns in the cited place; and that the supreme judge in a controversy about the limits of episcopal power is the one Bishop of Bishops, to whom the custody and defense of those rights too, as of all other rights that are in the Church, has been entrusted; and that he is the immediate source of episcopal jurisdiction, who is therefore truly honored when honor due to each of his brethren is not denied, as Gregory the Great says (Ep. 30, Book VIII, to Eulogius of Alexandria). Hence Nicholas V also said in the cited place: "It is our opinion that we should not despoil of their right those who are called to a share of the solicitude, namely the Bishops; for thus we hope to preserve our jurisdiction in future, if we have not usurped what belongs to others"—that is, what by Christ's institution is owed to them.

IV. The arguments advanced for the contrary opinion are drawn either from those scriptural testimonies by which we learn that by the authority of Christ or the Holy Spirit there are Bishops in the Church—as Acts XX:28 (that an appeal to Acts XIII:1–2 is inappropriate we showed in Thesis 6)—or from the fact that the Bishops are successors of the Apostles whom Christ sent immediately, just as the Roman Pontiffs are the successors of Peter; or from the fact that in our opinion the Bishops would be Vicars of the Pope, which in fact they are not; or from the fact that in the judgment of theologians the governance of the Church is monarchical tempered by aristocracy; or from the fact that in earlier times Bishops were established without the consent of the Roman Pontiff—either by the Apostles or later by Metropolitans or Patriarchs.

But: first, from those scriptural testimonies the divine institution of the Episcopate is indeed established; but the immediate conferral of power by God is not established. Second, the Bishops: a) are not successors of the Apostles in the strict sense of succession, because Bishops existed during the lifetime of the Apostles, who constituted them; nor are they b) successors in respect of equality, because the apostolic power as such ceased with the Apostles; but c) they are successors in respect of likeness, because in them there is continued a certain power of the Apostles—namely the power of binding and

loosing, of teaching and administering sacraments and of consecrating sacred ministers and bishops—which power Christ willed to be ordinary in the Church in those besides the successors of Peter. But these things do not require that Bishops be sent with the same mission with which the Apostles were sent. Just as priests too, by reason of the power of sacrificing and remitting sins, are called successors of the Apostles (Council of Trent, Session 23, Chapter 1)—without it being thereby permissible to infer that they have immediately from God jurisdiction in the court of conscience, or that they may lawfully celebrate Mass without the permission of the Bishop. Therefore d) it is false that the Bishops are the successors of the Apostles in the same way as the Roman Pontiff is the successor of Peter; for the Roman Pontiff succeeds in the entire jurisdiction of Peter, which was greater than in the other Apostles and ordinary; and moreover the Roman Pontiff sits in the episcopal chair of Peter, which by divine right at least of the consequent kind was elevated to the dignity of the Primacy; but the see of no Bishop exists by any divine right whatsoever.

Third, it is false that in our opinion the Bishops are Vicars of the Pope. For it is not by the right of the Pope but of Christ that the Bishops are in the Church, nor can the Pope abolish their dignity or authority; hence there is a double power and a double tribunal of the Pope and of the Bishop, because Christ willed there to be besides the chair of Peter the chairs of the Bishops. Nor are the Bishops delegates of the Pope, because they hold ordinary jurisdiction by virtue of an office instituted by Christ. The Bishops govern the sheep as their own, since by Christ's institution they must be the Shepherds of the portion of the flock over which they exercise the power of binding and loosing. And although the Roman Pontiff can validly remove jurisdiction from individuals and from all of them together, he is nonetheless obligated to substitute others, so that there may always be Bishops in the Church; for he himself cannot abolish episcopal authority.

Fourth, the tempering by aristocracy is contained in what we defend in the Prolegomenon, §17.

Fifth, the practice cited rather proves the contrary. For certainly the authority of Metropolitans and Patriarchs is not of divine right, and therefore is of ecclesiastical right and therefore ultimately of the Roman

Pontiff. If therefore the authority of Metropolitans or Patriarchs was required for a Bishop to have jurisdiction, then the jurisdiction of the Bishop flowed from ecclesiastical power—that is, from the power of the Pope. And indeed from this practice it is clear that the governing Church is the one that confers jurisdiction on Bishops; but the fullness of power is required to confer it; and the fullness of power is indeed in the Church but through the Roman Pontiff who alone is its subject; therefore from that practice it is clear that the ordinary jurisdiction of Bishops flows from the Roman Pontiff—whether from him conferring it explicitly, or tacitly as he approves the canons of synods, in accordance with which the election of Bishops is carried out. In the early centuries, moreover, the Roman Pontiff confirmed the Patriarchs by replying to them upon receiving the letters signifying their election, and through them confirmed mediately the others confirmed by them. But the Patriarchs had obtained the authority of confirming Bishops from their founder—that is, from Peter exercising the authority of the Primacy—which remains intact in his successors, who can therefore introduce a different arrangement. As for the Bishops established by the Apostles, since these—though fortified by so great an authority—were in reality inferior to Peter and were subject to his jurisdiction, and their extraordinary authority—part of which was the power to establish Bishops wherever they judged expedient—was bound to end with them and would therefore no longer be valid after their death; it is natural to think that they established Bishops in various places with the consent of Peter—that is, by virtue of that authority which was ordinary and would always endure, which was none other than the ordinary authority of Peter—so that the constitution of those Bishops would have permanent firmness. Just as it is certain that the Bishops were so established by the Apostles that the Apostles subordinated them to the chair of Peter, whose supreme authority over all the Bishops the Apostles taught the Churches together with the other dogmas.

V. It is therefore evident that the election of Bishops by divine right pertains to the Roman Pontiff, such that either he himself elects or he prescribes the mode of election (Bellarmine, *De Clericis*, Book I, Chapter 8). For one who by divine right is the supreme, universal, and immediate Shepherd of the Church has by the same right the power and

office of appointing those set over the individual portions of the flock who are called to a share of the solicitude; nor without his consent can others take upon themselves the feeding of those who are already his immediate subjects—lest they hear the Roman Pontiff saying to them: "What are you doing in my domain with those who are not mine?" Now one who has the right to appoint shepherds over the Churches also has the right to elect them; for they are elected precisely in order to be appointed. Therefore no election made without the authority of the one who by divine institution has the right to appoint those whom he considers suitable can have any force. If therefore in former times the right of election belonged either to the Bishops of the Province (Nicene canon 4), or to cathedral chapters (cf. the exposition of Gerhoh, a twelfth-century writer, on Psalm 64, n. 27), by which a certain right to the matter was conferred on the one elected, or to the Patriarchs or Metropolitans the right of canonically appointing pastors, it must be said that this derived from a concession of the Vicar of Christ arranging things thus for the good of the Church. For the decrees of the Nicene Synod derived their authority from the Roman See, and the authority of the Patriarchs had its origin from Peter. Therefore since all things reside in the power of the Vicar of Christ, it is impious and absurd to contend that the elections of Bishops should now take place in the manner in which they took place formerly, as if the Bishops of the Province or the clergy of the Church at that time elected by some right inherent in themselves—a right of which they would now be unjustly despoiled. This is utterly false and blasphemous. What, moreover, the role of the people in the election of Bishops is, we stated in the Prolegomenon, §8, n. 5.

SCHOLION

Since the question of the election of the Roman Pontiff is now being agitated by certain would-be scholars, it will not be beside the point to discuss it specifically. First, therefore, the question of right must be distinguished from the question of fact. If the question of right is discussed, it is evident that it is in the power of the Roman Pontiff alone to determine the form of this election, and to do so in such a way that

any election made otherwise is null. For the determination of that thing which pertains to the common good of society and from which there follows the obligation of the whole society is an act of jurisdiction proper to the supreme authority to which the whole society is subject. But the election of the Pontiff is a matter pertaining to the good of the whole Church and from it there follows the obligation by which the whole Church is bound to obey the person elected. But the supreme authority of the Church resides only in the Roman Pontiff—for it is the Primacy which is his very own. Therefore the Roman Pontiff alone has the right to establish the valid form of election.

Nor is there any vicious circle here; for the first Roman Pontiff—that is, Peter—needed no election, but assumed this chair by his own right, and both he and those after him could determine the form of election of their successors.

From this it follows that one who would be elected according to a different form from that established by the authority of the Roman Pontiff would not be truly elected, nor would the authority of the Primacy be conferred on him by God; but if he wished to govern the Church, he would be an execrable tyrant, even if all the powers of the world were in his favor—for he would be filling the role of Satan bearing the principate among the children of darkness.

As to the question of fact, let these individual observations suffice. First, the successor of Peter appears to have been designated by Peter himself. Second, in the early centuries of the Church the election of the Roman Bishop appears to have been carried out in the manner in which the election of Bishops of the principal sees was generally conducted—with the Bishops of the Roman synod convening, the clergy and the Roman people present. For so Cornelius was elected "by the testimony of almost all the clergy, by the suffrage of the people who were then present, by the assembly (or in another reading, the consent) of aged and good priests"—as Cyprian testifies, Ep. 32. The participation of the people long remained vigorous in the election of the Pontiff. It appears in the election formulas exhibited in the *Liber Diurnus*, §§58, 60; and it still appears in the middle ages in the decree of Nicholas II (see below). And it was the cause of many disturbances and not infrequently of elections that were less than praiseworthy.

Third, toward the end of the fifth century, Odoacer, King of the Goths, during the pontificate of Felix III, claimed for himself the right to confirm the one elected. The clergy and people of Rome did not comply with this decree, but it was the occasion of a schism in the election of Symmachus. Moreover, the Emperor Justinian claimed for himself by hereditary right the usurpation of the Gothic kings, whom he had driven from Italy—though the decree of Odoacer had been annulled by the Roman Synod under Symmachus.

Fourth, Constantine Pogonatus, at the request of the Roman See, during the pontificate of Benedict II, renounced in the year 684 the use of this confirmation. But this good will of Constantine proved of no avail; for the other Emperors continued to claim this right for themselves—until the yoke was entirely shaken off under Zachary, when the Iconoclasts were ruling.

Fifth, Stephen IV in the Lateran Council of the year 769 enacted this decree in Act 3: "But this too we decree under the penalty of anathema, that no layman whatsoever—whether from the armed forces (from the soldiery) or from any other class—shall presume to take part in the election of the Pontiff; but the election of the Pontiff itself shall come from certain priests and heads of the Church and from the whole clergy. And before the Pontiff elected shall have been conducted to the Patriarchate, all the nobles of the military, the whole army and honorable citizens and the whole general populace of this Roman city ought to hasten to salute him as lord of all. And so making a decree in the customary manner and all concurring together in it, they ought to subscribe." From all of this it is clear that the people were not entirely excluded from the business of election, but that a certain moderation was added to their action—so that they should not anticipate by petitioning but should follow by concordant subscription the election made by the clergy. Certainly in subsequent elections over many centuries the action of the people appears. Since, moreover, the authority of a Christian Emperor who would use it well could contribute to restraining disturbances in the business of elections and to keeping the factious in order, the Roman See at some periods tolerated it, and Gregory the Great himself when elected had not disapproved of it.

Sixth, Charlemagne in the year 814 commanded as executor of the canons that one who had been elected without contradiction should immediately be consecrated, asking only that once consecrated, legates be sent to him and his successors for the fellowship of peace. The Carolingian Emperors however, beginning with Louis the Pious, wished to meddle in the election of the Pontiff, commanding that the one elected not be consecrated without their consent; and Lothair contended for this under Valentine. This did not please the Romans, and therefore without the consent of the Emperor they ordained Gregory IV as successor. This displeased Lothair, who renewed his commands under Sergius III.

Seventh, under Adrian II the election of the Pontiff obtained full liberty from the unjust Frankish oppression. Pertinent to this period is what Florus, Deacon of Lyons, says in his book *On the Election of Bishops*, written around the year 880 (cf. Gallandi, Vol. 13). He says, n. 6: "Even in the Roman Church to this day (he appears to have considered what was then the custom to have always been in force) we observe that Pontiffs are legitimately consecrated without the questioning of the Prince, by the sole judgment of the constitution and the suffrage of the faithful." But John IX, who occupied the see in the year 898, of his own accord tempered that liberty at the Roman Synod in canon 10, decreeing thus: "Since the Holy Roman Church suffers many acts of violence, in that upon the death of the Pontiff the consecration of the Pontiff takes place without the knowledge of the Emperor and the presence of his legates, and those sent by the Emperor according to canonical rite and custom are not present at the ceremony, to prevent acts of violence and scandal in the consecration (this being the office of imperial authority), we will that henceforth this be abolished; and the Pontiff to be installed, with the Bishops and the whole clergy convening, shall be elected at the request of the Senate and the people, and thus once publicly and solemnly elected in the sight of all, with the imperial legates present, he shall be consecrated." Subsequently, however, the election was frequently made without the knowledge of the Emperor, until under Clement II it was decreed by Henry III in the year 1036, with the consent of the Roman people who desired that disturbances and seditions be prevented, that the election of

a Pontiff made without the consent of Henry himself should not be considered valid.

Eighth, Nicholas II enacted this decree at the Roman Synod in the year 1059, in which the Cardinal electors begin to stand out prominently: "The most devout men shall be the leaders in promoting the election of the Pontiff; the rest shall be the followers. However, a certain and legitimate order of election is discerned if, having considered the rules and acts of various Fathers, the sentence also of our predecessor of blessed memory Leo is recalled. 'No reason,' he says, 'permits that those be counted among Bishops who have been neither elected by the clergy, nor sought by the people, nor consecrated by the Bishops of the province with the judgment of the Metropolitan.' But since the Apostolic See is preferred before all the Churches throughout the world and therefore cannot have a Metropolitan above itself, the Cardinal Bishops beyond doubt perform the function of a Metropolitan, namely to raise the elected Bishop to the apex of the apostolic summit." In the same document he decreed that in the election the due honor and reverence of his beloved son Henry, then King and future Emperor, be preserved, as he had already conceded to him, and that the same honor be granted to his successors who shall have obtained this right in person from the Apostolic See. Finally the election began to be made by the Cardinals alone, which Alexander III so defined at the ecumenical Lateran Council of the year 1179 that "he shall be held by the whole Church without exception as the Roman Pontiff who shall have been elected and received by two thirds" (Chapter *Licet*, on election and the power of the one elected).

Note that Nicholas II in the cited place decreed that as soon as someone had been elected Roman Pontiff he could perform all acts of jurisdiction even before consecration. This follows of itself from the fact that the power of the Primacy is given by no man and that jurisdiction is not conferred through ordination. In the early centuries, however, consecration appears to have been regarded as the complement of election.

Now the form of election confirmed by Alexander III acquired commendation from experience and proved itself to the universal Church for many centuries. Who is so foolish as to desire that form

which, with the involvement of the common people, produced so many disturbances, seditions, and elections of unworthy men, especially in the tenth century? Moreover, as we have already said, the only legitimate form is that which has been determined by the competent authority—that is, by the Roman Pontiff.

THESIS XV

It is therefore proper to the power of the Primacy that it is not coactively circumscribed or limited by any ecclesiastical canons.

I. Canons are either of divine or natural right, or ecclesiastical; the latter are either universal or particular; and these either proceed from a Council—whether ecumenical or of some province—or from the Roman See alone. We do not dispute about canons of divine or natural right, but about the others. Here we encounter the Gallicans. For in the Declaration of the year 1682, having in article 2 premised the authority of general Councils above the Pontiff, they gather in article 3: "Hence the use of the Apostolic power is to be regulated by the canons established through the Spirit of God and consecrated by the reverence of the whole world; the rules, customs, and institutions received by the Kingdom and the Gallican Church have their force, the limits set by the Fathers remain unshaken, and it pertains to the greatness of the Apostolic See that those statutes and customs confirmed by the consent of so great a See and of the Churches should have their own stability."

The force of this article is explained for us by Benignus Bossuet in the *Defensio Declarationis*, Book 11. The authors of that article therefore hold that the fullness of ecclesiastical power is with Peter and his successors by divine right; but that the exercise of this power is to be regulated by the Sacred Canons. They say "exercise," not the power itself, because they concede that the Pope can do all things when necessity demands; but they know that the canons consecrated by universal reverence prescribe rules which he himself ought to follow. Since, therefore, the canons have regard not for the power in itself but for its use only, it is therefore said that the exercise of the power is to be regulated (Chapter 20). These are the words of Gerson in his treatise *On Ecclesiastical Power and the Origin of Right and Laws*, published at

Constance during the general Council, divided into 13 Considerations. Consideration 10: "The general Council has the authority to prescribe laws or rules according to which the fullness of papal power—not in itself, which is always the same, but in its use—is to be regulated and directed." Namely, the Church cannot be governed by the arbitrary will of the Roman Pontiff; but in the governance of the universal Church he must follow the canons universally received and consecrated by the reverence of the whole world; and in the governance of particular Churches—such as the Gallican Church—he must follow the rules received in those churches. Under the name of rules are also comprehended approved customs. Now those laws or rules are held to be received and approved which have been received and approved by the consent of the Roman See together with the churches (Defensio Declarationis, Chapter 2). Hence laws enacted by the Roman Pontiff against the disposition of the Sacred Canons must be held as null (Chapter 10), and if they are of such a kind as to fundamentally undermine all discipline, there is recourse to a general Council (ibid.). The Roman Pontiff can indeed dispense from the laws of the Church; but dispensations without cause are not only illicit but also invalid (Chapters 17, 18, 10). Nor are new laws or new rights rejected; but they must be measured by the norm of the old, so that the limits set by the Fathers remain unshaken (Chapters 13, 14). Moreover, as the power of the Pontiff is related to universal canons and customs, so it is also related to the canons and customs of particular churches; and the customs of these have the same force as canons (Chapter 12). The proper office of the Roman Pontiff therefore is to take care and bring it about that the canons which he has established together with the Church be observed (Chapter 10); and the Roman Church—that is, the Roman Pontiff—is governed by and bound by the same laws as the whole Church (Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6).

The reason for all of this is that the supreme power of the Church is in the universality, or in the Council representing the universal Church, to which the Roman Pontiff himself is subject, as article 2 declares (Chapter 15). Moreover, the doctrine contained in this third article is the foundation of the discipline and liberties of the Gallican Church (Chapter 2); which liberties (according to the testimony of

Bossuet, for not all hold the same opinion; cf. Charlas, *De Libertatibus Ecclesiae Gallicanae*, Book I, Chapter 3) consist in the fact that the Church of France is governed according to the common law, by the authority of Councils and the rules of the holy Fathers (Chapter 9). Hence he says that the Bishops of France do not reject the new law received among them, but contend that extraordinary laws and arbitrary power have no place in the governance of their churches, and that in this they place ecclesiastical liberty (Chapter 20) (Gerson retracted and rejected his opinion on the superiority of the Council over the Pope in the last years of his life after the Council of Constance. He calls that opinion a new one. See Bernard Desirant, *Consilium Pietatis*, Dissertation 2, *De Retractationibus Ioannis Charlier Gersonii*).

II. In order that the great levity of this most false opinion may be apparent, we note first, that when we speak of acts of power, a distinction must be made between the liceity of the act and its validity. For an act can be illicit and yet valid; on which point consult the treatises on natural law and the moral theologians. Moreover, when it is said that the power of the Roman Pontiff is not limited by canons, the meaning is not that his acts are exempt from the law of moral uprightness; but it is meant that for his act to be valid it need not be in conformity with preceding canons, and that he can abrogate preceding canons.

Second, although by the force of the word the term "arbitrary power" could denote (if the sense of the word is considered) that power which in society is independent and decides all things by its own will not constrained by any law, in common usage that power is called arbitrary which acts without counsel; and because when counsel is lacking, laws cannot be enacted that conduce to the common good, arbitrary power is that which is despotic and by which not the common good but rather the good of the prince enacting the laws is promoted—for then the prince decrees what pleases him. One may rightly ask whether the supreme power of the Church, which the Gallicans claim for the ecumenical Council, is limited by preceding canons. Some do not hesitate to affirm this, when they build up the Gallican liberties even against the decrees of Councils (cf. Marca, *Concordia Sacerdotii et Imperii*, Book III, Chapter 7); but this is most absurd. For if that is so,

the power that now prevails in the whole Church is no longer what Christ first instituted, and an age could finally come in which there is no longer even the smallest legislative power. And indeed there is no reason why the Gallicans should deny that power to exist in the Church which they admit exists in civil society, and which they assert for the king, of whose authority they make no end of magnifying. Now we hold the power of the Roman Pontiff to be unlimited in the same manner as the power of the ecumenical Council—over which he himself presides—is to be held unlimited. Who with a sound mind would dare to call the power of these Councils "unlimited" in the sense of "arbitrary"?

Third, when it is said that new canons must be measured by the norm of the old: a) several false things are implicitly affirmed; b) a rule is proposed which not even those who propose it understand; c) and one which serves only to subvert the hierarchical subordination. For a) it is implicitly affirmed that the power of the present Church is not the same as that of the primitive Church, which is absurd; it is affirmed or supposed that the ancient Church enacted its canons in such a way that it willed that they could not be wholly abolished by legitimate authority even if circumstances changed entirely and new needs arose—which is to represent the primitive Church as foolish; it is affirmed that the ancient canons are better than new canons could be—which can be proved by no argument. Indeed, it is well established that in the course of time the discipline of the Church has been changed for the better in many things. Is not the present discipline concerning the election of Bishops, concerning the administration of the Eucharist in which the chalice has been withdrawn from the laity, concerning the state of religious profession, concerning the impediments to marriage, better and more perfect than what preceded it? b) They want new canons to be measured by the norm of the old because they do not want canons that are contrary to the old ones; but what is it for new canons to be measured by the norm of the old? Let Bossuet be heard in the cited work, Chapter 14: "Our liberty therefore, to put it briefly, is placed in the observance of new rights, which are established for motives of piety or necessity, but in such a way that the old canons are always kept in view, to which one must always return lest discipline be relaxed." Very well. But what is to be done if piety or necessity requires that a law wholly

contrary to the old be enacted—such as the law abolishing the use of the chalice for the laity, and the participation of the people in the election of the Roman Pontiff and of Bishops, and the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council conferring the second place after the Roman Bishop on the Bishop of Constantinople? Could these things have been enacted? I believe Bossuet will not deny it. But how, when these things were enacted, were the old canons kept in view? Namely, account was taken of the common good, toward which the old canons too were directed; but this is not to keep the old canons in view, unless as they are to be abolished for consulting the common good—but not as a norm according to which new laws are made. Therefore the Gallicans concede that new canons can be made when the reason of piety or necessity requires it; but piety and necessity can require that canons be enacted wholly contrary to the old ones; but such canons the Gallicans do not want. Do they therefore know what they themselves mean? Accordingly c) what must inevitably follow from this proposed rule? This one thing: under the pretext of novelty, to reject all those recent decrees—whether of the Roman See or of an ecumenical Council—that do not please. For with that rule established, there is no way to persuade anyone to obey any recent decree, unless you contradict yourself.

What, therefore, was or is the liberty of the Gallican Church? When you hear "liberty of the Church," you would think it has reference to the powers and princes of the world, who often are ambitious to invade the rights of the Priesthood, as the Church herself has always understood it. But you are gravely mistaken. The liberty of the Gallican Church was directed against the head of the Church established by Christ, against the legitimate superior of the Gallican Church—it was the liberty of rejecting his decrees. And just as liberty from justice is slavery to sin, so the liberty from the Roman Pontiff was servitude rendered to the King, into whose power the Bishops delivered themselves.

III. These preliminaries having been set out, let us come to the proof of the Thesis and the refutation of article 3. Now the question is not whether canons enacted for the governance of the Church have a directive force upon the Roman Pontiff. The directive force of some norm consists in the fact that one who follows it acts honestly and licitly

and properly fulfills his office. The question therefore is not whether the Roman Pontiff is obligated from the law of moral uprightness, so as to give account to God, to procure the observance of the canons both in his own particular Church and in the others, so that he may rightly govern the Church—to which he is bound by moral obligation, the power of dispensing always remaining where necessity demands it; nor is the question whether every law or sentence enacted by him is valid—for we know that unjust laws and sentences are in themselves null. But the question is whether the Roman Pontiff is bound by the coactive force—both preceptive and punitive—of ecclesiastical canons, so that as one inferior to those laws he can be obligated and bound by the penalties established by them, and therefore his act decreeing something against those canons or abrogating them is thereby invalid on the sole ground that it is against them, even if what the Pontiff prescribes is not in itself something dishonest. For this is what it means for canons to have coactive force over someone. This we deny against the Gallicans. And we refute the Gallican position as follows.

Indeed, first, these two things which the authors of the declaration assert—that the full power of spiritual affairs resides in Christ's vicars the successors of Peter (art. 2), and that the use of the Apostolic power is to be regulated by canons (art. 3)—imply a manifest contradiction. For power is power toward act; power in habit can indeed be conceived and exist without act, but it cannot be conceived or exist without ordination to act; hence, if the act is impossible, there is no longer power with respect to that act. From this it follows that to place limits on the exercise of power such that it cannot effect certain acts is to limit the power itself; nor can power in potency be greater than what can come to act, since power in potency is nothing other than what can issue into act. There was therefore no reason why Bossuet should praise (at the cited place, Chapter 20) the accurate manner of speech of the Gallican assembly—or his own, if he is the author of those articles—because they said that not the power but the exercise of the power is to be regulated. For the full power of jurisdiction in the Church is that whole power which Peter had; it is the power that can perform all the acts by which jurisdiction is exercised in the Church. But power limited by canons is no longer that whole power which Peter had; it can no

longer perform all the acts by which jurisdiction is exercised in the Church, for it cannot itself decide anything about those matters concerning which predecessors could. It is therefore not full power. Therefore these two articles labor under a contradiction.

Second, what the power of the Roman Pontiff is and what its relationship to the canons enacted by the Church is must be discerned from the words of Christ who established the Primacy—though the most illustrious Bossuet preferred to pass over them in silence. But the power of the Roman Pontiff is the universal power of binding and loosing all things, it is an efficacious power—namely of binding and loosing in such a way that what it binds, God immediately binds, what it looses, God immediately looses; it is the power of binding and loosing proper to one who has the keys of this kingdom which is the Church—namely a power independent of any other power in this kingdom (Thesis I on these words of Christ). Now if the Pontiff can loose all things, he will be able to loose the laws or canons already enacted; if the loosing by the Pontiff is immediately followed by the loosing of God, no force in the Church can impede the loosing of the Pontiff; if his power is independent, it is incompatible that the Pontiff be bound by another or by others. But with these is incompatible a power whose exercise is to be regulated by canons, by whose preceptive and coactive force the Pontiff is bound. Therefore.

They say it is incredible that Christ permitted all things in the Church to the will of one person who disposes everything according to his will. I reply: first, it is remarkable that this should be said by those who in civil society permit all things to the will of one person whose authority they hold to be received immediately from God and independent of any power on earth; second, what Christ willed must be investigated from the explicit words of Christ manifesting his will, not from certain opinions of reason; third, given that the will of Christ is clear, this objection is nothing but an injustice inflicted on Christ, as if he did not know how to provide for the good of his Church. Moreover, fourth, Christ did not confer such power on Peter and his successors in such a way as to exempt them from the moral law of uprightness and from the obligation of right governance.

But against the excesses of tyrannical governance, Christ set several impediments. These are first the authority of their brethren—that is, the Bishops—who, if the Pontiff evidently commanded unjust things not walking according to the Gospel, could correct him and resist him; which is permissible for them not on account of any authority they have over him, but because the right of defense belongs to all and because an unjust law is no law, and this the Bishops can teach. An example of this is provided for us by ecclesiastical history in the time of Paschal II. An impediment is likewise the charism of infallibility with which the Roman Pontiff is endowed; for by this he is prevented from enacting laws for the universal Church that are in themselves evil; and although this does not directly prevent him from pronouncing unjust sentences or commanding unjustly in particular cases, indirectly however it can not infrequently do so—whenever, namely, things could be brought to the point where the Pontiff would have to defend his command or sentence by defining that what is commanded is right and holy. An impediment is also that spirit by which the Church is governed, which makes the Church universally abhor unjust and evil laws; for by this the one who governs her—who in this hypothesis would be seeking his own advantage—is morally prevented from enacting such laws. An impediment is also finally that the Pontiff lacks the immediate exercise of that means by which wicked Princes are accustomed to defend their unjust laws—namely, the immediate use of physical force by which he could coerce the reluctant Churches; but the mediate use of this force through the precept imposed on Princes, when an unjust law of the Pontiff would have to be defended—given that the Bishops teach its injustice and the Church resists—is morally impossible. Thus an evil Pontiff, if he wishes to maintain his authority, is morally compelled to abstain from unjust and tyrannical laws. Christ therefore adequately provided for the right exercise of the power of the Primacy.

Third, canons enacted by the whole Church are considered either as proceeding from the Roman Pontiff who confirms them with his authority, or as proceeding from the other Bishops, or as proceeding from all together. But insofar as they proceed from the other Bishops, they cannot bind the Roman Pontiff; for the whole remaining body is

inferior to the head, and an inferior cannot bind a superior. Insofar as they proceed from the Roman Pontiff, they cannot bind him either, because no one can exercise coactive force on himself, nor can he bind his successors, since they enjoy the same power. But insofar as they proceed from all together, they have no more force over the Roman Pontiff than if they proceeded from him alone. For since the Roman Pontiff holds the fullness of power, any other power is dependent on him; and he can loose and nullify all its acts; but a dependent power adds no coactive force to a decree with respect to its superior. Therefore as regards the Roman Pontiff it is the same whether a canon was enacted by the Apostolic See alone or by the whole Church together with him. But he himself cannot be bound by his own acts. Therefore.

Fourth, article 3 of the Gallicans perverts the whole form of governance of the Church established by Christ. For with this position in place, the Roman Pontiff would have only the supreme executive power, as happens in what is called a constitutional kingdom, but not the supreme legislative power, which would truly reside in the body of the Church and to which the Pontiff himself would be subject. But the Roman Pontiff received from Christ the supreme full power—not only executive but also legislative and judicial; for both of these are contained in the universal power of binding and loosing, in the power of feeding—that is, of governing the universal Church—so that he can truly be called, as Peter was called by Gregory of Nazianzus (*Apologia*, n. 15), "our Lawgiver." Therefore.

IV. Therefore canons have only a directive force over the Pontiff. That they have this directive force is manifest. For if canons have been enacted by the whole Church for the good of the Church, since the Church is governed by the Holy Spirit, it must be held that those canons are useful to the Church and that the good of the Church requires generally, unless conditions change, that they be observed. Since, therefore, the Roman Pontiff must by his office procure the good of the Church, in order to attain it he must measure his governance by the norm of the canons insofar as in the circumstances in which he finds himself the good of the Church requires it. If he does not do this, he will violate the divine or natural law, no less than if he did not enact a new law which he certainly knows to be necessary for the Church, and he

will render to God an account of his sin. The distinction, therefore, between the directive and the coactive force of canons is presented to us by the very nature of the Primacy instituted by Christ; for it is proper to the supreme and full power in a monarchical society that the monarch is not coactively bound by the laws of the society.

The observation made in Thesis 14 must be recalled—that even if the non-honest exercise of power is not useful to society, it is nonetheless useful that its acts be valid even when they are less licit, provided they are not certainly unjust; for an unjust law, as we said, is no law.

Since, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff is supreme and immediate over all the Churches and all the faithful, no Church can oppose its own laws or customs to the decrees of the Roman Pontiff decreeing something for that Church; that is, no Church can, under pretext of its own laws or customs, refuse obedience to the Roman Pontiff when he commands.

V. The arguments by which Bossuet defends article 3 of the Gallicans are contained both in the testimonies of certain Roman Pontiffs who denied that they could act against the canons (Zosimus, Ep. 6 to the Bishops of the Provinces of Narbonne and Vienne), who assert that it is right that the Roman Church—which also confirms each Synod by its authority—should observe the canons which the universal consent of the Church has approved (Gelasius, Ep. 13 to the Bishops of Dardania), who affirm that what is done against the canons is improper and reprehensible, and that privileges established by the decrees of the Nicene Synod cannot be changed by any novelty (Leo, Ep. 106 to Anatolius and Ep. 104 to Marcian); and also in the acts of certain Bishops or Synods of Gaul which rejected certain decrees and privileges issuing from the Roman See as contrary to or beyond the canons; and also in the oath which the elected Pontiffs take to observe the canons. Bossuet, at the cited place, Chapters 3, 4, 5, 7, 8.

But to begin with the last: the oath does not have this purpose—that the Pontiffs acknowledge themselves to be bound by the coactive force of the canons, or that they subject themselves to it; but that they profess their will to govern the Church as the nature of their office demands, by promoting its good, and therefore by keeping the canons

and directing their governance according to them. To the other point we reply that it is quite inept enough (though most frequent among the Gallican writers) to wish to gather right from certain facts, as if acts could not be done in excess of and contrary to right. That the Bishops, and not rarely, resisted the Apostolic See is a fact unknown to no one; but it must moreover be proved that they resisted rightly. Otherwise their acts will stand in the same place as the declaration of the Gallican Clergy. For the rest, in the few facts which Bossuet recounts in Chapters 7 and 8, the historical truth itself is wanting. Cf. the Council of Mouzon of the year 948, the Council of Anse of 1025, compared with that of Chalon of 1063, and the Second Council of Limoges of 1031. For when matters are even lightly weighed, it is clear that the Bishops refused to accept certain rescripts of the Roman See because they appeared to suffer from the defect of surreptition (cf. the excellent work of Marchetti, *Critica del Fleury*, art. 2, Chapter 2, n. 74), and that once this doubt was removed they received them respectfully, even though contrary to the common law. This is clear from the cited Council of Chalon. But when the Fathers of Limoges say that Peter would not have absolved that subject of Martial whom he had known to be excommunicated by Martial himself: if they wish to deny the right of Peter, they are not to be heard; but if they are only asserting what Peter would have done out of reverence for the Bishop, they are not opposing us.

Now the statements of the Roman Pontiffs carry this sense: that it is not lawful for them to act against the canons when this would be to the detriment of discipline—that is, to permit a relaxation of the canons by which the good of the Church is provided for—because they are bound by the divine and natural law to procure the good of the Church and will render to God an account of their governance; not because they are bound by the coactive force of the canons. Nor does anyone doubt that it is manifestly evil to act against the canons—namely, on the part of those who are subject to the canons, such as Anatolius. Moreover, a special reverence was paid to the canons of the Nicene Synod as the first, to which therefore "no matter how much more numerous a number of priests would not dare to compare itself or set itself above" (St. Leo, Ep. 106). The decree of this Synod concerning the first sees had

to be kept inviolate above all in the time of Leo for the good of the Church. But in order to make our interpretation of the words of the Roman Pontiffs clearly evident, it will suffice to adduce what Leo the Great declared and did in the case of Anatolius.

Anatolius had procured that the Fathers of Chalcedon should establish by canon that the Church of Constantinople was second after the Roman, and should therefore be preferred to Alexandria and Antioch, and that the three exarchates of Asia, Pontus, and Thrace, in which it would exercise patriarchal rights, should be subject to it. The Fathers of Chalcedon, in the absence of the Legates of the Roman See, had confirmed this by canon 28. Leo was unwilling to give his consent, which was requested; he declared that this could not be done, because it was contrary to the canon of the Nicene Council—"since against the statutes of the paternal canons which were established by spiritual decrees at the city of Nicaea so many long years ago, nothing may be added to anyone; so that if anyone wishes to decree something different, he may rather diminish himself than corrupt those decrees" (Ep. 103 to Pulcheria). Now it must be noted that at that time the question was not of a canon to be enacted by Leo alone, but to be enacted by an ecumenical council together with the Pontiff; the council had already given its vote, and the confirmation of Leo alone was desired. Therefore when the Pontiff says that this cannot be done, he does not deny that he alone can do it—for this was not the question; but he denies that he together with the Council, or that the ecumenical Council together with him, can do it. It is now permissible to ask Bossuet what kind of impossibility this is: is it from a defect of jurisdiction, or from a defect of the uprightness of the act, which then would not have been lawful because—as Leo himself indicates in the same place—the peace and concord of the Churches would be disturbed? It is evident to any Catholic that there was no defect of jurisdiction. For if jurisdiction was lacking then, it would always have been lacking in the future. But it is established that Innocent III at the Lateran Council paid that honor to the See of Constantinople which Leo had denied. Will Bossuet say that the Lateran Council erred and failed to recognize the limits of its own power? But it did what Chalcedon had declared it could not do when Leo was alive. Therefore it was not a defect of jurisdiction that was the

reason why it was said then that this could not be done. Nor can one suspect that Leo was ignorant of the rights of Councils and of his own See. It remains, therefore, that Leo denied he could do it because it was not lawful—"since, namely, as he himself says (Ep. 119 to Maximus of Antioch), the tranquility of universal peace cannot be maintained otherwise than if its own reverence is kept inviolate for the canons."

But the words of the other Pontiffs in similar cases are no different from—and generally less forceful than—those of Leo. It is therefore right, with history also lending its support, that we have interpreted them in this way. Nor do the words of Leo in Sermon 4 at his assumption set any limit to the authority of the Pontiff: "The privilege of Peter therefore endures wherever judgment is rendered according to his equity." For the meaning is that judgments in the Church are valid when they are rendered according to the equity of Peter, that is, the Roman Pontiff—that is, according to the norm of law and equity established by him. This is certainly required by the context. For what precedes is: "The right of this power (of binding and loosing) has indeed passed to the other Apostles, and the constitution of this decree has spread to all the heads of the Church; but not without reason is it committed to one what is declared to all. For Peter is therefore entrusted with this individually because he is set before all the rulers of the Church as the model of Peter." And what follows is: "And neither is severity nor remission excessive when nothing will be bound, nothing loosed, except what blessed Peter has either loosed or bound." With all of these our interpretation is consistent.

THESIS XVI

The Gallicans were wrong to appeal to the decrees of the Council of Constance and the positions of other councils in defense of their doctrine concerning the power of the Roman Pontiff.

I. The Gallicans acknowledged in article 2 of their Declaration that the Roman Pontiff possesses full power; yet they understood this differently from everyone else. The Gallican position was set forth in article 2 as follows: that full power over spiritual matters resides in the Apostolic See and in the successors of Peter as vicars of Christ, in such a

way that the decrees concerning the authority of general councils contained in Sessions 4 and 5 of the holy ecumenical Council of Constance—approved by the Apostolic See, confirmed by the practice of the Roman Pontiffs and of the whole Church, and guarded by the Gallican Church with perpetual devotion—simultaneously hold force and stand unshaken; and that the Gallican Church does not approve of those who would undermine the binding force of those decrees on the pretext that their authority is doubtful or insufficiently approved, or who would twist the Council's words so as to apply them only to the time of the schism. The Gallican position, examined more closely in the writings of those who undertook its defense, comes down to this.

First, this principle is established: namely, that the supreme power of jurisdiction and of teaching in the Church resides in the body of Pastors as a whole, so that this collection of all of them together—whether teaching each from his own see or assembled together in a Synod—is the sole subject of the supreme ecclesiastical power. The Roman Pontiff, who is the Prince of Pastors, also belongs to this body, and it belongs to him by ordinary right to convoke an ecumenical Synod and to preside over it, and without this convocation and presidency there is no ecumenical Council, that is, no subject of supreme power. But once the fathers have been convoked in Synod, since supreme power resides in the body as a whole, the binding force of the decrees depends on the consent of all or of the greater part, and the vote of the Roman Pontiff stands on no different footing from the vote of any other Bishop; and just as, once a decree has been established by the greater part of the Synod, individuals—even those who previously dissented—are subject to it, so too the Roman Pontiff, even if he was previously of another opinion, is bound to obey the Synod. It was in this sense that the Gallicans said the Pope is subject to the Council. From this it further follows that it is lawful to appeal from the judgment of the Roman Pontiff to an ecumenical Synod.

Given this premise—that supreme power resides in the body as a whole and in that alone, and that the Pontiff is thus subject to the authority of an ecumenical Synod so convoked and celebrated—it follows that the Roman Pontiff can be corrected and judged by the body assembled in Synod; and therefore, in the extraordinary case where the

Pope conducts himself badly and truly harms the Church, the body of Pastors can legitimately convoke itself into a Synod and institute a judgment concerning the Roman Pontiff, who, whether he will or not, will be judged by it and, if it sees fit, even deposed. Likewise, if the Pope is doubtful, the body of Pastors can again assemble itself into a Synod and consult for the good of the Church. In these two cases, a Synod convened even without the convocation and presidency of the Roman Pontiff is a true and legitimate ecumenical Synod, because both the subject of supreme power is present and the good of the Church requires that the ordinary mode of convocation and celebration not be observed. The Roman Pontiff does indeed confirm Councils, and his confirmation is necessary; but this confirmation does not serve to add force to the decrees of the Synod, but to declare authoritatively that the Synod was duly celebrated.

These positions cohere with the doctrine that the Pope has jurisdiction in the universal Church but not over the universal Church —that is, only over all the particular Churches taken individually, not over the whole body taken collectively, such as is represented in ecumenical Councils, which on the contrary is superior to the Pope. (See Bossuet, *Defensio Declarationis Cleri Gallicani*, Book 1, chapters 11ff., Book 7, chapter 2, and Book 8, chapter 6; Tournely, *De Ecclesia*, Part 2, Paris edition, pages 66, 67, 151, 139, 161, 162; Gerson in *Vindiciae doctrinae Maiorum Scholae Parisiensis*, volume 1, pages 183ff. and 223ff.)

Such a Gallican position does not exhibit a form of Church government that is in itself absurd; it can be found in several religious orders. The question therefore is only whether this position exhibits the form of government that Christ instituted. The Gallicans supported their position chiefly by the authority of the Council of Constance, which issued two decrees—one in Session 4 and another in Session 5—while the Council was still constituted solely under the obedience of John XXIII. The first runs as follows: "And first it declares that this holy Synod, legitimately assembled in the Holy Spirit, constituting a general Council and representing the Church militant, holds power immediately from Christ, to which power every person of whatever state or dignity, even if it be papal, is bound to obey in those matters

which pertain to the faith and to the eradication of the said schism." So far in Session 4. In Session 5, however, these further words were added to the same decree: "and the general reform of the Church of God in head and members"—though in the editions deriving from the collection of decrees made by the Fathers of Basel they appear already in Session 4; but see the excellent treatment of this question in Schelstrate, *De sensu et auctoritate Decretorum Concilii Constantiensis*, etc. In Session 5 a second decree was added: "Likewise it declares that whoever, of whatever condition, state, or dignity—even if it be papal—who contumaciously refuses to obey the mandates and precepts of this sacred Synod or of any other general council legitimately assembled concerning the matters aforesaid or relating thereto, whether already done or to be done, shall, unless he repents, be subjected to condign penance and duly punished, having recourse, if necessary, to other aids of the law."

This was the argument the Gallicans made. These decrees belong to an ecumenical council and were approved by Martin V and his successors; they are therefore certain and infallible. Moreover, they manifestly teach that the Pope is subject to the authority of ecumenical councils representing the universal Church, and that this is the supreme authority in the Church conferred immediately by God. Now the entire controversy concerns the subject of the supreme authority to which all the faithful and all the Churches and the entire universal Church must be subject: the Gallicans contending that it is the body of Pastors as a whole, while we teach that it is the one Roman Pontiff, whose proper possession the Primacy is, and to whose authority the entire assembled body of Pastors is subject. But we have already demonstrated this clearly in the preceding Theses; there is therefore no need to add further arguments—it is sufficient to resolve the difficulties.

II. Regarding the decrees of Constance (the first collection of the Acts of the Council of Constance is owed to the Fathers of Basel, at whose command certain persons extracted and collected and had faithfully copied the decrees and some of the proceedings of the said holy Council of Constance, reducing them into a single volume; see the preface placed by Hardouin), we affirm, first, that these decrees, understood in the sense of asserting absolutely the authority of the

Council over the Pope—and thus even over a certain Pope—were never approved by the Church, but on the contrary were repudiated. For it was in that sense that the Fathers of Basel accepted them, and accordingly they established these three propositions in Session 33: 1° "The truth concerning the power of a general council representing the universal Church over the Pope and over anyone else whatsoever, as declared by the general Councils of Constance and of Basel, is a truth of Catholic faith. 2° The truth that the Pope cannot, without his consent, authoritatively dissolve, prorogue to another time, or transfer from one place to another, a general council representing the universal Church lawfully assembled in act, concerning matters declared in the aforesaid truth or any of them, is a truth of Catholic faith. 3° Anyone who pertinaciously resists these two truths is to be considered a heretic." But Eugenius IV, by the Constitution *Moyses*, given at Florence in the public synodal session solemnly celebrated in the Church of Santa Maria Novella in the year 1439, on the day before the Nones of September, with the sacred Council's approval, condemned and reprobated, and declared condemned and reprobated, those very propositions according to the perverse understanding of the Baselers themselves—as their deeds demonstrated—as contrary to the meaning of sacred Scripture, of the holy Fathers, and of the Council of Constance itself, and as impious and scandalous, and moreover as tending to the manifest rupture of the Church of God and the confusion of all ecclesiastical order and Christian government. (See Odoricus Raynaldus, *Annales*, year 1439, no. 29, and Session 38 of the Council of Basel.) Likewise Leo X, in the Constitution *Pastor aeternus*, issued in Session 11 of the Lateran Council with the sacred Council's approval, decrees the following, which directly addresses the second article of faith of the Baselers: "That the Roman Pontiff for the time being, as having authority over all councils, has full right and power to convoke, transfer, and dissolve councils, is manifestly established not only from the testimony of sacred Scripture, the statements of the holy Fathers and other Roman Pontiffs our predecessors, and the decrees of the sacred canons, but also from the express confession of the councils themselves." Now these decrees, issued in public conciliar sessions with the approval of the Fathers, directly attack the doctrine of the Baselers who interpreted the decrees

of Constance in that manner, and they simultaneously attack the Gallican doctrine, which must interpret the decrees of Constance in this way if the authority of councils is to be above the Pope and if that is established by those decrees. Did the Apostolic See then accept the decrees of Constance in the Gallican sense, which is also the Baseler sense, as the Gallican clergy affirms in its second article?

Indeed, Martin V himself, elected at the Council of Constance, most clearly indicated that he utterly rejected and rendered void those decrees understood in that sense. For when Martin would not accede to certain petitions of the Poles and they had interposed an appeal to a future Council, Martin in his Constitution made and promulgated for perpetual record in the general consistory celebrated at Constance on the 6th of the Ides of March, in the first year of his pontificate, decreed "that it is lawful for no one to appeal from the Supreme Judge, namely the Apostolic See or the Roman Pontiff, Vicar of Jesus Christ on earth, or to decline his judgment in causes of faith, which as major causes are to be referred to him and to the Apostolic See." John Gerson testifies to this, and accordingly he attacked that decree of the Pontiff in his treatise *Quomodo et an liceat a Summo Pontifice appellare*, as being contrary to the decrees of Constance. For it was indeed contrary to those decrees understood in the sense in which Gerson understood them and in which the Baselers and the Gallicans subsequently understood them—namely, of the absolute authority asserted for general councils over the Pope; from which doctrine it evidently follows that it is lawful to appeal from the Pope to a Council. But if Martin's position was contrary to the decrees of Constance so understood, then he himself did not approve—indeed he disapproved—of those decrees so understood.

We affirm, secondly, that those two decrees of Constance were not in themselves approved or confirmed by Martin V. For, first, there exists a decree issued by him confirming matters decreed at the Council, *In eminentis* (see Schelstrate, work cited, dissertation 3, chapter 4), given at Constance on the 8th day before the Kalends of March in the first year: and in it only the definitions, reprobations, mandates, condemnations, etc., issued against John Wycliffe, John Hus, and Jerome of Prague by John XXIII at the Roman Council—to which the Fathers of Constance had also appealed—and the statutes of the Council of Constance against

the propositions of Wycliffe and Hus, and the error of the Bohemians concerning communion under both species, are confirmed. On the same day the Bull *Inter cunctas* was issued by Martin, addressed to all inquisitors of heretical depravity, in which, with the sacred Council's approval, the errors of Wycliffe, Hus, and Jerome are proscribed.

Secondly, after Session 43, held on the 22nd of April, at which an end was imposed on the Council, when a disturbance arose from those who wished to have a certain book by John of Falkenberg condemned—which Martin had passed over—the Protonotaries of the Council, in their compilation of the Acts, report that Martin V, having imposed silence on all, said in reply to the foregoing "that he approved and ratified all and singular the decrees of the Council of Constance which had been enacted conciliarly in the matter of faith, and in no other way and by no other manner."

Now it is evident that the decrees of Sessions 4 and 5 are not included among these by Martin. For a) the decrees of Sessions 4 and 5 were not reckoned among those which were in the matter of faith; for whatever they may appear to touch upon as regards the matter of faith, it is nevertheless manifest from the very Acts of the Council that under the designation "matter of faith" there fell only the articles of Wycliffe and others, with which proceedings began from Session 6. Compare the preface prefaced to the decrees of Session 5, where certain chapters by way of synodal constitutions and certain advisements in the matter of faith are distinguished—which pertained to the doctrine of Wycliffe, etc. b) When Martin said he approved acts "conciliarly," he is not to be thought to have issued a new decree of confirmation; for he uttered those words incidentally, on the occasion of a certain disturbance, after the Council had already been concluded and its decrees already confirmed, with no solemnity employed; he merely signified what he himself had confirmed by the preceding confirmation and what he then too, with the same persevering will, intended to confirm. This being established, it follows that decrees enacted conciliarly in the matter of faith are those which, in Martin's opinion, are found in the decree of confirmation; but among these are not the decrees of Sessions 4 and 5; therefore these are not contained among what Martin calls enacted in the matter of faith and conciliarly. This of itself is sufficient to

demonstrate that by that formula Martin V did not include those decrees.

Moreover, it is well established that the decrees especially of Session 5 were not enacted conciliarly. We have as witness Peter of Ailly in his book on the authority of the Church and of the Cardinals, which he wrote at the Council. He says that many doubted the procedure of this Council, because the deliberation had not taken place in a common session with votes gathered together, but separately in the assemblies of the nations, with priests, deacons, and even laymen also casting votes, the common or prevailing vote of whom one bishop would then bring to the public session, not in his own name but in the name of the nation.

The word "conciliarly" is customarily disputed as to its meaning, and yet the meaning of this word ought to have been clear and plain to all. To cut short every difficulty, we say it can be understood in two ways. Namely, an act is said to be done "conciliarly" either when it is decreed by a Council complete in its essence by the consent of the Fathers, or of the greater part of them, and also by the consent of the Roman Pontiff if it is an ecumenical council; or an act is said to be done "conciliarly" when it is decreed by a Council that is as yet incomplete and tending toward its own completion, but in the customary manner of councils. Now if the word "conciliarly" is taken in the first sense, it is plain that those decrees were not enacted conciliarly, since they were issued before the complete council existed, by the single obedience of John XXIII alone, which certainly did not represent the universal Church. But if it is taken in the other, less strict sense—so that acts are said to be done conciliarly, even by a not yet complete council, provided they are done in accordance with the custom of councils—it is again manifest that the decrees at least of the fifth Session, in which alone difficulty can arise, were not enacted conciliarly. For it is established that the promulgation of those decrees is owed to those who appeared to seek not the union and peace of the Church but schisms and scandals; who, observing none of the rites of ancient councils, held assemblies on Church affairs not publicly but scattered and in private; who, not by the way of the Holy Spirit as is fitting, but by force and clamor and insults, contrived many things unworthy of relation against the dignity of the Apostolic See (letter of John XXIII to the King of Poland). It is

established that the fifth session was held in a tumultuous manner; for as Eugenius IV reports in his Apologia against the Baselers—he having been present at the Council of Constance while still in minor orders—certain weightier voices raised objection but, overpowered by the noise of the crowd, could not be heard. It is established that, when votes were cast by nations, the votes of laymen too were received and the votes of the prelates were moreover subtracted (John XXIII, ibid.). It is established that several most learned Fathers did not give their assent (Turrecremata, *De Ecclesia*, Book 2, chapter 99; Rodericus, Bishop of Calahorra, in his *Dialogus de auctoritate Romani Pontificis*). It is established that the Roman Church—meaning not only John XXIII, the Pontiff of that obedience, but also all his cardinals—resisted those decrees; indeed it is established that at that time no account at all was taken of the votes of the order of Cardinals, who were not permitted to cast a vote separately from the others in their own name, but were only allowed to have each of them give his vote together with his nation (from the acts; see Schelstrate, work cited, Dissertation 2). The Cardinals rightly demanded that their Order—that is, the Roman Church—be represented separately in the Council, which they finally achieved in the subsequent Sessions.

Now all this is more than sufficient to show that those decrees were not sanctioned in the manner of councils and therefore were not enacted conciliarly.

You will say: if, from the fact that votes were cast by nations and not individually, decrees were not enacted conciliarly, then neither will the condemnation of the articles of Wycliffe and Hus be said to have been enacted conciliarly; for they were established in the same manner in Sessions 8 and 15. I reply: first, that we deny those decrees to have been enacted conciliarly not only on this ground, but because they were carried out by force and tumult, because the votes of laymen were admitted, because the consent of many was lacking and above all of all the Cardinals; and therefore, if not the greater, certainly the sounder part was in opposition—namely, those who wanted a decree to be established not by force and clamor and hastily, and indiscriminately by everyone of whatever grade, but after careful examination, with all and only those who had the right to vote being heard; and such were those

who resisted those decrees. I reply, secondly, that this custom of casting votes by nations, by which it could happen that a decree was ratified by the lesser part of those who had the right to vote, was certainly defective; yet if it had come about that all or the greater part of those who had the right to vote consented—which is to be believed to have happened with regard to the articles of Wycliffe and Hus—the customary practice of councils was had at least equivalently, so that the condemnation of those articles could be said to have been enacted conciliarly, at least equivalently. Nevertheless, because the custom was in itself illegitimate, Martin in the decree confirming the condemnation of those heretics made by the fathers of Constance expressly says that he is also supplying all defects, if any perhaps arose in them through failure to observe the legal solemnities in the foregoing proceedings. But it is not established that the greater part of those who had the right to vote consented to the decree of Session 4.

We affirm, thirdly, that the decree of Session 4 refers only to the time of that schism, and was aimed at establishing a rule for removing that schism and, if you will, for subsequent times as well when the Church should find itself in equivalent circumstances.

For the discussion there is only about that Constantian Synod and the eradication of that particular schism. ("This holy Council of Constance, constituting a general Council for the eradication of the present schism, etc., declares that this Synod, legitimately assembled in the Holy Spirit, constituting a general Council, representing the Catholic Church militant, holds power immediately from Christ," etc.) And it is accordingly said that even one endowed with papal dignity is bound to obey it in those matters which pertain to the eradication of that schism. He who, even if equipped with papal dignity, must obey, is therefore the one who at that time was called Pope, but was a doubtful Pope, to whom the title of Pope was nevertheless attributed in the Acts. By that decree, therefore, it was established that, given this factual doubt, when three persons claimed papal authority for themselves, they too were obliged to obey the Synod—for this was the only remaining way to remove the schism—and since Christ certainly willed the schism to be removed, it could be said that Christ willed this means to be employed, and accordingly gave power immediately to the Synod to

remove the doubtful Pontiffs. For by the law of nature every society has, in such circumstances, the right to provide for itself; and what simple natural law supplies in natural societies is conferred by divine law in the supernatural society of positive divine institution. Yet that right extends only to making provision for the election of the supreme Pastor. As for the fact of the matter, two Pontiffs—with almost the entire Church standing by them and whose right was more probable—voluntarily abdicated the pontificate. Hence the validity of the election of Martin V is independent of the force of that decree, which the Baselers should have taken note of in Session 38. As for the decrees of Session 5 insofar as they add something to that prior decree, there is no reason for us to dispute about them; since they were not only not confirmed, but rather reprobated (no. 1). Finally, that the Fathers of Constance did not wish to issue decrees of faith in these sessions is also clear from the fact that it is only from Session 6 that the treatment of matters of faith begins, and this is expressly noted.

Moreover, it can be demonstrated even with the Gallicans themselves consenting that these decrees of the Constantian Synod cannot be understood as applying to every ecumenical Synod that has ever been or ever will be convoked in the Church, so as to teach thereby the proper authority of an ecumenical Council as such. For if that is so, then any Synod equivalent to the Constantian Synod must be held as ecumenical, and therefore also a Synod assembled without the authority of a legitimate Pontiff whom the whole Church is bound to obey. For such was the Constantian Synod given those circumstances. If therefore that proposition ("this Synod, etc.") is equivalent to a universal proposition valid for any time, it will be true also of a similar Synod assembled without the authority of the Pope, even when a certain Pope was present and duly fulfilling his office. But this the Gallicans themselves deny, requiring for the legitimate existence of an ecumenical Synod the convocation of the Pope and his presidency, when the Pope is present and fulfilling his office. They must therefore admit that these words were not said by the fathers of Constance universally for any time and any general Council, but specifically for a particular time and Synod—namely, when the Pope is doubtful, and so doubtful that the schism cannot be averted except by his removal.

You will ask: why then was it said in that prior decree that everyone, even the Pope, must obey in matters pertaining to faith? I reply. In order that the Fathers at the preceding Council of Pisa might proceed more safely to the deposition of the two contenders for the papacy—since it was provided in law that a heretical Pope can be judged by the Church—they established that one who by his deed or act opposes a dogma is also to be considered a heretic; and the dogma is the unity of the Church, which the two Pontiffs were by their deed rending asunder; therefore those two contenders were to be held as heretics. Accordingly, at the Council of Pisa, the two contenders for the papacy—namely, Gregory XII, who was actually the true Pontiff, and the Antipope Peter de Luna called Benedict XIII—are said to have been summoned to the Council and proclaimed in the cause of schism and of faith (Session 3), and their contumacy and pertinacity in the contest for the papacy is said to be in the matter of schism and of faith (Session 8), because it was producing schism and was opposed to the faith concerning the unity of the Church. Now the same is the meaning of the words occurring in the decrees of Constance: "in those matters which pertain to faith"—meaning with respect to the unity of the Church under one visible head, which faith teaches to be necessary—the fathers of Constance wanted everyone to be bound to obey the Synod. That this limited sense underlies those words is clear both from the history of that age and from what immediately follows: "and the eradication of the said schism"; universal obedience is not therefore prescribed, but only insofar as it pertains to the eradication of that schism; and therefore obedience in matters pertaining to faith is required only in those things that are referred to the eradication of that schism.

That the Fathers of Constance felt they had no power over a certain Pope—however much certain persons, either less learned or greedy for power, greatly desired it—is also shown by the fact that before the election of the Pope, several articles of reform were proposed, to be carried out by the Pope. For, first, when the German nation demanded security and a guarantee by means of an annulling decree that after the election of the Pope the reform would take place before the Pope's coronation and before he undertook any administration… it

was finally said that the elected Pope could not be bound. Secondly, once Martin V was elected, decrees were issued by him in Session 43 on some of those articles—on exemptions, on unions of benefices, on the receiving of fruits, on simony, on dispensations, on tithes, on the life and integrity of clerics. But on others, especially those which pertained to the Roman See itself—on the number, quality, and nationality of Cardinals, on reforms of the Apostolic See, on causes to be handled or not at the Roman Curia, on appeals, etc.—nothing was done, nor was it requested by anyone. Why? Because the Council was entirely subject to the authority of the Roman Pontiff, and this was held by universal consensus. (See Schelstrate, work cited, *Acta Constantiensia* from several manuscript codices.)

You will say: Martin V in the Bull *Inter cunctas* commands that heretics be asked whether they believe that any general Council, and also the Council of Constance, represents the universal Church; whether they believe that what the sacred Council of Constance, representing the universal Church, approved and approves in favor of the faith is to be approved by all the faithful; and other things similar to these. Therefore according to Martin the Council of Constance was a true council representing the universal Church even before the election of Martin (he says "approved and approves").

I reply: first, these things pertain only to the decrees of the Council against heretics; second, the Council which was to be held by heretics as a true council representing the universal Church was the council over which a certain Pontiff was already presiding and who had confirmed its decrees of faith—and therefore a truly ecumenical council. Now this Council was in a twofold stage: first, of inception, and second, of completion and fulfillment; but by reason of the relationship of the incipient to the complete, it was in reality one single council, and for this reason the title of Council representing the universal Church is attributed to it viewed even in its prior stage—not insofar as it is separated from the other, but insofar as it is ordered toward it and insofar as its decrees issued in the prior stage were to be confirmed and were confirmed in the stage of completion by the conciliar judgment, with the consent of the Pontiff being added to the vote of the others. Thus, regarded as in the manner of one Council, the Council of

Constance, viewed in any of its parts, can be called a general Council representing the universal Church—but in different ways: first incompletely and in potency, then completely and in act. Hence Martin does not say only that the Council approved, but that it approved and approves, because that prior approval still needed to be confirmed and was in itself insufficient.

III. The Gallicans say: the chapter *Frequens*, established in Session 39, by which it was decreed that a Council should thenceforth be convoked by the Roman Pontiffs within a certain fixed cycle of years, exerts coercive force over every future and certain Pontiff; moreover, the force of this authority exercised by the Council over the Pontiffs manifestly rests upon the decrees of Sessions 4 and 5; and the decree *Frequens* was accepted by Martin V, who wished to satisfy this decree in Session 44, and by Eugenius IV, who, near death (see Odoricus Raynaldus, *Annales*, year 1447), acknowledged that he received the ecumenical councils and the Council of Constance and its chapter *Frequens* no differently from his predecessors. From all this the Gallicans conclude that the Fathers of Constance issued the decrees of Sessions 4 and 5 absolutely with respect to every Pontiff, as being the foundation of the chapter *Frequens*, which bound all Pontiffs, and that these decrees were approved by the Roman Pontiffs who complied with the decree of the chapter *Frequens*.

We reply by denying the antecedent. For the force of the decree *Frequens* arose from the approval of Martin, who did not comply but wished to give satisfaction to that decree, because he thought what was provided for in it was expedient. By that approval Martin bound neither himself nor his successors; but the Roman Pontiffs, judging it to be conducive to the good of the Church for the avoidance of schism to comply at that time with the wishes of so many who desired councils, themselves out of modesty accommodating themselves to the weakness of the sheep, wished to comply with them in this matter for as long as it was permitted. Therefore, to abolish that decree no conciliar sanction was needed, but the will of the Pontiffs was sufficient. We likewise deny that the chapter *Frequens* rests upon the decrees of Sessions 4 and 5; for it is asserted gratuitously that the Constantian Synod wished to bind the Roman Pontiffs without their consent, and this conflicts with the

Primacy and was acknowledged even within that council itself, namely that an elected Pope cannot be bound; nor did the Fathers of Constance need any coercive authority over the Roman Pontiffs in order to propose the decree of the chapter *Frequens* as useful to the Church, to be subsequently confirmed by a legitimate Pope. Moreover, in this question about the Council of Constance, the conciliar positions must be distinguished from the private opinions of certain individuals who were present at the Council, about which we are not concerned.

Note: Among the errors of Wycliffe, the 41st runs thus: it is not of the necessity of salvation to believe the Roman Church to be supreme among the other churches. Now this error had been reprobated by the fathers of Constance in Session 8 as follows: "It is an error, if he understands by the Roman Church the universal Church or the general Council, or insofar as he denies the Primacy of the Supreme Pontiff over the other particular churches." These words were moreover inserted by Martin into his apostolic letters. Does the Roman Pontiff therefore have Primacy only over the particular churches and not over the universal Church, as Richerius (*De Ecclesiastica et Politica Potestate*, chapter 3) and the Gallicans in general contended?

Note, first, that those words are not exclusive; second, that the Primacy over the other particular churches implicitly contains the Primacy over the universal Church; for the particular churches and the universal Church are not two distinct subjects but one subject existing in different modes—as, namely, the individual churches are viewed and act separately and are all particular churches, or as they act together and are viewed together and are the universal Church. When, therefore, the particular churches are spoken of, the universal Church is also spoken of implicitly, for the mode is contained in its subject. Martin therefore abstained from an explicit declaration of this matter, for a special reason which prudence perhaps suggested—especially since it was not necessary, both because it had already been affirmed in the profession of faith of the Second Council of Lyon in these words: "the Roman Church itself holds the supreme and full primacy and principate over the universal Catholic Church," and because the same Martin had also sufficiently asserted it in article 24 of those concerning which he ordered heretics to be questioned. The article runs: "whether he believes

that the Pope who has been canonically elected for the time being, his own proper name being expressed, is the successor of blessed Peter, having supreme authority in the Church of God"; now supreme authority in the Church is subject to no other authority by the very fact that it is supreme, but all—even taken together—are subject to it, just as the Gallicans judge of the authority of councils, which they want to be supreme in the Church. Therefore, according to Martin V, the Roman Pontiff is not subject to the council; on the contrary, even the council must be said to be subject to him.

IV. There is no need for us to say anything in particular about the Council of Basel. Even if it may have been at some point legitimate (which, however, after weighing all its sessions and acts, and taking into account as well the spirit by which those Fathers were led—a spirit that always showed itself clearly enough—we do not know how it can be affirmed), its decrees regarding the declaration of its own power were abrogated by Eugenius at the Council of Florence and by Leo X at the Lateran. It was a conventicle of the most turbulent men, assembled largely from the lower clergy, university doctors, and laymen as well, whose only concern was the ambitious enlargement of their own authority. Those who describe the history of the Synods of that age—such as those of Siena and Basel—and see in the solicitude of the Roman Pontiffs for defending the authority of their Primacy and in the estrangement from holding general Synods which they displayed, nothing but a certain human sentiment and profane eagerness for the enlargement of power, reveal themselves to be inept historians, strangers to theology and ecclesiastical law, or else malicious. The Primacy of Peter and its full liberty in the exercise of its rights are necessary for the Church, and he who defends them promotes the Church's good. Moreover, it is the duty of the Roman Pontiff to care for the good of the Church with every effort. Now there were not a few among those who demanded general Synods in that age, attended them, and wished to conduct them contrary to ecclesiastical custom, who were hostile in spirit toward the integrity of the Primacy and its liberty —which they wished to subject to themselves in several respects with the greatest arrogance and folly; it was therefore the duty of the Roman See to impede such Synods, unless greater harm was to be feared from

the malice of men; and if this could not be done owing to the wickedness of the times, then to moderate them so firmly that the authority of the Primacy should be secure.

V. Apart from the Councils of Constance and Basel, the Gallicans appealed to other councils as well. We shall deal with these briefly. Canon 21 of the eighth ecumenical Synod prohibits anyone from attempting to dishonor or remove from their throne the Patriarchs—and especially the most holy Pope of elder Rome—and from daring to compose and draft writings and accusations against him on the pretext of certain alleged crimes, as Photius had done, and before him Dioscorus. It then adds: "But if a universal Synod has been assembled and any ambiguity or controversy arises even concerning the holy Church of the Romans, inquiry should be made with veneration and fitting reverence concerning the proposed question, and one should receive its solution and profit from it, yet not boldly pronounce judgment against the Supreme Pontiffs of elder Rome." Therefore, the Gallicans say, causes of the Roman Church can be referred to an ecumenical Synod, and it is lawful to pronounce judgment on them there, though modestly and not boldly.

But, first, what was prohibited is not merely some manner of pronouncing judgment, but the very pronouncement of judgment, which cannot be given against the Roman Pontiff without boldness. For the letters of Nicholas I and Hadrian II, with the Synod's approval, had taught this clearly enough. And, second, the fact that, with the Roman Pontiff's own permission, causes of the Roman Church can be referred to an ecumenical Synod does not derogate from the authority of the Roman Pontiff, as is clear from the Acts in the case of Symmachus: now the cited canon speaks in this hypothesis—namely, that the cause of the Roman Pontiff is referred to the Synod with his own free consent.

The objection is also raised that Pope Siricius declined judgment in the case of Bonosus, which Anysius of Thessalonica had referred to him out of deference, the case having been committed to Anysius by the Council of Capua: "Since such was the judgment of the Council of Capua" (he says in letter 5 to Anysius), "that judges from among the neighbors of Bonosus and his accusers be assigned, and especially Macedonians, to examine his deeds together with the Bishop of

Thessalonica, we observe that the form of judging could not belong to us." Why so? Was it because the Pope is subject to the Council? Hear Siricius in the same place: "The first thing is that those should hear to whom the faculty of judging has been given; it is not fitting for us to judge as if by the authority of the Synod." That is: since we are superior to the Synod, it is not fitting for us to judge as if by delegated authority from it. It is disputed, however, whether this letter, attributed by Baronius to Siricius, is actually his. See the notes following letter 56 among the works of Ambrose in the Maurine edition, volume 3.

VI. Finally, an argument is raised from the closing clause of the Florentine definition: for it is defined that to the Roman Pontiff … the full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church has been handed on by our Lord Jesus Christ: "even as is contained in the acts of the ecumenical councils and in the sacred canons." Now, from the Greek text (καθ' ὅν τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς τῶν οἰκουμενικῶν συνόδων, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς κανόσι διαλαμβάνεται) they wish this to be read as: "according to the manner which is contained in the acts," etc. From this they conclude that the power of the Primacy is limited by the decrees of councils and the canons and subject to them (Bossuet, work cited, Book 6, chapter 11). Here we would have not the exercise of power, as Bossuet said, but the power itself as limited.

But, first, it is most certainly established that the Latin reading —"even as," etc.—is not a version from the Greek but is entirely the original; this is evident from the autograph manuscripts of that same Council, which are preserved in the libraries of Rome and Florence. Indeed, among the *Collationes* held at the Council of Florence, written by Andrea of the Holy Cross, advocate of the apostolic consistory, who was present at the Council, there is a twenty-second collation in which the title of the ninth entry reads: "Six are appointed for each side to work out the expression of the dogmas to be defined"; and then the speech of the Cardinal of Piacenza is reported: "From the day you came together, today is the eighth day on which four were appointed for each side to be together with the delegates of the Greeks for drafting the decree. The Fathers convened each day morning and evening. Finally, this morning the decree was read in San Francesco in Greek and in Latin, and all the delegates remained content." See also Session 25 near

the end. Now the Cardinal of Piacenza delivered these words in the general Congregation held in the Apostolic Palace on the 4th of July; the final session was held on the 6th of the same month in the great church called Santa Maria liberata, and the decree was read in Latin by Cardinal Julian and in Greek by Cardinal Bessarion, as the acts themselves inform us. Therefore those who labor at interpreting the Greek words are wasting their effort.

It is established, secondly, with full certainty that the particle "even" is original; for it is found in the original autograph, which may be inspected at Florence in the Laurentian Library. Now the particle "even," καί, binds what follows with what precedes, and binds them in such a way as to signify that the same thing is affirmed in what precedes and in what follows. But the Gallican interpretation excludes the particle "even," καί, which in that interpretation no longer has anything to do, since something new—that is, a limitation of the fullness of power—would be signified by this clause. Therefore the Gallican interpretation is at variance with the original. With the particle "even," καί, present and its force retained, the formula καθ' ὅν τρόπον—which literally means "according to which manner," that is, "even as" or "as"—does not implicitly include an antecedent (according to the manner which) but is simply relative, and refers back to the preceding words of the definition. From all of this it is plain that the formula καθ' ὅν τρόπον, "even as," etc., signifies no limitation whatever, but merely presents an argument drawn from the tradition of the Councils and the canons, in confirmation of the truth defined.

Moreover, even if we were to read: "according to the manner which is also contained in the acts of the councils and in the sacred canons," it would not follow that a limitation is here being imposed. For do these two formulas say the same thing? First: "The Roman Pontiff has the fullness of power according to the manner which is contained in the acts of the councils and in the sacred canons." Second: "The Roman Pontiff has the fullness of power, limited however by the authority of the councils, to which he is subject, and by the authority of the canons, which he is bound to observe." The distinction is plain enough: by the first formula, the mode in which the fullness of power is to be understood is signified—namely, as it is understood by the Councils

and by the canons; but by the second formula, only a limitation is signified. It is therefore equally plain that the Fathers would not have expressed themselves in that way if they had wished to signify this second thing. And again, what coherence is there in asserting to the Pontiff the fullness of power and at the same time affirming its limitation?

VII. Since the adversaries draw their argument not from this clause alone considered in itself, but as compared with the observations which the Greeks made regarding this article proposed for definition by the Latins, it will be sufficient to recall the following. Once the disputation concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit had been concluded and the formula of the definition approved, other articles were proposed by the Pope to the Greeks after Session 25, the first of which concerned the Primacy of the Pope: that the Apostolic See, or the supreme Pontiff, Vicar of our Lord Jesus Christ, should have his privileges, and that it should be lawful for him by his own right, as supreme Pontiff, to add what he added to the sacred symbol (namely, the particle *Filioque*). But this second point the Greeks disapproved of—not in a public session, but acting among themselves privately—saying that for this the consent of the brother Patriarchs was required.

Shortly thereafter, upon the death of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Joseph, his handwritten document composed the day before his death was found, in which he professed the following: "Everything which the Catholic and Apostolic Church of our Lord Jesus Christ of elder Rome believes and dogmatizes, I too believe, and I give myself as consenting to it and say so. I also profess for the certain faith of all that the most blessed Father of fathers and greatest Pontiff and Vicar of our Lord Jesus Christ is the Pope of ancient Rome." When the Latins pressed the Greeks to receive the article on the Primacy, the Greeks replied that they consented on the Primacy of the Pope, so that once union was achieved he should have whatever is owed to him by right. Then, in the presence of the Pope, John the Provincial demonstrated to the Greeks at length the doctrine on the Primacy of the Pope. The Greeks, meeting at the Emperor's residence, examined the demands of the Latins and found all five of them equitable and correct—namely, on the procession of the Holy Spirit, on unleavened and leavened bread, on

the Primacy of the Pope, on the addition of τοῦ Filioque, and on purgatory—and they pressed the Emperor to bring the work of union to completion by consenting to all of these; but he was unwilling.

After another day, the Pope summoned the Eastern Church to himself and commanded two masters to discourse on his privileges: that he is the Supreme Pontiff, and Peter's successor, and Christ's Vicar, and that he judges and governs the Catholic Church as Doctor and Pastor. The Greeks, after deliberating among themselves, professed that they admitted the privileges of the Pope, except two: first, that he should not convoke an ecumenical Synod without the Emperor and the Patriarchs, if they were willing to consent; and if summoned they did not come, that this should not impede the Synod from taking place; second, that if anyone believed himself to suffer an injustice from some Patriarch and came to Rome to interpose an appeal, the Patriarchs themselves should not be summoned to stand trial, but the Pope should send inquisitors into each province and there, through them, where the matter was concerned, those who had suffered an injustice should obtain their right. The Pope, however, replied that he wished to have all the privileges of his Church, and that appeals should be made to him, and that he would govern and feed the universal Church of Christ as Shepherd of the sheep; that he also had the authority and faculty to celebrate an ecumenical Synod when need arose, and that all Patriarchs were bound to obey his will. The Emperor did not acquiesce.

After a subsequent conference among the Greeks on the Primacy of the Pope, they acknowledged him to be the Supreme Pontiff, Vicar of Christ, pastor and teacher of all Christians, governing and administering the Church of God, with the privileges and rights of the Patriarchs of the East preserved, and that the Patriarch of Constantinople was second after the Pope, then the Alexandrian, etc. Having committed this to writing, the Greeks resolved that nothing further was to be done if these things were not received by the Pope. They learned, however, that they had been received and acquiesced. It was then arranged that a tome of definition be drawn up in Greek and Latin and that all subscribe to it. When in this it was written that the Pope should have his privileges according to the determination of sacred Scripture and the sayings of the Saints, this second formula seemed ambiguous to

the Emperor, who wished to add: "according to the tenor," κατά τὴν δύναμιν, "of the canons." A dispute therefore arose between the Latins and the Greeks on this point. The Latins withdrew, and the Greeks immediately took counsel among themselves and wrote that the Pope's privileges were to be had according to the canons and the sayings of the Saints and sacred Scripture and the acts of the Synods, τά πρακτικά τῶν συνόδων. This was handed to the Latins, who replied that they would report these things to the Pope. Finally, six from each side agreed to write out the definition and the tome of union in Greek and Latin; and when, on the occasion of that clause added by the Greeks—"with the rights and privileges of the four Patriarchs preserved"—the Latins heard that "all" had been added, they began to protest, contending that that particle should be deleted. But finally, coming to a friendly agreement, all admitted it, and thus the Greeks finally subscribed. Consequently, after the well-known clause, the definition of the Primacy is followed by these words: "Moreover renewing the order handed down in the canons of the other venerable Patriarchs, so that the Patriarch of Constantinople is second after the Most Holy Roman Pontiff, the third being the Alexandrian, the fourth the Antiochene, and the fifth the Hierosolymitan, with all their privileges and rights preserved."

Now from this history it is manifest: first, that in the stage of inquiry and preparation the difficulties against the dogma proceeded more from the Emperor than from the Greek Bishops; second, that Eugenius strenuously defended the rights of his see throughout; third, that all the Greeks finally freely consented together with the Latins to the definition as it stands; fourth, that the formula requested by the Emperor—"according to the tenor of the canons"—which was to be substituted for or added to the other formula, "according to the sayings of the Saints," was not aimed at saying that the exercise of the Pontiff's power was to be regulated by the canons, but aimed at signifying that the knowledge of the power of the Primacy was to be gathered from the doctrine of the canons; for the Latins had said it was to be drawn from the sayings of the Saints; but since the Emperor observed that such sayings are frequently adduced for honor's sake and employed in a looser sense, he wished to substitute or add: "according to the tenor or force of the canons"—which the Greek bishops also expressed by saying:

"according to the canons and the sayings of the Saints and sacred Scripture and the acts of the Synods."

VIII. The appeal to canons in this definition aimed at what Gelasius I aimed at in his *Commonitorium ad Faustum*, or letter 43 (Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, volume 59, page 26), where he says: "They oppose canons to us while they do not know what they are saying. Against these the very same canons betray them, for they flee from obeying the first See when it rightly and wholesomely counsels. It is the canons themselves that wished the appeals of the whole Church to be referred to the examination of this See. They have decreed that from this See an appeal is absolutely never to be made, and that it therefore judges concerning the whole Church, comes before no one's judgment, and has never been commanded to have its judgment judged by anyone; and they have established that its sentence is not to be dissolved, whose decrees rather they have commanded to be followed." And in the same cause of Acacius, writing to the Bishops of Dardania in letter 13, he says: "The whole Church throughout the world knows that the See of blessed Peter the Apostle has the right to loose what has been bound by the sentences of any Pontiffs whatsoever, since it has the right to judge concerning the whole Church, and it is not lawful for anyone to judge its judgment. Indeed the canons have willed that appeals be made to it from any part of the world, but that no one be permitted to appeal from it." Did Gelasius believe that the supreme power of judging without appeal in all matters, and of binding whatever other Bishops have loosed and loosing whatever other Bishops have bound, has its origin from the canons which the Church established, and therefore depends upon them and can be circumscribed and limited by them? Or did he wish only to signify that the Church itself, in its definitions and canonical decrees, has acknowledged the prerogative of its See, which it holds by divine right, and was therefore arguing from ecclesiastical canons as from testimonies received by all of the divine institution? That this second sense is the true one is shown by Gelasius himself in his decree on apocryphal scriptures, which begins with the establishing of the authority of the Roman Church: "Although the one bridal chamber of Christ is the whole Catholic Church throughout the world, yet the holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church has not been placed over

the other churches by any synodal constitutions, but has obtained the primacy by the evangelical voice of the Lord and Savior, saying: 'You are Peter,' etc." Which Innocent III also testifies in letter 209 of Book 2, saying: "The Primacy of the Apostolic See, which not a man but God—or more truly God made man—established, is confirmed by many evangelical and apostolic testimonies, from which canonical constitutions subsequently proceeded, consistently asserting that the Roman Church, consecrated in blessed Peter the prince of the Apostles, holds preeminence over the others as their teacher and mother." Now the Primacy is itself the power of binding and loosing all things, of judging all things without appeal; therefore.

THESIS XVII

The power of receiving appeals from the entire world from any judgment of bishops, and of pronouncing the final sentence on cases judged by bishops, not only through delegated judges at the place where the case arose but personally in Rome itself, is likewise a proper power of the Roman Pontiff. It is also his proper right to send his legates into all parts of the Christian world.

I. In law, an appeal is defined as the recourse of a defendant or plaintiff from a lower judge to a higher one, so that a sentence handed down by the former judge may be corrected or revoked by the latter. Hence a judge who can receive an appeal has the right to institute of himself a new examination of the case and to pronounce a definitive sentence, by which the prior sentence is either confirmed or rescinded. It is evident that such a right is 1° distinct from the simple right of granting a review of a case, which it will be useful to explain in the words of de Marca, whom it will be necessary to refute on this question of the right of appeals to the Holy See: "For there is a difference (he says in *Concordia* etc., bk. 7, ch. 3, n. 6) between an appeal and a review. For an appeal transfers the full cognizance of the case to the superior judge, who examines and decides the question in his own tribunal. But a review leaves the definitive judgment to the prior jurisdiction, on the understanding that new judges are added to the prior judges." We do not dispute the truth of this latter point; we take it only to determine the

object under discussion, which is the right of appeal; we will speak later about the right of granting a review, which de Marca falsely teaches in the same place to have been proper to emperors. It is also evident 2° that the right of receiving an appeal is distinct from that right by which it is required that bishops, after judging in a synod, report what has been done to the Roman Pontiff, so that he himself may either approve or disapprove. Indeed, even Hincmar of Reims concedes this right to the Pontiff (see below). The subject of our discussion is therefore the right of appeal in the proper sense.

Two things must be proved: 1° that the Roman Pontiff has the right to receive appeals from the entire world from any judgment of bishops and to pronounce the final sentence; 2° that he can institute the cognizance of a case and pronounce sentence personally in his own tribunal in Rome concerning matters already judged in a synod of bishops—this latter point being what the adversaries chiefly deny.

Both points are proved from the nature of the primacy. For the Roman Pontiff enjoys full power in the Church, the power of binding and loosing with respect to all things and all persons. Now the power of binding and loosing is also the power of pronouncing judicial sentences, whether of absolution or condemnation, with respect to all persons and all things. Among all the persons and all the things subject to this power are also bishops and their sentences. Therefore the power of pronouncing judicial sentence concerning the very sentences of bishops, and of rescinding or confirming those sentences, belongs to the Roman Pontiff. To this the right of receiving appeals reduces. See the testimony of Gelasius cited a little earlier. Moreover, the power of the Roman Pontiff is immediate with respect to all the faithful and supreme. Inasmuch as it is immediate, he has the right to cognize and judge the cases of every individual faithful person; inasmuch as it is supreme, he has the right that no sentence concerning his own proper subjects shall be peremptory without his consent. For this reason, the Roman Pontiff has the right to cognize and judge again a case already judged by others, and also to judge the sentence of others, since these too are his immediate subjects, and to pronounce the final peremptory sentence, which can be pronounced only by the supreme authority. And because this right is proper to the primacy, which belongs to the person of each

of Peter's successors just as it belonged to the person of Peter himself, this right can therefore be exercised personally by the Roman Pontiff himself.

Furthermore, from this it is established that the Roman Pontiff can receive an appeal not only from a bishop appealing from the judgment of a synod of bishops, but also from an inferior cleric or a layman appealing from the judgment of a bishop. For the Roman Pontiff, who is the immediate superior of all, is no less the superior of a bishop than of a synod of bishops. Such a right of the Roman Pontiff, since it is the right of the primacy itself, is a divine right, and therefore neither took its origin from any human or ecclesiastical law nor can be abolished by any human or ecclesiastical law.

Moreover, this right must be distinguished from its exercise, which can vary at the will of the Roman Pontiff himself and be more or less regulated. For even supreme rulers have not wished to allow subjects to appeal in all cases, or they have conceded only a single appeal in certain cases, because the public good demanded it. The same has also been established in canon law. But it would be most inept for anyone to infer from this that it is not within the power of the Roman Pontiff to receive appeals from any judgment whatsoever, since the regulations themselves as regards practice are established by his authority.

II. But our adversaries oppose to us the ancient practice of the Church, the canons of councils, bishops eminent for holiness and learning who resisted such appeals, and they advance their own conjectures, by which they strive to twist the testimonies of antiquity that are contrary to them into a different sense. Let us therefore settle the matter also through documentary evidence and witnesses. Let us begin, then, with the Council of Sardica.

This council of approximately three hundred bishops, held in the year 346, was ecumenical in its convocation, celebration, and confirmation; for a demonstration of this, see Marchetti in his work *Dissertazione polemico-canonica sopra il Concilio di Sardica*, part 1 (it is, moreover, intolerable audacity—not to say foolishness—on the part of the most illustrious de Marca, in *op. cit.*, bk. 7, ch. 3, who denies that the council was ecumenical in its celebration, because before the council was constituted the Orientals made a separation—namely, eighty Arians

who withdrew to Philippopolis. But there remained nevertheless a considerable number of other Greeks, as is evident from the subscriptions. Does a council then cease to be ecumenical because heretics withdraw? That would certainly be most welcome to Protestants). If this council is not enumerated separately from the other ecumenical councils, this is to be explained by the fact that it defined no dogma of faith, and its canons were regarded as an appendix to the canons of Nicaea and were always cited by the Roman See under the heading of the Nicene canons. The Fathers at Chalcedon mention the canons of this synod in their address to the Emperor Marcian, and they extol it with praise and indicate that they receive it no differently than the Council of Constantinople and the Council of Ephesus. The Emperor Justinian himself cites it in his edict of faith.

Now among the twenty-one canons of Sardica, the third, fifth, and seventh according to the Dionysian order are relevant to our question. It must be noted, however, that the Latin reading of these canons is not a translation but is the original text, since the greater part of the bishops were Western, and Dionysius Exiguus expressly attests this in his letter to Stephen, saying: "Also the statutes of the Council of Sardica and of the Council of Africa, which were issued in Latin." (See the Ballerini brothers on the works of St. Leo, vol. 3, *De Antiquis Canonum Collectionibus*, pt. 1, ch. 5.) We present the Dionysian edition of the canons.

The first of these three canons is as follows: "Hosius the bishop said… that if in any province any bishop has a dispute against a fellow bishop, neither of the two is to call in as arbiters bishops from another province. But if any bishop has been judged and thinks that he has a good case, so that the judgment should be renewed: if it seems good to you, let us honor the memory of the holy Apostle Peter, that letters be written by those who have examined the case to Julius the bishop of Rome, and if he judges that the judgment should be renewed, let it be renewed and let him appoint judges; but if he shall find that the case is of such a nature that the matters decided should not be reopened, what he has decreed shall stand. Does this please everyone? The synod replied: It is pleasing."

The second: "Bishop Gaudentius said: It must be added, if it seems good, to this sentence which you have brought forth full of holiness, that when any bishop has been deposed by the judgment of bishops residing in neighboring places and shall proclaim that he has a case to be handled in the city of Rome: a second bishop is in no way to be ordained to his see, after the appeal of one who appears to have been deposed, unless the case has been decided in the judgment of the bishop of Rome."

The third: "Bishop Hosius said: It has been decided, moreover, that if any bishop has been accused and the bishops assembled from that region have judged him and removed him from his rank, if he who has been removed shall appeal (in Greek: as if appealing he shall have fled, etc.) and shall have fled to the bishop of the Church of Rome, and shall wish to be heard: if the bishop of Rome shall think it just that the judgment be renewed or that the matter be examined anew, let him deign to write to those bishops who are in the neighboring and adjacent province, that they may carefully inquire into all things. And if he who requests that his case be heard again shall, by his entreaty, move the bishop of Rome to send a presbyter from his side, it shall be in the power of the bishop of Rome to decide what he wishes and what he thinks best; and if he shall decide that judges are to be sent who are to be present with the bishops to judge, having the authority of him by whom they have been sent, it shall be in his discretion. But if he shall think that the bishops of the province are sufficient to bring the matter to a conclusion, he shall do what in his most wise counsel he shall judge best. The bishops replied: What has been said is pleasing."

In order to grasp clearly the sense of the canons, note with regard to the first that there formerly existed the custom that when a bishop condemned in a provincial synod demanded to be heard again, he could turn to other judges; and that the Council of Antioch had decreed in canon 12 that he should turn to a larger council of bishops and lay his case before the greater number of bishops and await their examination and judgment. Now what kind of council was this larger council? Zaccaria (*Antifebr.*, pt. 2, bk. 3, ch. 3) says it was convened from the bishops of neighboring provinces, whom the metropolitan of the condemned bishop would convoke to judge in second instance. And he

proves this from Antiochene canon 14 (on the force of the canons of this synod, see the Ballerini brothers on the works of St. Leo, vol. 3, pt. 1, ch. 4, § 2): "If any bishop is judged concerning certain crimes and it should happen that the bishops of the province disagree about him, so that he is believed innocent by some and guilty by others, in order to resolve all ambiguity it has pleased the holy synod that the metropolitan of the province call in other judges from a neighboring province (ἐπαρχία), so that together with them and the provincial (τῆς ἐπαρχίας) bishops what shall seem just may be approved."

But to one reading this canon it is evident that the case there treated is not the hypothesis that a sentence has already been passed by the provincial bishops in the first instance and that the condemned bishop is requesting a different judgment in which his case may be judged again in second instance; but rather an entirely different hypothesis is treated, namely that in the trial of first instance the provincial bishops disagree and on account of that disagreement are unable to pronounce sentence—and this is how the Emperor Hadrian I and the ancient Greek epitomist understood it (see Schelstrate, *Sacrum Concilium Antiochenum*, in this place). Nor does it seem possible simply to prescribe that the prior judges must judge again together with the second judges, which would have to be said to be prescribed if canon 14 pertained to this other hypothesis. With this observation we do not wish to say that the opinion of Zaccaria is false—namely that the second synod, which would judge in second instance, was convened from the bishops of neighboring provinces—but only that this opinion is not proved by that canon 14, which alone Zaccaria expressly cites. Moreover, this opinion is certainly proved by the other Sardican canon cited above: for it is said there that the bishop is deposed by the judgment of bishops residing in neighboring places; and such a judgment could not lawfully have been in the first instance, since evidently that belonged to the metropolitan and his council. It was therefore the second judgment that was instituted when the defendant thought he had a good case. Therefore the judgment in second instance was assembled from neighboring bishops of another province.

Now the Council of Sardica, in the first of the canons cited, established the following concerning the judgments of bishops. 1° If any

bishop has a dispute against another bishop of the same province, neither of them is to call in bishops from another province as judges, but the provincial bishops are to judge in first instance. 2° If in a provincial trial any bishop has been condemned, and he believes he has a good case for the judgment to be held again, those who have judged are to write to the Roman Pontiff, who, if he judges that the judgment ought to be renewed, appoints judges by whom it is to be renewed; but if he judges that there is no need for the case to be tried again, what he himself has decreed shall stand. 3° The Fathers of Sardica say they are establishing this so that the memory of the blessed Peter may be honored.

Therefore a) there is here no mention of an appeal to the Roman See; it is not said: if the defendant shall have appealed to the Pontiff, or that he may appeal; and indeed if the hypothesis of an appeal were being treated, not judges but the defendant, or certainly the defendant himself, would have to write to the Roman Pontiff. The hypothesis treated is therefore only this: that a bishop who has lost his case in first instance requests a different judgment. This alternative judgment was the concern of the metropolitan, who would summon bishops from neighboring provinces. The Sardican Fathers, however, decree that this alternative judgment is to be committed to the care of the Roman Pontiff, whose function it is: 1° to judge whether the judgment ought to be renewed; 2° to appoint judges, if he thinks the judgment should be renewed. Now the first of these could not be performed by the Pontiff without cognizance of the case; notification of it therefore had to be referred to him by the provincial synod that had judged. The second is an act of superior and unlimited jurisdiction, so that he was not required to assign these or those judges in particular—say, the bishops of the province or neighboring bishops—but judges without restriction: "let him appoint judges," they say, namely whomever he himself may wish.

The Greek version indeed reads: "and let the judgment be renewed through the bishops of the neighboring province, if it is necessary, and let him—the Roman Pontiff—provide the judges," that is to say, it shall be in the power of the Roman Pontiff to choose from among the neighboring bishops whomever he wishes, and thus the second synod is

assembled from neighboring bishops—which accords with the following canon.

Now this decree, establishing that for a second judgment letters are to be sent to the Roman Pontiff and that he himself shall decide whether it is to be held and, if he judges so, appoints judges, constituted something new: and indeed this novelty does not consist in some right being conferred on the Roman Pontiff, but in the exercise of a right, which exercise was not necessary and had not previously existed; it is, however, most fitting with the rights of the primacy. That is to say, the Roman Pontiff, by reason of his primacy of jurisdiction over all bishops, is himself by divine right the judge of bishops; and since by divine right there are in the Church only bishops and the Roman Pontiff as Peter's successor in the primacy, while the other dignities of metropolitans, patriarchs, etc. are only by ecclesiastical right, which depends on the Roman Pontiff and cannot limit his divine right; the Roman Pontiff himself is by divine right the judge of bishops even in first instance. But with patriarchs and then metropolitans having been established from the beginning and called to share in the solicitude which Peter's successor exercises over bishops, they were given the power that in the council of their bishops they should judge the cases of a bishop in first instance, while the second judgment was to be held by neighboring bishops convened by the metropolitan. But the Fathers of Sardica decree that the arrangement of this second judgment is to be left to the care of the Roman Pontiff, who may freely exercise the right he holds from Christ with respect to it. That this was a new law of discipline is evident both from the fact that it had not previously appeared and from the words with which it is proposed: "If it seems good to you, let us honor the memory of the holy Peter." And this discipline was introduced in a most reasonable manner. For the Roman Pontiff by reason of his primacy can compel neighboring bishops or others to reopen the judgment and truly impart to them a superior authority: which the metropolitan could not do, since he had no jurisdiction in another province, but could only request and invite; and jurisdiction over foreign bishops was obtained from law or custom.

We have said that this was a new law of discipline, and it was new only with respect to this special case, that the Pontiff himself should

appoint the second judges and decide whether the judgment ought to be renewed or not. Otherwise the canon and custom had existed from antiquity that in cases of bishops, at least of the principal sees, the final sentence was to be pronounced by the Roman Pontiff. Thus Pope Julius I in his letter to the Orientals in the case of Athanasius, of Marcellus bishop of Ancyra, of Asclepas bishop of Gaza, who had been deposed by the Arians: "For if, as you say, they were at fault, the judgment should have been conducted in accordance with the canon and not in this manner; you should have written to all of us—the Roman synod—so that what was just might be decreed by all. For it was bishops who were suffering these things, and not ordinary churches, but those which the Apostles themselves founded by their own labor in the faith. Why therefore did you, and in the first place, not wish to write to us about the church of Alexandria? Do you not know that this is the custom—that we should be written to first, so that what is just can be defined from here?"

COROLLARY

Those therefore err who think that a new right is conferred on the Pontiff here by the synod; for the right, the exercise of which is here decreed, resides in the Roman Pontiff by divine institution, as do the other rights of the primacy. And the Sardican Fathers must be judged to have signified this when they say "let us honor the memory of blessed Peter," if they are to be believed to have had a clear understanding of the prerogatives divinely conferred on Peter. For if the reality was thus—as it certainly was—the honor paid to the memory of blessed Peter consists in this, that the exercise of his right is declared and vindicated by the synodal judgment. Those therefore err who judge that in this canon the right of receiving appeals is being conceded to the Pontiff for the first time by the Church, and that such a right belongs to him not by divine but by ecclesiastical institution: they err, I say; because, setting aside what has already been said, in this canon there is not even a word about appeals; those who, in order to deny that divine right, appeal to the words "let us honor the memory of blessed Peter"—by which words some new establishment is signified—are therefore idle and inept.

In the second canon, the narrative portion must be distinguished from the dispositive portion. The former contains the description of the case, or the fact presupposed, on which the vote is not being cast; the latter teaches what is to be done in that case. To the narrative portion belong the following: namely, that a bishop deposed by the judgment of neighboring bishops proclaims that he has a case to be handled in the city of Rome, that is, that he appeals to the Roman Pontiff. The dispositive portion is this: that after his appeal, another is in no way to be ordained to his see, unless the case has been decided in the judgment of the bishop of Rome. Now from this simple examination of the canon the following are clear. 1° The case treated here concerns a bishop deposed in the second judgment, which was held by neighboring bishops. 2° Since the mention of the discipline of appeals belongs to the narrative portion of the canon, concerning which the Sardican Fathers then establish something, and since they do not establish that appeals are permitted but only what follows as a consequence on that right being presupposed, it is clear that the Fathers presupposed that even without any decree of theirs the bishops had the right to appeal to Rome and Rome had the right to receive their appeals.

The Fathers of Sardica indeed ratified this right; for b) they grant to the appeal a suspensive effect, so that the preceding sentence is not put into execution; c) they say the case is not yet finished, but is to be terminated by the Roman Pontiff; d) and it is to be terminated in the judgment of the bishop of Rome, that is, in his tribunal. Now this is a profession of truly proper appeal—namely of the right which bishops have of appealing to the Roman See and of the right which the Roman Pontiff has of receiving an appeal which is a proper appeal and not merely a power of granting a review of a case. For terms are to be taken in their proper signification, especially when laws or canons are being enacted, and especially if they are legal terms; and such is the word "appeal," the meaning of which was most well known in civil court. Furthermore, with the appeal interposed, the case was to be judged in the very tribunal of the Roman Pontiff, or he had the right to this; for it is said: "unless the case has been decided in the judgment of the bishop of Rome" and "shall have proclaimed that he has a case to be handled in the city of Rome"; therefore judgment was instituted at Rome, therefore

the bishop of Rome judged, he did not merely send delegated judges to recognize and judge the case at the place of the prior judgment. Finally, the Roman Pontiff could in his judgment rescind the prior sentence; for this is the reason why the deposed bishop appealed, and this is the reason why it is forbidden to ordain another in the meantime; and through the sentence of the Roman Pontiff the case was terminated. Now these are the proper characteristics of an appeal: therefore the right of receiving genuine appeals resided in the Roman Pontiff before the Council of Sardica and was known to all the churches, and of this right the Sardican Fathers are not the authors but the witnesses (in the same way Balsamon interprets these canons, maintaining only the one point that the privileges of old Rome now belong also to new Rome).

You will say: in the Greek reading of this canon the words "appeal" and "in the city of Rome" are lacking. I reply: 1° that the canons were issued in Latin; 2° and even if those words are absent, the meaning is the same. For it says: "if any bishop… says that the right of defending his case belongs to him again, let no one be substituted in his place before the bishop of Rome, having cognized the case, shall have pronounced sentence." Therefore the case is to be cognized by the bishop of Rome, sentence is to be pronounced by him, nothing is to be changed before this; therefore the right of defense belonging to the defendant was a provocation to the judgment of the Roman See, and he who said this right of defense belonged to him was appealing to it.

In the third canon likewise the narrative must be distinguished from the dispositive portion. The former is: if a bishop shall have been judged in a synod of his province and shall have been deposed, and shall have appealed and fled to the Roman See. From these words it is clear that a different hypothesis from the preceding one is treated here. For here it is a matter of the appeal which is interposed after the first judgment; the reference is to the sentence passed by the bishops of that region, that is, of the province of the deposed bishop, which was the judgment in first instance. From the very character and structure of the sentence it is clear that the judge to whom he is said to appeal is the Roman Pontiff: "if he who has been removed shall have appealed and shall have fled to the bishop of the Church of Rome"; for the judge of the appeal had to be designated, so that something certain could

subsequently be established regarding this type of case; and the words "to the bishop of the Church of Rome" can in themselves be referred to both verbs, "shall have fled" and "shall have appealed," while the very purpose of the appeal is signified by the word "shall have fled," namely to protect himself from an unjust sentence. This can indeed be confirmed by the Greek reading, which expresses the single action more precisely: καὶ ὥσπερ (in the law of the Greeks published by Cardinal Pitra, vol. 1, p. 104, the reading of the codices, except one Parisian one, is ὥσπερ, with which reading the construction does not appear altogether straightforward; the meaning, however, is not changed) ἐκκαλεσάμενος καταφύγῃ ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ., "and as if appealing he shall have fled." Now it is quite inept to contend that there is no mention here of appeal in the proper sense, because it says "as if appealing," not simply "appealing," as if he were not properly appealing but doing something similar to an appeal. For the particle ὡς or ὥσπερ (which has all the meanings of the Latin *ut*) does not have merely an approximative sense, so to speak, but also a reduplicative or identical sense, so that it is equivalent to "inasmuch as," "seeing that," "since indeed": εἰ ὡς ἐκκαλεσάμενος καταφύγῃ, "if inasmuch as one appealing he shall have fled," or "if he shall have fled, seeing that he has appealed"—namely, if in appealing he shall have fled. Now this is the certain meaning underlying those words, as is clear both from the original Latin reading and can be seen from a comparison with the preceding canon.

Now in order to understand what the Fathers of Sardica established, it must be recalled that at that time the custom prevailed that a second judgment was instituted by a synod of neighboring bishops; and although it was in the power of the Roman Pontiff to judge in second instance as well as in first instance, this order of appealing from the immediate tribunal to the immediately superior one is nevertheless useful and right, and was established by both civil and canon law. There is therefore sufficient reason why the Roman Pontiff should wish this order to be observed. Now in this type of case, one who appealed from the judgment of first instance to the Roman Pontiff would be making a leap, bypassing the immediately superior tribunal. Hence, since they did not wish to abolish the custom which they had also brought to a better form in the first canon, they established the

following, which are sufficiently clear. In these decrees, this above all must be noted: namely, the manner in which they speak; for they say nothing imperatively, but offer their counsel, leaving the entire matter to the Pontiff's discretion: "Let him deign to write to these bishops… it shall be in the power of the bishop of Rome to decide what he wishes and what he thinks best… it shall be in his discretion… he shall do what in his most wise counsel he shall have judged best." This manner of speaking is testimony to the persuasion of the entire synod that it had no coercive power over the Roman Pontiff and that it was in his power to act differently than they were advising and to judge the case himself in Rome, bypassing the second judgment of neighboring or other bishops.

Furthermore, from these considerations it is established that the Sardican Fathers certify to us 1° as witnesses of the preceding custom and of the right of the Roman See to receive appeals and to judge the case of the appellant in its own tribunal; 2° and that the same right is confirmed by their decrees as judges. These are certainly the canons cited by Gelasius when he said in ep. 4: "These are the canons which wished appeals from the entire Church to be referred to the examination of this See." This right of receiving appeals and of personally judging in such cases—no less than the right of convoking ecumenical synods even if the patriarchs disagree—was defended by Eugenius in session 25 of the Council of Florence against the Greeks.

Had Hincmar of Reims—a turbulent man, the more arrogant toward his subjects the more irreverent toward the Roman Pontiff—taken heed of what has been explained up to this point, he would not have interpreted these three canons in such a way as to hold that the Roman Pontiff, upon receiving a bishop's appeal, was not to judge the case himself in Rome but to give judges to judge in the province (*Opusculum of 53 chapters against Hincmar, bishop of Laon*, ch. 3). As if the words of the second canon, which Hincmar recites as we have recited it, were not clear; and as if the third canon, of which he makes misuse, pertained to the same type of case as the second, so that the former was to be interpreted by the latter; and as if something were established in the third canon by which the Roman Pontiff is obligated.

III. And indeed, before the Council of Sardica, bishops appealed to the Roman See and there, after the case was cognized, a sentence was pronounced by the Roman Pontiff. With respect to the fact of the appeal, the question is whether Athanasius and the other bishops with him, who had suffered many injustices at the hands of the Eusebians, appealed to Rome. Liberatus the Deacon, a writer of the sixth century, says in his *Breviarium*, ch. 18, that Athanasius did appeal, speaking of John Talaia: "that, having taken synodal letters, he appealed to the Roman Pontiff Simplicius, as the blessed Athanasius did." However, we consider it must be conceded that if the form of a judicial proceeding is taken into account, it does not appear to have been a genuine appeal. For 1° an appeal is a recourse to a superior against the sentence of an inferior judge whose authority is admitted to some degree and whose sentence is accepted. Otherwise, if no account is taken of the inferior judge's proceeding and recourse is had afterward to the superior so that he himself may judge the case, a genuine appeal does not take place; but Athanasius acted in this latter way, for he did not admit the judgment of the Synod of Tyre nor paid any attention to its sentence, and subsequently, when summoned by Julius, he fled to Rome. 2° One who appeals is himself the one who provokes recourse to the judgment of the superior; but in this case Athanasius does not appear to have himself provoked the recourse, but was summoned by Julius ("not of his own motion but summoned and having received our letters he came here"—Julius's letter), after Julius had received letters from the Eusebians in which they requested that a synod be convened at Rome and referred the arbitration of the case to Julius himself (see Athanasius, *Apologia contra Arianos*, n. 20; Julius's letter to the Eusebians, nn. 2 and 20; Theodoret, *H.E.*, bk. 2, ch. 40). Although the legates of the Alexandrian synod and of Athanasius himself, who had brought the synodal letters to Rome—letters which that synod had sent to all bishops in order to make known the wicked deeds of the Arians—requested that a synod be held at Rome, which the legates of the Eusebians had already requested (Athanasius, ibid.); yet this does not prove that Athanasius properly appealed, both because that request seems to have been made after the Eusebians had referred the arbitration of the case to Julius, with the others spontaneously consenting to the same, and because, as we have

said, there is a difference between appealing and requesting judgment before a legitimate and just judge, which is what was then done.

Nevertheless, although the proper form of appeal was lacking, if what was done is considered, it must be said that Julius exercised the right proper to one who can receive appeals from the judgments of bishops and that the sentence pronounced by him was equivalent to a sentence in a case of appeal. For the right of receiving an appeal consists in this: that a sentence may be pronounced after the sentence of others on the same matter, that the prior judges may be compelled to appear with the defendant before the second judge, and that the latter may rescind and annul the prior sentence. Now whether the defendant appeals or comes when summoned—this does not diminish the right of the superior judge, but only changes the manner of instituting the proceeding. But Julius did all these things in the case of Athanasius and the other bishops, and the sentence of Julius pronounced in his synod was efficacious in itself, as the Sardican Fathers first instruct us in their letter to the Church of Alexandria, saying that "the equity of the judgment of our brother and co-bishop Julius was plainly apparent, who not by rash counsel but with due diligence pronounced sentence, so that no doubt remains about the communion of our brother Athanasius." Then Socrates and Sozomen instruct us: the former in bk. 2, ch. 15: "Then Athanasius after long labors at last with difficulty arrived in Italy… At the same time Paul, bishop of Constantinople, Asclepas of Gaza, etc., arrived in the royal city. When they had laid their case before Julius, bishop of the city of Rome, he—such being the prerogative of the Roman Church—strengthened them with more freely written letters and sent them back to the East, restoring each to his own see, and at the same time reproved those who had rashly deposed the aforementioned bishops." And Sozomen in bk. 3, ch. 8 on the same matter: "The bishop of Rome, having cognized the cases of each and having found that all were in agreement with the Nicene faith, received them into communion. And since by reason of the dignity of his see the care of all belonged to him, he restored to each his own church." Henry Valesius denies, in his note on the cited passage of Socrates, as do the Maurist editors (in their *Admonitio* on the cited *Apologia*), that Julius ever in fact restored Athanasius to his see. But does not Julius himself in his letter to

the Eusebians testify that after the case was examined he regarded and regards Athanasius as the true bishop? What was this, if not to judge him to be the legitimate bishop of Alexandria and that no account should be taken of the intruded Gregory? Now this is tantamount to having restored his see to him; for the question was not about a material restoration, nor had he ever been removed from it by any color of right, but only by force. Socrates and Sozomen therefore interpreted the action of Julius correctly.

Before Athanasius and his companions in appeal, others also appealed to Rome. We pass over Marcion, Primate of Lambesis, and Fortunatus the pseudo-bishop, about whom see Zaccaria, *Antifebr.*, pt. 2, bk. 3, ch. 2—for these perhaps did not truly appeal. For as regards Marcion, even if more credence is to be given to Epiphanius (*Haer.* 42) than to Tertullian (*De Praescriptione*, ch. 30), it is not sufficiently clear that he appealed. He indeed, after having been expelled from the Church by the bishop of Sinope for a scandalous act and being unable to obtain penance, fled to the Roman Church; but the reason for fleeing could have been multiple. For he could have fled for the purpose of an appeal, so that the sentence of his bishop might be reconsidered; he could also have fled in order to obtain communion and the place of a presbyter, which he had lost in his own church, in another church—one to which his crime was unknown, and indeed in the foremost church. For it is evident from canon 5 of Nicaea and canon 16 of Sardica—which forbade it again—that it frequently occurred that someone excommunicated by his own bishop fled to another and sought and even obtained his communion. Now this is something different from appealing. Indeed the Roman clergy—the see being then vacant—in refusing to receive Marcion into their communion gave this reason: "Without the order of your venerable Father—for his bishop was his Father—it is not lawful for us to do this; for there is one faith and one agreement of minds." But if the matter had concerned an appeal, either they would not have denied that they could receive it, or in denying it they would perhaps have given this reason: that the bishop of Rome was not present. The same thing appears to have been the real intent of Privatus the bishop, who, having been deposed by a synod, sent a legate to Rome "to attempt by stealth and fraud to extract letters from us," says

the Roman clergy to Cyprian in ep. 30—that is, he was seeking letters of communion, but by stealth and fraud; whereas if he had appealed, he would have had to lay out the whole matter openly, what crimes he was accused of, what sentence was passed. In the affair of Fortunatus also, the appeal is not sufficiently clear. In Cyprian's ep. 33 no mention is ever made of it nor of a retrial by the Roman Pontiff, but only of letters which Felicissimus, who was handling Fortunatus's case, brought to Rome and which contained accusations against Cyprian: hence Cyprian in that letter adduces proofs of the crimes of Fortunatus and his associates and of his own innocence. See Pamelius on this letter.

But, setting these cases aside, the appeal of two bishops of Spain to Stephen is certain, as attested by Cyprian himself. For when the bishops Basilides and Martialis had been deposed in a synod, and that by legitimate judges, and Felix and Sabinus had been substituted for them, they fled to the Roman Pontiff Stephen, who, having heard them and cognized their case, ordered them to be restored to their sees. Now this is a genuine appeal from the judgment of a legitimate synod to the tribunal of the Roman Pontiff, who cognized the case himself and pronounced sentence. Cyprian narrates the event in ep. 68 to the churches of Spain which had expelled Basilides and Martialis. Now when the sentence of Stephen was heard, those churches sent letters through Felix and Sabinus to Cyprian, so that he might relieve their just and necessary anxiety either with consolation or by the support of his judgment. What then did Cyprian do? Having convened a synod and read the letters in which many and grave crimes of Basilides and Martialis were reported, he judged together with his bishops that they had been justly deposed and were no longer to be regarded as bishops, and that Felix and Sabinus had been legitimately ordained. He then adds: "Nor can he rescind an ordination rightly accomplished: because Basilides, after his crimes had been detected and the awareness of them laid bare even by his own confession, went to Rome and deceived Stephen our colleague, who is situated far away and was ignorant of what had been done and of the concealed truth (perhaps Cyprian himself was deceived by Felix and Sabinus), so as to obtain by scheming to be unjustly restored to the episcopate from which he had been rightly deposed. This is relevant in so far as the offenses of Basilides are not so

much cancelled as accumulated, so that to his prior sins there has been added the crime of deceit and circumvention. Nor indeed is that man to be blamed so much who was negligently deceived, as this one who fraudulently deceived." That is to say, Cyprian notes only this defect of obreption, by reason of which the sentence is null, and not the appeal itself; which he would certainly have principally condemned if right or custom did not provide that the Roman Pontiff should annul the sentences of synods by his judgment and receive the appeals of those condemned. He even confirms the appeal; for one who notes the defect of obreption presupposes and regards the judge to whom recourse is had as legitimate: for obreption and subreption properly have their place before a judge and superior.

These considerations may suffice: for it must be noted that, since few documents of antiquity have survived, a great multitude of such facts is not to be expected. Nevertheless we have certain witnesses of this ancient custom. For it is attested by Leo the Great in the controversy with St. Hilary of Arles, Ep. 10 (see on this matter the Ballerini brothers in the works of St. Leo, vol. 2, at the third dissertation of Quesnel): "Therefore let your fraternity recognize together with us that the Apostolic See, out of reverence for it, has been consulted by innumerable reports even from the priests of your province, and through the diversity of—as the ancient custom required (here not the canons of Sardica are cited, but the custom, and that an ancient one)—through the diversity of appeals, the judgments have been either reconsidered or confirmed." Augustine also as a most well-known fact hands on that the Roman Pontiff had the right before the Nicene synod to judge personally the cases of bishops already condemned elsewhere (Ep. 43, n. 7): "Caecilianus was able to disregard the conspiring multitude of enemies, seeing that he was joined to the Roman Church, in which the primacy of the Apostolic See has always flourished… by communicatory letters, where he was ready to plead his case if his adversaries should attempt to alienate those churches from him." On the subsequent appeals of Chrysostom, Eutyches, Flavian, and Theodoret, read the Ballerini brothers in the place cited, at Quesnel's dissertations 8, 9, and 10.

The adversaries do indeed advance certain facts by which bishops appear to have resisted this right of the Roman See and to have contended that the sentences of synods of a metropolitan or primate or patriarch are firm and immutable of themselves; but we will examine these in thesis XX.

IV. The right of the Roman Pontiff to receive appeals from the entire world is therefore established. Up to this point in the historical argument we appear to have spoken only of bishops appealing; but it is evident that inferior clerics and other faithful can also appeal. 1° Because there is equal reason: for all the faithful and their judges are immediately subject to the authority of the primacy. 2° Because if bishops can appeal, the principle of the adversaries falls—namely that the sentences of synods are immutable; but if these are not immutable, much less will the sentence of a single bishop, by whom a cleric or layman may be condemned, be immutable; therefore from this judgment and from the judgment of a synod one will be able to appeal to the Roman Pontiff. It may indeed happen that for certain reasons this is forbidden by some law which derives its force from the authority of the Pontiff; but his right cannot be denied. 3° There are also testimonies in antiquity regarding the appeals of inferior clergy. Indeed this is where the interpretation applied by Innocent I to canon 16 of Sardica and to canon 5 of Nicaea is relevant; the latter reads: "Concerning those who have been separated from communion, whether they belong to the rank of clerics or of laymen, let the sentence of the bishops in any province stand in accordance with the canon (see apostolic canon 13) which declares that those expelled by some should not be received by others; but let it be examined whether they were expelled on account of pusillanimity, contention, or some harshness of the same bishop. In order therefore that this may proceed fittingly, it seems proper that synods be held twice a year in each province, etc." Now Innocent I explains this as follows in his letter to Victricius of Rouen: "If any cases or contentions have arisen among clerics of both the higher and the lower order, let the dispute, in accordance with the Nicene synod, be terminated by the assembled priests of that same province. Nor is it lawful for anyone (the following exceptional words are rejected by some as apocryphal, but without sufficient reason) without prejudice,

however, to the Roman Church, to which in all cases deference must be maintained, leaving these priests who govern God's Church in the same province by divine nod, to fly to other provinces." That is, these canons do not forbid clerics from fleeing to the Roman See; on the contrary, it has the right in all cases to receive those who have recourse to it. And since in the Nicene canon mention is also made of laymen, Innocent's interpretation is valid with respect to them as well. Thus Caelestius appealed from the African Council to Zosimus, who cognized the case and pronounced a definitive sentence (see his ep. 10). Likewise Eutyches the archimandrite appealed to Leo the Great, as is clearly evident from Leo's letter to Flavian. Similarly, Gregory the Great received the appeal of John the presbyter of Chalcedon and, having absolved him, sent him back to the fasting bishop (ep., bk. 6, ep. 13). See on this matter Zaccaria in the place cited; Christianus Lupus, *De Appellationibus Romanis*, in his works, vols. 8 and 13; and the most exquisite work of David, most fruitful to read, published at Paris in 1671: *Des jugemens canoniques des Évêques*, against the recent doctrines of many authors and especially of the most illustrious de Marca.

V. It is necessary, however, here also to resolve certain difficulties drawn from reason and authority. They say first that it is consistent with reason that a judgment be instituted where the offense was committed and where witnesses can be found. But 1° reason demands this in order that knowledge of the matter may be obtained through witnesses; and this knowledge is not lacking in the tribunal of the Pontiff to whom the appeal is made, for it must have been obtained in the first judgment of the bishops, all the acts of which must be referred to the Roman Pontiff upon the interposition of the appeal, to whom moreover witnesses and accusers are also summoned. 2° Not infrequently reason or equity teaches that the defendant should be withdrawn from the power of those who condemned him and judged in a place where they can accomplish nothing by force; for it has not rarely happened that some metropolitan or fellow bishops, from inordinate feeling, pronounced an unjust sentence and wished to maintain it by force or by intimidation. This is what Gregory the Great teaches us in ep. 24, bk. 6, of his letters, to the Metropolitan of Ravenna, when certain persons from his clergy were crying out "that it was against the laws and canons for the case

between his church and Abbot Claudius to be examined and judged at Rome." For he says that complaint is contrary to ecclesiastical order, "especially since the case could not be pleaded there, where the aforesaid Abbot has complained that he suffered injustice from your predecessor and has been suffering from that up to the present time. For this could perhaps have been objected if he were not having recourse to a greater authority and seeking at his hands the settlement of the merits of his case. Do you not know that the case which arose between John the presbyter and John of Constantinople our brother and fellow bishop proceeded, in accordance with the canons, to the Apostolic See and has been decided by our sentence?"

Then the authority of Cyprian is adduced, who, as de Marca says (*Concordia*, bk. 7, ch. 1), "expounds the rights of the bishops of each province, which consist in this, that the examination and judgment of cases belongs to them and the governance of the flock, with each rendering an account of his administration to God; and that it is not lawful to appeal to Rome or elsewhere." Here are the words of Cyprian from ep. 53 to Cornelius concerning Fortunatus and Felicissimus: "For since it has been decided by all of us, and it is equally just and right, that each one's case should be heard where the offense was committed and that to each shepherd a portion of the flock is assigned, which each one is to rule and govern, rendering account of his conduct to the Lord; those over whom we preside ought by no means to run about, nor by their crafty and deceitful presumption to undermine the coherent agreement of the bishops, but to plead their case there where they can also have accusers and witnesses of their crime… Already (in the previous year) their case has been cognized, already sentence has been pronounced on them, nor is it fitting that the priestly censure should be reprehended with the fickleness and inconstancy of a changeable and fickle mind." These words are cited by de Marca to prove that bishops cannot appeal to Rome.

In order to understand Cyprian's meaning, the learned generally point out that there existed in Africa a law that presbyters and other inferior clerics, if they brought complaints against the judgments of their bishops, should be heard by neighboring bishops, and if they wished to appeal from them, they should appeal to the universal council

of Africa and not to courts overseas, that is, to Rome. This law could have been established for just reasons, and there is no reason, if that law existed at that time, to doubt that it was established before Cyprian in some African council with the approval of the Roman Pontiff, to whom the acts of synods were referred; and one cannot reasonably think that Cyprian would have wished to cite this statute to Cornelius in defense of his position if it had been established without the authority of the Roman See. The same law was renewed in the Council of Carthage of 419, can. 34, and was included in the Code of the African Church. Now this law, it is said, was proper to the Africans: see Lupus, vol. 8, diss. 2, ch. 17—as can be understood from the very words of Cyprian himself; for he says "since it has been decided by all of us," namely, it has not been decided for the entire Church, but for all of us Africans. Moreover, the law itself concerned not bishops but inferiors (see the Observations of the Ballerini brothers at dissertation 5 of Quesnel in the works of Leo, vol. 2).

Now Fortunatus, who had been superordained by heretics as bishop of Carthage while Cyprian held the see, was not regarded—and rightly—by Cyprian as a bishop, enjoying the authority and rights of bishops, but only as a presbyter; hence Cyprian always calls him a pseudo-bishop. Therefore if the latter wished to try the judgment again, Cyprian contended by virtue of that canon that he should go to the council of Africa, not to a court overseas. But if the matter was thus, nothing can be inferred from all this against the right of the Roman Pontiff to receive the appeals of bishops, nor against his right of receiving the appeal of inferiors; for a law proper to a certain locality, established for the special reasons of that locality, approved by the Roman Pontiff who of his own will yields the exercise of some power of his for the common good of that region (which exercise, as is understood from the very nature of the matter, was to be resumed when the common good demanded it and the Pontiff so wished, as subsequently occurred in the case of Apiarius), detracts nothing from the Pontiff's own right. This response of the learned, as regards that canon which Cyprian is said to be pressing, is entirely sufficient, in the hypothesis that the question concerned a second judgment which Fortunatus wished to experience by appealing to Rome.

However, there is reason to doubt whether this hypothesis is true, and therefore also to doubt whether the statute to which Cyprian appeals is the one the learned mention. For indeed, as is clear from Cyprian's own letter, the matter stood as follows. Fortunatus had indeed been condemned by a synod on account of the schismatic ordination he had received from heretics; but he had not yet presented himself to the judgment of his own bishop Cyprian, in whose church he was a presbyter, in order to refute the accusations and defend himself, if he wished. Cyprian himself testifies to this: "because they know their own conscience, and they do not dare to approach us or to come to the threshold of the Church." Hence he adds: "if they wish to experience our judgment, let them come." Felicissimus and Fortunatus had not therefore yet experienced Cyprian's judgment, that is, had not come to his tribunal and pleaded their case before him. Hence when they are said to have been condemned by Cyprian after the case was cognized, this cognizance of the case was the very notoriety of the offense—the schismatic usurpation of episcopal power; nor does Cyprian deny that this sentence can be called to examination again, since he says he is ready to institute the judgment again; but he says the sentence is not to be censured with the fickleness of a changeable and fickle mind—which is an entirely different thing. The matter was still therefore at the stage of the first judgment, in which the defendant was to be heard together with the accusers and was to defend his case. Now this is what Cyprian contends: if these wicked men wish to be heard, let them defend their case where the crime was committed, where accusers and witnesses of the crime can be found. Therefore Cyprian is speaking of the judgment of first instance, to which the defendant ought to present himself.

Now it was established everywhere that a defendant—if the defendant were a presbyter, before the tribunal of the bishop; if the defendant were a bishop, before the synod of the province—should be heard first. Such therefore is the statute to which Cyprian appeals. And indeed the equity and justice which Cyprian claims for that statute have a place only with respect to the judgment of first instance. For he says 1° it is just and right that each one's case be heard (he does not say: terminated) where the offense was committed; 2° that to each shepherd a portion of the flock is assigned, which each one is to rule and govern,

rendering account of his conduct to the Lord. Now the first reason can be valid for the judgment of first instance, but for subsequent judgments I do not know whether there is any jurist—not excepting de Marca—who would admit it (see what was said above). And indeed if that reason were valid for all judgments, it would not have been lawful for any presbyter of a distant diocese to appeal to the universal council of Carthage. But if accusers and witnesses could go there, why could they not go to Rome? The only difference was in time and expense. The second reason is indeed difficult to understand unless it is taken to refer to the judgment of first instance. The individual shepherds are bishops. Christianus Lupus interprets them as patriarchs or primates, at any rate autocephalous ones, such as the three exarchs; but the reason for this limitation does not appear; since Cyprian, although he was Primate of Africa, was not an autocephalous primate as the patriarchs and exarchs were, but was subject to the patriarchal power of the bishop of Rome, who was patriarch of the entire West; and therefore a mention of autocephalous primates would not have helped Cyprian. The individual shepherds are therefore, as Cyprian frequently speaks, bishops: but what do the words "rendering account of his conduct to the Lord" mean? Are they, as de Marca would have it, to be taken exclusively—that is, to the Lord alone? But in this hypothesis it would not have been lawful to appeal to the neighboring bishops and to the universal synod of Africa either. But if they are not to be taken exclusively—if bishops too must render account of their conduct to their superiors—how can it be concluded from this that the cases of African presbyters are to be settled by African bishops? Was the Roman Pontiff not the superior of these very men and of the Primate himself? Did Cyprian wish to say that one should not doubt the justice of bishops in pronouncing sentences, since they rule their flock as those who will render account of their governance to the Lord? For Cyprian speaks in the same sense a little further below: "we, however, from whom an account is to be rendered to the Lord, weighing anxiously and examining carefully, etc." This indeed is more probable—that this is Cyprian's meaning: that those over whom the bishops preside ought not to run about, that is, seek other judges bypassing their bishops, which is indeed what happens when their judgment in first instance is avoided; because to each portion of

the flock a bishop is set over it, who therefore has the right to judge and whose equity in sentence it is wrong to doubt. But this due reverence toward legitimate and most honorable judges does not impede the right of appeal from their judgments to the judgment of a superior. There is therefore nothing in these words of Cyprian that attacks Roman appeals. Nor can the existence at that time of that canon, by which inferior clerics were prohibited from overseas appeals, be established from these words; for the statute to which Cyprian refers does not pertain to these.

There is also the objection drawn from what is prescribed in canon 5 of Nicaea described above, as if appeal were forbidden to judges outside the province and therefore also to the bishop of Rome. But two entirely different things must be distinguished. One thing is for a legitimate superior judge to receive the appeal of a subject and to pronounce sentence with the order of judgment observed; another is for any bishop whatsoever to receive into his communion an excommunicated subject of another. It is the latter, not the former, that is prohibited in the first part of this canon. The second part does indeed prescribe that cases be referred to the provincial synod; but 1° there the reference is to cases of inferior clerics and laymen; 2° the canon does not say that judgment is supreme. Innocent I, as the legitimate interpreter of the canons, says that these are to be understood without prejudice to the Roman See, as we have cited above. This canon appears to have first been misused by the Arians assembled at Antioch against Julius I (see Sozomen, bk. 3, ch. 8), and they are followed by de Marca, bk. 7, ch. 2, and others.

De Marca objects in the same place, can. 13 of Antioch: "If any bishop accused of certain crimes is condemned by all the bishops of the same province, and all of them consistently pronounce the same form of decree against him, this man is in no way to be judged by others, but the sentence of the agreeing bishops of the province shall stand firm." From this de Marca wishes it to follow that the sentence of a provincial synod in a case of a bishop is not subject to appeal. But de Marca himself notes that in canon 12 of the same Antiochene synod it is established that a bishop condemned by a provincial synod may appeal to a greater synod —which seem contradictory to him. But there is no contradiction.

Canon 13 must be connected with canon 14: in the latter it is prescribed that if in the provincial synod the votes of the bishops do not agree, so that a sentence cannot be pronounced, the metropolitan is to convoke neighboring bishops so that something may be decided in first instance; but canon 13, on the contrary, establishes that if all the bishops of the province agree in pronouncing sentence, other bishops are not to be convoked for the judgment of first instance. But just as appeal to a greater synod, of which canon 12 speaks, is not denied—even though no mention of it is made here—so neither is appeal to the Roman Pontiff, or to his synod, denied; which is certainly a greater synod than a provincial one. (See Schelstrate, *op. cit.*)

Again incorrectly does de Marca appeal in the same place to canon 2 of the First Council of Constantinople, where it is said: "Bishops are not to go uninvited beyond their Diocese to ordain anyone or for any disposing of ecclesiastical matters, observing the rule written above concerning each Diocese. For it is manifest that the provincial synod ought to administer and govern all things according to what was defined at Nicaea." In these latter words it is not said that the provincial synod is the supreme and non-appellable judge in pronouncing its sentences, but that the administration of the province—not the bishops of another province—belongs to it. The canon was issued against vagrant bishops, and just as it does not exclude the authority of a primate or patriarch over the provincial synod—indeed it signifies such authority in the preceding part of the canon—so neither does it exclude the authority of the Roman Pontiff. Besides, the canon was issued only by the Greeks and was never received, any more than the other canons of that council, by the Roman See.

De Marca, somewhat inconsistent with himself, after having taught that provincial synods are not subject to appeal, attributes this prerogative to patriarchal synods, to which appeal can therefore be made—which destroys the stated prerogative of provincial synods. De Marca appeals (ibid., ch. 5) to canon 6 of the First Council of Constantinople as having established (is it not strange?) both things at once.

To one considering the canon, it will be clear that it neither prescribed what de Marca wants nor established anything against the

Sardican canons. The part of the canon relevant to us is as follows: "If certain persons (who may be accused) say they have some accusations against a bishop, the holy synod orders them first of all to pursue the accusation before the bishops of the province and to prove before them the charges against the bishop who is accused of various things. But if it should happen that the provincial bishops are unable to correct the offenses charged against the bishop, then they are to come before the greater synod of the bishops of that bishop's diocese convened for this purpose." It then forbids the matter to be referred to the emperor.

Now 1° the Fathers at Constantinople do not deny that a bishop condemned by the greater synod can appeal to Rome, nor do they say that the sentence of that synod is supreme and non-appellable; 2° nor was there room in this constitution for discourse about appeal; for the question is not what is permitted to the defendant but what the accuser must do; nor is the hypothesis that the condemned bishop wishes to be heard in another judgment, but that the provincial bishops are not equal to correcting the crimes with which the bishop is charged. Hence 3° neither is this canon opposed to the first of the Sardican canons cited, which orders the matter to be left to the discretion of the Roman Pontiff; for that is prescribed in the hypothesis that, after a first sentence has been pronounced by the provincial synod, the defendant himself requests to be heard in another judgment.

De Marca also appeals (ibid.) to canon 9 of Chalcedon, in which it is prescribed "that if a bishop or cleric has a complaint against the metropolitan of the same province, let him apply either to the Primate of the Diocese or to the See of the royal city of Constantinople, and let him be judged there." This canon was issued in the same session in which canon 28 on the privileges of the See of Constantinople was also issued (see David, *op. cit.*, ch. 3, a. 4) and looks to the same purpose; for they wished to confer also on the bishop of Constantinople, whom they wanted to prefer over the other patriarchs in the East, this prerogative as well, that cases against any metropolitans might be heard before him, bypassing the proper primates. Now 1° the canon appears to have been issued without the consent of the Apostolic See, which could not approve it; for since Leo had annulled canon 28, he must be said to have also annulled those canons which necessarily cohered with it. Indeed 2°

it is established that Leo approved no disciplinary canon but positively disapproved them all. In ep. 114 to the bishops of the council he says that "by approving the synodal acts he had entered into the same judgment with them only in the cause of faith—as must often be said." And in ep. 119 to Maximus of Antioch: "If anything is said to have been done by those brothers whom I sent to the holy synod as my representatives, beyond what pertained to the cause of faith, it shall be of absolutely no force whatsoever." Moreover (since this canon 9 was received into the Dionysian collection and this collection was handed by Hadrian I for use in the Gallican Church), in this canon the judgment of first instance is indeed conceded to the bishop of Constantinople, bypassing the proper primates of the East: but it is not denied that appeal can be made from him to another, that is, to the Roman Pontiff. Christianus Lupus (ibid.) judges that this canon does not concern all clerics or bishops of whatever patriarchate, who could bypass the judgment of their patriarch to go to the bishop of Constantinople, but the clerics and bishops of the three dioceses over which the synod wished to confer patriarchal rights on the bishop of Constantinople. The other futile and inept arguments that de Marca heaps up may be seen refuted in the same David, ibid.

Febronius, ch. 8, § 6, adduces ancient monuments against Roman appeals: namely 1° the Novella 122 of the Emperor Justinian, who, enumerating the instances of ecclesiastical judgments, makes mention of the synod of a bishop and of provincial and patriarchal synods, decreeing that no party can effectively oppose the sentence of the patriarchal synod, with no mention made of the Roman Pontiff. But, setting aside that Justinian is not a competent witness on this matter—as one who frequently arrogated to himself the rights of the priesthood—we reply with David, ch. 3, a. 5, and Natalis Alexander, *H.E.*, cent. 4, diss. 27, pt. 3, that the reference is there to civil cases, the cognizance of which had been entrusted or permitted to bishops. 2° The provincial council of Lyons held in 567, which prescribes that if disputes arise between bishops, they should be content with the judgment of their metropolitan; but if they belong to different provinces, both metropolitans should meet and the matter be judged by the common sentence of the brethren. We reply: does the silence in this canon about

the second and third judgment of bishops mean, contrary to all the ancient canons, that these are denied? But if silence is not equivalent to denial, why is the right of appealing to Rome said to be denied? That is, the bishops in that synod decree only what pertains to themselves—namely the rights of the bishops of the province over their subjects—the rest, which pertains to the more universal governance of the Church, being left to the superior authority. The same reply is to be given to canon 6 of the Council of Frankfurt, which presents the same sentence. 3° Among the 70 chapters which in 785 Hadrian I is said to have handed to Engelram, or vice versa this latter to the former, chapter 12 has it that "the Nicene or African decrees most wisely and most justly defined that whatever cases arose should be settled in their own places where they arose; especially since it is lawful for all who think themselves aggrieved to appeal to the provincial synod and also to the universal one." We reply that those chapters are fabrications, and are probably the wares of the man from whom the Isidorian collection proceeded (David, ch. 13, a. 1); they are therefore falsely attributed to Hadrian and are of no authority. Moreover, among them there are many which most openly uphold the primacy of the Roman Pontiff and the right of appeal—something of which de Marca complains in bk. 7, ch. 20.

COROLLARY

From what has been said up to now it can be seen what value is to be placed on the *Codex Ecclesiae Universalis* published by Justellus, a Protestant, as a code used by the ancient Church. In it are missing the canons which were certainly in force in the ancient Church; on the contrary, it contains many canons which the Roman Church never received (David, ch. 2).

VI. The power of sending legates anywhere is essentially connected with the immediate supreme power of governing all the faithful and pastors. For the Roman Pontiff has immediate power over all the faithful in all things; and he can delegate his power to others who represent him and exercise in his name the immediate power, in some way providing the presence of the Roman Pontiff to distant provinces

(Leo, ep. 14, ch. 1, to Anastasius of Thessalonica). For this is intrinsic to the right of any ordinary power, that it can be delegated. Nor is any injury done to bishops; for the immediate power of the Roman Pontiff is itself greater than and more necessary than episcopal power, and it does not destroy episcopal power but subordinates it to itself. Just as therefore the power of the bishop is compatible with the power of the Roman Pontiff, so the former is compatible also with the power of a pontifical legate, which is itself the power of the Roman Pontiff delegated to another and actually exercising itself through an intermediary. The use of these legates is determined by the necessity or utility of the same. Hence in the eleventh century it was extremely frequent; for since reformation of clergy and people was not to be expected from so many bishops and metropolitans polluted by the stain of simony or incontinence, it was necessary that the Roman Pontiff send his legates, to whom the vigorous prosecution of the matter could be entrusted. But this practice also flourished in earlier centuries of the Church. Indeed, Sylvester presided over the non-ecumenical Council of Arles through his legates (see Baronius, an. 314, n. 31). Likewise Hosius presided in the East over several provincial councils as legate of the Roman See; nor could he have presided by any other right. "In what synod," says Athanasius of him in his *Apologia de Fuga*, "was he not the leader and standard-bearer?… What church does not hold the finest monuments of his presidency?" (See Baronius, an. 319, nn. 22, 23, and following.) Liberius also sent the legates Vincent and Marcellus to Constantius to compel the convocation of the Council of Aquileia (ibid., an. 353, n. 16). Hence already from the beginning of the fifth century the institution of the Vicariate of the Apostolic See, granted to certain bishops—to the bishop of Thessalonica already before the fifth century, then to others such as those of Tarragona, Arles, etc.—was held as the ancient discipline of the Church. By this institution, with the privileges of metropolitans preserved, the place of the Apostolic See together with jurisdiction was delegated to someone, so that both what pertained to the canons and what had been entrusted by the Apostolic See might be observed. Now in establishing these vicariates the Roman Pontiff was acting not as patriarch of the West but as successor of Peter and bishop of the entire Church, as is evident from the letters of Innocent I,

Boniface I, Sixtus III, and Leo the Great to the bishops of Thessalonica or to all the bishops of Illyricum. See Ludovicus Thomassinus, *Vetus et nova disciplina*, etc., pt. 1, bk. 1, chs. 30 and 31; and the *Responsio* of His Holiness Pius VI to the metropolitans… on apostolic nunciatures, ch. 8, sect. 3. And not to be more lengthy, this power of sending legates was asserted as belonging to the Roman Pontiff by the Fathers of Sardica in those canons which we have already explained. Therefore.

THESIS XVIII

The form of governance of the Church is, therefore, by divine right monarchical.

I. The form of social governance was formerly distinguished as threefold: monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic; and now there is added also that which is called constitutional or representative, which is a certain tempering of monarchy and democracy. For in this form the supreme legislative authority belongs chiefly at least to delegates from the people, while the executive power of the laws belongs to the king and his ministers. The question is asked: what is the form of governance instituted by Christ in the Church?

So that we may defend Catholic doctrine, we premise 1° that the notion of the form of ecclesiastical governance is not to be invented a priori, nor derived by analogy from other societies, but must be drawn from Christ's positive and free institution. 2° It is not to be thought that Christ endowed some subject with power, even supreme power, which from Christ's own institution could never exercise any act of that same power; for power is given for the sake of act, and a power ordered to no act, or to nothing, is no power at all. 3° When the question is raised about the form of ecclesiastical governance, the discussion is about that form whose visible subjects are part of that society which is governed by that governance. For it does not follow that, from the fact that any society is subject to God as monarch, the form of governance of any particular society is monarchical. But in visible society itself, the visible form of governance must exist.

Now of those three enumerated forms, no one can formally coexist with another in the same society; although one can virtually be

tempered with another; yet the governance or polity of the society is denominated by the form which is formally inherent in it. Now democratic governance can be conceived in a society in two ways: 1° radically, insofar as (according to the opinion of some) the supreme power is radically or according to its origin in the society itself; 2° formally, insofar as it is actually exercised by the society itself. For this second, however, it is necessary that the supreme power be actually in the possession of the entire society, which enacts laws, institutes all magistrates, and can judge and punish them for fault. The form is aristocratic when the power of governance belongs to the leading men, and in such a way that the leading men share equally in jurisdiction, so that while some may excel others in degree of honor, no one surpasses the rest in jurisdiction and has others as his subjects. Finally, the form is monarchical if a) one person presides over the entire commonwealth and he b) enjoys the fullness of power, c) has the other magistrates subject to him, d) can judge all and be judged by none, and e) all who wish to be in the society and enjoy its goods are bound to adhere and be subject to him as to the principle of the entire social unity. If these conditions are present, the form of governance cannot but be monarchical—though not all of them are strictly necessary. It is therefore not required that the one who presides be able to establish and abolish all offices or magistrates in the society at his own discretion, nor that he cannot be judged under certain conditions even by the entire society (we speak generally of monarchy); for if there is some order of magistrates which he neither established nor can abolish, provided those first five conditions remain, there will indeed be a certain tempering derived from aristocracy applied to the monarchy, but the governance will nonetheless be formally monarchical.

II. Now the form of governance constituted by Christ in the Church is not actually democratic. We have already demonstrated this in the Prolegomena, § 10. Nor is it radically democratic, as was taught by the bishop of Avila, Tostatus, who in question 48 on ch. 13 of Numbers teaches that the multitude does not have jurisdiction; because jurisdiction according to act cannot reside in a community but only in a determinate person; for it requires acts such as judging and commanding, which require a determinate person. He contends,

however, that jurisdiction according to origin and according to power is in the community; because all persons receiving jurisdiction receive it from the power of the community. These points, understood of natural society, may be permitted. But transferring the discussion to the power of the keys in the following question, he likewise teaches that the Church has the keys according to origin and power, but that prelates have them according to their use, while the Church does not have them as regards use. "All these things," he says, "derive from the fact that the Church is not something one per se, capable of having the administration of the keys; therefore it entrusts them to another; but if it could administer them itself, it would not commit them to any prelate."

What philosophy is in all this! How do you prove that the Church has the power of the keys according to origin? The words of Christ and the very nature of power only argue that the power was given for the good and benefit of the Church—which is an entirely different thing (Prolegomena, § 12). Do you presuppose this from the essence of any society whatsoever? But it is easy to note the following: 1° although it were true that in the natural political society the supreme power is radically and originally in the society itself, it is nonetheless wrongly presupposed that the same holds in the Church, which is a supernatural society of divine, positive, and free institution; for men have no right from nature to supernatural goods, and therefore to supernatural power, such as is ecclesiastical power, and to the benefits that flow from it. 2° In order for assembled men to be rightly and legitimately governed, there is no need per se that the power of those governing should be radically in the society; for it can be communicated by God—from whom ultimately all power is—immediately to the moderators of the society. Therefore, unless it is proved by positive arguments that God conferred the supreme power primarily on the entire Church, nothing will ever be accomplished. Positive arguments, however, are not only lacking for constructing this theory, but there are evident ones for the contrary position. Moreover, such a radical supreme power in the society, which can per se be reconciled with any actual form of governance, is irrationally presupposed, since it can itself never come to act—since it can never happen that the entire society, democratically represented, either changes the actual form of governance, or enacts laws, or

constitutes magistrates. Now it is certain that this can never happen in the Church; for the power of Peter can never be abolished from the Church (presupposing succession in the primacy, which even adversaries presuppose), and no law will ever be valid nor will any person have jurisdiction in the Church against the will of Peter. Therefore.

III. Nor is the form of governance constituted by Christ in the Church aristocratic—according to which, that is, the subject of the supreme power is a certain assembly of the best (τῶν ἀρίστων) consisting of equals in authority. For, as we have demonstrated, not equal power was conferred on all the Apostles, even taking into account the extraordinary power; but Peter alone was set over the other Apostles so as to have the primacy of jurisdiction over them as well. Nor is anything for aristocratic governance collected from the words of Christ to all the Apostles in Matt. 18:18, whose meaning we have already explained in the first thesis. Moreover, the observation of some is useless—that, although Christ first said to Peter "You are Peter" etc., this was a promise; whereas the power was conferred on the Apostles in this place before it was conferred on Peter in John 21. For the words of Christ to the Apostles in Matt. 18 are also promissory, just as are his words to Peter in Matt. 16: "Whatever you shall have loosed will be loosed," etc. "Whatever you shall have loosed will be loosed," etc. Now from the fact that after sending all the Apostles in John 20, Christ constituted Peter as the universal shepherd, it is rightly inferred that Peter is honored with a new and special dignity and authority above the Apostles.

They also argue from the fact that in Matt. 18:17 the supreme tribunal constituted by Christ is the Church, that is, the assembly of pastors: "Tell it to the Church." For the Church is some assembly, which can here be nothing other than an assembly of bishops. But if these constitute the supreme tribunal, the governance of the Church is aristocratic.

Now it is true what is said or presupposed in this objection—namely that "Church" in this place is not the assembly of simple faithful; for there is a manifest progression from more or less private correction to public correction, which is done when it is done by public authority,

which happens when the defendant is brought before the public tribunal of the Church, or before those who hold public power in the Church. Therefore "tell it to the Church" means "tell it to the public authority of the Church." Since then the public power of the Church does not reside in the people, to say "tell it to the Church" is not there to say "tell it to all the faithful assembled," but "tell it to him or to those who preside in the Church." Hence the name "Church" here designates the public power of the Church. Is the Church therefore the assembly of bishops? I respond that the Church here is not definitively the assembly of bishops, but, as we have said, the public power in the Church, which power, as in other societies, can be designated by the name of the society itself. Now this power can be exercised either by one bishop alone, or by several or all together with their head, or by the head alone—though not by all of them with the same perfection; yet nothing about this is determined here by Christ, but he speaks indefinitely. By the name "Church" therefore Christ designates public power in the Church; but whether it belongs to one alone, or to several together, or whether among these there is one to whom it most especially belongs while others share it under him—this Christ does not define here; and therefore this passage is not appropriate for determining the form of governance of the Church. Gerson, moreover, is merely guessing when, in the relevant place, he says that the words of Christ—"if your brother sins against you… tell it to the Church"—were said to Peter by name, in order to conclude from this that Peter does not come under the name "Church"; for he could not tell himself. But the speech of Christ is indefinite and Christ is instructing in the disciples all the faithful indiscriminately, how correction is to be made.

They also argue from Acts 15:6, 22ff.; for the synod was held simultaneously by the Apostles and the elders, and its decree is attributed simultaneously to the Apostles and the elders. But it is well established that it does not conflict with monarchy that some matter be decided in a common assembly and council of leading men and that a decree be issued in the name of the entire assembly by the prince, though in unequal manner. Therefore nothing for the aristocratic form can be collected from the manner of proceeding of this synod. And indeed who would doubt that the Apostles excelled the elders? Yet these

are shown decreeing together with them; therefore Peter could both excel all (of which an indication is that he was the first to speak his opinion and to resolve the question) and yet handle the common matter together with the Apostles and elders and issue a decree inscribed in the name of all.

IV. The form of ecclesiastical governance constituted by Christ is monarchical. For it is established from what has been said that there is one person to whom the supreme power belongs in the Church—namely Peter and his successors—and that this one person possesses the fullness of power and presides immediately over all, whether taken individually or collectively. Now this is the form of governance simply monarchical: therefore.

Nor does that tempering drawn from aristocracy and consisting in the institution of bishops impede this monarchical governance; for the bishops are not equal in jurisdiction to the Pontiff, nor when taken together do they surpass him, nor does their jurisdiction impede the fullness of the Pontiff's power. The governance therefore remains simply monarchical with a certain tempering of aristocracy, to the extent that it is not in the power of the Pontiff to abolish this ordinary power of bishops.

You will say: the right form of governance in human society demands that all authority should not be in one person or the same persons, but that some should have legislative power, others judicial power, and others executive power. I respond: if the question is about supreme power, this is not demanded from the very natures of things; on the contrary, supreme authority is per se one and contains all the functions of governance as in a source. Whether it is fitting for the same supreme and full authority to reside in a single person—this is to be judged from the circumstances, since it is lawful for a society to determine the form of its own governance. But when it is a question of divine institution, if it is established that God conferred the supreme authority on one person, no further question remains. Moreover, we have already sufficiently declared above that no harm to the Church follows from this institution of Christ.

What then did Cyprian mean in *De Unitate Ecclesiae* when he said: "The episcopate is one, a part of which is held by each bishop in its

entirety"? He certainly did not intend to deny what he had most explicitly affirmed immediately above in the same context of his discourse: that Christ had constituted one chair in order to manifest unity, and had established with his authority the origin of that same unity beginning from one; and that the primacy was given to Peter so that one Church of Christ and one chair might be shown, and that the Church was founded upon the chair of Peter.

Cyprian therefore affirms here that the episcopate is one, just as he affirms that the Church is one; for having spoken of the unity of the Church he adds: "which unity we should firmly hold and maintain, especially we bishops who preside in the Church, so as to prove that the episcopate itself also is one and undivided… The episcopate is one, a part of which is held by each bishop in its entirety. The Church too is one, which by her power of increasing fruitfulness expands into a multitude." He says the same in ep. 45, bk. 2, on Cornelius and Novatian: "since the one Church throughout the whole world is divided into many members, and the episcopate is one, shared among the harmonious multitude of many bishops," etc. Thus just as the Church is one, so is the episcopate one—that is, the one authority which governs the Church; for although many share in this authority, yet because they agree in one and constitute one assembly, the episcopate is in reality one just as the Church is one consisting of many members. Now bishops are united by reason of the chair of Peter, which is the origin of unity and upon which the Church is founded; therefore the unity of the episcopate asserted by Cyprian does not exclude but rather presupposes the primacy of Peter. Why then did he say "a part of which is held by each bishop in its entirety"? Namely, in which each one shares in unity, or coming together in unity; not because each one is a universal pastor—since in his ep. 55 to Cornelius he said that to each individual shepherd a portion of the flock is assigned, "which each one is to rule and govern, rendering account of his conduct to the Lord." This interpretation which we have handed on regarding the unity of the episcopate is not only consistent with the phrase but the entire context demands it; in which the discussion is about unity and its necessity. Moreover, that all bishops share in episcopal authority is an evident matter; but Cyprian does not say that all share in it in the same way—and certainly Cyprian himself,

bishop of Carthage, claimed for himself a certain special authority over the bishops of Africa; and since he had above preached the primacy of Peter and called it the origin of unity, he had already virtually affirmed that that episcopal authority belongs to Peter which, while it excludes colleagues in the episcopate, is nonetheless fitting to the primacy.

Wrongly, however, is Augustine invoked in defense of the Richerian heresy. For they say he teaches repeatedly what he suggested in Ps. 108: "Just as certain things are said which seem to pertain properly to the Apostle Peter, yet they do not have their clear meaning unless they are referred to the Church, whose person he is recognized in figure to have borne by reason of the primacy which he had among the disciples—such as: 'I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven,' and other such things." And in *De Agone Christiano*, ch. 30: "For not without reason does Peter, among all the Apostles, sustain the person of this Catholic Church. For to this Church the keys of the kingdom of heaven were given, when they were given to Peter; and when it is said to him, it is said to all: 'Do you love me? Feed my sheep.'"

But against this: 1° the representation of the Church which Peter bears is the proper juridical representation of a king, or head of a society; for he represents by reason of the primacy which he had among the disciples. 2° The keys being given to the Church can be understood in two ways: a) for the good of the Church—this indeed is true, but, as we have seen from the beginning, it is of no help to the Richerians; b) in such a way that the Church is the subject of the power—but this again can be taken in two ways: namely α) that the keys were given immediately and primarily to the universal Church or to the assembly of pastors, and through the Church to Peter; β) that the keys were given to Peter in such a way that they would always have to be in the Church —that is, they were given to Peter not as he was a private person who would someday die, but as he was a juridical person who would always continue in his successors; and therefore the keys were given to Peter so that the Church might always have them in Peter and his successors, and in others to whom they are communicated by Peter. Now this second sense, not the first, is the one intended by Augustine—as is demanded by the doctrine of the same Augustine on the primacy of Peter, which he hands on most explicitly both elsewhere and here. And

this is the illustrious meaning which the words of Christ have, manifesting not the privilege of some private person but a public function and power for the perennial good of the Church. Therefore the Church has the keys, because Peter, her preeminent part or head, received them to be applied for the Church and communicated to others. The reason why Augustine so frequently insists on this declaration was the heresy of the Novatians, who contended that the keys had been given to Peter as a private person and had ceased with him; and therefore that the power of the keys was no longer in the Church.

Therefore through the power conferred on Peter, Christ constituted the form of monarchical governance in the Church, and in such a way that he did not merely wish the exercise of supreme power to be in one person (ministerial head), with the same power existing in the universal Church; but that Christ himself immediately conferred the supreme power on Peter alone, while others received a share in it only through Peter and dependently on Peter.

Therefore those who in the fifteenth century, at the age of the councils of Constance and Basel, contended that the Roman Pontiff must be subject to the authority of a general synod and that the same general synods should be celebrated perpetually at some fixed interval of time, had utterly failed to understand the divine institution of ecclesiastical governance. For this is proper to societies in which full power resides in several, or indeed all, citizens, or at least among the leading men.

THESIS XIX

Arguments against the established doctrine on the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff are wrongly derived either from the dignity of Christ, or from the alleged lack of continuity among the bishops of Rome, or from the rejection by St. Gregory the Great of the title "bishop of the whole world," or from hierarchical subordination, or from certain statements of some of the Fathers.

I. Certain arguments of the adversaries must be resolved which are pressed against the doctrine established in the preceding theses. For

they say: 1° Christ is still the head and efficient principle of the unity of the Church; therefore there is no need of the Roman Pontiff for this effect; and the Roman Pontiff himself is a member of this body, of which Christ is the head. Furthermore, 2° with the Roman Pontiff failing even for several years, the Church remains one and the same as before. 3° Gregory the Great rejected and repudiated the title of universal bishop; therefore the bishop of Rome is not such, and consequently does not have immediate jurisdiction over the universal Church. 4° Hierarchical subordination seems to demand that inferiors be immediately subject to intermediaries, and these immediately to the supreme; but if the faithful are immediately subject to several—that is, to the bishop and the Pope—confusion in governance will result. And indeed, 5° God does not confer power whose exercise is impossible; but the Roman Pontiff cannot immediately govern all the faithful: therefore. 6° Cyprian, in the Council of Carthage 3, in the case of rebaptism, denies that any bishop is bishop of bishops; and Jerome in ep. 101 to Evangelus says that "wherever there is a bishop, whether at Rome or at Gubbio, at Constantinople" etc., "he is of the same merit and the same priesthood." But Sixtus III, in his letter to the bishops of Illyricum, writes that "as every body is governed by its head, so the head itself, unless it is sustained by its body, loses its firmness and strength and does not retain the dignity it had." Therefore.

II. Now in reply to the first: a) Sufficient answer has been given in the doctrine established in Thesis 12. For Christ alone is the efficient principle of unity through interior influence or governance; but exterior governance is also required, and an externally proposed norm of believing and acting, toward following which God inwardly promotes minds and wills through his grace; and Christ is the principle of this exterior governance, through which social unity is obtained, through his Vicar: therefore.

b) It has already been declared in Th. 12 how the Roman Pontiff is both a member and also the head of the Church, the body of Christ. Nor does it follow from the fact that he is a part of the Church that he does not preside over the entire Church; for when it is said that he presides over the entire Church, the entire Church is not understood as head plus remaining body, but as the remaining body alone, of which

the Roman Pontiff is the head. The Roman Pontiff is therefore an intrinsic part of the entire body of the Church; but the more eminent part—that is, the head presiding over the other members—and he is, if you will, a member, but that member which is called the head.

In reply to the second, these points must be noted. 1° The governance of the Church, since it is among men, cannot be maintained except in a human manner, unless God should wish to supply assistance through miracles, which is foreign to his ordinary providence. 2° For monarchical governance to persist in a society, it is not necessary that the permanence of the monarch be physical, but moral suffices—that is, it suffices that in the moral manner in which things among men are wont to happen and can happen, with some interruption occurring now and then, there should continue to be some monarch in the society. 3° It is necessary, however, that the form of monarchical governance be physically perennial—that is, it is necessary that that form of governance which is proper to monarchy always persevere, albeit in different manners according to the different states of the same. For if this form ceases, another form of governance will succeed, since there must be some form if the society continues; but if another, either aristocratic or democratic form succeeds, monarchy simply ceases. Therefore, for monarchical governance to persist in a society, the form of this governance must always endure, albeit in a different manner according to the different states of the society, whether the monarch is living or deceased.

Now how this comes about can be understood from the demonstration which we are about to give, intending to prove that the form of monarchical governance always perseveres in the Church even when the Pontiff is deceased.

Indeed 4°, with the Pontiff deceased: a) the supreme power of governing is found neither in the entire body of the Church nor in the bishops; b) there is a necessity for electing a Roman Pontiff, so that this power may exist in the Church; hence c) at that time no dogma can be defined, no law in the proper sense—one which would be perpetual of itself—can be established; but d) the duty which then falls upon the Church is the election of a Pontiff; and e) no law enacted or confirmed by the Roman Pontiff can at that time be abrogated; but the Church is

even then governed by the law established by the Roman Pontiff. Now f) the power of bishops remains, because although it is from the Pontiff, it is nonetheless ordinary, annexed to the episcopal office, and this is required by the good of the Church; it is nonetheless a power still subordinated to the power of Christ's Vicar, because it is in itself an incomplete power, insufficient for the governance of the Church, and requiring the power of the head, by whom the bishops are to be governed according to Christ's institution. That is, the society is still bound by the law instituting the perpetual primacy, the necessity of the primacy exists in the society, and the Church is indeed still a body, but a visible headless body—and therefore it is still one, because the power by which it is governed is the power which flowed from the Pontiff and which is still subordinated to the power of the primacy and demands it, and indeed this is demanded by the entire society. All these things are established from what has been proved about the primacy of jurisdiction and its conferral made immediately and directly to the Roman Pontiff.

Now this form of governance is neither democratic nor aristocratic; for then the full power of governing would be in the possession of the entire Church or the assembly of bishops, the law of the primacy would be dissolved, and it would no longer be necessary to elect one who would be the Primate. If therefore any form of governance remains (and some certainly remains), it must be called monarchical. And indeed the bishops still conduct themselves as they conducted themselves when the Pontiff was living—namely, they use the authority which they received from him; they do not claim for themselves, nor all together, the supreme and full power in the Church; and they acknowledge the necessity of a head by whom the whole Church may be governed. The form of monarchical governance remains, but in a different manner—that is, it remains incomplete and awaiting completion; it is complete when the Primate actually exists. In the former state there is an ordering of the entire Church to subjection to the Primate; in the latter there is actual subjection. Thus subordination to the power of the primacy endures always in the Church. Hence it is also said that the Roman See remains even with the sitter deceased. For the Roman See or chair is the rights of the primacy,

the supreme universal power of governing and teaching; which power remains insofar as the law of the institution of the perpetual primacy and the subordination of the Church to it remain. Now this is essential and necessary in a monarchical society; physical permanence of the person of the Prince is not necessary. Accordingly, with the Roman Pontiff failing, the Church still remains one and the same—I distinguish: completely, I deny; incompletely and in such a way that it is still one by reason of subordination to the power of the primacy of the Roman Pontiff, and therefore he himself is by his authority the efficient principle of unity in the Church, I concede.

In reply to the third: 1° It must be noted that the title "ecumenical" or "universal" attributed to a bishop can be taken in two ways. First, so that the ecumenical bishop is understood to be one who so universally possesses the fullness of the episcopate that he alone is truly a bishop—just as if a universal man actually existed, there would in reality be only one man, not many. Second, so that one is called ecumenical or universal bishop who, without excluding the other bishops called to share in solicitude, immediately governs the entire Church. More clearly, he is called bishop of the universal or Catholic Church. In this second sense the Roman Pontiff is called the ecumenical or universal bishop—bishop, that is, of the entire Church, which he immediately governs, together nevertheless with other pastors subordinated to him.

Given this, we say 2° that St. Gregory the Great did not deny to himself the reality signified by the title of ecumenical or universal bishop taken in the second sense. In the letters, bk. 9, ep. 12 (ed. of Giovanni Battista Gallicciolli, Venice 1770), he says: "Who can doubt that the Church of Constantinople is subject to the Apostolic See?" And ibid., ep. 59: "I do not know what bishop is not subject to it—the Apostolic See." And ibid., ep. 116: "What has been disposed by the decree of the Apostolic See cannot be disturbed by the molestation of any unlawful usurpation… what has once been sanctioned by its authority needs no further confirmation." Now these are the characteristics of universal episcopate. Again, in ep. 43, bk. 5, to Eulogius, bishop of Alexandria, and Anastasius, bishop of Antioch, and in ep. 18 of the same book, to John the Faster, he notes that his predecessor Pelagius had abrogated the acts of that council of

Constantinople in which John the Faster had arrogated to himself the title of Ecumenical—which act of Pelagius is certainly an act of this universal power. And Gregory himself, in bk. 6, ep. 15, absolved a presbyter who had been wrongly condemned by judges appointed by the Faster, having cognized the case, and ordered the same bishop of Constantinople to receive him well—which Gregory could only have done by the authority of the universal bishop. Then in bk. 3, ep. 6, he reprimands and punishes John, bishop of Prima Justiniana (which city was in Macedonia, the birthplace of the Emperor Justinian), "by the authority of the blessed Peter, prince of the Apostles," decreeing that he should abstain from holy communion for a period of thirty days, because he had pronounced sentence against Hadrian, bishop of the city of Thebes (which was in Thessaly and was subject to the metropolitan of Larissa), who had appealed to Rome after being maltreated by his metropolitan, and had pronounced that unjust sentence after the appeal had been interposed. Now this act is of supreme jurisdiction over the universal Church. In the same letter, bk. 7, ep. 19, he testifies that "the care of all the churches, enjoined upon him, constrains him." And in bk. 3, ep. 20, to the Emperor Maurice on this matter, he indicates explicitly that it was lawful for Peter to claim for himself the name of "universal Apostle": "It is clear to all who know the Gospel that by the Lord's own voice the care of the entire Church was committed to the blessed Peter (and he proves this by the adduced testimonies of Matt. 16, Luke 22, John 21). Behold, the care and the primacy of the entire Church is committed to him, and yet he is not called 'universal Apostle'; and does my most holy fellow-priest John strive to be called 'universal bishop'?" By this argument from the humility of Peter, the Roman Pontiff rebukes the pride of the bishop of Constantinople.

Why then 3° did Gregory not only repudiate that title but call it a new and profane word, a name of blasphemy, a perverse word, a new arrogance, a pompous expression, a foolish and arrogant word, a word of pride, a wicked and criminal word of exaltation—in the letters written on this matter to the aforesaid patriarchs, to the Emperor Maurice, to the Augusta Constantina, to John the Faster himself, to Cyriacus his successor, and to Anianus the deacon of Constantinople? (See bk. 5, epp. 18, 20, 43; bk. 7, epp. 4, 27.) And indeed he calls this

word rash and profane even when he testifies that it was offered by the holy Synod of Chalcedon to the Pontiff of the Apostolic See, bk. 5, ep. 43—as if even if the bishop of Rome used it it were to be considered profane: "But none of my predecessors," he says, "ever consented to use this so profane a word, because evidently if one Patriarch is called universal, the name Patriarch is derogated to the others; but far be it from this, far be it from a Christian mind to wish to claim something for himself whereby he may seem to diminish in any degree the honor of his brothers." See ibid., ep. 18.

Thus it must be noted: a) that the usurpation of this title, which John the Faster, bishop of Constantinople, had claimed for himself, generated disturbance and scandal throughout the entire Church—as Gregory testifies in ep. 18, bk. 5, to John himself and ibid. ep. 20 to the Emperor Maurice. b) That the title of Ecumenical in neither sense could belong to the bishop of Constantinople, and that the usurpation of it by him was a crime full of arrogance and pride. c) Setting aside the question of whether a true sense can underlie this title as applied to the Roman Pontiff—which cannot be denied—and setting aside the question of in what sense the Faster had usurped it for himself, who perhaps only wished to signify that he was the principal patriarch in the East: it is historically certain that Gregory had received this title in the first of the two senses we explained—that is, as meaning that one is the sole bishop and patriarch—and for this reason had condemned the same title in this controversy and had also rejected it from himself. This is established from all the letters written on this matter. "You have gone so far," says the Pontiff to John, "that with your brethren despised you seek to be called bishop alone." And writing to the Augusta Constantina he complains that John "strives to be addressed as bishop alone." Hence Gregory compares him to the Antichrist (ep. 30, bk. 6, to Maurice): "Because just as that perverted one desires to be seen as God above all men, so anyone who seeks to be called sole priest exalts himself above the other priests." And this we take to be the reason why Gregory calls this title profane even when offered to the Roman Pontiff by an ecumenical council (namely in certain letters read in that council: see th. 13, n. 3), and declares that it was rightly repudiated by his predecessors (Leo the Great indeed did not call himself "universal

bishop" but "bishop of the universal Church," a title which expresses only the second of the two senses explained above); because evidently, taken in the first sense, it detracts the honor due to the other patriarchs and bishops. But for Gregory to judge thus, it was not necessary for him to think that the title, considered in itself, bore this false meaning; it was enough that it was then so understood or could easily be so understood, or that there was a probable suspicion that it was so understood and that Gregory noticed this. "For if," he says, ep. 43, bk. 5, "this title is readily permitted to be applied, the honor of all the patriarchs is denied. And when perhaps one perishes in error who is called universal, no bishop is found to have remained in the state of truth"—that is, as a true bishop; and bk. 8, ep. 30, to Eulogius of Alexandria: "My honor is the honor of the universal Church; my honor is the solid vigor of my brothers. I am truly honored when the due honor is not denied to each one. For if your holiness calls me universal Pope, it denies itself to be what it confesses me to be as universal." That this is Gregory's meaning in rejecting from himself the appellation of universal bishop is established both from what was said in nn. 1 and 2, and from the very nature of the primacy, which Gregory most excellently understood.

Moreover, one ought to pause to admire here the singular modesty of this most excellent Pontiff, who decided to fight with Roman humility for the peace of the Church against the insolent pride of the Greeks—but in such a way as to act vigorously, even threatening excommunication to Cyriacus, the successor of John, if he persisted in so unjust a usurpation. "I endeavored," he says to Anastasius, ep. 27, bk. 7, "to admonish him about this superstitious and proud word, saying that he could not have peace with us unless he corrected the exaltation of the aforesaid word, which the first apostate invented." "For to consent to this wicked word"—which the bishop of Constantinople was arrogating to himself—"is," as the same Gregory says to Sabinian his deacon, his representative at the Emperor's court (ep. 19, bk. 5), "nothing other than to lose the faith." For faith in the authority of bishops and in the Roman primacy was endangered. Gregory did not, however, judge the bishop of Constantinople to be heretical for this reason, for claiming this title for himself; but rather he considered it a crime of intolerable pride than an error of faith, although he saw that it

could progress to a corruption of faith as well, which ultimately did occur.

On the occasion of this controversy, note 1° that St. Gregory in ep. 40, bk. 7, affirms that the three sees—Roman, Alexandrian, and Antiochene—are one, namely one see of Peter, over which three bishops preside. Now this unity is not absolute but only relative, by reason of origin or institution from the same Peter—not simply, so as to be equality of power, much less identity. For in the same place he says: "the holy Church is built on the firmness of the prince of the Apostles, who drew firmness of mind from his name, so that he was called Peter from 'rock'"; yet while teaching that those three sees are from Peter, he says the Antiochene see was confirmed by Peter, the Alexandrian adorned, but the Roman exalted—to whom he elsewhere affirms all bishops are subject.

Note 2° that Gregory argues as follows to rebuke the temerity and audacity of the Byzantine bishop, in ep. 18, bk. 3: "Surely Peter the first of the Apostles, a member—or rather the first member—of the holy and universal Church, Paul, Andrew, John—what else are they but heads of particular peoples? And yet all are members under one head." What then? Did not all the Apostles have universal jurisdiction? That is, he attributes to them that singularity in the episcopate which excludes that universality of the episcopate by which there would be only one true bishop; not the singularity which excludes that universality of the episcopate that is consistent with and subordinate to itself the presence of other many true bishops—such as is the universality of the episcopate of the Roman Pontiff, which St. Gregory certainly recognized.

Moreover, to conclude this question, nothing prevents the title "ecumenical" or "universal bishop" from having been attributed in the true and legitimate sense which we explained above to the Roman Pontiffs both before and after Gregory, as we have heard Pius VI testifying—although the Roman Pontiffs have preferred the title: "bishop of the Catholic Church," or "servant of the servants of God," which says the same thing with the seasoning of humility.

What then is to be said in reply to canon 30 of the Prima Sedes, dist. 99, in the *Decretum* of Gratian, expressed thus: "The bishop of the first see is not to be called 'prince of priests' or 'first priest,' but only

'bishop of the first see'"? Natalis Alexander replies (*H.E.*, dist. 4, § 4, arg. 11) that this canon censures only the African metropolitans, who wished to claim those titles for themselves; for the canon is presented by Gratian, Burchard, and Ivo as the sixth, or fifth, or twenty-ninth of the Council of Carthage. Hence Ivo errs in his *Decretum*, pt. 5, ep. 57, in explaining this canon of the Pope. Now what is subjoined to this canon in the *Decretum* of Gratian—"the Roman Pontiff is moreover not to be called universal"—is first not part of the canon but an addition of Gratian; and then it is to be taken in the sense in which we have explained Gregory's meaning; for in the following canon the words of Pelagius rescinding the acts of the Council of Constantinople—in which John had assumed that title—and the words of Gregory to Eulogius of Alexandria are subjoined. See the note of the editors of the *Decretum* in the same place.

Finally, if the matter is examined more closely, it will easily appear that it is not per se a consequence that some real prerogative is denied because a certain title expressing it is rejected. For there can be an extrinsic reason for rejecting it—say, because the appellation is new, because it savors of ostentation, or the like. Thus, if the matter signified is considered, what Catholic would deny that the Roman Pontiff enjoys in the Church those rights which are proper to an emperor or king in civil society? "We bishops also exercise sovereignty, and I add, a greater and more perfect one," said Nazianzen to Theodosius, Orat. 17—yet what Catholic would wish, in addressing the Roman Pontiff, to add to his name the title of "Emperor of the Church"?

In reply to the fourth: it is false that in an ordered series of those who exercise power in a society, one who presides commands only those who immediately follow him in that series. See the explanation given at the beginning of th. 13.

Confusion, however, would occur if the Roman Pontiff simultaneously with the bishop wished to exercise all the functions of his power with respect to all the subjects of the bishop. But this is not necessary, nor does the immediate power of the Pontiff aim at this—that he must exercise all those functions which he can exercise per se. It aims at this, indeed, by reason of its fullness, that the Pontiff can do all those things, if he wishes; hence his act would always be valid; but right order

demands that the unimpeded exercise of jurisdiction be left to the bishops. The immediate power of the Roman Pontiff therefore demands that all the faithful be his subjects, that he have the faculty of governing them all himself—that is, by his own authority—and that he actually immediately governs them in many matters, both by enacting laws, and by pronouncing sentence in cases, and by coercing them with punishments.

Relevant here is what Bernard says to the Roman Pontiff Eugenius III, *De Consideratione*, bk. 3, ch. 4: "What is so unworthy of you as that, holding the whole, you should not be content with the whole, unless you strive in some way still to make your own certain trifles and small portions of that universal charge committed to you, as if they were not yours?… In so acting, you prove that you have the fullness of power, but perhaps not so of justice. You do this because you can; but whether you ought to is the question."

In reply to the fifth: Note first that although it is impossible for the Roman Pontiff to supply in person everything that is necessary for individual faithful, it is not impossible to supply this through his delegates. Moreover, this objection presupposes that the immediate power over all the faithful aims at this—that the Roman Pontiff must exercise all acts of governance toward individuals in person, teaching each one, absolving each one, etc. But such is not the power which we have claimed for the Roman Pontiff. It is a power to which as his proper sheep all and each of the faithful are subject, whom he immediately feeds and governs with doctrine, laws, and sentences, when it is required; with respect to all of whom he can validly exercise all acts of episcopal jurisdiction, if he wishes, either in person or through his delegates. Now through such a power, the bishop of Rome is ordered to nothing impossible.

In reply to the sixth: a) The question might first be raised whether that council was actually held and whether the words of Cyprian reported there are genuine. But we will disclose what we think about this matter later. Now, granting the historical truth of that council and of the speech made there by Cyprian, we deny that Cyprian intended by those words—"nor has any one of us made himself bishop of bishops"—to strike at the Roman Pontiff Stephen. First, because he is speaking of

those present: "any one of us." Secondly, because the reason for believing that Cyprian intends to rebuke Stephen by those words is the decree sent by Stephen to Cyprian on not rebaptizing heretics, which decree Cyprian is said to have received with displeasure. But it must be maintained that that decree was not yet known to Cyprian when he held that council. For if the decree had already been brought to Carthage, it would certainly have been read in the same council; for it was the Pontiff's reply, and indeed the reply to the synodal letter of the preceding council held by the same Fathers. It was indeed the constant custom in the Church that such letters of the Roman Pontiff should be read in council if the council was in session. Especially since in that third council the same matter was being discussed—namely the baptism of heretics—and the opinions of the bishops were being sought on it. Cyprian could therefore not have abstained from reading the letters of Stephen. But it is established from the acts of that council that from the beginning the letters of Cyprian on the baptism of heretics to Januarius and the replies of the latter were read; and here was the place for reading the letters of Stephen, and the matter itself demanded it; but no mention is made of these letters. The reply of Stephen was therefore not yet known; there was therefore no reason for Cyprian to flare up against the Roman See: therefore. Thus the author of the dissertation published at Paris in 1724, *De Dissidio inter s. Stephanum et s. Cyprianum*.

b) The statement of Jerome is very true if only the character of the episcopate is considered and not jurisdiction; and it is this alone that Jerome considers, who attributes equal merit and priesthood to all bishops, and who regards bishops in comparison with presbyters and deacons—the last of whom he wishes to prove are inferior to the former. He proves that presbyters excel deacons, because the former consecrate the body and blood of Christ; and that bishops excel both, because they also perform ordinations. Now these proofs are drawn from the power of orders alone and show that Jerome had only this before his eyes when teaching these things. He then says: "if authority is sought, the world is greater than the city"—namely, his adversary was objecting some custom of the Roman Church, by which it appeared that deacons were preferred over presbyters (the evidence being that presbyters were ordained by the testimony of deacons, and that in the absence of the

bishop deacons sat among the presbyters), a custom which proved nothing; Jerome replied: if the matter is to be decided by authority—that is, by an argument drawn from the consensus and custom of the Church—the authority of the world is greater than that of the city; for the authority of consensus and custom is per se greater the more extensive it is, if nothing has been decreed against it by the supreme power; but the entire Christian world by its practice was proving that deacons are inferior to presbyters. Now this statement of Jerome is to be understood according to the subject matter; namely, when the practice of the entire Christian world is being compared with some practice of the Roman clergy, a practice which not even the bishop of Rome approved—as Jerome himself indicates regarding the seating of deacons among the presbyters—or when the practice of the entire Christian world, which evidently confirms some doctrine, is being compared with a practice of the Roman Church, from which nothing certain can be collected for either of the opposing positions. In such cases that principle—that the authority of all prevails over the authority of one, which in the natural order is most true—can indeed be pressed.

c) Sixtus III says what the Apostle had already taught in 1 Cor. 12:21—that the head cannot say to the feet: "I have no need of you." That is, the head is supported by its body; for the head cannot exist without the body, since it is aided by the other members in the exercise of its authority and the prompt obedience of subjects makes the administration of the entire body easier and more agreeable.

Against so manifest a truth, confirmed by so many arguments from Scripture and the testimonies of tradition which we have adduced up to this point, what was the point of Spelman's bringing forward some reply of a certain Abbot of Bangor by the name of Dinothus? For indeed, at the beginning of the seventh century, he writes as follows to Augustine, the Apostle of England (Migne, *P.L.*, vol. 80, p. 22—it is regrettable, by the way, that there have crept in among the Notes or Prefaces of this most excellent Library of the Fathers some writings foreign to Catholic doctrine, which can harm unwary readers): "Be it known to you without any doubt that we are all, and each one of us, obedient and subject to the Church of God and to the Pope of Rome, and to every true pious Christian, to love each one in his proper degree

with perfect charity and to assist each one of them with word and deed to be sons of God—and another obedience than this I do not know to be owed to him whom you call Pope, nor to be claimed and demanded as being Father of Fathers; and this obedience we are prepared to render and pay to him and to every Christian without delay. Furthermore, we are under the governance of the bishop of Caerleon upon Usk, who is appointed under God to watch over us, to make us keep the spiritual way." What then can you conclude from the ignorance of this monk, except that the Catholic faith was at that time so afflicted in England that it was indeed necessary for the Roman See to send there Apostles who might restore it and transmit an integral knowledge of Catholic doctrine—as was done by St. Gregory?

THESIS XX

Those who contend that the many rights which the Roman See now enjoys took their origin from the Isidorian collection of decretals, or that in antiquity the care of the Roman Pontiff extended by patriarchal right only to the West, reveal themselves as raving madly against the primacy of the Roman Pontiff or as complete strangers to ecclesiastical antiquity.

I. One who denies a historical truth he has discerned because it favors the opposing side must be called raving mad; therefore either raving mad or strangers to history must be called those who affirm what we indicate in the thesis. We will demonstrate the falsity of their claim with historical arguments. Therefore the collection of canons under the name of Isidore Mercator appeared in the ninth century (approximately in the year 845 or 846; see the Ballerini brothers, works of St. Leo, vol. 3, pt. 3, ch. 6, § 4, and Antonio Zaccaria, *Antifebronius*, pt. 1, diss. 3, ch. 3 and following). It appeared at Mainz and its author is probably that Benedict Levita who fabricated the capitula of Hadrian to Engelram. Not everything in that collection is rejected. It is accused of falsification chiefly in its first part, which contains the decretals of Roman Pontiffs from Clement to Melchiades, with others in the third part down to Siricius. These decretals as they stand were either fabricated by the author of the collection himself or adopted by him as already fabricated

by another. Now at that period, Leo IV (who began his pontificate in 847), writing to the bishops of Britain and teaching them by what decretal rules and conciliar canons the Roman Church was using, drew them one by one from those which are found in the Hadrian collection with its two additional supplements, and adduced no decretal which we owe to Isidore. See the Ballerini brothers, ibid., ch. 2, n. 5.

Now in those decretals supposed by Isidore, the rights of the Roman primacy, its universal and supreme power, are affirmed. They therefore say that as a result of the Isidorian decree being received in good faith, it came about that the discipline of the Church was changed, the Roman Pontiff usurped for himself enormous power over all and all things, and that there was introduced the monarchical form which the flatterers of the Roman See defend. But nothing is more certain than that Isidore, although he fabricated false documents, said nothing new on any matter of importance and asserted by his decretals no point of doctrine concerning the power of the Roman Pontiff that cannot be abundantly demonstrated from legitimate and earlier documents.

II. Indeed 1° it is intrinsically impossible that Isidore should have introduced so many and such essential changes in the discipline and governance of the Church—as many and of such a kind as the adversaries condemn—and that the entire Latin Church should have accepted that collection without suspecting the fabrication and without protest. Therefore the Isidorian doctrine was not new, even though he brought forward new witnesses of it. And indeed 2°, regarding the authority of the Roman Pontiff, what novelties were introduced by him? These are the principal ones listed: a) that the Roman Pontiff is the bishop of the universal Church; b) that all major cases are to be referred to the Apostolic See; c) the right of receiving appeals from any judgment of bishops; d) that the cases of bishops are to be definitively judged by the Roman Pontiff alone; e) that councils ought not to be celebrated without the sentence of the Roman Pontiff; f) the right arising from these points of sending his legates anywhere; from which Febronius, ch. 3, § 9, n. 10, concludes that the monarchical governance of the Roman Pontiff was constituted.

But a) from what was adduced in Th. 13, it is evident that the title of ecumenical bishop and bishop of the Catholic Church was conferred

on the Roman Pontiff many centuries before Isidore; and there is no need to add more. b) It is established by most certain documents that the custom obtained in the earliest centuries of the Church that on matters of religion the Roman See was consulted by any church. This is attested by Jerome when he says to Agerouchia, ep. 123, n. 10: "Several years ago, when I was assisting the bishop of the city of Rome, Damasus, in his ecclesiastical correspondence and replying to the consultations of East and West," etc. And Innocent I teaches that this is the ancient and legitimate practice, ep. 37 to the bishop of Nuceria: "We cannot but marvel that your charity follows the institutions of the fathers and refers to us, as to the head and apex of the episcopate, whatever cases may admit of any doubt, so that the Apostolic See, informed by the very doubtful matters, may pronounce something certain to be done." See also Justinian, *Cod. de Summa Trinitate*, tit. 3.

As regards major cases, it was ratified from antiquity that these were to be referred to the Apostolic See. Witness to this practice is Ambrose, who, writing to Theophilus of Alexandria—to whom the cognizance in the case of the Antiochene See occupied by several bishops had been entrusted by the Council of Capua—says (ep. 36, n. 7): "We think it should be referred to our holy brother the priest of the Roman church, since we presume you will judge those things which cannot displease him either." Witness to this practice is again Innocent I, ep. 2 to Victricius, n. 6: "If greater cases have come up for discussion, they are to be referred, after episcopal judgment, to the Apostolic See, as the synod has established and the blessed custom requires." Accordingly he praises the Fathers of Mileve, ep. 30, n. 2, saying: "You diligently and fittingly consult the hidden things of the apostolic honor—that honor, I say, beyond those matters that are external, upon which the care of all the churches rests—as to what judgment is to be held in urgent matters; following, that is, the rule of antiquity, which, as you know together with me, has always been observed throughout the entire world": namely, the discussion was not about the rights of the primacy of the patriarchate of the West alone. And St. Leo, ep. 3 to the metropolitans of Illyricum, confirms this in n. 6: "If any more serious cases or appeals arise, we have decreed that they are to be sent to us under the report of Anastasius himself—namely our vicar—so that they may be settled by

our judgment in accordance with ecclesiastical custom." To these is added Theodore of Studium, ep. 86, bk. 2, to the Emperor Michael: "If there is anything of this kind, about which your divine majesty in its piety doubts or distrusts that it can be resolved by the Patriarch, let your great and God-confirmed hand, as an emulator of divine things, for the common benefit order that a declaration be received from ancient Rome, as was the custom handed down from the fathers in ancient times and from the beginning. For this, O Emperor who emulates Christ, is the supreme Church of God, in which Peter first held the see, to whom the Lord said: 'You are Peter, and upon this rock,'" etc.

Among major cases, the cases of bishops hold their place—their confirmation, translation, judgment, etc. Now as regards judgments, we have already seen in Th. 17 what part the Roman Pontiff has always played in these. As regards confirmation: it is true that in the earliest centuries the Roman Pontiff did not actually confirm all bishops, but in general for the East only the patriarchs and primates, who then confirmed the others subject to them. An example of this practice is supplied by Damasus, ep. 5 to Ascholius; the Greek bishops in Act. 10 of the Chalcedonian synod approving the institution of Maximus as bishop of Antioch, because the Roman Pontiff Leo had judged that he should preside over the Church of Antioch; and then Leo himself, ep. 104 to the Emperor Marcian, affirming that Anatolius obtained the see of Constantinople with his assent; and the Roman Pontiff Simplicius, ep. 17 to Acacius, clearly indicating that the bishop of Alexandria was to be confirmed by the Roman See.

As regards the deposition of bishops, especially of the principal sees: Julius I had already warned the Eusebians that letters should first be written to Rome, so that what is just could be decreed from there. And indeed the Orientals requested from Damasus the deposition of Timothy, bishop of Berytus (ep. of Damasus 11); Caelestinus deposed Nestorius, pronouncing the sentence of deposition against him, which the Fathers at Ephesus carried out, Act. 1, saying: "compelled by the holy canons and the letter of our most holy Father and fellow minister Caelestinus, bishop of the Roman Church, we have come with tears to this sorrowful sentence against him as a matter of necessity." (See also the words of the bishop of Caesarea Cappadocia, Act. 2.) And so

entirely did the whole matter depend on the sentence of Caelestinus that Cyril and other Orientals did not think a council was needed; and when a council was convened, since a prolongation of the time set for Nestorius to come to his senses seemed to have been granted, the Orientals nonetheless consulted the bishop of Rome as to whether they ought to receive Nestorius if he repented after the time previously fixed in Caelestinus's letters (Ep. of Caelestinus X to Cyril). They judged, that is, that the sentence of the bishop of Rome still held and that all the Fathers together could do nothing against it. Felix III exercised the same right in his synod (ep. 4), deposing Peter the Fuller, bishop of Antioch, and (ep. 6) excommunicating and deposing Acacius, bishop of Constantinople (Ep. 4 of Felix III is referred to by Mansi, *Conc.*, vol. 7, p. 1046. It was approved by Baronius, Pagi, and Scipio Maffei; but it is considered spurious along with other letters by Henry Valesius and by Constans Blanchini in his notes on Anastasius under Felix III. Constans says the arguments of Valesius do not exceed the bounds of probability; and he approves the arguments of Constans. But Ep. 6 of Felix is generally received as genuine. Moreover, Victor of Tunnuna, a writer of the sixth century, reports in his *Chronicle* that Felix III condemned at a synod held in Italy: Acacius, Peter the Mongus, and Peter the Fuller, in the year 487).

The transfer of bishops from one see to another had been forbidden by apostolic canon 14 except from necessity; the Council of Nicaea, can. 15, and Sardica, can. 1, prohibited it absolutely. Since therefore it was a universal law of the Church, only the supreme authority could dispense from it. And indeed by the authority and command of the Roman Pontiff it came about that the Corinthians were allowed to have Perigenes as bishop, who had been ordained for the Church of Patras (Socrates, bk. 7, ch. 36; see also ep. 15 of Boniface I). Likewise, in order that Proclus—who had been ordained for the Church of Cyzicus—might be elevated to the throne of Constantinople, the letters of Caelestinus were exhibited by the Emperor Theodosius, which permitted it (Socrates, bk. 7, ch. 40).

And these are more than enough to understand whether this right —that major cases be referred to the Holy See—was introduced by Isidore (see Zaccaria, *Antifebr.*, pt. 2, chs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).

c, d) As regards the right of appeals and the right of definitively judging the cases of bishops, it is already clear from what was said in Th. 17 whether both were fabricated by Isidore. For it is established that the sentences of bishops and provincial synods were not regarded as non-appellable but appellable, and therefore that the power of judging definitively resided in the Roman Pontiff alone. And Gelasius teaches this in ep. 13 to the bishops of Dardania.

e) It is false that it was a fabrication of Isidore and that it was in his age that the law first arose that councils should not be celebrated without the sentence of the Roman Pontiff. For Socrates, bk. 2, ch. 17, reports this sentence of Julius to the Eusebians, at least indefinitely—even if it is not found explicitly in his letter: "Since by the ecclesiastical canon it is forbidden that anything be decided by the churches without the sentence of the bishop of Rome." Now whatever the churches decided, they established in synods. See Sozomen, bk. 3, ch. 10. And the author of the *Historia Tripartita*, bk. 4, ch. 10, says "that councils ought not to be celebrated without the sentence of the bishop of Rome"—which are the very words of Isidore. Moreover, Lucentius, legate of the Roman See at the Council of Chalcedon, Act. 1, reproached Dioscorus because "he had dared to hold a synod without the authority of the Apostolic See, which was never lawful nor done." Theodore of Studium, ep. 33, bk. 1, writing to Leo III about two synods held at Constantinople for particular affairs of that church, says that they dared to hold a heretical synod by their own authority, "when they ought not even to hold an orthodox one without your knowledge, according to the ancient custom." Therefore it is absolutely false that this law was devised and introduced by Isidore. Moreover, this law did not regard only ecumenical synods; for Socrates reports it on the occasion of a non-ecumenical synod. But having regard to the words of Socrates, the law is to be understood in this way: that no synod enacting some new law was to have been held or to have obtained force without the authority of the Roman Pontiff—which is most just.

Hence Stephen the Younger replied to the iconoclasts (see his life in Migne, cent. 8): "For what reason do you call your synod ecumenical, one that neither the bishop of Rome approved, though the canon prescribes that ecclesiastical matters may not be determined without the

Pope of Rome?" Therefore Deacon Ennodius, in his pamphlet in defense of Pope Symmachus approved at the Roman synod, responding to adversaries who objected: "So the councils of priests decreed by ecclesiastical laws to be held annually throughout the provinces, because they do not have the presence of the Pope, have lost their validity?" replies: "Read in them, most senseless men, whether anything has ever been determined besides the sanction of the Apostolic high point—and whether, concerning greater matters that arose, the judgment of the aforesaid See was not kept in reserve for consultation."

It is therefore not necessary to say that no metropolitan could convoke his synod without first having obtained permission and explored the opinion of the Roman Pontiff. For it was enough either that synods be held through legates of the Roman See, or that after the episcopal sentence, if something new was established or major cases were being treated, a report of what had been done be sent to the Roman See. Hence the Primates of Africa in their synodal letter to the Roman Pontiff Theodore I: "By the ancient rules," they say, "it has been sanctioned that whatever was transacted, even in remote and distant provinces, should not first be treated (that is, put into practice) or accepted unless it had been brought to the knowledge of your nourishing see." Now this could come about either immediately, as the Sardican Fathers said in their letter to Julius: "it is best and most fitting that the priests of the Lord refer from each and every province to the head—that is, the see of the Apostle Peter"; or mediately through the bishops of the principal sees, to whom what had been done would first be reported: hence Leo, ep. 14 to Anastasius of Thessalonica, ch. 11, said: "it has been provided by a great arrangement that no one should claim everything for himself, but that in the individual provinces there should be individuals whose opinion among the brethren should be held as first, and again that some should be established in the greater cities to take upon themselves a wider solicitude, through whom the care of the universal Church should flow together to the one See of Peter."

Now in this matter, right must be distinguished from practice: the right is indeed in the Roman Pontiff to require that from any synod a report of what was done in it be sent to him; but the practice can vary

according to the gravity of the matters, the ease of transmitting such reports, the confidence enjoyed by metropolitans before the Apostolic See, and other reasons.

Finally, the power of sending legates into any part of the Catholic world we have already seen to have been exercised from antiquity in Th. 17.

COROLLARY

Therefore, since these rights, as the adversaries themselves testify, presuppose the supreme and monarchical power of the Roman Pontiff in the Church, such must be said to have always been regarded as and to be the power of the same.

III. But because it is moreover usually asked whether in the earliest centuries of the Church—that is, in the ante-Nicene era—the power of the primacy was in force and whether this can be demonstrated historically, we note first that this question is twofold: a question of fact and a question of the immediate proof of this fact.

The first question can be resolved even independently of such proof, both by an argument a priori drawn from the words of Christ instituting the primacy—which were always believed in the Church—and a posteriori from the persuasion and manner of acting that appears in subsequent centuries, which cannot but be a continuation of the preceding persuasion and manner of acting.

The second question, if it is resolved affirmatively, must be resolved by adducing historical facts or documents—if any exist from that age—in which the exercise of the primacy and faith in it throughout the universal Church manifest themselves. If such facts or documents were lacking, the certainty of that fact, which is certain from other sources, would not be shaken. But there remain sufficient monuments or facts of that age which attest to the exercise of the primacy and faith in it throughout the universal Church. These—some of which we have already reported—it will be enough to briefly enumerate here.

Let there therefore be recalled 1° that the Church of Corinth (a province of Achaia, Thessaly, and Illyricum belonged to the Roman

Patriarch; the capital of Achaia was Corinth under which Athens came; the capital of Asia was Ephesus. It is said that there is no certain indication in the letter that the Corinthians had recourse to Rome. For the words of ch. 1 about "things requested by us" should be rendered as "things necessary for you." Nevertheless the Roman authority appears) —while one Apostle who governed the churches of Asia was still living, had recourse to the Roman See for composing its dissensions. 2° That the Roman Church is called by St. Ignatius in his letter to the Romans the church that presides. 3° That the same Ignatius writes to the Roman Church in an entirely different manner than to the others. To these latter he suggests many commands to be kept; to the former he makes no mention of any command; he teaches these, but by no means the latter—rather he commends to it the Church of Syria. 4° That the bishop of Rome is called by Tertullian, according to the Catholic understanding (see what was said on p. 370), in *De Pudicitia*, ch. 1, "Pontifex Maximus, Bishop of Bishops." 5° That Dionysius, bishop of Corinth, in his letter to Soter, bishop of Rome (Eusebius, *H.E.*, bk. 4, ch. 23), testifies that it is the custom of the Roman Church from the very beginning of the religion to benefit all the brethren with various kinds of beneficence and to send necessary means of life to very many churches. Among these beneficences are to be counted the letters both of Clement and of Soter, which were read in the Corinthian church every Sunday, as the same Dionysius testifies in the same place.

Let there be recalled 6° that the Montanists condemned in Phrygia fled to the Roman See in order to have peace from it and thus to be counted as Catholics. This is gathered from the words of Tertullian, *adv. Praxeam*, ch. 1: "The same—namely Praxeas—had at that time prevailed on the bishop of Rome, who had already recognized the prophecies of Montanus, Prisca, and Maximilla, and who by reason of this recognition was at the point of granting peace to the churches of Asia and Phrygia—making false assertions about the prophets themselves and their churches and defending the authority of his predecessors—to revoke the peace letters he had already sent, and to desist from his intention of receiving the gifts of prophecy."

Let there be recalled 7° that the decree of Zephyrinus on giving peace to adulterers was held to be valid for the entire Church; for it was

called a peremptory edict in that controversy, nor would Tertullian have been greatly troubled about it if it had not applied to all the churches—on the contrary, he attributes the position contained in that edict to all "psychics," that is, to all Catholics (*De Pudicitia*, ibid.).

Let there be recalled 8° that Victor ordered the Asians to receive the custom of the Roman Church in the celebration of Easter, and excommunicated the contumacious ones—which excommunication not a few bishops regarded not as null and void, but only as not very prudent (Eusebius, bk. 5, ch. 24; see also the testimony in what follows).

Let there be recalled 9° that the same Stephen had threatened those churches which rebaptized those baptized by heretics, as Dionysius of Alexandria testifies in Eusebius, bk. 7, ch. 6.

Let there be recalled 10° that the cause of Origen's doctrine was finally brought to the tribunal of the bishop of Rome, Fabian; for this is sufficiently gathered from the letter of Origen to Fabian, in which (as Jerome reports, ep. 86 to Pammachius) "he does penance for having written such things and refers the causes of his recklessness to Ambrose, who published in public what had been privately written." See Eusebius, *H.E.*, bk. 6, ch. 36.

Let there be recalled 11° the appeal of the two bishops of Spain (p. 426) to Stephen.

Let there be recalled 12° that Novatian, as soon as he appeared to himself to be the Roman Pontiff, wrote to all the churches everywhere (παντaχοῦ) and gave them commands—showing that he too knew the universal authority of the Roman Church (Socrates, *H.E.*, bk. 4, ch. 28).

Let there be recalled 13° that Cyprian writes to Stephen as follows in ep. 67, when Bishop Marcian of Arles had gone over to the Novatian party: "Therefore you ought to send most full letters to our fellow bishops established in Gaul, that they no longer tolerate Marcian, stubborn and proud and an enemy of the divine grace and of fraternal salvation, insulting our college… Let letters be directed by you to the province and to the people dwelling at Arles, that with Marcian set aside, another may be substituted in his place."

Let there be recalled 14° that Dionysius of Alexandria, because in his letter to Ammonius against the heresy of Sabellius he had uttered certain things expressed less accurately, which seemed to deny the

divinity of the Word, had been accused by certain brothers in the Church before his namesake Dionysius the Roman bishop, and that the latter had commanded him to clear himself—a command which the Alexandrian complied with (in Athanasius, *De Sententia Dionysii*, n. 13).

Let there be recalled 15° what St. Basil reports about the same Dionysius of Rome in ep. 70 to Damasus: "We know from the record of memory, taught by interrogating the fathers and by letters still preserved with us, that that most blessed Dionysius the bishop, who was distinguished among you for right faith and the other virtues, visited our church of Caesarea by letter, consoled our fathers, and sent men to redeem our brothers who were in captivity." And these testimonies may suffice.

IV. From what has been adduced in this and the preceding theses, it is established that the power of the Roman Pontiff was not in antiquity enclosed within the limits of the West, but also extended over the East and the entire Church. To note only a few most evident examples: the bishop Dionysius of Alexandria was judged by the Roman Pontiff Dionysius; Damasus condemned Timothy, the disciple of Apollinaris, for heresy along with his teacher, at the request of the Orientals (Gallandus, vol. 6, ep. 9); and the same Damasus prescribed for the Church of Antioch a symbol of faith (ibid., ep. 3). Victor ordered Polycrates, bishop of Ephesus, to convene a council on the question of Easter, and excommunicated him when he was unwilling to acquiesce to the Roman position (Eusebius, *H.E.*, bk. 5, ch. 24). It is sufficiently clear that the Roman See exercised power over the bishops of Constantinople. As regards the churches of Pontus: Basil narrates in ep. 263 that Eustathius the bishop, having been deposed at a provincial synod, fled to Rome; he then adds: "what were proposed to him by the most blessed bishop Liberius we do not know, except that he brought a letter by which he was restored; when he exhibited this at the Synod of Tyana, he was restored to his place." That is, even if the bishops did not know the reasons, it was enough for them that the Roman Pontiff so commanded: so certain was the primacy.

The same St. Basil frequently implored the help of the Western bishops, and especially of the Roman bishop, for defending the faith in

the East against heretics: "I already know myself, with my mediocre knowledge of affairs, that there is only one way of assistance for our churches, if the Western bishops conspire with us," he said to St. Athanasius himself, ep. 66. And in ep. 70 to Damasus he begs him to come to the aid of the failing Church of the East; he says this is the custom of the Westerners and especially of the bishop of Rome. "We ask absolutely," he says, "nothing new, but what was customary to the other holy and God-beloved men of old, and especially to you."

To be sure, Basil is from time to time vexed at the bishop of Rome and criticizes his haughtiness, epp. 239 and 215; but the cause of this indignation was that, as Basil judged, the bishop of Rome was unwilling to be instructed about questions of fact in the way that was proper, by those who had accurate knowledge of the affairs—which we do not deny could have happened, although Basil too could have been deceived in this matter. Yet these laments of Basil presuppose that the bishop of Rome was regarded as a necessary judge in the cases of the Eastern churches too. From this presupposed ignorance of the facts it came about that Basil, having heard that Paulinus of Antioch received letters of communion from the Westerners, wrote in ep. 214 that he was not surprised by this, "for they know absolutely nothing of our affairs…. But since we accuse no one, on the contrary we wish to have charity toward all, and especially toward the household of faith, we rejoice for those who have received letters from Rome… Nevertheless I shall never be able to persuade myself to ignore Meletius or to forget the church over which he presides."

It is furthermore worth noting with what words Eusebius in the passage cited expresses the excommunication which the Roman See would pronounce against some, namely: "he attempts to cut off from communion, and by letters sent abroad proscribes all the brothers there and pronounces them to be altogether strangers from the unity of the Church." That is, one cut off from Roman communion is by that very fact outside the Church; and Irenaeus and other bishops understood that this is how the matter stood—for they did not deny the right, but only somewhat disapproved of the exercise of the right in that question.

You have therefore in every Patriarchate and Exarchate of the East the authority of the Roman Pontiff exercised. Indeed in the West also,

he conducted himself almost always not as a simple patriarch but as one holding the primacy. For it was to the rights of Peter that he appealed—rights by which the power of the primacy over the entire world is contained. But when the Fathers of Arles in their synodal letter praise his dignity with these words: "from you, who hold the greater dioceses," etc.—they are perhaps speaking only of his patriarchal dignity, whose breadth was greater than that of the other patriarchates, and to which patriarchal power all those Fathers were subject who were enacting canons for the Western Church. On the dignity of the Roman Pontiff see Schelstrate, *Dissertatio de Auctoritate Patriarchali et metropolitica*.

V. The ignorance of Salmasius, castigated by the learned Sirmond, cannot however be passed over here. Having read in Rufinus an abbreviation of canon 6 of Nicaea: "that the ancient custom be observed at Alexandria and in the city of Rome, so that either the former should exercise care over Egypt or the latter over the suburban churches," Salmasius first taught that the "suburban churches" meant those contained within the hundredth milestone from the city, and then maintained that the authority of the bishop of Rome was extended only to these.

But 1°, to speak of the Nicene canon itself, the following things are certain. In the common editions and according to the version of Dionysius, the canon reads thus: "Let the ancient custom which exists throughout Egypt, Libya, and the Pentapolis be preserved, that the bishop of Alexandria have power over all of these, since the like is also customary for the bishop of Rome (ἐπείδη καὶ τῷ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ ἐπισκόπῳ τοῦτο σύνηθές ἐστι). Similarly, let the churches in Antioch and in the other provinces (ἐπαρχίας) keep their own privileges." Now it must be denied that anything is decreed in these words about the Roman See ("The Nicene Synod did not dare to establish anything above him—Peter and his successor—seeing that nothing could be conferred above his merit; for it knew that all things had been granted to him by the word of the Lord"—Boniface I, ep. 19, in Gallandus, vol. 9); but the custom of the Roman See is taken as a norm and example for decreeing something for the bishop of Alexandria. Now the authority of the bishop of Alexandria of which mention is made here is what was later called patriarchal (for the name itself was more recent than the reality);

if any comparison is instituted between the bishop of Alexandria and the bishop of Rome, it is a comparison between the patriarchal rights of each. It will not, however, be beside the point to note that this same canon was read a little differently by Paschasinus, legate of the Apostolic See, at the Council of Chalcedon, who adduced it in Act. 16 against the Fathers who, without the knowledge of the legates, had in the preceding act enacted a canon for amplifying the rights of the Church of Constantinople. He read it thus: "Canon six of the three hundred and eighteen holy Fathers. That the Church of Rome always had the primacy; let Egypt also hold it, so that the bishop of Alexandria have power over all, because this too is customary for the bishop of Rome (τοῦτο σύνηθές ἐστι)," etc.—a reading to which no one objected.

Sirmond testifies to having seen another reading in a most ancient edition of the Nicene canons of the Vatican Library in these words: "On the primacy of the Roman Church and on the bishops of other cities: it is the ancient custom that the bishop of the city of Rome have the principate, so that he govern with his care the suburban places and his entire province," etc. But on these matters let the learned examine further.

In order then that the canon, as it is commonly read, may be understood: it must be recalled that the bishop of Rome not only has the primacy over the universal Church but also specifically is a patriarch and was always recognized as such. Now his patriarchate was the entire West. This is sufficiently well known. John Zonaras, a writer of the twelfth century, says on can. 6 of the Nicene Synod: "It orders the bishop of Alexandria to preside over those in Egypt, Libya, and the Pentapolis; the bishop of Antioch to preside over the provinces subject to him—namely Syria, Coele-Syria, both Cilicias, Mesopotamia—and the other bishops each over their regions, just as the custom also obtained that the head of the Roman Church should govern the Western provinces." The extent of this patriarchate is evident from the fact that it had subject to it the metropolitans of Thessalonica, Corinth, Nicopolis, Athens, and Patras—who were afterward violently appropriated to himself by the bishop of Constantinople; see Leo the Wise in his *Diatyposis* on this matter. And indeed, with three patriarchs having been given and then two more added, all confessed that the entire Church was divided into

five patriarchates (see Justinian in Novella 123); and four of these looked to the East; therefore the entire West was subject to the bishop of Rome, who is also numbered as first among the patriarchs.

What was subject to the patriarchal jurisdiction was called a Diocese according to the form of division of the Roman Empire made by Constantine—not, however, so that each civil diocese corresponded to one ecclesiastical diocese; for the diocese of the bishop of Rome and of the bishop of Antioch and of Constantinople comprised several civil dioceses. The Diocese contained several provinces over which individual metropolitans presided; the province contained several churches governed by individual bishops. When the Patriarch held civil dioceses under himself, between him and the metropolitans were Exarchs who presided over the Dioceses—such as the Exarchs of Caesarea of Cappadocia, Ephesus, and Heraclea, who governed the Dioceses of Pontus, Asia, and Thrace—who were subject to the Patriarch of the East, that is, of Antioch (see can. 9 of the Synod of Chalcedon). Patriarchal sees were called by distinction Sees (θρόνοι), as is clear from Gelasius; who in his *Commonitorium* to Faustus denies that the episcopate of Constantinople (whose patriarchal power had not yet been approved by the Roman See) has by the canons a place among the Sees.

Therefore, since in the Nicene canon a certain comparison is instituted between the bishop of Alexandria and the bishop of Rome, and the patriarchal dignity of the former is in view, the bishop of Rome must also be regarded in this respect insofar as he is Patriarch.

Hence 2°, as regards the interpretation of Rufinus: either he grasped the meaning of the Nicene canon or he did not; if he did not, we are not concerned about him; if he did, he could not have meant by "suburban churches" anything other than the churches of the entire West, which were under the power of the bishop of the city. For just as, with the two Vicariates of the Praetorian Prefecture of Italy established by Constantine—one called the Vicariate of the City, with its seat at Rome, the other the Vicariate of Italy, with its seat at Milan—those regions or provinces which were under the Vicar of the City were called "suburban" (suburbicarian), so it was legitimate for Rufinus to call "suburban churches" those that were subject to the bishop seated in the

city. Moreover, it is historically established that the jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome, not only patriarchal but also metropolitan, in antiquity extended beyond the hundredth milestone, so that the imagination of Salmasius is altogether inept. Read the *Diatribae* of Jacques Sirmond on the suburbicarian regions and churches, in his works, vol. 4, Venice edition, 1728.

VI. Our adversaries bring against us especially the controversy that arose between the African bishops and the Roman See over appeals in the case of the presbyter Apiarius, who, having been excommunicated and deposed by his bishop Urbanus of Sicca, appealed and fled to the Roman Pontiff Zosimus. This appeal, unusual to the Africans, so disturbed them that in the same year 418 (see the *Critica* of Antonio Pagi, an. 419, n. 25) they decreed in a synod (can. 123 in Dionysius) that clerics should not appeal to courts overseas. Zosimus, however, received the appeal and toward the end of the same year sent his legates into Africa to cognize the case and pronounce sentence together with the neighboring bishops, giving them a written *commonitorium* in which certain Sardican canons were described, though cited by Zosimus as Nicene canons. For at that time the Roman Church was accustomed to call these and other canons by the denomination derived from the Nicene canons to which they were appended (see works of St. Leo, vol. 3, ed. of the Ballerini brothers, pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3).

The African bishops, who had lost the memory of the ecumenical Council of Sardica, were astonished that these canons were being produced; since they did not find them among the Nicene canons, they decided to send to the East, to obtain authentic copies of the Nicene canons from the principal churches: in the meantime, however, they declared that they would observe those canons which the legates of Zosimus had brought, pending a more diligent investigation into the Nicene council, as Augustine said. They also sent letters to the Roman Pontiff Boniface, the successor of Zosimus, asking him also to take care of this. In these letters they report that four things had been enjoined on them by the Roman See: "one about the appeals of bishops to the priest of the Roman Church; another, that bishops should not importune by sailing to the court; a third, about handling the cases of presbyters and deacons before neighboring bishops, if they have been wrongly

excommunicated by their own bishops; a fourth, about excommunicating or even summoning Bishop Urbanus to Rome, unless he corrected what appeared to need correcting. Of all these," they say, "regarding the first and third… the previous year we took care to intimate to the same Zosimus, so that we might be permitted to observe them without any injury to him until the investigation into the decrees of the Nicene council." Meanwhile the African Fathers restored Apiarius with a certain degree of accommodation; he was afterward condemned again, appealed to Rome again, and again a legate was sent into Africa by Caelestinus, the successor of Boniface—Faustinus, who, if the Africans are to be believed, conducted himself with a certain insolent haughtiness.

Having received the Nicene canons from the Eastern churches and not finding among them the ones which Zosimus had produced, they wrote to Caelestinus a synodal letter, in which, after mention is made of Apiarius, the following is contained. 1° The bishops request that henceforth the Roman Pontiff should not so readily admit bishops coming from Africa, nor wish to receive in his communion those excommunicated there; 2° likewise, that he should repel the improper flights of presbyters and clerics of lower rank. The first of these they prove from Nicene canon 5 (see Th. 13, n. 4), by an argument a minore ad maius: "because although it seems that the canon guards against this in the case of inferior clerics or laymen, how much more (the reasoning is not indeed apparent) did it wish this to be observed for bishops, lest those suspended from communion in their province should appear to be restored to communion by your holiness too hastily, too precipitately, or without due cause." The second they prove: "because no definition of the Fathers has derogated this from the African Church, and the Nicene decrees most openly committed clerics of lower grade and bishops themselves to their metropolitans." Both they also prove "because the Fathers most wisely and most justly provided that all cases be settled in their own places where they arose"; and also because it is difficult to bring the necessary persons of witnesses to a court overseas. 3° They say they have not found in their copies of the Nicene canons the canons produced by Zosimus. 4° They finally exhort the Roman Pontiff not to wish to send or concede his executors to any petitioners.

From this history the adversaries infer that the African bishops did not recognize or approve the right of the Roman Pontiff to receive appeals; for if they had believed this, they would have acquiesced spontaneously to the commands of Zosimus even though the Sardican canons were unknown to them. Then, in attacking those appeals in their letter to Caelestinus on the basis of the decrees of the Nicene council, those Fathers seem to have judged that the authority of the Roman Pontiff is limited by canons.

Now in order to understand the nature of this event, we think the following should be noted. 1° The occasion for the dispute that arose was the appeal of a presbyter to the Roman See, which appeal Zosimus received; but in order to handle the matter graciously while safeguarding his right, he did not wish to hold the judgment at Rome but sent his legates to Africa to judge together with the African bishops. 2° Furthermore, the same Zosimus sent to Africa three Sardican canons —the first (as he himself notes in his *commonitorium*, ch. 3, read at the synod commonly called the Sixth Council of Carthage, an. 419; see Baronius under the same year) about the appeal of bishops, which is the fifth Sardican canon and the last of those we cited above; the second, that bishops should not importune by sailing to the court; the third, about the appeals (as the same Pontiff says in the same place) of clerics —that is, of those of lower rank—which is the seventeenth Sardican canon, in which it is established that if a bishop has been hastily or harshly moved against his presbyter or deacon in anger and has wished to expel him from the church, care is to be taken that the innocent be not condemned; and therefore the expelled person may flee to the metropolitan, and if the latter is absent, to neighboring bishops, and request that his case be accurately examined. That bishop, however, who has expelled the presbyter justly or unjustly should patiently bear that the matter be examined and his sentence either confirmed or corrected. The Africans make mention of both canons in their letter to Boniface.

To what purpose did Zosimus produce the first and third canons? Was it only to safeguard his right in the appeal which he had received of the presbyter Apiarius? But the first canon concerns the appeal of bishops; the third concerns indeed the appeal of clerics but to the metropolitan or neighboring bishops. The question is somewhat

involved. In any event we cannot agree with David, *op. cit.*, ch. 11, a. 9, who thinks that those canons were handed over by the Pontiff to his legates only for their instruction; for as soon as the legates entered the synod, they demanded that the *commonitorium* which they had brought, together with those canons, be read publicly and inserted into the acts—which was done—and they demanded its execution. The Pontiff therefore wished to teach the Africans something or to remind them of something by adducing those canons. That is, since Zosimus had received the appeal in such a way as to send his own legates to judge —though in conjunction with other African bishops—he sent those two canons, in which the power of bishops to judge in cases of appeal of presbyters and the power of the Roman Pontiff to send legates who judge in his place are established, so that it might be clear that the one does not exclude the other.

Now it is true that Sardican canon 5 concerns the power of the Roman Pontiff to send legates in the cases of bishops; but we judge it was the intention of Zosimus that the same should hold in the cases of presbyters, and that this could be confirmed from received custom— and therefore we judge that Zosimus gave his legates instructions to interpret that canon in this way having regard to custom; and rightly so. For the canon does not establish a right but only determines the exercise of a right; and the reasons that held for the appeals of bishops could frequently hold for the appeals of presbyters; there being therefore a divine right in the Roman Pontiff regarding both, a right independent of canons, and the same reason holding for the appeals of presbyters as for those of bishops, and since the Sardican canon had approved the appeals of bishops and the sending of legates in their cases, it was to be judged as having approved the same also in the cases of presbyters. For which reason it is not beside the point to suppose that Zosimus ordered his legates to explain the canon according to this intention, confirming it also from custom, to which Faustinus the legate certainly appealed at the synod of 419. But because a different custom of the African Church obtained in such cases of presbyters, the Africans did not approve this interpretation. But what most of all disturbed them was that the Sardican canons were unknown to them; hence when they heard these canons cited under the name of Nicene canons, and had neither found

them in their copies of the Nicene council nor anywhere else (we find it established, they say, in no synod of the Fathers), for they lacked the canons of the Council of Sardica—whose catholicity as a council they did not know—the question arose about the canons themselves.

Now in this question the Africans did not deny the right implanted by divine institution in the Roman See of receiving appeals whether of bishops or of clerics or presbyters, but denied the fittingness and utility of the exercise of this right only with respect to presbyters and other inferiors, and only for Africa; and recognizing no law that prescribed this exercise, they denied that they were acting against any right in not permitting these appeals of presbyters. Indeed, as regards the right of the Roman See to receive appeals of presbyters: the Africans not only on the first occasion but also the second—after Apiarius had appealed again—received the legates of the Roman See to sit as judges in the council. And after Apiarius had been condemned by the legates themselves, the Africans writing to Caelestinus do indeed request (they say "we beseech") that he not wish to receive the appeals of presbyters, and they adduce reasons urging this; but they neither deny the right nor decree anything about it. Indeed, since they do not deny it but only occupy themselves with adducing reasons whereby it might be persuaded that the exercise of that right is not fitting for Africa, by this very fact they signify that they do not doubt the right itself of the Roman Pontiff. Moreover, since the right of the patriarch to receive appeals had been approved by the Orientals themselves, and the Roman Pontiff was patriarch of the West, by what reason could the Africans claim for themselves the prerogative that their sentences should not be subject to appeal? The question therefore was only about the fittingness of the exercise of this right in certain circumstances.

Now as regards the right of the Roman See to receive the appeals of bishops: it is certain 1° that these could not have been repudiated by the Africans, who admitted them, as Augustine testifies in ep. 162, speaking of the appeal of Caecilianus, bishop of Carthage: "for the matter was not about presbyters or deacons or clerics of lower rank, but about colleagues, who could fully reserve their case to the judgment of other colleagues, especially those of the Apostolic Churches." Again, at the very same period in which the controversy of the Africans—among

whom Augustine also was—with the Roman See about Apiarius was raging, Augustine gave a letter, which is ep. 209, to the Roman Pontiff Caelestinus on behalf of the case of Anthony, bishop of Fussala, who had conducted himself very badly in the episcopate. Now in this letter Augustine indicates that Anthony, who had been condemned by the African synod, had appealed to the Roman See (nn. 6, 9); which Augustine not only does not disapprove, but begs Caelestinus that, using his authority with gentleness, he might be willing to consult both the welfare of Anthony and that of the people of Fussala. In the same place Augustine mentions other recent and ancient appeals of bishops from Africa to Rome (n. 8).

It follows, therefore, that those African bishops who had a dispute with the Roman See in the case of Apiarius did not deny the right of receiving the appeals of bishops to the Roman Pontiff. It is also certain 2° that those same bishops used nothing but entreaties (*deprecamur*) toward the Pontiff and persuasions by which they reinforced their entreaties; and what they entreated was that he should not so readily admit to his hearing bishops coming from Africa, nor wish to receive into communion those excommunicated in Africa. This, admittedly, granting communion to one who has fled is certainly something different from receiving an appeal and instituting a judgment (see p. 432); but it is clear that the Africans are speaking and requesting concerning appeals as well, from what follows: namely, when they say that all cases must be settled where they arise and that a court overseas cannot be ratified because of the impossibility of sending witnesses; and they pray or urge that legates should not be sent from his side, because they find this established in no synod. They beg therefore that the Roman Pontiff neither in person nor through his legates should judge the cases of those who have fled to him—which is to ask that he not receive appeals; but that he permit the cases to be settled by a provincial council or the universal council of Africa, as they themselves say. Because this had not yet been forbidden to them, they also enacted it in the synod of 419, can. 25 and 34—but reserving the final judgment in this matter to the Roman See, to which the synodal acts were sent for confirmation.

If any difficulty arises from can. 34, in which bishops also appear to have been previously forbidden to appeal to overseas courts, let the Ballerini brothers be consulted on this matter in their *Observations* on Quesnel's fifth dissertation, pt. 1, ch. 6, n. 27.

The question therefore that arose on account of the appeal of the presbyter Apiarius was not about the right but about the fitness of the exercise of the right, which the Africans judged not to obtain because of certain circumstances; though no one will deny that they could have been mistaken in this matter, or have gone further than was fitting.

As regards the question of the Sardican canons, of which the Africans were ignorant, it must be noted that one question is whether a right exists; another question is, when the exercise of the right is not necessary, whether there exists a law prescribing that exercise; with such a law existing, one who wishes to impede that exercise is rightly reproved; without it existing, and especially if an opposing custom exists, the one impeding is immune from reproach. Now Zosimus, by producing the Sardican canon, was directly proving not the existence of the right but a law prescribing the free exercise of that right, and that the Africans who opposed that law were deserving of reproach. The question therefore was about the existence of this law. What wonder then if the Africans, not finding that canon—cited as Nicene—in their copies of the Nicene council, doubted its existence and wished to be better informed on the matter? And yet, when afterward the canon was not found among the Nicene canons either, so that the Africans were persuaded that that law did not exist; they did not deny that they wished to obey and follow that canon produced by Zosimus; they only beg and persuade the Pontiff not to oblige them by it. That is, they knew that the Pontiff had the power to prescribe this even if no canon existed. Therefore it is also false that the Africans thought the power of the Pontiff to be limited by canons. With this chief historical argument dissolved, you will easily dissolve others of equal weight, such as, for example, the controversy of St. Hilary of Arles with St. Leo the Great, on which see the Ballerini brothers, works of Leo, vol. 2, *Observations* on Quesnel's fifth dissertation.

It is necessary, however, to briefly refute a most impudent argument. Up to this point we have made frequent use, and will

continue to make use, of the authority of Roman Pontiffs in vindicating the prerogatives of the Roman See. But the adversaries say they are not to be heard, because they speak in their own cause. But 1° they speak in the cause of Christ and his Church. Let Bossuet be heard (*Defensio*, pt. 3, bk. 10, ch. 6): "I hear what they say: that Roman Pontiffs commending the dignity of their own See are not to be believed, since they speak in their own cause; but God forbid; for by the same right they would say that not even bishops or presbyters are to be trusted when they proclaim the honor of their own priesthood… Which I was pleased to say here once for all, in order to refute this rash and most wicked response; and I profess that I will believe the doctrine and tradition of the Roman Pontiffs regarding the majesty of the Apostolic See; even though they themselves are not the only ones who proclaim their see—equally with the rest and the whole Church do so, the Orientals no less than the Occidentals." 2° The sentiments of those Pontiffs are consonant with the sentiments of the other Fathers and synods; therefore they must be regarded as perfectly conformable to tradition. And we have 3° cited those Pontiffs as witnesses of the tradition and teachers of the Church; and in this category—namely of witnesses or teachers—the universal Church has always regarded those Pontiffs whose testimonies we have used; hence their testimony, approved by the Church, must be accepted by the adversaries as at least the testimony of the whole Church.

ARTICLE II
ON THE POWER OF THE ROMAN PONTIFF TOWARD SOCIETIES DISTINCT FROM THE CHURCH

THESIS XXI

Between the religious authority which is proper to the Roman Pontiff and the political power of a Christian prince there exists, from the very natures of things, such a relation that the latter is subordinated to the former not only negatively but also positively, albeit indirectly.

I. The subordination of which we speak consists in this: that one is inferior to the other and dependent on it. We say that one power is negatively subordinated to another when the inferior, even within the

limits of its own object, cannot do (the very law of nature prohibiting it) what would redound to the harm of the superior, and must abstain from those acts which the other power judges to be unlawful. We say that one power is positively subordinated to another when the inferior depends in such a way that it must, when the other demands it, contribute through its acts to the latter's good and advantage.

The prior subordination of civil power to the authority of the Church, and therefore also of the Roman Pontiff who holds the fullness of that authority, is manifest. For from the very natures of things, man must be both a citizen and religious; but this second is more excellent and more necessary by reason of its end. Hence civil power in its exercise must take account of religion at least negatively—that is, it must not impede men from attaining the ultimate end; the reason is evident, because this power exists for the good of men, and their end is to be preferred to other goods. Nor can civil power lawfully be atheistic; for this power is from God according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:1)—whose doctrine does not mean that all power is immediately conferred by God; for this meaning is neither necessary and is frequently false in any opinion on the origin of civil power, if the reference is to all superiors in civil society whom one must obey, as the Apostle appears to be speaking. But the meaning is: that by divine ordinance there exists in society a power which is a certain participation of the power of God, who alone from himself has the right of obliging men, so that without this participation no one can have the right of obliging others by his command; that is, this force of coercively governing the actions of those who are equal by nature and mutually independent, equally ordered immediately to God, must derive its origin solely from him who is by nature superior to men and their creator. Now a power that is from God and established for the good of those who are necessarily ordered to God cannot be atheistic, any more than the power from which it derives its origin can be atheistic, and from which alone it has its force.

But if there exists a religious power positively instituted by God, to which all religious jurisdiction over men has been entrusted, and much more if it is a power of the supernatural order for men elevated to a supernatural end: civil power 1° no longer has any right over matters religious and sacred, which are of a superior order and have been

committed by God, lord of both orders, to another power (see what we said on matrimony, § 4, prop. 5); it follows 2° that in the hypothesis of a distinct religious power instituted by God, civil power must equally, at least negatively, as we have said, take account of that religious order and its governing power.

Moreover, the religious power of the primacy instituted by God is the infallible teacher of morality, whereas civil power is not; and this power has no right to prescribe what is dishonest; and a Christian prince is bound to submit himself to the magisterium of the Church; when therefore the Church or the Roman Pontiff teaches that some law or institution is dishonest and cannot be observed without sin, that power must submit to that judgment and abstain from what is forbidden. Therefore.

II. But civil power must also take positive account of religion: that is, it must not only not impede the good of religion and the exercise of that power by which religious society is governed, but must also positively contribute, when necessary and when the religious power demands it, to the good of religion, to the assistance or support of that religious power. Now this support can be rendered in multiple ways, according to the threefold power—legislative, judicial, and coercive. If, namely, the religious power judges it to be expedient for the good of religion that the civil authority enact certain laws and judge and punish violators thereof, or that it abstain from enacting certain laws, even if not bad in themselves, or from instituting certain proceedings, or that it exercise its coercive force against disturbers of religious order, the religious power can command the prince to render this assistance, and the prince is bound in justice to carry out these commands.

This is the certain doctrine of Boniface VIII in the Bull *Unam Sanctam* (*Extravagantes Communes*, bk. 1, tit. 8, *de Maioritate et Obedientia*). For it teaches that the material sword, which is in the Church, must be under the spiritual sword and must be employed for the Church at the nod of the priest; the civil power therefore has a dependence on the religious; "to be employed for the Church"—therefore not only is the sword not to be employed against the Church nor to impede its good, but it is to be employed for the benefit and advantage of the Church. Furthermore, the constitution of Boniface

VIII was renewed and approved by Leo X with the approval of the sacred Lateran Council, Sess. 11, without prejudice to the declaration of Clement V that begins *Meruit*. Now this declaration of Clement V confirms the doctrine of Boniface. For Clement says (see *Extravagantes communes*, bk. 5, tit. 7, ch. 2) that through the definition and declaration of Boniface VIII, the king of France Philip and his kingdom are not any more subject to the Roman Church than they previously were. That is, Boniface did not enact a new right but authentically declared an ancient and divine right, and therefore the Most Christian King was subject to the Roman See after the Bull of Boniface no differently than before.

The question is asked: how great is the force of this prior part of the Bull (some recent authors have denied that the Bull as it currently exists is authentic and has the force of law. In the periodical *Rivista Universale* of Florence, July 1877, its canonical authority is denied: because it exists only among the *Extravagantes*; because Leo X, who praised it, did not insert it into his own constitution; and therefore we do not know what it was or what it contained; because it was cited by no theologian afterward. A certain scholar adds, in the *Revue des Questions Historiques*, Paris, July 1879, intrinsic arguments from which it appears to be rather a schema of a Bull to be issued than a Bull already issued. Another in the same place shows that it was drawn in large part from an unpublished work of Aegidius Romanus, *De Ecclesiastica Potestate*, three books. But certainly some Bull was issued by Boniface; otherwise what would the declaration of Clement refer to? Leo is moreover to be said to have approved what existed among the *Extravagantes*; for this was known to all. Besides, an ancient commentary was published on this Bull, by a Cardinal contemporary with Boniface VIII, in which the same Bull is quoted entire), in which the subjection of the temporal sword to the spiritual is handed on: for the doctrine there asserted does not appear to have the force of a definition of faith; for the formulae exhibiting a definition of faith appear only in the final part of the Bull and affect the doctrine about the necessary subjection of all to the Roman Pontiff. (*Moreover, to be subject to the Roman Pontiff we declare, say, define, and pronounce to be altogether necessary for salvation for every human creature.*) We do not contend that it is certain with the

certainty that entails an obligation of believing that a definition of faith is contained there beyond this explicit conclusion; for regarding this alone does the Roman Pontiff clearly signify that he is performing the office of supreme teacher and explicitly proposes it to all as necessarily to be held.

But the doctrinal part, which precedes, on the subjection of temporal authority to spiritual, is so bound up with the final conclusion that it is established with theological certainty that what has been defined also contains the former. Indeed the process of the Bull is as follows. The Church, outside which there is no salvation, is one, one body. The one Church has one head—namely Christ and the Vicar of Christ, Peter, and Peter's successor. In the Church there is a twofold power, or twofold sword—temporal and spiritual; but the former is to be exercised for the Church, the latter by the Church; the latter by the hand of the priest, the former by the hands of kings and soldiers but at the nod of the priest. Moreover the sword must be under the sword and temporal authority must be subject to spiritual power; because both powers are from God, and what is from God is ordered—which would not be the case unless the sword were under the sword and as the inferior were reduced by the other to the supreme. But spiritual power excels the temporal. This spiritual power was divinely conferred on Peter, and whoever resists it resists the ordinance of God, unless he imagines two principles, which is false and heretical. Furthermore, etc.

Now you see 1° that all that precedes the final conclusion coheres most aptly with itself: the Church is one, outside which there is no salvation; its one head is Christ and Peter; there is one supreme power; and whatever twofold power is found in the Church, the temporal and the spiritual, the former must be subject to the latter and exercised at its nod, so that there may be order and unity. You see 2° that what is handed on about the unity of the Church, the unity of the head, and the subordination of the powers is not said incidentally and by the way but purposely and substantially—for if these are removed, the same doctrinal constitution is not formally had; for it is made up not of the conclusion alone but of the entire series and context of propositions. You see 3° that the preceding propositions are tied as principles to the final words of the conclusion; for the unity of the Church, the unity of

the head, and the due subordination of all to the one—enunciated in the preceding propositions—are the reason why every human creature must be subject to the Roman Pontiff, which is affirmed at the end of the constitution. Now 4° in the preceding propositions the necessity of the subjection of temporal princes, as such, to spiritual power is explicitly asserted. From these it follows that the final words—"every human creature"—embrace kings as such, and that therefore by this definition the necessity of that subjection of temporal power to spiritual, which was explicitly set forth above, is also taught. The consequent is proved: for the breadth of the consequent depends on the breadth of the antecedent; and certainly what is universally expressed in the consequent contains what was explicitly enunciated as part of it in the premises; but in the premises the subjection of kings as such to ecclesiastical power was explicitly enunciated: therefore. Thus from this analysis of the constitution it is established that the thing defined—that is, that all must be subject to the Roman Pontiff—embraces also Christian kings as such, or political power.

This was certainly how this Constitution was received at that time, and this was the reason why the Most Christian King flew into a rage.

The doctrine of Boniface is ancient; for the same is the opinion of the Fathers. Their doctrine can be known both from the testimonies cited in the Prolegomena under § 18, n. 7, in which the due subordination of political power to ecclesiastical authority is handed on, and in particular from the comparison frequently instituted between the relation of civil society to the Church and the relation of body to soul, which already appears in the *Apostolic Constitutions*, bk. 2, ch. 34. "You —turning his address to princes and prefects—the law of Christ has subjected to my power and my authority. For we bishops also exercise sovereignty, and I add, a greater and more perfect one; unless indeed it is right that spirit yield to flesh and heavenly things to earthly"—so said Nazianzen, Orat. 13, n. 8. And Isidore of Pelusium, bk. 3, ep. 249: "From the priesthood and the kingdom the administration of affairs is composed. For although the difference between the two is very great—the one being, as it were, the soul and the other as it were the body—they tend nevertheless toward one and the same end, which is the salvation of men." With which the most learned Ivo agrees, ep. 51 to

King Henry of England, reminding him to always think that the kingdom of earth must be subject to the heavenly kingdom committed to the Church. "For just as the animal senses must be subject to reason, so earthly power must be subject to ecclesiastical governance; and as much as the body avails unless it is governed by the soul, so much does earthly power avail unless it is informed and governed by ecclesiastical discipline." St. Thomas uses the same formula in *2a 2ae*, q. 60, a. 6, ad 3, saying that "secular power is subject to spiritual power as body to soul; and therefore it is not a usurped judgment if a spiritual prelate involves himself in temporal matters insofar as the secular power is subject to him." This doctrine was authentically professed by the Fathers of Constance in the condemnation of the errors of Wyclif: "As spirit stands to body and the realm of spirit to the realm of body, so proportionately does the ecclesiastical judge stand to the earthly judge and the ecclesiastical forum to the temporal: as the venerable Hugh of St. Victor and Alexander of Hales and other doctors and the sacred canons say." See this condemnation in the Appendix of the Council of Constance, n. 23 at art. 12. This constant and common manner of speaking compels one to admit that it belongs to the doctrine of the Church, what is expressed by that comparison concerning the relation between ecclesiastical and civil power. Now what is expressed is the subordination of civil to ecclesiastical power—not the subordination of the vivified to the vivifying; for in the Catholic Church the certain doctrine is that both powers are distinct and in their own order independent; but such as is the relation of the inferior ordered to the good of the superior and having toward it the character of an instrument in respect of what is superior and has the character of end and principal cause: for this is properly the other relation of body to soul, and with this excluded no other remains. But such a subordination of civil power to ecclesiastical demands that at the nod of the latter the former should positively cooperate in its assistance and support; for thus the body obeys and serves the soul as its instrument: therefore.

And indeed between civil power in a Christian society and religious power 1° a certain bond exists; for they are bound together both by reason of the same subjects, who are governed by both powers, and by reason of the ends to which the same subjects are directed by

both powers; the order of civil society and the order of religious society can also mutually assist each other. Now the bond 2° is not one of coordination; for the powers stand in relation to each other as do their ends; but the end of civil power—which is order in civil society—and the end of the other power—which is religious good—are not coordinated, just as the ultimate end of man and some temporal happiness are not coordinated; which ends are the reasons why order in civil society and religious good in religious society are respectively to be cared for by each power. But there is 3° a bond of subordination; for the end which is temporal happiness is subordinated, as regards men, to the ultimate end which is obtained through religion. And the subordination 4° of civil to religious power is the subordination of a means—of that which can and must be referred to the good of the subordinated ends when it is useful to the end of the same and when that subordinating party demands it. For there are certain means which are per se ordered to some end, so that they exist because that end exists—such as sacraments for sanctification; there are other means which are not per se necessary for a certain end and can exist without it; but with that end in existence, they are subordinated to it, so that one who has the right to attain this end can and does have the right, if these means are at hand, to use them for the end. Thus too, without religious worship, gold and silver could exist in nature; but given that men wish or ought to dedicate temples, they have the right to use gold and silver for their adornment as means subordinated to this end.

Now we say that civil power is to be found in this class of means with respect to ecclesiastical power. For civil power is established solely for the good of those who are nonetheless ultimately ordered to one end, which is religious good; and for attaining this, therefore, man has the right to be assisted in this life through other goods which exist for his sake and have been conferred on him, and which therefore take on the character of a means to this end: therefore the subordination of civil power to ecclesiastical power is a subordination of a means. Now this right of the faithful is exercised by religious power, which has been instituted for procuring the religious good of men and the attainment of the ultimate end. For it has the right of demanding what is necessary for men to attain this end; and since it is a true power of jurisdiction, and

deals with all things that are ordered to the religious end, and is superior to civil power as its end is superior to the latter's end; it can rightfully command the Christian prince what it judges to be useful or necessary for itself. Now such a subordination is positive: therefore the political power is positively subordinated to the jurisdiction of the primacy, which is the fullest religious power.

According to all this, Innocent III was most correctly saying (ep. 197, bk. 2) that Christ willed that the successor of Peter "sit not only among princes but above princes and judge princes"; and (ep. 209) that Christ "left to the blessed Peter not only the universal Church but the entire world to be governed." Moreover, it is equivalent for civil power to be positively subordinated to religious power and to obey it in doing something, and for it to obey the same in omitting something; for the subordination is formally the same, and both can be equally demanded by the same title—the religious end: therefore also in respect of these omissions is civil power positively subordinated to religious power. "These things being noted," says John, Archbishop of Canterbury, to King Edward of England in 1281 (in Mansi, *Conc.*, vol. 24, p. 426), "Catholic emperors subjected all their laws to the sacred canons, lest they be thought schismatics or heretics. Since therefore, O most excellent lord king, it belongs to you to preserve the glorious peace of the empire, and you too are bound to subject your laws to the canons and to abolish those contrary to them."

COROLLARY

From these considerations it follows that Innocent III (*c. Novit de Iudiciis*) did not embrace the entire subject matter in which Christian kings are obligated to submit to the authority of the Pontiff when he said: "for we do not intend to judge concerning a fief, the judgment of which belongs to him—the King of France Philip—but to decide concerning sin, the censure of which belongs to us without doubt." For the power of the Pontiff can be exercised with respect to kings not only by reason of the intervening sin, on account of whose punishment Christian kings are, no differently than other faithful, subject to the Pontiff, but also having regard to the nature and ends of both powers.

III. But is this positive subordination direct or indirect? We have already said above that the direct subordination of one power to another consists in this: that the subordinate power, with respect to its own proper end, is governed by the superior power and therefore depends on it for all its acts, and in such a way that the superior can render any acts of the former either null and void or valid. But civil power is not thus subordinated to religious power. For the power given by Christ to Peter is formally a religious power, ultimately ordered to the attainment of the supernatural end in the next life, immediately ordered to procuring divine worship in this life in the manner Christ instituted. Now no civil power was formally conferred on Peter. Hence ecclesiastical power does not per se have the care of temporal happiness, which is the end of civil society; and therefore in all those matters in which only the consideration of temporal happiness enters, civil power —which must direct to it—is independent; since it and no other exists for this end. Nor, although the civil order can be conducive to the order of religious society, is it necessary that all acts of civil power be governed by religious power; because the order and peace of religious society demands indeed that civil society be rightly and justly governed, but does not determine the manner—which can be multiple, with diverse laws and institutions. Therefore, since the dependence of civil power on religious power derives its entire rationale from the end, and since the end of religious power does not demand that it determine also the manner in which civil society is governed—whether it determines the form of governance, laws, etc.—there is therefore lacking sufficient reason why religious power should direct all the acts of civil power. Civil power is therefore not directly subordinated to religious power.

It remains therefore that it is subordinated indirectly. And indeed the reason for the subordination is the excellence of the end of religious power, to which everything else established for man must be subordinated and must provide assistance and support when necessary. Now subordination by reason of end is only indirect. This subordination, moreover, is not excluded by the fact that only religious power was formally given to Peter; for a formally religious power, by the very fact that it is ordered to a more excellent end to which the end of civil power is subordinated, is at the same time a power of indirectly

using this other power; and for this use, no formally civil power is required in the one using it. Therefore, although the person of the Prince himself is directly subject to the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, yet insofar as he exercises his power in the governance of his society, he is subject indirectly; because he is subject to that extent, namely insofar as the spiritual end demands it and the Roman Pontiff therefore has the right to direct the exercise of that power, and the latter is bound to obey. Now this subordination is from the very natures of things, as is clear from the demonstration given, which was derived from the essences of things. It is required by natural right in the hypothetical sense—that is, presupposing the existence of the Church.

Most ineptly would anyone deny this subordination on the ground that civil power is immediately from God; for even given this (see Prolegomena, § 16), what prevents something from proceeding immediately from God with subordination to something else? Are not animals immediately from God and yet subordinated to man? Were not the body and soul of Adam immediately from God, and yet the body subordinated to the soul? Can chemists not dispose of the elements of matter because they are immediately from God? There is therefore nothing more inept than this argument.

This is the doctrine of St. Thomas. For in bk. 2, *dist. ult.*, in the exposition of the text after a. 3, q. 2, he says: "to the 4th it must be said that spiritual and secular power are both derived from divine power; and therefore secular power is under spiritual power to the extent that God has subjected it to it—namely in those things which pertain to the salvation of the soul; and therefore in these matters obedience to spiritual power is to be preferred to secular." See also his words from this same passage cited in thesis 14.

IV. We have said that the power of a Christian prince is subordinated to the jurisdiction of the primacy. For jurisdiction, which is not exercised in the abstract but in the concrete, requires a person on whom it may be brought to bear, and this person must be subject to it—such as the Christian prince. But when a prince is not subject to the Church, his civil power indeed is, by divine ordinance, of such a nature that it must be subordinated to the Church; as God wills all the kingdoms of the world to be aggregated to his Church and all kings to

become lambs of the Roman Pontiff; yet the Roman Pontiff cannot exercise his authority over a king who is not his subject. What then can or may or may not be done, especially if the entire royal society is Christian, is to be disputed in another place.

Is a Christian prince, then, in a worse condition than an unbeliever? To assert this is inept and impious. For 1° a prince who becomes Christian loses no right which he previously had; for he did not previously have a right over sacred things of the supernatural order, but only at most over some natural religion, and that in the present state from the hypothesis of ignorance of the true religion, which alone God wills. Now this right over natural religion, if there is such a right, the Christian prince still retains—in the hypothesis, that is, that only natural religion existed, or also in the hypothesis that he has unbelieving subjects who do not wish to be converted to the faith, whose rites and institutions he can regulate so that they do not exceed the bounds of natural honesty. But 2° dependence on religious power is not an imperfection but a perfection; for it is a perfection to be joined to the supernatural order and governed by it and ordered to the supernatural end: just as it is a perfection of the human nature of Christ to subsist not in itself but in another, and generally, given the institution of the supernatural order, it is a perfection for natural things to serve it. Moreover, 3° is a believer to be said to be in a worse condition than an unbeliever, because the former's freedom is limited by more laws—for example, fasting, receiving the sacraments, sanctifying feast days, etc.? Why then do they say that pagan princes are rightly deterred from becoming Christian if that subordination of their power to religious power is asserted? Finally, 4° there are certainly many goods which princes obtain in Christian society—not only as private persons but as princes—which would be long to enumerate. Hence princes lose nothing but gain many things.

COROLLARY

From what has been proved it follows 1° that princes by this office can claim for themselves no authority over ecclesiastical and sacred matters; for they stand on the side of means, which are not to rule but to

be ruled; that is, kings manage the care of the Church not as lords but as ministers, not as judges but as executors (see Becanus, *In Duello de Primatu Regio*, ch. 8). 2° That it belongs to religious power to judge whether and how in each particular circumstance support for religious society is to be supplied by civil power; for the judgment about the use of means belongs to one who has the care of the end. 3° And for the same reason, that it belongs to religious power to determine what the Church can demand from civil power, and what this civil power can do in matters pertaining to the Church. 4° When the temporal end, which is the end of civil society, and the spiritual end, which is of religious society, concur in any matters, just as the former end must be subordinated to the latter, so civil power must yield to religious power in these matters. 5° That proposition 54 of the Syllabus was rightly proscribed: "Kings and princes are not only exempted from the jurisdiction of the Church, but are also superior to the Church in settling questions of jurisdiction."

THESIS XXII

Even if concordats entered into by the Roman Pontiff with secular princes are said to have the character of bilateral contracts, the power of the primacy is not thereby diminished.

I. The subject matter with which concordats deal is per se and ordinarily that which is called mixed. Mixed subject matter is that which under different aspects can pertain to both the religious and the civil order and thus under different aspects be subordinated to both authorities—such as the temporal goods of clerics, public instruction, marriage, and the like; for under one respect these are ordered to temporal happiness, under another to religious good. On account of the subordination of civil authority to religious authority, when in such subject matter either divine law or the law of the Church transfers something to the religious order, civil authority must yield—and this occurred without controversy when civil societies, imbued with the religious spirit, revered the authority of the Church. But when the bond of due subjection began to be broken and civil societies began to claim for themselves the right of autonomy and to wish to govern themselves

as if the Church did not exist, an occasion arose for entering into certain conventions between the supreme religious and civil authorities, by which the limits would be positively determined beyond which civil authority should not go and within which religious authority would wish to contain itself for the sake of preserving peace. We said that the subject matter of these conventions is per se and ordinarily mixed subject matter. "Ordinarily," because they almost always deal with this subject matter. "Per se," because since such subject matter is referred to both orders, it can give rise both to a certain disagreement and to a friendly settlement. Extraordinarily and per accidens, however, it can happen that the subject matter of these conventions is something simply religious—such as the election of ministers, over which some right is conceded to civil authority—or something simply civil, such as some temporal possession, say a fief, which is donated to the Church. The authors of these conventions are the supreme powers in both orders, religious and civil, who jointly establish something for the same subjects who are subject to both powers. Hence such conventions can be made only for a Christian society subject to the Roman Pontiff: they can indeed be made with a prince who is not a believer, who in this matter will act as the representative of a civil society which is also Christian.

The form in which such conventions are customarily entered into is the form of a synallagmatic or bilateral contract, by which the mutual obligation of observing the agreements is expressed.

II. The question is asked whether these concordats are genuine synallagmatic contracts obligating both parties equally, from an obligation arising from the very contract itself, so that without the consent of one the other cannot withdraw from the agreements. For this is the character of this type of contract—that it generates an obligation on both sides and that neither party can withdraw from the agreements without the consent of the other. The question is not, therefore, when the matter concerns the Roman Pontiff, whether it is fitting for the Roman Pontiff to observe what he has agreed to, or whether he is bound to do so by the law of honesty; but the question is whether by force of the convention he is bound toward the other party, just as the other party is toward him. This can indeed seem so at least having regard to the form in which such conventions are entered into. Yet the opinion

more common among Italian theologians is that these conventions are not genuine synallagmatic contracts and that the Roman Pontiff is not bound by them toward the other party with the obligation proper to a contract, such that the exercise of his power would be impeded and made void by contrary acts, without the consent of the other party.

III. Indeed they say: 1° Consider the subject matter. The subject matter of a bilateral contract can apparently be only that which can be had in equal manner by both contracting parties; but such is ordinarily not the subject matter of concordats. Then moreover the very subject matter with which these conventions deal excludes the character of a bilateral contract. For the discussion is about spiritual matters or matters connected to spiritual things, which cannot be the object of a contract; it is therefore wrong to think that the Roman Pontiffs intend by these conventions to establish bilateral contracts. And whatever form is added to these conventions, it cannot transfer the subject matter into a species that is repugnant to it; and therefore the form of a bilateral contract added externally to it can be extrinsic and accidental to it, not intrinsic and substantial.

2° Consider the very act of the convention. On one side is a Christian society which as such is subject to the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff; on the other is the Roman Pontiff himself as supreme Pastor of all Christians: the matter concerns things subject to the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, in which the Christian society has no authority but only the duty of obedience. The Roman Pontiff by his authority could indeed oblige that society to observe everything that is of the common law and derives force from the authority of the Pontiff; but in order to accommodate himself to the weakness of the flock, he makes certain exceptions and establishes certain special provisions accommodated to the condition of the society, and establishes a special law by which that Christian society is to be governed, or which he wishes to use in governing it. That is, such conventions are nothing other than certain special laws established by the supreme Pastor for the governance of some part of the Christian flock; they are a certain privilege granted to that society, which is thereby exempted in various matters more or less from the common law. But it is repugnant for a superior granting a privilege to be bound by his own concession of the

privilege; it is repugnant for the supreme authority to be bound by its own law: therefore.

3° Consider the nature of the primacy. It is the fullness of power for the governance of the entire Church, immediately instituted by God and immediately conferred by God on each individual successor of Peter; which must always persist the same in quality and quantity as it was instituted by Christ; for the primacy of Peter must be perennial. Now the perpetuity of this fullest power does not indeed demand that it always be fully exercised, but it demands that it always, when it is necessary and when the Roman Pontiff judges it necessary, be capable of exercise (see what was said in Th. 11), independently of the consent of subjects and others; otherwise the primacy would be diminished, in that it would no longer be the fullness of power. And this power of exercising itself independently of the consent of subjects must be not only valid but also licit per se; for it is the proper gift of the divinely instituted primacy. Nor can the Roman Pontiff himself diminish the force of this fullest power; for it exists in the Church by divine law and he is its depositary, not its owner. It is therefore repugnant to the primacy that the free exercise of it should lawfully be impeded by the will of subjects and others, so that it can no longer validly do certain things that are contained per se in the fullness of power; but this would occur if concordats were synallagmatic contracts: therefore.

These arguments, setting aside the first for a moment, look chiefly —not to say exclusively—to ensuring that the divine authority of the primacy suffers no harm, is liable to no diminution, but always remains immutably the same, as regards its integrity and fullness, in each individual successor of Peter. This is indeed what divine institution demands. Now, they say, if in concordats the Roman Pontiff truly binds himself toward the prince or civil society, just as the latter toward him; he can no longer lawfully dispose of all those things which he has either ceded to the other or regarding which he has bound himself; therefore the power of the primacy is diminished. Nonetheless, because the Roman Pontiff in entering a concordat, when he solemnly pledges to observe it, certainly assumes some obligation for himself—otherwise he would seem to be playing games—the same authors concede that the Roman Pontiff is by virtue of the concordat bound in a certain manner,

whether from honesty or from fidelity, so that if he, without adequate reason, violates the concordat, he acts badly and will sin before God; but his act would be valid.

And this doctrine appears to have been approved by those somewhat earlier canonists who flourished especially in Germany and spoke of the concordats entered into between the Holy See and the German nation in 1447 under Nicholas V. So for example, Georg Brander, canon of Augsburg, in his *Collectanea super Concordatis*, q. 8 (a work composed in order to restore the collapsed practice of concordats in Germany, completed in the year 1600): "On this question not much labor is needed. For one who recognizes the Pontiff to be the supreme Vicar of Christ and to have by divine right the fullest administration of all goods belonging to any churches whatever… will not doubt that his Holiness can by the fullness of his power revoke concordats in whole or in part. For when concordats are said to have the force of a contract (from Puteus, *decis.* 47), this is to be understood on the part of the Germans, namely that they are bound not only by divine law, as Christians, to obey the Roman Pontiff in the matter of reservations, but also by a special agreement, as it were in the force of a concluded pacification entered into… But on the part of the Pontiff, concordats admitted in favor of the Germans contain pure grace, which remains in the free faculty of the Pontiff, according to that: 'whatever you shall have bound,' etc., Matt. 16. And the Pontiff cannot abdicate from himself the faculty competent to him by divine right."

Laurentius Nicolarts, canon of Liège, in his *Praxis Beneficiaria*, tit. 3, dub. 3, § 5, where he reviews the cited work of Brander: "I reply that the Pope cannot at pleasure and without legitimate cause derogate from the concordats of Germany; but he can, when a just and reasonable cause demands it—such as the utility or necessity of the Church and the like, according to the circumstances of places and times. The first part is proved by the arguments adduced above for the negative position… The second, however, is first of all demonstrated by the supreme and absolute power coming immediately from Christ, residing in the Pontiff as Vicar… which through no agreements does he wish or can he abdicate from himself so far as not always to retain a greater power on his own side (*c. Dudum de Praebendis in 6°*); because someone can

renounce a private right for himself and in his own utility, but not a public right—and here a divine one—concerning the public utility of the Church. And it is a contradiction for the head of the hierarchical or sacred-political body, considered as such, not to be the head nor to have the power competent by divine right to the head of the same hierarchical body; since through that power it is constituted in the being of head… Moreover, concordats of the Supreme Pontiff with some king or prince, as far as the Pope himself is concerned, have not so much the force of a pact as of a certain privilege…; hence just as a privilege can be revoked, so also can concordats… Nor does a voiding decree appended to concordats stand in the way; because it does not bind and cannot bind the hands of the Pope, as is evident from the reasoning of our conclusion… Moreover, just as the Pope cannot bind his own hands (*c. fin.* and the gloss there, *de Rescriptis in 6°*, and *c. Innotuit 20, de Elect.*), so neither can a Pope impose a law on a Pope; since an equal has no power over an equal… The reason is that successor Pontiffs receive their power not from their predecessors nor from the German prelates but from God immediately—by the very fact that they have been legitimately elected as head of the Church; and therefore predecessors or German prelates do not appear to be able by agreement to restrict or impede the use of that power."

Observe, as regards the first part of this testimony, that two things are said: one, that the Pope cannot derogate from concordats at pleasure and without legitimate cause; the other, that the power of the Pontiff regarding matters conceded in the concordat, which he had before the concordat, remains the same after the concordat. From these you easily understand what the former of these two means. That is, when it is denied that the Pope can derogate from concordats without legitimate cause, at pleasure, the reference is to the lawfulness of the act, not to the validity, if the Pope derogate at pleasure. The rest is consonant and clear.

There is added the authority of the Rota, which Nicolarts cites in the same place from a case *una Leodiensis Canonicatus*, 15 March 1610, in these words—certainly worth noting: "Since the will of the Pope is established, it is not to be doubted that he could derogate from the said concordats, by reason of the most ample power which the Pope has in beneficiary matters… Nor does he appear to have assented to the said

concordats in such a way as to have tied his hands entirely… And what is said elsewhere, that the concordats of Germany have the force of a contract—either this is not true, because spiritual matters do not fall within commerce but are handled by way of grace… and the Pope through such concordats acquired nothing new but remitted much of his right (now this holds in all concordats, as the reader does not ignore); so that there remains a pure privilege; or insofar as the name of contract can be sustained, this will be so improperly and to the effect that the Pope is presumed to derogate with more difficulty, and therefore general clauses do not suffice, but special mention of concordats is required… which therefore do not obstruct when the express will of the Pope is established."

Paul Laymann, on the *Decretals*, *c. Cum dilectus in 6°*: "The concordats of Nicholas V with the German nation are considered to have passed into a pact from which the Supreme Pontiff does not customarily derogate; although from the fullness of his power, speaking absolutely, he can derogate." That is, the Roman Pontiff does not customarily derogate from concordats—certainly not without just cause; otherwise the proposition is historically false; but he can from the fullness of his power derogate—certainly even without just cause, so that the opposition stands. This formula—that the Pope can derogate from concordats from the fullness of his power—is used by several others. But what does it mean? The fullness of the pontifical power is the very power which the Pope received from Christ, circumscribed by no limit. To act from the fullness of power, moreover, is opposed to acting from ordinary power; and this is customarily understood as that which in its exercise conforms to existing canons, customs, granted privileges, and the like. The Pope nonetheless has the power to act beyond and against these acts validly, even without just cause: the reason is that otherwise there would be no room for the exercise of the fullness of power, but only for ordinary power, which can do here and now what just cause demands; the power of the Pope would therefore be, as regards the value of the act, circumscribed and limited by canons, etc. Which we have proved to be most false against the Gallicans (Th. 15). Therefore to be able for the Roman Pontiff to do something from the fullness of his power which he does not ordinarily do, reduces to

this: that he can act efficaciously even beyond and against existing laws. When it is therefore similarly affirmed that he can derogate from concordats from the fullness of his power, what is said is that the exercise of his power is not impeded by such agreements, so that he acts validly if he does something contrary to those agreements, whatever the cause may be.

Just as Laymann, so very many canonists speak, e.g., Vitus Pichler (*tit. de Praebendis*, n. 71 ff.), saying: "If the Pope wishes to use the fullness of power, by himself alone and without the consent of the German nation and outside a general council, he can absolutely (from the cause of the public good or necessity of the Church) derogate from said concordats." In support of this doctrine he appeals to "that supreme and absolute power of the Pontiff, which he cannot abdicate from himself, even under the guise of a contract or concordats, without always retaining a greater power on his own side." That is—as we have already noted in the words of Nicolarts—even after the concordats, the same power as before remains in the Pontiff over the conceded matters, and this is the reason why he can derogate from concordats; it is therefore a power that can validly come to act; and therefore when mention is made of some legitimate cause, that is to be referred to the lawfulness of the act.

In the same manner speaks Schmalzgrüber (*tit. de Praebendis*, n. 271 ff.), who adds: "These concordats, although they have some force of a pact, as Julius III confesses, are nonetheless more a papal privilege, as, attested by Nicolarts, the Rota has proved (see above); and the reason is, both because spiritual matters do not properly fall within a contract and commerce, and because by these concordats the Pope has rather remitted something of his right or rather communicated it, than acquired anything."

Fr. Suárez (*Defensio Fidei*, bk. 4, ch. 34) teaches 1° that "through no contract can the Pontiff abdicate from himself the supreme spiritual power of disposing of those things that pertain to the fitting governance of the Church." He teaches 2° "although the Roman Pontiff cannot without cause withdraw from an agreement, yet if afterward, with circumstances changed or better understood, he understands the agreement to be harmful or unfitting to the Church, he can, by revoking

it, withdraw from it, compensating the other party for the damage which perhaps it may suffer by reason of the preceding agreement."

This is explained more clearly 3° in the following sections: "Which general doctrine," he says, "holds with special reason in this subject matter of exemption; both because, as I was saying, whatever is remitted in that matter on the part of the Church is ordinarily granted liberally, without compensation, and most of all because in this exemption greater attention must be paid to the common good of the clerical state than to any convention made with a temporal prince; because it is necessary that it always have that condition tacitly included: provided it does not turn out or follow from the agreement to the prejudice, vexation, or disparagement of the clerical state. With a similar cause intervening, therefore, it can be revoked; without it, however, it cannot be revoked, at least licitly; but if it is done, I think the act holds, on account of the supreme spiritual power of the Pope, which cannot in itself be diminished." In these last words you have the express doctrine of the canonists we have cited.

And indeed several others could be cited to the same opinion; but there is no need: for from what has been recited it is sufficiently established that Cardinal Tarquini in his celebrated letter and his followers brought forward nothing really new, but restored the doctrine of the ancients.

We cannot, however, deny that in this ancient doctrine there is something, at least as regards the form or manner in which it is proposed, that does not entirely satisfy, if all things pertaining to concordats are weighed. For from it it follows that concordats are not genuine agreements, genuine bilateral contracts; but does this not conflict with certain affirmations of Roman Pontiffs, which more recent authors especially press?

Indeed Julius III (in Nicolarts, ibid.) said: "We, noting that the said concordats have the force of a pact between the parties and that what is established by pact cannot customarily and should not be abrogated without the consent of the parties," etc.

More forcefully, Pius VI in his *Responsio super Nunciaturis*, ch. 6, n. 34: "Under these terms 'Concordats of Princes,' as employed by laws, emperors, and Pontiffs, the Aschaffenburg concordats were always

understood and ought to be understood, as being an agreement entered into by princes with the Apostolic See, presenting a genuine and legitimate bilateral pact, which is the foundation of each concordat."

Hence the concordats between Leo X and Francis I bore this conclusion: "These concordats have the force of a genuine contract obligating both sides." And Pius IX in his Allocution of 1 November 1850, lamenting that the concordats were being violated by the government of Sardinia, calls them agreements "by force and right of which, if violated and shaken, the force also of other public and private agreements would fall." Therefore concordats are in the same category as public and private agreements that oblige both sides for the same reason.

This argument—drawn not so much from the clauses of the concordats, about which there could be a question whether they exhibit the substantial or the accidental form of the matter, as from the declarations of the Holy See, which, purposely expounding the force of concordats, there is no reason to think used ambiguous and less proper terms—this argument, I say, carries no small weight and may not be passed over.

Our opinion is that both are true: that the power of the Roman Pontiff after a concordat has been entered into is in no way diminished but remains the same, so that he can validly do the same as before—not only in habitu but in use—and that concordats are bilateral contracts.

That is, a double power of acting must be distinguished: one the power of acting validly, the other of acting licitly. Frequently an act is juridically valid even if not licit or honest; and sometimes (e.g., through invincible ignorance) it is licit but juridically invalid and null. Now the obligation of a synallagmatic contract—of that kind, at least, which consists in a mutual promise—impedes or removes the power of licitly acting against the agreements, but not the power of validly acting against them. Examples are everywhere at hand. Betrothal is a bilateral contract, contained in a promise; if the betrothed marries another, he acts illicitly but most validly; the power of validly acting against the contract had therefore not been removed or diminished by the contract. Likewise a sale is a bilateral contract, perfected before the delivery of the thing; if the seller delivers it to another, he delivers it validly, even if he

is liable for damages to the first buyer. In short, when a bilateral contract consists not in the delivery of a thing—as, for example, marriage—but in a promise to do or to suffer something, the right to act against the agreement is indeed lost once the agreement is entered into; but this right that is lost is nothing other than the power of acting licitly—that is, the power of licitly performing a valid act—and is not the very power of acting validly, which moreover remains and produces its effect even if one uses it illicitly. Now such a power is not only a physical power; for the power of contracting a valid marriage with Bertha, after betrothal to Lucia, is moral—by which a genuine right is truly given and accepted.

Now concordats are contracts contained in a promise; they are agreements, pledges.

If this is so, what prevents one from saying that concordats are bilateral contracts? Do you wish the authority of the primacy always to remain intact, so that the Roman Pontiff can always validly act against agreements? We reply that the nature of this contract does not prevent this, as we have demonstrated. But the Roman Pontiff loses the power of licitly acting against the agreements when there is no reason for withdrawing from the agreements; but this is true also in the opinion of Cardinal Tarquini—the Pontiff will be acting illicitly if he acts against agreements without a reasonable cause (which is to be measured from the circumstances, the subject matter, and the conditions and purpose of the contract).

Certainly, if the matter is so explained, it must equally be affirmed that the prince also can validly act against the concordats entered into. But this must be accepted with a distinction. If, namely, the matter concerns something that per se is under the power of the prince and which the prince promises to the Church, it must be conceded; but if the matter concerns something proper to the Church, over which the prince has no power per se, then it must be denied. Now everyone knows that this is the condition of the concordats that are now made. Princes bind themselves solemnly by a new obligation of a pact, accepted by the Church, to that which (if they are Christians) they are already bound by other titles; but they are not accustomed to remit any of their own rights.

From the given explanation of the matter it follows that, in order to assert for the Pontiff the power—even without adequate cause—of acting against agreements, there is no need of recourse to the fullness of power; for such agreements do not stand in the way of the power of validly acting against them, even in private persons (if the explanation given up to this point is satisfactory to the reader, let him know that it has not been drawn from my own resources, but that I owe it to a man as learned as he is modest, formerly a professor of canon law and now of theology).

The explanation of certain more recent authors, which they use lest they seem to diminish the divine power of the primacy, either reduces to what we have said, or is absurd. For they say that by concordats only the use of the power of the primacy is circumscribed and limited, not the power itself (e.g., Barthel, *Dissert. General. de Concord.*, ch. 3, sect. 2). If they mean only that the licit use is restrained within limits when there is no adequate cause—they are saying what we say. But if they take the matter in such a way that the use of the power, with the concordat in existence, is not merely illicit but also invalid and effects nothing if the Pontiff acts against the agreements; then they are saying contradictory things, since they nonetheless simultaneously affirm that the power, under the concordat, remains intact. For in this hypothesis the Pontiff effects nothing, however much he may wish; therefore he effects nothing because here and now he cannot; therefore here and now his power is not the same as before, and therefore it has undergone some change—that is, it has in part ceased.

If there is therefore any difficulty against this thesis—that concordats are bilateral contracts—it is the one which the earlier authors also frequently mention: namely, that the subject matter of concordats, since they are spiritual matters or matters connected to spiritual things, stands in the way of the mutual obligation contracted on both sides; lest, for the sake of a temporal benefit conferred by the prince, the Roman Pontiff be bound to give spiritual things—which would be the crime of simony.

We said that this is the remaining difficulty; for if the arguments adduced above are recalled, it is the third one of them that we have been examining up to now; the second, however, appears not very efficacious.

For it is lacking in those concordats in which the prince binds himself to render or permit to the Church things that are of his own right—such as certain dignities, say seats in the Senate, judicial authority in civil cases granted to bishops. Then, even if the prince binds himself to what he is already bound by; if the other contracting party is content with this new obligation voluntarily undertaken and reduced to an agreement, there is already room for a bilateral contract. When it is said, moreover, that the subject matter of a bilateral contract is only that which can be had in equal manner by both contracting parties—this seems to narrow too much the essence of the bilateral contract, which demands only that the obligation be mutual and non-dissolvable without the consent of the other; the condition of the matter reduced to agreement and the manner in which the matter is obtained by the contracting parties are extraneous to this essence.

Therefore, as regards the difficulty drawn from the taint of simony, we note first that even if we were to grant that this difficulty holds, our thesis—which prescrinds from this question—would not on that account be false. With this premised, we note in general that simony, which is supposed to intervene in such contracts, can be nothing other than simony of ecclesiastical law; and this ceases when the Roman Pontiff dispenses (see *Opus Theologiae Moralis* of Ballerini, vol. 2, *de Decalogo*, on simony, nn. 268 ff., and vol. 4, *de Statu Clericali*, dub. 1, art. 5), since it was established by his law.

Furthermore, it is not necessary that the Roman Pontiff concede to the prince something spiritual or connected to spiritual things, when he permits him certain things that are per se of ecclesiastical law. For example, when through a concordat personal immunity of clerics is suspended so that they can be brought in civil cases before lay tribunals, the Roman Pontiff is not communicating to the prince that jurisdiction over clerics which is proper to the Church; but he permits the prince to use his own civil and temporal power over them as citizens. Likewise, when the Roman Pontiff promises not to exercise certain of his rights, you do not yet have a conferral of a spiritual matter on another; for non-use is not something spiritual nor is it a kind of donation; what is given or permitted is what follows from it—the free exercise in the prince of his temporal power.

THESIS XXIII

The right of the primacy also requires that no human authority may licitly impede the communication of the Roman Pontiff with any of the faithful; that there is no such right as that which princes have arrogated to themselves and claim to exercise through the royal *placet* or *exequatur*; and that the appeal called "from abuse" is absurd.

I. These things fight not only against the authority of the primacy but generally against the authority of the Church, about which we spoke in the Prolegomena, § 18. However, because their iniquity and injustice is most evident when they are employed against the primacy, and because chiefly to diminish its authority the first and second were devised at least initially, we therefore discuss these in this place. What is said about the authority of the Pontiff can easily be accommodated to individual bishops for their own churches.

II. Therefore first we teach that no human authority can licitly impede the communication of the head of the Church with its members. That it can do so physically, experience attests; but the question is not about physical but about moral force—that is, about right.

The reason is evident: for the Roman Pontiff by reason of the primacy is the immediate pastor of all the faithful (Th. 14), having a divine right and a divinely imposed duty of feeding them; and they in turn are bound to hear and follow him and have the right to enjoy his direction and governance; and that right of the Roman Pontiff—both by reason of its origin and by reason of its end—prevails over any right of civil power; for it is immediately from God, the author of the supernatural order, and instituted for directing men to the ultimate and supernatural end. Therefore there is no right in the prince of diminishing the rights of the primacy or of impeding the exercise of his office; for the right would be diminished and could even be abolished if there were a right in the prince to impede the communication of the head with the members; for the right of the Roman Pontiff to communicate with them would thereby cease; and with this right ceasing, the Roman Pontiff would cease to be their immediate pastor

and the primacy would consequently cease—the primacy which consists in the universal and immediate power of feeding.

Moreover, it would be inept and impious for anyone to call the power of the Roman Pontiff in individual kingdoms a foreign power; let Clement XI be heard in the Bull *Accepimus*: "We cannot but be filled with horror at whoever reads that decree of a certain pretended tribunal of the Monarchy when, among other things, he will see and ponder that such temerity has been reached as to ascribe the title of foreign power to that power which we have received on earth through the blessed Peter and his successors from the Lord—the greatest power, which does not fail in an unworthy heir; as if the kingdom of Sicily were situated outside the globe of the earth; although almost no one is ignorant of those words with which the illustrious abbot of Clairvaux addressed Eugenius III: 'He must go outside the world who perhaps wishes to investigate what does not pertain to your care'" (*De Consideratione*, bk. 3, ch. 1).

III. It is equally established that there is no such right as that which princes have arrogated to themselves and which is said to be exercised through letters to which the name *placet* or *exequatur* is given. This *placet* is defined by Van Espen (*Opus de Promulgatione Legum Ecclesiasticarum et Ius Canonicum*, pt. 2, t. 24, ch. 6) as the permission which civil authority imparts to bulls and briefs of the Pontiff and other acts of ecclesiastical authority, so that they may obtain force in its own state. Now the right of this *placet* is said to be inherent from the nature of the matter in political authority and to be a certain right of self-protection against usurpations by the Church, by virtue of which right the civil authority declares that pontifical bulls and briefs and any other act of ecclesiastical authority have no value unless furnished with its permission. Such a right was first attributed to Christian princes, but with the logic demanding it, was also conceded to unbelievers. This is said to be the indirect, negative power of the prince in sacred matters. "Indirect," because it belongs to the prince by reason of protecting himself and his kingdom against the machinations of the Church. "Negative," because it does not consist in enacting laws but in denying or withholding force from the laws of the Church (see prop. 41 of the Syllabus). Whether it truly is such we will see below.

This right is one of the Gallican liberties. De Marca teaches (*Concordia*, bk. 2, ch. 17) that not only is the consent of the Gallican Church to be awaited for new canons (even those issued in disciplinary matters by ecumenical councils) to be in force, but that the king is especially charged with this solicitude and that new laws cannot be put into execution if they lack the express or tacit consent of princes, even if perhaps they have been accepted by very many of the leading men of the Gallican Church." The same right is listed among the Gallican liberties by Pierre Pithou in his work *Traitez de Droits et libertez de l'Église Gallicane*, vol. 1, p. 11—a work, however, that was repudiated by the bishops of Gaul. Hence—to note this in passing—you will understand why such men defend that opinion which teaches that ecclesiastical laws too are not valid unless they are promulgated through the provinces and accepted by at least the tacit consent of the people (see de Marca, ibid., chs. 15, 16): for in this way they provide for the tranquility of consciences that do not observe a law not promulgated—for whatever reason its promulgation was impeded. How it came about that kings claimed this right for themselves you will learn from the dissertation of the eminent Cardinal Tarquini published on this matter. Its origins, according to the same author, are to be traced to the fifteenth century.

Now it must be noted that this power is wrongly called negative: both because a negative power savors of absurdity, and because the denial of royal consent or *placet* is a positive act, and a positive effect follows that act, if it is indeed an act of legitimate right as the adversaries say; namely there follows the binding of ecclesiastical power, whose act is forbidden to manifest itself and is rendered null, and there follows the release of subjects from the obligation of obeying the law enacted by the Pontiff. Nor can this power even be called indirect by the adversaries; for it is, as proposed by them, direct. It would be indirect if by reason of some harm to society, the prince had the right to impede the execution of some law or act of the authority of the Roman Pontiff, per accidens; but the right of the royal *placet* is more than this—for it is brought to bear per se on all the laws and acts of the authority of the Roman See, so that none shall be valid unless with the consent of the prince. Therefore the entire exercise of ecclesiastical power depends on

the power of the king; but this is proper to one who directly subjects the power of another to himself: therefore.

The position of the Church on this question is most manifest. Very many Roman Pontiffs have proscribed in their constitutions this doctrine on the right of the royal *placet* as absurd, rash, impious, and subversive of all ecclesiastical order and authority. Let there be consulted: the Bull *In Coena Domini*, § 13; the constitution of Innocent VIII *Officii nostri*; the constitution of Clement XI *Nova semper*; the apostolic letter of Clement XIII *Quam graviter*; the Brief of Pius IX *Probe nostis* and the Encyclical *Quanta cura* and the Apostolic Letter to *Apostolicae ac*; and finally the Vatican Council, Sess. 4, ch. 3, § 4. Hence whoever wishes to be Catholic cannot assert such a right for civil authority.

And indeed if this right is innate and essential to civil power, it ought to have belonged also to Nero and to the tyrant princes of earlier centuries; but the absurdity of such Neronian right is evident: therefore. This right was unknown to the kings of fourteen centuries, and was implicitly rejected by the Fathers who denied to emperors any right whatsoever in ecclesiastical matters (see the testimonies cited above): therefore.

And in truth with this right asserted for civil authority, "that very supreme power of binding and loosing committed to the prince of the blessed Apostles and his successors by Christ the Lord is subjected with the greatest injustice and intolerable temerity to the arbitration of secular power" (Clement XI, ibid.); for that power is subjected to another when the exercise of the former and its efficacy depend on the latter's consent, so that without the consent of the latter it does nothing in act. But that this is absurd is clear from what has been disputed up to now. Again, in this way the ordering of men to the ultimate end is subjected to their ordering to some temporal end; for this alone is what civil power looks to, and therefore whatever it does by its own right, it does for this end. Hence if civil power by its inherent right permits or prohibits the publication of acts proceeding from ecclesiastical authority, so that they are valid if it permits, and null if it prohibits: the acts of ecclesiastical power are reduced to the order of things that are conducive to temporal happiness, and thus the ordering to the

supernatural end is subordinated to the ordering to the temporal end. Hence finally the institution of the primacy is thus rendered void; for the sheep of Christ entrusted to the care of pastors and to the supreme Pastor established by God are handed over not to the pastors alone and to the supreme Pastor, but at least equally also to laymen; and it would be altogether false that what the Roman Pontiff binds and looses on earth is bound and loosed in heaven: therefore.

The defect of this doctrine therefore lies in this: that the promulgation and validity of a law and of any act of pontifical power is made to depend on the consent of the prince. This is completely heretical and intrinsically repugnant to the authority of the primacy. Hence whether this is done by reason of this right for any law whatsoever, or only for some, or always, or from time to time, the matter is intrinsically evil and a manifest injustice.

This monster of error proceeds logically from that doctrine that among men there is only one supreme authority and that it is the authority of the republic or State, deriving from the principles of nature, to which even religious power, if there is any, must be subject; from the doctrine, that is, which, with the supernatural order excluded and any end beyond this world, recognizes only nature and temporal end. Naturalism and rationalism must be presupposed in order for that error to be defensible. These doctrines, most evidently false, so often proscribed, were condemned again by Pius IX in the Syllabus, where proposition 39 must be noted, which is the immediate rationale of the royal *placet*: "The condition of the republic, as being the origin and source of all rights, enjoys a right circumscribed by no limits."

Moreover, the reason adduced for this right—namely, that the king should protect himself and his society from the aggression and usurpation of ecclesiastical power—is inept and impious. For 1° if this is so, why is the same right not conceded to the Roman Pontiff and to bishops against civil authority? To this question anyone who wishes to appear Catholic will never give a satisfactory answer. 2° Even if it were possible that the Roman Pontiff should sometimes abuse his authority, from this alone it would follow that when knowledge of an act that is notoriously unjust has been received, the prince may licitly take care that it is not put into execution; but this care on the part of the prince

will not be very necessary—for if the injustice is notorious, no pious person will obey. It must be noted, however, that this right is not a right of jurisdiction but of simple defense: it is not the right of detracting from or adding to the validity of the law of the Pontiff, but—presupposing the law to be invalid because unjust—it is the right of defending oneself against unjust aggression.

I said "if the act is notoriously unjust"; for if 3° there can be doubt about this matter, the definitive judgment of it does not belong to the prince. The reason is that the king cares only for the temporal end; but the laws of the Church are enacted for the sake of the eternal supernatural end, to which the temporal end must be subordinated, even at some cost to itself, if necessary. Now it can happen that some law enacted by the Pontiff is necessary or very useful for spiritual good, which nonetheless impedes some temporal good of civil society. This being so, it is clear that judgment on the injustice or justice of an ecclesiastical law that also touches temporal good cannot be made by one who cares only for the temporal good; but must ultimately be made by one who has the care of the supreme end. 4° To conduct oneself thus toward the Church is a detestable contempt both of the Church and of Christ. Of the Church indeed, which is venerated not as a loving mother but is feared as an insidious stepmother; and of Christ, who, as the institution of the Church and the governance of it by his Spirit make plain, is made out to be the author of an institution that wages war on human rights and social happiness, and thus would have been a sower of discords in the world.

IV. What we have said about the royal *placet*, the same must be said about the appeal called "from abuse," which is another Gallican liberty, if we believe the most illustrious de Marca, bk. 4, chs. 19, 20, 21. French doctors distinguish two kinds of appeal. One, called simple, intervenes when a defendant appeals from an inferior to a superior judge not because the latter omitted the order which natural or positive law prescribes in judging, nor because the judge was incompetent, but because the defendant, judging that the sentence of the inferior judge does not accord with the truth or justice of the matter, submits it for correction by the superior judgment through appeal. The other kind of appeal, called "from abuse" (formerly called "from notorious abuse"),

has place when it is permissible to except against an ecclesiastical judge on the ground that in judging he did not observe the legitimate order, or that he was not the competent judge. In these cases, those who defend appeals from abuse say that it is open to the defendant to interpose against a bishop or other ecclesiastical judges an appeal to the prince—who, being the guardian of rights and executor of canons and protector and defender of all, can suspend the execution of the ecclesiastical sentence until the judgment is reformed, if necessary.

But the assertors of the Gallican liberties teach that appeals from abuse are lawful not only on account of failure to observe the order of law, but also "if canons received by constant use, or inveteracy of customs, or conditions appended to the foundation of benefices, or privileges legitimately granted to churches, or other matters in which the Gallican liberties are customarily established, are violated… if royal constitutions are violated which either confirm canons or make decrees about benefices or prescribe the order for instituting suits in both civil and criminal cases" (de Marca, bk. 4, ch. 20, nn. 1, 6).

Why this appeal is so called de Marca himself explains, ibid., ch. 19: "The formula of appeals from abuse has been specially accommodated by ancient practitioners to that complaint which is brought by clerics against the violence of ecclesiastical judges before royal magistrates, whether they complain about rescripts of the Roman curia or about the judgments of bishops." The mention of abuse was inserted, he says, "lest anyone should think (that is, about words, not about the reality) that it was the intention of the magistrates to subject ecclesiastical jurisdiction to secular; and therefore they professed in this formula that they were not going to take judgment of the matter itself, but, having taken extraordinary cognizance of the abuse of power, would come to the aid of the oppressed by the right of protection." Since therefore this kind of appeal is also interposed against rescripts of the Roman Pontiff, Charlas (*De Libertatibus Ecclesiae Gallicanae*, bk. 12, ch. 2) notes that a certain reverence as regards manner is observed toward the Pontiff, so that one should appeal not from his sentence, decree, or rescript, but from its publication or execution—whereas the acts of bishops are directly impugned and made null.

Now the most absurd abuse of these appeals from abuse is evident. Indeed 1° with this right of appeals from abuse established, jurisdiction is asserted in the secular judge and prince—by which he can judge that an ecclesiastical judge has abused his power and by which he can validly impede the execution of the ecclesiastical sentence, which reduces to the annulment of the act. Now this jurisdiction is a jurisdiction over the ecclesiastical judges themselves as such and over the very matters or ecclesiastical cases; but this jurisdiction cannot belong to lay power: therefore. The minor is certain from what was proved in the Prolegomena, § 18; for ecclesiastical power is independent of lay power. The major is easily proved. For a) a sentence which is pronounced about the abuse of ecclesiastical power concerns the act of a person acting as an ecclesiastical person and furnished with ecclesiastical power; for this alone can abuse ecclesiastical power; it is therefore a sentence which is pronounced against the ecclesiastical judge as such; and therefore the latter as such is subjected to the lay forum. b) In order to pronounce this sentence about the abuse of ecclesiastical power, the lay judge must simultaneously cognize and judge about the extent and limits of ecclesiastical power, and juridically cognize the cause regarding which the sentence has been pronounced by the ecclesiastical judge; for without this cognizance the abuse in an act which is wholly referred to the case judged cannot be cognized; and such is jurisdiction over ecclesiastical causes or matters: therefore.

2° In any perfect society there is indeed a remedy against the abuse of power by inferior judges, but this is situated in the power of the superior judges of the same society, and this is demanded by the nature of a perfect society—namely that it can per se do all things that are necessary for it, among which is that remedy against abuses of the power of judges. But if it cannot do this, or if it is lawful to have recourse to another society to obtain it, then it is no longer a perfect society. But the Church is a perfect society (Prolegomena, § 18): therefore. Indeed it is completely illogical to give defendants in an ecclesiastical forum the power of appealing from abuse to lay judges, and to deny the same power to defendants in a civil forum of appealing from abuse to ecclesiastical judges—if one believes the Church to be a perfect society, that is, self-sufficient and independent. Hence the

defense of appeals from abuse is nothing other than a dishonest adulation of lay power and a shameful profession of servitude.

3° The arguments by which this servitude is vindicated are none. They say: the king is the guardian and executor of canons. I distinguish: he is guardian and executor with jurisdiction which he exercises over the Church itself—I deny; guardian and executor insofar as he must, at the nod of the Church and according to its will, take care that the canons are observed by his subjects—I concede.

They say again: the king is the defender of his subjects against violences inflicted on them. I reply: 1° one who has the right of defending someone against violence can only do what the person being defended could himself do. 2° The right of defense with some jurisdiction over one's subjects belongs to the prince concerning matters in which his own authority is exercised; not concerning matters in which he himself is inferior. Therefore: the king is the defender of his subjects against violences—I distinguish: in the civil order, I concede; in the ecclesiastical order, sub-distinguish: with jurisdiction, I deny; without jurisdiction, I concede. Hence just as a defendant cannot pronounce law for himself, so neither can the prince pronounce law for a defendant in an ecclesiastical forum in his own tribunal. Moreover, history teaches that it was frequently the lay power rather than the ecclesiastical power that inflicted violences on subjects, and that a remedy was needed against the former from a superior power; and that those who suffered violence from lay power frequently found protection and defense in ecclesiastical power.

Wrongly, however, is recourse had to the deed of St. Athanasius, who is said to have appealed from the sentence of the Synod of Tyre to Constantine—as an appeal from abuse. For Athanasius well knew (see his testimonies cited in the Prolegomena, ibid.) that laymen had no power to depose or restore bishops. But since he recognized no right in the Synod of Tyre and had not awaited its sentence, yet that synod, relying on the aid and force of Constantine, dared all things beyond and against law; he fled to Constantine not as a judge but as one who would repel the injustice which was ultimately proceeding from the Emperor himself, even if against his intention. Athanasius did indeed wish, by rejecting the judgment of the bishops of Tyre, to keep his case entire

before the Emperor, and professed this in a document presented to the Count Dionysius sent to the synod by Constantine; but who does not see that Athanasius then took care solely that the Arians should not abuse the power they were arrogating to themselves—against right and to the ruin of the Church—being himself ready to defend himself before the Emperor himself, not as the legitimate judge of his case but as one who could effectively repel the violence inflicted on him? For Athanasius well knew that the judge of his case was the Roman Pontiff and that he had the right to appeal to him; but it is not always expedient to use one's right, and in that age, when great deference was paid to the emperor on account of his merits for the Church, and it was to be feared lest the emperor, offended, unjustly inflict graver damage on the Church: Athanasius judged that he should refrain from the appeal to the bishop of Rome and use only that approach which would be more advantageous in those circumstances. Now from the action of a man who is prevented by many circumstances from acting according to the strict rules of law, who can rightly collect what is or is not a matter of right?

As regards rescripts, decrees, and sentences of the Roman Pontiff: the appeal from abuse pertains to this extent—that either what the Pontiff decrees is not published and put into execution, or by the sentence of a royal magistrate that publication and execution can be declared null and void. In this matter the defect is the same as in the royal *placet*. Such appeals the French episcopate always disapproved.

In the Bull of the Supper, excommunication 13, they have been expressly condemned by Roman Pontiffs. De Marca therefore deceives or is deceived, ibid., when he says "that since the use of such appeals is frequent in France, nothing has come from the Roman curia to signify that this wearing away of the forum is unwelcome to it." In the Syllabus of Pius IX, prop. 41 has been proscribed: "The indirect negative power in sacred matters belongs to civil authority even when exercised by an unbelieving ruler; and therefore there belongs to it not only the right called *exequatur* but also the right of the appeal called from abuse." They are already found rejected and condemned in can. 12 of Antioch and can. 6 of the First Council of Constantinople, which we cited above; hence—to say this in passing—we cannot understand how those who

taught that the liberties of the Gallican Church consist in the custody of the ancient canons would defend such appeals. See the excellent discussion of Charlas, ibid., and in *H.E.* of Natalis Alexander, cent. 4, the observations of Domenico Mansi on dissertation 21.

V. A singular objection must be resolved, derived from the modesty of Gregory the Great, in order to demonstrate that in ecclesiastical matters too the Roman Pontiff is subject to political authority. The matter stands thus. In the year 592 the Emperor Maurice enacted a law that whoever has been involved in public administration may not come to an ecclesiastical office, and that equally the same and those who have once been enrolled in military service may not convert to a monastery; and the same emperor had commanded Gregory to have this law transmitted through the various parts of the world. This is established from ep. 63, bk. 3, of Gregory. Now Gregory praised the first part of the law but greatly disapproved of the second and demonstrated it to be bad, since the Emperor would find no excuse for it in the judgment of Christ. Nevertheless, after assembling many arguments to refute that part of the law, he concludes his letter writing: "I, subject to his command, had the said law transmitted through various parts of the world; and since that same law is in no way in agreement with almighty God, behold I have notified it to my most serene lords through the document of my suggestion. I have thus discharged what I owed on both counts: I both rendered obedience to the emperor and did not remain silent before God about what I thought." Now, they say, this was an ecclesiastical matter—namely entrance into a monastery; yet the Pontiff obeyed the emperor, even though the law did not please him: which demonstrates above all a duty of subjection.

Namely, this most holy Pontiff judged that even in a bad matter obedience must be rendered to princes—how far this is alien to the holiness and wisdom of so great a man, no one fails to see. From this example therefore we are taught to inquire how Gregory transmitted the law of Maurice to others. There exists a letter of the same Gregory, bk. 8, ep. 5, to many metropolitans and bishops, which is either the very letter with which Gregory transmitted the law, as Baronius wishes, or, if it was written in the year 398 of Christ as more recent editors judge, is certainly one from which it is possible to know in what way the Pontiff

transmitted the imperial law. For he says: "the law which the most pious —this is a title of honor, not a real predicate—Emperor has given… I took care to transmit to your fraternity," etc. Now Gregory so tempers and softens this law that those from the ranks of the military who hasten to convert to monasteries should not be received rashly, but should be tested for three years in their habit according to the monastic rule and so received. But those who are liable to public accountings should not be received in monasteries unless they have first been absolved from their public accountings. He then adds: "Believe me, in this matter even the most serene and most Christian Emperor is in every way pleased and willingly receives the conversion of those whom he knows to be uninvolved in public accountings." Now Gregory does not prove this from any response of Maurice, but rather Gregory appears to gather this from his equity. Thus in transmitting the law Gregory did not conduct himself as a subject but as a superior, and did what the straits of the Church—which were then pressing on her—at the time permitted. Indeed this deed was interpreted precisely in this manner by Hincmar of Reims, who says (ep. 15, Migne, vol. 126, p. 94) that the decree of Maurice "St. Gregory destroyed by apostolic authority and the general consent of the bishops, with ecclesiastical vigor and the restraining religion of the Christian commonwealth, as is shown in his letter to Maurice the emperor himself and in the letters directed to very many archbishops."

THESIS XXIV

By divine right, the Roman Pontiff enjoys full personal immunity from lay jurisdiction. The right of this immunity is indeed essential to the Primacy as instituted by Christ, but its exercise is not absolutely necessary for the Church to exist, though it is necessary for the Church to exist well and to live perfectly that social life to which she has a right. The perfect actualization of this immunity, moreover, is the civil Principate, which was instituted by the providence of God so that the Roman Pontiff might possess that full liberty required for the discharge of the office of the supreme Apostolic ministry, in order to govern the Church and safeguard her unity.

I. Immunity is defined as the privilege by which some thing or person is exempted from some common obligation or burden. The term "privilege" is taken in a broad sense, insofar as it can encompass some natural or divine right that belongs specially to one person rather than to others (Fr. Suárez, *Defensio fidei*, bk. 4, ch. 2). Ecclesiastical immunity is distinguished as twofold or threefold with respect to its objects: namely, there is one immunity of places, that is, of temples or churches; another is the immunity of persons, that is, of clerics; and a third is the immunity of goods that are exempted from burdens or taxes by reason of places or persons. Immunity can be violated in two ways: 1° by acting simply against it; 2° by acting under the pretext of right, whereby someone contends that he acts rightly and has jurisdiction to do what is contrary to immunity, as civil authority frequently tends to do. Whoever violates ecclesiastical immunity in this second way is properly said to act against the liberty of the Church; for one properly acts against the liberty of another who wishes to reduce him to servitude and impose the burden of servitude upon him; but such is not the case with one who merely does not obey, but who arrogates to himself a right over another (the same author, ibid.).

Personal immunity is contained under two privileges: that of the canon and that of the forum. The privilege of the forum is that by which clerics are granted exemption from lay jurisdiction, to which exemption from taxes is consequently annexed. It is the personal immunity of the

forum that is directly and expressly at issue for us in this thesis, and that primarily and in itself with respect to the immunity of the Roman Pontiff, and secondarily and incidentally with respect to the immunity of other clerics.

Since immunity is a kind of right, and right is of many kinds, a distinction must first be set out among the kinds of right, regarding which it may be disputed whether the Church's immunity belongs to them. The right that may be inquired into here is either divine, canonical, or civil. Divine right, moreover, can be conceived as twofold, namely natural and positive: natural, not in the sense that it proceeds from nature alone, but in the sense that it flows from some divine institution and is implicitly contained within it, so that it is in consequence connatural to it—that is to say, given that institution, it is demanded by the very essences of things; positive, in the sense that it is expressly established by God revealing and making known his will.

What holds for divine right can hold also for canonical right, and indeed in several ways: 1° insofar as the Church by her own authority establishes the very same thing that divine authority has already decreed, confirming it and adding special penalties; 2° insofar as the Church specifically determines what God has commanded in a general way; 3° insofar as the Church determines the exercise of a right that God has granted, but whose exercise he has left to the prudence of the Church.

If divine right is taken in the strict sense, it is distinguished from canonical right, which is established by ecclesiastical authority, God conferring the power but not himself enacting the law or right.

Positive divine right can be distinguished as twofold: properly so-called, and improperly so-called. The former is that which is contained in an express precept of God, found either in the sacred scriptures or clearly conveyed to us through tradition; the latter is that which can be deduced by a kind of analogy from examples or testimonies of the Old or New Testament (cf. Bellarmine, *de Clericis*, bk. 1, ch. 28).

Likewise, natural divine right can be distinguished as twofold, in keeping with what we said in the *Tractatus de Matrimonio* (Thesis 4, p. 75): namely, primitive and secondary. The former prescribes what is

essential to the thing itself or to the end intended by nature; the latter prescribes or recommends what is fitting for that same end.

In matters pertaining to divine right in the supernatural order and to canonical right, civil authority can have a part, insofar as it approves the same right as it ought to, both by removing obstacles by which the free exercise of those rights would be unjustly impeded, and by obliging its subjects not to resist those same rights.

When a given right is under discussion, a distinction must be drawn between the right itself, that is, the moral power, and its exercise. For the former can exist without the latter, and the former can be necessary and essential without the latter being always necessary and essential. For a capacity for something can be essential even when the act is not necessary, as is the case with so many human capacities; and a right is a kind of capacity or power, albeit a moral one. For the very nature of a thing can demand a certain power, whose exercise, however, may either be subject to free choice or must be regulated by the rules of prudence.

Likewise, the exercise of a right can be necessary for someone, either simply in order that the thing exist at all, or in order that it exist well.

The question is not merely whether clerics and especially the Pontiff are immune from lay power in ecclesiastical matters: we have already resolved that question (Prolegomenon, § 18); but the question concerns only temporal matters and civil causes. Nor is the question about subjection to civil power considered in any manner whatsoever, but about subjection to coercive power, that is, to jurisdiction in the strict sense.

II. Full personal immunity—that is, the right of exemption from any jurisdiction of civil powers—belongs to the Roman Pontiff; and it belongs to him by divine right, at least natural divine right. We prove this as follows.

1° A posteriori. Indeed, by force of canonical right every cleric enjoys personal immunity. This is evident from the fact that this immunity is contained in the body of canonical right and indicated therein as established both by the authority of the Church and by divine authority. Cf. bk. 2, tit. 2, *de Foro Competenti*, and the chapters *Noverit*

and *Gravem*, *de Sententia excommunicationis*, and the Bull of Leo X in session 9 of the Lateran Council *de Reformatione*, and frequently elsewhere. The Council of Trent, moreover, in session 25, *de Reformatione*, ch. 20, teaches that "the immunity of ecclesiastical persons has been established by the ordinance of God and by canonical sanctions." Now it is permissible to argue thus: the personal immunity sanctioned by canonical right encompasses also and especially the Roman Pontiff, who is the head of all; but this canonical right was established by the Roman Pontiff himself, and in establishing it he did not err; yet he could not have established it unless he were already immune by divine right in himself. Therefore.

The major premise is evident as to its first part; it is also certain as to its second part, because every universal law of the Church derives its force from the Roman Pontiff; as to the third part, however, it is clear from the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, which we presently take as given; for the matter concerns establishing a rule of conduct or of rational action for all Christians in a certain order of affairs, namely with respect to clerics, which rule of conduct must be morally sound and must not violate the rights of another, which would be morally wrong. The minor premise is proved as follows. Since the Roman Pontiff, in enacting immunity by his own positive law also for himself, cannot antecedently be subject by right, for one who is so situated cannot lawfully withdraw himself by his own will alone from a subjection that is owed; therefore the Pontiff was already immune, not by human right, but therefore at least by natural divine right arising from the very dignity of the Primacy, and his canonical law is aimed at authentically declaring this right and establishing it by new authority.

Therefore, even if the Pontiff at some time has not made use of this immunity, yet since he can lawfully withdraw himself from this subjection if he wills, his subjection must never be conceived as necessary, but as voluntary, and therefore not a true subjection to the power of jurisdiction. When the Pontiff withdraws himself from the jurisdiction of a superior civil authority, he does not act as a citizen, but as Pontiff by the authority of the Primacy, to which authority civil authority is subordinated in itself, indirectly indeed; but this is of no consequence, because this subjection, though indirect, is assuredly

sufficient that the Pontiff by the authority of the Primacy can command a Prince not to exercise his jurisdiction over the Pontiff. It is, however, incidental that the person who is withdrawn from civil jurisdiction is the same person who possesses authority over the civil Prince; for the distinction that is required is a distinction of authorities, of which the one is subordinated to the other.

2° The immunity of the Pontiff by natural divine right is proved a priori from the very nature of the Primacy. It must be recalled that one man is not subject to another man merely by reason of human nature considered as such: for by this all men are equal; but by reason of those things that are accidental to nature, on account of which it comes about that one is a Prince and another is a subject. And just as among accidental qualities there can be found that which is the reason why one is a subject and a subject of this person, so too there can be found that which is the reason why one is not a subject of this person and is indeed subject to no one. Thus a subject of a governor or of a lower judge, if exempted from their jurisdiction by decree of the Prince, or adorned with a dignity incompatible with subjection to them, will cease to be their subject; thus one elected as Prince of a perfect society ceases to be subject to anyone, at least in the natural order. The condition or quality of a person, therefore, can be such as to preclude another's jurisdiction over that person, and it can also be such as to preclude all jurisdiction whatsoever. In order, therefore, to demonstrate that the person of the Roman Pontiff is immune by natural divine right from the civil jurisdiction of Princes, it suffices to prove that he has been divinely endowed with that quality or dignity which excludes such jurisdiction. This is proved as follows.

Coercive power, which is the proper characteristic of jurisdiction, requires such force over another that it cannot be impeded or bound by that other; but the Roman Pontiff is able to impede or bind any coercive power exercised against his person; therefore the person endowed with the Primacy, by virtue of being such, is immune from the jurisdiction of any other man. The major premise is evident; the minor is proved. By reason of the positive though indirect subjection of civil power to the power of the Primacy, the Roman Pontiff has the right both to forbid secular Princes those things that would be harmful to the Church, and

to command those things that are necessary or highly useful for the Church; for he can loose and bind whatever conduces to the good governance of the Church and the right ordering of the Christian commonwealth. Yet it is at least useful and highly useful to the Church that legal coercive force not be exercised against the Roman Pontiff. For it cannot be denied that it is at least: 1° highly unbecoming that the Vicar of Christ and Father of the entire Catholic world should be cast into prison by force of law and afflicted with other penalties; 2° that this greatly harms the esteem which the Vicar of Christ ought to enjoy among all; and therefore 3° that it gravely injures the right and peaceable governance of the Church. Wherefore, although the law of nature, given the institution of the Primacy, does not absolutely forbid this by a primary precept, it nevertheless by a secondary precept persuades that this is gravely unfitting. Therefore the Pontiff has the right, by virtue of his superior authority, which is the authority of the Primacy, to impede any legal coercive force against himself and to annul any law enacted against himself by another. Therefore the supreme power of Princes over the Roman Pontiff himself cannot be coercive, that is, it cannot be jurisdiction in the proper sense. Cf. Fr. Suárez, *Defensio fidei*, bk. 4, ch. 4.

3° And in truth it is established that the Church acknowledges that immunity has proceeded from divine right. Indeed, as the Council of Trent testifies, as we have already heard, the immunity of ecclesiastical persons is established by divine ordinance and by canonical sanctions; among ecclesiastical persons, moreover, the Pope is foremost. The meaning, furthermore, of the words "by divine ordinance" can be explained by the words of Leo X in the Bull of reform promulgated in session 9, who with the approval of the Council says: "since neither by divine nor by human right has any power over ecclesiastical persons been attributed to laymen." Now the meaning of these words is either simply negative—that laymen do not possess this power by divine or human right—or positive—that this power is forbidden to laymen. If the former: either this division encompasses every kind of right and therefore natural right as well, or it does not; if it does not encompass it, the proposition is pointless, for it proves nothing; therefore if the meaning of the words is negative, natural right is also encompassed.

Thus either these words are to be taken in a positive sense, or in a negative sense but one that excludes every kind of right. But if you take them positively, it must be said that laymen have no power whatsoever over ecclesiastical persons, for a power that is forbidden by divine right is no power at all. In what manner, then, is this power forbidden to laymen? Either because by positive divine law clerics are exempted, or because the very nature of a sacred person demands this immunity—and this latter is true natural divine right. If, therefore, positive law is lacking, it must be said that immunity has been established by natural divine right by the very fact that God instituted the priestly dignity. The Church therefore, by the witness of the Tridentine and Lateran Fathers, acknowledges some divine right sanctioning ecclesiastical immunity; and the words of Trent—"divine ordinance," compared with the words of Leo—signify a law establishing a right.

III. What part, then, does human right have in the immunity of the Pontiff? The right of immunity itself is divine, and as such does not depend on the will even of the Pontiff himself. Yet there is in the Pontiff an authority to confirm it. Its exercise, however, since it is not absolutely necessary and can be absent and has at times been absent and can be more or less full, requires some determining cause beyond the divine right itself. The determining cause will be objectively the utility of the Church, and efficiently the authority that governs all things in the Church, that is, the authority of the Roman Pontiff, who by divine law ("Feed my sheep") is bound to care for the utility of the Church. It is therefore within his power both to command others that the exercise of immunity not be impeded, and to determine the manner in which that right is to be exercised.

We deny, however, that a right of this kind derives its origin from civil power. For a right that is proper and intrinsic to the Primacy can have its origin only from the one who instituted the Primacy; but the right of independence from the authority of a Prince, which is possessed regardless of whether the Prince consents or not, cannot in its coming-to-be and in its existence depend on that same authority. For any right whatsoever that an authority confers, insofar as it comes from that authority, can cease to exist if that authority so wills; and every authority, just as it cannot affirm and deny itself at the same time, so

also cannot confer a right of independence from itself that is held independently of its own consent. This right of the Pontiff, therefore, belongs to a higher order and depends adequately on a higher cause, namely on God.

Why then did Princes sanction ecclesiastical immunity by their own laws, and why did the Church embrace those laws—indeed, why was it asserted that ecclesiastical persons are immune by both divine and human right? I reply that these laws regard ecclesiastical immunity taken universally; and because what holds for ecclesiastical immunity taken universally holds also for the immunity of the Pontiff, we shall speak of it in general terms so that the doctrine may be more comprehensive. It must therefore be considered that the Church has the right of immunity and the power to command that its free exercise be impeded by no one; yet if Princes who prevail by material force wish to impede it, it will not be possible to physically maintain it. In order, therefore, that the right of immunity be actually exercised, it is necessary that Princes do what they are bound in right to do, namely, desist from the unlawful violence by which they would impede it. It is therefore for them to provide the condition that is necessary for the Church to actually enjoy immunity. This they accomplish when they enact laws protecting ecclesiastical immunity; by which laws the right of immunity is not conferred (whatever may be the form in which they are promulgated) but, as is the function of civil power, protection is provided for the liberty of the Church. Those laws, moreover, have the true character of law if considered in relation to lay subjects, upon whom the Prince also imposes the obligation not to injure the rights of the Church. The reason why the concurrence of civil authority is also required by the Church is thus clear.

When, however, the canons say that the immunity of the Church exists by both divine and human right, if the reference is to constituting right, the human right in question is ecclesiastical or canonical right. Indeed this is what Trent teaches us—for speaking of constituting right, it mentioned only divine ordinances and canonical sanctions—and Leo X teaches the same, who denies that by any human or divine right do laymen have power over ecclesiastical persons; and reason teaches the same, as we have shown in proving that ecclesiastical immunity cannot

derive its right from civil power. If, however, the reference is not only to constituting right, but also to the right commanding laymen not to violate the right of the Church and to the right removing what prohibits the legitimate exercise of ecclesiastical right, it can be said that ecclesiastical persons enjoy immunity by human, that is, civil, right as well.

Nor should you say that it is expedient for the peaceful life of the commonwealth that justice be exercised indifferently against wrong-doers and disturbers of the community, and therefore that there is in the temporal commonwealth power to exercise this justice indifferently against all, and hence also against clerics. For the consequence is denied; not everything that is expedient is within the power of the one for whom it is expedient.

Nor should you say that there is a right in the commonwealth to defend itself against any unjust aggressors and to defend its subjects, and to conduct that defense by public authority. For the antecedent is distinguished: private defense, by which force is repelled by force, belongs to everyone and to the commonwealth as well, but this is not an act of jurisdiction; defense by way of punishment, namely by deterring evil through fear of penalty and inflicting punishment if evil is done, is an act of jurisdiction and belongs only to a superior over his own subjects. But lay magistrates are not the superiors of clerics.

Thus far we have spoken explicitly of faithful Princes; but the right conferred by God on the Pontiff regards in itself also unbelievers, for they too are bound by the will of God to be subject to the Roman Pontiff, just as they are obligated to receive the faith. Wherefore they are excused from that submission which Christians owe only by reason of ignorance, and the Church refrains from claiming immunity for ecclesiastics within their kingdoms only because of the physical impossibility of maintaining it there.

Note that the arguments for asserting the right of immunity proceed from the special dignity of ecclesiastics insofar as they have jurisdiction and the ministry of sacred things, not merely from the fact that they are marked with some sacred character; hence it does not follow that all the baptized are immune. Cf. on all these matters Fr.

Suárez, loc. cit., and *de Immunitate Ecclesiastica a Venetis violata*, bk. 2, ch. 1.

You will ask whether there is also some positive divine right. I reply that properly so-called positive divine right we do not possess; but as for what concerns improperly so-called right of this kind, cf. Becanus in *Duello de Primatu regio*, ch. 20.

IV. Now the right of immunity is necessary and essential to the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff. For a power to be called essential to something, it is not necessary that its exercise be necessary and essential to the subject, but it suffices that it be necessarily connected with the essence of the thing itself; thus the power to acquire any knowledge whatsoever is essential to the intellect, yet the intellect can exist without the exercise of that power. Hence, although the ground of power is an end, yet since a question can arise about the end, it cannot be demanded that the standard for judging whether a given power is essential to its subject be derived from the necessity of the act in view of the end; for once the essence of the subject is known, that standard can be derived from the connection that the power has with its essence. From the end, however, the ground for judging whether the act is necessary and essential or not will be derived. Now a right is a kind of power. But from what has been proved it is established that this power is intimately connected with the essence of the Primacy and that the Primacy cannot exist without it; therefore this right must be inherent in the Primacy and is essential to it. Therefore, just as it is essential to the Primacy to have the power of receiving from the entire Christian world appeals from any first judgment of bishops, and just as it is equally essential to the Primacy to have the right of exercising any act of episcopal jurisdiction throughout the universal Church—even though the exercise of these rights is not necessary—so likewise it must be said that the right of immunity from lay jurisdiction is essential to the Primacy.

If, therefore, the right of immunity itself is considered and the question is raised whether it has been constituted by a primary or secondary right, or by a primary or secondary natural divine precept, through the very institution of the Primacy, the answer must be that that right, or that moral power (for a right is a kind of power), has been constituted by a primary right or precept; for God willed that that right

should belong to the essence of the Primacy and be therefore inseparable from it.

V. Now concerning the exercise of this right. Every power exists for the sake of act, and act for the sake of an end, which is either the perfection of the agent or of others outside the agent. The Primacy, however, was conferred upon Peter and his successors for the good of the Church; therefore every power and every right of the Primacy is for the good of the Church; hence also the right of immunity has been conferred upon the Pontiff for the governance of the Church. Now the exercise of this right is not absolutely necessary for the Church, namely in order that she exist; this is clear from the facts, for in the first centuries of the Church the Roman Pontiff did not enjoy the exercise of this right, and yet the Church stood firm. There is, however, some necessity of its exercise. Namely, the Church has the right not only to exist, but also to exist well, that is, to exist and be governed in the perfect manner befitting her nature; for every being has the right to attain its proper perfection, and especially one that does not exist for others but for which others exist—such is the Church, for whose sake other things exist. Now in order for the Church to exist well, it is evident that it is necessary for all her rights to be brought into act, among which the rights of her head are foremost; for God did not confer those rights in vain. It is therefore necessary that the right of immunity also be brought into act.

Indeed, if the utility of the Church, which is the end of this right, is considered, it must be noted that the Church is a visible and independent society, having the right to a perfect social life. But in order for her social life to go well, or to be perfect, it is necessary that her supreme Head always actually enjoy the full and uninterrupted liberty of teaching, enacting laws, and restraining offenders by penalties, with respect to all the faithful and to Princes themselves; it is necessary that the peace and tranquility of ecclesiastical governance be stable of itself and therefore in no way dependent on the mutable will of a man to whom the care of the Church has not been entrusted; it is necessary that the exercise of the authority of the Head of the Church be able to be so certainly established before all the faithful that plausible exceptions be excluded, such as contumacious persons might raise by claiming that

the Pontiff was not acting freely; it is necessary that the immediate Pastor of all the faithful be a stranger to the contentions that faithful peoples might engage in among themselves in civil society, lest he also lose the trust and reverence owed to him by the faithful and his decrees, which perhaps may not please, be under suspicion of having been issued as a favor to his Prince; it is necessary that the Primacy be honored with that outward splendor of ceremonial and dignity suited, in the eyes of men who perceive the intelligible through the sensible, to conciliate for it an esteem commensurate with its supreme authority and to remove the danger that its authority may be held in contempt among men.

Now all these things, if taken together under any hypothesis of the social condition of men, either include or demand the immunity of the Pontiff from lay jurisdiction. For the authority of the Pontiff would surely be held in contempt by the multitude of men if he were brought before lay tribunals just like other citizens and subjected to penalties by lay power. For it is the common way of human thinking that one who is judged and punished by the same persons as others is not regarded as possessing a dignity and authority superior to theirs; hence by common human consensus those of superior rank in society enjoy a certain privilege of forum. In order, therefore, that due honor be paid to the Pontiff, he must not be subject to the authority of Princes, over whom he himself is superior in authority. Likewise the tranquility of ecclesiastical governance would not be stable of itself, that is, by the intrinsic force of authority; for tranquility would depend also on the extrinsic will of a Prince who could compel the Pontiff and impede his actions, and although he might not do so, he nonetheless could when he wished, and since his will is mutable he always could so will; hence tranquility of governance would be obtained only incidentally. Likewise, considering the disorder of human wills, it would be impossible for the Pontiff, if subject, to enjoy the full and uninterrupted liberty of teaching, enacting laws, and imposing punishments; for by moral necessity, on account of the corruption of nature, it would come about that Princes, excessively devoted to their own authority, would wish to prohibit the Pontiff from those things that did not please them. Hence not even the plausible exception against the non-spontaneous exercise of Pontifical

authority would be excluded, at least if the Pontiff were voluntarily subject to the Prince, bound to him by a friendly alliance. And because every nation is civilly opposed to all those who belong to an enemy nation, the Head of the Church would frequently become the object of aversion to those Christians who were at war with their Prince, and his decrees, which perhaps did not please them, would be under suspicion of having been issued as a favor to his Prince and therefore would be liable to contempt. These prejudices cannot be guarded against unless the Pontiff be a subject and even a prisoner and be treated as an enemy, so that no one could suspect him of favoring his enemies; which would be an unjust and certainly absurd condition. Therefore the utility of the Church—that is, in order that she exist well—demands the immunity of her Head (Cf. the Allocution of Pius IX, *Quibus quantisque*, April 20, 1849).

Hence as soon as peace was restored to the Church by Constantine, the Roman Pontiff acquired actual immunity, and it was never violated without harm to the Church; and although the Pontiff continued to show reverence to the Emperor, it never appears that he was juridically held to be subject to the coercive force of imperial laws.

And indeed, to mention briefly what it suffices to note here, the Roman Pontiff was the author of the Western Empire, whose right he conferred on Charlemagne (cf. Bellarmine, *de Translatione Imperii Romani*, bk. 1), and likewise was the author of the right by which civil society was commonly governed in that age, so that a Catholic and Church-obedient ruler might govern a Catholic people; all of which argues that the Pontiff was at that time free from any coercive subjection to lay power.

From what has been said it is clear that the exercise of this right, or moral power, belongs to natural divine right in the secondary sense; because it is not absolutely necessary for the Church in the sense that the Church exist as regards her essence, but only in a qualified sense, namely that she exist well and perfectly.

VI. If one considers what is required for the essence of immunity in act as well—that is, in the second act—it is clear that immunity can exist without the Principate, if the Prince in whose territory the Roman Pontiff resides admits his independence and therefore claims nothing

over him, and it becomes certain—whether from the well-known piety of the Prince, or from agreements made with Christian nations, or in some other way—that the Prince will never claim any right over the Roman Pontiff. For in this way the Roman Pontiff would enjoy immunity, not subject by right or in fact to the coercive power of another: he would not, that is, be a subject, though he would not be a King, which is something more. But if one considers: 1° that Princes, or whoever is endowed with supreme civil power, are very prone to extending their dominion; 2° that whoever is continuously in the territory of some king is numbered among his other subjects and is reckoned among them in some way, since the reason why these are subjects of that king is that they are in his territory; 3° that the exemption of the Roman Pontiff would in this hypothesis have the character of a privilege as to exercise, granted by the will of the Prince; 4° that Princes are those to whom the Roman Pontiff not infrequently must prescribe things that displease them; 5° that therefore there would always exist in that case a proximate danger lest, if the Roman Pontiff be unwilling to fail in his duty, the Prince abuse his physical power and impede the exercise of the Primacy, or lest others suspect the Roman Pontiff of showing favor to that same Prince and take exception to laws enacted by him, if what the Pontiff decreed on some occasion, whether under coercion or through the Prince's inducement, was displeasing to other nations; if these things, I say, are considered, it will be manifest that the immunity of the Pontiff can neither be secure and stable of itself nor adequately serve its purpose, if the Pontiff lacks the Principate.

Now in order to demonstrate what we set forth in the Thesis, we observe that a twofold question can be raised: 1° whether this Principate is legitimate; 2° whether it is necessary or useful. We do not treat the former question, leaving it to jurists; and therefore we presuppose that the acquisition and possession of the civil Principate of the Roman Pontiff has been and is legitimate, with due regard for human laws. We then observe that what is said to have been instituted by the providence of God, or by the singular counsel of divine Providence, is that which divine Providence not only permits but intends through natural causes as intermediaries, and achieves by wise design.

With this established, we argue as follows: to the credit of the singular counsel of divine Providence is to be referred that institution which is obtained in an efficacious and most gentle manner and which, being good in itself, conduces in the highest or even uniquely effective degree to the end intended by divine Providence, given the circumstances of history. But such is the institution of the civil Principate of the Roman Pontiff; therefore. The major premise is evident both because it is proper to divine Providence to achieve its end at once efficaciously and gently, as the mistress of all causes, and because what is good and conducive to the intended end is to be said to be not merely permitted but willed by divine Providence. The minor premise is proved, first, by the fact that efficacy and gentleness shine forth most brilliantly in the institution of the civil Principate, which, without violence or fraud, aided by natural causes themselves and as it were demanded by the order of things, grew gradually and imperceptibly and acquired its stability with the consent of all.

That through it, moreover—that is, in the more perfect manner—the end is obtained, which is the independence of the Pontiff and his full liberty, and thus the perfect administration, in this regard, of the Christian commonwealth, is of itself evident. Wherefore, even if the civil Principate did not uniquely conduce to the end intended by divine Providence, it would still be sufficient for this Roman Principate to be said to have been instituted by the singular counsel of divine Providence. But when it is affirmed that the civil Principate has been instituted by the providence of God, or by the singular counsel of God, there is also considered the fact that the Principate is itself a necessary means to the end that Providence intends—not indeed necessarily in itself or absolutely, but given certain circumstances, such that it alone is effective in those circumstances.

Namely, the end is that the Church not merely lead her social life but lead it perfectly; that accordingly the Roman Pontiff enjoy full liberty, that the peace of ecclesiastical governance be stable of itself, and that the Pontiff communicate so freely with all the faithful that it can be certainly established for all that his decrees proceed from him freely, and that all render him their full trust and reverence. But if the matter is viewed historically and account is therefore taken of the customs by

which human societies are usually governed, it can be affirmed in general terms that it is altogether difficult, or morally impossible, to obtain these goods—miracles being set aside—if the Roman Pontiff is not a Prince. This follows from the considerations adduced above, from which it is established: 1° that one who is not a king is a subject, if not by right then at least in fact, exposed, that is, to the force of a superior who can always abuse and is easily disposed to abuse his physical power, which the Pontiff would be unable to repel; it is established accordingly 2° that neither the full nor, much less, certain liberty of the Pontiff in the exercise of his Primacy would be entire for the whole Church. "For it is known to all that the faithful peoples, nations, and kingdoms would never render full trust and reverence to the Roman Pontiff if they saw him subject to and in no way free from some Prince or government. For the faithful peoples and kingdoms would never cease to strongly suspect and fear lest the Pontiff conform his acts to the will of that Prince or government in whose domain he resided and therefore would not hesitate often to resist those acts on that pretext. And indeed, let the very enemies of the civil Principate and of the Apostolic See, who now rule in Rome, themselves say with what trust and reverence they would receive the admonitions, exhortations, mandates, and constitutions of the Supreme Pontiff if they were to acknowledge him to be the subject of any Prince or government whatsoever, especially if he were subject to a Prince between whom and the Roman territory some prolonged war were being waged," says Pius IX in the cited Allocution. Therefore the perfection of the social life of the Church demands the civil Principate of the Roman Pontiff.

You will say that clerics, even though they are in the territory of a king, are nonetheless not subject to his coercive jurisdiction by reason of their immunity. This is indeed true, if right is considered and if Princes are willing to obey the prescriptions of the Church; but it is also true: 1° that clerics are still in some degree subjects of the King—for they belong to the body of his society, even if as privileged members, and are bound by the directive force of his laws, and if they transgress these laws, they can and must be punished by their legitimate superior; and that if they act as plaintiffs against a layman, they must appear before a lay tribunal; 2° that Princes easily arrogate to themselves an

illegitimate authority over clerics thus constituted, who need the help of Princes and are unable to defend themselves against their violence; 3° that the violation of the immunity of others does not produce for the universal Church those harms that are apt to arise from the violation of the immunity of the Head of the Church, which is the immunity of the whole Church at once, not merely of certain of her members. Therefore what has been said about the immunity of clerics does not prevent it from being true that it is difficult for the immunity of the Roman Pontiff to exist and endure if he lacks the Principate, and that the Principate is necessary for that immunity to be in act.

Therefore, since this is the ordinary condition of human society, such that it is morally impossible for the Roman Pontiff actually to enjoy his full independence and liberty unless he is a Prince, it follows that as the former is necessary, so too is the latter, and that the latter uniquely conduces to the former.

You will say: did not the Roman See lack the Principate for several centuries after the age of Constantine? Or why therefore did God not institute it from the very beginning? I reply: 1° Divine Providence, as we were saying, disposes things gently and executes its design ordinarily through natural causes themselves; therefore, since the Roman Empire was subject to one ruler, in order for some portion of it to be assigned to the Roman Pontiff, it was necessary that the Roman Empire be dissolved through human vicissitudes and that a part of it be legitimately withdrawn from the power of a Prince; for then no legitimate pretext for the violation of right could have existed and the Roman Pontiff would have exercised his possession most peacefully. And this was accomplished gradually and imperceptibly, finally in the eighth century. 2° In the meantime, however, divine Providence so ordered affairs that the Roman Pontiff was free in the city of Rome, and even before possessing any semblance of royal authority, he was already exercising political power from the fifth century: cf. Brunengo, *Origine della sovranità temporale del Papa*; De Maistre, *du Pape*, bk. 2, ch. 6. 3° This condition, however, was of itself uncertain and unstable and subject to changes, and was transitory—that is, ordained by God as a path toward attaining a firmer and more perfect state through the Principate. Wherefore it would be inept to demand that there be a

return to that condition. "It came about by the singular counsel of divine Providence that, with the Roman Empire divided into several kingdoms and various dominions, the Roman Pontiff should have a civil Principate" (cited Allocution). Cf. Cardinal Orsi, *Origine del potere temporale dei Papi*.

You will say: the Pontiff is now without the Principate and yet all Catholics receive his decrees without suspicion and he is free in governing the Church. I reply: the first happens because the Pontiff is not only a subject but is under the power of those who are regarded by all Catholics as his enemies; but the law of nature itself does not permit this condition to be permanent. The second is precarious in the first place, and moreover doubt about the very fact is permissible. Is the Pontiff free to continue the Vatican Council? Will the election of his successor be free?

VII. It is commonly asked what kind of certainty attaches to that truth—asserted in this age—concerning the necessity of the civil Principate of the Roman Pontiff. Since the Principate is itself connected with the right of immunity, of which it is the perfect actualization and which is necessary for the full liberty of the Pontiff, we must speak of each individually.

We say therefore: 1° that the right (we are not speaking of the fact) of personal immunity is a truth divinely revealed. From this it follows that it is to be believed with divine faith. Our assertion, however, proceeds from theological reasoning; hence we do not wish to say that those who think otherwise are heretics, nor do we attach any other censure to the opposing opinion. Certainly what is to be called revealed is that which, upon analysis of a revealed truth, is found to be contained in it by means of the principle of contradiction; but in the truth of the Primacy is also contained the truth of the immunity and independence of him who exercises it from any other power; for it is contradictory that the Roman Pontiff should be able to bind and thus annul acts of another power exercised against him and at the same time be subject to that power; therefore. Cf. section II above.

The same is to be said about the other truth, namely that the Pontiff has the right to the means necessary for the use of his full liberty; for it is revealed that the Roman Pontiff has the right to the

fullest exercise of his authority; for to confer authority and to confer this right is the same thing; but with the conferral of the right to an end, the right to the necessary means is thereby conferred, so that whoever affirms that the right to an end exists and wills it, thereby affirms that the right to the necessary means also exists; therefore this too has been affirmed by God, that is, has been revealed.

What those means are, however, which for the most part depend on the various circumstances and conditions in which the Church can find itself, did not need to be revealed one by one, but could be left to the determination of the Church. And this appears to have been done with respect to the civil Principate. The Church, that is, knowing that she has the right to the necessary means for the full exercise of her power and that she possesses this right always and under any condition of human society, can define: in these circumstances, with human customs as they are, the civil Principate is necessary for the Pontiff.

What certainty, then, attaches to this truth? It must be presupposed that the Church (Prolegomenon, 21.V.) can render an infallible judgment not only concerning revealed truths, but also concerning other truths, whether theoretical or practical or historical, which have a connection with dogma, whether theoretical or practical. Now such is that truth. For it is a dogma that the Roman Pontiff has the right to the free exercise of his full power, and it is a divine precept—or a practical dogma—that all the faithful must reverence this power and never impede its free exercise; but in order for this to be firmly maintained, it must be established with certainty what the necessary means are for that exercise; for if the necessity of some means that is in reality necessary is denied, the faith of the faithful in the dogma itself—namely, the right to free exercise of his power—can be imperiled; for if someone thinks that a certain means is not necessary and can be taken away from the Pontiff without injustice, that person cannot at the same time hold that the Pontiff has the right to that liberty which without that means he is in reality unable to exercise.

Now to the authority of one who teaches there corresponds in the pupil faith, and to infallible authority there corresponds certain and infallible faith. This faith is therefore not merely human faith, for it rests on the authority of a divinely instituted and infallible magisterium; but

it is not simply divine faith either, because its formal object is not the authority of God revealing. It is therefore infallible faith resting on the authority of a divinely instituted magisterium. It is moreover due faith; for the authority of the magisterium of the Church is an authority of jurisdiction by which faith is commanded; hence even an assent with respectful silence does not suffice, as Clement XI decreed and declared in the Constitution *Vineam Domini*.

Furthermore, it is certain that the Roman Pontiff more than once, and together with him the universal episcopate, has solemnly taught the necessity of the civil Principate. Cf., in addition to those already cited, the Apostolic letters of Pius IX, *Cum Catholica*, March 20, 1860, and the Syllabus of the same, propositions 75 and 76.

COROLLARY

I. From what has been argued in this article it is clear how rightly the Church has always defended her liberty—that is, her independence from civil authority in ecclesiastical matters—and championed it with every care. For the secular power to intrude itself into the governance of the Church and to subordinate the Church's rights to itself is equivalent to thoroughly disrupting the Church and bringing about her ruin. For if the Church is subject to civil authority, she is no longer a society governed by Apostolic authority, she is no longer the kingdom of Christ ordered to the supernatural good and procuring the sanctification and salvation of souls; and therefore she ceases to be the Church of Christ. Hence a fierce struggle was waged in former times to prevent the election of bishops from being at the disposal of secular power. For what did secular power aim at in that conflict but to subject the governance of the Church to itself, to which it wished to give rulers as it pleased? Indeed a society that must receive its rulers from another is not independent but enslaved; and it is to the Church and to the Supreme Pontiff above all that Christ conferred the right of constituting pastors for his sheep. Since the Church was defending that right, she was fulfilling her duty and was moved not by desire for honor or excellence, but by obedience toward God and love toward the human race, whose interest—in the highest and indeed in the only true sense—is to be

directed to the way of salvation, and to be directed by those who alone are capable of fulfilling this function, namely those who, having received authority from those who succeed the Apostles, are lawfully admitted into that same line of succession; for to these alone did Christ entrust his authority, as we said in the Prolegomenon, § 26.

II. From these considerations it is likewise clear how impiously and ridiculously the kings of Sicily once claimed for themselves the right of Apostolic Legateship, in defiance of the Roman See. For apart from the fact that the right those kings claimed for themselves was never conferred upon them—as Cardinal Baronius conclusively demonstrated in his *Annals* for the year 1097—nor could it have been conferred, divine right forbidding it; it was altogether ridiculous that someone should wish to be the legate of a Prince against that Prince's will, and that such a legate should act with delegated authority against the will and laws of the Pontiff who delegated him, and should wish to exercise jurisdiction in his name who denied that he had given, could give, or was able to give such authority and who declared all the acts of the counterfeit legate null and void. For either those well-meaning kings believed in the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff, or they did not: if they did not believe, from what source did they derive that jurisdiction which they professed to have obtained by title of legateship from the Roman Pontiff alone? For it could only have been conferred by the fullness of power, if such a conferral had been possible. But if they did believe, then—since the rights of the divinely instituted Primacy can in no way be diminished or alienated, and since each Roman Pontiff has the duty and right to abrogate all laws and all privileges granted by himself or his predecessors which he judges harmful or less useful to the Church, and since it is repugnant to the divine constitution of the Church that she be governed by lay authority—it is manifest that it was only by supreme impiety or the most crass ignorance that certain persons could, in defiance of and in opposition to the Roman Pontiff, have wished to be his legates in ecclesiastical affairs and to use his delegated authority against him. Cf. the Apostolic letters of the most holy Pius IX, *Suprema*, given in the year 1864, January 28.

CHAPTER TWO
ON THE INFALLIBLE MAGISTERIUM OF THE ROMAN PONTIFF

PRELIMINARY NOTES

I. We have now proved that the universal Church is infallible and we have established that the infallibility of the universal Church is obtained through an infallible magisterium (§§ XXI ff.). In this matter the distinction we gave there must be recalled: namely, if we have regard to the final cause, the infallibility of the whole Church is prior to the infallibility of any magisterium; for the infallibility of the Church is itself the end for which the infallible magisterium exists, and is therefore what is primarily intended by God. Now this infallibility of the universal Church is infallibility in the true sense of the word according to its essence; for it consists in the fact that the common profession of faith of the universal Church is immune from error and is necessarily such by reason of the assistance of the Holy Spirit; and these are the characteristics of infallibility, for this is what its definition amounts to (§ XX). Therefore, whatever may be the proximate cause of this infallibility, the entire assembly of the faithful in their profession of faith is formally infallible. If, however, we have regard to efficient causality, the infallibility of the magisterium is prior to that of the whole assembly, for the magisterium is the efficient principle of the Church's infallibility. Hence it came about that the infallibility of the teachers, or of the teaching Church, was called active, and that of the rest, the disciples, or the learning Church, passive. Now we dispute only about active infallibility, and since we have seen in general terms that it belongs to the magisterium, the question is now raised more distinctly about the subject of this same infallible magisterium.

It is certain that Christ willed that those whom he appointed as Pastors in his Church should at the same time be authentic witnesses and teachers, who would preach, guard, and perpetually propagate the word of God revealed to men for their belief; on this point enough has been said when we treated of the Magisterium. But it is equally certain

that Christ willed that, in addition to the individual chairs of the magisterium in individual Churches, there should be one universal magisterium for the whole Church—namely a magisterium that would extend its authority to the universal Church and to which the universal Church would be bound to submit. The existence of this magisterium as universal in its efficacy is evident from the very end of its institution and from the economy employed by Christ for achieving that end; for the end is the unity of the whole Church in the true faith, and the economy employed by Christ consists in the fact that this unity is obtained through authority. Now a universal magisterium of this kind is certainly infallible; for it is the ground of the infallibility of the entire Church.

Indeed, it is the infallibility of this magisterium alone that is certainly established for us, and this must be noted. For the reason we know the magisterium to be infallible is that the Church for which it was instituted must be infallible; but it is equally established that not this or that particular Church, or several particular Churches, are infallible, but only the universal Church by the promise of Christ; therefore it is certain that only the magisterium on which the faith of the whole Church depends is infallible; and this is what we call the universal magisterium. The question may indeed be raised about the subject of this magisterium—whether it is the ecumenical council alone, or the Pope alone, or both—but in this dispute it must always be presupposed that infallibility certainly belongs only to that magisterium by which the universal Church is bound, or to which the universal Church is bound to give credence. We said "certainly belongs"; for in themselves two questions could be raised: the first, absolute, whether by reason of God's assistance someone is immune from error; the second, moreover, relative, whether his immunity from error is certainly known to us. For it can happen that someone is indeed immune from error, and yet neither he himself nor others are aware of his immunity through the assistance of God from error. But because infallibility of this kind, arising from God's assistance producing it necessarily but unknown to us, is useless to us, and infallibility of the magisterium has been promised solely for the good of the Church, it must not be presupposed. Therefore there is simply one question: who, namely, is the one to whom the gift of infallibility has been promised, as is certainly established for

us by divine revelation. Now that one alone will be able to claim this promise for himself.

II. We said that this infallibility comes from the assistance of the Holy Spirit. This assistance consists formally in that efficacy of the Holy Spirit by which nothing is placed positively in the mind of the teacher by way of revelation or inspiration, but the mind of the teacher is so directed that it most certainly apprehends and proposes as true only what is in reality true and truly to be held by all. This direction of the mind can be had both negatively, by preventing false judgments from creeping in and preventing false formulas from being employed, and positively, by exciting (in the manner in which salutary acts are excited) those clear apprehensions and certain judgments by which truth is apprehended. These considerations concern the mode in which the assistance is exercised when it is directly referred to the one who must teach; but the assistance of the Holy Spirit with respect to those for whose good the magisterium has been instituted can be had in a wholly extrinsic manner, as for example if, by anticipating through death a supreme teacher who wishes to propose something false, he prevents the Church from being taught what is false.

The question is raised whether the assistance by which the Holy Spirit assists the teacher is something positive or something negative. On the part of the Holy Spirit something positive must be present, namely his own action (which is his efficacious will); otherwise it would be false to say that he assists if he does nothing. On the part of the effect, however, those who deny that something positive is present contend truly insofar as revelation and inspiration are excluded, neither of which is necessary for the doctrine proposed to be infallible; but with these excluded, we do not think it necessary to exclude every other positive operation. This could not well be proved from the fact that infallibility alone is something negative, that is, immunity from error; for 1° it cannot be called something purely negative, but at least privative, since it is the negation of something in a subject; 2° and this immunity considered concretely is a true perfection of the magisterium and therefore something positive, just as truth is; 3° even if the end of the assistance were some negation in the subject, yet in order to bring that

about, something can be effected positively, for example an illumination of the mind; therefore.

Since infallibility exists for the good of the Church, and the good of the Church is secured through external and public teaching, not through interior faith alone, hence the assistance of the Holy Spirit has its chief aim at preventing error in the proposing of decrees of faith and handing on the truth. But since God acts gently, accommodating himself to the nature of the subject, and since ordinarily men propose as true for belief what they themselves conceive, hence the direction of the Holy Spirit is aimed at causing the teacher to apprehend with the greatest certainty as true what is true and to propose it to others; the first of which, at least, is to be understood according to the ordinary course of providence.

III. It is therefore certain even for those with whom we are about to dispute that the Roman Pontiff together with the entire college of bishops, or an ecumenical council approved by the Roman Pontiff, is infallible. The question is, first, whether the Roman Pontiff—not insofar as he is a private person, but insofar as he formally is Pastor of the Church and Vicar of Christ and exercises the function of Pastor by teaching the Church—is infallible of himself alone.

The Gallican position, adhering to its own principles which we explained in Thesis 16, was negative. For according to the Gallicans the supreme authority of the Church resides in the totality of Pastors, to which the prince of Pastors himself is also subject; hence the supreme authority of teaching also resides in the totality of Pastors; and therefore infallibility is also found there, which is the endowment of the supreme magisterium to which the universal Church is subject. But since in the Church there must be one supreme authority, not two, and therefore also only one supreme authority of teaching, which is an authority of jurisdiction, no one else besides the totality of Pastors is infallible of himself. And indeed, if the Pope, though presiding over the ecumenical Council, is nonetheless subject to the authority of the universal Church assembled, and can be judged by it, any sentence of his can be retracted and reformed by the totality of Pastors; but a reformable sentence is not infallible of itself; therefore. The Gallican position thus consists of three elements: first, that the subject of supreme authority in the Church is

one; second, that the supreme authority of jurisdiction and of teaching, and hence infallibility, resides as in its immediate subject in the totality of Pastors and therefore in the ecumenical council rightly convened and legitimately acting; third, which follows logically from these, that the Roman Pontiff, just as he is subject to the totality of Pastors, is so also not infallible of himself alone—lest there be a twofold supreme authority in the Church.

For the sake of clarity it must be noted that besides the Gallican hypothesis another could also be constructed: namely, that the subject of the supreme authority of teaching is constituted essentially by these two elements—the Roman Pontiff and the college of Pastors—in such a way that the consent of both is required for an infallible definition to be issued. This hypothesis differs from the Gallican; for although the latter also requires the union of Pastors with the Roman Pontiff and his convocation and presidency in the Council, except in extraordinary cases, it nevertheless contends that the supreme authority found in the Council resides as in its immediate subject in the totality, and that laws enacted and definitions of faith issued by the votes of this totality or majority have force even if the Pontiff dissents, who is therefore bound to consent.

The Catholic doctrine regarding the question of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was set forth by the Vatican Synod, session 4, ch. 4: "that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, exercising the office of pastor and teacher of all Christians, he defines, in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, possesses, through the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be endowed in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals; and therefore that such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not by reason of the consent of the Church." In these words you have: 1° the formal ground under which the Roman Pontiff is said to be infallible, namely when he exercises the office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, that is, when he defines by his supreme apostolic authority a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church. By these words, moreover, the celebrated formula among theologians—

speaking ex cathedra—is explained; for the cathedra, taken not materially but formally, is the authority of teaching itself; thus the Roman Pontiff speaks ex cathedra, from his own cathedra, when he teaches the Church by the authority of the Primacy. This renders wholly untenable the interpretation of that formula offered by the Gallicans, namely that the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra is speaking from the consensus of the bishops (Tournely, *de Ecclesia*, q. 5, a. 3)—that is, from the chairs of others—as if the Roman Pontiff had no cathedra, or as if the cathedra of the Primacy were the collection of all episcopal chairs. You have 2° the cause of infallibility, namely the assistance of the Holy Spirit promised by Christ; you have 3° the extent of the Pontiff's infallibility, that is, that it reaches as far as the infallibility of the Church extends; you have 4° the intrinsic force of a Pontifical definition—namely, the definitions of the Pontiff are in themselves infallible and irreformable, not by reason of the subsequent or prior or concomitant consent of the Church.

Furthermore, the cause of infallibility must be distinguished from the means—not of infallibility itself, but of preparation for the exercise of this magisterium; of which means there is mention in the same chapter 4 (the Roman Pontiffs, as the circumstances of time and circumstances suggested, sometimes by summoning ecumenical councils or by exploring the sense of the Church dispersed throughout the world, sometimes through particular synods, sometimes by other means offered by divine providence, have defined those things to be held, etc.). For such means are human, the cause is divine; those means pertain to the state of preparation, the cause bears immediately on the act of definition itself, in that it has for its aim—however the Holy Spirit may operate—that the act of definition itself be conformed to truth. And this cause always bears on that act; for it is a matter of faith that the definition of the Roman Pontiff spoken ex cathedra is infallible through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which must be true in every definition. The means, moreover, are required so that the Pontiff may proceed in the right manner according to human custom; for it is not revelation but assistance that has been promised to him; infallibility, however, is to be traced not to these means but to the cause, that is, to the assisting Holy Spirit. In this respect the Roman Pontiff defining alone and an

ecumenical council are on a par; for the latter too is suited to prepare itself for a definition by such means. The assistance of the Holy Spirit, moreover, is to be considered present whenever the Roman Pontiff speaks ex cathedra, so that once it is certainly established that a definition has been issued ex cathedra, it would be wrong to raise the question whether the Pontiff used the means and which means; for even if he had not used them (which of course is not to be presumed), when the Pontiff comes to the act of definition, God certainly assists in such a way as to prevent error. Therefore, just as regarding conciliar definitions no one, in order to believe them, asks by what means the Fathers came to know the revealed truth, but it suffices for him that the Fathers spoke thus—for he knows that assistance has been promised to the Council lest it err—so one must conduct oneself the same way regarding Pontifical definitions; for the reasoning is the same.

This, then, is the prior question: whether the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra is infallible of himself. The other question is of this kind: if the Roman Pontiff is infallible of himself and therefore holds the supreme authority of the magisterium to which the whole Church must submit, what kind of active infallibility belongs to the other Pastors and to their teaching assembly before the Pontiff himself pronounces his judgment? This question we shall take care to resolve after the first.

IV. In the act of definition, the exercise of two functions must be distinguished, as it were. For the function of witness is exercised insofar as the divine tradition is represented, and the function of judge is exercised insofar as controversies that have arisen are settled by the sentence of definition. Now he who defines also testifies; but it can in itself happen that one exercises the function of witness without acting the part of judge, if there is no controversy to be settled. Historically, however, it is established that solemn definitions issued either by the Roman See or by ecumenical councils are not customarily issued except when some preceding controversy is to be settled. Indeed, infallibility of some perpetually living magisterium is postulated chiefly for this purpose—namely, that controversies may be peremptorily settled and what is to be believed may be known with certainty; hence among Catholic theologians the dispute with Protestants on this matter is customarily entitled the question concerning the judge of controversies.

But since the magisterium of the Church when it judges also testifies, and must be infallible in simple testimony by Christ's institution, it suffices—with this distinction set aside—to ask whether the Roman Pontiff, when he teaches ex cathedra, in which both functions are contained, is infallible of himself.

V. Now we engage the Gallicans. The falsity of their opinion denying the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is indeed evident even from what was demonstrated above alone, accepting the Gallicans' own principle. For the Gallicans hold that the ecumenical councils alone are infallible, because infallibility is the endowment of supreme authority in the Church and this is found in the totality of Pastors or in ecumenical councils. But we have demonstrated that the supreme power—indeed the fullness of the power of jurisdiction, of which the authority of teaching is a part—belongs properly to the one Roman Pontiff, to whom the universal Church is subject not only in each of its parts individually but as a whole at once, after the manner of a single edifice; therefore infallibility, which is the endowment of the supreme and fullest power, must also be ascribed to the Roman Pontiff. But because this is a matter of great importance, it must be treated more fully. Therefore let there be

THESIS XXV

The Roman Pontiff, speaking ex cathedra—that is, when, exercising the office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, he defines by his supreme Apostolic authority a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church—is infallible of himself, and therefore his definitions are irreformable of themselves and not by reason of the consent of the Church. (From the Vatican Council, session 4, ch. 4.)

I. The fourth article of the Gallican Declaration stated: "In questions of faith also, the chief part belongs to the Supreme Pontiff, and his decrees pertain to all and each of the churches; yet his judgment is not irreformable unless the consent of the Church has been added to it." What such chief parts would be and why decrees in questions of faith, though reformable, should pertain to all and each of the churches, the Gallicans were never able to define or declare. Alexander VIII by the Constitution *Inter multiplices* declared these four articles of the

declaration to be of no force, null, void, and empty from their very beginning and to remain so forever, and with the same fullness of power he disapproved, quashed, and annulled them, etc. The same pontiff shortly afterward proscribed this proposition: "Futile and repeatedly refuted is the assertion concerning the authority of the Roman Pontiff over the ecumenical council and his infallibility in deciding questions of faith." Sixtus IV had already condemned the first proposition of Peter of Osma: "The Roman Church can err." Pius VI, moreover, in the Bull *Auctorem fidei*, condemned and once again censured the audacity of the Pistoia assembly, which had insidiously included the Gallican articles in its decree on faith. The Catholic truth was at last solemnly defined in the Vatican Council. This must now be defended theologically.

Let it therefore be noted that, according to the very words of the definition, the Roman Pontiff is viewed formally insofar as he is the Head of the whole Body of the Church, the Pastor of the whole flock, the Vicar of Christ; and therefore insofar as he exercises the proper office of teaching, defining, and declaring the true faith and the salutary laws of morals, and those things connected with them and required for them—and thus consults the unity of faith and of the communion of the Church and the sanctity of the morals of the faithful. We must demonstrate the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra first from the clear authority of the Scriptures, and then from the perennial and universal preaching and practice of the Church.

II. a) Matthew 16:18. Peter and his Successors, the Roman Pontiffs, are called the Rock of the Church: namely the rock upon which, as upon its foundation, leaning against it and consolidated by it, the whole edifice of the Church rises and coalesces into a single building. Now the edifice of the Church is built first by faith, by which its members are united into one society of believers: "For the Church," as Ambrose testifies (*de Officiis*, bk. 3, ch. 3), "is the congregation which rises up into one unified and compact body and is joined together by the unity of faith and charity." But if Peter is the Rock of the Church—that is, the efficient principle of its unity and stability (cf. Thesis 1)—it is necessary that he be the Rock of faith, the efficient principle of the unity and stability of the faith of the Church; for he is the Rock of the Church insofar as it is formally the Church, that is, a society professing the true

faith. But Peter cannot be the Rock of faith except through faith; therefore the faith of Peter is the foundation of the faith of the Church, or the efficient principle of its unity and stability. "Faith therefore," says Ambrose (*de Incarnatione*, bk. 5), "is the foundation of the Church; for it was said not of the flesh of Peter but of his faith that the gates of hell shall not prevail."

To this point is the frequent interpretation of the Fathers who explain the Rock as the faith, which we gave and explained in Thesis 1. Hence Peter is proclaimed by the Fathers the Rock of faith (Asterius, bishop of Amaseia, Homily 8 on the holy Peter and Paul; St. Leo, letter to Maximus of Antioch; Epiphanius, *adversus haereses*, bk. 2, heresy 39), and Peter is honored with the same title by the Greek Church in its Menologion on June 29: "Upon the rock of his theology the Lord Jesus established the Church immovable, in which, O Apostle Peter, we glorify you! You are set as the foundational rock, of great price, for the souls of the faithful, O Peter, rock of faith!" Among the titles with which St. Peter is honored by the Russian Church (in the work *Omaggio Cattolico*, pp. 433 ff.) there occur: rock of faith, foundation of faith, immovable basis of dogmas, seat of faith, principle of orthodoxy.

If therefore one asks what the relationship of this Rock of faith to the faith of the Church is, it is evident from the terms themselves that the solidity, immovability, and constancy of the faith of the Church depends on this Rock—that is, on the faith of Peter—and, as the Fathers say, that we are consolidated upon the rock of the apostolic confession, and that through Peter, made the true and faithful teacher of piety, the firm and inflexible stability of the Churches subsists and the rectitude of orthodox faith is founded upon the firm rock of the Prince of the Apostles, and that the certainty of faith is to be received from the Roman Pontiff; that the sublimity of the Church raised to heaven rises up in the firmness of Peter's faith; that the foundation is established in the confession of Peter (cf. Asterius, loc. cit.; the sacred liturgy in the vigil of the Apostles Peter and Paul; the letter of Agatho read at the Sixth Council, act 4; Theodore the Studite, letter to Leo the Sacellarius; Leo the Great, Sermon 4 on the occasion of his own election; Theophanes Cerameus, Homily 55 on the Gospel).

Furthermore, if the solidity, immovability, and firmness of the faith of the Church depends on this Rock, then the following relationship exists between Peter and the Church: 1° that the faith of the Church is not firm without the faith of Peter; 2° that the faith of Peter is firm of itself; 3° that there is no greater firmness in the faith of the Church than in the faith of Peter. Now a faith that is wavering and deficient is not a firm faith; the firmness of the faith of the Church lies in her infallibility; if, moreover, the Roman Pontiff can err, his faith would be wavering and deficient and he would therefore be unable to confirm the faith of the Church, nor would he enjoy that firmness which the faith of the Church enjoys. Therefore the Roman Pontiff, as the Rock of faith, is infallible of himself. He is, however, infallible insofar as he is the Rock—that is, insofar as he is referred to the Church which leans upon him—and is infallible, namely, insofar as he exercises the office of supreme Pastor; therefore the magisterium which the Roman Pontiff exercises by his supreme authority is in itself immune from error.

And indeed, as we have seen in Thesis 1, the gates of hell will not prevail against the Church because the Church is founded on this firm Rock; thus the reason why the Church is firm against the gates of hell is to be sought in the firmness of the Rock. The gates of hell, or their assaults and weapons, are chiefly heresies and schisms; therefore heresies will not prevail against the faith of the Church because the faith of the Church has its firmness from the Rock. Thus: 1° the gates of hell will never prevail against the faith of Peter; for otherwise they could also prevail against the Church; 2° the firmness of the faith of the Church against heresies depends on the firmness of the faith of Peter, which is firm of itself and cannot be less firm than the Church herself. Therefore the Roman Pontiff, who is this Rock of faith, is infallible and infallible of himself. Hence Ambrose concludes in the same place: "Since the Church, like a good ship, is often beaten by many waves, it is against all heresies that the foundation of the Church must prevail."

Furthermore, the Roman Pontiff holds the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and in the power of the keys the supreme magisterium is also contained. For that kingdom is the kingdom of believers, the kingdom of truth, which must be nourished and governed by heavenly doctrine. The supreme power by which this kingdom is governed is therefore also

the supreme power of teaching, of prescribing the rule of faith, and of obligating the faithful to faith. Hence the keys given to Peter are also called by the Fathers the keys of faith (Theodore the Studite, letter 53 to Naucratian; Maximus the Confessor, letter to Marinus the Deacon), and the Fathers relate the power of teaching to the power of the keys and of binding and loosing. For when Leo in Sermon 4 had said, "The sublimity to be introduced into my Church rises in the firmness of this faith. The gates of hell will not hold this confession," he adds: "For this reason it is said to the most blessed Peter: I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever you shall bind, etc." And Hilary of Poitiers, *de Trinitate*, bk. 6, ch. 38: "Let there be another faith (other than the faith of Peter), if there are other keys of the kingdom of heaven; let there be another faith, if there will be another apostleship, binding and loosing by itself on earth and in heaven and releasing." And Epiphanius in *Ancoratus*, n. 9: "Faith is indeed in every way established in him who received the key of heaven and looses and binds on earth." But the power of the keys given to Peter and his successors is a universal, supreme, independent power, the source and origin of power in others, an irrefragable power whose sentence is peremptory (cf. Thesis 1); therefore the power of teaching is likewise such—namely, a supreme and universal magisterium, independent, irrefragable, whose sentence is peremptory. But such a magisterium must necessarily be infallible of itself—infallible, because it is irrefragable and peremptory; infallible of itself, because it is supreme and independent, directing all but itself directed by none.

That this interpretation of the words "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church" is Catholic and cannot be rejected by any Catholic, we are taught by the formula of faith prescribed by Hormisdas to the Eastern Bishops and by Hadrian II to the Fathers of the Eighth Synod, and subscribed to by all of them both on the first and on the second occasion: "The first salvation is to guard the rule of the right faith and to deviate in no way from the constitutions of the Fathers. And since the sentence of our Lord Jesus Christ cannot be passed over which says, 'You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church,' these words are proved true by their effects; for in the Apostolic See the religion has always been preserved immaculate and the holy doctrine

celebrated. Therefore, desiring in no way to be separated from her faith and doctrine, and following the Apostolic See in all things and proclaiming all her constitutions, we hope to merit to be in the one communion which the Apostolic See preaches, in which is the entire and true solidity of the Christian religion." Thus, from the testimony of Matthew, just as the primacy of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff is proved, so also his supreme magisterium and its infallibility are demonstrated.

b) Luke 22:31 ff. In Thesis 2 we proved both that the words of Christ, "But I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail, and you, when you have turned back, strengthen your brothers," refer to Simon Peter alone, and that the subject of those words is true faith. It remains now to be proved that by these words there is imposed on Peter a permanent and lasting duty, to be transmitted to his successors.

It is certainly established: 1° that there is nothing in the context of Luke requiring that the indefectibility of Peter's faith and the confirmation of the brethren be limited to some specific time, such as the present time or the time immediately following the passion of Christ; for the words of Christ are indefinite in their scope and Christ speaks of the assault of Satan, who will never cease to assault the Church; 2° that there are elements which require that the indefectibility of faith and the imposed duty of confirming be understood as permanent.

For: a) The assault of Satan against the brethren of Peter, to which the firm faith of Peter is opposed, will be perpetual. b) He who is commanded to be the confirmer of the brethren against the assaults of Satan is the same one who has already been designated as the Rock of the Church against the gates of hell; and to confirm is the proper function of the Rock which by its stability makes the edifice firm and is of the same character as it; therefore, since the Rock of the Church and its function are perpetual, the function of confirming the brethren must also be perpetual. Hence also the indefectibility of Peter's faith, which was prayed for on account of this function, will be perpetual. c) The function of confirming the brethren in faith is certainly an Apostolic function, as is also the function of teaching of which it is the completion, and it is the function of a Pastor; but Christ willed such

functions to be perpetual in the Church and to be transmitted to the successors of those to whom he first committed them; therefore the function of confirming the brethren passes to all the successors of Peter. Therefore the indefectibility of faith which Christ obtained in prayer so that Peter could fulfill that duty also passes to them. d) The exegetical tradition of the Church requires this interpretation. For the promise of indefectible faith and the duty of confirming the brethren are referred to Peter as the foundation of the Church and to his successors by: Ambrose, *de Fide*, bk. 4, ch. 5; Leo the Great, Sermon 4; Gelasius, letter 5 to Honorius, bishop of Dalmatia; Pelagius II, letter 5 to the Bishops of Istria; Gregory the Great, letters, bk. 7, letter 40; Theodore the Studite, letters, bk. 2, letter 12; the Menologion of the Greeks on June 30; Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, and Stephen, Bishop of Dor, in the libellus read at the Lateran Council under Martin I; Vitalianus, Pope, letter 1 to Paul, archbishop of Crete; Agatho in the dogmatic letter read and approved at the Sixth Ecumenical Synod, act 4; Leo IX in the letter to Michael Cerularius; Urban II in the letter to Rainald, Bishop of Reims; Innocent III, letter 306, bk. 1, to the Patriarch of Constantinople; Bernard, letter 190 to Innocent II; Clement VI, letter to the bishops of the Greeks (Oderic. Raynaldi, year 1343, n. 16); Gerhohus, in the commentary on Psalm 64, n. 39 (Gallandi XIV); St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 10; Bessarion, encyclical letter to his people; Gregory of Trebizond, *de Una sancta catholica Ecclesia*, n. 7; John Plousiadenos, in the *Dissertation on behalf of the Florentine Synod*; St. John of Capistrano, *de Papae et Concilii sive Ecclesiae auctoritate*, pt. 3, question of the principal part concerning the question of the superiority of the Pope and the Council; and also the bishops of the Gallican Church in the letter written in the common name to Innocent X, July 15, 1633; and finally the Vatican Council, session 4, ch. 4.

Furthermore, as we noted already in Thesis 2, those who are to be confirmed are not only the brethren individually, but all the brethren taken together. For it is only for the faith of the one Peter, distinct from all others, that Christ prayed in a special way and placed in the indefectibility of that faith a support for all the others; but he did not pray immediately for the faith of the whole college and place in its faith the support; therefore all those who are not the person of Peter himself

are to be confirmed by the faith of the one Peter; but also all the brethren of Peter taken together are distinct from the person of Peter. Indeed the brethren of Peter are none other than those who constitute one body with Peter as their head; and members constituting one body are formally united; the most proper understanding of the words "your brethren," therefore, is that the brethren united into one body or assembly are to be understood. St. John of Capistrano argues aptly in loc. cit., argument 149, against those who contended that Peter received from Christ power over individual members but not over the universal Church: "I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ, so that I might hear from his most holy mouth whether a head is over its members when united or when divided. If you say when united, then over the whole political body, concerning which the Apostle says in Ephesians 4, 'one body and one spirit.' If you say when divided, then over you, schismatic, who have cut yourself off from the unity of the body." Hence the required confirmation of the Roman Pontiff for decrees of faith issued not only by individual bishops or particular synods but also by ecumenical synods—"by whose authority and sanctioning all synods and holy councils are strengthened and receive their stability" (Nicholas I, letter 12)—so that "no synod is read as ratified that has not been supported by apostolic authority" (Pelagius II, letter 8 to John of Constantinople, etc.)—and "whose authority the entire Catholic Church and the universal synods have always faithfully embraced, following it in all things, since the Lord and Savior of all promised that the faith of Peter would not fail and exhorted him to confirm his brethren" (Agatho, cited letter).

If, therefore, the Roman Pontiff and the rest of his brethren or bishops—whether individually or all together—are compared with one another, the faith of the former is the confirming faith, and that of the latter is the faith to be confirmed. Namely, the faith of the whole Church must be firm; but the faith of the brethren does not have firmness of itself, yet it does have it from the faith of the Head, who is the Roman Pontiff; and the faith of the latter imparts firmness to the faith of the rest and does not borrow it from any of them but only from Christ. But the faith of the Roman Pontiff cannot impart that firmness which it does not possess in itself. Therefore the entire firmness of faith that is found

in the Church is already antecedently, as it were at its source, in the Roman faith. But the firmness of the faith of the Church is her infallibility; therefore the faith of the Roman Pontiff is in itself antecedently infallible.

Furthermore, the Roman Pontiff confirms his brethren not by his private faith as such but by his public faith, or by the authentic magisterium by which he proposes his faith to be held by the Church; therefore the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff is of itself infallible.

The objection is commonly raised that it is impossible for the words of Christ to pertain to the successors of Peter. For by reason of Christ's promise, Peter obtained the guarantee that he would never err in faith even when speaking privately; but such indefectibility of faith, as Catholic doctors themselves do not deny, does not belong to the successors of Peter; therefore. We reply that a distinction must be applied which adversaries too frequently neglect, between the ordinary and extraordinary prerogatives of the Apostles. That Peter would be infallible whenever he spoke or wrote about faith, we indeed concede; for this was a privilege he had in common with the other Apostles, but an extraordinary privilege. We deny, however, that this privilege is in itself derivable from these words of Christ about which we are disputing. For the indefectibility of faith prayed for by Christ on behalf of Peter has for its purpose enabling him to confirm his brethren; therefore only that indefectibility of faith is necessarily to be understood that is required for the exercise of the function of confirmer of the brethren; and this is not the faith of one speaking privately, but the faith of one fulfilling the function of teacher of the brethren, or of one exercising the authority of the magisterium proper to him who is the head of the brethren. Cf. what we shall say at the end of Thesis 31.

c) In Thesis 3 we gave the interpretation of Christ's words in John 21: "Feed my lambs, feed my sheep"; that the infallibility of the magisterium is also contained in these words is now briefly to be demonstrated. Certainly, Peter and each of his successors was by these words of Christ constituted the supreme, universal, and immediate Pastor of all the faithful who belong to the Church, namely all who are lambs or sheep of Christ; hence of all both individual faithful and bishops. But he is Pastor of all not only individually but also taken

collectively, so that even taken collectively they are to be fed by him in whatever manner, and not feed him. For all who are in the Church, apart from Peter, are compared to him as sheep and lambs to a Shepherd; but sheep and lambs even taken collectively are contained only within the order of those to be fed and governed, and cannot feed or govern their shepherd or ruler; therefore the faithful, however many belong to the Church, represented by the lambs and sheep, even taken collectively, are to be fed and governed by Peter and do not feed or govern him. Furthermore, the Pastor or ruler of all is he who is the Rock of the edifice which is the Church, who holds the keys of the kingdom, who by his authority is immediately referred to the Church insofar as she is one body collected and united from many; therefore he is Pastor of all taken collectively in whatever manner.

Therefore it is the right and duty of the Roman Pontiff to feed all; the obligation of all is to follow him and to obey him. Now the universal Church must be fed and governed also by the word of doctrine, which is authentically proposed and to which the faithful are bound to give the assent of faith. The function of Pastor of the Church is therefore also to teach authentically. But the magisterium of this Pastor the universal Church is bound to follow; for all, even taken collectively, are subject to and bound to obey the supreme, universal, and immediate Pastor. That is to say, the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff is the supreme, universal magisterium. But such a magisterium is infallible. For why is the Church believed to be infallible if not because by the law of God all are bound to believe with divine faith what she proposes? But falsehood cannot underlie divine faith. Yet the universal Church must follow the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, because she must obey her Pastor; therefore.

Moreover, the Roman Pontiff has the right and duty of feeding immediately from Christ, and entirely independently of the Church which is to be fed by him and does not feed him; therefore the acts of his power have their value independently of the consent of the Church; and therefore his magisterium has the force of binding the universal Church and is irrefragable apart from the consent of the Church; therefore.

II. The same point of doctrine must be proved by the perpetual and universal testimony of the Church, manifested both theoretically and practically. It is impossible to bring forward all that could be adduced on this point, but we shall select the clearer and more illustrious testimonies. Tournely himself (*de Romano Pontifice*, q. 5, a. 3) openly admits that it cannot be concealed that it is difficult, in such a mass of testimonies gathered by Bellarmine and others, not to recognize the certain and infallible authority of the Apostolic See or Roman Church; but that it is far more difficult to reconcile them with the declaration of the Gallican clergy, from which we are not permitted to depart (on account of the so-called Gallican liberties). Omitting a continuous recitation of testimonies, we shall place the most open sense and doctrine of the Church in the light by means of what follows.

1. It is certain that this right has always been in force in the Roman Pontiff, "that as often as a question of faith is ventilated, the bishops must refer to Peter, the author of their name and honor," as Innocent I says to the Fathers of Milevum, affirming that this is the "ancient rule which you know with me to have always been observed throughout the whole world," so that all might know "that responses have always flowed to all who petition from the apostolic source through all the provinces." Cf. also his reply to the Fathers of Carthage. Many others testify to this both explicitly, such as Cyril of Alexandria writing to Celestine about the case of Nestorius and saying: "Since the ancient custom of the Churches recommends that matters of this kind be communicated to your holiness"; and implicitly, when they teach that the greater causes, among which the cause of faith is certainly to be counted, must be referred to the Apostolic See, so that "by its judgment they may be settled according to ecclesiastical custom," as Leo the Great says in the letter to the metropolitans of Illyricum. "Ask, if you desire to hear something true," says Fernandus, deacon of Carthage, letter to Severus, n. 1, "most prudent man, chiefly the bishop of the Apostolic See, whose sound teaching is upheld by the verdict of truth and fortified by the protection of truth."

This prerogative of the Roman Pontiff was also acknowledged by Princes. For Justinian in the letter to John II (preserved in the Code under the title on the holy Trinity) writes: "We have hastened to bring to

the notice of your Holiness all things pertaining to the state of the Churches, since it has always been our great concern to preserve the unity of your Apostolic See and the stability of the holy Churches of God… For we do not permit anything that pertains to the status of the Churches, however manifest and indubitable it may be, to be raised without your Holiness also being informed of it, since you are the head of all the Churches." He then reports on certain heretics, to whom he opposes Catholic teaching, and concludes: "We therefore ask your paternal affection that by letters sent by you to us you make known to us that your Holiness receives all who rightly think the aforesaid things and condemns the perfidy of those who have dared in a Jewish manner to deny the right faith."

This is also attested in the *Libri Carolini* (bk. 1, ch. 6): "that the Roman Church, placed by the Lord over the other Churches, is to be consulted by the faithful… so that from her, after Christ, they may seek help for the strengthening of faith; and that she, having neither spot nor wrinkle, treads down the monstrous heads of heresies and strengthens the minds of the faithful in faith." This is also attested by heretics themselves, among whom Pelagius in the libellus of faith offered to the Roman See (in the fifth dissertation of Garnier on the first part of the works of Marius Mercator): "This is the faith, most blessed father, which we have learned in the Catholic Church; and if anything therein has been stated less skillfully or with insufficient care, we desire it to be corrected by you, who hold the faith and see of Peter. But if our confession is approved by the judgment of your apostleship, then whoever wishes to cast a stain upon me will prove himself to be unskilled, or malevolent, or even not Catholic—but not me a heretic."

This indeed is what St. Bernard said to Innocent II, letter 190: "Dangers and scandals arising in the kingdom of God must be referred to your apostleship, especially those which arise in matters of faith. For I judge it worthy that the losses of faith be repaired chiefly there where faith cannot suffer defect. For this is the prerogative of this See. To whom else has it ever been said: 'I have prayed for you Peter, that your faith may not fail'? Therefore what follows is required of Peter's successor: 'And you, when you have turned back, confirm your brethren.' This indeed is now necessary." And indeed, with the approval

of the Second Lyons Council, the Greeks professed "that, as the Roman Pontiff is bound before all others to defend the truth of faith, so also, if any questions about faith should arise, they ought to be defined by his judgment." Wherefore Cardinal Bessarion says to the Greeks in his general letter (see the theological opuscula of certain Greeks edited by Peter Arcudius): "Search through the volumes; if you examine them carefully, you will find that the Roman Church has held the primacy over all from the very beginning and presides over the universal Church to such a degree that without her nothing whatsoever ecclesiastical has ever at any time been concluded and believed."

Now to decide causes by judgment, or, as Leo says, to settle them by sentence, is to settle them by a peremptory and irreformable sentence. Thus: 1° there has been a perpetual right and practice conformable to that right that causes of faith be referred to the Apostolic See; 2° the purpose for which they were referred was that they might be settled by its judgment; 3° the reason why causes were referred to the Roman Pontiff for this purpose of obtaining the desired result was that this is the prerogative of the Apostolic See—that there faith cannot suffer defect, because Peter is the author of the name and honor of the bishops, because the Roman Pontiff holds the faith and see of Peter—which reason is entirely Catholic and was therefore adopted by a heretic who wished to conceal himself. But the proclamation of such a right and its perpetual practice is a clear and constant profession of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff as something he possesses of himself. For the end for which causes of faith were referred to the judgment of the Roman Pontiff requires this understanding; for causes of faith cannot be settled except by an infallible sentence; and the reason adduced—why they were referred especially to him—also requires this; for he must be infallible whose faith cannot suffer defect.

Hence the Apostolic See is called the seat of faith by Bachiarius in his profession of faith, an author of the fifth century (Gallandi 9, p. 183). This is also signified by another formula, which is so frequent among the Fathers who call the faith and doctrine of the Roman Pontiff the faith and doctrine of Peter and say that Peter speaks through the Roman Pontiff.

For what is signified when it is said, "the faith of Peter"? Surely, when we say the faith of the Apostles, by that very fact is signified faith immune from error; for the universal Church professes no other faith than the Apostolic faith. The same is signified when we say the faith of Peter; for the Church likewise professes no other faith except that which Peter and the Apostles in agreement with him (cf. Thesis 3) taught. The faith of Peter, therefore, is the faith to which error cannot be subject. What does it mean, then, for the Roman Pontiff to hold the faith and see of Peter? Namely, the faith of Peter had to persist always in the Church; but when it is said that the Roman Pontiff holds the faith and see of Peter, it signifies: 1° that the Roman Pontiff certainly has that faith, just as when it is said that the Church holds the faith of the Apostles, it signifies that the faith of the Church and that of the Apostles is the same; but he holds it 2° by hereditary right of succession—he holds it because he is the Roman Pontiff, that is, because he holds the see of Peter; and he holds it accordingly 3° by the same right by which it was held by Peter himself, for it is proper to successors to possess the inheritance by the same right as the predecessor; and he holds it therefore 4° perpetually and inalienably. The faith of Peter, therefore—the proclamation and magisterium of Peter, and the doctrine handed down by Peter himself—persists continuously the same in the chair of Peter; therefore, just as the proclamation of Peter was infallible and the doctrine handed down by him was nothing but truth, so also the proclamation and doctrine of the Roman Pontiff is true and infallible. It is the same, namely, as recurring to the judgment of Peter, which was certainly infallible.

b) It is certain that it was believed in antiquity that a sentence pronounced by the Roman Pontiff in a cause of faith was, even apart from an ecumenical council, a settled cause. Indeed, when a controversy of faith arose at Antioch concerning the divinity of the Holy Spirit, "which controversy, it is credible, was growing day by day through the eagerness for contention, the Roman Bishop (Damasus), informed of this matter, wrote letters to the Churches of the East, that together with the priests and bishops of the West they should hold the Trinity to be consubstantial and equal in glory. Once this was done, since the controversy had been settled by the judgment of the Roman Church,

individuals were at peace and the question seemed at last to have received its end," says Sozomen, bk. 6, ch. 22. One may not suppose that Sozomen wished to contradict himself in the same sentence: he asserts absolutely that the controversy had been settled by the judgment of the Roman Church and that this was believed in the East—for this is the reason why individuals were at peace. Why then did he say that the question "seemed" to have received its end? Namely, because heretics are not accustomed to acquiesce in the definitions of the Church, just as the Arians did not acquiesce in the Nicene definition but continued to agitate questions; hence it was not certain that the adversaries would make no further attempts and raise no further disturbances or questions against the Catholic doctrine proclaimed by Damasus; but it was hoped, by reason of the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff—and this is what Sozomen says—that the question seemed to have received its end.

Augustine likewise in Sermon CXXXI (which is said to have been the second after the decretal letters of Innocent I arrived in Africa) says: "Refute those who contradict and resist and bring them to us. For already regarding this cause two councils have sent to the Apostolic See, and from there responses have also come: the cause is finished; would that the error were at some time finished." And against the two letters to the Pelagians, bk. 2, ch. 3, he says that "the letters of the late Pope Innocent have entirely removed all doubt on this matter." Hence Prosper (*adversus Collationem*, ch. 21) says "the firm foundation stands firm against that heresy, because it has been peremptorily condemned"; and explaining this firm foundation, or naming those by whom it was overthrown, he mentions two Pontiffs who, without the aid of an ecumenical council, destroyed it—including Pelagius himself who pronounced sentence against himself—adding that by the authority of another Pontiff the Pelagians were again overthrown in the Synod of Ephesus: "Then their stumbling blocks were broken... when the late Innocent of blessed memory struck the heads of that nefarious error with the apostolic sword; when the Synod of Palestinian bishops compelled Pelagius to pronounce sentence against himself and his followers; when the late Pope Zosimus of blessed memory added the strength of his own sentence to the decrees of the African Councils and with the sword of Peter armed the right hands of all the bishops for the

cutting down of the impious… when the venerable Pontiff Celestine of blessed memory aided with the apostolic sword the most glorious defender of the Catholic faith Cyril, bishop of the Alexandrian city, for the excision of Nestorian impiety, by which sword also the Pelagians, since they were allied with related errors, were again overthrown." You hear that all the bishops, armed not with their own sword but with the sword of Peter, overthrew heresy—that is, that heresy was overthrown by the magisterium of the Roman Chair, derived to the other bishops who agreed with it?

From the words of Prosper concerning the decree of Zosimus, the words of Marius Mercator (in the *Commonitorium on the name of Caelestius*, etc.) can be understood, when he says that through the letter of Zosimus—which is called the *tractoria*—Caelestius and Pelagius were condemned, "which letter, having been sent also to Constantinople and throughout the whole world, was strengthened by the subscriptions of the holy Fathers." For here the consensus did not add intrinsic force to the decree of Zosimus; on the contrary, Zosimus armed the right hands of all the bishops with the sword of Peter, so that heresy was destroyed by the sword of Peter—which is the sword of the Roman Pontiff—and in the subsequent authentic judgment of the bishops, the destructive force of the sword or authority of Peter was exercised.

Hence among the questions concerning doctrine necessarily to be believed, proposed by Clement VI to the Church of the Armenians so that they might be in unity with the Roman Church, this is the thirteenth (Oderic. Raynaldi, year 1351, n. 3): "If you have believed and still believe that the Roman Pontiff alone, when doubts arise concerning the Catholic faith, can by authentic determination—to which it is necessary to adhere inviolably—put an end to them, and that whatever he determines by the authority of the keys entrusted to him by Christ to be true is true and Catholic."

Now if, when the Roman Pontiff had pronounced sentence, the controversy was immediately said to be terminated, the cause finished, and all doubt removed—even when no sentence of an ecumenical synod had intervened—then the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra was held to be infallible of himself; for a cause of faith can be finished and all doubt regarding it removed only by an infallible sentence. The

arguments by which some attempt to undermine the force of the cited authority of Augustine we shall resolve in what follows when we treat the historical difficulties.

c) It is certain that in antiquity it sufficed for one to be regarded by all as orthodox if his faith was approved by the Roman Pontiff. The illustrious Doctor and Martyr Maximus is a witness of this common and universal persuasion for us in his letter to Peter concerning Pyrrhus of Constantinople, where he says: "Therefore, if a heretic does not wish to be one and to be considered as such, let him not seek to satisfy this person or that one… but let him hasten above all to satisfy the Roman See. For once it is satisfied, all will everywhere in common proclaim him pious and orthodox. For one who thinks he must persuade those like me speaks in vain, if he does not satisfy and implore the most holy Pope of the most blessed Church of the Romans—that is, the Apostolic See—which has received from the Incarnate Word of God himself, and from all the synods according to the sacred canons and from all the Churches which are in the whole world, in all things and through all things, the dominion, authority, and power of binding and of loosing." In these words is also rendered the reason for that common and universal persuasion: because the Roman Pontiff has dominion, authority, and power of binding and loosing in all things and through all things in the universal Church.

But: 1° it is impossible for one to be regarded as orthodox commonly and everywhere by all, because he has satisfied the Apostolic See, unless it is commonly, everywhere, and by all—that is, by the universal Church—believed that the Apostolic See is infallible; for what is regarded as orthodox commonly, everywhere, and by all—that is, by the universal Church—is certainly and infallibly orthodox. Since therefore it is said that that doctrine is held as orthodox by the universal Church which is approved by the Supreme Pontiff, this must be understood of infallibly orthodox doctrine. Furthermore, if the reason why some doctrine is regarded as orthodox by the universal Church is that it is approved by the Roman Pontiff, the teaching and approving authority of the Roman Pontiff must be regarded by the universal Church as infallible; for a reason cannot be less than what it grounds. Therefore in that common and universal persuasion of the Church, of

which St. Maximus is the witness, is contained the common and universal faith of the Church concerning the infallible magisterium of the Roman Pontiff. And indeed of an infallible magisterium of itself; for it is not necessary to satisfy also the other Churches, but it suffices to satisfy the Roman Church, and by that very fact one is regarded as orthodox by all; therefore apart from the consent of the other bishops the Roman Pontiff is held to be infallible. This is also persuaded by the reason given by St. Maximus: namely, the supreme power of binding and loosing given to the Roman Pontiff, in which the supreme and universal magisterium is contained which the universal Church must follow; but such a magisterium is necessarily infallible of itself.

The opinion of Maximus had already been anticipated by Gregory of Nazianzus. For in the first letter to Cledonius, speaking of the followers of Apollinaris, he says at n. 2: "To this indignity there is added the fact that they say they have been received by the Western Synod, as I hear, by those by whom they had previously been condemned, as is evident to all. (From which it is clear that the synod in question was the same one; but it is established that they had been condemned by Damasus in the Roman synod; the reference therefore is to the Roman synod.) And indeed, if they have been received either now or previously, those who follow the tenets of Apollinaris should show this and we shall acquiesce. For it is clear that they have been received as assenting to right doctrine; for it cannot be otherwise, if they have obtained this."

d) It is certain that the universal Church believed that an appeal could be made from any sentence to the judgment of the Apostolic See, but that it was not lawful to appeal from or to dispute the judgment of that See. A witness of this persuasion is Gelasius I, letter 13 to the bishops of Dardania: "The whole Church throughout the world knows that the see of blessed Peter the apostle, bound by the sentences of whatsoever bishops, has the right to dissolve them; since it has the right of judging every Church and no one has the right to judge its judgment; since canons have willed that appeals from any part of the world be made to it, but from it no one is permitted to appeal." Likewise in the *Commonitorium* to Faustus: "They cite canons against us, while knowing not what they say. They betray that they are acting against these very canons in this very matter, that they flee to obey the First See when it

rightly and correctly advises. The canons themselves are those which have willed that the appeals of the whole Church be brought to the examination of this See. They have decreed that from it no appeal whatsoever should be made; and therefore they have prescribed that it should judge the whole Church, but that it should appear before the judgment of none, that its judgment should never be passed upon, that its sentence cannot be dissolved, the decrees of which rather they have commanded should be followed."

This last point had already been testified by Zosimus writing to the Council of Carthage (Council, vol. 2, p. 1572), saying: "The tradition of the Fathers has attributed to the Apostolic See so much authority that no one would dare dispute its judgment, and it has always maintained this through canons and rules… So much power did canonical antiquity wish, through the sentences of all, to belong to this Apostle (Peter), by the very promise of Christ our God, that he might both loose those who were bound and bind those who were loosed; equal condition of power having been given to those who should merit by his approval to have the inheritance of his See… Nevertheless, though we had so much authority that no one can retract our sentence, we have done nothing without referring it to your notice by our letters." Ferrandus the Deacon likewise, letter 6 to Pelagius and Anastasius, Roman deacons, defending the letter of Ibas approved, as he says, in the Synod of Chalcedon, argues thus at n. 6: "If any accuser of the letter—whose Catholic composition had been declared—had appealed then to higher judges, perhaps room for the appeal would have been available according to custom; but where would he go? Or where would he find higher judges in the Church, when before him were the legates of the Apostolic See, with whose consent whatever that synod defined received invincible force?" The appeal is excluded, namely, because the Apostolic See rendered judgment. Hence at the following number, speaking of the authority of councils, he says: "Universal councils, especially those to which the consent of the Roman Church has been added, hold the second place of authority after the canonical books."

Likewise Nicholas I at the Roman Council in the year 863, ch. V, decreed: "If anyone has despised the dogmas, commands, prohibitions, sanctions or decrees promulgated in a saving manner by the president

of the Apostolic See for the Catholic faith, for ecclesiastical discipline, for the correction of the faithful, for the amendment of the wicked… let him be anathema." Hence Martin V at the Council of Constance—as Gerson testifies, who deliberately ventured to refute that view—decreed that in matters of faith it is not lawful to appeal from the Roman Pontiff. For this reason appeal from the Roman Pontiff to a future Council was condemned by Pius II in the Bull *Execrabilis* as erroneous and detestable, and is there called an execrable abuse and one unheard of in former times.

Now: 1° when it is denied that it is possible to appeal from the sentence of the Roman Pontiff or to retract his judgments, this must be understood also of sentences and judgments in causes of faith, a) because the expressions are universal; b) because the reasoning is the same—for the authority of judging in causes of faith is the authority of the keys, of binding and loosing; c) because all those causes must be understood as included in which the Roman Pontiff can judge, and no one will deny that he can judge in causes of faith, since they must especially all be referred to his judgment (as Ferrandus, Nicholas, Martin, and Pius expressly indicate); d) because these are expressly stated by Ferrandus, Nicholas, Martin, and Pius. 2° Not only is appeal excluded to any other bishop or particular church, but also to a universal synod. The reason is evident: a) no exception to this is indicated anywhere; b) if appeal to a Council were lawful, it would be simply true that it is lawful to appeal from the sentence of the Roman Pontiff; and therefore the proposition denying this would be simply false, whereas for it to be true it must be universally true; therefore when it is said that it is not lawful to appeal from the sentence of the Roman Pontiff, all appeal to any tribunal whatsoever on earth is excluded; c) because such an appeal is explicitly rejected by Pius II.

Furthermore, the sentences pronounced by the Roman Pontiff on cases of appeal from any part of the world, from the judgment of any inferior judges, are not sentences to be pronounced by him together with the other bishops, but sentences pronounced by him as distinguished from others, by his singular authority of supreme Pastor and Judge; and therefore those sentences derive their value from the sole authority of the Primacy proper to the Roman Pontiff,

independently of the consent of the rest. For it is evidently of such sentences—those pronounced by the Pontiff alone (even if in his own synod)—that Zosimus speaks, as is clear from his words; and Gelasius speaks of them in his cited letter 13, where he adds to the words already cited: "But nor do we pass over the fact that the Apostolic See, as has been said, frequently in keeping with ancestral custom, even without any preceding synod, has had the faculty both of absolving those whom a synod had unjustly condemned and of condemning without any existing synod those who deserved it." Of the same sentences speaks Pius II, condemning the appeal to a universal synod.

And the nature of the matter demands this meaning; for in appeals, in which there is an appeal from lower to a higher tribunal, the higher tribunal judges independently of the judgment of the lower, by that authority which is proper to it and by which it is distinguished from and surpasses the others. And certainly this power is asserted for the Roman Pontiff on account of those words of Christ spoken immediately and directly to Peter alone. Moreover, when it is said that appeal can be made from the sentences of any bishops whatsoever to the Roman See—if this includes also appeal from the judgment of a universal synod—the independence of the sentence of the Pontiff receiving the appeal from the judgment of the synod is manifest. But if that appeal is not understood, but only appeal from particular bishops or synods; since it is certain both that the sentence of the supreme judge is independent of the sentence of the inferior particulars from whom the appeal is made, and that from the sentence of the Roman Pontiff there can be no further appeal; it is evident that the sentence of the Roman Pontiff alone, without the consent of others, is inappellable. But if in causes of faith the sentence of the Roman Pontiff is inappellable, it is therefore irrefragable; therefore infallible; and indeed irrefragable and infallible of itself, since it has of itself, apart from the consent of the rest, the quality of being inappellable.

e) It is certain that it was believed in antiquity that by virtue of its primacy the Roman Church is the center or principle of the unity of faith of the whole Church, and that the doctrine of the Roman chair is, as it were, the paradigm of apostolic truth to be believed by all, and that it is therefore necessary for all the faithful to maintain the unity of faith

with the Roman See, professing that faith which it proclaims. The most noble witness of this is St. Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses*, bk. 3, ch. 3: "Since it would be very long to enumerate in such a volume the successions of all the Churches, we point to the greatest and most ancient, known to all, founded and established at Rome by the two most glorious Apostles Peter and Paul, and its tradition from the Apostles and the faith announced to men through the succession of bishops coming down to us, and we confound all those who in any way, whether through self-pleasing, or vainglory, or through blindness and perversity of opinion, gather otherwise than they ought. For with this Church, on account of its superior preeminence, every Church must agree—that is, those who are the faithful from everywhere—in which Church those who are from everywhere have always preserved the tradition that is from the Apostles."

Now in this testimony Irenaeus asserts: 1° the fact of the communion of all Churches with the Roman Church, and specifically communion in faith: "In which Church those who are the faithful from everywhere have always preserved the tradition that is from the Apostles"; 2° the right or necessity of communion: "every Church must agree" (since the Latin translator follows the Greek expression closely, the Greek text of Irenaeus will have been συμβαίνειν πρὸς ταύτην ἐκκλησίαν, which, as Salmutius testifies in his book *de Primatu Papae*, ch. 5, means to agree with this Church—in matters of faith and doctrine); the necessity, I say, of communion in faith—for it is of this specifically that he speaks; 3° the reason for this right, or necessity, is asserted, and the absolute reason for the necessity is a final one, namely for preserving the unity of faith, or so that all the faithful may profess the Apostolic doctrine; this is clear from the whole context and from the final words; the comparative reason for the necessity—that is, why one must agree with this Church rather than with another for the purpose of achieving that end—is placed in the superior preeminence of the Roman Church "on account of its superior preeminence" (cf. what was said in Thesis 13 on this text); 4° the effect of this right exercised and maintained by the universal Church is asserted: namely, that through the Roman Church the Apostolic tradition is preserved by all—for this is the force of the words "in which," namely that the faithful who are

from everywhere preserve the Apostolic tradition, but preserve it in the Roman Church, insofar as they agree with the Roman Church—that is, it is not in themselves but in the Roman Church that the reason for this preservation lies, and so all must agree with her; 5° hence Irenaeus does not for the same reason appeal to the Roman Church and to other Apostolic Churches—for he does not separately affirm of these what he affirms of this one, namely that every Church must agree with them, but attributes to this one alone the superior preeminence which is the juridical title of that necessity; 6° furthermore, with this necessity of communion in faith for all Churches with the Roman Church asserted, the subordination of those Churches to her is affirmed; for the communion is said to be necessary on account of the superior preeminence; therefore the Roman Church is principal and first among the principal or Apostolic Churches; the Roman Church has, namely, the primacy, and the other Churches are in second place and are subordinated to her; 7° and indeed subordination in the magisterium of faith is affirmed; for all must agree with the Roman Church on account of her primacy so that the Apostolic tradition or doctrine may be preserved by all; therefore the primacy of the Roman Church is also a primacy in faith, or in the magisterium of faith, of which the norm is proposed by the Roman Church and which all must follow if they wish to hold the Apostolic doctrine. Therefore, in the testimony of Irenaeus, the Roman Church by virtue of her primacy is the efficient principle of the unity of faith of the whole Church, and the doctrine of the Roman chair is the paradigm of apostolic truth to be believed by all, and all the faithful must necessarily profess that faith which the Roman chair teaches. But in these assertions is contained a profession of the infallible magisterium of the Roman Pontiff of itself.

And first, a profession of an infallible magisterium; for if it is necessary for all Churches, in order to preserve the Apostolic tradition, to hold that faith which the Roman chair teaches, it must be said that the doctrine of this See is the doctrine necessary in the Church; but a doctrine necessary in the Church cannot be other than infallibly true; therefore. And then a profession of a magisterium infallible of itself; for the following order exists between the Roman Church and all the faithful from everywhere, such that in the Roman Church the Apostolic

tradition is preserved, and through her is preserved by all who agree with her—that is, who are subordinated to her; therefore the Roman Church of herself guards the deposit of the Apostolic tradition, the other churches through the Roman Church; and therefore the doctrine of the Roman Church is infallible antecedently to the consent of the other churches. Furthermore, it is necessary to agree in faith with the Roman Church on account of her superior preeminence; she has, namely, the primacy of the magisterium; and so infallibility of doctrine is found indeed in all taken together who agree, but in the rest it is the infallibility of the learners, while in the Roman chair it is the infallibility of the teacher; but just as the knowledge of the teacher is prior to and independent of the derived knowledge of the disciple, so the infallibility of the teacher of the Roman See is antecedent to and independent of the infallibility of the other churches; therefore.

Irenaeus is entirely consonant with Optatus, who in bk. 2 teaches that there is one and singular chair in the Church, which is the chair of Peter, in which unity must be preserved by all. For if there is one chair, there is therefore one supreme authority of teaching, with respect to which all are in the position of disciples; therefore all must profess that doctrine which that chair teaches, and therefore the doctrine of this chair is necessary in the Church; therefore this chair is infallible and indeed infallible with the infallibility of the teaching chair, and hence infallible of itself, as we argued a little earlier.

To this point is the most splendid testimony of St. Maximus, from a letter written at Rome (Works, vol. 2, pp. 72 ff.): "All the ends of the world and those who everywhere among the nations truly confess the Lord with right faith look, as to the sun of everlasting light, to the most holy Roman Church and its confession and faith, awaiting from it the radiance shining forth… For from the beginning, when the Word of God descended to us in the flesh assumed, all the Churches of Christians everywhere have obtained and possess the one firm base and foundation, namely the Church that is there, against which, according to the very promise of the Savior, the gates of hell have not prevailed at any time, nor will prevail; which holds the keys of right faith in Christ and of the confession, and opens to those who approach it with piety that which is truly and by its very nature and alone piety, and closes and

bars every mouth of heretics speaking justice on high." If the Roman faith is the sun of light from which the whole Church is illuminated, it shines of itself and is the necessary and infallible norm of truth; if it holds the keys of faith and opens to all the true piety, it is itself the source and origin of all certainty in the Church. It is therefore necessary for all to agree with the Roman Church and its magisterium, just as it is necessary for all bodies to move about the sun and to borrow light from it lest they remain in darkness; just as it is necessary for all who enter a house to have it opened for them by the one who holds the keys.

f) It is certain that ecumenical councils, which obtain force in the Church, have always been confirmed by the Apostolic See—either by subsequent confirmation, insofar as the Roman Pontiff ratified what the Fathers had decreed, or by antecedent confirmation, insofar as the Roman Pontiff gave prior shape to the doctrine to be handed down. And as regards subsequent confirmation, it is certain that this was held necessary for the validity of the decrees, and that it was this that added force and strength to decrees which of themselves, apart from it, would have had no power to oblige the Church; and that it was therefore a confirmation freely and voluntarily given, not under compulsion of any ecclesiastical law, since the decrees of the Fathers obligated no one as yet. This needs to be more fully declared and demonstrated.

Indeed, the confirmation of ecumenical councils by the Roman Pontiff has always been required, and it has always been maintained that their decrees have no force unless the consent of the Roman Pontiff is added. In this matter a twofold confirmation must be distinguished—namely exterior and interior; the former is civil and pertains to the due protection of the decrees; the latter is authentic, proceeding from those who have the authority to teach. This in turn is twofold: one is simply authentic, the other is both authentic and peremptory—by reason of the existence of which the decrees of councils have irrefragable value, and in whose absence that value is lacking. Now such is the confirmation required from the Roman Pontiff for the decrees of councils, of a kind that was not required from any other bishop or provincial synod, even though bishops were required to add their authentic confirmation to the decrees of councils. Wherefore Bossuet (*Defensionis*, bk. 8, chs. 2–3) is playing games when he attempts to show historically that confirmation

was sought from and given by others just as by the Roman Pontiff; for this is not the question; for there can be authentic confirmation that is owed because the decrees of councils already have value—to which decrees the consent of the bishops also, in the exercise of their function, is to be manifested—or which, if absent, does not take away the value of the decrees of the other bishops; but the question is about the necessary confirmation for the decrees of councils to have force, which we call peremptory. Nor is the question whether the Pontiff's sentence alone, without conciliar approval, suffices; but whether it is necessary for the decrees of councils on matters of faith (for this is what we are discussing) to be irrefragable.

Now historically it is established: 1° that the eight prior ecumenical councils either defined in matters of faith what the Roman Pontiff had already given prior shape to and ordered to be defined, or afterwards sought his assent and confirmation, or did both simultaneously. The first certainly took place at the Council of Ephesus, the Council of Chalcedon, and the Sixth and Seventh Synods. The second at the First Council of Nicaea; for even though its acts are lacking, we have as witnesses the Fathers of the Roman Council under Felix III in the year 484, according to Baronius, saying: "Following this voice ('You are Peter,' etc.) the three hundred and eighteen holy Fathers assembled at Nicaea brought the confirmation of matters and authority to the Holy Roman Church"; it also took place at the Council of Sardica, as can be gathered from its synodal letter; and at the First Council of Constantinople, of which only that decree had force which the Roman Church approved—namely the decree of faith; that the other canons were null from the beginning, because they were never brought to the knowledge of the Apostolic See, is attested by Leo in letter 106; and that the Roman Pontiff approved its decree of faith is proved by this very argument of Leo and is attested by Photius in the book on synods, saying: "Not much later Damasus, bishop of Rome, confirming and approving them with his own assent, added his agreement"; it also took place at the Fifth Council, which so insistently sought the consent and approval of Vigilius; and at the Eighth Synod. Both simultaneously took place certainly at the Council of Chalcedon and the Sixth: for Leo prescribed the form to the former by his celebrated letter to Flavian; to

the latter Gregory II did so by his letter to the Emperor Leo the Isaurian, and Hadrian I by his letters read in the Council. Indeed at the First Council of Constantinople also the antecedent shaping of doctrine by the Pontiff must be said to have taken place: this is gathered from the letter of the Easterns from the Constantinopolitan Synod, which was later than the one called ecumenical (Gallandi, *Bibliotheca*, vol. 6, p. 333, letter 8 among the Damasian letters), professing the faith which Damasus had prescribed (ibid., letter 2) to the Easterns, and therefore appealing to the subscription to the tome of Damasus made in the East.

It is established 2° that such assent or confirmation was held necessary for the validity of the decrees. Certainly Damasus, giving the reason why the Synod of Ariminum lacks authority, says in letter 6: "No prejudice could arise from the number of those who assembled at Ariminum, since it is established that neither the Roman Bishop, whose judgment above all was to be awaited, nor Vincentius, who had inviolably maintained the episcopate for so many years… gave any consent to such decisions." Gelasius in the *Tome on the Bond of Anathema* openly affirms: "The whole, as has been said, is placed in the power of the Apostolic See: thus what the Apostolic See confirmed in a synod obtained force; what it rejected could not have firmness."

The Emperor Marcian shows the character and force of Roman confirmation clearly in letter 110 among the letters of St. Leo: "We marvel exceedingly that after the Chalcedonian Synod and the letters of the venerable bishops sent to your Holiness, signifying all that was done in that holy Synod, no letters whatsoever have been sent back by your clemency, letters which needed to be read in the most holy churches and to come to the knowledge of all. This has introduced much ambiguity into the minds of some who still follow the perverse opinion and wickedness of Eutyches, as to whether your Beatitude has confirmed what was decreed in the Synod. And for this reason let your piety deign to send letters by which it may be made manifest to all the Churches and peoples that what was done in the holy Synod is held as ratified by your Beatitude." The matter concerned the decree of faith directed against the Eutychians, and the Roman confirmation was awaited—not by which it would be declared that the synod had been legitimately conducted, but by which the Roman Pontiff would signify that he held

as ratified what had been done there against Eutyches; which ratification or confirmation being lacking, the sentence of the Council was still ambiguous for the heretics, who took cover behind the absence of the Pontiff's confirmation—though without justification, since Leo had already issued the definition that the Chalcedonian Fathers followed. This is evidently the view of Marcian, that it is generally necessary for it to be manifest to all the Churches and peoples that the Roman Pontiff holds the decrees of the Council as ratified; and therefore, in order to refute the heretics who denied that this confirmation had been given, he asks especially of Leo that he send letters to all the churches signifying this. It was therefore the persuasion of all—both heretics and Catholics—that decrees of faith issued by councils had no force unless the Roman See had ratified them.

Hence Ferrandus the Deacon in the cited letter, n. 9, speaking of universal councils, says: "It is judged sufficient for full confirmation if, having been brought to the knowledge of the whole Church, they cause no offense or scandal to the brethren, but are confirmed as consonant with the apostolic faith, strengthened by the consent of the Apostolic See." And St. Stephen the Younger (cf. his life in Migne, 9th series) replied to the iconoclast heretics who extolled the synod they had held: "By what reasoning do you call your synod ecumenical, which neither the Roman bishop approved (though it is prescribed by canon that ecclesiastical matters should not be settled without the Pope who is in Rome), nor, to speak truly, the Alexandrian, nor the Antiochene, nor the Jerusalemite bishop?" In the Eighth Ecumenical Synod, moreover, the letters of Nicholas I were read—both to the Emperor Michael and to Photius—at the fourth session, in which the Pontiff testifies that "there had been very many assemblies of holy Fathers, who had deliberated and observed that no conclusion of any rising deliberation should be given without the consent of the Roman See and of the Roman Pontiff," and that "all synods and holy councils are strengthened and receive their stability by the authority and sanctioning of the Roman Church"; upon the reading of which, acclamation was given to Nicholas at the end of the session. Moreover, these statements were intrinsically pertinent to the nature of the cause then being treated. The Fathers of that same Council in the first session subscribed to the formula of faith proposed

by the Pontiff Hadrian, in which they testify "that they are unwilling to be separated from the faith and doctrine of the Roman Church, and following in all things the constitutions of the Fathers and especially of the holy presiders of the Apostolic See, they anathematize all heresies." The Eighth Synod therefore professed the necessity of the consent of the Roman Pontiff for the validity of decrees of faith. Cf. also the testimony of Nicephorus, bishop of Constantinople, cited in Thesis 12, sub n. 3. Thus, without the consent or confirmation of the Roman Pontiff, decrees issued by the universal council were not irrefragable—they were not, that is, those to which the assent of faith would be owed. From these considerations, moreover, there follows what we were saying, namely that the confirmation of the Roman Pontiff was not obligatory but free.

As regards antecedent confirmation—when, namely, the Roman Pontiffs established the rule of faith for settling a controversy—it is established that the same Roman Pontiffs proposed the rule of faith handed down by themselves to the Fathers as certain and immutable, and therefore to be held by all, the power of judging otherwise being denied to the Fathers, and this not only without the Fathers contradicting but with their consent.

Indeed, at the Council of Ephesus a cause of faith was being treated and the sentence in the cause of Nestorius's deposition depended on the sentence in the cause of faith. Now Cyril of Alexandria had consulted Celestine, bishop of Rome, as to what he thought on the matter: "Since the ancient custom of the Churches recommends that matters of this kind be communicated to your Holiness, I write, plainly compelled by necessity, informing you of this" (he sets forth the heresy of Nestorius)… "We do not desert his communion publicly and openly before notifying your piety of this. Deign therefore to prescribe here what you think, so that it may be clearly established for us whether we should communicate with him or freely declare to everyone that no one communicates with him who fosters and preaches such erroneous doctrine." Celestine, having examined the matter and writing back to Cyril, decreed thus: "Wherefore, having adopted the authority of our See and acting in our stead and place, with power, you are to execute this sentence, not without exquisite severity: namely, that unless within

an interval of ten days, to be counted from the day of this our warning, he anathematizes in express terms his nefarious doctrine and promises to hold in the future that faith concerning the birth of Christ our Lord which both the Roman and your Holiness's Church and the entire Christian religion at length proclaim, your Holiness is immediately to provide for that Church, and he is to understand that he is separated from our body in every way." This sentence Celestine pronounced without an ecumenical synod, in his own Roman synod; for that Celestine had already condemned the heresy of Nestorius before the Ephesian Synod is attested by the Ephesian Fathers in the report to the Emperors concerning the deposition of Nestorius after the first session, saying: "We also extol with praise Celestine, bishop of great Rome, who before our sentence had condemned the heretical dogmas of Nestorius and preceded us in pronouncing sentence against him, looking out for the security of the churches and the pious and salutary faith."

Wherefore, the Fathers of the East who finally condemned Nestorius (at act 1) judged that the sentence of Celestine against Nestorius had force of itself on account of the authority of the Roman Pontiff even after the ecumenical synod had been convoked and even while it was still in session, and that they were bound by it. For they confess that they came to this sorrowful sentence against him compelled by the sacred canons and the letter of their most holy Father Celestine. Hence Firmus, bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia (act 2), says: "The Apostolic and holy See of the most holy Celestine through the letters which he sent to the most religious Bishops Cyril etc. had already pronounced beforehand in the present matter a sentence and rule which we also followed, carrying out in practice that form and pronouncing canonical and apostolic judgment against him." Celestine himself, moreover, in the *commonitorium* given to his legates to the Council, who were to preside together with Cyril (letter 17 of Celestine, in Constant), thus commands them: "We command that the authority of the Apostolic See is to be preserved… if there should come to a disputation, you are to judge their positions, not to enter into debate."

To the Synod of Chalcedon St. Leo writes in letter 93 (or 72): "In these brothers Paschasinus and Lucentius, bishops, and Boniface and Basil, priests, let your fraternity consider me presiding over your synod,

my presence not being separated from you who am now present in my representatives and have long since not been absent in the proclamation of the Catholic faith—so that you who cannot be ignorant of what we believe according to ancient tradition cannot doubt what we desire" (what need was there for them to know what he himself believed and wished to be defined, if his faith were not the norm necessarily to be followed by the Fathers?) "Therefore, most beloved brethren, let the vain unbelief of those who err be at rest, the audacity of disputing against divinely inspired faith being entirely rejected; nor let it be lawful to defend what it is not lawful to believe; since according to the evangelical authorities, prophetic voices, and apostolic doctrine, it has been most fully and clearly declared through the letters which we sent to the most blessed Flavian of revered memory what is the pious and sincere confession concerning the mystery of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ." Leo, that is, declares to the bishops assembled in the Synod that it is not lawful to believe otherwise than what he himself had most fully and clearly declared.

Hence at the first session, when the question was raised whether the exposition of faith drawn up by the late Flavian was orthodox and Catholic, Paschasinus said: "Flavian has set forth the faith in a holy, complete, and Catholic manner; for his exposition of faith is in accord with the letter of the most blessed and apostolic man, the Pope of Rome." The care of the presiding legates, who had already received the doctrine of faith from the Pontiff, was aimed not at learning something from the bishops, but at having the Roman doctrine received by all. And at the second session, when the most magnificent judges and the amplest Senate, present to maintain peace in the synod, had asked the Fathers to make an exposition of faith, the most reverend bishops replied that they did not wish to make another exposition, and Cecropius, the bishop, explaining their sense as it were, said: "The matters pertaining to Eutyches have come to light and on these a form has been given by the most holy archbishop of the city of Rome and we follow him and we have all subscribed to the letter"; and the rest cried out: "We all say the same, let what has been set forth suffice, another exposition may not be made," adding also a little later, all together: "We

believe thus, no one doubts our faith, we have already subscribed to the letter"—namely of Leo.

When, however, the most glorious judges and the Senate asked the synod itself to wish to make an exposition of faith, the bishops acquiesced, yet clearly indicating what was to be the norm of the exposition to be made, which was issued in the fifth session. This norm was: the Nicene Council, the Ephesian Council, the faith of Cyril and Celestine, and the letter of the most holy Leo. That is, the exposition of faith proposed by Leo is numbered among those concerning which it is no longer lawful to doubt and which are norms necessarily to be followed by the Fathers teaching in the Council. Hence the Fathers in the letter to Pulcheria after the second session, in which Dioscorus was condemned, recounting events, say that all went well "Christ prospering their understanding, who showed in Leo, wonderful, the truth; for just as he used the wise Peter, so also he uses him as his champion." There were indeed at the second session bishops from Illyricum and Palestine who still had doubts; but the doubt concerned the meaning of certain texts of Leo's letter that were obscure to them; hence bishops were chosen from among those who had already subscribed, to instruct those who doubted, not to dispute as if the matter were still in doubt. The doctrine of Leo was certainly never brought into dispute. Therefore the letter of Leo was held by the Fathers of the Council who were about to issue a profession of faith in their own name as irreformable, no differently from the Nicene symbol and the doctrine of Peter. This does not, however, prevent them from also having been judges, as they showed in the fourth and fifth sessions, on which point something must be said below.

Writing to the Sixth Ecumenical Synod, Pope Agatho, having declared the faith of the Roman Church and proposed it as the most certain and immutable rule, reminds them that it is the confession of blessed Peter, "who received the spiritual sheep of the Church to be fed by the Redeemer of all; by whose assisting protection this apostolic Church of his has never deviated from the way of truth in any part of error; whose authority, as belonging to the prince of all the Apostles, the entire Catholic Church of Christ and the universal synods have always faithfully embraced, and in all things have followed; and all the

venerable Fathers have embraced the apostolic doctrine… and the holy Doctors have venerated and followed it." This letter of Agatho, moreover, was read in the Synod at act 4, and the holy Synod embraced it with outstretched arms and received it faithfully (in the decree of faith at act 18). Furthermore, what Agatho transmits in those letters concerning the doctrine and authority of the Roman See is not something indifferent and not necessarily pertaining to the matter being treated, but on the contrary was intimately and essentially connected with the heart of the matter; for it is the reason by which it is proved that the doctrine of the double will that Agatho was teaching is most certain and to be held. And therefore the Emperor Constantine Pogonatus, who attended the Synod, testifies in the letters to the Roman Synod that "we marveled greatly, as at the voice of blessed Peter himself, at the account of Agatho; for not a single one dissented." And the Fathers themselves write to Agatho: "Therefore to you, as the Bishop of the first See of the universal Church, we leave what is to be done, since you stand on the firm rock of faith, having gladly read the letters of true confession sent by your paternal beatitude to the most pious Emperor… With Constantine urging us to decide… we have destroyed the heretics with anathema on the basis of the sentence passed upon them beforehand through your sacred letters." And therefore Leo II, granting the confirmation requested by the Fathers, renders this reason: because "the Synod has followed in all things the apostolic rule and the doctrine of the approved Fathers, and because it has proclaimed the definition of the right faith most fully, as has been said, which also the Apostolic See of blessed Peter the Apostle (in whose ministry, though unequal, we function) has received with veneration; and therefore both we and through our office this venerable Apostolic See consent harmoniously and unanimously to those things which have been defined by it and confirm them with the authority of blessed Peter, just as upon the solid Rock which is Christ, having received stability from the Lord himself." It is therefore true what Agatho, in the sight of the universal Synod and with the Synod's approval, proclaimed: that the authority of the Roman See has always and in all things been followed by the entire Church of Christ and the universal synods. But in matters of doctrine we do not follow the authority of one with whom we merely agree, but of one

whom we have as our teacher and guide, whose doctrine is the rule for our thinking and judging. And if we follow that authority always and in all things, we hold it as a necessary norm from which it is not lawful to deviate without erring.

With the confirmation of Councils having thus been declared, both antecedent and subsequent, made by the Roman See, it is useful to argue in the following manner. Therefore 1° according to the sense of the universal Church the supreme and full authority of defining in causes of faith does not reside in the totality of the assembled Pastors together with their head presiding over them, according to the norm of aristocratic governance. The reason is evident: for what it means for the supreme and full authority to reside in the totality of an assembly is that the decrees issued by it have force because the totality or the greater part consents, even if the vote of some individual or even of the presiding officer is lacking, and the totality has the power to decree that the vote of some individual or of the presiding officer need not be taken into account. But if on the contrary the vote of one individual or its absence can annul the decree of the rest of the totality, and in that assembly there is no right to decree that his vote need not be taken into account, then it must be denied that the supreme and full authority resides in the totality. This is how all conceive supreme and full authority residing in the totality of an assembly, and the nature of things demands it; for if not each individual but the totality possesses the supreme power, it cannot lawfully happen that the vote of one individual has the power to annul the decree of the rest. But from what was said about subsequent confirmation it is clear that the vote of the Roman Pontiff or its absence can annul the decree of the remaining totality, and that the totality cannot decree that his vote need not be taken into account; therefore.

Therefore 2° neither does the supreme and full authority of teaching reside simultaneously in both—that is, in the assembly of Pastors and in the Roman Pontiff, in the union of the two, namely of the Roman Pontiff and the Body of Pastors, such that from these the subject of supreme authority is necessarily constituted, after the manner of what they call constitutional governance. For when a subject of authority of this kind exists, the law or decree of neither part is valid without the consent of the other; but neither part is superior to the other, nor is the

assembly bound to follow the authority of the king. Wherefore if one person so presides over the whole assembly that he can declare what is to be decreed and the assembly must follow his authority, he himself sitting as judge of all in the assembly—it cannot be said that the subject of the supreme and full authority is constituted by that One and the totality of the assembly. Now that such is the relationship of the Roman Pontiff to the assembled college of Pastors—that he sits in it as judge of all, that his judgment is the necessary norm for the rest, and that the Synod must follow his authority—is established from what was said about antecedent confirmation.

But it is necessary that the supreme and full authority of teaching exist in the Church, and therefore that some subject of it exist; if, however, this is neither the totality of Pastors, nor the supreme Pastor together with the totality of the other Pastors, it remains that this subject is only that one Pastor who has the right of confirming the decrees of Councils and whose authority Councils always follow in all things. But to this supreme and full authority of teaching all must submit; and the magisterium that is infallible in the Church requires faith from all; therefore. Moreover, a fuller discussion of this argument will be had in the following thesis.

You will say: has it not always been maintained in the Church that the authority of universal councils is supreme and most full? I reply: it is one thing for that authority to be in the Council, another for it to be in the totality of the Council. That in an ecumenical council confirmed by the Pope there is supreme and most full authority, no one doubts; but since a council can in itself be an assembly either of equals or of unequals in power, it is asked what the subject of that authority is in a council of bishops—whether it is the totality, or some singular person to whom the rest are subordinated as members to a head. Now that this subject is the totality was maintained by the Gallicans, but not by the universal Church. But on this argument again, as we have already said, more in the following thesis.

But is not the consent of the greater part required in councils in order that a decree may be issued? I reply: the consent of the greater part is required for a definition to be conciliar; for this is demanded by the nature of the matter, since a definition cannot be called conciliar to

which the council does not consent. The consent is not required, however, for the definition to be valid and irrefragable, if the Roman Pontiff is infallible of himself; hence only those who denied the infallibility of the Pontiff required the consent of the council or of the bishops for the validity of definitions.

From what has been proved, moreover, it is established that the Roman Pontiff is infallible of himself; for such is he whose authority must necessarily be followed by councils.

Another demonstration of this infallibility, drawn from the relationship of the Roman Pontiff to the Council and vice versa, will be given after letter I.

g) It is established that on the occasion of the Acacian schism, by which the Eastern Church was troubled, the Roman Pontiff Hormisdas prescribed a libellus, or formula, of faith to be subscribed to by those who wished to return to the unity of the Church, the communion of the Catholic Church being denied to those who refused to subscribe; and that the Eastern bishops obeyed, and that with them thus restored to unity, peace was re-established (cf. Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, 5th century, art. 16). Now that libellus contained a profession of the infallible magisterium of the Roman Pontiff (cf. what we say under letter I, where substantially the same libellus occurs). This libellus was also subscribed by Justinian and presented to Agapitus, Roman Pontiff (Pitra, *Ius ecclesiasticum*, vol. 2, p. 219). From these considerations it is established that the dogma of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was confirmed by the public profession of the Eastern bishops and that this profession was held necessary for obtaining Catholic unity. Whether one says that this truth was at that time held with certain faith by the universal Church, or that it sufficed for the Eastern bishops that this profession was proposed by the Apostolic See so that they accepted it—whichever of the two is said, it amounts to the same.

h) It is established that an explicit, universal, and ancient profession of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff existed in the Church. It suffices to adduce the following. Cyprian, letter 55 to Cornelius, concerning schismatics, says: "They dare to sail to the chair of Peter and to the principal Church… not thinking that these are the

Romans whose faith was praised by the Apostle's proclamation, to whom treachery cannot have access." Jerome in the *Apologia*, bk. 3, ch. 12, against Rufinus: "Know that the Roman faith praised by the apostolic voice does not receive deceptions of this kind." And letter 15 to Damasus: "Speaking with the successor of the Fisherman and the disciple of the Cross, following no one as first save Christ alone, I unite myself in communion with your beatitude, that is, with the chair of Peter. I know that the Church is built upon that rock… I do not know Vitalis, I reject Meletius, I ignore Paulinus; whoever does not gather with you, scatters—that is, whoever is not of Christ is of Antichrist… Therefore I beseech your beatitude that by your letters the authority be given me as to which hypostases are to be passed over in silence and which are to be spoken of," and the following letter to the same: "The Church of Antioch, split into three parts, hastens to draw me to itself… I meanwhile cry out: whoever is joined to the chair of Peter is mine."

Paulinus the deacon, in the libellus presented to Pope Zosimus, says: "I beseech the justice of your beatitude, Lord Zosimus, venerable Pope. True faith is never disturbed, and especially in the Apostolic Church, in which perverse teachers of faith are as easily detected as they are truly punished." Theodoret, letter 116 (ed. Migne), to Renatus, Roman priest: "That See holds the primacy of all the Churches throughout the world for many reasons, and above all for this, that it remained free from heretical infection, and no one holding a contrary opinion ever sat in it, but it preserved the apostolic grace intact." That this immunity was not merely a matter of fact but a proper and therefore perpetual prerogative of the See, he teaches in letter 52 to Leo the Great: "For your see is adorned with many prerogatives… but above all, faith adorns it." Likewise Gregory of Nazianzus in the poem on his own life has words similar to these at vv. 562 ff.: "Nature has not given two suns, but two Romes are the lights of the whole world—the ancient power and the new—differing between themselves to the degree that one illumines the East and the other the West. Yet beauty matches beauty with equal weight. As regards the faith of those cities, the old Rome now, as before, runs aright, binding the whole West with the saving word (τὴν ἑσπέραν πᾶσαν δεοῦσα τῷ σωτηρίῳ λόγῳ), as is fitting for her who presides over all things and cultivates the whole

harmony (in the Trinity) of God (καθὼς δίκαιον τὴν πρόεδρον τῶν ὅλων, ὅλην σέβουσαν τὴν Θεοῦ συμφωνίαν)." Namely, the preservation of the right faith is linked to the προεδρίᾳ τῶν ὅλων, which is proper to the Roman See and therefore perpetual, just as the dignity of τῆς τῶν ὅλων προεδρίας is perpetual—a dignity already acknowledged and professed by St. Ignatius the Martyr. "The new Rome," Gregory continues, "stood upright, but now by no means so (I speak of my city, now no longer mine), but lay in the depth of ruin," etc.

St. Theodore the Studite, letters, bk. 2, letter 63: "I testify now before God and all that the heretics have severed themselves from the body of Christ and from the supreme vertex throne, in which Christ placed the keys of faith, against which the gates of hell—that is, the mouths of heretics—have not prevailed until now nor shall prevail until the end, as he who does not lie has promised. Let the most blessed and apostolic Paschalis (who is Paschalis I), worthy of his name, rejoice; for he has fulfilled the work of Peter."

The councils have professed the same. The words of Agatho read and approved at the Sixth Council we gave in the preceding section, to which must be added what he subjoins shortly after: "This is indeed the rule of the true faith which this apostolic Church of Christ, the spiritual mother of your most tranquil empire, has truly maintained and defended in prosperity and in adversity, which will be proved never to have erred from the path of apostolic tradition, nor to have yielded succumbing to heretical wickedness; but as she received from the beginning of the Christian faith from the founders, the princes of the Apostles of Christ, she remains to the end in immaculate faith, according to the divine promise of the Lord and Savior himself spoken in the holy Gospels to the prince of his disciples: 'I have prayed for you,' etc."

Then Leo IX in the letter to Michael Cerularius, ch. 7, thus questions the schismatics: "Have not all the inventions of heretics and the hearts of the brethren been reproved, refuted, or overcome by the See of the Prince of the Apostles—namely the Roman Church—both through Peter himself and through his successors, and confirmed in the faith of Peter, which has not failed until now nor shall fail to the end?" Cf. also his letter to Peter of Antioch. This is indeed the prerogative

which Gelasius professed in the decree on canonical writings, saying: "After these prophetic, evangelical, and apostolic writings on which the Catholic Church has been founded by the grace of God, it should also be made known that, although the one bridal chamber of Christ is the whole Catholic Church spread throughout the world, the holy Roman, Catholic, and Apostolic Church has been set before the other Churches by no synodal constitutions, but has obtained primacy by the evangelical voice of our Lord and Savior: 'You are Peter,' etc.… The first See therefore is the Roman Church of the Apostle Peter, having neither spot nor wrinkle nor anything of the kind." The necessity of this is declared from its purpose in letter 8 to the Emperor Anastasius: "This is what the Apostolic See greatly takes care of: that since the glorious confession of the Apostle (Peter) is the root of the world, it should be stained by no crack of wickedness, by no contagion whatsoever. For if (God forbid, and we trust it cannot happen) something of the kind were to occur, from where would we dare to resist any error, or from where would we require the correction of those who err?" For all applies the exhortation of Peter Chrysologus to Eutyches: "In all things we exhort you to obediently attend to those things which have been written by the most blessed Pope of the Roman city, since blessed Peter who lives and presides in his own See gives the truth of faith to those who seek it." From these testimonies it is evident that the Roman Pontiff is not only infallible but infallible of himself; for such is he who is the ground of the infallibility of others, as is proclaimed by these witnesses or by the greater part of them.

The same was acknowledged also by the Greeks after the Florentine Synod, for whom George of Trebizond may be a witness, in the letter to the Cretans concerning the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church (in Leo Allatius, *Graecia Orthodoxa*, vol. 1), saying at n. 12: "It must indeed be believed that it cannot happen that the Roman Church, which is the first and through which the universal Church has its unity, should fall into heresy. For if she herself has erred together with heretics, in what one, holy Church shall we Christians believe?… Let us hear Christ the Savior: 'You are Peter,' he says, 'and upon this rock I will build my Church and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.' By the gates of hell he here means heresies," etc.

I) It is established that the universal Church in a solemn profession of faith has professed the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff of himself. For: 1° The Fathers of the Eighth Ecumenical Council, treading in the footsteps of their predecessors (for the Eastern bishops had made the same profession in subscribing to the formula of faith prescribed by Hormisdas), issued this solemn profession: "The first salvation is to guard the rule of the right faith. Thereafter to deviate in no way from the constitutions of God and of the Fathers. For the one of these pertains to faith, the other to good works; as it is written, without faith it is impossible to please God, so again it is read, faith without works is dead. And since the sentence of our Lord Jesus Christ cannot be passed over which says, 'You are Peter and upon this rock I will build my Church,' these words are proved true by their effects, because in the Apostolic See the religion has always been preserved immaculate and the holy doctrine celebrated. Therefore, desiring in no way to be separated from her faith and doctrine, we hope to merit to be in the one communion which the Apostolic See preaches, in which is the entire and true solidity of the Christian religion. And following in all things the constitutions of the Fathers and especially of the holy presiders of the Apostolic See, we anathematize all heresies… since, as we have said, following in all things the apostolic See and observing all its constitutions, we hope to merit to be in the one communion which the Apostolic See preaches, in which is the entire and true solidity of the Christian religion." This formula, which was read in the first session, is certainly a profession of faith; for the rule of the right faith is set forth and accepted, the discussion is about faith and doctrine from which no one can be separated, and all heretics are anathematized. Furthermore, in that same session, when the Roman legates asked: "Does this libellus (which contained that profession) please all of you?" the whole holy Synod exclaimed: "The libellus set forth has been read to us justly and fittingly by the Holy Church of the Romans and therefore it pleases all" (and if those things that are human and owed to worldly affections, by which even Fathers existing in a Synod can be influenced, you separate from those things which are done by them synodally under the assistance of the Holy Spirit and which alone have authority, it will be evident that no force is diminished in this universal subscription by the

fact that afterwards, according to human reasoning, it was less pleasing to the Greek Fathers, who nevertheless in the end, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, gave their consent absolutely). At the second session, moreover, all subscribed: "The legates said: 'We have brought the libellus from the holy Roman Church, from the most holy Pope Hadrian, receiving a command from him to require it of you that you make this libellus and thus receive it; are you therefore willing to do what has been commanded by the most holy Pope Hadrian?' The bishops said: 'We are willing and it pleases us and we subscribe.'"

Now it is manifest that in that profession of faith is contained a profession of the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff as infallible of itself. For it is asserted: 1° that in the Apostolic See the religion has always been preserved immaculate and the holy doctrine celebrated; and 2° this is said to be a proof from effects of the truth of the words of Christ: "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church"—by which we are plainly taught that that fact of the preserved immaculate religion and celebrated holy doctrine in the Apostolic See is necessarily connected with the Primacy of Peter and therefore perpetual; 3° it is expressly asserted that in the Apostolic See is the entire and true solidity of the Christian religion; for the relative "in which" is immediately connected to the Apostolic See, and solidity coheres with the concept of the Rock which is the Apostolic See, as declared from the beginning of the libellus. But in these words not a fact but a prerogative or property of the Apostolic See is signified; and the entire and true solidity of the Christian religion is nothing other than infallible faith, or infallible magisterium of faith. Moreover, this infallible magisterium of itself is exhibited; for the Roman Pontiff is infallible by the very fact that he is the Rock of the Church—and insofar as he is such, infallibility belongs to him; but he is not the Rock and a stable Rock through the Church; on the contrary, the Church is stable through the Rock; therefore.

Furthermore, by reason of the fact that the Apostolic See is infallible, the Fathers testify that they wish to follow her and therefore by following her to anathematize all heretics; the doctrine of the Roman See is therefore the rule which the Fathers follow so as not to err; but a rule of this kind has its rectitude not from its followers but from itself.

Therefore the universal Church assembled in Synod has professed the infallible magisterium of itself of the Roman Pontiff.

Furthermore, here it is pleasing to draw from the manner of acting of the Roman See and of the bishops in the Council another argument which we promised under letter F. Namely, at the very opening of the Council, before anything is decreed, the Roman Pontiff commands all the bishops to make a profession of faith in his infallible magisterium, and all the Catholic bishops comply with the Pontiff and subscribe to the libellus proposed, and the Pontiff required the libellus from the schismatics so that they might be admitted into the Synod. But this in no way coheres with the Gallican position; and the Gallicans, unless they had shed their opinion, would not have wished to subscribe. For that command of the Pontiff and the spontaneous obedience of the whole Synod make it evidently manifest that it was believed by the universal Church: 1° that the Pope is superior to the Council not only in honor but in jurisdiction; 2° that the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff is of itself infallible. For the object with which the libellus to be subscribed is concerned is some doctrine of faith; furthermore, the Roman Pontiff commands the bishops to subscribe and the matter had not yet been defined by any synod (if you say the matter had already been defined through the subscription of the Easterns in the time of Hormisdas, who commanded them to subscribe to the same libellus, the same argument will be redirected to that earlier period); but the bishops do not marvel that the Pontiff commands this nor do they complain about this command, but simply acknowledge themselves to be obligated to obey and obediently subscribe. Wherefore one of two alternatives must be the case: either this was the most manifest and certain doctrine in the universal Church, or it sufficed for the bishops assembled in Council that the Pontiff commanded it, so that they were certain that this doctrine could not be anything but true. But whichever alternative is stated, it amounts to the same; therefore.

Another solemn profession of the same doctrine is that which was made by the Greeks at the Second Ecumenical Council of Lyons. For it was approved by the Council, in which it was solemnly made and on account of which the Greeks were received into union; and it corresponds to what Clement VI had already required of the Greeks for

union (Oderic. Raynaldi, *Annals*, year 1343, nn. 12, 15). "The Greeks therefore, with the approval of the ecumenical Synod, professed: 'that the holy Roman Church holds the supreme and full primacy and principate over the universal Catholic Church, which she truly and humbly recognizes as received with the fullness of power from the Lord himself in blessed Peter, the prince or head of the Apostles, whose successor the Roman Pontiff is; and as she is bound before all others to defend the truth of faith, so also, if any questions concerning faith should arise, they ought to be defined by her judgment.'" Now whether the last part is considered by itself or in connection with what precedes, it is clear that infallible judgment in questions of faith is asserted for the Pontiff. For the judgment by which questions of faith ought to be defined cannot be other than infallible; for if it is fallible, there is no necessity that questions be settled through it, since through it they cannot be settled at all. Nor should you say that the judgment spoken of here is a judgment issued together with an ecumenical synod, for there is no mention of any such synod here, and the judgment is said to be "his"—the Roman Pontiff's, distinct from the rest ("as he is bound before all others," etc.)—and therefore the judgment of him as distinguished from the rest is signified. But if you compare these words with what precedes, it is clear that the authority of defining questions of faith is the authority of one who has the primacy over the universal Church (not merely in the universal Church, as the Gallicans would have it), who has the fullness of power of feeding, that is, of governing and teaching—for this too pertains to power; but a full power of teaching that is fallible implies a contradiction, for it lacks its most essential complement, which is the charisma of infallibility.

The third solemn profession is the Florentine definition, by which the Roman Pontiff is said to be the Teacher of all Christians. But the Teacher of all Christians is he to whom all Christians—and therefore the universal Church even taken collectively—must give credence. I say "the universal Church even taken collectively"; because the faith of the Church must be one; the Christians taken individually, therefore, cannot be obligated to believe what the universal Church taken collectively is not also obligated to believe. But the Church cannot be obligated to believe what can have falsehood underlying it; therefore the

magisterium of the Roman Pontiff is necessarily infallible. And indeed infallible of itself; for a teacher's magisterium cannot borrow its force from the assent of the disciples.

You will say: if so, then the matter was already defined before the Vatican Council—which cannot be admitted, since those who thought otherwise would not have been held as heretics.

I reply: although that doctrine is most certainly contained in those professions, and those who issued them intended to profess it, nevertheless some analysis or reasoning is required to understand it from those words; and what is held as defined by the Church is what is represented in the direct and immediate sense of the words. But what is gathered by means of reasoning pertains in itself to theological knowledge, not to the common knowledge of the faithful for whom all decrees of faith are issued. Moreover, all Roman theologians already certainly held that the Gallican opinion was at variance with the Florentine definition and the other professions of faith.

L) Even at the time when in the disputes that arose a certain opinion prevailed in the schools of certain churches—that the Roman Pontiff is not infallible of himself—the Roman Pontiffs nonetheless continued to exercise the authority of their infallible magisterium even in those churches in which the schools defended the opposing opinion, and in such a way that, whatever was held theoretically or defended by partisan zeal in the schools, practically those same churches, no differently from others, openly reverenced the authority of the supreme magisterium of the Roman See. Thus, for example, Innocent XII acted in the proscription of the propositions concerning pure love of God; thus Innocent X in the condemnation of the propositions of Jansenius; and Clement XI in the condemnation of the propositions of Quesnel; and thus, as we have said, the Gallican Church conducted itself toward these Pontiffs. For the Pontiffs, without any hesitation or doubt about their infallibility, in their Constitutions establish norms of faith necessarily to be followed by all under penalty of excommunication and command all bishops not to examine those constitutions but to promulgate them and cause them to be observed; and even the Gallicans always felt themselves obligated to do this on account of the

authority of the Apostolic See. Cf. the letters of the bishops of Gaul to Innocent X, dated July 15, 1603.

Let there be heard, as a summary of all, what took place in the Quesnel affair. Clement XI in the Brief *Gratulationes*, given to the archbishops, bishops, and ecclesiastical men assembled in the General Assembly of the Gallican Clergy in Paris, rebuked certain presiders of the Gallican Church because they had usurped for themselves the license of recalling to examination and passing judgment on the Pontifical constitution *Vineam Domini*. The most holy Pontiff therefore says among other things that they cannot be ignorant of what "the whole Church throughout the world knows, that the See of blessed Peter the apostle has the right of judging every Church and no one has the right of judging its judgment. Indeed, if it had pleased them to observe the very form of our Apostolic constitution—not recently invented by us but employed by our predecessors through a long series of centuries—by which we with apostolic authority command, commit, and mandate the execution and integral observance of that same constitution to all archbishops and bishops, from it you could have been taught sufficiently that in this cause we do not seek your counsel, do not ask for your votes, do not await your judgment, but enjoin obedience… You were running well, venerable brethren, and following the illustrious footsteps of your forebears to the Apostolic See as to the citadel of faith, the metropolis of all discipline and the center of Catholic unity, to which all the lines of all the Churches must converge, lest going astray elsewhere they find ruin, and you were making your way confidently as well as humbly to the faith of blessed Peter which never fails, by which the errors of heretics are overthrown by a peremptory decree. Why therefore have you so quickly turned to what is almost another Gospel?… Let your fraternity preserve the honor and dignity proper to the episcopal order, but let it not exceed the boundaries which our fathers have set; let no bishops inferior to her presume to judge or to teach the Roman Church, the mother and mistress of all, or to judge after her judgment; but let what the Roman Pontiff (we recite to you the old Gallican canons) has decreed according to his sacred ministry by apostolic authority be received by all." These words, though directed to some bishops, hold for all, and the irrefragable sentence of the Pontiff is

asserted prior to the consent or judgment of the order of bishops, who indeed profess, as the same Pontiff says, that decrees of faith issued by the supreme Pontiffs have supreme authority in the universal Church and the bishops do not confer firmness on them: "as if," the Pontiff adds, "the same apostolic judgments issued by the supreme Pontiffs for establishing the rule of faith, which a few years ago the entire Gallican Church in letters sent to our predecessors openly professed to rest on divine and supreme authority throughout the universal Church, were now, forsooth, to be considered nearly infirm and as it were tottering, unless they were propped up by the supervening judgment of your few bishops."

What in reply to so grave a rebuke of so great a dignity did the bishops respond? Cardinal de Noailles, in the name of all, replied among other things: "When the clergy said that the constitutions of the holy Pontiffs accepted by the body of bishops oblige the whole Church (you see what the Roman Pontiff disapproved and rebuked), its intention was not that a solemnity of this kind of acceptance is necessary for them to be held by all Catholics as rules of believing and speaking" (and this response is preserved at the end of the preface to the *Trutina Propositionum Vivae*). Behold also the practical position of the Gallican Church. In these matters the practical persuasion and faith of both parties in the infallible magisterium of the Roman See is apparent; for they could not have spoken more clearly if they had firmly held it.

M) It is established that the opinion denying the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is new in the Church and its beginning can be indicated as rather recent. For it cannot be denied what Ruardus Tapperus testifies in the third *Theological Oration*, n. 7: "Whether this ruler (the Roman Pontiff) can be mistaken in his judgment when he passes cognizance on matters of faith and morals of the faithful, just as kings and bishops in their judgments, has been controverted and disputed on both sides for about a hundred and fifty years… For from the time of the Council of Constance and Basel, certain doctors teach that the privilege of infallible judgment resides in the ecumenical council alone. But the older writers concord in handing down from the Scriptures that this privilege of infallible judgment belongs to Peter, placed over the whole household of Christ, and to the Roman Pontiff, the supreme vicar of Christ on earth

after Peter, as to him who alone has received the keys of the house." Cf. also the testimony of John Major in Thesis 13, sub n. 4. That the matter stands as Tapperus testifies is evident from what has been demonstrated thus far. But it is also pleasing to adduce the consensus of the School, for which it suffices to call as witness St. Thomas, whom all generally follow. He in *Summa Theologiae* IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 10 teaches that "the promulgation of a creed belongs to the authority of him to whose authority it belongs finally to determine those things that are of faith, so that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. But this belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, to whom the greater and more difficult questions of the Church are referred. Hence the Lord says to Peter, whom he appointed Supreme Pontiff, in Luke 22: 'I have prayed for you,' etc. And the reason for this is that there should be one faith of the Church… which cannot be preserved unless a question of faith that arises is decided by him who presides over the whole Church, so that his judgment may be firmly held by the whole Church."

Wherefore, although St. Antoninus, *Summa Theologica*, pt. 3, tit. 22, ch. 3 (ed. 1740), affirmed that the Pope is infallible together with the Council, his authority could not rightly be cited against us. For such an affirmation is not in itself exclusive, and the reason for appending that limitation must be sought in the controversies then existing, on account of which the holy Doctor wished to affirm what was certain to all. Moreover, this is not the meaning of the words of St. Antoninus. For he establishes that the authority of declaring doubts in matters of faith, from which the obligation of belief follows, resides only with the Supreme Pontiff. And the reason is that which St. Thomas gives: "for it is necessary to place in the Church one head to whom it belongs to declare, etc.… the reason being that it is necessary to establish the Church in such a manner that the whole community of the universal Church remains in the unity of faith; but this could not be the case unless the whole Church had recourse to one head. But it is established that in the Church there can be no such head except the Pope alone." The totality of bishops is therefore excluded from this dignity of the head. Then he raises the objection for himself that the Pope is a single person who can sin and err, and that with a power capable of erring there ought not to be authority against which it is not lawful to hold an

opinion. He replies, however, that "although the Pope acting as a single person and on his own initiative can err, yet the Pope using counsel and seeking the help of the universal Church, God so ordaining who said to Peter: 'I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail,' cannot err." In these words there is not expressed a necessary condition for the definition of the Pontiff to be infallible, but the condition for the exercise of the authority of defining is expressed—namely, that he be considered to speak not as a single person but as a universal doctor. Nor do we think that St. Antoninus wished the condition he mentioned to be taken exclusively, if by "council" and "the help of the universal Church" an ecumenical synod is understood—since this neither coheres sufficiently with what precedes nor is required by the antithesis he established with the Pontiff as a single person, nor is it historically true. But if by "council" is understood indefinitely any council whether universal or particular, or simply counsel (which the holy Doctor perhaps wrote, or intended to say), and by "the help of the universal Church" is understood the manifestation of divine tradition preserved in the universal Church, or the prayer of the Church, or something similar, these in no way hinder the doctrine of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff of himself; for it is certain that human means must be employed in the preparatory stage in order for a definition of faith to be issued.

COROLLARY

From the demonstration of this thesis it is clear what judgment is to be made about the opinion of those who wish to be Catholic, yet cannot or will not shed certain Gallican prejudices, who therefore concede that the Roman Pontiff is infallible, but, as they themselves say, through the Church which is infallible of herself. If they said "on account of the Church," they would be saying something true; for any social authority and its prerogatives exist on account of the society; and therefore the Church is infallible of herself insofar as she is the end for which the gift of infallibility was given. But if they wish to say that the Roman Pontiff is infallible efficiently through the Church, they are utterly ignorant of what they are talking about and pervert the whole

economy of divine institution. For just as in general the authority of the Pastors and specifically the authority of Peter is not in them through the Church, but on the contrary is in the Church through them, to whom it has been given by God; so also the authority of teaching infallibly is not in the Roman Pontiff—just as it was not in Peter—through the Church, but is in him immediately from God and through him in the Church; which will be more evident from the following thesis.

THESIS XXVI

As a certain theological conclusion we defend that, setting aside the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, the magisterium of the remaining college even of all the Pastors cannot claim for itself the prerogative of divinely promised infallibility in teaching; there is therefore in the Church one immediate subject of infallible authority.

I. The point of the question must first be clarified. And first we set forth certain things as established. Certainly: 1° it is certain that the union of the body of the Church with its visible head will be perpetual, just as the Church herself will be perpetual, and therefore perpetual also will be the union of the bishops with the Roman Pontiff, to the extent that it is necessary for the union of the Church with her head, and her perpetuity and catholicity to be secure. Wherefore, if by Christ's institution the union of the bishops with the Roman Pontiff is obtained through their subordination to and obedience toward him, it is certain that this subordination and obedience will always be had to the extent that it is necessary for that union to exist.

2° It is certain that the authority of teaching has been instituted to teach in act, and that the assistance of infallibility has been promised to the exercise of it, in such a way that if there is one subject of infallibility while others are authentic teachers, though not infallible of themselves, it does not suffice for their judgment to be infallibly certain that these are joined in communion with that one, but it is required that they be joined with that one as he exercises his authority—whether he exercises it explicitly or at least implicitly.

Now, as regards the point of the question, we note the following. 1° The question is not whether the universal consensus of bishops in

something to be believed and proposed absolutely to the faithful is infallible—and therefore whether it is a sufficient motive for giving the assent of faith, even if the voice of the Supreme Pastor, that is, the Roman Pontiff, is not distinctly heard; but the question is where immediately and proximately the infallibility of this consensus comes from. The first we certainly do not deny; on the contrary, we defend it. For since it cannot happen that the universal college of Pastors withdraws from its head; since all the bishops teach something to be believed and indeed not conditionally—that is, if the Roman Pontiff so sees fit—but absolutely, obligating the faithful to assent; and since infallibility has been promised to the college of Pastors itself; it must be held that the magisterium of this college is infallibly true, whatever ultimately may be the proximate cause of this infallibility. And if the consent of the Supreme Teacher is required for the infallibility of this magisterium, since that universal absolute consensus of which we spoke obtains and since it cannot happen that the universal college of Pastors withdraws from its head, it must be held that in that universal consensus is contained also the consent of the Roman Pontiff, to whom as the prince Pastor and their confirmer the bishops subordinated their consensus; hence even if the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff is not distinctly heard, it is certainly gathered a posteriori.

Furthermore, if the infallible authority of this consensus can be explained in this way, it is wrongly concluded from the fact that what is confirmed by such a consensus of bishops is infallibly true, that the consensus of bishops is of itself infallible, the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff being set aside. For there remains still another real question: where immediately and proximately does the infallibility of this consensus come from. We know indeed that it comes from the assistance of the Holy Spirit; but since the Holy Spirit can exercise his assistance through certain particular supports—just as he assists the whole Church but through the mediation of the magisterium—it is therefore asked whether there is some medium or support through which the Holy Spirit exercises his assistance toward the bishops.

And indeed, as we have already noted, no one doubts that the consensus of all—even of the simple faithful alone—in something as revealed is infallible and a certain argument of truth; yet no one would

therefore say that the assembly of the faithful, setting aside the Pastors, possesses the authority of the magisterium instituted by Christ; but on the contrary, through this magisterium of the Pastors the consensus of the faithful who obey it becomes infallible. In what, therefore, the universal consensus of the faithful holds, the revealed truth is most certainly contained; but not for that reason is the universal assembly of the simple faithful the teacher in the Church. Wherefore it is one thing to profess an infallible doctrine, and another to be the teacher of it. Just as it can happen that the universal assembly of the simple faithful holds infallibly true doctrine without being its teacher, but receives it from the magisterium of the Pastors; so it can happen that the universal college of Pastors is indeed the teacher of truth, but is infallible in teaching insofar as it is governed and confirmed by the magisterium of the supreme Pastor. And just as from the consensus of faith of all the faithful one may certainly gather what is revealed without deducing from this that the simple faithful are teachers of truth in the Church; so it can happen that although the consensus of all bishops bears infallibly on something true, yet the infallibility of that consensus is derived from the magisterium of one single one into all—of him, namely, whom Christ expressly made the Rock of faith and the Confirmer of the brethren.

In order to resolve the question more clearly, let us consider the magisterium concerning matters not yet defined in the Church. For if a matter has already been defined in the Church, or if it is one that the Apostles transmitted explicitly and has always been preserved in explicit profession of faith in the Church, in this matter there is indeed an infallible magisterium of the universal bishops, but whence? Is it of itself, or because it perpetually adheres to the apostolic magisterium which certainly perseveres in the Apostolic Roman chair in unbroken succession? In order therefore for our question to be clearly resolved, the magisterium of the bishops must be examined with respect to matters not yet defined in the Church, for which the judge of controversies is more properly required; and what holds in these matters must be held to hold in the others as well, for in matters of faith the witness and the judge are in reality the same.

But since we are about to compare the Roman Pontiff and the other Pastors, something must first be said about this comparison.

Therefore, 2° let it be noted that when the Roman Pontiff and the other Pastors are compared with each other, a twofold conjunction and separation can be conceived. The prior conjunction is the conjunction in due communion and subordination of the Pastors with the Roman Pontiff; the other is a special conjunction in some act or exercise of power. Likewise, the prior separation, opposed to the prior conjunction, would be a total separation, insofar as the other Pastors are not in the communion of the Roman Pontiff; the other would be only a separation in some act, insofar as the other Pastors, existing in the communion of the Roman Pontiff, decree or teach something without the consent or approval of the Roman Pontiff having yet been added.

As regards the prior separation, by reason of the divine promise that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the Church founded upon the Rock, it will never happen that the universal college of Pastors withdraws from Peter; even though one can separate him from Peter in thought and hypothetically suppose such a separation, in order to investigate more deeply the nature of that college. What can, however, actually occur is that the universal college of Pastors, whether dispersed or assembled, united in communion with the Roman Pontiff, issues some decree of faith to which the approval of the Roman Pontiff is still lacking. This would happen when a decree is issued concerning something about which the Roman Pontiff, whether separately or together with other teachers, has not yet promulgated his judgment, and the college of Pastors precedes him in defining.

The prior hypothesis differs from the other. For in the prior, total separation is conceived—all communion of the bishops with their head and their subordination to him is excluded; in the other, however, communion and subordination are generally maintained, yet the special communion and subordination in the actual magisterium with regard to that particular object they define is lacking, since the judgment of the Pontiff has not yet been pronounced. By "magisterium," as is evident, we understand the very exercise of the power of teaching, the act by which doctrine is proposed. There is nothing wrong with Pastors anticipating the definition of the supreme Pastor; we say, however, that a definition issued by them alone or by all together, the consent or approval of the Roman Pontiff being excluded, is not an irrefragable definition—or

rather is not the definition which, by reason of the assistance of the Holy Spirit promised to the Church, must be held as infallible. Since, however, the consent of the Roman Pontiff can be had in two ways—expressly by teaching, and tacitly, namely when he permits something to be proposed to all as to be believed in those circumstances in which, if anything were false, he would certainly object—henceforth when we speak of consent, we take it in both ways.

It must be noted, however, that we are not affirming that such a definition of bishops is false, or that it is to be held in no esteem, or that from some principle of reason proving that in certain circumstances the universality of consent is alien to error, it cannot be scientifically or theologically certain that what is proposed by the bishops is true. But this is something different from the infallibility which, as the assistance of the Holy Spirit, is a necessary and most firmly certain endowment of the magisterium of the Church promised to us. We deny, however, that the definition of the bishops alone is, by virtue of the divine assistance promised to the Church, necessarily infallible; to which therefore there would correspond in the faithful an obligation of belief. This position is directly opposed to the Gallican doctrine set forth above.

The question, therefore, is about the infallibility of the universal college of Pastors separated from the Roman Pontiff in the act of teaching, according to the second hypothesis. And the question is about the magisterium concerning a matter not yet defined and approved by the Roman See. The conjunction of all the bishops with their head is presupposed, and therefore the unity of the college is presupposed, in which is the power in the first act of teaching the universal Church infallibly; but at the same time it is presupposed that in the second act the exercise of this power takes place only through the other bishops, the Roman Pontiff not yet teaching; it is asked whether that exercise of the power of teaching, which we call the magisterium, is, by the divine promise, to be held as infallible and therefore of irrefragable authority. Since we have no definition of faith on this matter, what we propose in the Thesis we propose not as a truth to be believed by faith, but as a theological conclusion which we judge to be gathered by reason from theological principles; and if we err in this, we judge that this labor of ours will bring at least this benefit, that it leads learned men to a deeper

investigation of the matter. In resolving the difficulties, however, the arguments of the opposing position will be set forth, so that nothing may be lacking to the integrity of this treatment.

II. We therefore thus begin our demonstration. If the entire college of bishops adhering to the Roman Pontiff, with at least moral universality, should agree in something, the Roman Pontiff not yet having rendered his judgment, a twofold hypothesis can be made. For either the bishops render their judgment without subordinating it to the judgment of the Roman Pontiff, or they do subordinate it so that he himself peremptorily defines the matter. If they subordinate it, they judge only that it is to be believed if the Roman Pontiff thinks so; in which hypothesis their judgment is certainly reformable and it is not a magisterium that obliges either the whole Church or any of the faithful. But if it is supposed that they do not subordinate it, we say first that this hypothesis will never obtain, and given the institution of Christ it is absurd. For this would be a schismatic act repugnant to the Primacy. For since all the Pastors are sheep given by Christ to be fed by his Vicar, and this one is the supreme and universal Pastor of the whole Church, it would be an act of rebellion against the Primacy if the inferior Pastors wished without the consent of the Primate to define peremptorily a question of faith and to oblige the universal Church by any act of their own. But secondly, in order to resolve the question we have at hand, let us allow this hypothesis. We deny, however, that in this hypothesis their judgment is infallible. And we deny it for this reason: because the magisterium of the universal college of Pastors without the consent of the Roman Pontiff does not enjoy the privilege of infallibility, which we demonstrate as follows.

1° The promise of infallibility has been made only to the magisterium which we called (in the Preliminary Notes) universal—namely to that magisterium to which the whole Church necessarily must submit; but the magisterium of the other bishops, the Roman Pontiff not yet teaching, even if it be an act of those who are joined to their head, is nevertheless not the universal magisterium; therefore. The major premise is beyond doubt according to what was said in the Preliminary Notes. The minor is proved. The universal magisterium is the magisterium requiring faith from the universal Church, and is

therefore an act of jurisdiction (§ 20) over the universal Church; but this act of jurisdiction must come from the supreme power over the universal Church; but such supreme power does not reside in the totality whether of the faithful or of the bishops, but in one, as is abundantly clear from what has been demonstrated (Theses 12 and following, and 24.f); but when the supreme power is not in the totality but in one, a decree issued by that totality for the whole society, without the consent of that one in the very thing that is decreed, does not have the force of law for the whole society, which depends entirely on that one alone; therefore. Namely, if the supreme power were in the totality of bishops, then a decree issued by the greater part of the ecumenical council or of the universal bishops, over which the Roman Pontiff presides, even if he did not consent, indeed even if he dissented, would be valid and the Roman Pontiff would be required to subscribe to it no differently from the others. But on the contrary the supreme power of jurisdiction is in one—that is, in the Roman Pontiff; for to one the whole flock has been entrusted to be fed, upon one the whole Church leans as upon a rock, to one the keys of the Kingdom and the full power of binding and loosing have been given, one is the efficient principle of the unity of all, and on this one all depend not only individually but also collectively, as has already been demonstrated.

Now when the governance of a society is of this kind, laws enacted by the totality, even in a Council over which the supreme Prince presides, do not have the force of binding the society unless the consent of the Prince is added, and without his consent his subjects cannot be bound by others. Therefore decrees of faith issued by the college of bishops, even in a Council convoked by the Roman Pontiff over which he presides, without his consent being added, do not have the force of law for the whole society; that magisterium is therefore not what we called universal; and therefore those decrees cannot claim for themselves the promise of infallibility. And indeed, infallibility of the magisterium is the endowment of fullness of authority in teaching; but fullness of authority does not reside with the other bishops even taken collectively, but with the one Roman Pontiff, with whom alone resides the fullness of power by which the Church is governed—the fullness of that power signified by the words of Christ to Peter and to the Apostles;

but the Church is also governed by the authority of the magisterium, and this authority was also signified by the words of Christ; therefore.

But if someone should wish to suppose the hypothesis that the Roman Pontiff gives to the other Fathers, say in a Council, the faculty of issuing a decree of faith, proposing to ratify himself, without any examination, whatever they decree: 1° this is not the Gallican hypothesis, for the consent of the Pontiff with its authoritative force adding strength to decrees that would not be valid without it would be maintained—which the Gallicans reject. 2° In this hypothesis the ultimate judgment of the magisterium of the Church would not yet be had; for even if all the other bishops decree something to be believed, it is evident that the distinct judgment of the Roman Pontiff can still be required so that it may be certainly known whether he himself teaches and proposes as to be believed the same as the others, and therefore it can still be in doubt whether the Roman Pontiff approves by his consent what others teach; the ultimate judgment, therefore, to which all must submit, has not yet been pronounced; the universal magisterium has not yet therefore been attained. 3° This hypothesis is absurd; for although participation in power can be delegated to another, the fullness of power cannot be transmitted by the Vicar of Christ to another or others; but this fullness is required for infallibility to be had, since it is connected with that fullness; for only it can enact an irreformable law for the universal Church.

Therefore the consent of the Roman Pontiff is required so that the law of belief may oblige the whole Church; consent, I say—whether explicit or tacit—is required for the ultimate judgment to be had by which all are obligated; therefore without the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, the magisterium of the others is not that to which the universal Church must submit, that is, it is not the universal magisterium; therefore it cannot claim for itself the promise of infallibility.

You will say: infallibility can be had without jurisdiction; for formally these two prerogatives differ. And indeed, if someone confirms his doctrine with miracles, he is infallible; yet he lacks jurisdiction by which he can command assent. I reply first that this second point is wrongly introduced. For it is false that this preacher is infallible; rather

the doctrine he preaches is infallible, of which the certain argument is the testimony of God working the miracle. We, however, are speaking of infallibility which is an endowment of the magisterium and the reason why we hold what the teacher teaches; and therefore our knowledge of it precedes our knowledge of the truth of the doctrine handed on. Although the infallibility of the magisterium can exist without jurisdiction obligating to assent, still the present question is not what can exist but what does exist; namely what Christ instituted. Now it is certain that some infallible authority of teaching in the Church is simultaneously an authority of jurisdiction (§ 20); the question will therefore be whether this is the only one, or whether there is another which is only an infallible authority of teaching lacking jurisdiction that obliges to assent. But the burden of demonstrating this falls upon the one who asserts it; but neither from the words of Christ nor from the sense or practice of the Church do I see how this can be effected.

Nor is the unity of the Church placed sufficiently securely, which is the unity of subordination of all members to one head. For if the infallibility is certain (for if it is not defended as certain, it must be regarded as null, as we noted in the Preliminary Notes), you are obligated to believe what that magisterium teaches both by the law of nature and also by the positive law of God, who certainly wills that the infallible magisterium instituted by him to teach men be believed. And because this magisterium concerns faith in which there must be unity, you are obligated by the law of God to believe what that infallible magisterium teaches in order to be a member of the Church, that is, a Catholic. There are therefore two principles of the unity of the Church, either of which can act separately from the other: namely the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, and the magisterium of all the other bishops together. Is this the institution of Christ? Is it not on the contrary established that without the consent of the Roman Pontiff there is no obligation of believing, either by the law of nature or by any positive law of God? For until the Roman Pontiff has confirmed the conciliar definitions in matters not previously defined, it has never been believed that the faithful had an obligation of believing them in order to remain Catholics and members of the Church.

Wherefore Christ must be said to have conjoined both in the same subject—namely the supreme power of jurisdiction and infallibility—lest concerning the same matter you be simultaneously obligated by one motive and free from obligation so that the opposite is lawful for you by another motive.

Furthermore, 2° the magisterium of the others is the magisterium of those who, insofar as they also belong to the unity of the edifice, lean upon the Rock and borrow firmness from it; who, insofar as they also constitute one college, are sheep of Peter to be fed by him, and brothers to be confirmed in faith by Peter—this is clear from the proper argument (Theses 1, 2, 3, and 24); but from these considerations it is clear that teachers of this kind are not coordinated with Peter as they are coordinated among themselves, but are subordinated to him; subordinated, moreover, as those who are to be fed and disciples needing confirmation; but the magisterium of those who by Christ's institution stand in need of confirmation cannot by the same institution be firm and peremptory of itself; but a magisterium that is not firm and peremptory is not that to which the whole Church must submit, nor is it infallible; therefore.

The same is also established 3° by the continuous practice of the Church, by which, as we were saying, the confirmation of ecumenical councils by the Roman Pontiff has always been required, so that their decrees might be held as the infallible norm of faith. This we have already proved in Thesis 24.F. From which it follows: the judgment or sentence of the Pontiff is therefore required; before the judgment of the Pontiff, questions of faith are not settled; the judgment of the others alone is therefore not irrefragable; therefore their magisterium taken separately does not yet oblige the Church to faith—that is, it is not the universal magisterium; therefore it cannot claim for itself the promise of infallibility made by God.

Now this is the reason why we say the doctrine we are defending is ancient. For what does it mean that the judgment of all the bishops in an ecumenical council requires confirmation by the Pope in order to be valid? Shall we think the confirmation of the Pope amounts to some kind of authentic attestation that the council was legitimately conducted? This was indeed the opinion of the Gallicans, which Bossuet

defends in the cited work; but who would say that the ancients were Gallicans? Shall we think that confirmation was required for this purpose, that through it an obligation is indeed imposed on the faithful to believe what was taught by a magisterium that is already, however, infallible? But first: this distinction—that in the Church there is, on the one hand, a magisterium that is infallible and has the force of obligating, and on the other hand a magisterium that is indeed infallible but lacking in itself the force of obligating—I do not see how it can be put forward by those who wish to accuse our position of novelty; for what witnesses will they produce for this distinction? Furthermore, this distinction cannot be reconciled with the certain doctrine of the ancients. For it was certain that even in matters of faith it was lawful to appeal from the judgment of a whole synod to the judgment of the Roman Pontiff, just as it was certain that questions of faith are to be settled by his judgment. Shall we think the ancients held that an appeal can be made from an infallible judgment? No one fails to see the problems of this opinion, as indeed we already pointed out a little earlier. What therefore remains? If we consult the ancients, they will unanimously teach us that the confirmation of the Pope is that act which confers force, strength, and firmness upon the decrees of councils, so that without that confirmation such decrees—whether in matters of faith and morals or in matters of discipline—intrinsically lack force, strength, or efficacy for generating the certainty of faith and producing the obligation. And the demonstration of this opinion was drawn from the prerogatives of Peter—namely that he is the Rock of the Church and the Rock of faith for all, even bishops even taken collectively and acting simultaneously, that he is the Confirmer of the brethren, the Pastor of all lambs and sheep. But this in other words is the very opinion we are defending. For a decree of faith that by Christ's institution is still inadequate to generate the certainty required for something to be believed by divine faith as revealed is not of itself, by the same institution, infallible.

Now this is the teaching of St. Thomas. Certainly in the *Disputed Questions de Potentia*, q. 10, a. 4, ad 13m, he teaches that the Roman Pontiff can interpret creeds of faith previously issued and add something to them for the declaration of faith, and this by his own

authority. The reason is that only by his authority can an ecumenical synod be assembled, and by him the sentence of a synod is confirmed, and from it there is appeal to him: all of which is clear from the acts of the Chalcedonian synod. Since, therefore, the issuing of a creed was done in a synod, the same can be done by the Roman Pontiff by his authority alone. This is St. Thomas's teaching.

Now considering what is affirmed and its demonstration, you have: 1° that the authority that is proper to the Roman Pontiff and not common to others ("by his authority")—namely the authority that confirms sentences pronounced by bishops in synods and to which appeal can be made from synods—is infallible; for such is the authority that issues or interprets creeds of faith or adds something to them for the declaration of faith for the universal Church; 2° you have that ecumenical councils need the confirmation of the Roman Pontiff, which confers force and strength upon their decrees; for such is the confirmation of him to whose sentence appeal can be made from the sentence of a synod; 3° you have that the sentence of a synod without antecedent or subsequent confirmation—that is, without the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff—is not the sentence of the supreme magisterium and cannot claim for itself the prerogative of infallibility; for such is a sentence from which it is lawful to appeal and which can therefore be amended. Furthermore, that Thomas speaks also of appeal from the sentence of a synod in matters of faith is clear both because he speaks universally and because he is directly discussing authority in matters of faith. And what follows from these considerations but what we are defending?

The same Doctor teaches the same in the *Summa Theologiae*, IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 10, in which he asks whether it belongs to the Supreme Pontiff to draw up a creed of faith, and answers affirmatively. He affirms, namely, that it belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff to determine those things that are of faith so that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. The first reason is drawn from the words of the Lord to Peter in Luke 22:25. The second reason is that there must be one faith in the Church; but this could not be preserved unless a question of faith that arises were decided by him who presides over the whole Church, so that his judgment might be firmly held by the whole

Church. The third reason, which is placed first in the *Sed contra* argument, is this: because the issuing of a creed was done in a general synod; but this can be assembled only by the authority of the Roman Pontiff alone; therefore the issuing of a creed belongs to his authority.

Now let the second reason adduced by St. Thomas be considered. Unity of faith, he says, demands that questions of faith be defined by the authority that presides over the whole Church, and this moreover is to be taken exclusively—namely that questions be defined only through it; for the exclusive sense is required by the very scope intended, namely the unity of faith in the whole Church, which requires one and not a dual principle; for according to St. Thomas the principle of unity is one; therefore questions of faith can be defined only through that authority which presides over the whole Church; but this is none other than the authority of the Primacy; therefore the other bishops or even all taken together cannot settle questions of faith. But the authority that cannot settle questions of faith is not infallible; therefore. In the *Sed contra* argument, when St. Thomas says that a general synod can be assembled by the authority of the Roman Pontiff alone, this authority is to be understood as the one which, as we heard from the testimony previously cited, confirms synods and to which appeal can be made from the sentence of synods. With this established, it is manifest that St. Thomas affirms that the issuing of a creed belongs to the authority of the Roman Pontiff for this reason—that synods in which a creed has been issued could only be assembled by his authority alone; because the authority of the bishops alone is not sufficient for this, as it still stands in need of confirmation and is reformable; therefore.

Has not this doctrine, moreover, already been handed on by Irenaeus in the celebrated passage cited more than once? For what does it mean when he says that in the Roman Church the apostolic tradition has been preserved by all the faithful who are from everywhere, if not that through the Roman Church—that is, through her magisterium—the true faith is preserved by all who agree with her—that is, who are subordinated to her? And when he says that it is necessary for all the faithful from everywhere to agree with this Church, in which the apostolic tradition has been preserved by all, what else does he teach but that the Roman Church, or See, by herself, and the other churches

through her, retains the true faith—that is, are infallible in faith? But among the other churches the bishops too are included, just as the Roman bishop is included when the Roman Church is mentioned; therefore.

And indeed, if the doctrine which we defend in Thesis 14 with St. Thomas and the foremost scholastic theologians is true—namely that the ordinary jurisdiction of bishops is derived as from a source from the Roman Pontiff—since infallibility is the endowment of the authority of teaching, how can infallibility be in them or in them taken collectively of itself, since in them there is only a participated and dependent authority of teaching derived from the Roman Pontiff, falling short of the fullness proper to the Primacy?

COROLLARY

Therefore the conclusion of Toledo cannot be accepted (pt. 2, q. 1, a. 10, Controversy 7, Conclusion 5, p. 63), which reads as follows: "A general council in which all the Fathers consent, together with legates of this kind (namely, those who do not speak according to the instruction of the Pontiff, because they have not received it—from the preceding conclusion), even without the immediate confirmation of the Pontiff, cannot err"—namely, its magisterium is to be held irrefragable and infallible. The falsity of this opinion, which Toledo attributes to the Parisian Doctors and defends after them but only as the more probable opinion (how then can it be said to have been the common opinion?), is manifest from what has been said. For even if the Roman Pontiff presides through his legates or in person, yet if he himself has not rendered his judgment, the universal magisterium to which the Church is bound to give faith has not yet been attained, as we have seen. Legates, moreover, who have not received instruction do not represent the one who sends them with respect to the magisterium.

Nor do Toledo's arguments support that conclusion. The arguments are: 1° because such a council represents the whole Church; but the whole Church cannot err; 2° because such a council is gathered in the Holy Spirit; but since it is directed by the Holy Spirit, it cannot err; 3° Julius, d. 17, canon *Regula*, disapproving a certain synod, says:

"Nor was it gathered from orthodox bishops, nor did any legate of the Roman Church attend"; from which it is gathered: if therefore the bishops had been orthodox and a legate had attended, it would have had authority and could not have erred; 4° Sixtus IV in the Bull of approval of the Council of Alcalá says: "although those things that are done rightly by our mandate have full force, yet we sometimes add strength so that they may persist all the more inviolate, the more they shall have been protected by our support"; 5° because the Pope cannot say anything other than what the whole council of Fathers judges; for the Pope does not have the assistance of the Holy Spirit unless a diligent scrutiny of the Scriptures has been made; if therefore he were less learned, he could certainly not judge otherwise. Indeed Toledo himself, citing Torquemada bk. 3, ch. 64, says that if the Pope were to say something other than what the whole Council says, one would have to stand by the Council, because it is of greater authority in discussion, though not as regards judging. 6° The Pope can be a heretic, at least according to the opinion of Cajetan and Torquemada, and in common opinion. Let us therefore grant that he holds some opinion about which there is doubt whether it is error or heresy. The rule for discerning will be the Council assembled by his own will. If therefore this can err, there is certainly no rule for discerning this doubt. 7° Because the Fathers in a Council, as soon as they are unanimous, are accustomed to publish dogmas of faith and to hurl anathema; therefore they already have infallibility.

To the first, therefore, we reply that that council indeed, insofar as all the principal members of the Church together with their head are considered in it, represents the whole Church and its magisterium—but in the first act, to which belongs the power of defining infallibly; but the magisterium is had in the second act when the Fathers speak and teach; and that magisterium which can be called the magisterium of this body representing the whole Church is actually infallible; but in order for the magisterium of this teaching body to be had in act, it is necessary that the head itself speak, which is the essential part of this body without which it is contradictory to represent the Church; therefore the Roman Pontiff not teaching, the magisterium to which infallibility belongs has not yet been attained in act.

To the second we likewise reply that the direction of the Holy Spirit can be distinguished as manifold: the common kind, by which also other actions of the faithful are directed; the special kind by reason of the matter, which in its special office governs authentic teachers, and which appears also in so many provincial synods assembled in the Lord, and which does not necessarily and always exclude error, but always orders those teachers toward due subordination to the supreme magisterium; the most special kind, which governs the supreme magisterium of the Church necessarily by divine institution so that error is never possible for it. This last, however, by reason of which alone we become certain and are obligated to believe that what is proposed is true, has certainly not been promised except to the magisterium that also proceeds from the Roman Pontiff—that is, to the universal magisterium; hence with the judgment of the Roman Pontiff lacking, it is not yet established whether that assistance has been present.

To the third we say: 1° that decree is taken from a certain apocryphal letter of Julius to the Easterns; 2° the issue in that synod was not by its nature the doctrine of faith but the deposition of Athanasius, for which the authority of the Roman Pontiff was required; 3° what is adduced from Julius was sufficient indeed to prove that that council had been illegitimate; the special mention of legates is made because the Roman Pontiff presided at councils in another province not in person but through his legates, to whom he was accustomed also to give instruction; but the consequence of Toledo does not hold; for more is required for good than suffices for evil, since good comes from an integral cause while evil comes from any defect whatsoever.

To the fourth we say that Sixtus IV in the Bull *Licet eo* (by which he confirms the sentence issued in the assembly of theologians against Peter of Osma; see Cardinal D'Aguirre, *Collectio Conciliorum Hispaniae*, vol. 3, for the year 1479), testifies that he had previously commissioned by his other letters the venerable brother Alfonso, Archbishop of Toledo, to take with him some masters in theology and, by the authority of the Apostolic See, to declare and decide what in the propositions of Peter of Osma concerning the confession of sins and the ecclesiastical sacraments (of which the same Sixtus makes mention above) was false

and heretical. He then testifies that the aforesaid Archbishop had proceeded to the execution of those letters, their form having been duly observed. Now from this account it can be gathered both that those propositions had already been referred to the Apostolic See and that the latter had already expressed its judgment about them; and that furthermore the principal ones had already been condemned at the Council of Constance and in the decree of Eugene IV for the Armenians. With these facts established, the meaning of the words of Sixtus IV cited by Toledo is clear. Otherwise it would have to be said that some assembly not of bishops but of theologians, such as that one was, enjoys infallibility from the mere fact that it is appointed by mandate of the Pope to pass judgment on something—which no one has ever dreamed.

To the fifth these observations are made: a) although the Roman Pontiff must make a diligent inquiry into the matter, it is not necessary that he do so through the bishops; but he can do so through himself, or through theologians or his counselors ("now by summoning ecumenical councils, or by exploring the sense of the Church dispersed throughout the world, now through particular synods, now by other means offered by divine providence": Vatican Council, session 4, ch. 4); b) the certainty of the Pontiff's judgment does not depend on the human talent or diligence of human study, but on the assistance of the Holy Spirit who immediately assists the Pontiff lest he err while actually exercising the power of teaching. Immediately, I say, the Holy Spirit assists him and assists him in such a way that the Pontiff himself understands through himself that what he defines is true. For this is the aim of the assistance proper to the one who is the Rock and the Confirmer of the brethren—that he himself with most certain faith apprehend as true what he must propose to others as to be believed; just as Peter apprehended when he said: "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God." "Those things have been defined to be held which the Roman Pontiffs, with God assisting, recognized as consonant with the sacred Scriptures and apostolic traditions." Ch. 5, loc. cit. c) Hence it makes no difference whether he be less learned. And indeed, if Toledo's argument were valid, it would also prove that the assemblies of theologians in councils, if they unanimously counsel something, are infallible; because it can be said in

the same way that the bishops themselves, even all together, do not have the assistance of God unless a diligent inquiry has been made; and therefore if they were less learned than the theologians, they could not judge otherwise. As to what is said in the first place, therefore—that the Pope is bound to follow the judgment of the Council—we reply: 1° that he is not bound with respect to the exercise of the act; for he can withhold his assent; and from the fact that he can do so, it is certainly gathered that the magisterium of the whole council is not yet the supreme magisterium and that a dogma established by it has not yet become a matter of faith; 2° as to the specification of the act, we distinguish; the Pontiff is bound to follow that judgment as the judgment of those who have authority over him, or infallible authority of themselves—we deny; as a guide for his own judgment, we subdistinguish; if the Roman Pontiff himself through himself recognizes from the assistance of God and judges it to be true—we concede; otherwise—we deny. But any other bishop is bound to adhere to the judgment confirmed by the Roman Pontiff, even if he perhaps does not understand the truth of the matter. Torquemada in the cited place, however, says that when a controversy in matters of faith arose between the Pope and the Fathers of the Council, although the totality of the Fathers was to be followed as more eminent and superior in the judgment of discretion, nonetheless nothing was to be concluded in the manner of a council until the Pope and the Fathers concordantly came together in one and the same judgment. That is to say, when the Roman Pontiff has not yet defined as Teacher of the Church, his private judgment, compared with the contrary judgment of the others, can theologically be held in lesser esteem.

To the sixth we say that the rule for discerning whether the opinion of the Pope is true is the solemn magisterium of the Pope himself; for it is certain regarding every judgment that when he confirms it through the Council he cannot err; but if the Pope does not use his authority of teaching, it will not be possible to know with the certainty of faith whether that opinion is true or false, although theologically a judgment could be rendered about it as about other opinions; but in this there is no inconvenience; it will be the same as if

the council had not wished to render a definitive judgment about some opinion.

To the seventh Bellarmine replies (*de Conciliis*, bk. 2, ch. 11) in the hypothesis that a new definition is being made and the Pontiff has not yet disclosed his judgment, that councils indeed pronounce anathema but understand it to have force once it has been confirmed by the Pontiff; just as when a judge from whose decision appeal can be made pronounces a sentence of death against someone, it is understood that that person must die unless the Prince retracts the sentence. What is said about anathema is to be understood also about the promulgation of decrees. In all such cases, that is, there is always room for that subordination of which we spoke from the beginning.

Therefore without the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff there is no peremptory magisterium in the Church that can claim for itself the divinely made promise of infallibility and exact faith from the faithful.

You will say: can it therefore happen that the whole Church, with the exception of the Roman Pontiff, is in error? I reply that if all the bishops wished to teach separately from the Roman Pontiff, they could err; for infallibility has not been promised to them separately from the Roman Pontiff. But just as God does not will the whole Church to err, so he will never permit the universal college of Pastors in their teaching to withdraw from the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff and not to subordinate their magisterium to his; for the primacy of faith of Peter is the support of the unity and stability of faith instituted by Christ for his Church. Moreover, either it is supposed that the bishops are teaching the opposite of what has already been defined in the Church with the consent of the Apostolic See—and God will not permit that as regards the universal flock of Pastors, as has been said—or it is supposed that they are passing judgment on some matter not yet defined; and in this hypothesis: 1° God will not permit the whole college of bishops with a schismatic spirit to wish to define something even without the consent of the Pope, but will bring it about that they determine it only conditionally, namely if the Pope consents; 2° even if they were to err in this matter, no danger would threaten the Church, since the Church herself would not be obligated to believe, and the judgment of the bishops would be reformable by the Pope.

The difficulty drawn from the infallibility of Tradition, of which the bishops are witnesses, will be resolved in the following thesis.

III. By the immediate subject of infallibility we mean that which has the Holy Spirit assisting it of itself, not through another or not by means of another. Since, however, a medium is not merely a condition but something that acts, hence when we say that the infallible subject does not proceed by means of another, we exclude not a pure condition but the exercise of the activity of another, by means of which the Holy Spirit assists the teacher. Wherefore there would be a twofold subject of this kind of infallible authority, if both the Pope alone were infallible of himself and the college of Pastors, even though it must be united to the Pope, were also infallible without the Pope teaching or confirming. On the contrary, if the Pope alone is infallible of himself and the college of Pastors is infallible only with the Pope and through the Pope teaching or confirming, there is one immediate subject of infallibility. The reason for this is that in this hypothesis there are not two things that have infallibility of themselves and not through another—which is required for the character of an immediate subject—but there is one, by reason of which also others participate in it.

But from Thesis 24 it is established that the Roman Pontiff of himself alone is infallible; and from what has already been said in this Thesis it is established that the magisterium of the universal college of Pastors, the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff being set aside, is not infallible; therefore the immediate subject of infallibility is not twofold, but one. There is, namely, one Roman Pontiff who has the prerogative of infallibility of himself. Wherefore, since infallibility also belongs to the other bishops teaching simultaneously with the Roman Pontiff—for their judgment is infallible—such infallibility can only be participated and mediated, derived into them from Peter, with whom they are associated and whose doctrine they follow.

You will say: has it not always been believed that the universal college of Pastors, or their consensus, is infallible? I reply: it was so believed, but at the same time it was also believed (which some seem to forget in this question) that ecumenical councils not confirmed by the Roman Pontiff can err—that is, that their decrees are reformable and are therefore not those to which the obedience of faith is owed by all. Now

what is said of bishops assembled in a synod must be said also of those same bishops dispersed; for assembled in a synod they have no less power than remaining individually in their sees. If these two things are put together—namely that the consensus of Pastors is infallible, and that ecumenical councils not confirmed by the Pontiff lack firmness—it will be clear that what was always believed is this one thing: namely that the consensus of Pastors in agreement with the Roman Pontiff, and by reason of that agreement, is infallible. But this does not multiply the immediate subjects of infallibility.

You will say again: it has been defined only that the Roman Pontiff is infallible when he defines; when therefore he himself does not issue a definition and yet a consensus of bishops exists in something to be believed—to which indeed the Roman Pontiff himself consents, though without defining (for he can also teach without defining)—an infallible certainty of truth would not yet be had, which seems highly inconvenient; for there are not a few things that are believed in the Church by virtue of such consensus.

I reply. I note 1° that we do not demonstrate our conclusion from the words of the Vatican definition, but from the words of Christ and the institution of the Primacy, and that we defend it not as a truth to be believed on faith but as a theological conclusion. I note 2° that according to the Vatican definition itself, the infallibility of the Pontiff is the same (at least in species) as the infallibility of the Church; the infallibility of the Church, however, is not only had when it solemnly defines something, but also belongs to the ordinary and universal magisterium of the Church, as was established in session 3 of the same Council. With these things posited, we say that in that hypothesis the consent of the Pontiff is in reality an act of the Confirmer of the brethren, which confers force and strength on the ordinary magisterium, just as his definition confers force and strength on conciliar decrees.

Is it not the case, you will ask, that the Spirit of truth was promised to all the Apostles and their successors (John 16:13), and that Christ said (Matthew 28:20): "Behold, I am with you (as teachers) all days, even to the consummation of the world"? I reply that this promise was made to the unity—that is, to the apostles and their successors united; but

these are united, or rather brought back to unity, only through Peter; the promise was therefore made to the consensus of those in agreement with Peter. The question, however, remains how Peter must care for their unity and what efficacy belongs to him with respect to this consensus. This we learn from the other words of Christ—those by which Peter and each of his successors is constituted the Rock of faith of the Church, the Confirmer of the brethren, and the Pastor of the sheep.

And indeed I do not see how it would be safe to infer from these testimonies of Scripture this infallibility of the bishops. Is it not the case that just as to all the Apostles taken together infallibility was promised, so also jurisdiction was promised and conferred? Would then a disciplinary decree issued by all the bishops without the consent of the Pontiff have the force of obligating the Church? I think not, without prejudice to the authority of the Primacy. Therefore what necessity is there that, when the magisterium is in question, the words of Christ spoken to all the Apostles be taken in such a way as to be valid for the successors of the Apostles even independently of the exercise of the authority of the successor of Peter?

Is it not the case, you will press, that the Holy Spirit equally assists all who cohere in unity, with that same assistance by which their consensus is rendered immune from error? But if this immunity is to be referred immediately to the Holy Spirit assisting them, the consensus of the Pastors even without the magisterium of Peter will be infallible.

I reply. We distinguished above a twofold special assistance. There is that one by which the Holy Spirit so governs the magisterium of the inferior teachers that it is subordinated to the supreme magisterium and they wish to teach what is conformed to it, and thus their consensus comes to exist with the Roman Pontiff teaching. There is another, the necessary terminus of which is the immediate infallibility of the teacher whom the Holy Spirit assists. Now if this most special assistance were to belong not only to the Roman Pontiff but equally to the other Pastors enjoying his communion, in such a way that through it immediately their consensus were kept immune from error, it would have to be said that the consensus of the Pastors even without the Roman magisterium is infallible and the supreme norm of believing. But the matter is not to be conceived in this way. The special assistance of the Holy Spirit indeed

extends immediately to all, but the most special assistance attains immediately the Roman Pontiff, and the special assistance attains immediately the others—and these latter mediately through the most special assistance. For only to him does that assistance belong immediately whose necessary terminus is the infallibility of the teacher —without whom teaching there is no infallible magisterium, and with whom teaching alone there is an infallible magisterium. Therefore to the Roman Pontiff alone does this assistance belong immediately.

To this, moreover, the Catholic position reduces: ecumenical councils not confirmed by the Roman Pontiff can err; but once confirmed, they cannot. For if this is so, it must be said that the magisterium of the whole council, the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff being lacking, does not enjoy at least immediately that most special assistance; but that assistance belongs immediately only to the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, and with his consent being added, the judgment approved by him is held to be infallible. Wherefore, the assistance by which the college of the other Pastors is immediately governed is that which befits their condition insofar as they are inferior teachers—namely the assistance we called special. But mediately, by reason of agreement with the doctrine of the infallible teacher, just as the judgment of the Roman Pontiff becomes the one judgment of the whole college, so also the infallibility proper to that judgment is communicated to the universal consensus: "The divine dignity has conferred upon this man (Peter) a great and wonderful fellowship of his own power, and if he willed anything to be common to others among the rulers, whatever he did not refuse to others he gave only through him… In Peter, therefore, the fortitude of all is fortified and the assistance of divine grace so ordered that the firmness which is given to Peter through Christ is through Peter conferred on the Apostles," says Leo, Sermon 4.

Thus, to gather into a summary what has been said, this doctrine reduces: 1° to what we gathered from the analysis of the testimonies of Scripture. For this is demanded: a) by the character of the Rock—for the universal college of Pastors belongs to the edifice; but this is not firm of itself, but is made firm through the Rock; and the Rock makes the Church leaning upon it firm actively (ἐνεργητικῶς); for the Rock exists

by reason of the authority, which is active and ordained for action; therefore the firmness of the Church depends on the authority of Peter as it exercises itself. Since therefore Peter is the Rock of faith and the firmness of faith is infallibility, this immediately resides in the teaching Rock, which is firm of itself and of itself alone; mediately in the edifice —that is, in the college of the other Pastors, who belong to the edifice. This is demanded b) by the dignity of the Confirmer. For if the faith not only of individuals but of the whole college of brethren stands in need of confirmation, it is not firm of itself and therefore not infallible; but the faith of the confirmer is firm and infallible of itself. This is demanded c) by the dignity of the universal Pastor, with respect to whom the other bishops even taken collectively are sheep to be fed. He who is to be fed by doctrine can err of himself and infallibility is promised to him only insofar as he follows his Pastor. Therefore the subject of infallibility is not twofold, but one, from which it is also communicated to the others.

In other words: if you deny this, you must also deny the force of the argumentation by which the Primacy of the Pope is demonstrated from these testimonies, or you must form another concept for yourself of that same Primacy. For what kind of Confirmer of the brethren is this, if the brethren are firm apart from the exercise of the function of the confirmer? And what is this exercise if not the magisterium? Does not "to confirm" connote activity and act? Say the same of the Pastor. The Pastor is he who feeds, whose guidance the sheep follow; and if he must also feed by doctrine, the Pastor is he whose actual magisterium the sheep must hear and follow. Are not even the bishops taken collectively sheep of Peter? And on what ground is he bound to follow the guidance of the Pastor who is infallible without hearing the Pastor? The same holds for the Rock. Peter is the Rock of the Church and the Rock of faith of the Church—but not an inert Rock, rather an efficacious one; for the Rock exists by reason of the authority, which is the authority of the keys, which is active and given for the purpose of acting. Since therefore the power of the Primacy is given for the purpose of acting, and in the act itself or exercise of it the dignity of the Primacy must be preserved, it is necessary that those who are sheep,

when they teach or feed, depend on the magisterium of the one who is their Pastor, Confirmer, Rock.

This is demanded 2° if we truly do not wish to be Gallicans. For the Gallican doctrine, as we noted at the beginning of this question, does not consist only in denying the Pope's infallibility—indeed this is the consequence of another cardinal position—namely that the supreme authority of the Church resides of itself with the totality of the college of Pastors, the college not indeed separated from the Roman Pontiff but adhering to him; from which it follows that in ecumenical councils, which the Roman Pontiff must indeed convoke and over which he must preside, the supreme authority resides with the totality, and therefore sentences are to be passed by the plurality of votes; to which sentences the Pontiff himself must be subject even if he has not previously confirmed them by his vote; because the prerogative of infallible magisterium belongs only to the supreme authority, and this is not twofold in the Church but one; hence finally it follows that only the totality of the Pastors legitimately cohering together, not the first Pastor alone, is infallible. Now from these three principles—first: the supreme authority resides with the totality of the college of Pastors; second: only to the supreme authority belongs the prerogative of infallible magisterium; third: there is one supreme authority in the Church—the second and third are certain; therefore in order for that consequence to be denied, the first must be denied, and denied in such a way that both of the latter are secure. But this cannot be done unless you assert that the prerogative of infallible magisterium resides of itself with the Pontiff and through him with the others; for otherwise you either posit two supreme authorities in the Church, or you ascribe the prerogative of infallible magisterium to one other than the supreme authority.

Yet it is permissible to object against this argument on the basis of the proper infallibility of each of the Apostles individually, in the following manner. The infallibility of the others could coexist simultaneously with the proper magisterium of Peter—that is, while the Primacy of Peter was in force, there could have been multiple subjects of infallibility; therefore the economy instituted by Christ with respect to the Primacy of Peter does not prevent others from likewise being infallible of themselves alongside the infallible Roman Pontiff; or in

other words, from the prerogative of Peter as Rock, as universal Pastor, as Confirmer, it cannot be concluded that the Roman Pontiff alone is infallible of himself.

For the response, note 1° that the nature and force of the Primacy of Peter must be gathered from the words of Christ understood in their proper and adequate sense. Note 2° that if the infallibility of each of the Apostles individually, just as their jurisdiction, was extraordinary and destined to cease with them, then the institution of the Primacy is rightly understood as full and perfect, just as it is presented by the words of Christ; for this institution, which is of itself universal—that is, for all and perpetual—is not hindered by the fact that through an extraordinary privilege some may exist for a brief time who do not need all those supports for the conferring of which the Primacy was instituted. For the form of governance proper to a society is the one that is ordinary; and this is contained in that social authority which is ordinary, not extraordinary. If therefore only the authority of Peter among the Apostles was ordinary, then even in the apostolic age the same form of governance of the Church existed as after that age, and the same Primacy of Peter. But if 3° those prerogatives of the individual Apostles had been ordinary and thus destined to be perpetual, then assuredly a different form of governance of the Church would have had to be expected in the future from what now exists and has always existed; for in that hypothesis the supreme authority would in fact have been divided among several, and there would not be one head of the Church but several heads. Therefore in such a hypothesis the Primacy instituted by Christ would have turned out to be useless—indeed impossible—in its fullness in Peter and his successors. For then there would not have been, nor could there have been, need for all the sheep of that confirmation or firmness of faith derived from Peter which the words of Christ, understood in their proper and adequate sense, convey. Therefore 4° we gather also from the institution of the Primacy that those Apostolic privileges could only have been temporary.

And so to the argument we distinguish the antecedent: the Primacy of Peter was in force simultaneously with those extraordinary Apostolic prerogatives, granted; it would have been and would remain in force if they had been ordinary and perpetual, we subdivide: in some

respect, we pass; according to its fullness, which the words of Christ require, we deny.

The same conclusion is finally demanded, if one looks more deeply, by the arguments drawn from the whole of tradition. For why must causes of faith be referred to the Apostolic See and defined by its judgment? If an infallible consensus could be had in the unity of the college of Pastors communicating with the Roman Pontiff, even apart from his magisterium, that necessity would be wrongly asserted; for the only thing that is necessary is that an infallible judgment intervene to bring controversies to an end. Therefore all the infallibility of the whole college must be said to be derived from the Pontiff, inasmuch as his judgment, infallible of itself, becomes common to the entire college. Likewise, why did the Roman Pontiffs prescribe the rule of faith for ecumenical councils and command that judgment be rendered according to it, and why did all the Fathers profess that they wished and were obliged to follow the doctrine of the Apostolic See lest they deviate from the truth? For this is tantamount to saying that infallibility does not reside of itself in the totality of the college, but resides of itself in the Head and is derived from him into the members cohering with him.

A certain singular difficulty presents itself readily here. From the Bull of Martin V: "Among all things it is established that one must believe that the Pope canonically elected, whoever he may be for the time being, with his own proper name expressed, is the successor of blessed Peter, having supreme authority in the Church of God." It is therefore a truth to be believed as a dogmatic fact, that this particular man canonically elected is the successor of Peter in the Primacy. Furthermore this must be believed as soon as the canonical election becomes known: "He who has been elected by two-thirds of the Cardinals shall be held by the universal Church without any exception as the Roman Pontiff" (ch. 6, On election and the power of the elect). Now who proposes this to be believed infallibly? Not the elected Pontiff himself; for he is not to be believed unless it is already established that he is the successor of Peter: therefore it must be said that this is proposed by the Bishops; and therefore in this at least the doctors are infallible of themselves without the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff.

Before I respond, I note that what must indeed be believed is that this particular canonically elected man is the successor of Peter holding the Primacy over the universal Church; but that an obligation of believing that this particular man has been canonically elected is not imposed. Nor does it matter that perhaps the election may not have been canonical; for it suffices that it appear such according to prudent estimation. This being established, that fact—namely that this particular man has been canonically elected, that is, according to the norm established by the Apostolic See (Thesis 14, scholion), is the successor of Peter—is believed both by virtue of that faith by which the perpetuity of the Primacy is believed, and by virtue of the decree of the Pontiff establishing that he who is thus elected is to be held as the successor of Peter. Which decree, having been issued by the Pontiff in the manner of a law, binds even after the death of the legislator. With these things in place it is established that this fact—that is, that this particular man is the true Pontiff—is connected with dogma and therefore is to be believed. Accordingly, if you ask who is the teacher proposing this fact as something to be believed, it is the Roman Pontiff himself, who has the right to establish the norm for the election of his successors and who commands that he who is canonically elected be held as the successor of Peter.

That the Bishops have no part in this matter is clear even from the reason which Alexander III adds at the end of that decree; for rendering the reason why something special is prescribed for the election of the Pontiff—namely that only the greater part of the votes and not also the sounder part is to be considered—he says this is done because what in other Churches may come into doubt can be defined by the judgment of a superior, but in the Roman Church something special is established because recourse to a superior cannot be had. But if it were the Bishops' task to teach that this particular man is the successor of Peter, it would in reality fall to them to inquire into the election, to ratify and confirm it, and therefore they would be superiors in this matter. Yet they too, no less than others, are bound without any exception to hold as Pontiff him who has been canonically elected. Therefore there is one infallible authority in the Church, which is the authority of the Roman Pontiff,

proper to him and immediately residing in him, in others participated and existing mediately.

This appears to be the doctrine of the Vatican Council; for it says that the infallibility with which the definitions of the Roman Pontiff are endowed is that same infallibility with which Christ willed his Church to be equipped: therefore not a twofold infallibility but one; for the infallibility of the Church is that which resides of itself and immediately in the Pontiff and is derived through him to others.

But if you say that we are restricting the infallibility of the Church too narrowly by resolving it entirely into the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, we observe that this manner of speaking is not sufficiently accurate. For if infallibility is considered in its final aspect, we on the contrary teach that it belongs primarily to the universal Church rather than to the Pontiff under this respect, and that this is the true infallibility (see the preliminary notes). But if it is considered in its active aspect, we resolve it into the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff in such a way as to assert that the entire college of Pastors is infallible by the assistance of the Holy Spirit—which is the cause of infallibility—yet in such a manner that the medium by which the Holy Spirit proximately assists the entire college is the magisterium of the Pontiff. What we assert of infallible magisterium is, in other words, what is affirmed universally of the authority of jurisdiction by those who defend the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff as instituted by Christ: in which matter we consider ourselves to be consistent.

But here two special difficulties spontaneously present themselves, not only against this Thesis but also against the preceding one, against which these objections have indeed been raised. For first, the Vincentian canon seems to stand in the way of what has been said in this and in the preceding Thesis, since it derives the certain rule of belief from the consensus of the universality; and then, it seems that from what has been said the dignity of the Bishops is diminished more than is right, and it is not sufficiently understood what the authority of the same in a Council may be. In order that these difficulties may be removed, we establish the two following Theses.

THESIS XXVII

One must distinguish between the supreme teacher or judge of controversies of faith and the norm which that judge must follow in judging—a norm which, in order that he may follow it without error, the Holy Spirit assists him to observe. These two things are confused by those who, in order to prove that the supreme authority in defining matters of faith resides with the universality, appeal to the Vincentian canon and to the testimony of the Pontiffs themselves, who in their decrees on faith teach that the universality and the consensus of antiquity must be followed. Furthermore, the universality itself of the preceding Fathers and Doctors gives us certain testimony of the true faith insofar as all the Fathers and Doctors were in agreement with the magisterium of the Apostolic Chair and were approved by it.

I. Indeed, revelation was made complete from the beginning and the deposit of revelation is complete. Nothing new is therefore to be expected as regards the matter itself, but only the objective explication of dogmas and subjective scientific progress. Teachers therefore who exist in successive ages must always teach what was once handed down. It is necessary therefore in the exercise of this magisterium to have always before one's eyes the Word of God both written and handed down. This indeed is communicated from predecessors to successors not by some kind of infusion, but through the magisterium by which those are taught who will afterwards succeed in the place of the teachers. But it can happen that some teachers may err through ignorance or pervert doctrine through malice, and it can happen that error occurs in investigating the doctrine contained in Scripture and the monuments of tradition; whence controversies in faith are prone to arise. It is therefore necessary that there exist a supreme judge and teacher who cannot err in apprehending the doctrine divinely written or handed down and constantly propagated, and in promulgating it and proposing it to the faithful: by whose ministry as judge and teacher the same doctrine always handed down from the beginning may be continually preserved and remain in force in the Church. It is necessary therefore that he cannot err in the investigation of the truth handed down from the beginning, and in discerning it from the spurious

doctrines introduced afterwards. To this end belongs the charism of infallibility, which does not consist in this, that the mind of the teacher is informed by revelation or by an infusion of knowledge; but in this, that the Holy Spirit so assists the Teacher by his aid that he may be immune from error in the investigation of the truth previously handed down and in proposing to the faithful the dogmas to be believed, which were already previously believed at least implicitly and consigned to the deposit of tradition. Whence the solemn definition of the Church, or its universal magisterium concerning revealed matters, has this as its object: to teach the faithful infallibly that something is a divinely revealed dogma and therefore to be believed with divine faith. Cf. the definition of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary and of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff. Therefore the individual supreme judges and teachers receive from without, from the perpetual tradition that is in force in the Church, the truth to be believed and proposed to the faithful; but they are aided by the assistance of the Holy Spirit lest they themselves err in apprehending and handing on to the Church that doctrine.

With these things established, it is clear 1° that the doctrine contained in Scripture and the other monuments of tradition is not of itself alone sufficient for the faithful to attain revealed truths with infallible certainty; 2° that there is continually required a living teacher and supreme judge (who is the Roman Pontiff, and together with him the college of Pastors), who infallibly teaches the faithful what is revealed and settles questions of faith; 3° that the norm of this magisterium is the ancient and universal tradition of the Church, for it must teach what has been handed down; 4° that it truly needs the assistance of the Holy Spirit lest it err, as can and does happen to others, in proposing to the faithful the revealed doctrine to be believed. Therefore it is plain that one must distinguish between the supreme teacher and judge and the norm according to which he teaches and judges.

II. Now these two things are confused by those whom we must now oppose. For they say that the supreme authority of teaching, on the authority of Vincent of Lérins, is found in the universality. And why? Because, as he teaches (Commentary, nn. 3, 4, 38, 41), one must hold

what has been believed everywhere, always, and by all; which, he says, will come about only if we follow universality, antiquity, and consensus. Moreover, they add, Vincent himself makes no mention of the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, from which doctrine and infallible knowledge of truth is to be sought, but he does make mention of Councils.

Now if this doctrine is considered in itself—namely that the universality must be followed, or that what is held by all everywhere must be believed, and that if this present universality is lacking, the consensus of antiquity must be followed—this doctrine, I say, considered in itself suggests nothing other than a certain norm which must be available in deciding questions of faith, inasmuch as it proposes certain objective marks of the true tradition which must certainly be followed. Which norm indeed all must follow, even councils, on the authority of Vincent of Lérins; but because it can happen that one errs in the investigation of this norm, hence, in order that questions of faith may be definitively settled, there must be some teacher or infallible judge who cannot err in proposing the doctrine which is contained in tradition. Now whether you say that this teacher and infallible judge is the ecumenical Synod, or the Pope, or both, it is always true that beyond the consensus of antiquity (which indeed exists objectively, but is not infallibly known when decrees of faith are lacking) and beyond the universal consent of the present Church on a matter not yet defined (which universality is not supposed to be complete, for it does not exclude the dissent of some, otherwise there would be no place for a question), the judgment of some judge who may define the matter is required. But who this judge is, that is not to be gathered from this Vincentian canon but from elsewhere—that is, from the institution of Christ as manifested through the Scriptures and universal consensus of tradition: from which it is established, as we have proved, that such a judge is the Roman Pontiff. Therefore the Vincentian canon is wrongly appealed to in order to impugn the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff; for the norm to be followed in the magisterium is confused with the very authority of the magisterium.

But if the doctrine of Vincent is considered according to his own purpose, it comes to this. When new heresies arise (ch. 38), let there be

opposed to them 1° the present universal consensus of the Church; if the present universality is not so clear, let 2° antiquity be sought; but if some dissent appears even in it, let there be preferred 3° a decree, if one exists, of the universal Church or of a Council; but if this too is lacking, then 4° having compared the opinions of the Fathers, let us follow those who, though living in different times or places, yet persevering in the communion of the one Catholic Church have stood forth as reliable teachers, and what we know that they held, wrote, and taught not one or two of them only, but all alike with one and the same consent, openly, frequently, and perseveringly, let us likewise follow that; namely let us follow the consensus in antiquity (ch. 4, 3, 6, 37). But not always, he says, nor against all heresies is this method to be employed, but only against new and recent ones, namely at the moment they first arise. But as for whatever older profanities of schisms or heresies, in no way must we do anything other than either convict them, if necessary, by the authority of the Scriptures alone, or certainly avoid them as having been already in former times convicted and condemned by universal councils of Catholic priests (ch. 38). And Vincent teaches that both teachers universally, and the Roman Pontiffs (ch. 9), and Councils (ch. 32) used that method in issuing their decrees against rising errors.

And so we say 1° that the purpose of Vincent was to furnish a method of scientific (that is, here the critical or historical method, as distinct from the dogmatic use of the Fathers as divinely instituted witnesses—for some theologians seem insufficiently to distinguish between the twofold method of employing the authority of the Fathers in theological questions: sometimes the Fathers are considered as witnesses and teachers divinely instituted, whose consensus is an infallible argument of revealed truth or is a most certain testimony of the consensus of the entire ecclesiastical magisterium in revealed truth, and since at any age the consensus of the entire magisterium in something as revealed is an infallible motive of the certainty of the same and therefore also of the antiquity of the doctrine, and this holds by the same reasoning for any age whatsoever, the force of this demonstration from the Fathers is equal however far back the consensus invoked extends—this may be called the dogmatic method; but sometimes, abstracting from their character as witnesses or teachers divinely

instituted, and from the infallibility of the Church's magisterium, especially when disputing with those who deny these things, the Fathers are considered simply as historical witnesses who report immediately or mediately what was handed down from the Apostles to the Church, in order to conclude what the Apostolic doctrine is, which even heretics receive as true; when this method is employed, either the moral certainty arising from their consensus is pressed, or appeal is made to certain of them only, and, as is customary with historical witnesses, the testimony of an earlier one is then held in greater esteem than that of a later one, even though the latter may enjoy greater authority in the divinely instituted ecclesiastical magisterium—thus for example we prefer the testimony of Ignatius Martyr or Tertullian to that of Leo the Great or Chrysostom; this method we may call critical or scientific; and it is this method, though not the only one, which we consider Vincent of Lérins to have had before his eyes) inquiry for finding the truth against new heresies; therefore he distinguishes between new and old heresies, because regarding the latter we already have definitions of the Church, whereas regarding the former we must ourselves take counsel. Therefore one must first inquire what the universal Church holds; but if the universal consensus cannot be established on account of the discord of adversaries, let antiquity be sought, and indeed if in it there is found an opinion or decree of the universal Church or of a Council that is opposed to the rising error, that suffices; but if that is lacking, and if all antiquity is in agreement, let what it teaches be held; but if some discrepancy is found even among the preceding doctors, let us follow "the agreeing opinions of the many and greater masters" (ch. 77).

2° This method, according to Vincent, is to be employed also by those who are about to formulate a definition of faith; for they must confirm by their authority and propose as something to be believed, what has been handed down from antiquity and what the universal Church now holds, if indeed a truly universal consensus is also present.

Therefore 3° this kind of method pertains to the stage of inquiry and touches upon the norm which any inquirer after truth must follow. But because 4° in investigating that norm error can creep in, therefore even with that norm in place there is still required a supreme teacher and judge, who infallibly following that norm may teach what is handed

down or revealed; hence by the proposing of this norm Vincent does not exclude the ultimate infallible judgment of the Roman Pontiff.

And when he makes mention of a Council, he does not thereby 5° exclude the decrees of the Roman Pontiff; for first, when mention is made of one species for the genus, the other is also implicitly signified; especially since the definition of the Roman Pontiff and a conciliar definition are not properly two species of one genus, but differ in mode, since the very definition of a Council is the definition of the Roman Pontiff proposed in a more solemn manner. Moreover, Vincent sufficiently signifies that the authority of the Roman Pontiff alone is sufficient for settling questions of faith, by the example he adduces of Stephen in the matter of baptism, who "resisted not only with his colleagues but nevertheless ahead of all the rest, deeming it worthy, as I think, if he surpassed all the rest in devotion of faith by as much as he excelled them in the authority of his see"—and the outcome of Stephen's decree, Vincent teaches, was what is customary and usual: "antiquity was retained, novelty was rejected" (ch. 9).

Furthermore 6° when it is said that the universal Church or the consensus cannot err, a twofold question can be raised: a) whether the universal Church can err; b) what is the intrinsic reason or proximate principle of this inerrancy. To the first question the answer is negative, but (which is the answer to the second question) on account of Peter and his successors, whose magisterium the universal Church follows. Nor is this denied, but rather presupposed, by Vincent.

III. Likewise, the Pontiffs in promulgating decrees of faith confirmed the proposed doctrine by the authority of the ancients and also by the present consensus of the Church—as Celestine in the letter cited to Cyril, Leo in his dogmatic letter to Flavian, Agatho in his letter to the Sixth Council. But what can be inferred from this? Did they not also confirm the same dogmas by the authority of the Scriptures? Therefore does the supreme authority of teaching in the Church reside with the Scriptures, to the exclusion of the authentic and infallible magisterium? Did not the ecumenical Councils themselves use the same method? Therefore will the adversaries deny that the supreme and infallible power of teaching resides in the Councils? Surely the Pontiffs were carrying out what Vincent recommends: they were following the

norm of ancient tradition, but following it infallibly by reason of divine assistance, and hence it was infallibly established for all that what was proposed by them as something to be believed was truly and divinely revealed.

IV. In order that the force of this pontifical authority may be more fully understood, what we placed last in the thesis must be added. Namely, when the Pontiffs, about to define something, have recourse to the testimonies of the ancients, they do not consider those testimonies in abstraction from the authority of the Apostolic See—or, which amounts to the same thing, they do not prescind from the preceding magisterium of the Roman See—but on the contrary they take account of it, and thereby the perpetual sincere propagation through successive centuries of the doctrine handed down from the beginning is established. And indeed, since it is necessary that there exist a medium by which the doctrine handed down from the beginning may be preserved and perpetually propagated, this medium is the infallible magisterium. This moreover is the property of the Roman Chair, which is the center of the unity of faith and to which therefore the whole Church must necessarily converge if it wishes to preserve the apostolic tradition. Wherefore the magisterium of the others must be conformable to the Roman magisterium, and only those have been held in the Church as approved doctors and true witnesses of divine tradition whose testimony and doctrine the Roman See has approved either by express attestation or by known and permitted use of the same (cf. the decree of Gelasius I). Hence when Pope Hormisdas was asked by Bishop Possessor what was to be thought of the books of Faustus of Riez, he responded (ep. 70) that those works are not received by the Roman Church. Therefore when appeal is made to ancient witnesses, abstraction is not made from the judgment of the Roman See; and the Roman Pontiffs, when they define something, follow as their norm in the end the doctrine of their own chair, which has never had spot or wrinkle, in which faith has never failed, but in which the tradition handed down from the Apostles has always been preserved.

What then did Augustine mean when he said (*Contra Iulianum* l. 1, c. 4, n. 13): "For what could that holy man (Innocent, Roman Pontiff) have responded to the African councils save what the Apostolic See

itself and the Roman Church together with the other churches has always perseveringly held?" We note here that Augustine is not speaking universally, nor is he setting forth the norm according to which judgments are to be issued from the Roman See, but is speaking in a special hypothesis—namely in the question on original sin and the necessity of grace, in which question there was indeed unanimous consensus of the Churches of both West and East. Moreover, since Julian seemed to reject the authorities adduced by Augustine on the grounds that they were only those of Westerns, and seemed to demand the consensus of the whole Church, Augustine responds that the authority of the Western Church and of the Apostolic See, and therefore of Innocent who sat in it, ought to suffice for him. And why? Because Innocent could not (whatever ultimately may be the cause of this impossibility, about which cause Augustine does not speak, but which he supposes) respond other than what in that matter the See held along with the other churches and what the Apostolic See itself had held from antiquity and then together with the Roman Church. For if something is believed by the universal Church, certainly the Roman See, when consulted about it, can respond nothing other than what the universal Church believes. By this response sufficient satisfaction is made to Julian, who demanded the consensus of the Church in that question.

But there yet remains a twofold question: 1° whence comes this impossibility of error in the Roman Pontiff; 2° what will the Roman See do when the consensus of the churches is lacking, and how great is the force of its magisterium in that hypothesis. To this latter question, as being foreign to his subject, Augustine does not respond, yet its solution depends on the solution of the former. Nor does Augustine adequately address the former question directly, because, as we have said, he rather supposes the infallibility of the Pontiff; yet he hints at something by which the question can be solved. Namely, when he says that Innocent could not have responded other than what the Apostolic See itself held from antiquity; by which words it is signified that the doctrine of the Apostolic See is the norm of truth.

You will say: the unanimous magisterium of the Bishops represents tradition; this cannot be false; therefore the magisterium of the universality is of itself infallible. This is the difficulty whose solution

we promised in the preceding Thesis. I respond: the antecedent is simply true if all the Bishops teach together with the Roman Pontiff consenting either expressly or tacitly, or if they teach what the Roman See has already approved; in which hypothesis the consequent is simply granted. But if they teach something not yet defined apart from the consent of the Roman Pontiff, a distinction must be made. In order that this distinction may be understood, it must be noted that it is one thing for the revealed truth in question to be contained more or less implicitly in the things which are explicitly proposed as something to be believed by the universal episcopate, and another thing for that truth to be actually known by a reflexive act and known infallibly in those things. In the first manner, the tradition contained in the magisterium of the Bishops stands in relation to the truth in question just as Scripture stands in relation to many truths certainly contained in it, about which there has been and still is dispute: the truth is contained there, that is, but is not yet known infallibly. In the second manner, certain and infallible cognition of this truth is had.

With this established, we distinguish as follows: the magisterium of the Bishops represents tradition as regards those truths which they necessarily propose as something to be believed (cf. preceding thesis, part 1), granted; as regards other truths implicitly contained in those, we subdivide—that is, that these truths too are contained in what they teach, granted; that these are elicited with certainty from those things by their investigation and proposed to the faithful apart from the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, we subdivide: with a reformable judgment, granted; with an irreformable and therefore infallible judgment, denied. And indeed the deposit of revelation has been entrusted to all the Bishops for safekeeping (1 Tim. 6:20), but especially to the Apostolic See, in which the tradition that comes from the Apostles has always been preserved by all (Irenaeus, cited work). Nor is it to be supposed that clear and distinct knowledge of the entire deposit resides with every episcopal see, which is historically established to be false.

ON COUNCILS I

THESIS XXVIII

Individual Catholic bishops, that is, those enjoying communion with the Roman See, have this as their distinctive prerogative above other faithful: that they are authentic teachers and true judges, albeit not supreme ones, in matters of faith; and when they teach individually in their own sees, it is to be presumed juridically that their doctrine is catholic, that is, the doctrine of the chair of Peter. The coercive power of convening them into an ecumenical council belongs solely to the Roman Pontiff, and he alone has the right to preside over them by authority of jurisdiction. Bishops, therefore, assembled into an ecumenical council, receive from the Roman Pontiff the authority to teach the universal Church together with him, and there they are of themselves true judges of the faith, although their judicial authority exerts its force with respect to the faithful only when a definition from the chair of Peter precedes. When such a definition has preceded, those convened into the council have the right and duty to subject it to examination—not a doubting examination, but a confirmatory one. By approving with their due vote the doctrine proposed by the Pontiff, they also judge it by their own authority, and together with the Roman Pontiff himself they define and confirm it. The sentence of the bishops is nonetheless final and infallible because the Roman Pontiff defines the matter together with them.

Note. Since in this thesis we treat of bishops convened into an ecumenical council, and since this thesis cannot now be passed over if the question of infallibility is to be fully resolved—lest we divide one subject matter and be forced to repeat the same things—we have gathered here everything that remains to be said or to be demonstrated more fully concerning the authority of the Roman Pontiff with regard to ecumenical councils, namely concerning the power of convening and presiding, etc.

I. Since Christ willed that the doctrine divinely revealed should be perpetually guarded, preached, and propagated through a definite succession of witnesses and teachers instituted by himself, the one who

is called an authentic teacher or doctor in the Church is he who, by virtue of a divinely instituted office, has both the right and the obligation to guard, preach, and propagate revealed doctrine, and who likewise, by the same divine ordinance, has the right to require belief in the doctrine he has transmitted. Now an authentic teacher must be distinguished as twofold: one who is authentic and at the same time infallible, namely one who demands absolutely that faith be given to the doctrine he has transmitted, by reason of the very fact that he himself is the one teaching; and one who is simply authentic, fallible of himself, who requires faith in the doctrine he has transmitted because he teaches together with the center or head of the entire authentic magisterium, of which he is a member. For authority, that is, the authority of teaching, extends more widely than infallibility: authority to teach can, that is, belong to someone without infallibility belonging to him as well. The reason is that for authority in teaching it is generally sufficient that a person have the right to teach and to require that he be heard and that the doctrine he proposes be accepted; it is not required, however, that he not receive the norm of his teaching from another superior. That, however, is the proper characteristic of supreme and infallible teaching, that it is itself the norm of doctrine for others. Infallibility is indeed required in an authentic magisterium—for otherwise it could not satisfy the end for which it was instituted—but it need not inhere in the individual members of that same authentic magisterium.

A judge, properly speaking, is one who by public authority pronounces sentence on some particular controversy, which sentence must be obeyed. It is not of the essence of a judge that he himself declares or establishes the law—that is, that he establish for himself the norm or rule according to which he must judge: this is clear from both canon and civil law. Nor is it of the essence of a judge that his sentence be final, in the sense that it cannot be disobeyed; it suffices that it must be obeyed if it is not overturned or confirmed by a superior or supreme judge. When such confirmation exists, the sentence of the prior judge exerts its full force, and it is that sentence—not the sentence of the superior alone—that must be obeyed: this is equally clear from both systems of law.

Now it is manifest both that all the bishops together with Peter constitute that authentic magisterium to which infallibility belongs on account of its head, and that individual bishops, who hold a share jointly in the one episcopate, are in their own churches authentic teachers of the faith and judges. For individual bishops have their own chairs, and to each one is assigned a portion of the flock, which each one governs and rules by episcopal authority—that is, by authority of jurisdiction, which is: a) the authority to make laws for their own churches, and therefore also to teach; b) to judge in all those matters in which their sheep must be governed, and therefore also in matters of faith, for which the magisterium of the Church was instituted; and c) to coerce. Moreover, this authority of teaching and judicial power are proper to bishops. For although other faithful can also teach, these others: first, do not succeed those whom Christ sent to teach, nor do they belong to the succession of those whom Christ established as witnesses and teachers in his Church; and therefore, second, they do not, by virtue of a divinely instituted office, have the right to preach, guard, and propagate the faith; nor, third, do they have the right to require that they be heard and that the doctrine they propose be believed. They lack, indeed, jurisdiction, of which the authority to teach is a part. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of a bishop; yet since his sentence is pronounced from authority, if the matter concerns something not yet defined or sufficiently clear in the Church, the sentence at least requires that the faithful subject revere it by not publicly attacking it, because the authority of the judge must not be despised and unity must be preserved in the Church, the care of which is committed to the bishop, who is to be judged by his superior, not by his inferior. When we speak of the other faithful, we mean those who do not by privilege of the Roman Pontiff possess ordinary episcopal power or some participation in it over any portion of the flock; for such persons, given that privilege, are to be compared in this respect to bishops.

II. From what has been said it follows that what we have established in second place in the thesis is this: when bishops teach in their own churches those things that pertain to faith and require assent, it is to be presumed juridically that their doctrine is true, or catholic,

that is, the doctrine of the chair of Peter. Presumption is in general an anticipated opinion formed from indications or conjectures regarding a matter that could in itself come into doubt. A presumption of law, if we are speaking of positive human law, is one that is found expressed in a canon or statute; but if we are speaking of natural and divine law, it can be called that which is necessarily inferred from natural or divine law, or is required by it. Such a presumption does admit proof to the contrary, unlike an irrebuttable presumption of law; but until such proof has been brought forward, the presumption favors the one for whom it stands. Hence what the law presumes is rationally believed, since presumption is itself a kind of proof.

Now this presumption, of which we have spoken, rests upon the very divine institution of teachers and upon the divine promise. For Christ willed that there should be teachers whom the faithful are bound to hear, and he promised that the concordant consensus of these teachers would never depart from the teaching of Peter; and he assists each one with his aid so that, unless they fail themselves, they may wish to remain in unity and always to agree with the chair of Peter. Now since this is the law of Christ—that there should be teachers and that the faithful must receive doctrine from them—first, since the very law of nature teaches that one who acts by authority and office is presumed to act rightly in those matters that pertain to his authority and office, Christ, in conferring the authority and office of teaching upon bishops, must thereby be said to have willed that they should be presumed to use their authority rightly, that is, to teach correctly. Second, since it is certain that the concordant consensus of teachers will not depart from the doctrine of the chair of Peter, it is also certain that the generality of them, taken in the aggregate, does not depart from it; and although individual ones can singillatim be absent from that generality, yet since no one is to be considered wicked or unfit for his office unless it is proved, one may not specially judge of any particular bishop that he departs from that consensus unless it is proved—that is, he is to be presumed to be in agreement with the universal consensus. This presumption is therefore juridical, founded in divine law itself.

Hence the following resources are available to the faithful person seeking truth: first, it is certain that the Roman See excels all others for

those seeking the truth of faith; second, it is certain that the consensus of divinely instituted teachers coheres always with the Roman chair, and indeed formally and materially in all those things that have already been explicitly transmitted and are transmitted by it; and at least formally as regards due submission of will and intellect in those matters not yet defined by its judgment. Third, it is to be juridically presumed that individual bishops in communion with the Roman chair teach the same thing that it teaches. If, therefore, a faithful person can consult either of the first two, he will attain knowledge of the truth: from the first, indeed, regarding any point of revealed doctrine, even one not yet defined, if the Roman See is willing to respond; from the second, regarding all the truths that the consensus of pastors explicitly professes together with the teaching of the Roman chair. But if the faithful person is unable to use either of these means—as can happen with the unlearned—let him then be content with the teaching of his own bishop; for in giving credence to him and believing that the doctrine which the bishop teaches is revealed, he acts rationally. It is the will of God that sheep should hear their shepherd and presume that he teaches well, unless the contrary has been proved; and so even if the faithful person is taught an error, his error will be material, not formal, and true virtue of faith will always thrive in him. It is clear, moreover, that the kind of assent rendered to a bishop who alone is heard, and much more to an inferior who performs the functions of a bishop, is either formally or certainly virtually always conditioned—conditioned, namely, on this being the doctrine of the Church, this being the doctrine of the Roman See; for we will to believe what the universal Church believes, as we profess in the creed of faith, saying: I believe in the holy catholic Church.

It can indeed happen that a faithful person doubts whether his bishop teaches rightly; yet it is historically evident, with reason lending its support, that doubts of this kind rarely arise spontaneously in the minds of the unlearned. For such a doubt requires a degree of reflection that the unlearned do not ordinarily employ, since they generally proceed by direct, if confused, intuition rather than by reflex and distinct knowledge. Nor should we overlook the aid of divine grace, which guides individual persons according to their condition and need.

The assent of such persons to doctrines transmitted by a single teacher is therefore an act of faith—for they believe God revealing, on account of the authority of the Church—and even if at the same time it may be a material error, it is a firm assent, for they are troubled by no doubt. If, however, a true doubt should arise, the matter is either a truth already defined or it is not. If the truth is not yet defined, since the faithful person is not bound to believe it, his faith will suffer no harm from the fact that he cannot be taught it by his bishop. If, however, the matter concerns something already defined, and it is doubted whether the bishop teaches the opposite of what the universal Church explicitly professes, and the doubt is moreover a positive one, then the presumption on that side is already failing, since some proof to the contrary exists, and the assent of faith will have to be suspended. But for a person in such doubt it will be easy to find the truth, since he is already supposed to have some knowledge of the contrary universal consensus, with which he has compared the position of his bishop; for otherwise the doubt would not have been a positive one.

III. Let us now consider bishops assembled into an ecumenical council. Concerning ecumenical councils, in order to include everything here as we have noted, we teach first who can convene them.

The Roman Pontiff alone has the right to convene an ecumenical council by his power of jurisdiction. A council of bishops differs from bishops remaining in their own sees by reason of special power and action; for as regards their being, whether they remain in their own sees or are gathered into one council, they are always bishops—one body cohering to its head, one episcopate, of which each one holds a share jointly. But remaining in their own sees, individual bishops have power only over their own churches and govern them independently of one another, each acting separately. But when gathered into a council: first, they jointly exercise their activities, deliberations, and votes, so that from the acts of all there comes one act; second, they exercise their power not only over their own church, but over one province if the council is provincial, or over the universal Church if the council is ecumenical. It is clear, moreover, that this pooling of all actions into one, this pooling of deliberations and votes, can in itself be obtained even from bishops remaining in their own sees—in which case one

would certainly have an equivalent council at least as regards its formal element; nonetheless, such pooling can more fully and effectively be had in the ordinary course of events when bishops come together in person and communicate their deliberations to one another and cast their votes. The difference, therefore, between bishops assembled in council and the same bishops remaining in their own sees concerns both the nature of the action—inasmuch as in a council there is one action arising from many, and by that one action either some portion of the Church or the universal Church is governed—and the nature of the power which is the principle of that governing action. We are now speaking of ecumenical councils. Moreover, what we shall say about their convocation is to be understood also of that action by which the votes of all the bishops remaining in their own sees would be sought on some matter so that a decree might be issued in the common name; for the formal nature of a council is found in this as well.

A twofold act of convocation must be distinguished. The first is an act of jurisdiction over those who are convened, which act therefore obliges them to come; this can be called coercive convocation, or simply convocation by authority. The second act of convocation is an act of ministry performed in service to the power of jurisdiction, or it is an act of counsel or exhortation, inviting bishops to come together in council. An act of counsel or exhortation can also be performed by bishops when they request and exhort that a council be held. An act of convocation performed in service to the power of jurisdiction can be called ministerial convocation, insofar as it is subordinated to and serves legitimate authority.

Now although ministerial convocation—which is more of a duty than a right—belongs also to emperors, coercive convocation by authority pertains to the Roman Pontiff alone; and this cannot be denied except by those who utterly subvert the order of the Church by introducing aristocratic or popular government, or by subjecting the Church to civil authority—adversaries whom we have sufficiently refuted in what has gone before. Indeed: first, it belongs to the one who has jurisdiction over all bishops to command all of them to assemble; but this one is neither any other bishop, nor a body of the faithful, nor the body of bishops itself apart from the Pontiff, nor any emperor, but

solely the Roman Pontiff, in whom resides the fullness of power, since he is the pastor of all the sheep; therefore he alone can oblige all bishops to come to a council. Second, bishops are gathered into an ecumenical council in order to enact laws for the universal Church. For, as we have already noted, they do not individually enact laws or issue decrees for their own churches, but all concurring together in one act they enact a law or decree for the universal Church; for the conciliar act is one and refers immediately to the universal Church.

Now although bishops are, by divine right, the suitable subject for the exercise of this power together with others and under the Roman Pontiff—because by divine right they are rulers, that is, they possess ordinary jurisdiction in the Church—they nonetheless do not possess this power of enacting laws for the universal Church, either individually or collectively, from themselves or immediately from God; they can only have it immediately from the Roman Pontiff who convenes them by his power. Therefore the convocation of the Roman Pontiff is required, by which convocation this power is conferred upon the bishops. The consequence is clear, because without power there is no council in reality. The minor premise is proved, and specifically as to its second part, in which the difficulty may lie. Indeed, if the governance of the Church were aristocratic, it would be natural to infer that, from Christ's own institution, once the fact of legitimate assembly had occurred, jurisdiction would immediately belong to the assembled bishops since it resides in a corporate body by its very nature. But Christ's institution is altogether different.

For by Christ's institution there are not two supreme powers in the Church—that is, there are not two subjects endowed with supreme power—but there is one head of the Church, just as the Church itself is one; and moreover, the supreme power itself is the power of the Primacy, and its only subject is the Roman Pontiff. But the power of enacting laws for the universal Church is the proper act of supreme power; therefore it cannot of itself belong to the other bishops, whether taken individually or collectively. Nor is such power conferred immediately by God upon the bishops as they constitute one body, whether dispersed or united in council; for it is true that supreme power exists in the assembly of pastors only insofar as it is proper to the head

of that assembly, by whose authority it can come about that the other pastors together with him and through him concur in the exercise of supreme power. For the institution of the Primacy excludes supreme power from the universality of pastors and subordinates all the other pastors, even taken together, to the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff; and for this reason God does not communicate the power of enacting laws for the universal Church immediately except to one, and indeed wills that the others should not have it of themselves; for those who are subordinated to supreme power cannot possess it. Bishops assembled in council are therefore by divine right capable of this power, but in such a way that they must receive it from their head, the Roman Pontiff. And indeed, since the Roman Pontiff is the supreme and immediate shepherd to whom the universal Church is entrusted, and since he possesses the fullness of power, he has the right that no one should enact laws binding upon his subjects without his consent; therefore, in order for bishops in council to be able to issue decrees on faith, morals, or discipline, the faculty to do so must be granted to them by the Roman Pontiff.

The position of Bolgeni, who goes in search of new opinions, must therefore be rejected. He holds that universal jurisdiction has been conferred immediately by Christ upon bishops, not insofar as they are individuals, but insofar as they constitute the episcopal body together with its head the Roman Pontiff (in *Episcopato*, Part 1, chapter 7). For Christ immediately granted universal jurisdiction to the head alone, and through the head communicates to the body—acting together with the head—the power of concurring in the exercise of universal jurisdiction.

If the Roman Pontiff does not exist in the Church, no true ecumenical council is possible, because the head and subject of universal power is lacking; rather, a Pontiff must be elected. But if obstacles exist to the election of a certain Pontiff, or obstacles that render one or more elected candidates doubtful, and this evil cannot be remedied except through a council of all the bishops, the bishops do have the right to convene in council so that the Christian commonwealth may suffer no harm; but their power extends only to providing for the election of a legitimate Pontiff, not to enacting laws for the universal Church—because they lack the authority which they can

receive only from the Pontiff; although by way of preparation and initial drafting, laws can also be enacted by them which, once a Pontiff exists and has confirmed them, will have binding force.

You may object that ecumenical councils exist or are held in the Church by divine right—as indeed a learned and Roman writer of the present day has sought to prove from the fact that divine assistance has been promised to them—and therefore that conciliar power is conferred upon bishops by God himself.

I respond, first: granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence; for bishops in individual churches likewise exist by divine right, yet it does not follow that they have jurisdiction immediately from God.

I respond, second: I distinguish the antecedent. That councils exist in the Church by a divine right prescribing something necessary by a necessity arising from the very constitution of the Church—this I deny. That they exist by a divine right counseling and recommending something useful, and in certain circumstances also prescribing something necessary, but by a necessity arising from those very circumstances so that provision may be prudently made for the end—this I concede. The reason is that from Christ's very institution the Primacy of Peter suffices and must always exist in the Church. See the following thesis.

As for the reason annexed to the antecedent, we deny the consequence: assistance has been promised to councils if they are duly convened, but from this it does not follow that they are commanded to be convened.

The right of the Roman Pontiff is likewise asserted by the history of the ancient councils. In this matter it must be noted that the substance of the thing must be distinguished from its accidental form or mode. The substance consists in this: that bishops are convened by the will of the Roman Pontiff and constitute the council by his authority, so that by him the faculty of decreeing on matters common to the Church is granted to the bishops, and without his authority the council is null. The accidental form consists in the manner in which the will of the Roman Pontiff is signified—whether by a certain sign, such as an apostolic letter, a bull, or some other means—and whether his will precedes or follows that of another, or whether he himself is the first to

announce the convocation or himself approves and consents to one announced by another.

Furthermore, it must be noted that it is the duty of Christian emperors to use their power in defense of the Church, and that great benefit accrues to ecclesiastical authority when rulers spontaneously—as they ought—lend their efforts in aid of the Church; hence, in its proper modesty, ecclesiastical authority, when it sees them acting rightly, allows them from time to time to carry out without its prior admonition whatever conduces to the good of the Church; for such execution, both by its own nature and by the intention of those acting, is understood to be subordinated to ecclesiastical power, and such permission is a sign of the authority's consent, by virtue of which all things are done. Again, it must be noted that when a matter can be peacefully handled with the civil power, every consideration counsels that it be done; and at that period the law of the empire forbade public assemblies of men without the consent of the emperor, so that, in order that emperors might not be aggrieved at having their law flouted, their consent had to be sought. Finally, at that period the public vehicles of travel through the regions of the empire were not available to all, but were under the power of the emperor and required his permission for their use; and the not inconsiderable expenses of the journey for so many bishops coming from the most distant places, and the necessary costs of maintaining them while the council was in session, could be supplied only from the imperial treasury. It was therefore physically impossible for bishops to celebrate an ecumenical council without the consent of the emperor, even though they could have done so juridically of themselves.

Given these premises, we affirm: first, as a matter of fact, that Roman pontiffs convened the earlier ecumenical councils; second, as a matter of right, that they convened them by the power of coercive convocation and that this belonged to them alone; whereas emperors convened them only by ministerial convocation. As to the first point: that the first Council of Nicaea was convened by Sylvester is attested by the Fathers of the Sixth Council in their address to the emperor, and is indicated by Damasus in his seventeenth letter (preserved in Gallandus, volume 6, page 321). That the Council of Ephesus was convened by the

authority of Pope Celestine is taught both by that same address and by the second profession of faith found in the *Liber Diurnus Romanorum Pontificum*. That Council of Ephesus likewise which later became the robber council was convened by the authority of the Apostolic See, that is, of Leo, as he himself attests in his letter 33 to the Ephesian council. The authority of that same Leo was implored by Valentinian and Marcian (ibid., letter 33) so that the Council of Chalcedon might be held. That the Sixth Council was assembled with the consent of Agatho can be gathered from the fact that the emperor Constantine urged him to send his legates (letter of the emperor to Leo II), while the Fathers testify that they leave to Agatho, as bishop of the universal Church, the determination of what is to be done, and that they condemn the heretics according to the sentence previously pronounced by him (in the letter sent by the council to Agatho)—although perhaps they exceeded the proper manner in this regard. Hadrian I consented to the holding of the Seventh Council, as is clear from his letter to Tarasius read at the second session. Hadrian II wished the Eighth Council to be celebrated, as he himself states in his letter to Emperor Basil read at the first session. The Second Council, moreover, was not ecumenical in celebration and convocation, nor was the Fifth Council of that character, since Vigilius dissented from it.

As to the second point: the convocation by the Roman pontiffs was a convocation by authority—coercive convocation—and this was believed to belong to them alone. Indeed, a) it must be maintained that all ecumenical councils stand on the same footing, and that this was believed from antiquity. If, therefore, there is clear historical testimony establishing that some council was convened by the authority of the Roman Pontiff in such a way that this authority was deemed necessary for bishops to assemble in council—commanding them to assemble and granting them the power of decreeing—the same must be said of all. Now it is historically clear that this was how the Council of Chalcedon was convened. For the empress Pulcheria, desiring a council, wrote to Leo (letter 77, ibid.) saying: "Let your Reverence, in whatever way it shall see fit, deign to signify, so that all the bishops of the entire East, of Thrace and Illyricum, as it has also pleased our Lord my most pious imperial consort, may be able to come together swiftly from the eastern

regions into one city, and there, a council having been held, concerning the catholic faith and concerning those bishops who have previously been separated from it, as faith and Christian piety require, with you as the authorizer (σοῦ αὐθεντοῦντος—the one conferring power and granting right), they may decree." The consent or command of Leo was being sought, then, so that the bishops might be able to assemble—not with physical power, which the emperor alone could supply (see what was said just above), but therefore with juridical power. And when assembled into council the bishops were to decree with Leo as their author, that is, by the authority received from him and following his teaching.

And indeed Gelasius testifies to the bishops of Dardania that "the Apostolic See alone, for the sake of truth, decreed that the Council of Chalcedon should take place"—alone, that is, by the authority of jurisdiction, by which the power was given to the bishops to constitute the council and to decree on matters of faith for the universal Church; for Leo in his letter 114, confirming the acts of the council in the matter of faith, asserts that the council was also convened by the command of the Christian rulers.

Finally, at the same council, at the first session, Dioscorus was reproved by the Pontiff's legate, with the entire council approving, because he "dared to hold the Council of Ephesus—which was meant to be universal but was turned into a robber council—without the authority of the Apostolic See, which was never permitted nor had ever been done." The authority of the Apostolic See, therefore, was considered necessary for a council to be held, and this authority was believed necessary for a council to be able to be held—an authority conferring the power by which the council came to be and synodal action was conducted. And indeed the authority of the Apostolic See is nothing other than the authority of supreme power; and this supreme power is necessary precisely in order that it may command the council to be held and confer the power to do so. The Council of Chalcedon, therefore, which approved this judgment, knew itself to have come into being by this necessary authority of the Apostolic See. Therefore, etc.

Moreover, as a principle that holds universally for all councils, it was a principle of ecclesiastical law that "councils should not be

celebrated contrary to the opinion of the Roman Pontiff" (Thesis 17, page 457)—something we have also just heard from Paschasinus, legate of the Roman See: that it had never been permitted to celebrate a council without the authority of the Apostolic See. This law being in force, it was therefore necessary that the Roman Pontiff should have convened all ecumenical councils by coercive convocation.

Socrates, in book 2, chapter 17, reports the opinion of Julius in these words: that by an ecclesiastical canon it has been forbidden that anything should be decreed by the Church contrary to the opinion (γνώμην) of the Roman bishop. Sozomen, in book 3, chapter 10, reporting the same thing, says: it is a sacerdotal law (ἱερατικὸν νόμον) that acts performed contrary to the opinion (παρὰ γνώμην) of the Roman bishop should be held as null. Therefore, according to the ecclesiastical canon, a council lacks the power of decreeing anything without the will or authority of the Roman Pontiff, and whatever he does not approve is null. In order, therefore, for councils to have force, they must be convened by his authority, with him conferring the power of decreeing something for the Church.

Finally, since it is a certain historical truth that convocation was made by the Roman Pontiff, the character of that convocation must be gathered from the power of the one convening and from the reason why his convocation could have been required. But the power of the Roman See is a power of jurisdiction over bishops, which moderates and governs their acts; and given the nature of the Primacy, no other reason can be conceived why the convocation of the Pontiff should be required, except that he must confer upon the bishops the power to decree. Therefore the convocation of the council made by the Roman Pontiff was coercive.

When it happens, therefore, that we read in the letters of Roman pontiffs that they obey the command of emperors and convoke councils in obedience to them—as occurs in the letters of Agatho cited above—these are formulae of modesty, by which not formal obedience of the Pontiff (which in such matters is incompatible, as shown in § 18) is signified, but material compliance—that is, agreement with the very thing that emperors desired and commanded to the extent that it lay in their power. The same must be said of those formulae of deference with

which the Fathers, after completing ecumenical councils, in giving thanks to emperors assert that they were convened by them; as may be seen in the addresses to emperors, or even when the Fathers of provincial councils make the same assertion, as may be seen in the tenth letter of Ambrose to Gratian and Valentinian in the name of the Council of Aquileia. For the Fathers are speaking of ministerial convocation, not coercive.

b) Moreover, it is established that the Roman pontiffs alone have legitimately used or could have used such a right. We say legitimately; for we are not treating of any violent usurpation, which can have a physical effect but not a moral one. For either the Roman pontiffs, or the emperors, or other bishops used this right. But it is evident that emperors were believed to lack this right. This is clear from the explicit teaching of the Fathers of that age, who assert that rulers have no right over ecclesiastical matters, that it is the duty of rulers to serve the Church, and that royal power has been conferred by God for the protection of the Church—all of which we have given in the cited section.

It was likewise believed that other bishops or patriarchs lacked this right, as is evident from the condemnation of Dioscorus and his Ephesian council.

Therefore the right of coercive convocation has never belonged to anyone but the Roman Pontiff.

IV. The Roman Pontiff has the right to preside over ecumenical councils—and not merely honorary presidency, but that of jurisdiction. For the right of presiding follows from the nature of his Primacy; but the Roman Pontiff holds the Primacy of jurisdiction over all bishops, even when assembled. This we have already demonstrated in Thesis 12, and it can be further confirmed from what has been said up to this point. And indeed, bishops assembled in council differ from themselves as individuals remaining in their own churches only with respect to action—inasmuch as in their own churches they each act separately, whereas in council the actions of the individual members are pooled and from them emerges one common action. As regards their being, however, the dispersed and united assembly of bishops is the same; for the Church is always one, one body. Now the entire assembled body of

pastors possesses the power to decree by common action laws for the universal Church only from the Roman Pontiff (as shown in the preceding part); therefore the entire council is subject to the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff. The same can be confirmed again from the prerogative of infallibility. For the power of teaching is a power of jurisdiction; but the entire assembly of bishops is subject to the teaching power of the Roman Pontiff, who borrows infallibility from the Roman Pontiff and must follow his judgments. And indeed it is necessary that decrees of faith issued by the council be infallibly true and decrees of morals infallibly right; for the Church cannot be governed by unjust laws; but even taken together the bishops do not possess from themselves the power to issue such decrees; therefore in terms of power the assembly of bishops and the Roman Pontiff are not equals.

The Roman Pontiff has always presided over ecumenical councils that were ecumenical in their celebration, with a presidency of jurisdiction, either in person or through his legates, as in the earlier councils held in the East. Indeed at the Council of Ephesus the legates were to judge the others, not to submit to litigation, if any question had arisen (Thesis 24, section f), and the Fathers of Ephesus testify that they were assembled by Celestine to pronounce sentence against Nestorius (ibid.). That Cyril presided in the name of Celestine is also attested by the acts of the council: see Session Six and its account in the work of Marius Mercator in the second part of his work; and also the Menology of the Greeks for the ninth of June: "The birthday of St. Cyril, a most learned man and outstanding champion of the catholic faith, whom Supreme Pontiff Celestine judged suitable to delegate his role in the Council of Ephesus." At Chalcedon the legates of the Pontiff provided the form which the Fathers were bound to follow in judging (ibid., following). At the Eighth Council the Fathers at the first session were commanded by the legates to subscribe to the formula of faith proposed by the Pontiff (cited thesis). The Pontiff therefore presided through his vicars or legates with a presidency of jurisdiction. And these suffice for a judgment to be formed about the other councils held in the East. This, therefore, is the right and honor of Peter of which Leo speaks when he says that his presence was urgently requested by the council (letter 93 to the Council of Chalcedon), with the right and honor of the Apostle

Peter being preserved: "In these brothers, Paschasinus and Lucentius, bishops, and Boniface and Basil, priests, who have been sent by the Apostolic See, let your fraternity's council consider me to preside." But the right of Peter, as Leo himself testifies, is the right of the Church of the Rock, the right of the Confirmer, the right of the Shepherd—that is, the right of supreme jurisdiction; therefore the presidency of which Leo speaks is a presidency with jurisdiction.

And indeed, as holds for all councils, there obtained in the Church the law of councils prescribing that the place of presider be assigned to the Roman Pontiff or to his legates. This is taught us by the Seventh Council. For the Seventh Council at session 6 proves that the council of bishops assembled by Copronymus to assert the heresy of iconoclasm cannot be called an ecumenical council, because "it did not have the assistance of the Roman pope, either through his vicars or through an encyclical letter, as the law of councils prescribes." Now the assistance rendered to councils by the Roman Pontiff, whether in person or through his vicars or through an encyclical letter, consisted—as history makes clear—in the fact that the Roman Pontiff convened the council and sent legates who would guide the council and judge all matters, and also necessarily preformed the doctrine to be held, which he proposed through his legates. This embraces also the right to preside with the power of jurisdiction. It was therefore a law that the Roman Pontiff should preside over councils with the authority of jurisdiction.

Some have doubted whether the Pontiff presided over the first Council of Nicaea, because in the subscriptions the first to subscribe is Hosius with the title of bishop alone, followed by Vitus and Vincent with this title: "We, priests of Rome, have subscribed in place of our venerable lord and bishop, the holy Sylvester."

But: first, Hosius therefore presided; yet by what title did the Bishop of Cordoba preside over a universal council at which patriarchs were present and at which the rights of the primary sees were so carefully safeguarded (canon 6)? The right of presiding depends not on personal merit but on the dignity of the see. Second, witnesses exist who affirm that Hosius presided by delegation from Sylvester: Eusebius in book 3 of the *Vita Constantini*, as reported by Gelasius of Cyzicus in book 2 of his history of the Council of Nicaea (see Natalis Alexander,

Historia Ecclesiastica, century 4, dissertation 12); Hadrian I in the *Epitome of Canons* in the preface to the canons of Sardica; Leo IX in his letter to the patriarch Michael. See Natalis Alexander, loc. cit.

You will say that emperors also presided. The difference between the presidency of the Pontiff and that of the emperor, which would be sufficiently manifest from the nature of the things themselves, is explicitly taught by the Chalcedonian Fathers in their account of the council's proceedings to Leo (among Leo's letters, number 98), when they say to Leo: "You, as a head over its members, presided in those who held your place, showing your benevolence; but the faithful emperors presided for the sake of seemly order (πρὸς εὐκοσμίαν)."

However, the Belgian scholar Gilbert (in his *Tractatus theologico-canonicus*, year 1687, Disputation 1, question 3, § 3) establishes the following against what has been said above: first, that by right it belongs to the Roman Pontiff to convene ecumenical councils and preside over them; second, that in fact several councils were held which the Pontiff himself neither convened nor over which he presided with authority, and which were nonetheless held to be legitimate by the Church. As to convocation, he proves this by citing councils held in the East, which were convened by emperors.

As to presidency, he concedes that the Pontiff had the right to preside in person, but denies that his legates presided in those councils, with the exception of Chalcedon, which had a special reason. For as he himself says, the practice observed at that time was that if the presiding see's bishop was present he would preside; if absent, the bishop of the second see would preside, and so on. Thus at the First Council of Nicaea, Eustathius, Bishop of Antioch, presided, as Felix III testifies in his fifth letter to the emperor Zeno, where, speaking of Peter the Fuller, it is said that he "polluted the holy see of the martyr Ignatius and of Eustathius the confessor, who presided over the three hundred and eighteen Fathers who assembled at Nicaea." Why the Bishop of Alexandria did not preside, he explains by the reason that his case was being tried along with that of Arius. Likewise he says that at the First Council of Constantinople, the patriarch of Constantinople presided—whom he already supposes to have obtained the second place among the patriarchs. At Ephesus, Cyril presided, and this is clear, he says, from the

fact that he subscribed first without any indication of a legatine role, unlike those who had come from Rome: he subscribed, that is, as president of the council. Over the Fifth Council presided Mennas and after him Eutychius, patriarchs of Constantinople. Over the Sixth and Seventh likewise the patriarchs of Constantinople presided, occupying the right-hand seat, with the legates of the Roman See sitting beside them. At the Eighth Council, since only the legates of the patriarchal sees were present, the Roman legates rightly presided. At the Fourth Council of Chalcedon, there was a special reason why the Roman legates presided: namely, because the other patriarchs had defected from the true faith. And lest this reason seem fabricated, Leo himself is adduced as witness in his letter 89 to Marcian, where he says: "Since certain of the brothers—bishops, that is, at the Ephesian robbery council—which we cannot say without grief, could not maintain catholic steadfastness against the storms of falsehood, it is fitting that the aforesaid brother and co-bishop of mine (Paschasinus) preside over the council in my place." Moreover, the same author denies that a valid argument can be drawn from the order of subscriptions, since in these regard was had to the pre-eminence of the patriarchal churches among themselves.

Now, as regards convocation, sufficient answer has already been given in the foregoing. As to presidency, the following can first be noted about this singular theory. First, there is a contradiction in the fact that from the subscriptions something is denied to be provable, and yet that Cyril presided at the Council of Ephesus is proved precisely from the fact that he subscribed first. Second, there is an ignorance of ecclesiastical history. For: a) it is falsely supposed that the Bishop of Constantinople had obtained the second place among the patriarchs when the First Council of Constantinople was held under Damasus. b) It is likewise false that this council and the Fifth were ecumenical in their celebration. c) It is false that the bishop of Alexandria, Alexander, came to the First Council as a defendant or plaintiff, as though—which is falsely supposed—the faith in the divinity of the Son had been doubtful or could have been doubtful before the Council of Nicaea. For the profession of faith in the Trinity was always explicit in the Church, as so many martyrs also attested; therefore the Fathers did not assemble

in council at Nicaea to hear two litigants, plaintiff and defendant—Alexander and Arius—but to overthrow a heresy already manifest, to defend the faith, and to preserve all the faithful free from perversion. d) It is false that the right-hand place was the more honorable, "which (to use the words of Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, century 4, dissertation 12) is proved by the example of the Council of Chalcedon: at the first session of which the seating arrangement of the bishops is described as follows—on the left side of the Apostolic See sat its legates and after them the patriarchs of Constantinople and Antioch; on the right, Dioscorus of Alexandria, who was shortly to be condemned, and Juvenal of Jerusalem. This arrangement was undoubtedly derived from the solemn custom of preceding councils. This could have come about for either of two reasons: either because in the Church of Christ, in imitation of the patriarchal blessing of Jacob—where the order of things is reversed—the right was changed to the left for the sake of dignity; or because for Romans the left side was of better omen, as Varro and other masters of profane literature attest, and was therefore considered more honorable—but this only in sacred and divine matters, so that, as they say, our left is counted as the right hand of the deity." Thus far Natalis Alexander. Moreover, at the Council of Chalcedon, as Gilbert himself admits, Leo's legates presided; therefore the first place in the right-hand row was not the place of the presider—from which another contradiction of this writer is also apparent, if he knew his history. Similarly at the Sixth Council, the legates of the Roman See occupied the first place on the left and are named first in the roll of those assembling at the council; at the Seventh Council the placement of seats is not indicated, but the Pontiff's legates are always named first. d) It is false that Cyril presided at the Council of Ephesus without the authority of Celestine, as is clear from what has been said elsewhere.

Therefore the reason added by Leo is not exclusive—Leo who counted presidency at councils among the rights of Peter; rather, presupposing the institution of the Primacy and the due subordination of bishops to the Roman See, he shows that no good can be hoped for from bishops assembled in council who convene without their head, and that therefore, in order for things to go well, the Roman Pontiff must guide the councils.

But Felix III (this letter is considered spurious) signifies that Eustathius was among the foremost bishops, not however that he held the absolutely first place. For from time to time all the patriarchs who are present are said to have presided at the council, by reason of their special dignity and authority. Thus Cedrenus, in his historical compendium, speaking of the Council of Nicaea, says: "Presiding over it were Vitus and Vincent, priests representing Pope Sylvester of Rome; Metrophanes (Nilus, Metropolitan of Rhodes, in his book on councils, places the Alexandrian here) of Byzantium; Alexander of Alexandria; Eustathius of Antioch; and Macarius, Bishop of Jerusalem."

It is indeed true that in the order of subscriptions regard was had to the pre-eminence of the churches among themselves; but at the same time it is possible to infer from them who presided at the council. For it must be maintained that someone presided at the council—as even Gilbert concedes; and the one who subscribed first must be said to have presided, since the order of subscriptions represents the order that the bishops hold among themselves in the council, being indeed the order of votes cast in the council. That the Roman Pontiff surpasses the other patriarchs will be taught to you even by the patriarchs of the East—of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria—in their letters presented to the Seventh Council and read at the third session; read these.

For the rest, the theory of presidency that Gilbert devised reduces the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff to a certain primacy of honor; for in that hypothesis it can only be true that in the absence of the Primate the right of presiding belongs to the next in rank, even if the Primate's legates are present. But if the Primacy is one of jurisdiction, since his governing authority is necessary for acts to be legitimate and valid, it is required that his legates, present in his place and bearing his authority before the council, should preside over it.

What has been said above concerning the power of the Roman Pontiff over councils, both of convocation and of presidency, is confirmed by the authority of Leo X in the bull *Pastor aeternus*, issued with the approval of the sacred council at Session 11 of the Fifth Lateran Council (an objection was formerly raised by the Gallicans that the Fifth Lateran Council was not ecumenical, while at the same time they wanted the Council of Basel to have been such; the question is now

theologically futile). For he says that the Council of Basel, after its abrogation by Eugene IV, no longer deserved to be called a council, "and that the Roman Pontiff for the time being, as having authority over all councils, has full right and power both of convoking, transferring, and dissolving councils, as is manifestly evident not only from the testimony of sacred Scripture, the sayings of the holy Fathers, and the decrees of other Roman pontiffs and sacred canons, but also from the express confession of the councils themselves."

Connected with both the right of convocation and the right of presiding is the right of proposing—that is, of determining the subject matter on which deliberation and sentence are to be given. For it belongs to the one who grants to the bishops the power of dealing with matters pertaining to the universal Church by the act of convocation, to determine also what matter the bishops are to deal with; just as he could have refrained from calling them and granting any power at all, so he can exclude such matters as he wishes, withholding power with respect to them. And just as the Roman Pontiff alone can convoke the council, so he alone has the right to determine the object around which the common action of those convened shall turn. Likewise, it belongs to him—to whose jurisdiction the others are subject—to determine in the council the matter to be treated; for that is an act of authority. Therefore, etc. Hence Leo never wished to approve what had been done at the Council of Chalcedon beyond what had been decided in the matter of faith, because he had convoked the council and sent his legates for that end alone, as he himself testifies in letter 119 to Maximus of Antioch and in his confirmatory letter of the council.

V. What, then, can bishops do in a council? We have already seen in section III that the power of enacting laws and issuing decrees of faith for the universal Church is derived in them from the Roman Pontiff. Nor does the demonstration we have given of this truth depend upon the position that the jurisdiction of bishops in their own churches is immediately from the Roman Pontiff. For even if it be held that this jurisdiction is immediately from God, nonetheless the jurisdiction that bishops exercise in a council must be said to be from the Roman Pontiff. For the act of enacting laws for the universal Church is the proper act of that authority which is supreme—an authority which can indeed

communicate a participation of itself to others, but without whose consent no obligation can be imposed upon the whole society. But from Christ's institution the supreme authority in the Church is the authority of the Primacy, which belongs to one alone and remains the same whether bishops are convened or not; for he remains always the Rock, the Confirmer, the Shepherd of all. Therefore, etc.

VI. Bishops present in a council, moreover, are judges of the faith, not mere consultors. For they do not lose, when assembled, the right that each one possesses by reason of his office in his own church; indeed, by union with the supreme judge, that right is rather perfected insofar as its scope is extended. Yet they are of themselves inferior judges, from whose sentence appeal can be taken, and whose sentence is therefore not of itself incontrovertible and final. Yet this, as we have already noted, does not remove the character of true judgment, but only a special degree—namely, that of supreme judgment. And indeed the sentence of a council as such has always been regarded as a judicial sentence; yet the sentence of a council—or a conciliar sentence—is not obtained unless the universality, or the greater and sounder part, of bishops also consents. For although the Pontiff can define on his own, he cannot issue a conciliar definition except with the approval of the sacred council: this has been perpetually retained in the Church and arises from the very nature of things; for a conciliar sentence presupposes a council, that is, an assembly of many. But if the conciliar sentence is a judicial sentence, and the consent of the bishops formally constitutes the conciliar sentence, then this consent of the bishops is a judicial consent.

Note, however, that since the judge, insofar as he has authority, is related to those who are subject to him, when bishops are called judges in matters of faith they are considered in relation to the faithful, to whom as their subjects and inferiors they pronounce judgment and propose their sentence. For they are shepherds and therefore also judges, as Pius VI says—bishops with respect to the peoples; but if you regard the Pontiff, they are nothing but sheep to be fed (page 445).

VII. The difficulty arises concerning what bishops may do when the sentence of the Roman Pontiff precedes that of the bishops, and first, what kind of examination is their right.

We say that the examination which bishops have the right to conduct, after the Roman Pontiff has already defined, is not a doubting examination but a confirmatory one. The meaning of this twofold designation is first explained. A doubting examination is one that begins from doubt about the matter itself; it supposes, or may rightly suppose, that the matter about which inquiry is to be made is still doubtful—that is, it is unknown whether it is true or false—and the purpose of the examination is that the truth of the matter, if there is one, may become known. A confirmatory examination does not begin from doubt about the matter itself, but rather presupposes the matter itself to be certain; yet although the matter is certain, and therefore some motive producing certainty is already held, such as an authority that does not err, there can still remain ignorance of other motives, knowledge of which would make one's grasp of the matter clearer and, if possible, more certain. This examination does not begin from doubt about the matter, but—since every examination presupposes some doubt—it begins from doubt either about the existence of other motives, or about their quality or nature. The former type of examination is used by those who, genuinely doubting whether the human soul is immortal, seek a demonstration by which this truth may first be established. The latter is used by those who, certain of the matter by faith, for instance, or from the common and universal consent of humanity, seek deeper motives by which the truth may be more fully illuminated and more firmly retained.

Now the distinction of this twofold examination, as applied also to the examination which bishops have the right to conduct in councils, is not arbitrary and invented to forestall difficulties, but is objective and entirely true. For: first, if the matter is considered in itself, it is evident that even though it be established on account of the teaching of an infallible authority that the matter is true, it can still be unknown by what testimonies of Scripture or Tradition the matter itself is asserted, and by what arguments drawn from the analogy of faith its truth can be intrinsically illuminated, and finally in what ways it can be most invincibly defended against the quibbles of heretics. It is therefore permissible to subject all of these to examination while the certainty of the truth of the matter remains. Second, if history is consulted, it will likewise be evident that confirmatory examination, to the exclusion of

doubting examination, has had a place in the councils. For there can be no doubt about the truth of a matter defined by an ecumenical council; yet at the Second Council of Lyons it was solemnly defined that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and that the Roman Church holds the supreme and full primacy over the universal Church. These things were defined, I say, for the Greeks professed these things with the approval of the entire council and the union was made on account of this profession; yet both truths were once again brought to examination, not only by the Orientals but also by the Westerners and by the Roman Pontiff who held them with the fullest certainty, at the Council of Florence. This examination, therefore, on the part of the Westerners at least, was not a doubting examination but only a confirmatory one. Furthermore, at the Fourth Lateran Council the dogma of transubstantiation was defined. The same dogma was again brought to examination at the Council of Trent at session 13, so that the same doctrine might be asserted against the Protestants.

And indeed, third, the authority of Leo is ready at hand, who reconciles both—namely, that bishops have the right of examination concerning what they are about to define, and that such examination is not of the doubting kind. The first he teaches in his letter to Theodoret, setting out the benefits of the bishops' consensus with the sentence of the Roman Pontiff: "The truth itself shines more clearly and is held more firmly when what faith had previously taught, this subsequent examination has confirmed. The merit of the priestly office shines splendidly when the authority of the highest is so preserved that the freedom of the lower is not thought to be diminished in any respect." The second he teaches in letter 93 to the Fathers of Chalcedon, saying: "In these brothers, Paschasinus, etc., let your fraternity's council consider me to preside, not absent from you in my presence, I who am now present in my vicars and have long been present in the proclamation of the catholic faith—so that you who cannot be ignorant of what we believe from ancient tradition cannot doubt what we desire. Wherefore, dearest brothers, with the audacity of disputing against the faith divinely inspired being utterly cast aside, let the empty unfaithfulness of those in error be silenced, and let it not be permitted to defend what it is not permitted to believe, since according to the

evangelical authorities, the prophetic voices, and the apostolic teaching, what the devout and sincere confession of the mystery of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ is has been most fully and clearly declared through the letter that we sent to the bishop Flavian of blessed memory." The bishops were therefore bound to subject the matter to be defined to examination and to render their sentence; yet without it being permitted to them to treat the matter as doubtful. Whatever the reason may have been why the matter was no longer doubtful, it is at least certain that the Fathers at the Council of Chalcedon—to whom the Nicene faith had been declared by Leo in his dogmatic letter, and who were bound to judge and render sentence according to it, concerning that doctrine which Leo calls the constitution of the ancient Council of Nicaea—both could conduct an examination and could not doubt the truth of the matter. Thus this distinction of the twofold examination is objective and entirely true.

Now, in the hypothesis that the Roman Pontiff has rendered his sentence from the chair, it is manifest that no other examination is permissible for the bishops. For if his definition is of itself infallible and irreformable, it is incompatible that any further doubt about it should be permitted; rather it must be ratified by irretractable assent, as Leo says in the cited letter to Theodoret: that "what God had previously defined by our ministry, he has confirmed by the irretractable assent of the universal brotherhood." By these words Leo does not signify that the doctrine of the Pontiff becomes irretractable when the consent of the bishops has been added; for Leo attributes this predicate not to the doctrine transmitted by the bishops but to their assent. Moreover, assent is irretractable when the doctrine to which the mind adheres is already of itself incontrovertible, and must therefore be ratified by irretractable assent—because it is in itself irretractable, that is, no longer to be treated as doubtful; and indeed such must be called the doctrine that God has defined.

That bishops in a council have the right of this examination is established. For they are judges, and they are called to the council not only to believe but also to judge and to propose their sentence authentically to all the faithful; but judgment must be rendered with knowledge of the case; therefore they have the right to know the

motives by which the truth to be taught is established. Furthermore, they are themselves authentic teachers who must teach the doctrine proposed by the Pontiff to their own faithful and must prove and defend it; but this they cannot accomplish without such examination. Since, therefore, the end is owed to them, they also have a right to the means. From this their duty also becomes clear: they must, as authentic teachers, be so prepared that they know how to set forth the truths of faith and how to prove and defend them.

VIII. Examination is followed by the vote by which the doctrine is approved. We say that the vote of the bishops, after the examination has been completed and the matter duly understood, is obligatory as regards the specification of the act—that is, it must be in agreement with what the Pontiff has defined, if his sentence has preceded—and as regards the exercise of the act, if the same Pontiff wishes what has been examined to be defined. The reason is that the sentence of the Pontiff having preceded, the matter defined by him is certainly true; and the examination having been conducted, a clearer knowledge of its motives has been obtained. Hence, unless someone accidentally falls into error from whatever cause, the truth must be manifest to all. But a judge called by his superior to judge, sitting as a judge, once he has come to know the case, is bound: both as regards the specification of the act, to judge according to the known truth of the matter; and as regards the exercise of the act, he is bound to render sentence and cannot suspend it. Nor does this harm the freedom of judgment; for the freedom of judgment does not consist in the judge rendering whatever sentence pleases him and when it pleases him, but in his being allowed to judge according to the norm of truth and justice, with no extrinsic cause being applied that, diverting his mind from love of truth and justice, would also pervert his sentence. Hence the freedom of judgment is greatest when both the causes that corrupt the rectitude of the affections are removed and an abundant supply of knowledge for the inquiry into the matter is provided. The very natural law of honesty demands of a judge that he judge according to truth and that he render sentence once he has assumed the office of judging and has come to know the case, especially if the parties request it or a superior commands it. The vote of the

bishops approving the doctrine of the Pontiff, having conducted their examination, is therefore obligatory.

IX. Moreover, the bishops, in rendering their vote together with the Pontiff—whether the Pontiff has previously proposed what is to be believed or subsequently adds his consent—both all collectively and each individually truly define the matter by their own authority. For a definition is an act of the authority to teach and to judge in matters of faith—to teach, that is, the faithful, and to render a judicial sentence with respect to those same faithful; but this authority the bishops possess, and therefore exercising it they truly define; although this definition, considered in itself and separately, is incomplete or imperfect, just as their authority to teach is incomplete.

For a definition of doctrine, which is asserted by testimony and which is an authentic approbation of doctrine that wins belief for it among the disciples, can be either complete or incomplete. For just as a twofold judicial sentence is distinguished—one that is truly judicial but subject to appeal, and another that is judicial and final—so too a twofold definition is to be distinguished, corresponding to the twofold judicial power. Complete or final definition is proper of itself to the Roman Pontiff. As for the other bishops: even if all teach, the consent or vote of the Roman Pontiff not yet existing, since the sentence of all still needs confirmation that would add force and strength to it, their magisterium is not yet a final definition—that is, it is not that authentic approbation of doctrine which requires faith—although it can generate a certain certitude, to oppose which would be reckless. But when bishops teach together with the Roman Pontiff and are assumed by him into a share of his supreme authority to teach the universal Church, then their vote can again be considered under a double aspect: absolutely, according to the value it has by reason of the proper authority of individual members even when taken together; and relatively, insofar as it is an element of one definition and universal confirmation, which is the conciliar definition and confirmation. Considered in the first way, their vote is an incomplete definition confirming the doctrine by an approbation that is authentic indeed but not yet irreformable. Considered in the second way, since they are united together with the Roman Pontiff and from all of them together

there arises one act of conciliar definition which is final, all the bishops together with the Roman Pontiff truly define finally—because they are truly together with him the cause of that one act which is the conciliar definition. Yet in different modes: for the Pontiff defines finally of himself, the bishops because of the Pontiff himself. Thus all bishops truly define by their own authority if definition is taken in its generic sense; but insofar as it is taken specifically as a final definition, they also define in that sense inasmuch as, by teaching together with the Roman Pontiff, they issue with him an act that is the incontrovertible and final definition of doctrine. Thus they define finally, not of themselves but through the Roman Pontiff.

The reason for this assertion is what we established in the preceding thesis. For the infallibility of the assembly of bishops is in the end a participated infallibility; for the magisterium of the other pastors is a magisterium to be confirmed by the magisterium of Peter, who is the Shepherd and Confirmer of all pastors even taken together.

X. From what has been discussed up to this point it is possible to gather what the dignity and authority of bishops in a council are. For it is clear: first, that bishops in a council are truly judges; and indeed when bishops anticipate with their vote the sentence of the Pontiff, there is no special difficulty, but what has been said above in section 6 suffices. But it is also manifest that they act as judges even when they follow the Pontiff who has preformed the doctrine. For: a) their act which follows —being the same in substance—could have preceded; and if it would have been a judicial act then, it will be so now as well. Furthermore, b) bishops: first, by conducting examination, come to know the case by virtue of the authority they possess to guard, defend, and teach the faith; second, by that same authority—extended indeed by the Pontiff to the universal Church, yet proper to them in respect of a certain portion of the flock, and by which they are by divine right capable of receiving this breadth of authority—they render sentence and confirm the doctrine together with the Roman Pontiff; and third, by that same authority, the sentence proceeding from them is rendered to the faithful subjects who are bound to hear them; whence, fourth, through the consent of the bishops the conciliar sentence comes into being, which is certainly judicial.

Hence the sentence of bishops differs altogether from the sentence of others, such as theologians, which might precede or be added to the definition of the Pontiff. For these others do not judge by authority, nor do they render sentence upon subjects, nor are the faithful bound to hear them; nor is the doctrine of faith authentically defined, confirmed, or defended through them. Wherefore, even if the Pontiff were to associate them with himself, the result would be nothing but the authority of one teacher—namely, the authority of the Pontiff—that authority of teaching, I say, which Christ himself instituted when he instituted the authentic magisterium. Nor should you say that it follows from this that the infallibility of bishops is nothing but the infallibility of disciples, and therefore does not differ from the infallibility of the other faithful—in what, then, does it differ? For it is certain from what has been proved above that bishops, even taken together, stand in relation to the Roman Pontiff as sheep to be fed, as brothers to be confirmed, as pillars of the building to be sustained by the foundation; and therefore they are shepherds in such a way that they are also sheep, they govern in such a way that they are also governed, they teach in such a way that they are also taught. This twofold condition of bishops must be kept before our eyes if we wish rightly to understand the order of the Church. Since, therefore, they themselves are also to be governed and taught, infallibility cannot belong to them of themselves; for why should one who is of himself infallible need to be taught? If, therefore, the entire assembly of pastors is also to be fed by the Roman Pontiff, it cannot of itself, apart from the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, be infallible. Yet the infallibility that belongs to bishops differs from that which belongs to the body of the faithful. For to the faithful body there belongs passive infallibility, but to bishops active infallibility. Indeed, there belongs to them the proper infallibility of the authentic magisterium, which is promised to the entire magisterium and which is the reason for the infallibility of the others; yet this infallibility belongs to the entire magisterium in such a way that it inheres immediately and absolutely in the Roman Pontiff, mediately and conditionally in the others—that is, if they cohere with his magisterium, if they are confirmed by him, if they are fed by him.

You will say: if that is so, then the Roman Pontiff could have defined his own infallibility by himself alone. This we concede and indeed contend. And first it is manifest that this must be conceded. For: first, if the Church can define her own infallibility, why will the Pontiff not be able to? Second, if the Pontiff can define in a conciliar manner, he can also do so on his own: for the infallibility of a conciliar definition is the very infallibility of the Pontiff, and the incontrovertible force of a conciliar definition depends ontologically on the definition of the Pontiff, insofar as his definition is of itself infallible and communicates its infallibility to the consent of the others. Nor can any other conciliar definition be conceived that does not in this way rest upon the authority of the Roman Pontiff. Whoever, therefore, obeyed the conciliar definition (and what Catholic was not bound to obey?) should likewise have accepted the definition of the Pontiff alone and rendered the obedience of faith to it.

Yet a certain difficulty exists, because it would then seem that a certain begging of the question is taking place. But in reality this is not so. For: first, the same difficulty could be raised if the Church were explicitly to define her own infallibility, and yet who does not see that the Church can explicitly define her own infallibility? For why should this dogma, which is certainly contained in the deposit of revelation, be excluded from the number of those things about which the magisterium of the Church can render its sentence, when every revealed truth is an object of the Church's magisterium? Nor is there any begging of the question here. For it suffices to presuppose some more universal principle—namely, that the magisterium of the Church is a magisterium divinely instituted, which all men must believe in order to be saved—something that is certain to reason from the motives of credibility. Given this, we know that this magisterium is to be believed in all those things which it teaches as having been handed to it by God, and that it has the right to teach whatever it has received from God revealing; in which is also contained its own infallibility—something no one denies. In this course of reasoning, the infallibility of the magisterium is already held once the magisterium itself is held to be divine—for the former is inseparable from the latter; and when a special act of that magisterium concerning its own infallibility exists, the divine faith which was held by

reason of the motives of credibility is further confirmed and becomes divine and catholic—the kind of faith that is given to the truths proposed by the magisterium of the Church.

Second, as regards the Roman Pontiff defining his own infallibility, it would suffice to presuppose what is most certainly believed in the Church, and what even the Gallicans professed—even though they were unwilling to accept all that it contains—namely, that the Roman Pontiff is the Rock of the Church, the Shepherd and Teacher of all, and that the universal Church is bound to obey the Roman Pontiff. Given this, it follows that even decrees of faith issued by him bind everyone, and that what he teaches is to be believed by the universal Church, and that by divine right; and therefore also that his infallibility is to be believed, if he defines it. Wherefore the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff would be implicitly believed in the very act of believing him to be the Rock of the Church, and would be explicitly inferred theologically from those principles; and finally, by reason of the authority of the supreme Shepherd himself binding all men—since the faithful and indeed the universal Church would know themselves to be bound to obey him and to be fed by him—his infallibility would also be believed with catholic faith, if the Pontiff alone were to issue a decree of faith on the matter.

And to place the matter before our eyes: suppose the Roman Pontiff had on his own authority alone defined his infallibility and had proposed this doctrine to be held by the universal Church under penalty of denial of his communion to those who refused to render the obedience of faith. What do you think the Church would have judged to be open to it? To withhold faith? But where would unity between Peter —that is, the one seated in the Roman chair—and the building have gone? Where would faith in that dogma: that the Roman Pontiff is the Shepherd and Teacher of all Christians? The universal Church, that is, would have felt, from its own inherent dependence by divine institution upon the Roman Pontiff, that the necessity of believing lay upon it; and therefore the definition of the Pontiff alone would have sufficed for the defining of this dogma in the Church.

And indeed it is proper to the authority of anyone who is supreme to affirm its own prerogatives, and its judgment thereon is incontrovertible. This, therefore, is also what Christ willed in his

Church; but the supreme authority in the Church belongs to the Roman Pontiff. Therefore Christ willed that he should be able to render incontrovertible judgment concerning his own prerogatives, and therefore also concerning his infallibility, whether it belongs to him or not. Moreover, this suffices for us to believe the Pontiff when he testifies concerning his own prerogatives and his own infallibility; for he is to be believed to whom God wills that credence be given.

For the rest, it must be noted that those speak inaccurately who say that Catholics believing the doctrine defined at the Vatican Council rest upon nothing but the testimony of the Pontiff alone. If one wishes to rest upon it, that indeed suffices, as we have just explained. But it is not necessary. For a distinction must be made between the infallibility of the council considered objectively in itself and considered subjectively with respect to us. If considered objectively in itself, it is true that the infallibility of the Pontiff is the reason for the infallibility of the others and therefore precedes in nature the infallibility of the others. But if considered subjectively with respect to us, the infallibility of the council—or of the Pontiff together with the bishops teaching—was better known than the infallibility of the Pontiff alone; and therefore progress from the former to knowledge of the latter could be made. Now this came about through the Vatican definition. We therefore believe the testimony of the entire council, not of the Pontiff alone, when we believe his infallibility by virtue of the Vatican definition.

ON COUNCILS II

THESIS XXIX

There is therefore no essential difference between a definition issued by the Roman Pontiff alone and a conciliar definition, but only an accidental one. Hence an ecumenical council is never simply necessary; yet it can often be useful and in a qualified sense necessary.

I. The essential difference between the two definitions must be taken from the value of the act; for each is a judicial ecclesiastical sentence inducing an obligation of assent in matters of faith or morals. Now since the object is the same, and both are ecclesiastical powers,

they cannot differ essentially except by reason of the value of the act, and therefore of the power from which the value of the act arises. Now from what has been said it is manifest that the value of both definitions is essentially the same and arises from the same power; for each act is of itself infallible and irreformable, binding the universal Church, and each is an act of the supreme power in the Church—that is, of the Primacy. Therefore, etc.

Yet that some accidental difference exists cannot be denied, whether one considers the entity of the act or all the effects which one act is suited to produce above the other. As to the first: a conciliar definition is an act to which the authority of the bishops also concurs, an act proceeding from the whole authentic magisterium, and is therefore in itself a more splendid manifestation and a more solemn confirmation of truth. For it is not only the Head that acts, but the whole body together with the head. Hence in such an act it is not only papal authority that has place but also conciliar authority—that is, the authority also of the others who are members of the authentic magisterium instituted by Christ.

You will say: by this very fact it is proved that greater intrinsic force inheres in a conciliar definition. For since the bishops also teach, their authority is present as well, which confirms the decrees of faith; and this authority adds a certain strength to the decrees that is not found in the definition of the Pontiff alone.

I respond: when one says that the authority of the bishops adds strength to the decree of the Pontiff, one must conceive of their authority as separate from his authority, while all concur in the same matter. Now the authority of the bishops is indeed of itself an authority of some weight but not a final one; hence it confirms doctrine by an incomplete confirmation. Although, then, it confers of itself some strength—albeit imperfect—upon the doctrine it sanctions, if it accrues to a decree already of itself infallible, it can add no formal strength to it of itself: both because that decree already of itself has all the firmness it can have, and because what is of itself infirm and needs to be strengthened by another cannot by its accession strengthen that by which it is to be strengthened. There is therefore only a certain material addition, insofar as more persons teach the same thing and the act is

more solemn. By reason of the entity of the act, therefore, the difference between the definition of the Pontiff alone and the conciliar definition is not formal but material, insofar as all subjects that possess the authority of the magisterium in the Church concur in the latter, and thus the proclamation of truth is more manifest and more solemn.

As to the second, however—that is, as to the effect of the conciliar definition—a twofold scope of the council must first be distinguished: namely, some definition of faith and the enactment of laws of discipline. Now we consider the first at this point. To enumerate the effects of an ecumenical council in this matter: first, by reason of the prior examination of the matter to be defined conducted by all the bishops, the council is apt of itself to illuminate the mind of the Pontiff in the investigation of truth. Now although the Pontiff is infallible, nevertheless (as Bellarmine notes in *De Conciliis*, book 1, chapter 11) "the Pontiff ought not, in deciding controversies of faith, either to rely on his judgment alone, or to await divine revelation, but to apply such diligence as so great a matter demands, and the ordinary means, and only then to await the assistance of the Holy Spirit and divine direction." But what means is in itself more suited than consultation with those whom God has placed as witnesses and teachers in his Church? Yet in this matter, lest anyone be misled, two things must be noted: a) that for obtaining this effect, the counsel of all the bishops is not required of itself, but (as Bellarmine also notes in that place) a particular council suffices—and this has indeed been the practice of Roman pontiffs in controversies of faith, especially when they were about to preform the doctrine of faith for ecumenical councils; b) it is one thing for bishops, having been consulted by the Pontiff, to express their opinion on some matter; it is another thing to constitute them in an ecumenical council. For the latter requires that, beyond the common consultation, the bishops render a judicial sentence together with the Pontiff and define; but for that end to be attained—which is the illumination of the Pontiff in the investigation of truth—the first of these two suffices. An example of this is found in the dogmatic definition of the Immaculate Conception.

Second, another effect of the council—again by reason of the examination conducted by the bishops pooling their knowledge

together—is a more abundant understanding of the dogma in the bishops themselves, whereby the bishops are better prepared to teach and defend the dogma in accordance with their office.

Then, third, through a conciliar ecumenical definition, provision can generally be made more gently and more swiftly for the peace and unity of the Church; for it is more easily obtained that bishops in their own churches zealously defend a truth defined by themselves and overcome adversaries, and it is more easily obtained that heresies—which draw audacity and strength from the multitude of their adherents—are more efficaciously extirpated, if the universal consensus is opposed to them immediately and in a more solemn manner. This was indicated by Marcian in the letter sent to the bishops whom he was calling to the council (Council of Chalcedon, Part 1, letter 37), explaining the reasons for convocation: "so that, with minds coming together and all truth having been examined, and with the contentions having ceased by which certain persons are known to have disturbed the most holy orthodox religion up to now, our true faith may become more manifestly known to the whole age, so that henceforth there can be no doubt or discord."

This effect deserves careful attention; and we believe—unless we are wholly mistaken—that its reason is to be found not only in the infallibility divinely granted to the magisterium of the Church, but also in that efficacy which from the nature of the matter inheres in the universal consensus of witnesses, when the matter concerns a fact, such as the fact of revelation. For God, in augmenting the magisterium instituted by himself with the charism of infallibility, did not deprive his Church of the means that from the nature of things can belong to a society. Now the consensus itself of witnesses, whose successive series is perpetual and from whom later witnesses receive doctrine from earlier ones, is of itself a motive of moral certitude, and indeed of the highest moral certitude; and this motive has the greatest force with respect to heretics, who, having rejected the authority of the Church's magisterium, are in reality guided by human reasons. When, therefore, it is put to them that the universal Church testifies that what they deny is revealed, they are necessarily overwhelmed by this weight of authority, even if they wish to consider only the natural force of this

consensus and not also the supernatural force arising from the divine charism of infallibility. And in this way theologians customarily proceed in several questions when dealing with heretics who deny the infallibility of the Church, such as Protestants. For when theologians cite the testimony of the Fathers, they regard the Fathers as historical witnesses to the doctrine that was once believed in the Church and to the fact of revelation.

Hence it comes about that the sentence of the Roman Pontiff is strengthened—extrinsically, to be sure—through the conciliar definition. For the doctrinal sentence of another can be strengthened in two ways. Intrinsically: when the consensus of another confers force upon a decree not yet of itself efficacious, and is therefore the reason why certainty is generated in the minds of the faithful—a certainty which, if this consensus did not exist, would not by the very nature of the matter be generated; and this confirmation is therefore intrinsic, conferring intrinsic strength upon the decree. Extrinsically: when the consensus of another adds no force in itself to the decree, and is therefore not of itself necessary for the certainty of the faithful; yet by removing certain obstacles that might accidentally arise, it brings about that universal assent to the sentence of the Pontiff which, although it ought to exist, might perhaps not exist due to the wickedness or weakness of the human heart. This is accomplished through the authority of the vote of the bishops, insofar as it manifests the universal consent of the Church, as we have said. This is the confirmation of which Leo speaks in his letter to Theodoret, saying that what he had defined was confirmed by the assent of the universal brotherhood. This was signified by Marius Mercator, saying that the sentence of Zosimus against the Pelagians had been strengthened by the subscriptions of bishops from the entire world (see page 610). Note, however, that if by the name of confirmation you understand the definition or judicial sentence itself, then the bishops in a council truly confirm the doctrine by an intrinsic confirmation of the conciliar sentence—which is nonetheless of itself incomplete and refers to the faithful, not to the Pontiff, as we said in the preceding thesis.

III. This efficacy of a conciliar definition over a definition of the Pontiff alone has its reason not in some mark by which it differs from

the definition of the Pontiff alone with respect to the intrinsic value of the act, but in a mark that is indeed essential to the conciliar definition but accidental with respect to value—namely, the plurality of teachers; on account of which those enumerated effects follow: a more splendid knowledge of the matter is had, and the peace of the Church and the defeat of heresies are more easily obtained. For these last two effects, which depend on the value of the definition, it is accidental that the conciliar definition rather than the definition of the Pontiff alone produces them; for the latter has of itself all force to produce them. Hence neither does the conciliar definition always obtain these effects, and from time to time the definition of the Pontiff alone rather than the conciliar one is more suited to bring about peace and unity in fact (see Bellarmine, *De Conciliis*, book 1, chapter 10).

Therefore, if the question is asked what in the end the vote of bishops contributes to the definition of faith, the answer must be: that besides greater light and fuller knowledge of the matter, it contributes intrinsically greater solemnity, since the definition is issued by the whole magisterium; and extrinsically, as we have said, firmness, by removing obstacles to the due assent that would exist on account of the wickedness of minds. Some value, albeit imperfect, would indeed be added by the vote of the bishops if that vote alone existed; but once truth has been defined by the Roman Pontiff, since it can no longer receive value from them, it adds no actual value.

IV. From this the question can be resolved whether ecumenical councils are necessary. And indeed, if the question concerns simple necessity and a council that defines and judges rather than merely consults, the answer is negative; for the definition of the Pontiff suffices of itself. The extrinsic strength that a definition of the whole assembly of bishops would add to the definition of the Pontiff: first, can be required on account of contingent circumstances lying in the human will; second, is required not in order for the due assent to exist, but in order that it be more easily obtained; third, this extrinsic confirmation can in itself be had also through the merely subsequent consent—which is due—of the bishops to the definition of the Pontiff.

If the question concerns a council that at least consults, in order to supply a clear knowledge of the dogma to be defined, the answer must

again be in the negative that an ecumenical council is simply necessary; for a particular council can suffice, as has frequently been the case. Is at least a particular council of bishops simply necessary for an accurate investigation of the dogma? Opportune consultation is indeed simply necessary, unless extraordinary aids and miracles are to be expected; but I would not venture to affirm that it must necessarily be carried out through bishops. For the nature of the matter only requires that consultation take place; and this can even be carried out most accurately by the Roman Pontiff through his cardinals and theologians. Nor can any law of Christ prescribing this be adduced; although we do not deny that it is recommended by Christ's own institution of the episcopate. And the Vatican Council at Session 4, chapter 4, indicates that there are other ways for the Pontiff to conduct prior examination besides councils of bishops.

Nonetheless, the Church and the Roman See itself have frequently judged ecumenical councils to be necessary, either for restoring discipline or for settling controversies of faith and averting the danger of error from the faithful, and have implored the aid of secular powers in order to celebrate such councils conveniently. We do not deny this. But this necessity arises from that law by which any social authority is bound to provide for the good of society in a fitting manner. Now if this law demands the use of some means because it is required by the very institution of the society and it alone is of itself efficacious, the necessity of employing this means for the good of society will be called simple necessity. But if that law demands the use of some means within its power because, attending to certain contingent conditions in which the society finds itself, it does not seem possible ordinarily in any other way to attain the intended end, the necessity of employing such a means will be called qualified necessity; for it is required not of itself as though it alone were capable of this effect, but by reason of what accidentally occurs, and is therefore demanded by the final causes. Now this and no other has ever been the necessity of ecumenical councils. Ecumenical councils are therefore most useful, and in a qualified sense necessary—not always, but from time to time.

If at some point pontiffs have enacted that ecumenical councils should be celebrated at fixed intervals (see what was said in Thesis 16.3

concerning Martin V and Eugene IV), they are to be said to have conceded or decreed this on account of the particular conditions of the Church at that time, and principally in order that by a certain paternal condescension (συγκατάβασει) they might recall unruly sons to due obedience.

The utility and qualified necessity of councils is that which Leo indicated in his thirty-seventh letter on the cause of Eutyches: "since the cause of faith is so evident that it would have been more reasonable to have refrained from calling a council." He thereby suggests that in less evident causes, in which a not negligible doubt or dissension exists, it is opportune to convoke councils, by which either the inquiry of the Pontiff who is about to define may be guided, or discords may more easily be quieted with everyone solemnly consenting. Similarly, Innocent III, for the same reason, acknowledged in the case of the divorce of King Philip that he was not permitted to determine anything without a general deliberation of a council (letter 106, book 13, to King Philip of the Franks). For apart from the fact that a question of fact was also involved—and a most grave one—and that offense to the king had to be removed from the Roman See, and that the king would more readily have yielded to the authority of all, Innocent required deliberation of the universal council so that he might prepare himself with due knowledge to render sentence on a matter pertaining to divine right, such as the indissolubility of marriage.

We have thus far spoken of the necessity of ecumenical councils with respect to resolving questions of faith. But if the question concerns the establishment of canons of discipline, it is easily clear: first, that since such canons must be adapted to the needs and utility of the Church, consultation is needed, which individual bishops—who know their own flocks—are particularly suited to supply; second, that this consultation is better conducted and will yield more abundant fruits if bishops meet together and pool their studies; third, that it will be more gently and more easily obtained that the canons issued be observed in the individual churches, if they have been confirmed by the authority of those same bishops who have the duty of ensuring their observance. Hence the utility in this matter of ecumenical councils, and their qualified necessity in certain circumstances, is manifest. But there is no

simple necessity. For the authority of the Primacy suffices by itself alone to issue such canons. And even if consultation is required: first, this can in itself be carried out by the Roman Pontiff through persons other than bishops, such as through his legates; second, even if the counsel of bishops is employed, if the matter stops there, what is properly called an ecumenical council is still not had, even if the bishops meet together; for bishops are properly said to constitute a council when they judge and decree. Their decree, however, is not simply necessary in order that a law be enacted for the universal Church.

V. Augustine is nonetheless objected against us; speaking of the controversy between Cyprian and Stephen concerning baptism conferred by heretics, he indicates that the cause was not settled by the sentence of Stephen, that Cyprian, though dissenting from Stephen, was able to remain in unity and in fact did so, and that a decision of a plenary council was needed to terminate the dispute. This is his position frequently in the books *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*. Thus in book 1, chapter 18: "Let us piously believe concerning baptism what the universal Church, preserved from the sacrilege of schism, maintains. In which Church, however, if some still held one thing and others another on this question, while peace was preserved, until by a universal council something settled and pure had been agreed upon, the charity of unity would excuse the error of human weakness." And in book 2, chapter 4: "Nor would we dare assert any such thing unless confirmed by the most harmonious authority of the universal Church, to which Cyprian himself would without doubt have yielded, if the truth of this question had by that time been refined and declared through the authority of a plenary council."

Concerning that plenary council, universal from the whole world, of the whole Church (ibid., book 5, chapter 47; book 1, chapter 18), to which Augustine appeals, consult the dissertation of the most learned David subjoined to his already cited work. But the solution of the difficulty does not depend on this; it depends rather on the position of Augustine, who seems to teach theoretically that questions of faith—at least obscure ones—are settled only by the conciliar sentence, as Bossuet holds.

I respond, first, with a preliminary consideration. In the Pelagian cause, Augustine judged that the cause had been settled and all doubt removed almost as soon as the rescripts came from the Apostolic See: Augustine therefore judged that causes of faith can be settled by the authority of the Roman See alone. Bossuet responds that Augustine so judged in that cause because the matter was not obscure and no dissension of any importance existed among the bishops, and therefore the concordant consensus of the episcopate with the sentence of the Roman See was manifest; and the concordant consensus being established, the sentence of Innocent was thereby incontrovertible. But this response does not satisfy; for it divines, it does not interpret the words of Augustine. For: a) this consensus was not demanded by Innocent, nor was it expressed in an authentic manner at that time, but only afterward when all the bishops subscribed to the circular letters of Zosimus; b) Augustine makes no mention of this consensus, but attributes the termination of the cause solely to the rescript of the Pontiff; and if the consensus of the bishops of the whole world had been a necessary element for the value of the definition, Augustine could not have omitted it. c) If from Christ's institution the universality of bishops alone is the infallible judge in causes of faith, their consensus must always be required in order for the cause to be truly said to be settled; for while certain bishops affirm it, heretics can deny it, nor are they bound to believe the Roman Pontiff who affirms it—because if he can err in faith, much more can he err in asserting a fact. Augustine therefore judged that the cause had been settled by the authority of the Pontiff alone. But if one cause of faith is settled by the authority of the Pontiff, all can be so settled. For the distinction made among causes—that some are clear, others obscure—does not create different authorities for teaching, but only means that greater or lesser effort is to be expended in the prior investigation.

I respond, second, directly. And first it must be maintained that Augustine judged that Stephen had not rendered a final sentence such that those who thought otherwise were not permitted to remain in the Church; for Augustine indeed says that Stephen wrote against them and commanded, and judged that those who attempted to overturn the ancient custom concerning the reception of heretics should be cut off—

but he adds nonetheless: "Yet the peace of Christ prevailed in their hearts (those of Stephen and Cyprian), so that no evil of schism arose between them in such a dispute" (*De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, book 4, chapters 23–25). That is, neither did Cyprian reject the communion of Stephen, nor Stephen that of Cyprian.

Next it must be noted that the reason why Stephen was unwilling to settle the question finally can be none other than the one we have said explains why councils are in a qualified sense judged necessary. For Stephen, seeing that not a few bishops in the West and in the East dissented and defended their own opinion with great fervor of mind, doubtless felt that amid such agitation of minds it could have happened that certain churches, though undeservedly, would have separated themselves from unity if the matter were immediately defined, and that prudence demanded that the definition be issued by common consent; and therefore the definition should be deferred to a more tranquil time, when, with minds calmed, the truth would more easily be evident to all. It therefore sufficed him, for the exercise of his office, to assert the truth by commanding that the ancient practice be maintained, while nonetheless not actually imposing the excommunication he had threatened in order to recall the erring, thus signifying that he tolerated the contrary practice and was deferring the definition of the matter to a more opportune time. That this was the reason why Stephen was unwilling to define the matter finally is proved from the following: either this was the reason, or it was because he believed he could not define the question without a universal council. But it is evident that the latter reason did not move Stephen. For one who, relying on his authority alone without a universal council, threatens excommunication to many bishops in a controverted matter if they do not obey, is—unless he is said to be playing a game—persuaded that he can settle the question by his own authority; and Stephen behaved in precisely this way, threatening excommunication to bishops who rebaptized those baptized by heretics, as can be gathered from Augustine, and as Eusebius testifies in book 7, chapter 5, concerning the bishops of Cilicia, Cappadocia, and the neighboring provinces. Therefore, etc.

Now, third, things being as they are, it is manifest that the question could only be settled by common consent and was in fact settled in that

way; and therefore Augustine was both bound to appeal to the authority of the council and able to affirm that until the council had defined the matter, the truth had not yet been refined, the sentence and practice of those who rebaptized did not yet tear the unity of the Church. But he was able to affirm this not because a council was simply necessary, but because it was necessary in a qualified sense and, with the Roman See consenting, the final resolution of the question was referred to the conciliar sentence. Augustine therefore speaks hypothetically—in the hypothesis, namely, that the Roman See was unwilling to define the matter on its own; and when he says that the concordant authority of the whole Church was necessary, he does nothing more than adduce one of the reasons that from time to time recommend—and at that time recommended—the utility and qualified necessity of councils.

VI. From what has been demonstrated it is clear what must be said about appeal from the Pope to a council. Appeal from the Pope to a council rests upon this principle: that the Roman Pontiff is inferior to the council. But that this principle is false and its contrary true is sufficiently clear from what has been demonstrated; for the universal Church, even assembled in council, is subject to the authority of the Roman Pontiff. Therefore, etc. Pertinent to this are the testimonies adduced in Thesis 24 under letter D, from which, independently of the infallibility deduced from them, what we are now asserting is immediately inferred.

Moreover, the infallibility of the Pontiff—which is proved even apart from those testimonies—is itself also a reason why this appeal cannot have place, at least if we are dealing with decrees issued by him concerning faith or morals. But if the power of teaching is not subject to appeal, the power of jurisdiction universally of the Roman Pontiff—or the power of the Primacy—will likewise be not subject to appeal; for it is in reality the same power, and no one can judge him who alone can infallibly judge the truth of doctrine and the honesty of the morals of anyone. Furthermore, a vicar constituted directly by an entirely independent ruler for the governance of an entire society can have no other judge than the ruler himself; since, therefore, the Roman Pontiff is the Vicar of Christ and has been constituted by him immediately, the causes of the Pontiff are reserved to the judgment of Christ alone.

We say that this doctrine—that it is permitted to appeal from the Pope to a council—is schismatic, for it sets the Church in conflict with its head and denies to the head of the Church the due subjection that is absolutely necessary for anyone to be a member of the Church. We say that it is likewise heretical; for it is opposed to the constant and universal doctrine of the Church, it directly contradicts the dogma of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff and the fullness of his power; and it has been proscribed by Pius II (see loc. cit.) and in the bull *In Coena Domini*, § 2; and it has been decreed in the Vatican Council, Session 4, chapter 3, that "they depart from the straight path of truth who affirm that it is permitted to appeal from the judgments of the Roman pontiffs to an ecumenical council as to an authority superior to the Roman Pontiff."

This doctrine is, finally, absurd. For when you appeal to an ecumenical council, either you include the Pope in it—the one who would have convened it and would preside over it—or you do not. If you do not include him: first, you do not have an ecumenical council; second, you have an illegitimate gathering of pastors; which, third, whatever its character and however great it may be, is entirely subject to the authority of the Pontiff. If, however, you include him: it is absurd that the Roman Pontiff should by right be subjected to the coercive authority (for this is what an appeal requires) of that council which: first, can exist only by the will of the Roman Pontiff; in which, second, the supreme and full authority belongs to the same Pontiff; and who, third, can nullify all decrees of that council by his negative dissent alone.

Therefore the supreme and full power of the Roman Pontiff is not subject to appeal.

Query I. Is it ever permitted to resist the Roman Pontiff? I respond: it is not permitted to resist the Pontiff teaching from the chair, because he does not err. In the hypothesis that the Pontiff behaves badly and unjustly inflicts harm and vexes the Church, resistance to the Pontiff is permitted: "For it is permitted" (says Bellarmine in *De Conciliis*, book 2, chapter 19) "to admonish him while maintaining due reverence and to rebuke him modestly, and even to resist him by force and arms if he wishes to destroy the Church. For to resist and to repel force by force requires no authority." And Fr. Suárez (*Defensio Fidei*,

book 4, chapter 6, number 16), against those who object that it is possible for the Pope to use his power for destruction, and that if he is subject to no one's judgment, the Church is to be called imperfectly instituted and insufficiently provided for, responds that several remedies are available in that hypothesis: namely, the interior aid of the Holy Spirit, the common prayer of the Church, and private admonition; then a fourth—which, he adds, "is not indeed unjust, but more human and dangerous, and therefore not to be employed without extreme necessity: this is just defense; for if the Pontiff inflicts manifest and unjust violence, he can be resisted by way of defense within the limits of blameless self-protection, because repelling force by force is a natural remedy and is denied to no one, and does not require superior power or jurisdiction in the one who defends himself, but only the right or strength to protect himself." Add moreover the fifth remedy established by Christ in this: that the Roman Pontiff is infallible in the doctrine of faith and morals; for this prerogative existing, neither can there be the universal ruin or the greatest harm that he could inflict upon the Church, and he himself will be able without great difficulty to be recalled to the right path of justice, if by lawful resistance applied he is compelled to render a solemn sentence concerning the things he does.

Query II. Why, then, has the Roman Pontiff from time to time submitted himself to the judgment of others? I respond: he has not submitted himself, nor was he able to submit himself, to the coercive judgment of another—nor was he able to confer upon another coercive jurisdiction over himself; for this jurisdiction he does not possess himself, and therefore cannot give it, and its existence in others is incompatible with the whole order of the Church. Rather, he submitted himself to others only as arbiters, while supreme power and independence remained with himself (in the *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, question 67, article 1, ad 2), and to this end he submitted himself—not in order that a coercive sentence might be rendered against him, but in order that his innocence might be made manifest by a legal process.

Query III. Why, then, does the Pontiff submit himself to the judgment of another in the internal forum? Fr. Suárez responds (loc. cit., number 11) that the reason differs in many respects between the external and the internal forum. For: first, the Pontiff is by no right

exempt from sacramental judgment, since he is a human being and a sinner and is bound by the precept of penance like the others. Second, the judgment of the internal forum is higher and more divine than any external judgment; for in that forum the principal judge is God alone and the priest is only an instrument of God, immediately performing his function; and therefore it pronounces the last sentence on all, from which there can be no appeal to any human being nor to the Pontiff. See what we said in the tract on penance, Thesis XVI, number 5.

SCHOLION I

From what has been demonstrated you have how to distinguish what is essential and accidental, material and formal, in an ecumenical council. For an ecumenical council can be considered: first, insofar as it is ecumenical, having regard to the ecumenicity or juridical representation of the whole Church through all its pastors and teachers; for although the Roman Pontiff alone juridically represents the whole Church—whence he is and is called the ecumenical shepherd—a council is nonetheless called ecumenical in which the Church is juridically represented through all the other legitimate pastors and authentic teachers as well. For council implies the union of many; hence that council is called ecumenical which coalesces from all those who can juridically represent the universal Church. Second, an ecumenical council can be considered insofar as it has binding force, namely by reason of authority.

Considered in the first way: in order to be a council ecumenically with respect to convocation, it must be summoned from the entire catholic world, though it is not necessary—nor can it morally be done—that absolutely all bishops assemble; but in order to be ecumenical in celebration it must be conducted in the same way by the bishops of the whole world. Among these the Roman Pontiff holds the first place: so that if he neither presides in person nor through his legates, the council is not ecumenical in its celebration. For without the head, the representation of the whole Church cannot be had, nor the common action that can be called the action of the whole Church, as is required in an ecumenical council.

But if the council is considered in the second way, it has binding force over the universal Church insofar as its decrees are confirmed by the Roman Pontiff. Hence, in order that the council be ecumenical under the first aspect, it is essential that it be convoked and celebrated by the bishops of the whole world; but a council is understood to be celebrated by the bishops of the whole catholic world when, a universal convocation having been made by the Roman Pontiff and power of assembling having therefore been given to all, even a few assemble, if the law of convocation remains, as happened at the Fifth Lateran Council. Hence it is accidental, under this aspect, whether a greater or smaller number of bishops celebrate the council. But in order that the council be ecumenical under the other aspect, it is essential that it be confirmed by the Pontiff; and it is accidental whether it is confirmed by prior or subsequent confirmation.

Moreover, if you compare these two aspects, it is clear that the formal element of the council is authority, while the material element is the gathering of bishops; for the council aims to enact laws. And because the supreme authority that confers force upon decrees is the authority of the Roman Pontiff, the form of the whole council is ultimately his authority.

Now because the authority of the Pontiff is independent of the consent of the bishops, and therefore of the number of bishops adhering to him, and because when the form is present what is essential to the council insofar as it has binding force is present, hence when the Pontiff's confirmation accrues to the decrees of a council that was not ecumenical in convocation and celebration, that council is said to be ecumenical by reason of authority, inasmuch as that which binds the universal Church is ecumenical.

You will say: if that is so, then the definition of the Pontiff alone will be able to be called the definition of an ecumenical council. I respond: it must indeed be called an ecumenical definition, because it is the decree of the ecumenical shepherd; but in order to be called the definition of a council, there must be some council—some gathering of bishops; and if this gathering is from the whole world, it will be the definition of a council that is ecumenical both materially and formally;

if it is a partial gathering, it will be the definition of a council that is formally ecumenical only.

Note, however, that although all Catholics agree as to the substance—that is, they all attribute incontrovertible authority to all particular councils to which the solemn confirmation of the Pontiff has accrued—there is nonetheless a difference in manner of speaking: for the designation "ecumenical" is not attributed to all of them. The general reason may be that in this designation primary regard could be had also to the material element; or the council could be considered also in that first way we mentioned, so that it was deemed ecumenical only if perfectly so—namely both materially and formally. Hence apart from certain particular councils confirmed by the Roman Pontiff, such as the Second and the Fifth, which on account of a certain external solemnity could be equated with others, the rest are not reckoned under the name of ecumenical councils, unless with an addition—that is, if they are considered formally with respect to authority.

SCHOLION II

From the governance of the Church and from the authentic magisterium established by Christ, it is clear who have the right to sit in ecumenical councils, that is, the right of a decisive vote. These are all bishops possessing jurisdiction, even if not yet consecrated. We say "possessing jurisdiction," for these are the pastors and teachers who have, namely, the right to govern and to teach; we say "even if not yet consecrated," for jurisdiction—that is, the right to govern and teach—is obtained not properly through consecration but through the mission of the Supreme Pontiff. Now that bishops are to be convoked is clear, because to define what is to be done and believed is the proper office of pastors, such as bishops; and these are the ones who by divine institution constitute the governance of the Church and therefore juridically represent the universal Church. Hence the Pontiff can indeed refrain from convoking an ecumenical council; but if he wishes to convoke one, he must summon all the bishops. All of them, I say, in order that it be ecumenical; and in any case the right of each one to attend is equal. The constant practice of the Church has confirmed this.

Yet if the Pontiff were to pass over or exclude some without cause, it would not thereby seem that the ecumenicity of the council would be defective in its essence, but only in something accidental, or as to its integrity; for the whole Church would still be morally represented.

By privilege of the Roman Pontiff and by custom introduced by his authority, there are also called to the council with the right of a decisive vote: cardinals—who assist the Roman Pontiff by their counsel and industry in the governance of the whole Church—and abbots and superiors general of orders, who obtain a participation of episcopal jurisdiction. See Bellarmine, *De Conciliis*, book 1, chapter 15, and Hefele, *Historia Conciliorum*, volume 1, page 16 and following.

THESIS XXX

Every prerogative of the Roman See resides in the very person of the Roman Pontiff as in its subject; and therefore these prerogatives are most truly called personal, and they belong in equal measure to each individual successor of Peter. Hence, although it is permissible from more than one standpoint to distinguish between the see and the one who occupies it, nevertheless that distinction must be rejected as utterly false and absurd when it aims at the conclusion that the prerogatives and rights of the see are different from the prerogatives and rights of those who occupy it, and that the Roman See or the entire line of succession enjoys the privilege of indefectibility or infallibility in faith, but not each individual successor of Peter singularly.

Note. The distinction between the see and the one who occupies it can be applied to all jurisdiction and all the rights of the Primacy; it was devised, however, in connection with the question of infallibility, and therefore we treat it here in that context; yet what we say on the occasion of this question can easily be applied to the other prerogatives of the Primacy.

I. It is established that reason can distinguish in multiple ways between the see and the one who occupies it. For a see, chair, or throne is materially the place where one sits, and specifically the place where one who has authority sits; hence the see is a sign of authority; and therefore the see is taken metaphorically for the thing signified, to

designate authority itself. When it is taken in this sense, it is taken formally. Now in the person of the Pontiff two things can and must be distinguished: the person himself, who is in himself a private individual, and the pontifical authority. Moreover, if you consider these two things thus distinguished by reason, separately, and then compare them with each other, you have: that the authority: first, is perpetual, for it must always perdure by the law of the institution of the Primacy; second, it is therefore one and the same always; third, it exists prior to the individual successors; fourth, it is annexed to a certain determinate church, namely the Roman church, insofar as it must reside in it and from it be exercised over other churches as well. On the contrary, the person passes and there are many such persons; and individual successors are more recent than the authority which they do not have from themselves but obtain; and therefore they belong to the Roman church because they are assumed into it.

Since, therefore, the see is the symbol of authority, the same distinction can be made between the see and the one who occupies it. For the see, materially considered, can be conceived as enduring perpetually; and considered formally, inasmuch as it is the authority, it must always endure. The see, therefore, is perpetual; but those who occupy it—the persons—pass. Hence the see is one, the persons are many; the see exists prior to the successor occupants and always inheres in the Roman church; individual succeeding persons are assumed into it. The see, finally, being perpetual and one, encompasses the entire series of pontiffs; individual occupants are only part of this collection. Multiple distinctions can therefore be conceived between the see and the one who occupies it; and one can say with Leo (letter LXX) that the see is one thing and those who preside another—namely, that the authority which must be vigorous in some church is one thing, and the persons who obtain that authority are another; and that the rights of the see or the amplitude of its authority are not increased or diminished by the personal merits or demerits of individuals.

But what is the nature of this distinction? We say that if by the name of the see is understood the entire series of those who occupy it, the distinction between the see and individual occupants is a real but inadequate distinction; but if by the name of the see is understood the

pontifical authority itself, or its subject considered confusedly, the distinction is one of reason only, and there is one real subject which is both the see and the one who occupies it—that is, the authority is found as in its subject only in that person who is said to occupy the see. Every distinction between the see and the one who occupies it is therefore flawed and false when, speaking of authority, it so separates the two as to constitute another subject of authority besides the very person of the Roman bishop. And although individual occupants are really but inadequately distinguished from the whole collection, this distinction nonetheless affects the persons—the matter—not the form or the authority; for with respect to the latter, since it is always the same, the standard is one and equal for all. Both points must now be proved against those who have ineptly abused this distinction between the see and the one who occupies it—a distinction which, although it was brought forward on the occasion of the question of infallibility, can nonetheless, as we have said, be applied to any prerogative of the Roman Pontiff; and therefore we shall argue more generally.

II. Accordingly, first, it is manifest that the subject of every prerogative of the Roman See is the very person of the Pontiff. For the subject of the power of the Primacy must be a person; and this person was initially none other than Peter, and Peter alone among the apostles. After Peter, however, there can be none other than his successors, who must be individuals, so that there may always be one alone in the Church who represents Peter. And indeed it is of faith that the Roman Pontiff is the successor of Blessed Peter and that through Blessed Peter the full power of feeding and governing has been transmitted to him. There is therefore no other person besides the one who is the Roman Pontiff who holds the entire power of Peter, or the Primacy; but the Roman bishop is one person, not a body of persons—just as Peter, the first in the series of Roman pontiffs, was one person. Outside the person of the Roman Pontiff it is therefore foolish to seek the subject of the power of the Primacy. Hence every prerogative of the Primacy—and therefore infallibility—is personal, that is, the very person of the Roman Pontiff is and is alone the adequate subject of the Primacy.

Therefore they err who, with Launoy (see Tournely, *De Ecclesia*, Part 2, page 71, cited edition; Charlas, *De Libertate Ecclesiae Gallicanae*,

book 7, chapter 3), object against the authority of testimonies from tradition adduced for asserting the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff that those testimonies affirm the infallibility of the Roman See, not of the Roman Pontiff. For when the Roman See is affirmed to be the subject of infallibility, it stands for the Roman Pontiff; for he alone is the subject of every power and prerogative of the Roman See. And indeed the Fathers, when they speak of authority and infallibility, take the Roman See and the one who occupies it as one and the same subject. Thus Jerome, writing to Damasus: "I am united by communion to your Blessedness"—a title by which the person is designated—"that is, to the chair of Peter." Maximus the Confessor (in his first letter to Peter the Illustrious): "Let him implore the most blessed pope of the holy Church of the Romans—that is, the Apostolic See." Hence Sergius, Bishop of Cyprus, in his letter to Pope Theodore, says: "Christ established your Apostolic See as a firmament fixed and immovable by God. For you are Peter, and upon your foundation the columns of the churches have been confirmed." Hence it is frequent among the Fathers, with Augustine (in the *Psalm against the Party of Donatus*), to affirm that the Apostolic See is that Rock which the proud gates of hell do not overcome; but this Rock is the very person of Peter (Thesis 1) and of each of his successors. Hence Cyprian likewise equates the chair of Peter and the Roman bishop; for he says in letter 55 that schismatics "dared to carry letters to the chair of Peter"—obviously to the one who sits in it. Therefore the common opinion expressed by St. Peter Damian, addressing the elected Hildebrand (in his *Apologetica ob dimissum Episcopatum*, chapter 1) is: "You are the Apostolic See, you are the Roman Church."

III. Why, then, is it said that the see remains after the death of the one who occupies it? I respond: the see does indeed remain, but vacant —which formula signifies precisely this: that the subject of the see's authority is lacking. What, then, remains? The apostolic authority remains: first, in its effect, that is, the efficacy of the authority of preceding pontiffs remains, insofar as the Church is still governed by their laws and individual churches are governed by that episcopal power which was derived from the preceding pontiffs; second, the apostolic authority remains not in act but in power and in the exigency of the divine institution—namely, the law and the necessity of succession to

Peter in the Primacy subsists, and indeed as annexed to the Roman church; and therefore the universal Church remains subordinated to this necessary authority. (See what was said in Thesis 19.2.2°.)

They also err who, with the same Launoy, object against the same authority of the Fathers that the Fathers frequently speak not of the Roman Pontiff but of the Roman Church—as though, when the question is of authority, what is represented through the Pontiff and what through his Church are different things. But it is known to all that all the authority of the Church resides in the bishop and is derived from the bishop to those below him; for the bishop, as Ignatius testifies in his letter to the Trallians, is in the Church as Jesus Christ, and the doctrine of the Church is the doctrine of the chair from which the Church is taught—that is, the doctrine of the shepherd and bishop. Hence if the Roman church is infallible, she must be infallible on account of her bishop; and therefore the Pontiff himself must be infallible of himself.

COROLLARY

Therefore they miserably deceive themselves who think they can adhere to the Roman See and the Roman Church while they resist the Pontiff.

IV. Now, second, the other point remains to be proved: that individual pontiffs are infallible. Bossuet (*Defensio*, book 10, chapter 5) teaches that although certain pontiffs may not preach the true faith but err in it, the faith of the Roman See nonetheless remains unchangeable. For the defect of one will be repaired either by that same pontiff or by his successor. He therefore wishes to consider the entire succession of Roman pontiffs as jointly constituting the person of Peter, whose faith will never entirely fail. This faith can waver and sometimes be deficient, just as—as he himself says—it was deficient in Peter when he denied Christ; but shortly after it will be restored, so that error cannot take root in this succession. Thus the entire series is indefectible in faith, but not each one of the successors individually. Infallible authority (says Cardinal de Luzerne, Part 2, chapter 2) is that which can never err, not even for a moment, in decisions of faith. Indefectibility of faith consists in this: that faith cannot wholly perish, but if at some time it is deficient,

it is promptly restored—so that if some pope professes or teaches an error, shortly afterward the error is corrected either by himself or by his successor. But what kind of indefectibility is this? Is it properly infallibility? Those who vindicate the privilege of infallibility for the universality alone or for the council—as Bossuet does—must also teach that the indefectibility of this kind for the Roman See consists in its holding indefectibly the faith which the Church teaches—not by teaching, therefore, but by learning; that its infallibility, namely, is passive only and not active, as Tournely says in the cited passage. Yet some seem to understand an active indefectibility; and those who, as we were just saying, concede an infallible see but not an infallible occupant, may perhaps not be alien to this interpretation (see Mourray, *De Ecclesia*, disputation 20, section 3, § 3). For it must be recalled that these distinctions arose from polemical causes and were devised by all these persons in order to respond to Roman arguments, and were therefore tempered according to necessity.

But the Roman See must be claimed not merely the indefectibility such as we have just described as conceived by the Gallicans, but infallibility—and infallibility to be asserted of itself; and not of the universal series alone, but of each individual Roman Pontiff equally. Now only this one point remains to be proved; for the first has already been proved abundantly. Now this Gallican hypothesis rests on no foundation in Scripture or Tradition; indeed it is openly contrary to both. For from Scripture and Tradition we are taught that the Primacy of Peter is perpetual, and therefore the rights and prerogatives of Peter are perpetual; but that the Primacy of Peter is perpetual through his continuous successors, and that each Roman Pontiff is the successor of Peter; but the proper character of a successor is that he obtains all the rights and all the prerogatives of the dignity in which he succeeds, which his predecessor had; therefore each Roman Pontiff is as Peter; therefore each one is infallible. Hence on each occasion the Fathers, when opportunity arises, affirm of each Pontiff that he is Peter, that Peter speaks and lives in him. In the profession of faith of Hormisdas and of Hadrian II it is affirmed that in the Apostolic See religion has always been kept immaculate and holy doctrine celebrated; and this because in it is the solidity of the Christian religion. Hence this is

affirmed to be necessarily connected with the dignity of that see, and is therefore believed to endure perpetually. But if holy doctrine is always celebrated in that see, how does error sometimes creep in?

If the Gallican hypothesis had been present in the minds of the Fathers, nearly everything that has been attributed to the Roman See would be inexplicable. For how did the perpetual practice exist of bringing questions of faith to the Roman See for settlement by its judgment? How was its sentence believed to settle causes? Did all the Fathers always follow the decrees of the Apostolic See? And so on. In the Gallican hypothesis, all this would have been affirmed only conditionally, and the practice would have been conditional—namely, if this Pontiff holds the true faith; which would have had the effect that the practice could never have applied. And indeed in reality, if individual pontiffs can err, it will always be possible and necessary to doubt whether this one or that one, when he defines, when he confirms councils, errs; and therefore the sentence of the Pontiff will have to be measured against the norm of another judgment. But such a judgment cannot be that of the Pontiff himself or of his successor, since each of them can err; it will therefore be the judgment of the Church—that is, it is not Peter who confirms the brethren, but who is confirmed by them; not he who feeds but who is fed; not the foundation of the Church, but one who is founded upon it.

Hence in the Gallican hypothesis the institution of the Primacy would have been utterly inept and unworthy of God. For it confers nothing and can be of no use if this one and that one can cease to be the Rock, the Confirmer, and the Shepherd of the Church. And indeed either the prerogatives of the Primacy are bound up with the dignity of the successor of Peter, or they depend on the personal qualities of the person; if the first, they must belong equally to all and each of the successors; if the second, nothing is more inept than this institution, by which a necessary power in the Church is made dependent on the personal qualities of the person endowed with power.

Therefore the Roman See is indefectible, because the Primacy of Peter must be perpetual; it is indefectible in faith, because it is the Rock of faith; it is indefectible in faith with a proper infallibility of its own—because its faith is the faith of the Rock, the Confirmer, the Shepherd

and Teacher; and this indefectibility in faith, or infallibility of its own, is proper to each Roman Pontiff, because each one is the successor of Peter, the Rock of the Church—and otherwise the institution of Christ would be utterly subverted and rendered vain.

THESIS XXXI

Those who, after the Vatican definition of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, demand another conciliar definition to teach us the manner in which decrees of faith must be issued by the Roman Pontiff in order that they may be held by all as irrefragable of themselves, are acting in vain. And it is altogether false what some suppose, namely, that the certainty of the faithful regarding the infallible definition of the Roman Pontiff depends, as upon a condition, on the knowledge which they previously possess of the means by which the Roman Pontiff prepared himself for the act of definition.

I. Not every act of will on the part of one who is king has the force of binding his subjects, but only that which proceeds from him insofar as he is king, which is, namely, the exercise of royal authority. Therefore, in order that subjects may be bound to obey some decree, it must be established for them, first, that he who issues the decree has the authority to command, and second, that the decree is issued by royal authority. And therefore, beyond the exercise of authority itself, which confers binding force upon the decree, some criterion is also needed by which the exercise of authority may be made known to the subjects. But it is not necessary that such a criterion be something distinct from the exercise of authority itself; for since the exercise of authority is accomplished through sensible means, it manifests itself to the society, just as other human acts can be manifest. Yet it is distinguished by reason, insofar as it is the objective manifestation of the exercise of authority. But because the sensible means by which authority can manifest itself in act are many, if for the good of society it should be necessary that some special mode of manifestation be determined, the power of determining that mode belongs to the supreme authority itself; for its acts cannot be subject to the coercive power of subjects.

Now from the Vatican definition we have the following: 1° that the authority to issue infallible and intrinsically irrefragable definitions of faith resides in the Roman Pontiff; 2° that his decrees are infallible and intrinsically irrefragable when, relying on his supreme apostolic authority, acting by the force of that authority itself, not as a private person but as a public one, fulfilling the office of Father and Teacher of all Christians, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church. In these words 3° there is also contained the criterion by which the exercise of that supreme authority may be made known to all, namely, when the Roman Pontiff as a public person, as Pastor and Teacher of all, defines a doctrine to be held by the universal Church. For this can be sensibly evident, and it can be signified by the Roman Pontiff either explicitly or in the very exercise of authority that he is issuing a definition as Pastor and Teacher of all Christians and that he is defining a doctrine which is to be held by the universal Church. All that can be required is therefore present, so that the faithful may be certain that a decree issued by the Roman Pontiff is infallible and irrefragable. These things are indeed necessary so that the faithful may know they are bound to believe: namely, that the doctrine which all are to believe is being proposed, and that it is being proposed by the force of that authority which is infallible.

What more can be desired? That a special mode be determined by which the Roman Pontiff defines a doctrine to be held by the universal Church, such that when this mode is employed his definition is to be judged infallible, and when it is not employed, it is lawful not to regard it as such? But neither is it in itself necessary to lay down a fixed mode for the certain exercise of any given authority. For since nature provides all men with several ways and means of signifying with certainty to others their will and the exercise of their faculty, there is no necessity that this power, which nature has given to all, should be limited in the case of a Ruler. For what is required is simply that he signify that he is acting as Ruler and intends to bind; and by whatever means he accomplishes this, provided he does accomplish it, is all the same. 2° Even if it were incidentally and accidentally necessary to determine the mode by which the Roman Pontiff when teaching is to be judged as teaching from the chair and defining a doctrine to be held by the

universal Church, the determination of this matter must be left entirely to himself. For any other determination would be useless: if he himself were unwilling to exercise his authority in that manner, the act placed in that manner would by that very fact not be an exercise of the supreme authority, which can be compelled by no one.

II. Nor should you say that such a determination cannot be certain for us, because we do not yet know in what manner and under what circumstances a definition of the Pontiff is infallible. For that determination 1° is not a doctrinal definition at all, but simply an act of jurisdiction; 2° it can in itself be immediately known; 3° its value, namely that it is to be regarded as a legitimate mode of definition, depends on the authority of the Roman Pontiff, which we already know to reside in him entirely independently of that determination.

Vain, therefore, are those who await another conciliar definition in this matter. Now those who demand another definition from a Council on this subject do so because they hold the following opinion: 1° that the Roman Pontiff cannot define without a prior diligent inquiry into the truth; and 2° that the faithful must know that such inquiry has been employed in order to be bound to believe. It is therefore necessary that the sufficient mode of inquiry be determined, the employment of which would make it perfectly certain that the definition of the Roman Pontiff is infallible. But this the Roman Pontiff himself cannot decide, for this decision would have to be infallible, and in order for its infallibility to be established for us, what it defines would already have to be presupposed as known.

But 1° even if it were necessary to define the mode of inquiry or preparation, by issuing a decree on this matter whereby it would be determined that such a mode is sufficient and such another mode is altogether insufficient for the Roman Pontiff to exercise the act of infallible authority, nonetheless such a definition, now after the Vatican definition (to speak only within this hypothesis), could be issued by the Roman Pontiff alone. For if he himself issues it, the following most evident syllogism can be formed: It is certain from the faith that when the Roman Pontiff, as Pastor and Teacher of all, defines, by virtue of his authority, a doctrine to be held by the universal Church, he cannot err and his decree is intrinsically irrefragable, as is clear from the Vatican

Council. But now he speaks as Pastor and Teacher of all and defines a doctrine to be held by the universal Church, which indeed can be immediately evident from the very words of the decree. Therefore this decree is infallible and intrinsically irrefragable. In this syllogism the inference is valid, and in order to deny the conclusion you must deny the truth of the major premise, which is however the Vatican definition itself. Therefore, given the Vatican definition, it can already be infallibly established for the faithful through the decree of the Pontiff alone what is the sufficient mode of inquiry. Nor is there any begging of the question; for the certainty of the conclusion depends only on this: that the Roman Pontiff speaks as Teacher and Pastor of all and sets forth a doctrine to be held by all, from which any particular mode is altogether abstracted. Provided, therefore, that this is established, the conclusion must be certain.

And indeed, if the Pontiff alone cannot suffice, neither will a Council. For why is a Council said to be able to do this? Because we believe it to be infallible. But we likewise believe the Roman Pontiff to be infallible. True, it has not yet been established what inquiry the Roman Pontiff must employ. Granted; but neither has it ever been defined what kind of inquiry is to be employed by a Council. Therefore either neither suffices, or the Roman Pontiff alone is sufficient.

III. But that hypothesis upon which the adversaries rely must be denied: namely, that the faithful must know that a diligent inquiry has been employed by the Roman Pontiff in order to render the obedience of faith, such that this prior knowledge must precede the act of obedience and serve as its condition in the manner of a condition. That this is to be denied is sufficiently clear from the last observation. For although Councils too are bound to conduct inquiry, it has never been demanded that the sufficient mode of inquiry be defined and that this be established for the faithful before they believe, in order for them to be bound to believe. And indeed 1° the adversaries confuse two things: namely, what is necessary for a thing to exist, and what is necessary for an existing thing to be known. Now in order to know an existing thing, it is not necessary to know what was necessary for it to exist. For the knowability of a thing is intrinsic to it by reason of its essence, and is independent of what is extrinsic to it, such as the efficient cause or the

condition of its existence. Thus, in order for me to know Paul who is present before me, I need not know his father and mother. Wherefore, even if that inquiry is necessary in order for a definition of faith to be held as such, the definition can nevertheless be known through itself, that is, through its own marks: namely, if it is issued by the Roman Pontiff as Teacher of the Church and if a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the universal Church is defined. It is therefore not necessary to know beforehand whether the conditions of its existence have been fulfilled, since it is already known as existing; rather, we understand consequently that those conditions have been fulfilled, just as, seeing a man, we know that those who begot him have existed or exist.

2° Indeed it is necessary that, when the faithful are certain that the infallible magisterium has spoken, they at once render the obedience of faith, without any right on their part to institute a judgment concerning the value of the definition. This is evident from the economy of the institution of the magisterium in the Church by Christ. For there is established that relationship between teachers and disciples such that upon the latter falls only the duty of obedience, and no authority over the teachers; and it is a sufficient and adequate motive for them to believe something to be revealed by God because the Church, that is, the infallible magisterium, teaches it. Augustine, in his work *De Haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum*, toward the end, says: "Why the Catholic Church thinks otherwise concerning these things (heresies)... is needlessly inquired, since it suffices to know that she does think otherwise." But this order would be subverted and the authority of judgment over teachers would be conferred upon disciples, if, when a teacher who is in himself infallible—whether an ecumenical Council or the Roman Pontiff alone—is teaching, one were still permitted to doubt whether their doctrine were true until the faithful had ascertained that the teachers had conducted their ministry rightly. For this would be to summon the teachers before the tribunal of the faithful and to subject the act of supreme authority to the judgment of those who are subjects and upon whom falls only the duty of obedience. Therefore, in order for a faithful person to know that he must believe, it is not necessary that he first know that diligent inquiry has been employed by the magisterium;

rather, this must be established for him from the fact that the infallible magisterium defines the doctrine to be believed.

3° Wherefore the assistance of the Holy Spirit preventing error must not be conceived as promised conditionally to the magisterium in the act of teaching, but absolutely, so that it is always present whenever that magisterium to which it was promised teaches. And thus it belongs to the providence of God, who promised that assistance, to bring it about that due inquiry precedes the actual magisterium; or if it did not precede, that either the supreme teacher defines nothing, or, if he does define, he nonetheless defines what is true, even if human diligence in inquiry was applied little or not at all as the dignity of the matter required. The absolute character of this promise of assistance is indeed required by the necessary subordination established by Christ between teachers and disciples, between the magisterium of the former and the obedience of the latter. For if whatever is proposed by the supreme magisterium as to be believed must be believed with divine faith, and if the faith of this supreme magisterium must be the faith of the whole Church, it is necessary that whenever the supreme teacher speaks—whether the Roman Pontiff alone or together with him an ecumenical Synod—he is immune from error. And in truth, is not the divine promise that the Church will never fail in faith? But she would fail if, for whatever reason, the supreme magisterium, which the universal Church follows, were ever to err. But if this promise is not absolute, we cannot be certain that the Church has never failed. For who will judge whether the conditions required for obtaining that assistance have been fulfilled? The Church herself? But the question will recur concerning this judgment. And Christ has provided us with no other means; for the end of all questions is the magisterium of the Church. It is therefore necessary that the divine assistance preventing error has been promised absolutely to the Church, that is, to her supreme and universal teaching magisterium. But this magisterium is the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff. Therefore.

It is therefore not necessary to know the means used or whether the Roman Pontiff has used them in composing a decree of faith before we believe; for the sufficient and adequate reason for our believing is

this: that the Pontiff speaks, and the Holy Spirit assists the speaking Pontiff so that he does not err.

Nonetheless, if it is established that some decree of faith or subscription to a formula of faith was extorted by physical or moral force, it is thereby already established that the definition is not from the chair. For a definition from the chair is an act of supreme power, and therefore an independent act, which is placed with the motive of teaching men and obligating them to believe. But an act placed under coercion, or to free oneself from unjust harassment, is not such an act; for it is not the act of any power, but of physical subjugation, and one from which the superior is not even presumed to intend to bind subjects and teach them.

You will say: how, then, will it be lawful to discern among the teachings of previous Roman Pontiffs which are definitions of faith and which are not? For not everything they asserted is held as a definition of faith. I reply that the norm is that which the Vatican Synod supplies: namely, when any Roman Pontiff, fulfilling the office of Pastor and Teacher of the Church, has defined a doctrine which was to be held by the universal Church.

But if this mode is obscured by a deficiency in the historical records, consider the following effect: if that doctrine afterwards prevailed in the Church and you find no other definition, you will be able to affirm that it was a definition of faith. If, on the contrary, an opposing doctrine also persisted, with the knowledge and permission—and much more so with the approval—of the Roman See, you will be permitted to affirm that the former was not a definition of faith. These things, once the certainty of the dogma of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is established, are sufficiently clear. But if you find nothing of the sort, the consequence will be that you do not know whether any Pontiff ever defined anything from the chair or not. From which ignorance no inconvenience arises except perhaps for historians; for the number of defined and explicitly believed truths is not diminished, but only the historical and certain knowledge of the defining acts. Indeed even at the time when such a definition was issued, the Church may have been uncertain whether it was or was not a definition, and by that very fact, through the deficiency of due manifestation, it would have failed to

achieve its effect and would not have increased the number of defined truths. But if it was certain to all at that time that it was a definition, it was believed then by the universal Church; and what was believed then could not but be believed afterward. Wherefore even now we believe as proposed by infallible authority all those things which were previously believed, even though we may be historically ignorant of who first defined them.

THESIS XXXII

For the judgment of the Roman Pontiff to be held as a definition from the chair and therefore infallible, it is our opinion that it is not necessary that the words of the Pontiff be directed immediately to the universal Church.

I. This question can be debated among theologians, and we defend our opinion as the more probable.

Indeed, from the Vatican definition, these elements certainly suffice for a definition of the Pontiff to be and to be held as infallible: 1° that he make use of his apostolic authority, fulfilling the office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians; 2° that he define a doctrine on faith or morals; 3° that he define a doctrine to be held by the universal Church. But all of these the Pontiff can fulfill even if he addresses himself immediately to a single Bishop, as Leo did in his dogmatic letter to Flavian. Indeed, in order to cut off difficulties, it must be noted: a) that it is one thing to direct a discourse to the universal Church, and another to establish a doctrine to be held by the universal Church. For in the former, what is referred to the universal Church is the discourse itself, that is, the speaking subject; whereas in the latter it is the object, that is, the doctrine which the speaker proposes. But it is not the former but the latter that is required by the Vatican definition. It must be noted b) that it is one thing for someone to fulfill the office of teacher of all Christians, and another to teach all Christians simultaneously. Thus a teacher fulfills the office of teacher of his school even when he corrects and instructs a single pupil; thus a king fulfills the office of ruler of the entire society when he condemns even a single criminal to death. That is to say, the exercise of an authority which extends to all can be

manifold; and since all and each individually are subject to the same authority, it can be exercised both toward all simultaneously and immediately toward individuals. Wherefore when a Ruler exercises his authority toward one person, he exercises that authority by which he presides over all, namely the authority by which he is Ruler and head of the whole realm. Thus, even if the Roman Pontiff directs his letters to a single Church, he can fulfill the office of teacher of all and make use of his apostolic authority and define a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the universal Church. But when he thus conducts himself, his definition is infallible. Therefore, in order for his definition to be both infallible and held as such, it is not necessary that the words of the Pontiff be directed immediately to the universal Church.

And indeed the Roman Pontiff is certainly infallible when he fulfills the office of Confirmer of the brethren, for this is the office of Teacher of all Christians. But the office enjoined upon him by Christ of confirming the brethren cannot be so understood as to be exercisable only when all at the same time stand in need of confirmation; rather, he must confirm those who are in need, who seek confirmation. Therefore when he confirms them, he must be infallible; otherwise he would not be confirming them.

We have said that the words of the Pontiff are directed immediately to some only; for they are directed to all mediately and virtually. For the faith of the Church must be one and cannot admit the variety in it that discipline can. Therefore if some decree of faith is proposed by the Roman Pontiff to some persons, it is thereby understood to pertain to all, and all are bound to believe it. Wherefore a decree is announced to one or to some only because they alone seem to be in need of confirmation, or because they are departing from the common faith, or because they themselves are seeking the judgment of the Roman See.

Therefore, in order that the other faithful also be bound by such a definition of faith, it will indeed be necessary that it be authentically made known to them that it is a definition of the Roman chair—which was also necessary for the first recipients of the definition—but no further definition will be needed.

II. What we have gathered from the analysis of the Vatican definition is also confirmed by history. Indeed the decree of Innocent in the Pelagian cause was sent to the Africans alone, and yet Augustine declared the cause to be finished. Leo regarded his dogmatic letter sent to Flavian, even before it was made known to others, as an infallible norm by which the controversy of faith at Constantinople was to be settled; for it was sent to that end. Hormisdas directed his profession of faith to the Eastern Bishops alone; it certainly contained the faith of the universal Church, but that profession was not directed to the universal Church. The proscription of the errors of Baius made by Pius V was authentically intimated to the University of Leuven alone, and nevertheless the obedience of faith was demanded even then from Baius and his followers. Whence also for the Emperor Justinian it was sufficient for the certainty of the Faith that a response had been directed to him and to the Churches of the East from the Apostolic See: "For we believe that to be catholic which has been made known to us by your religious response" (letter to Agapetus, in the Councils of Mansi, vol. 8, p. 846).

SCHOLION I

It is customary to ask whether the Pontiff, as a private person, when he is not actually fulfilling the office of Teacher of the Church, can err in matters of faith. The question properly concerns error regarding an article of faith already defined, such that if it be voluntary it would constitute true heresy. Some deny this possibility, following Bellarmine (in *De Romano Pontifice*, bk. 4, ch. 6). But since the ancients supposed this to be possible, and the Pontiffs themselves have sufficiently signified the same (cf. Innocent III, Sermon 2 on his Consecration: "The faith is so necessary to me that, while for other sins I have God alone as my judge, for the sin alone which I might commit against the faith I could be judged by the Church," and Adrian II, in the third allocution read in the Eighth Synod, act 7), and since they permitted to be read in the Decree, *Distinctio* 40, ch. 6, the words of Boniface, Archbishop of Mainz: "No mortal presumed to rebuke his (the Roman Pontiff's) faults, because he who is to judge all is to be judged by no one, unless he be

found deviating from the faith"—we think it not fitting for us to be more solicitous than the Roman See itself about asserting this prerogative for the successors of Peter. The words cited are indeed to be understood of the Pontiff privately erring in matters already defined or equivalently handed down in the Church (§ 21, n. 7); for concerning other matters no judgment could be instituted.

You will ask what is to be said of the opinion of those theologians and canonists who say that in a case of heresy the Pontiff can be deposed. I reply: 1° the case is hypothetical and has perhaps never been real nor ever will be; 2° granted the hypothesis, that opinion is to be understood in such a way that a Pontiff obstinate in heresy (obstinate, I say: for if he himself yields to the admonition of the Church, nothing further remains to be done) is deposed not by any man but by God himself, who takes away the jurisdiction that was given him; while the Church merely declares that he is a heretic and therefore has been stripped of jurisdiction by God (Fr. Suárez, in the work cited, ch. 7, n. 5).

You will ask whether it can be proved that there is a private immunity from even material error in matters not yet defined, from the words of Christ in Luke 22, by the following argument. Christ says: "I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail, and you, once you have turned, confirm your brethren." Now in that text two things are distinguished, namely the confirmation of the brethren, which is accomplished through public preaching of the faith, and the indefectibility of faith. The latter is presented as the consequent and the former as the antecedent; wherefore the indefectibility of faith, prayed for and obtained from Christ, precedes the public preaching itself. Therefore the Pontiff is not infallible only when he fulfills the office of Teacher, but always, even in matters not yet defined and which can be defined by him.

I reply that it is not necessary that the indefectible faith be really distinct from the Confirmation of the Brethren, but it suffices that it be distinguished by reason. For if authentic and solemn preaching of the faith is infallible, it can confirm the brethren. Wherefore the same faith that is infallible is also confirmatory, and by reason of the property of infallibility it also has the power of confirming. Therefore, since the

indefectibility of faith was obtained for the Pontiff to the end that he might confirm the brethren, only that which is necessary and sufficient for that end can be necessarily inferred from the words of Christ; and such is the infallibility of authentic preaching.

Nevertheless, the private immunity at least from formal heresy which Bellarmine asserts for the Pontiff would not be the privilege of confirmation in grace or justice, since sin can coexist with faith; nor would it be, as to its effect, a so very singular privilege, for very many of the faithful never fall into heresy.

SCHOLION II

There is also the question of what kind of obedience is owed to the Roman Pontiff when he teaches something concerning doctrine of faith or connected with it, without defining it from the chair; and what kind of obedience is owed to the doctrinal decrees of the Congregations of Cardinals. Now that the Roman Pontiff can teach something without defining it from the chair is manifest. For upon becoming Pontiff he does not lose the qualities common to all; moreover the exercise of the authority of teaching can be manifold, and the full exercise of supreme power is free to him who holds it. It can indeed be recognized that the Roman Pontiff is not on every occasion speaking from the chair; for when, while teaching something, he nevertheless does not intend to impose an obligation of believing it as something to be held by the universal Church—whether he does not signify this intent, or signifies that he does not so will—he is not then said to be speaking from the chair, even though he speaks on a matter pertaining to faith or morals. In this hypothesis it is not quite accurately said that he speaks as a private teacher; for although he does not speak out of the fullness of authority, he nonetheless speaks with authority. Wherefore the Roman Pontiff speaking in this manner is not to be thrust into the category of ordinary private teachers who have no authority.

We therefore reply to the first question in the following way. To the magisterium of the Roman Pontiff even when not speaking from the chair there is owed: 1° the obedience of silence, that is, he is not to be publicly contradicted, nor is an opposing doctrine to be publicly

defended, unless it is established that he permits the matter to be disputed among Catholics, whether for the clearer manifestation of the truth, or for completing the course of inquiry preparatory to a solemn definition, or for some other motive. For that obedience is demanded by the reverence owed to the Supreme Pastor, which everyone perceives to be violated by open contradiction.

2° There is also owed to him a certain religious assent, when there is nothing that prudently counsels the suspension of assent. I explain my terms. We do not say that the assent of Catholic faith is owed, since no doctrine to be held by the universal Church is being proposed; nor do we say that the assent formally of divine faith is owed, for this assent rests upon an infallible proposition known to be such, which is lacking in the hypothesis. This assent can, however, be elicited by the habit of faith, as will be explained below. Nor do we say that it is an assent metaphysically certain (cf. what we disputed concerning such certainty in the *Critica*, thesis 9); for since there is no certitude of infallibility, it thereby appears that error is not impossible and therefore it appears that the opposite could be true. Given this knowledge, metaphysical certitude cannot obtain. We therefore say that the assent is morally certain, and accordingly, if motives appear—whether true or false but arising from inculpable error—which counsel otherwise, then since in these circumstances the will does not act imprudently by suspending assent, we do not say that assent is then owed. Finally we call this assent religious, both by reason of the object with which it is concerned and by reason of the motive on which it rests, as we will presently explain.

Indeed, when something seems right to all or to the greater part of the learned and competent, and you find no reason persuading you to the contrary, you act rashly in resisting and rashly in dissenting even interiorly. Now what holds true in the case of many learned and competent persons generally holds much more in the case of those many learned and competent persons whom God has established by special institution as teachers, and who it is certain are governed by special providence to fulfill their office rightly. But what holds true of these persons holds true also, and most especially, of him who, though he be but one, is nonetheless established by God as Pastor of all, relying on greater divine assistance and furnished with more abundant human

means for recognizing the truth. For the force of the consensus of many, which engenders moral certainty, consists in this: that it is most probable that the causes of error are absent. But in these circumstances, whether by reason of the resources with which the Pontiff is furnished or by reason of special divine providence, it is likewise most probable that the causes of error are absent. Therefore.

Indeed the right of teaching which belongs to the Roman Pontiff is not such that it can be exercised only in a solemn act by which the obligation of believing is imposed upon the universal Church; rather it can be exercised even short of such solemnity. For it is an ordinary and constant right, and the good of the faithful can require that it be exercised frequently even when it is not opportune to issue a solemn definition. Now to this right an assent of the mind corresponds in itself; for it is the right of directing minds (§ 20). But it is necessary that the assent which is owed correspond to the force of the magisterium which is exercised. Therefore in these cases a religious assent is owed, because the magisterium is religious and is concerned with a religious matter; a firm assent is owed with moral certainty, because the motives of this certainty accompany that magisterium, as has been said.

We judge that the following statement, which Bellarmine reports in *De Romano Pontifice*, bk. 4, ch. 2, also pertains to this: "Among Catholics it is agreed... that the Pontiff alone, or together with his particular council, determining something in a doubtful matter, whether he can err or not, is to be obediently heard by all the faithful."

We say that this assent can be elicited from the habit of faith. For a habit can elicit acts both perfect according to its species and imperfect yet retaining some common character; for by the very fact that the capacity of the habit is ordered to something perfect, it is also ordered to what is imperfect in the same genus and is as it were the beginning of the perfect. Now when the Pontiff teaches, though not yet definitively defining something as revealed, you elicit an assent to what is proposed from the motive of divine authority which is morally certain for you from the magisterium of the Pontiff, in that it is morally certain that he does not err. This assent is indeed imperfect on the part of its firmness; yet it retains the common character of the assent of faith on the part of its object. It is not, however, formally the assent of divine faith, which

cannot exist unless it be certain. But if the Pontiff in the same manner proposes some truth connected with a divine truth, the assent to it will be an imperfect act of that faith which is owed to the infallible magisterium.

The first question being thus resolved with regard to such magisterium of the Pontiff, we consider the second question likewise resolved with regard to the decrees of the Congregations of Cardinals, if the argument we have adduced for the former is weighed carefully and it is borne in mind that the Roman Congregations are the organs of the Roman Pontiff. We say that the same must be said of them.

What could be objected from a decretal of a certain predecessor of Innocent III in the case of the dissolution of marriage on account of the heresy of a spouse, or from the decree of the Inquisition in the case of Galileo, or from a few other possibly similar cases, proves only the exception we have stated and that no metaphysically certain assent is owed.

Note. To this kind of magisterium of the Pontiff must not be referred those private letters by which the Pontiff intends not really to teach anything but only to exhort and encourage learned men devoted to the illustration of Catholic learning and the defense of the faith. Such are the letters of the most holy Pius IX on behalf of the Academy of St. Thomas, in which certain cardinal points of the doctrine of St. Thomas are recited. For the same most holy Pontiff declared that by such letters he neither wished to diminish the value of certain other systems celebrated in Catholic schools, nor wished to prescribe an exclusive norm of thought which the learned must follow if they wish to be Catholic. He wished simply to commend the study of the ancient scholastic doctrine, especially in those matters which concern the unity of the human composite—a doctrine which was never confined to a single system and which does not exclude scientific advances arising from a deeper analysis of things and from the assistance of the more recent sciences. Accordingly those letters are wrongly abused by certain persons beyond and against their scope.

THESIS XXXIII

Those who, in order to attack the dogma of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, strive to demonstrate that some Roman Pontiff speaking from the chair has erred, are acting in vain. And specifically they are mistaken who bring forward the opposing doctrines both of Hormisdas and John II, of Nicholas III and John XXII, and likewise John's opinion on the beatific vision, and the subscription of Liberius, and the decree of Nicholas I on the form of baptism, and the opinion of Stephen VII regarding those ordained by Formosus, and the letters of Honorius I in the Monothelite cause, and the opinion of Zacharias on the antipodeans, and the Bull of Sixtus V in the edition of the Vulgate, and the opinion of a certain predecessor of Innocent III in a matrimonial case, and the judgment of the Roman Inquisition in the case of Galileo.

I. For this is established in general by a peremptory demonstration: the prerogative of infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was always a truth to be believed with true faith; it was therefore impossible for the Roman Pontiff speaking from the chair to have erred. Accordingly, difficulties of a critical and historical nature concerning the explanation of certain facts can indeed remain, but no dogmatic difficulties, that is, none that could call into doubt the defined truth. For the sake of illustration we dispose of some of the weightier among these difficulties.

Hormisdas, they say, condemned the Scythian monks who said that one of the Trinity suffered in the flesh, but John II approved that proposition; therefore one or the other erred. But the matter stood as follows. While the affairs of the East were being settled by the work of Pope Hormisdas, dissensions being removed and peace restored, some Scythian monks took it into their heads that it should be said: "One of the Trinity suffered or was crucified in the flesh," in order to oppose the Nestorians more effectively, and they thought this should be added to the Trisagion. This novelty was not approved by the Pontiff's legates, because it seemed an occasion for new dissensions when the old ones had been suppressed with such difficulty. The monks appealed to Hormisdas, to whom they sent some of their number as legates. The Pontiff's legates also wrote to Hormisdas, urging him not to gratify the monks, not indeed disapproving the proposition in itself, but pointing

out its inopportuneness and how it would be a cause of discord and how it would be an injury to the Council of Chalcedon, as if its profession were not sufficient. Hormisdas, having heard the monks, was unwilling to define anything until his legates had returned; and when the monks wished to depart, he ordered them to be detained. But they, as the return of the legates drew near, secretly fled, having given no few signs of rashness, partisanship, and pride. This scandalous conduct Hormisdas condemned in his letter to Possessor, calling them men "eager for new controversies, thinking the only right path of knowledge to be whatever opinion each conceives with ease, puffed up with such arrogance as to think the judgment of both worlds must be bent to their will, and not counting among the faithful those who follow paternal tradition if they see that tradition unwilling to yield to their opinion." In this entire letter the conduct of the monks is condemned; but on the doctrine itself no judgment is passed. But when word spread widely that Hormisdas had not approved (which was true only in a negative sense) that proposition of the monks and had rebuked the monks—indeed, John Maxentius, the patron of the monks, had refuted the above-mentioned letter of Hormisdas, traducing him as though he had disapproved and condemned the proposition—this gave an occasion to certain persons favorable to Nestorianism, namely the Sleepless Monks, to say that the profession of faith adverse to them had been disapproved by the Roman See, and that therefore their own doctrine was approved by it. Then at last John II, the matter having been discussed in a Roman Council, declared the proposition to be Catholic (cf. Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, century 6, ch. 3, art. 2 and ch. 9, dissertation 22). There was therefore no opposition. Felix III had indeed in his letter to Peter the Fuller attacked that addition with even dogmatic arguments (cf. Petavius, *De Incarnatione*, bk. 5, ch. 2, n. 4); but that attack was directed more against the errors which he presumed, with the mind of a heretic, to lurk beneath that formula than against the formula itself.

II. Nicholas III in the Constitution *Exiit qui seminat*, on the signification of words, in the Sixth (Book of Decretals), teaches three things: a) that ownership, proprietorship, possession, and the right of use can be separated from the bare use of fact, and he reserves the ownership of the goods used by the Friars Minor to the Roman See; b)

that the renunciation of the ownership of all goods, not only in particular but also in common, is holy and meritorious; c) that Christ taught this same poverty by word and example, though not always.

John XXII in the decretal *Ad Conditorem* and in the other decretal *Cum inter* (among the Extravagantes, on the signification of words) teaches the following: a) that it is repugnant to law and contrary to reason to affirm that in things consumed by use there can be constituted a right of use, either in law or in fact, separate from ownership or dominion, and that it is not credible that Nicholas intended to affirm this (cf. Clement VI in Raynaldus, year 1346, n. 70); b) that the fact that ownership of the goods of the Friars Minor belongs to the Roman See does not make the Minors more perfect than other religious who hold some things in common, because "since the perfection of Christian life consists principally and essentially in charity, toward which the way is prepared by the contempt of temporal goods and their expropriation, chiefly by the cutting off of that anxiety which temporal goods require in acquiring, preserving, and dispensing them and which for the most part draws one away from the act of charity; it follows that if the same anxiety persists after such expropriation as was present before it, such expropriation can contribute nothing to this perfection. But it is established that after the aforesaid arrangement the brothers themselves were no less diligent in acquiring and preserving the aforesaid goods in court and out of court than they had been before, although they are mendicant religious who hold some things in common." Then John renounces that dominion which Nicholas had reserved to the Roman See; c) he declares erroneous and heretical the affirmation that Christ and the Apostles held nothing either in particular or in common, and that they had no right to use the things they had, nor the right to sell or donate them.

Now as regards the first point of doctrine, there is indeed a certain opposition between John and his predecessors. But (as we have already noted in our *Theologiae Moralis* of Ballerini, treatise 8, bk. 1, n. 493) what is relevant here is not the decision which is the argument of the constitution, but only a certain reason given for the intended decision, which is of a disciplinary nature, determining, namely, that the dominion of the goods of the Friars Minor which are consumed by use

shall no longer belong to the Roman Church. John therefore issued no definition (cf. *Miscellanea Balutii*, vol. 5, pp. 279 and 595 ff., edition of Mansi).

As regards the second point, there is no opposition; for Nicholas views the matter theoretically in itself, while John considers it historically as a fact. As regards the third point again there is no opposition; for John does not deny that Christ taught poverty devoid of ownership by word and example, but denies that Christ and the Apostles never had anything proper in particular and in common and were entirely without any right of using, selling, or donating—or (as he says in ch. 5) denies that Christ maintained in himself and imposed upon the Apostles the aforesaid expropriation of all right in the ownership of anything whatsoever and in its use. But this denial of John is neither contradictory nor contrary to the affirmation of Nicholas, who concedes that Christ had a purse. Cf. Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, century 14, dissertation 11, art. 1.

III. John XXII was of the opinion that the souls of the just would not see God before the resurrection; for the question was not simply about beatitude in heaven, but about the so-called facial vision (cf. the *Annals* of Raynaldus, year 1331), and John was arguing in favor of that opinion. But 1° he was asserting this at a time when no decree of faith on the matter yet existed; 2° he was not asserting it as something certain to himself, but in the manner of one disputing, and he was disputing to that end in order to investigate the truth. This he himself testified shortly before his death, adding that the contrary opinion now seemed more probable to him; he had thus made progress in the investigation of the truth (cf. Giovanni Villani, *Historia*, bk. 11, ch. 19). There was therefore no heresy, not even material. The Catholic doctrine was asserted by his successor Benedict XII.

IV. As regards Liberius, we reply briefly: 1° if he subscribed, he certainly subscribed under coercion, and therefore even if he sinned, his act had no juridical value, and hence it cannot be held as a definition of faith (cf. what we said in Thesis 30, § 3, 3°); 2° if he subscribed to some formula of faith, he is to be said to have subscribed to one which in itself did not carry a heretical sense, namely to the first Sirmian formula issued against Photinus (cf. the note of Mansi in the 32nd dissertation,

century 4, of the *Historia Ecclesiastica* of Natalis Alexander); 3° the subscription of which he is accused is not certain; indeed it is highly probable that he conducted himself in every way properly. Cf. Theodoret, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 2, chs. 15, 17; Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 2, ch. 37; Rufinus, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 2, ch. 27; to whom the account of Sozomen, bk. 4, ch. 15 is not opposed, from which it is clear that Liberius did not accomplish what the Emperor was striving to obtain from him, namely, to profess that the Son was not consubstantial with the Father, but rather that rumors had been spread by the Aetians that Liberius had condemned the term consubstantial and confessed the Son to be unlike the Father. Read the Ballerini brothers, *De vi ac ratione Primatus*, ch. 15, § 8, and the seventh dissertation among the Latin works of F. Antonio Zaccaria, from which you will also learn the value of the Hilarian fragments.

V. Nicholas I in his *Response to the Consultations of the Bulgarians*, ch. 104, says: "You assert that many in your country have been baptized by a certain Jew, you know not whether Christian or pagan, and you ask what is to be done regarding them. These, certainly, if they were baptized in the name of the Holy Trinity, or only in the name of Christ, as we read in the Acts of the Apostles—for the one is the same as the other, as St. Ambrose explains—it is established that they are not to be baptized again. But first let it be investigated whether that Jew himself was Christian or pagan, or whether he afterward became Christian. Although we believe it should not pass unnoticed what blessed Augustine says about baptism: 'We have shown sufficiently,' he says, 'that the error of anyone, whether giver or receiver, in thinking otherwise than the heavenly teaching instructs, whether concerning the Father or concerning the Son or concerning the Holy Spirit, does not pertain to the baptism which is consecrated by the words of the Gospel.'" Nicholas therefore taught that baptism conferred with the sole invocation of the name of Christ is valid; and he taught this while fulfilling the office of teacher of all Christians. But this is erroneous.

Now we concede that baptism administered with the invocation of the name of Christ alone is not valid. Yet it is permissible to note with Bellarmine (in *De Romano Pontifice*, bk. 4, ch. 12) that no certain definition of the Church exists on this matter, and that some

distinguished theologians have defended the validity of that formula, at least for the apostolic age (cf. Augustine Orsi in the dissertation published on this subject), inasmuch as it implicitly signifies the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; for when Christ is named, both the Anointer and the Anointed and the Anointing are signified. And Paulinus of Aquileia proves in his synodal letter that baptism conferred in the name of Jesus is valid (cf. Mansi, *Concilia*, vol. 13, pp. 838 and 921). Indeed Toletus, in *In tertiam partem*, q. 66, art. 6, relying principally on the decree of Nicholas, defends that opinion as theoretically the more probable.

I reply, first, that it cannot be proved that Nicholas, in handing on that doctrine which is usually gathered from his words, acts as teacher of all Christians, or speaks from the chair. For the question put to him concerned the minister, not the form: namely, whether any Jew whatsoever baptizes validly. Therefore the direct reply of Nicholas to the inquiry of the Bulgarians is: whoever baptizes, provided he uses the legitimate form, which the Bulgarians certainly did not ignore, baptizes validly. For in those words—"if in the name of the Holy Trinity, or only in the name of Christ: for the one and the same is the baptism"—these two things are contained: 1° the general principle, if the legitimate form is used; 2° that both (if indeed by these words Nicholas signifies the form of baptism) are legitimate forms. But the first of these directly answers the consultation of the Bulgarians. Nor did Nicholas have in mind to explain all the requirements; for he makes no mention of the intention of the minister, which is certainly required. He does, however, incidentally also determine the form specifically. But nothing prevents the Roman Pontiff from speaking in an incidental question from his own private opinion or from the probable opinion of theologians, leaving it in the same degree of certainty or probability which it has in itself. And indeed it is evident a posteriori that Nicholas defined nothing on this matter. For if he had defined that form of baptism to be valid, such an opinion would certainly have prevailed in the Roman Church; but it is established that no change was made in it. Therefore no such definition was issued (cf. the *Roman Catechism* on Baptism, n. 16). And these things are said on the hypothesis that Nicholas, by the words "or only in the name of Christ," intended to signify the invocation of the

name of Christ alone. But that this hypothesis is not certain will be clear from the following reply.

I reply, second, that when Nicholas says "in the name of the Holy Trinity" he does not mean that the form of baptism is "I baptize you in the name of the Holy Trinity," but that it means the explicit invocation of the three Persons who come under the designation of the Trinity. Moreover, baptism "in the name of Christ" likewise means baptism conferred with the explicit invocation of the three Persons; for this is the baptism instituted by Christ, and this sense is gathered from the Acts of the Apostles—as Ambrose teaches along with Basil (in *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 12; *De Spiritu Sancto*, bk. 1, ch. 3, compared with *De Mysteriis*, ch. 4). Therefore Nicholas does not set forth different forms but proposes the same form in two ways. But why? It is indeed not necessary for us to give an account of this; it is sufficient that this manner of speaking is fitting in itself. But a reason arising from the circumstances of the question or from other factors could have existed for Nicholas to speak in this way, a reason which we however do not know. For what if the Bulgarians in their inquiry had used both designations but in such a way as to appear to think that the baptism of which Luke speaks in the Acts was administered in a different form, and thus according to form was a different baptism—which error Nicholas may have wished to note and correct in passing, teaching that in the Acts there is discussion of one and the same baptism according to form? The difficulty is raised by the particle "only" (or only in the name of Christ); but this must be said to belong to the text of Luke, which is cited as it stands and from which the Bulgarians were given occasion to suspect that the baptism was different. This hypothesis (for it is permissible to form some hypothesis, since the text of the Bulgarians' questions is not available) seems to us more apt for explaining the text of Nicholas, and so there is no difficulty.

VI. It must be noted 1° that it had long before been decreed by Stephen III, otherwise numbered IV, against the Antipope Constantine, who had been ordained bishop by the Bishop of Palestrina under constraint, in the Roman Council of the year 769 (to which many learned Italians and Gallicans had gathered), Act 3, that the bishops whom he (Constantine) had consecrated, if they had been previously

priests or deacons, should return to the same previous dignity, and afterward, the customary decree of election being made for them, should come to the Apostolic See with the people and the decree of election for consecration and should receive consecration from our Apostolic See, as if they had not previously been ordained at all. And if Constantine performed anything else in the sacred offices besides baptism alone, all should be repeated. Cf. also Anastasius in the life of the same Stephen. Now those who defended the acts of Stephen VII appealed to the authority of Stephen III and his Council (cf. Auxilius in *Tractatus de Sacris Ordinationibus*, bk. 2, which is called *Infensor et Defensor*, ch. 4). Again, another Pontiff, John XII, in the year 956, established this in a Synod: "Those whom Leo—the neophyte and invader of the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Roman Church, elected and consecrated Pontiff by command of the Emperor Otto—advanced in any ecclesiastical order, we restore to their former rank by apostolic and canonical authority and by synodal decree, because their ordainer had nothing and gave them nothing." And the example and authority of Stephen III is cited: "Just as our predecessor of holy memory Pope Stephen once passed sentence on those who had been ordained by Constantine, formerly a neophyte and invader of the Apostolic See, and afterward consecrated certain of them who were acceptable to him as priests or deacons, decreeing that those who had been consecrated by him should never be elevated to a higher grade nor advanced to the height of the pontificate, lest such an impious and novel error should spread in the Church." Against all of these it is permissible to argue, and they appear to have thought that an ordination performed by an illegitimate bishop was null as to sacramental effect, and that those ordained by him were to be reordained, being so in name only.

It must be noted 2° that it is incredible that the Roman Church or the Roman Pontiff should for so long a time, even after the disputations of adversaries such as Auxilius, have been ignorant of what Gregory the Great had taught in his *Epistles*, bk. 2, ep. 32, saying that it is ridiculous to wish to ordain again one who has been ordained; that they were ignorant of the doctrine of Augustine proving against the Donatians that baptism cannot be repeated because neither is ordination repeated; that they were ignorant of the decree of the Council of Capua under

Siricius, by which the ordinations of the heretic Bonosus were approved; that they were ignorant of what Innocent I decreed in this matter, of what Pope Anastasius II determined concerning the ordinations of Acacius in his first letter to the Emperor Anastasius, etc. Cf. what was said in the Prolegomenon, § 13.

It must be noted 3° that learned men readily concede that the repetition decreed by Stephen III was not a repetition of the sacrament of ordination, but a certain sacramental rite and sacred ceremony by which those who had been deposed and degraded from their rank were, by the benefit of pontifical reconciliation, again promoted to their former dignities. But this rite was called consecration because when they received the insignia of their orders before the altar, were reconciled with the blessing of the bishop, and obtained by his indulgence the power to fulfill the functions of the orders they had unlawfully assumed, they appeared to be consecrated as it were anew. So Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, century 8, ch. 1, art. 8. The reason why he himself so interprets that history is that it is not very plausible that Stephen and the bishops called from Gaul, learned and educated men who sat in that Synod, should have been so ignorant of tradition.

And indeed this interpretation seems most suitable if the words of the decree are weighed. For it is not said that they are to be consecrated because they were not previously ordained, but "as if they had previously not been ordained at all." That is, the ordination is supposed valid as regards the character, but as regards dignity and honor and rights, no account was taken of it, as Innocent I had already taught (§ cited). Stephen III therefore did not think that the sacrament of ordination conferred by the Antipope had been null, but only that no right of exercising the office had been conferred, and no jurisdiction given; and therefore, according to the usage of the ancient canons, they were not bishops, were not priests or deacons, and accordingly had to be restored by a certain rite which can be called consecration. Cf. the Roman Council under John IX, in which the Synod of Stephen VII was abrogated; in which, in ch. 8, it is decreed that those who have been canonically deposed by that Council are not to be counted among the clergy nor called priests. So also in the Second Lateran Ecumenical

Synod, canon 2, it was enacted that "ordinations performed by heretics are void."

Now it is equally permissible to interpret in the same way the acts of Stephen VII regarding the ordinations performed by Formosus. For what we know from history comes down to this: that the ordinations of Formosus were declared void, that those who had been ordained by him were not to be regarded as priests and bishops, that the ordinations were (as some put it) to be repeated. And this the defenders of Stephen VII maintained by the example of Stephen III. The opinion of both Stephens was therefore the same, although their adversaries, among whom was Auxilius (in the treatise cited), sometimes took it in the worse sense, carried away by the heat of disputation. But if the matter stood thus, what was the cause of the dispute, since the same had been done on other occasions throughout all antiquity? I reply: the cause was twofold. 1° That Formosus had been a legitimate Pontiff and was regarded by many as pious and holy, whereas Stephen was ill-regarded, and two opposing factions existed; whence those ordained by Formosus and those favoring his cause could not bear the injustice. 2° The use of the terms ordination and consecration, which could give occasion to the adversaries to attack that decree more freely.

We said that they judged the ordinations to be repeated in the manner we have explained, because the adversaries of Stephen VII make mention of them. But the testimony of Sigebert of Gembloux (an author of the eleventh century, rather hostile to the Roman Pontiffs) must not be passed over; he writes in his *Chronicle* at the year 903: "Theodorus, the 118th president of the Roman Church, thinking otherwise than Pope Stephen, reconciled those ordained by Formosus, whom Stephen, by force, within Rome and not outside it, had deordained, yet had not presumed to consecrate them again." And to this the nucleus of the whole history must be said to reduce itself; the rest were piled on by the declamations of the adversaries.

Nevertheless, even granting the hypothesis that Stephen wished to initiate again with the sacrament of ordination those whom he knew to have been ordained by Formosus as bishop, we reply with Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, century 9, ch. 1, that it was a sin of conduct, not an error of preaching. For Stephen taught nothing, but

only did and ordered something to be done contrary to what faith teaches. Nor did he ordain it as a rule always to be observed by the Church, as happens when doctrines of morals are defined by the Pontiff, even if he immediately teaches only some; rather he only ordered it to be done in the particular case of Formosus. Moreover, even with faith remaining, something can be done from a perverse will which we know to be forbidden by faith, and by that act one is not truly said to teach anything against the faith. Stephen therefore sinned, but 1° he cannot therefore be said to have erred in faith; nor 2° can he be said to have taught anything against the faith; and much less 3° to have taught anything from the chair as to be held by the universal Church.

VII. As regards Honorius, a double question can be raised: 1° whether heresy is contained in his letters; 2° how it could come about that he was condemned as a heretic by the Council, if the Roman Pontiff was held to be infallible. The difficulty lies in the second question, which we shall however treat in the following thesis. As regards the first, it is now sufficiently established that the doctrine of the letters of Honorius is entirely Catholic, and this has been placed in the clearest light in our own times as well by several persons. We will show this briefly in the following thesis in order to join everything together.

VIII. Pope Zacharias in his letter to St. Boniface (in the *Annals* of Baronius, year 748) passes the following judgment on the perverse doctrine of one Virgilius: "But as regards the perverse doctrine which he has uttered against God and against his own soul—namely, that there is another world and other men beneath the earth, and another sun and moon—if he be convicted of confessing this, call a Council together and expel him from the Church, stripped of his priestly honor." The meaning of this perverse dogma of Virgilius must first be inquired into, although no other document is available beyond these words of Zacharias. Observe therefore that among not a few ancient Christians there was the opinion that only this surface of our earth, surrounded by seas, is inhabited; that the sun setting does not complete its circle beneath the earth in returning to the East, but when it has set, going beyond the sea and gyrating around the northern region, returns to the place of the East and rises thence; and that the moon does the same (cf. Cosmas Indicopleustes, *Topographia*, bk. 2; Severianus, Bishop of

Gabala, *De Mundi Creatione*, Oration 3). Under this hypothesis, whoever wished to assert that there were other men opposite to us beneath the earth—that is, antipodeans—would have had to suppose a different sun and a different moon for them. From this it is clear how one opinion could couple these two things: namely, other men beneath the earth and a different sun and a different moon. Since therefore this Virgilius joined these together, such appears to have been his opinion.

Now this opinion represents the antipodean men in such a way that they are a different kind of humanity from our own, that is, not men descended from Adam; and this is certainly what the words of Zacharias sound: another world, other men, another sun and moon—men, that is, who have nothing in common with us. But that there are in this world other men who are not from Adam, and to whom therefore neither the sin of Adam nor the redemption of Christ pertains, is indeed heresy. And this was the reason why the hypothesis of the antipodeans was not approved by Augustine either (*De Civitate Dei*, bk. 16, ch. 9); for since it was believed that, because of the interposed immense ocean, it was impossible for those born of Adam to reach there so as to establish the human race there too, the opinion concerning the existence of antipodeans was accepted by Augustine as the opinion concerning the existence of men on earth who were not from Adam, and under this aspect it was rejected. But this aspect manifested itself plainly in the opinion of those who said there was another world, other men beneath the earth, for whom there was a different sun and a different moon. It was therefore justly decreed by Zacharias that a man teaching these things should be punished.

IX. Sixtus V (says Dr. Langen, in the work cited, pt. 2, § 2; pt. 4, § 4, p. 93) in the Bull *Aeternus ille*, which he prefixed to his edition of the Vulgate, acknowledges that he devoted his labor to completing the emendation of the Vulgate, weighing the emendations proposed by the consultors and selecting those which seemed superior; and he signifies that he accomplished this by virtue of the authority which he received in Peter, to whom the indefectibility of faith was obtained by prayer from Christ, and who was therefore commanded to confirm the brethren. And in publishing the Vulgate thus emended by himself he decrees from certain knowledge and from the fullness of apostolic power that it

is to be received without any doubt or controversy as the Latin Vulgate which was received as authentic by the Tridentine Synod, and which, he says, we publish emended as well as could possibly be done. But, they say, Sixtus V's edition was so far from being a proper emendation that shortly afterward all copies of it, together with the Bull *Aeternus ille*, were recalled and suppressed by his successor. What purpose then did Sixtus V's appeal to the words of Christ promising infallibility to Peter serve for this work of emendation performed by him, if in this very work he must be said to have done poorly?

Before we reply, we note: a) from the words of Christ the following certainly follows: 1° that the authority of establishing the emendation of the Vulgate and of rendering the final judgment about it belongs to the Roman Pontiff; 2° that an emendation of the Vulgate issued by virtue of this authority for the universal Church will be immune from every error and will agree with the original as regards the doctrine of faith and morals and matters of greater importance. We note b) that the emendation proposed by Sixtus V contained no error regarding the doctrine of faith and morals and did not disagree with the original in this respect. We note c) that Sixtus V himself did not present that emendation as perfect; indeed he signified that it could still be perfected, when he said it had been emended "as well as could possibly be done," a phrase which we find also finally expressed in the edition of Clement VIII itself. Given these observations the reply is clear. For Sixtus V appealed to the words of Christ in order to assert his authority in this matter and to assure the faithful that no error or disagreement with the original in the doctrine of faith and morals and in matters of greater importance was contained in it—this we concede. But in order to prove that the emendation was complete in every respect, or that it could be perfected no further—this we deny.

X. A certain predecessor of Innocent III (whom some think to be Celestine III and others Urban III) is said to have judged that if a spouse becomes a heretic, it is lawful for the other Catholic spouse to pass to another marriage, just as one converted from paganism to the faith is permitted to enter another marriage if the unbelieving party is unwilling to cohabit without insult to the Creator. Cf. that decretal *Laudabilem*, in Mansi, vol. 22, col. 638. The witness to this is Innocent

III himself (in the chapter *Quanto*, on divorces), who resolved the question differently, and correctly. Now that earlier decision once appeared among the decretals which are proposed to the universal Church; from which it follows at least that some false doctrine was proposed to the universal Church as a norm in matters of faith and morals by the authority of Gregory IX (Dr. Langen, in the work cited, pt. 4, p. 92). I reply by denying the inference; for by the very fact that both the response of Innocent III and that of the other Pontiff were inserted among the decretals, it is evident that either Gregory IX wished to define nothing, or that the earlier response was placed there only as a historical document so that the response of Innocent might be understood. Moreover the response of Celestine, or of the other, addressed to a private individual, certainly did not have the characteristics of a decree from the chair, and it was lawful for the Pontiff in such private responses to follow some opinion which seemed probable to him.

XI. Regarding the case of Galileo, take note of the following: a) in the year 1616, under Paul V, the following decree was issued by the Congregation of the Index, after the prohibition of other books: "And because it has also come to the attention of the aforesaid Holy Congregation that the false doctrine of Pythagoras concerning the motion of the earth and the immobility of the sun, altogether contrary to divine Scripture, which Nicholas Copernicus teaches in *De revolutionibus orbium caelestium* and Diego de Zúñiga in his work *In Iob*, is now being spread abroad and accepted by many, as may be seen in a printed letter of a certain Carmelite Father, entitled *Lettera del Rev. Padre Maestro Paolo Antonio Foscarini Carmelitano sull' opinione de Pittagorici ecc.*, in which the said Father attempts to show that the aforesaid doctrine of the immobility of the sun at the center of the world and the motion of the earth is consonant with truth and is not contrary to Scripture; therefore, lest this opinion spread further to the detriment of Catholic truth, the Congregation has decreed that the said Nicholas Copernicus's *De revolutionibus orbium* and Diego de Zúñiga's *In Iob* are to be suspended until corrected; but the book of Father Paolo Foscarini the Carmelite is to be entirely prohibited, and likewise all books which teach the same doctrine are to be prohibited, as by the

present decree they are respectively prohibited, condemned, and suspended. In witness whereof the present decree has been signed with the hand and seal of the most illustrious and reverend Lord Cardinal Bishop of the Holy Church of Albano, this 5th day of March, 1616. Brother Francis Magdalen Capiferrus, O.P., Secretary."

Now what the Holy Inquisition did at that time with Galileo, who defended the doctrine of Copernicus, is recorded in the decree of the same Congregation issued on the 2nd day of July, 1633, under Urban VIII, which was written in Italian: "Whereas you, Galileo, son of the late Vincenzo Galilei, Florentine, aged seventy, were denounced to this Holy Office in 1615 for holding as true the false doctrine taught by many, that the sun is the center of the world and immovable, and that the earth moves even with diurnal motion; for having disciples to whom you taught the same doctrine; for maintaining correspondence on the same subject with certain mathematicians in Germany; for having published certain letters entitled *Delle macchie solari*, in which you expounded the same doctrine as true; and for replying to objections which were at times raised from the Sacred Scripture by glossing that Scripture in accordance with your own meaning. And subsequently a copy of a written document was presented, in the form of a letter said to have been written by you to a former disciple of yours, in which, following the position of Copernicus, there are contained various propositions contrary to the true meaning and authority of the Sacred Scripture. Wishing therefore to provide against the disorder and harm which was thence proceeding and growing to the prejudice of the Holy Faith; by the order of His Holiness and the most eminent Lords Cardinals of this supreme and universal Inquisition, the two propositions of the stability of the sun and the motion of the earth were qualified by the theologian qualifiers; that is to say: That the sun is the center of the world and motionless with respect to local motion is an absurd and false proposition in philosophy, and formally heretical, for being expressly contrary to Sacred Scripture. That the earth is not the center of the world nor motionless, but that it moves even with diurnal motion, is likewise an absurd and false proposition in philosophy, and considered in theology, at least erroneous in faith. But wishing at that time to proceed with you with benignity, it was decreed in the Holy

Congregation held before His Holiness on 25 February 1616 that the most eminent Lord Cardinal Bellarmine should order you to abandon the said false doctrine entirely; and should you refuse to do so, the Commissary of the Holy Office should issue you a precept to abandon the said doctrine and that you could not teach it to others, nor defend it, nor treat of it; and should you not acquiesce in the precept, you should be imprisoned. And in execution of the same decree, the day following, at the Palace and in the presence of the said most eminent Lord Cardinal Bellarmine, after having been gently warned and admonished by the same Lord Cardinal, the precept was given to you by the Father Commissary of the Holy Office of that time, with a notary and witnesses, that you should altogether abandon the said false opinion and that henceforth you could neither defend it, nor teach it in any way, neither orally nor in writing. And having promised to obey, you were dismissed.

"And in order that this pernicious doctrine might be altogether removed and not go on spreading to the grave prejudice of Catholic truth, a decree came from the Holy Congregation of the Index by which the books treating of this doctrine were prohibited and the same was declared false and altogether contrary to the Sacred Scripture."

But because Galileo, after this admonition, published a book entitled *Dialogo di Galileo Galilei delli due massimi sistemi del mondo Tolemaico e Copernicano*, in which he defended the doctrine which he had been ordered not to teach, though by a certain circumlocution of words he sought to indicate that he was defending it only as probable and leaving it undecided; by order of the Cardinals of the Inquisition he was summoned to the Holy Office, by which, on the 2nd of July, 1633, after the above recited matters, the following sentence was pronounced: "Invoking therefore the most holy name of Our Lord Jesus Christ and of his most glorious Mother ever Virgin, by this our definitive sentence, which sitting in tribunal with the counsel and judgment of the reverend masters of sacred theology and doctors of both laws, our consultors, we pronounce in these writings, in the case and cases pending before us between the Magnificent Carlo Sinceri, doctor of both laws, fiscal procurator of this Holy Office, on the one part, and you Galileo Galilei, defendant, present and tried as above, on the other: We say, pronounce,

sentence, and declare that you, the said Galileo, by reason of the things adduced in the trial and confessed by you as above, have rendered yourself vehemently suspected of heresy by this Holy Office, that is, of having believed and held the false and contrary-to-Holy-and-Divine-Scriptures doctrine that the sun is the center of the earth and that it does not move from east to west, and that the earth moves and is not the center of the world, and that you can hold and defend as probable an opinion after it has been declared and defined as contrary to Holy Scripture. And consequently you have incurred all the censures and penalties imposed and promulgated in the sacred canons and other general and particular constitutions against such delinquents, from which we are content that you be absolved, provided that first with sincere heart and unfeigned faith, before us, you abjure, curse, and detest the aforesaid errors and heresies, and every other error and heresy contrary to the Catholic and Apostolic Roman Church, in the manner and form to be prescribed by us.

"And in order that this grave and pernicious error and transgression of yours may not remain altogether unpunished and that you may be more cautious in future and an example to others to abstain from similar offenses, we order that the book of the *Dialogues* of Galileo Galilei be prohibited by public edict." Certain penalties follow and the sentence thus concludes: "Thus we pronounce, we the undersigned Cardinals," followed by the names of the Cardinals. Galileo then abjured the aforesaid errors and heresies. The form of the abjuration was that, swearing, he professed to believe whatever the Roman Church believes, and pledged to cast aside that false opinion, abjuring and cursing and detesting the aforesaid errors and heresies. (Both decrees are found in the work *Memorie e lettere inedite ecc. di Galileo Galilei* per Giovambattista Venturi, 1821, part 1, p. 268; part 2, p. 170.)

Now the correction to be made in the work of Copernicus as prescribed by the Congregation of the Index in its decree—if we credit Galileo, who was then residing in Rome and whom it chiefly concerned to know—came down to this: that the part of the preface should be deleted (Copernicus had dedicated the work to Paul III) in which he says: "I do not mind those who may dare to censure and attack this undertaking of mine on account of some passage of Scripture badly

twisted to their purpose; so that I will even scorn their judgment as rash"; and that the designation "Star" applied to the Earth should also be deleted (ibid., pt. 1, p. 269, compared with p. 227). The Roman See finally expunged from the Index of Prohibited Books the work of Nicholas Copernicus and the *Dialogues* of Galileo, and afterward not only permitted that doctrine to be publicly taught, but even greatly favored those who cultivated it, as may be seen in this very city of Rome.

These matters being established, 1° it is permissible to note: a) that the first part of the doctrine as then propounded—namely, that the sun is immovable and is the center of the world—is in fact false, and physically absurd as well; b) that the modern view is not certain from faith. Wherefore if someone were still a Peripatetic who, out of love of antiquity, wished to defend the opinion of Ptolemy and Aristotle, he could reply that there is no fault in those decrees, but that the modern philosophers are mistaken. The difficulty would however remain: namely, why did later Pontiffs then tolerate the more modern doctrine and favor its authors, while also expunging from the Index the books previously condemned? But persons of this sort could reply that since the matter has not yet been defined, the contrary opinion can be permitted or tolerated. They must therefore admit that no definition of faith on this matter has yet been issued; for publicly taught doctrine contrary to a defined truth is not tolerated with impunity.

Therefore, better, 2° we reply that no definition of the Roman Pontiff speaking from the chair exists in those decrees. This is proved in several ways. a) A posteriori, even on the hypothesis of the adversaries that the Roman Pontiff by himself alone is not infallible. The definition of the Roman Pontiff from the chair has always been followed by the consent and obedience of all the bishops and the submission of all the faithful. But if there was any decree that could not be prevented from obtaining the obedience of faith from all by any obstacle, it was this one; for the matter was approved by nearly all at the time. If therefore it had been a definition of the Pontiff, it would also have been an opinion approved by the universal Church, and the doctrine on the motion of the sun and the stability of the earth would have obtained the status of defined dogmas. But if this had been the case, how could it have come

about that afterward in the Church the contrary doctrine prevailed and was defended with the knowledge of all the bishops? These things are altogether irreconcilable. Therefore no definition from the Roman chair existed.

b) This is proved from the nature of a definition from the chair. For in order for it to be a definition from the chair of the Roman Pontiff, it must be a judgment pronounced or approved by the Roman Pontiff himself and proposed in his own name to the faithful as to be believed. For a definition of this kind is an act proper to the Primacy, and the infallibility which belongs to it is a prerogative proper to the Primacy. Just as the Pontiff cannot communicate the fullness of his power, that is, the Primacy, to another, so neither can he communicate the supreme magisterium and the gift of infallibility connected with it. Therefore, in order for an infallible definition of the Roman chair to be held as such, it is necessary that the Pontiff himself teach. The Roman Pontiff can indeed exercise his power through others, and insofar as he approves what they determine, their decrees are to be regarded as decrees of the Roman Pontiff. But when the question concerns other decrees, it can suffice that he approve in general what others will do in his name, provided the matter is not evidently evil, the authority of deciding having been conferred; for subjects can be bound to obey in matters which are not certainly evil, even if they should be evil in themselves. But when the question concerns decrees of faith, since the faithful cannot be bound to believe with divine faith what can be false, the Roman Pontiff cannot give others the power to issue decrees of faith binding upon the faithful, unless he himself specifically approves what is defined and manifests his approval to the faithful. Hence it is one thing for the Pontiff to will that the Congregations established by him fulfill their office and exercise the power which he has shared with them, and another for him to affirm from the chair as teacher that very same thing which they teach. For the Roman Pontiff can delegate part of his power to others and will that all obey them, without thereby depriving himself of the innate right of pronouncing the last and definitive judgment and of correcting errors that may have crept into the judgments of the delegates through human fault. Therefore, in order for a definition from the Roman chair to be obtained, he who sits in the chair must speak,

and that is the Bishop of Rome alone. But the author of those decrees is no Roman Pontiff, neither Paul V nor Urban VIII; only the Cardinals appear as issuers of the decree. The Pontiffs therefore abstained from pronouncing the last definitive judgment. Therefore.

You will say: since the decrees of the Holy Inquisition are approved by the Roman Pontiff, it is just as if they had come from him; moreover in that age the decrees of the same Holy Congregation had the same force even without the accession of the Pope's approval as they now have with his explicit consent. Therefore the decree of the Holy Inquisition against Galileo must be held as a decree of Pope Urban VIII himself.

I reply, first, that it is one thing for the Roman Pontiff to approve a decree of any Roman Congregation, and another for him to make the same decree his own as an act of his infallible magisterium. For he can approve the decree of a Congregation and at the same time leave it in the order proper to it, furnished only with the force which the Congregation can have by reason of its institution.

I reply, second, that what was directly at issue in this affair was a matter of discipline: namely, the particular sentence to be passed on Galileo, who in a serious matter had been disobedient and seemed, by his interpretations, to be creating a danger to the faith among Italians. This sentence the Pontiff certainly approved, who had ordered Galileo to be dealt with on account of his disobedience and to be forbidden to teach further that opinion which, given the common opinion of the time, was held as foreign to the Scriptures. But it was not therefore necessary for the Roman Pontiff to approve all the acts of that trial and all the affirmations of the Cardinals, who, in good faith, nonetheless exceeded due measure in presenting as a doctrine of faith that concerning which no definition of the Church existed. We therefore have no pontifical definition, nor did Urban VIII depart from the path of Paul V, who, although he had ordered the qualifiers of the Holy Office to qualify those two propositions, did not however approve the censures, but was content to have a precept issued to Galileo not to teach that doctrine further.

THESIS XXXIV

Those too are acting in vain who think they can gather from the history of the controversy of the Three Chapters, from the condemnation of Honorius in the Sixth Ecumenical Synod, and from the dissent of the Frankish bishops on the question of the veneration of images, that the faith of the Church is that the Roman Pontiff is fallible in himself and subject to the authority of ecumenical Councils.

I. From the Fifth Council, and from the events that preceded and followed it, an argument against the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff can be drawn either from the fact that Vigilius changed his opinion, or from the claim that the Council was held and issued its decree without him, or from the fact that some Western bishops refused to obey the judgment of Vigilius and subsequent Roman Pontiffs. (The vindication of Vigilius from the calumny of having unlawfully occupied the See while Silverius was still alive is found in a manuscript of Coustantius in the Vatican Library; on these papers of Coustantius, A. Mai inscribed the title "Magna de Gestis Vigilii Apologia," in Pitra, *Ius Ecclesiasticum*, vol. 2, p. 211.)

Now 1° the question of the Three Chapters was debated among Catholics themselves, and the question was not one of faith but of persons, as Gregory the Great says in bk. 2, ep. 51, to the Bishops of Istria. That is to say, it was agreed by all that the doctrine said to be contained in those Three Chapters was heretical; but a double question remained: 1° whether that heretical doctrine was in fact contained in those chapters, that is, in the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia, in certain writings of Theodoret, and in the letter of Ibas; 2° whether those chapters ought to be condemned by the solemn judgment of the Church.

As regards the first question, the Latins, being ignorant of Greek, did not have a clear view of the matter (cf. the *Constitutum* of Vigilius and the letter of Pelagius II to the Bishops of Istria). The Latins, however, knowing that those authors had been approved by the Council of Chalcedon, denied that those writings were heretical and affirmed that they were to be explained in a Catholic sense (cf. Facundus of

Hermiane in his twelve books *Pro Defensione Trium Capitulorum*, which he had written before the Council). The Greeks, on the contrary, affirmed that those books were heretical and denied that the Synod of Chalcedon had approved those books or had passed an irretractable judgment on them (cf. the Edict of Justinian against the Three Chapters), which the Latins afterward acknowledged (Pelagius II, in the place cited).

As regards the second question, it may first be noted that its solution depended upon prudential judgment. For although heretical works are to be condemned, it does not follow that they must always be condemned by the solemn judgment of the Church in particular; for that general condemnation by which the doctrine contained in them has been rejected often suffices, and it certainly suffices when such works appear unable to cause harm either because they are disdained by all or because they are unknown. That this is what was done at the Council of Ephesus regarding the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia is attested by Cyril in his letter to Proclus, Bishop of Constantinople (*Bibliotheca* of Gallandi, vol. 9, p. 696); these works, though condemned, were nonetheless passed over by economy without anathema, "lest some, regarding the man's great reputation, should separate themselves from the Churches." And Cyril adds that "to use economy in these matters is the best and prudent counsel." Since, therefore, the good of the Church is the reason why certain works are proscribed by the solemn judgment of the Church, it can happen in certain circumstances that in order to avoid scandals and to forestall dissensions the Church should abstain from this solemn condemnation. Thus what prudence counsels must be seen.

Such was the question at that time. The Latins denied that they should be condemned, because by this condemnation the authority of the Council of Chalcedon would be diminished—which had approved the authors and had acknowledged the letter of Ibas as orthodox—and nothing was more harmful to the Church than to detract from the authority of that Synod, which the Eutychians attacked so fiercely. To condemn those chapters would therefore be equivalent to favoring the heretics (cf. the *Constitutum* of Vigilius toward its end). The Greeks, on the contrary, affirmed that by the condemnation of those chapters,

which contained Nestorian doctrine, the authority of both ecumenical Synods—the Ephesine and the Chalcedonian—which had proscribed that heresy, would be strengthened and made secure; but if those chapters were not condemned, a danger to the faith would always remain, for the Nestorians were abusing those books as orthodox in order to disseminate their heresy.

The question therefore was not one of faith, that is, of establishing some point of doctrine against heretics, but was at once a question about a dogmatic fact—which is mixed, as it were, between faith and persons—and a disciplinary question, namely, whether those works ought to be proscribed by the solemn judgment of the Church.

Now Vigilius conducted himself with the greatest prudence. First, arriving at Constantinople, where he knew that the Greek bishops had subscribed to the Edict of Justinian condemning the Three Chapters, he rebuked them for having dared to do so without the authority of the Apostolic See and refused to consent to the condemnation (letter sent by the Italian clergy to the envoys of the Franks; Facundus of Hermiane, work cited, bk. 4, ch. 3). Then, after examining the case and receiving the vote of other bishops, he wrote to Mennas, Bishop of Constantinople, the *Iudicatum*, which he himself mentions in his letter to Rusticus and Sebastian, in which he excommunicates them; by this *Iudicatum* he approves the edict of Justinian.

But because this decree had been issued by Vigilius by way of economy, not because he judged it necessary in itself, but in order to provide for the peace of the Church which the Orientals were disturbing by demanding the condemnation of the Chapters, and whose complaints and contentions he had consented to silence by agreeing to their condemnation; since, because of his *Iudicatum*, the complaints and dissensions of the Westerners broke out, Vigilius perceived that by this means the end he was uniquely aiming at—the tranquility of the Church—was not being achieved. He therefore revoked his *Iudicatum* and wished the matter to be handled in a Council attended both by Westerners and Orientals together, and in the meantime forbade any judgment to be pronounced.

Now as regards the revocation of the *Iudicatum*, note that it had been issued by Vigilius not absolutely but conditionally—that is, if it

proved acceptable to all, and especially to the Westerners, so that concord and peace would be obtained. For this was the chief aim of Vigilius in the entire affair. As regards the holding of the Council, Vigilius did not request it because he thought he lacked sufficient authority to settle the question—how false this is is clear from the confirmatory decree finally issued by Vigilius, as we will show below—but because, given the great agitation of spirits, he prudently judged that the way to composing peace without the danger of schism (which, even if it should occur through no fault of the pastors, they must nonetheless take care to prevent as a harm) was that a decree should be issued with the agreement of all.

Since the Synod had not been convoked according to the rule prescribed by Vigilius—for he himself wished the Westerners also to be present and in equal number with the Orientals, whereas the Westerners were absent—he refused to be present at the Synod and to preside over it, though urged. However, at the insistence of the Orientals, he granted that they might treat the matter in a regular assembly, observing equity, with the Holy Gospels as mediators (letter of Vigilius to Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, *Collectio* 2, Councils, 5th Council). Meanwhile, while the Orientals deliberated among themselves, Vigilius wrote his opinion to the Emperor in a sufficiently long letter, which is called the *Constitutum* (cf. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 69, p. 67). In this *Constitutum* Vigilius condemns the sentences of Theodore of Mopsuestia, but says that the person and name are to be spared; that is, adducing several reasons, he concludes: "we do not dare to condemn him by our judgment, nor do we allow him to be condemned by any other." By these words it is not said absolutely that it is impossible or unlawful to condemn him, but that it does not seem expedient, and therefore it is also prohibited. The reasons adduced by Vigilius were aimed at demonstrating this inexpediency. Then Vigilius anathematizes and condemns the writings or Chapters of Theodoret consonant with the errors of Nestorius, yet preserving in everything due reverence for his person, who was a most approved man in the Council of Chalcedon; and he therefore decrees that nothing be done or said in reproach or detraction of him under the citation of his name. He finally decrees the same regarding Ibas and his letter.

The *Constitutum* appears to differ from the *Iudicatum* in this: that in the *Iudicatum*, Vigilius seems to have consented also to the condemnation of the person of Theodore; for in the letter of condemnation of Rusticus and Sebastian, Vigilius so describes the object of the *Iudicatum*, saying "the cause of the chapters, that is, concerning the words of Theodore of Mopsuestia and his person, but also concerning the letter said to have been written by Ibas to Maris the Persian, and also concerning the words of Theodoret." Here, as regards the other two, only the writings are mentioned, whereas as regards the first, the person as well is mentioned. Inasmuch as the matter was free and concerned discipline, and the Westerners had signified their abhorrence of the condemnation of persons, Vigilius, in order to accommodate himself to them for the good of peace, judged and decreed that this condemnation should be abstained from. The *Constitutum* of Vigilius was not communicated by Justinian to the Fathers of the Council.

Finally, when the deliberations of the Oriental Fathers were concluded and their judgment had been pronounced, Vigilius, six months later, approved and made his own what they had determined, in a letter to Eutychius, who had presided over the Council. This letter, because it establishes and decrees what the Synod had decreed, was regarded by the Greeks as the Confirmation of the Synod by the Apostolic See and was incorporated into the Acts of the Synod. That this letter is genuine is proved by de Marca (Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 69, pp. 127 ff.) and by Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, century 6, dissertation 3, art. 3. In this letter it is noteworthy that Vigilius makes no mention of the Synod, but, solely on the interposition of his own authority, condemns the Three Chapters just as the Greeks had condemned them. The sentence is: "We condemn and anathematize the former Theodore, Bishop of Mopsuestia, together with his impious writings; and likewise those things which Theodoret wrote against the true faith and against the twelve chapters of St. Cyril and against the First Ephesine Synod and in defense of Theodore and Nestorius; furthermore the letter to Maris the Persian, which is said to have been written by Ibas." That is, Vigilius returned to the sentence of the *Iudicatum*, condemning also the person of Theodore. In the same

manner spoke the Fathers of the Council, Collation 8: "If anyone defends the impious Theodore and his impious writings (canon 13), if anyone defends the letter said to have been written by Ibas (canon 14)," etc.

Vigilius returned then to his former view regarding the person of Theodore and judged that the solemn condemnation of the Three Chapters should be pronounced, because the matter was both useful in itself, demanded by the Greeks, and the fear of dissensions had ceased, as he himself testifies in the decree of confirmation: where, after having said that scandals and disturbances had arisen because of those chapters, he adds: "Since Christ our God, who is the true light, having removed all confusion from minds, has called the whole world and the Church back to peace etc."

But does not Vigilius on this very account oppose the Council of Chalcedon, where the Fathers had solemnly said: "Having read the letter of Ibas we have recognized him to be orthodox"? From which it is clear that they had also recognized the orthodoxy of the letter, from which they argue the orthodoxy of its author?

I reply 1°: This decree, if it exists as such, was that of the Orientals and was not confirmed by the Holy See, which frequently declared that it did not confirm except what had been done in the cause of faith. The Orientals, however, could err.

2° In order to recognize from the reading of the letter that the author himself was orthodox, it was sufficient that the letter was not manifestly heretical, that ambiguous phrases could be bent to a right sense, and that the author himself, being present, interpreted them in a Catholic manner. Since at that time the proper question was not about the orthodoxy of the letter but about the person of Ibas, these things were certainly sufficient for rendering a judgment. Therefore if any change took place in the opinion of Vigilius, it was most prudent, and concerned not the doctrine of the faith but the economy of discipline. Cf. Baronius, year 553, n. 230 ff.

2° The Council was not truly ecumenical as regards its convocation; for Vigilius wished the Westerners also to be present. Since Justinian, impatient of delay, prevented this, Vigilius indeed permitted the Greeks to hold the Synod, but did not by this permission cause them

to hold an ecumenical Synod. This permission of Vigilius is therefore wrongly adduced in support of the ecumenicity of the Synod. Still less was it ecumenical as regards its celebration, since the sessions were celebrated by the Greeks alone, in the absence of the Pope and his legates. But since afterward the judgment of Vigilius, approving what the Synod had determined, was added, as we have said, the Council became ecumenical by authority. And thus this Synod, along with the other ecumenical Councils, was held in honor and was received and defended together with them by the Roman Pontiffs, as is clear from the 3rd and 6th letters of Pelagius I, the immediate successor of Vigilius; from the letter of Pelagius II already cited; from the letter of Gregory the Great, bk. 1 (letter 25), to John, Bishop of Constantinople, and the other Patriarchs; and from the second profession of faith found in the *Liber Diurnus* of the Roman Pontiffs (Migne, vol. 105).

3° The periods must be distinguished. Before the definitive judgment of Vigilius, several Western Churches were averse to the condemnation of the Three Chapters, but after the confirmation by Vigilius the situation was different. It is sufficiently clear from the *Chronicle* of Victor of Tunnuna that Pelagius I, scarcely created Pontiff, approved the same Synod, and that following his example nearly all the African and Illyrian bishops desisted from the stubborn defense of the Three Chapters. The bishops of Venice and Istria indeed made a schism; the cause of this schismatic dissension was ignorance and pride. Read the letter of Pelagius II to the same. But what does it follow from this? Their rebellion was not only against the Pontiff but also against the Council which had become ecumenical by authority. Will they then say that Councils too can be disregarded? Those bishops therefore erred, and they erred because they were unwilling to obey the Roman See.

4° St. Isidore of Seville speaks inaccurately in his *Chronica*, n. 115, saying of Justinian: "He, embracing the heresy of the Acephalians, compelled all the bishops in his realm to condemn the three chapters of the Council of Chalcedon." The same, in his book *De Viris Illustribus*, n. 5, infers from the praises with which Theodore of Mopsuestia had been honored by some Catholic men that he was a distinguished teacher of the Church, and says that he was condemned by the Acephalians along with Ibas and Theodoret in prejudice to the Council of Chalcedon.

Natalis Alexander (in the place cited) acknowledges that this error persisted among the Spanish bishops for no short time—they did not count the Fifth Synod among the ecumenical ones. Yet this dissent of the Spaniards (says the same author in the same place) was not approved by the Roman Pontiffs, but was dissembled by a kind of economy until they might be disabused of their factual error, because the Fifth Council dealt not with faith but only with persons. Baronius, together with Antonio Pagi at the year 592 and others, considers it probable that the Irish bishops were also in doubt on this matter, drawing the argument principally from a certain letter of Columban to Boniface IV; and they therefore consider the title of letter 51 of Gregory the Great (bk. 2) to the Bishops throughout Hibernia to be legitimate, although it is probably more likely that the reading should be "throughout Histria."

II. As regards the cause of Honorius, we judge the following points are to be maintained in order.

1° It is certain that letters were sent by Honorius to Sergius of Constantinople, in which he asserted one will of Christ on the ground that it was our nature, not our guilt, that was assumed by him (meaning one human will, the rational will, to the exclusion of concupiscence). Witnesses to this, prior to the Sixth Synod, are John IV and the Abbot John, who had dictated that letter by order of Honorius, and St. Maximus, who as witnesses look to the letter which was read first and in its entirety in the 12th act of the Sixth Synod.

2° It is certain that Honorius in his letters taught not heresy but Catholic doctrine. For a) in the first letter (Sixth Council, Act 12) he says: "confessing that the Lord Jesus Christ, the mediator of God and men, performed divine things through humanity naturally united to God the Word, and performed human things through flesh ineffably and singularly assumed, distinctly, unconfusedly, and unconvertibly." And in the second letter (Act 13) he says: "as far as pertains to ecclesiastical doctrine, what we must hold and preach... we must confess that both natures in the one Christ are joined in natural union, operating with the other's communion and being operative: and the divine indeed operating what belongs to God, and the human executing

what belongs to the flesh, not dividedly nor confusedly nor convertibly, but confessing the differences of the natures as integral."

b) When he asserted one will for Christ, even granting that he had not grasped the state of the question, still he spoke only of the human nature and denied to Christ the will of sin, or evil concupiscence, or the tinder of sin. For he says in the first letter: "Wherefore we also confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ, since indeed our nature, not our guilt, was assumed by the Godhead—that nature, namely, which was created before sin, not the one corrupted after the transgression (by which words the one will of the human nature is signified)." Since therefore in what precedes he had asserted the perfect divinity of Christ joined unconfusedly and without mixture to humanity, and hence also the divine will, he sufficiently clearly taught a double will and a double operation. Cf. the letter of St. Maximus to Marinus the priest. He continues: "There was therefore not assumed, as we have said above, the corrupted nature by the Savior, which would war against the law of his mind... For there was no other law in his members, nor a diverse or contrary will of the Savior; because he was born above the law of the human condition." Cf. the letter of John IV to the Emperor Constantine in defense of Honorius, then St. Maximus, cited in the *Collectanea* of Anastasius the Librarian, among the works of Sirmond, vol. 3.

However, as regards the manner of speaking, Honorius, suspecting no fraud, conceded to the heretics that it did not matter whether one or two operations of Christ were spoken of; first letter: "But whether on account of the works of divinity and humanity one or two operations ought to be said or understood, these things should not concern us, leaving them to grammarians... For we do not perceive one operation or two operations of our Lord Jesus Christ from the sacred letters, but have known him to have operated in manifold ways." By these words—unless they are those to which the Abbot John referred when he rebuked the Greek text of the letter of Honorius, which he had dictated in Latin words by Honorius's order, namely "that in no way had he made mention therein by number of one will altogether, although this is now being fabricated by those who interpreted this into Greek," as St. Maximus reports in the letter cited—by these words, I say, Honorius seems to have taken one or two in a numerical distinction, whereas they

ought to have been taken in a specific distinction. He therefore approved the economy proposed by Sergius, that the newly introduced term of one or two operations should be removed from the preaching of the faith and that common letters should be written to Cyrus and Sophronius, the bishops, "that they should not seem to insist or dwell upon the word of the new term, that is, of one or two operations, but that the designation of this new term being erased they should preach with us Christ as one in both natures, divine and human, operating." And Honorius himself instructed Sophronius "not to strive henceforth to preach the term of two operations" (second letter). By the economy of silence, that is, Honorius judged that he was providing for the peace of the Church in a question which he thought concerned not the matter but the words.

But it is sufficiently probable that Honorius performed additional acts by which, setting aside the economy of silence, he positively opposed the Monothelites. For it is sufficiently probable that he approved the synodal sentence pronounced by Sophronius against the Monothelites in the Synod held at Jerusalem, the acts of which were sent as customary to Rome—as George Cedrenus and John Zonaras testify (*Historia Byzantina*, vols. 9 and 14)—and were well received and approved at Rome, so that on account of the assent given at Rome to the acts of Sophronius, Heraclius, blazing with anger, promulgated his *Ecthesis*. Now although those writers name as the Roman Pontiff who received the acts a certain John, successor of Honorius; since, however, Sophronius died under Honorius, who survived him, it is easy to see that the reading should be Honorius; especially since the *Ecthesis* was written in the year in which Honorius died and was sent to Severinus, his immediate successor, before he was ordained, so that he might subscribe to it. (Read Baronius and Antonio Pagi at the year 639.)

2° We have not yet been able to bring ourselves to hold that the acts of the Sixth Synod where the condemnation of Honorius occurs have been interpolated; but it is permissible to doubt whether Leo II received them with the condemnation of Honorius, though in some degree tempered, as it stands in the letters of Leo and as we will report below. As regards the first point, it suffices to compare what Garnerius disputes in the Appendix to the *Liber Diurnus* edited by him, at the

notes to Chapter 2, § 6, and Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, century 7, and Francis Anthony Cavalcanti in *Vindiciae Romanorum Pontificum*, bk. 8, and others in various places.

As regards the second point, the reason for doubting can be manifold. For 1° a sufficient reason for this condemnation on the part of the Roman See seems to be lacking; since Agatho, when prescribing for his legates in the Sixth Synod what they were to do, and making mention of those deceased persons whom he himself knew were to be condemned, made no mention of Honorius (the letters of Agatho read in Act 4). From which it would follow that the legates and the Orientals exceeded the course set for them and should therefore have been disapproved rather than approved by the Roman See. 2° Such a judgment of Leo was hardly consistent with the public profession of his predecessor Agatho, read in the Synod, that "the Apostolic Church of Peter has never deviated in any part of the way of truth into any error, whose authority, as that of the Prince of all the Apostles, the whole Catholic Church and the universal Synods have always faithfully embraced and followed in all things." For even if Honorius is not reproached by Leo as a teacher of heresy or its approver, yet the very listing or subnumbering of Honorius among the heretics and his solemn proscription sits ill with the simultaneous issuance and confirmation of a solemn profession of immunity from error of all previous Pontiffs. For since that condemnation could be an occasion for the unwary to think that the Roman Pontiff too can err, whoever wishes to protect the dignity and authority of the Roman See is by a certain moral law thereby prevented from affirming what might seem adverse to it. 3° Adrian II in the Roman Council (which is recorded in Act 7 of the Eighth Synod) seems to say, and deliberately so, that the anathema was pronounced against Honorius by the Orientals, that is, he does not say by the Synod comprising both Fathers and the Roman Pontiff, but says only by the Orientals. 4° Anastasius the Librarian in his preface to the *Collectanea* for the defense of Honorius compares the condemnation of Honorius with those canons or Synods of the Greeks which were not received by the Roman See—which he would not at all have done if he had known that it had been approved by the Roman See as well. Nor does the force of the third argument weaken the subsequent words of

Adrian: "although it was not lawful for anyone there, whether Patriarch or other bishop, to pass any sentence regarding him, unless the authority of the consent of the Pontiff of that First See had preceded"; for it is permissible to reply that he is speaking only hypothetically.

But here are the letters of Leo II, both to Constantine Pogonatus and to the Bishops of Spain, in which the Sixth Synod is received and an account is given why Honorius too was condemned. You cannot prove them spurious by critical arguments, and how the Greeks could have interpolated Latin letters sent to the Spaniards cannot be divined. But here again is the second profession of faith in the *Liber Diurnus* of the Roman Pontiffs, which the elected Pontiff used to pronounce, in which along with the heretics Honorius too is rejected, who provided fuel for their wicked assertions. Moreover it is not possible to understand how the hands of heretical interpolators could have crept into a private and secret booklet of the Roman Curia. Here furthermore is the fourth reading which was once read in the Roman Breviary on the feast of Leo the Second, which together with the heretics condemned by him also numbered Honorius.

What then? Even if it is permissible for us to leave the historical question unresolved, the dogmatic difficulty which concerns us nevertheless remains. For it cannot be denied that it was once believed that Honorius was condemned with the approval also of the Roman See, and was condemned at least in the manner which Leo II in his letters and the *Liber Diurnus* exhibit. Whether therefore Honorius was truly condemned by the Synod or not, and whether the Synod was deceived by a factual error or not, the adversaries can reformulate the argument thus: the entire Synod, or subsequently the entire Church, judged that the Roman Pontiff can be condemned as a heretic; therefore the Roman Pontiff was not regarded as infallible.

3° In order therefore to reply, we observe that it is not necessary for us to labor at explaining the formulas employed by the Orientals in the condemnation of Honorius and at softening their force, which we judge to be difficult. Cf. however Garnerius in the place cited. We maintain that this is not required; for 1° the binding force of the conciliar judgment depends on the consent of the Roman See; 2° if Honorius was once believed to have been condemned and to have been

able to be condemned, this was accepted in that manner of condemnation which Leo II was said to have originated. Nor does it follow from the fact that the Oriental Fathers thought that the Roman Pontiff could be condemned as a heretic that this must be held. For 1° their judgment without the consent of the Roman See is not infallible; 2° since for several centuries a certain disposition of aversion toward the Roman See had taken hold of the Greek bishops, and since they then found it grievous enough that so many of their Patriarchs were to be condemned, we will not rashly judge that they, seizing an opportunity for taking their revenge on the Roman See and greedily grasping it, exceeded the proper measure in pronouncing sentence. And lest the union of the Churches be endangered, Leo II permitted the condemnation, but softened it with a tolerable sense that was not repugnant to truth (cf. the vindications cited, bk. 8, dissertation 32). Indeed Leo II in his letter to the same Constantine, by which he confirms the Council, says: "We anathematize the inventors of the new error, Theodore of Pharan, Cyrus, etc., and also Honorius, who did not illuminate this Apostolic Church with the teaching of apostolic tradition, but permitted its immaculate purity to be defiled by a profane betrayal." The stain branded on the Roman See is a profane betrayal; what this consisted in is explained by the same Leo in his letter to the Bishops of Spain: "Those who had proved themselves rebels against the purity of apostolic doctrine, departing indeed, were punished with eternal condemnation, that is, Theodore, Cyrus, etc., along with Honorius, who, when the flame of heretical doctrine was beginning, did not extinguish it, as behooved apostolic authority, but by neglect fostered it." Now this is not to err in faith, and still less is it to teach error from the chair, but it is a sin of negligence and therefore of imprudence and of conduct.

4° It must be noted finally that that condemnation was not indeed necessary—for Honorius was not a heretic and Martin I in the Lateran Council had passed over him—yet neither was it unjust. For that anathema pronounced against the dead, by which they were cast out from the Church, aimed at deleting their names from the sacred diptychs and at their not being mentioned in the Church, or not without infamy, and at the extermination of their writings (Act 14). Now in

order for such a punishment to be justly inflicted on a deceased Pontiff, authority was required on the part of the judge, and on the part of the accused culpable negligence was required—that is, either that he had fostered heresy through culpable negligence (which could be held without any disposition toward heresy) or that it could rightly be presumed that he had truly been negligent. But this second thing, at least the presumption that he had been negligent, certainly existed at the time of the Sixth Council, as seemed sufficiently inferable from his letters, from the omission of due opposition, and from the growth of the Monothelite heresy. And authority certainly did not lack to the Roman Pontiff; for the question did not concern a judgment directed immediately against the Roman Pontiff—who no longer existed—but only indirectly, insofar as his memory was rendered infamous before the faithful, while directly the sentence bound the faithful themselves, so that they should remove the name of the condemned from the diptychs, abolish his writings, and execrate his memory. Therefore.

Nevertheless, since presumption yields to truth, it seems that it came about subsequently that, the matter being better considered, it was recognized that the negligence of Honorius was either truly not negligence, or was not formal, that is, culpable, but only material, and therefore that he was not deserving of that punishment. Indeed in the Roman Church the memory of Honorius afterward flourished with praise, sufficient testimony of which is afforded by what Anastasius narrates in the life of Adrian I, who entered upon the pontificate in the year 772. For the Librarian says: "This thrice blessed and apostolic man, having discovered through his most diligent inquiry that the monastery of Pope Honorius was falling into extreme desolation through a certain neglect, moved by divine inspiration, newly built it up and enriched it, and ordained and established an abbot together with other monks living there according to rule, and appointed them to celebrate the offices in the basilica of the Savior, which is also called the Constantinian basilica situated near the Lateran patriarchate, that is, the morning hour, the first, third, sixth, and also the ninth, and the vesper hour; from one choir indeed, of those monks who had long been singing singly in both choirs, from the monastery of St. Pancras situated there, and from the other choir monks of the already mentioned monastery of St. Andrew

and Bartholomew, of Pope Honorius; so that, singing together in holy praises with hymn-bearing choirs, they might joyfully resound songs and render glorious melody to the Lord, mentioning very often the name of the venerable Pontiff, singing his memorial in perpetuity in poems." That venerable Pontiff whose name the monks, by the institution of Adrian, were to mention very often, is he of whom Anastasius makes mention just before, that is, Pope Honorius, the founder of the monastery of St. Andrew and Bartholomew. Therefore.

And so for the difficulty: Honorius was condemned by an ecumenical Synod or by the Roman See as a heretic; therefore 1° the Roman Pontiff is not infallible; therefore 2° he is subject to a Council. The reply to be made is 1° he was condemned as a supporter, and indeed negatively, through negligence—this we grant; as a teacher of heresy—here we distinguish: by the Orientals—this we concede; by the Roman See or by the Council—this we deny. Whence the first consequent is denied. 2° He who is actually Roman Pontiff was condemned—this we deny; the memory of him who was Roman Pontiff was condemned—here we distinguish: by the authority of the Orientals alone—this we deny; by the authority of the Roman See—this we concede. Whence again the other consequent is denied, which speaks of the reigning Pontiff. Cf. what was said under n. 4.

Note in passing that in the Memorial presented by the nobles of France to Clement V for the condemnation of Boniface VIII in the year 1305, they said: "When there is an inquiry into the heresy of the deceased Boniface, a general Council should not be convoked. For you, most holy Father, are he who holds the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven. Nor could the whole general Council convoked, without you and unless by you, take cognizance of the aforesaid matter, according to the sanction of the Fathers and the judgment of the doctors of law and of God's Holy Church." Gallicanism had not yet taken possession of France.

III. As regards the judgment of the Frankish bishops opposing the decree of the Second Council of Nicaea, expressed both in the Synod of Frankfurt and chiefly in the subsequent Synod of Paris, it must first be noted that not many years before, in the Council held at Rome by Stephen III, several Frankish bishops who had gathered there decreed

together with others, in Act 4, that the images of the saints were to be venerated: "If anyone shall refuse to venerate the holy images of our Lord Jesus Christ and of his Mother and of all the Saints, according to the statutes of the holy Fathers, let him be anathema" (Lateran Council of Stephen III, year 769, by the work and effort of Gaetano Cenni). Yet in the year 794, in the Synod of Frankfurt, at which the principal business was the extirpation of the heresy of Adoptionism, the question of the veneration of images was also debated, and the decree of the Nicene Synod then recently celebrated was disapproved and rejected. The acts of this second part of the Synod of Frankfurt do not indeed survive; yet the canon which is the second among the 56 remains, and reads as follows: "A question was brought forward concerning the new Synod of the Greeks, which they held at Constantinople (read: Nicaea) on the adoration of images, in which it was written that those who did not render to the images of the saints that service or adoration which they render to the divine Trinity were to be judged anathema. Our most holy Fathers aforesaid, utterly refusing and condemning adoration and service, condemned those who consented to it."

Now it is permissible to note the following. 1° The Fathers of Frankfurt presuppose that adoration had been asserted by the Greeks for images such as is owed to the Most Holy Trinity. But it is established that in this they were grossly mistaken. Indeed one is struck with wonder at how they could have been so abnormally deceived, since in the Greek Synod the matter was defined so clearly, and they could have persuaded themselves that the Greek bishops were so inept as to sanction so crude and absurd an error. This astonishment, though not removed, is diminished if you first consider, with Baronius (in his dissertation on the Council of Frankfurt, year 794): "In those times the affairs of the Greeks stank exceedingly to the Franks, from the fact that Constantine, at the instigation of his mother Irene, had refused the promised marriage long awaited with the daughter of Charlemagne, and that therefore every occasion offered was seized for detracting from and insulting his deeds, even though they bore the appearance of piety... we are human, and so long as we live in this life, we are sometimes involuntarily constrained to be assailed by these private feelings." Your astonishment will be further diminished if you note that the

Franconians could have been deceived either by the word adoration, or especially by the opinion of Constantine, Bishop of Cyprus, which, badly translated into Latin, read thus in the acts presented to the Fathers of Frankfurt: "I receive and honorably embrace the holy and venerable images according to the service of adoration which I send up to the consubstantial and life-giving Trinity, and those who do not so think nor glorify I segregate from the holy Catholic and Apostolic Church and submit to anathema." But the original acts read something altogether different.

2° It is permissible to note that the Fathers of Frankfurt judged that the Roman Pontiff had not yet approved that Nicene Council. This becomes evident from the Carolingian books themselves, which are a rather indigestible collection of arguments by which that Greek Synod was attacked before the Franks; these arguments, produced by many persons, Charlemagne either collected or ordered to be collected after the Frankish Synod, and sent to Pope Adrian either a summary of them or all of them in full (cf. the dissertation of Baronius cited). Now in bk. 1, ch. 6, it is stated that in defining controversies of faith "the Roman Church, placed by the Lord before the other Churches, is to be consulted by the faithful, especially since testimonies are to be taken from no other Scriptures than those which she receives as canonical... and all holy and learned men have implored the assistance of the Roman Church for the strengthening of the faith; which all Catholic Churches ought regularly to observe, that after Christ they should seek from her assistance for fortifying the faith, which, having no spot nor wrinkle, tramples upon the portentous heads of heresies and confirms the minds of the faithful in the faith." And Charlemagne professes therein his wish to persevere in fellowship with the Church founded on Peter. But whoever writes these things to the Roman Pontiff himself certainly does not judge that the opinion which he is attacking has been defined from the chair by the same Pontiff. And indeed the Franconians do not call the Nicene Synod an ecumenical Synod, but the Synod of the Greeks. Moreover Hincmar of Reims, who flourished before the middle of the following century and who as a youth read that volume of the Carolingian books in the palace, held it for certain that "that seventh Synod called universal by the Greeks, the pseudo-synod on images, was

held at Constantinople without the authority of the Apostolic See and sent to Rome, from which also the Pope of Rome directed it to France." The Frankish bishops erred indeed in this matter, but given this error it is clear that they in no way called into question the infallibility of the Pontiff.

But on this matter again a Synod of Paris was held in the year 825, and the Gallican bishops pronounced the same judgment: namely, that images were indeed to be retained, but that cult was not to be shown to them, always playing on an equivocation as if there were no other cult than the adoration of latria owed to God alone. By this double judgment they thought themselves opposed both to the iconoclasts, who rejected and destroyed images, and to the Fathers of the Second Council of Nicaea, who had decreed that they were to be venerated. They relied principally on the letter of Gregory the Great to Serenus, in which they held with certainty that their doctrine was contained. Now the Parisian Fathers knew that the Roman Pontiff Adrian had defended the Nicene judgment when he replied to the arguments which had been brought against that Synod by Charlemagne. For at the beginning of the exposition of their doctrine the Parisian Fathers say (Mansi, *Concilia*, vol. 14, p. 422) that Adrian had attempted to reply to those chapters with what he wished, though not what was proper. For they say that certain things are such which he set in opposition to those objections, which—setting aside pontifical authority—are repugnant to truth and authority, and that he sometimes endeavored to bring forward, in defense, testimonies which are sometimes discordant, sometimes inappropriate, and sometimes even deserving of reproof. Are we to think that the Fathers spoke thus of a judgment of infallible authority? The Roman Pontiff was therefore not regarded as infallible in that age, they say. (Christian Lupus in *Dissertatio de Septima Synodo*, ch. 15, notes that the Gallican bishops were not only held fast by a factual error, as if a latreutic cult had been decreed by the Greeks for images, but also erred in their knowledge of the dogma, insofar as they were unwilling for sacred images to be venerated relatively with respect to their prototypes, but only to be proposed for the instruction of the faithful, which they proved from the letter of Gregory. That is to say, they judged that the former smacked of a certain superstition. The same Lupus

notes, from the *Chronicle* of Thegan, that the bishops of Gaul were at that time unlearned men, rustic, restless, born of servile stock, most arrogant, and intolerable.)

I reply 1°: I concede the whole and deny the inference. For even if those bishops judged that the Roman Pontiff defining from the chair could err, it does not follow that this was believed in that age. For, apart from the exception drawn from the text of the Carolingian books just cited, two other exceptions can be made to weaken the force of that inference. The first is that these few Fathers did not represent the sense of the Catholic Church: "What the present Synod, the Nicene, teaches concerning the adoration of venerable images, this the Apostolic See of yours has held from antiquity, and the universal Church has always venerated and venerates to this day, except for some Gauls," says Anastasius the Librarian in the preface which he prefixed to the same Synod, translated by him into Latin, addressed to John VIII. The second is that the opinion of the Church regarding the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, as with any other dogma, is wrongly required from those who, by reason of an error conceived in the mind from which they will not allow themselves to be freed, are rendered incapable of making a judgment about any truth. For since these men could conceive no other adoration of images than latreutic adoration, and knew most evidently that this belongs to God alone, while on the other hand they knew historically that the Pope admitted the cult of images—placed in these straits, when it came to denying one of two truths, namely either that latria is owed to God alone or that the Pope is infallible, since the former is more evident, they were compelled to dismiss the latter. But can a conclusion of this kind, which depends on the abnormal state of certain minds, be a witness to the common or more common opinion of the Church? But we granted the antecedent gratuitously; and therefore

I reply 2°: I deny the supposition, namely that the Parisian Fathers judged that the Pope wished to settle the question by apostolic authority and to propose by a definitive judgment what was to be believed in the Church. For they are not speaking about the confirmation of the Synod, but about a certain response to chapters objected to him, which as private and still belonging to the course of inquiry could have been judged by the Parisian Fathers to be such. And to show that they so

regarded this response of the Pontiff, after having said that he had not satisfactorily answered the arguments objected to him, they add that "at the end of the same apology he professed to think and hold and preach and command concerning the matters at issue, as it was established to have been instituted by blessed Gregory. From which words it is clearly gathered that he deviated from the right path in the same matter not so much knowingly as ignorantly." But this manner of reasoning about a matter—first striving to meet the contrary arguments and finally admitting the opinion one had attacked—is proper to one who is inquiring and privately determining something, not to a judge deciding something by authority. Therefore in that response of Adrian the Parisian Fathers saw only some private work belonging to the course of inquiry. Therefore. It is needless to add that in judging the inept response of Adrian and his contradiction, those bishops were in error; but now we are asking what they themselves thought.

THESIS XXXV

Those also abuse the history of the controversy of Cyprian with St. Stephen who from it strive to prove that in that age it was believed that the Roman Pontiff teaching from the chair was fallible. They also abuse the authority of Augustine, who from his letter 43 strive to infer evidently that it is lawful to appeal from the judgment of the Roman See to the judgment of a plenary Council of the universal Church, and that the judgment of the former can be dissolved by the judgment of the latter. And finally, a certain response of Gregory III is wrongly invoked.

I. As regards the controversy of Cyprian with Stephen, there is not one opinion among Catholics. The first comes to this: granting the historical truth of all those acts which are referred to that controversy, the reply is that Cyprian not only erred when he judged that the baptism of heretics was altogether null, but also sinned when he resisted Stephen and acted at that time against what he himself had already taught and what was most certain: namely, that bishops must obey both their Patriarch and especially the Successor of Peter who holds the Primacy over the universal Church.

You will say: therefore Cyprian did not believe the Roman Pontiff to be infallible. I reply: granted even that the question was then regarded by Cyprian as a question of faith, the consequent is denied 1°: for Stephen did not wish to define the matter. But though he proposed the doctrine of the Roman Church, he nonetheless abstained, for the good of peace, from pronouncing a definitive sentence by which it would be precept what was to be believed, permitting meanwhile that, until the matter was solemnly defined, each one remain in his own opinion (cf. Thesis 28). 2° If Cyprian is said to have thought that Stephen had pronounced a definitive judgment from the chair, we distinguish the consequent: Cyprian never believed the Roman Pontiff to be infallible—this we deny; he did not believe it at that time when, led astray by love of his own opinion, he preferred to renounce the obedience owed to the Pontiff rather than his own opinion—this we concede by transmission. We say by transmission, I say, because not even this follows necessarily; for a person can act against what he believes. In this hypothesis Cyprian would have conducted himself just as so many others who, after having for a long time revered the magisterium of the Church, prefer rather to renounce the obedience owed to the Church than their own opinion. For the act of faith is ultimately free and changeable.

But what does it follow from this? Did the Church in that age believe that the Roman Pontiff defining from the chair was fallible? In order to prove such a consequent, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the Church both thought at that time that the Roman Pontiff had spoken from the chair and approved the resistance of Cyprian. But neither is this proved, if we believe Augustine and Jerome, nor did Dionysius of Alexandria prove anything similar among the Orientals; nor can the former be admitted, since all knew that Stephen had not denied his communion to those thinking otherwise. There therefore remains only the disobedience of Cyprian. Thus to adversaries contending that Cyprian resisted the Roman Pontiff in a dogmatic matter, granted their hypothesis, the reply is: and if they ask why then Cyprian is venerated as a saint by the Church, it must be replied that this proves either that the hypothesis of the adversaries is false, or that Cyprian finally departed from his opinion and submitted, as was fitting,

or that the Church judged that the disobedience of Cyprian was purged by the sickle of martyrdom.

II. The second reply (cf. Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, century 3, dissertation 12, art. 4, and the anonymous author of the *Dissertatio de Auctoritate Pontificis vindicata*, etc., part 2, in Migne, vol. 3, p. 1323 ff.) says that Cyprian did not judge the question of the baptism of heretics to be a question of faith but only of discipline: namely, that it was not an immutable dogma but a mutable practice. We do not say that his judgment was correct, but that he had such a judgment. And this no one will be able to deny on the grounds that the opinion was false; for it must be granted that Cyprian erred. Therefore, in order to prove this reply, it is not necessary to bring intrinsic arguments by which it is demonstrated that the question could truly have been regarded as a question of discipline; it suffices to bring extrinsic arguments by which it is demonstrated that Cyprian so thought. For the question is about the subjective fact of Cyprian. And if the intrinsic arguments of the matter conflict with the opinion of Cyprian, the consequence will indeed be that he erred, but not that he was free from that opinion, unless you suppose that he could not have erred.

Now let the following be noted. 1° Cyprian traces the origin of his practice only to his predecessor Agrippinus (who appears, following the lead of Tertullian, to have introduced this discipline, so that all those baptized by any heretics whatsoever should be baptized again; he governed the Church of Carthage at the end of the second century or the beginning of the third), whom he says he follows; while Cyprian at the same time knew that the custom opposed to him was more universal and had prevailed from antiquity (his letter to Jubaianus and to Quintus; Augustine, *De Baptismo*, bk. 2, ch. 7; bk. 4, ch. 6; Jerome, *Dialogue against the Luciferians*, ch. 9). But what began in the third century and is opposed simultaneously to universality and antiquity cannot be vindicated as a dogma of faith; yet there is nothing to prevent a new disciplinary law from being enacted and observed because it has already been in use for several years. The matter was therefore regarded by Cyprian as one of discipline.

2° Cyprian concedes that individual bishops are free to determine in their own Church on this matter what seemed to them more approved (his letter to Stephen; cf. Jerome, in the place cited, ch. 9). But that can indeed be asserted when the matter is conceived as pertaining to discipline, not when it is judged to pertain to faith. Therefore. You will say that Cyprian permitted this because the matter was not yet defined. I reply that this reply has more appearance than solidity. For Cyprian nowhere makes mention of the deficiency of such a definition, from the deficiency of which he might derive the reason for that liberty; nor did he conduct himself in this way when questions of faith were at issue, as for instance with the Novatians; nor could he have replied so simply, if he thought it was a question of faith. For in faith, according to his own principles as well, unity is to be sought; therefore if the truth is unknown and the matter concerns a question of daily practice to be believed, such as the value of baptism, the magisterium of the Church is first to be consulted, and then if nothing certain can be obtained, liberty is to be permitted.

3° Cyprian indicates that his doctrine is among those which are wont to be revealed by God to individuals for the better, and which therefore, when they prove to be better and more useful, are to be embraced; and he contends that against his opinion custom should not be made the rule, but that reason should prevail (letters to Quintus and to Jubaianus). But these things can be affirmed when some disciplinary law is being considered, not when a dogma of faith is at issue, unless by one who is altogether a stranger and a novice in dogmatic matters.

4° Basil too (*First Canonical Letter to Amphilochius*) treats the question of the baptism of heretics as one of discipline, and although he says that in his judgment the baptism of certain heretics is not valid, he nevertheless concedes that it can be received, if the abrogation of that baptism is going to be an impediment to universal economy; and after bringing the arguments of Cyprian by which it is proved that the baptism of heretics is not valid, he adds: "But since it has seemed good to some Asians, altogether for the sake of the economy of the many, that their baptism be received, let it be received." Now these are the words of one speaking of a disciplinary matter, not of a dogma. But if Basil so

judged, it should not be surprising that Cyprian also was of the same opinion.

Moreover it must be noted that Cyprian appeals to the Scriptures in support of his opinion; but he never formally asserts, so to speak, that it is contained in the Scriptures, but only argues from the Scriptures, wishing to prove that his practice is consonant with the teaching of the Scriptures and of the faith, and indeed more consonant than the opposing custom. But this can also be done in defending a disciplinary matter. And if in this discussion someone should exceed due measure in speaking and use phrases that seem to indicate dogmatic doctrine, those phrases may be explained and softened in the light of the author's meaning gathered from elsewhere. Cyprian uses a similar manner of speaking in this question as when he treats of the mode of election of bishops. The custom of election then prevailing he says derives from divine authority (ep. 68); the law of baptizing those baptized by heretics he says comes from the ordinance of divine disposition (ep. 72 to Stephen).

The same Cyprian, when asked by Magnus about the clinically baptized—whether they are to be regarded as legitimate Christians on the grounds that they were not washed but sprinkled with the water of salvation—softens his affirmative response in the letter to him thus: "In which matter neither our modesty nor our reserve shall be prejudicial to anyone, so that each may think as he believes and act as he thinks." He therefore did not think this question pertained to faith, or that there was apostolic doctrine on this matter. Now from that response it seems that Cyprian was of the opinion that it was in the power of a bishop to establish certain conditions, or to impose certain impediments—as we now say—by which the very existence of the Sacrament would be impeded. The anonymous author cited thinks it can thus be explained how Cyprian judged the question of the baptism of heretics to be disciplinary and permissible for individual bishops to follow their own opinion in the matter; while he himself, for the reasons he adduces, judged that Agrippinus had rightly abrogated the baptism of heretics, and therefore preferred to follow him.

This reply is not without its probability; yet we confess that it seems to us difficult.

Note that even if Cyprian judged the matter to be one of discipline, he sinned nonetheless by not obeying the Roman Pontiff. Yet since Stephen retained him in his communion, disobedience perhaps ceased with the cessation of the precept, and whatever sin was once committed was purged by the sickle of martyrdom.

III. The third reply. There are those who consign the history of the Cyprianic controversy on the value of baptism, wholly or in part, to the realm of fables: such as Raymund Missorius the Franciscan in his work *Disputationes criticae in duas epistolas Firmiliani et Cypriani adversus decretum s. Stephani*, etc.; Marcellinus Molkenbuhr of the same Order in his *Dissertatio de epistola Firmiliani ad Cyprianum*; and Vincenzo Tizzani, Bishop of Nisibis, in his work *La celebre contesa fra s. Stefano e s. Cipriano*, Rome, 1862. We do not deny that Cyprian was once of the opinion that those baptized by heretics were to be rebaptized, and that he so thought before the decree of Stephen we concede, or pass on. Although it is permissible to note that nothing was certain to Augustine. For against Cresconius, bk. 2, ch. 31, he speaks hypothetically: "If it is established that those writings are his which you consider are to be brought forward for you," and ch. 35: "But if you think that Cyprian also favors you in this opinion (that the baptism of heretics is invalid), which you boast," and again ch. 32: "or whoever it was that wrote that letter (to Jubaianus, namely)." Cf. also the words of Augustine from ep. 93, to be cited a little below. Hypothetically, to be sure, Augustine always speaks. But it suffices for us to institute the inquiry concerning the opinion of Cyprian against the decree of Stephen, and hence concerning those acts which are reported to have been done or said after notification of that decree was received: namely, the letter of Cyprian to Pompeius, the Third Council, and the letter of Firmilian to Cyprian.

The decree of St. Stephen does not survive in full, but that he wrote and decreed something in this question both to the Africans and to the Orientals is attested by Dionysius of Alexandria (in Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 7, ch. 5), by Eusebius, ibid., ch. 3, by Augustine, *De Baptismo*, bk. 5, ch. 25, and by Jerome, *Against the Luciferians*. Nor was it possible that Stephen should reply nothing to the synodal letter sent to him by Cyprian on that question. The parts of that decree, as may be gathered from the letter of Cyprian to Pompeius and from that of

Firmilian to Cyprian, would be these: "It is not to be inquired who it is that baptizes; for one who is baptized may obtain grace, the Trinity of the names of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit being invoked (Firmilian, ch. 7)... The name of Christ avails greatly toward the faith and the sanctification of baptism, so that whoever is baptized in the name of Christ immediately obtains the grace of Christ (ibid., ch. 11)... In those who are baptized among heretics, the presence and holiness of Christ is present (ibid., ch. 8)... Those who are baptized in the name of Christ, wherever and whenever they are baptized, are to be judged renewed and sanctified (to Pompeius, ch. 3)... If therefore anyone comes to us from any heresy, let nothing be innovated, except what has been handed down, that a hand be laid upon him in penance; since the heretics themselves do not baptize those coming to them from elsewhere, but only admit them to communion." You see how perfidiously the more recent heretics calumniate Stephen, as if he had approved any baptism whatsoever conferred in any form, when he expressly attributes the force of baptism to the invocation of the names of the Trinity and speaks of those who are baptized in the name of Christ, namely by the baptism instituted by him, in which his name is also uttered, whether when the Son is named, or when the name of Jesus Christ is explicitly added to it. And indeed the entire controversy at that time was only this: whether baptism conferred by a heretic was invalid by reason of being conferred by such a person. This alone was what Cyprian with his followers maintained—that it was not valid, because a heretic cannot give what he does not have, because the baptism which is one is possessed by the Church alone.

Now in response to this decree, expressed in these or similar words, did Cyprian obey or resist? A double question can be raised: 1° whether he submitted at once, and therefore never resisted; 2° whether, even though he resisted at first, he nevertheless returned to obedience afterward. For us, the truth or probability of this second is sufficient; for from a disobedience which Cyprian himself condemned, what can be gathered from Cyprian against the authority of the Roman Pontiff? Whoever denies both relies principally on these arguments: a) the letter of Cyprian to Pompeius, the Third Council of Carthage on the matter of baptism, and the letters of Firmilian make the resistance of Cyprian

manifest; b) no testimony of the ancients exists testifying that Cyprian yielded to the authority of the Roman See; c) the First Council of Arles plainly indicates that in its own age the Africans were still using their own law of rebaptizing (canon 8); but if Cyprian had changed his opinion, that law, which had begun with Agrippinus, would have ceased on account of his authority; d) and throughout so many following centuries it has been maintained that Cyprian purged his fault by martyrdom alone.

On the contrary, there are arguments by which it is certainly persuaded that Cyprian either never resisted the authority of the Roman Pontiff, or at length returned to obedience. Indeed 1° Augustine in ep. 93 to Vincent the Rogatist says: "But that Cyprian thought otherwise about baptism than the form and custom of the Church had, is found not in canonical letters but in his own and in the letters of the Council. That he corrected this opinion, however, is not found; yet it is not incongruously to be thought of such a man that he did correct it, and it was perhaps suppressed by those who were too much delighted by this error and did not wish to be deprived of so great a patronage. Although there are not lacking those who contend that Cyprian did not hold this view at all, but that it was fabricated under his name by presumptuous and lying men... Furthermore, Cyprian either did not at all hold what they recount him to have held, or afterward corrected it according to the rule of truth, or covered this as a sort of blemish on his most upright breast with the abundance of charity, while he defended and most perseveringly maintained the unity of the Church growing throughout the whole world with most copious arguments, and the bond of peace. To this was added also that, like a most fruitful branch, whatever in him needed to be corrected, the Father purged with the pruning knife of passion."

From these passages it is established: 1° that in the age of Augustine no certain testimony existed of the perseverance of Cyprian in his error and disobedience, nor did the letters of Cyprian which survive constitute for Augustine a sufficient argument to prove it; 2° that Augustine, who knew the Donatians, judged it possible that they had suppressed certain writings of Cyprian; 3° that Augustine himself judged it probable that Cyprian corrected his opinion, for this is the

force of what is thought not incongruously. But what was probable to Augustine then, why will it not be probable now? Augustine, to be sure, among the words just cited, says that he does not deny that Cyprian held that view "for two reasons: because his style has a certain characteristic face by which it can be recognized, and because our case is thereby shown more invincible against you." But it is one thing that Cyprian held that view, another that he did not correct it. Moreover the second argument adduced by Augustine proves only that it was not necessary for Catholics to deny it in order to defend their case against the Donatians; while the first argument would indeed prove that the letter to Pompeius also is a genuine work of Cyprian, but by itself alone it is not a demonstrative argument, since it is not improbable that some Donatian imitated the style of Cyprian, especially since on the subject on which it was to be written, Cyprian had already written, from whose preceding letters the manner of writing and the formulas could be derived.

The Third Council in the cause of the baptism of heretics, said to have been held after the judgment of Stephen, is justly suspect. For in the preceding Council, whose synodal letters had been sent to the Roman Pontiff, the matter had been fully dealt with by the fullest suffrages; why then are the same bishops convoked again, as if to deliberate about a doubtful matter? There could be only one reason: either to receive the response of Stephen synodally, or to approve the opposition being made to him. But it is evident that neither was the reason for holding the Council. For if the former reason had existed, the letters of Stephen would certainly have been read in the Council; yet, although other letters that were read are enumerated one by one, no mention is made in the acts of the letters of Stephen. This moreover shows that neither did the other reason exist at that time; for the letters of Stephen would equally have been read and at least mentioned, and it could not have happened that so many bishops casting their votes one by one and confirming their opinion with arguments, in order to oppose Stephen, would never have brought forward anything by which the authority of Stephen would be diminished, or by which it would be demonstrated that it was not necessary to obey Stephen as legitimate superior. Yet nothing of this kind appears in that Council. And if some

allusion in a certain opinion of some bishop is made to the decree of Stephen, it could certainly have been fabricated by one who forged the synod.

Furthermore, what do these words of Cyprian in the preface mean: "Every bishop, in accordance with the lawful exercise of his freedom and power, has his own judgment, just as he cannot be judged by another, so neither can he himself judge another. But let us all await the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who alone and uniquely has the power both of setting us up in the governance of his Church and of judging our acts"? The necessary sense of these words is plainly heretical and schismatic; and even if Cyprian is understood to be speaking only of the bishops present, did not Cyprian himself have the power with his Synod of judging individual bishops of Africa? Was it not established in the African canons that in the first instance bishops were to be judged in Africa? How therefore could it have been said that Christ alone and uniquely has the power of judging individual bishops, so that his judgment is to be awaited, whereby the power which Christ exercises through his ministers is excluded? These things are not only most false, but so contrary to the elementary notions of ecclesiastical society that it is absurd to think they were said by Cyprian solemnly in a Council. There is therefore reason to doubt whether this Synod, as it is now read, was in fact held.

Moreover, it is sufficiently established that in the cause of baptism in that age another Synod was held in which the former opinion was amended. For the memory of this Council was left to us by St. Jerome, *Against the Luciferians*, where he says: "Cyprian, rejecting the baptism of heretics, directed an African Synod to Stephen, then Bishop of the city of Rome, on this matter. But his attempt was in vain. For those same bishops who had decreed with him that heretics were to be rebaptized, returning to the ancient custom, issued a new decree." This is talk of the same bishops in number who had judged that those baptized in heresy were to be baptized. But it is permissible to doubt, in the judgment of Jerome, whether Cyprian himself consented to the new decree; for Jerome does not reckon him among those who issued the new decree, but rather appears to separate him from them. But if that decree was issued while Cyprian was still alive, it is not to be doubted that he

assented to it. Yet Jerome does not tell us the date of that decree. In any case it is clear that that council which we are talking about was held; and the Donatians perhaps substituted for it the third one in the cause of the baptism of heretics, in order to obliterate the memory of it, fabricating it from the opinions of the second Council and from certain opinions of Cyprian gathered here and there from his works, colored in his style but foreign to his mind.

There is no valid argument by which the force of the authority of Jerome in this matter can be broken. The eighth canon of the First Council of Arles is indeed objected (Concerning the Africans who use their own law to rebaptize, it is pleasing, etc.), which testifies that in its own age—that is, at the beginning of the fourth century—the custom of rebaptizing persisted in Africa. But 1° it is not necessary to understand that canon of all Africans, but only of those who rebaptized, such as the Donatians were; 2° indeed it cannot be understood universally of the Africans; for it is established that under Miltiades, when the cause of Donatus and Caecilian was being dealt with in the Roman Council, Donatus was condemned "because he confessed to rebaptizing... which is alien to the Church," as Optatus reports in his work *Against Parmenianus*, bk. 1, ch. 24. Therefore the custom of rebaptizing was not that of Caecilian and the Catholics but of the heretics; otherwise Caecilian also would have been condemned, or if the custom was common and tolerated, Donatus would not have been condemned. From which it again appears that as the third century was closing, the custom of rebaptizing did not exist among Catholics in Africa; which is an argument that around the middle of the same century—that is, under Cyprian—or shortly afterward, the decree of baptizing those already baptized in heresy was abolished. We are therefore permitted to give credence in this matter to Jerome as witness, who, having already dwelt in Rome and been baptized there, could have received this information from the Roman clergy.

Equally with good reason is the letter of Cyprian to Pompeius open to suspicion. For if you consider what is poured out in it against Stephen, Stephen is said to "assert the cause of heretics against Christians and the Church of God"; he is said to have "written proudly, not pertinently, contradicting himself, ignorantly and imprudently." We

ask not the heretics, to whom these things should be pleasing, but men learned in ecclesiastical history, whether it is probable that the Roman Pontiff, who is otherwise praised by all as an asserter of the faith, in a decree issued in defense of the faith, not only wrote proudly, but wrote things not pertaining to the matter, things contradicting each other, and wrote ignorantly and imprudently? Can any other such response of the Roman See be exhibited? And yet Stephen is to be believed to have done this, when the evident argument stood for him. The author of this letter therefore lies, as heretics are accustomed to lie; but it is not credible to us that Cyprian lied so disgracefully. If you consider the arguments by which the author of the letter attacks the decree of Stephen, they not only prove nothing, but moreover betray the malice of the arguer, who deliberately distorts the most sound words of the decree into a foreign sense in order to refute them. Stephen had said that the baptism of those coming from any heresy was valid on account of the Trinity of the names of Father and Son and Holy Spirit being invoked, by which reasoning baptism conferred in another form was excluded. Cyprian infers: "Why has the obstinacy of our brother Stephen burst out to such a degree as to contend that sons are born to God also from the baptism of Marcion, and of Valentinus and of Apelles and of the others who blaspheme against God the Father?" Stephen had said that heretics were not to be baptized, since even they themselves do not baptize those who come to them, confirming the truth of tradition from the very consent of the heretics themselves. But the author of the letter so renders this: "To this has the Church of God and the Bride of Christ been reduced, that she should follow the examples of heretics, that Christians should do what antichrists do." Did so pious and learned a bishop play thus in a matter of such great importance?

The suspicion is confirmed. Those who hold the letter of Firmilian (whose Greek exemplar no one has read) as genuine, on the grounds that it was found in twenty-six codices, also wish it to have been rendered into Latin by Cyprian himself, on account of the similarity of style—for one egg is not more like another egg—and disseminated by him in Africa (cf. the note of Baluzius on this letter, the 75th among those of Cyprian). That is to say, Cyprian would have publicly put forth those most shameful vituperations against the Roman Pontiff which not

even a follower of Döllinger would dare. Now the arguments by which the cited Molkenbuhr either persuades or certainly makes it plausible that this letter was substituted for Firmilian are sufficiently clear; compare the dissertation cited. But if it is probable that this letter was fabricated, the force of the argument by which Cyprian is proved to be the author of the letter to Pompeius on account of the similarity of style collapses; for whoever was able to fabricate the one was able to fabricate the other as well.

Augustine holds it for certain that Cyprian maintained peace with Stephen; but this could not have come about if Cyprian continued to attack the doctrine of Stephen. Therefore Cyprian permitted others to follow the doctrine of Stephen and abstained from attacking it. That is, Cyprian no longer defends his opinion as certain, as he had before. Some change in him must therefore be admitted. Now if this must be conceded, neither is it improbable that he yielded entirely to Stephen.

The Roman Church from the most ancient time venerated St. Cyprian and held him in special honor, going so far as to recite his name in the Canon of the Mass, a distinction granted to very few. But it is not probable to us that the Roman Church would have wished to place among the Saints on account of his martyrdom—and not only among the Saints but among those whom she honors with special veneration—a bishop who was contumacious, opposing the decree of the Roman See to his dying breath. Let those believe that who think the Roman Church at that time had a different estimation of its own authority than it has now; but to us, who are persuaded that the Roman Church always thought the same about itself, this cannot so easily be proved.

The arguments of the opposing opinion set out above are not demonstrative. To the first, answer has already been given. The second is negative, nor is it simply true if Jerome is not to be dismissed. To the third we have already replied under 2°. To the fourth we deny that it has always been believed that Cyprian never departed from his opinion; and that several Catholic critics admitted all the controversial works as genuine, we believe was done rather for a certain economic reason—namely, lest the heretics should believe that the Catholics were

despairing of their cause if all those things were true; the Catholic writers preferred, that is, to follow the method of Augustine.

Whoever therefore wishes to argue from the authority of Cyprian against the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff and his infallibility, let him first demonstrate by certain arguments—which, however, even if he demonstrates, will accomplish nothing—that he resisted Stephen and never yielded. For if he at some point yielded, he himself confessed his error and condemned his former disobedience. As regards the controversy concerning the baptism of heretics, read Emanuel Schelstrate in *Antiquitate Ecclesiae Illustrata*, dissertation 1, ch. 5, and Augustine Orsi, *Dissertatio de Baptismo in Nomine Iesu Christi*, part 2.

IV. Augustine in ep. 43 to Glorius and other Donatians, in order to show that the Donatians complain without cause of the judgment issued against them at Rome by the Roman Pontiff Miltiades with other bishops as unjust, says among other things, n. 19: "As if it could not be said to them, and said most justly: suppose those bishops who judged at Rome were not good judges; there still remained a plenary Council of the universal Church, in which even the case with the judges themselves could be debated, so that if they were convicted of having judged badly, their sentences could be dissolved." "Indeed," says Gilbert, Doctor of Belgium, in the *Tractatus* cited, disp. 2, § 5, "nothing stronger, more efficacious, or more decisive of the truth we teach (the fallibility of the Roman Pontiff) can be found in all of antiquity." For it is evident that an appeal can be made from the judgment of the Roman See to the judgment of a universal Synod, and that this Synod is superior to the Roman Pontiff, whose sentences it can rescind—and indeed even in causes of faith, for such was the cause judged by Miltiades between the Donatians and Caecilian.

I reply: Granting the antecedent, that is, the testimony of Augustine, I deny the inference—that is, that from the opinion of Augustine it follows either that the Roman Pontiff speaking from the chair is not infallible, or that the universal Council is superior to him in such a way as to have coercive force over him. The reason for denying the inference is this: that even admitting the infallibility and superiority of the Roman Pontiff, these things could rightly be said by Augustine. For indeed 1° it must be held that the question in which Miltiades

pronounced his judgment was a question of fact: namely, whether the crimes which the Donatians were charging against Caecilian and his ordainers were true. Now 2° no one will say that Pontiffs are infallible in pronouncing such judgments. 3° If anyone does not acquiesce in such a judgment, he can request that the same judge, together with other assessors and a more ample Synod, take cognizance of the case; in which Synod, if the injustice of the earlier judgment appears, it can certainly be dissolved, principally by the authority of the same Pontiff. These things in no way conflict with the infallibility of the Pontiff or his superiority over ecumenical Synods. Now these are the things which Augustine certainly affirms; for he speaks neither of an appeal, nor is it clear that he denies that the prior judge, that is, the Roman Pontiff, ought also to be judge in the ecumenical Synod. For although he employs formulas properly used of defendants, not of judges (with the judges themselves the cause could be debated; if they were convicted—for those with whom the cause is debated and who are convicted are defendants or plaintiffs), he could nonetheless have employed them improperly, insofar as, when the earlier judgment was being retried, the prior judges took on as it were under some aspect the character of defendants.

And did Augustine not know what Zosimus, in the same age, was asserting to the Fathers of Carthage in ep. 10: "The tradition of the Fathers has attributed (that is, acknowledged and asserted) such authority to the Apostolic See that none dare dispute its judgment... such is our authority that no one can reconsider our sentence"? "For the entire Church throughout the world knows," says Gelasius at the end of the same century (ep. 13, to the Bishops of Dardania) "that the See of blessed Peter has the right to judge concerning every Church, and it is not lawful for anyone to judge its judgment." Cf. what we gave in Thesis 17.

V. Since the controversy over baptism has been treated here, let us also adduce the words of Gregory III, which are judged to teach what is false. For in his first letter to Boniface he decrees among other things in the first place, in response to Boniface: "Those whom you assert to have been baptized by pagans, if the matter stands thus, we command that

you baptize them again in the name of the Holy Trinity." And this has been recorded by Gratian in his Decree, *De Consecratione*, d. 4, ch. 52.

Did Gregory deny that baptism conferred by a pagan is valid? Since the question of Boniface is not available, from which the sense of the response would be more clearly perceived, it is necessary in some way to divine; but I do not think the divination difficult. For what the Pontiff commands is that they be baptized again in the name of the Holy Trinity; therefore they had not previously been baptized in this manner. Something similar occurs in the fourth response in the same place: "Those also who are in doubt whether they have been baptized, or who have been baptized by a priest sacrificing to Jupiter and eating the flesh of sacrifices, we direct to be rebaptized." For it was not credible that these had been duly baptized. In the case of doubt about a baptism received, it is again to be conferred conditionally; but the ancients, when commanding that the conferral be repeated, did not make explicit mention of this limitation under condition. Cf. the 11th letter of Pope Zacharias to Boniface, where he speaks of those baptized by heretics.

THESIS XXXVI

Neither does it follow, from the fact that the Roman Pontiff himself is bound to believe what he defines, that he alone cannot define.

I. In order for someone to be bound to believe with divine faith, it suffices that it be certainly established for him that God has revealed. But in order for someone to believe with Catholic faith, it suffices that it be certainly established for him, through the divinely instituted magisterium of the Church, that God has revealed; for once this is posited, the natural and divine law itself obliges him to believe. But when the Roman Pontiff has spoken from the chair, once this fact is established, it is established for him through the divinely instituted magisterium—just as for others—what God has revealed. He could indeed have been unwilling to define, but once the definition has been made, to which divine assistance was present (which would not have been present if he had not defined), the infallible certainty of revelation is now independent of his will. Therefore these two things can be joined in one subject: that he defines and that he is bound to believe.

And indeed the Council itself which defines must believe what it has defined, nor only the individual members, but the entire Synod, if it wishes to make a universal profession of faith, must also include in it the things which it had itself defined. And in fact, if the one who defines were not bound to believe, neither would one who succeeds him in the same authority be bound; wherefore a subsequent Synod would not be bound by the decrees of faith of the preceding Synod. But this is false. Therefore there is no repugnance in the fact that the same person—whether moral or physical—both defines and must believe what he defined, or rather what God himself defined through his ministry.

II. There can be a difficulty: the Roman Pontiff is not bound by laws he has enacted through his power of jurisdiction, at least coercively, because no one has coercive power over himself. If therefore the authority of teaching is a power of jurisdiction, a decree of faith issued by the Roman Pontiff will be an act of his jurisdiction. Therefore the Pontiff will not be bound by that decree. Either, therefore, it must be said that the Pontiff is not bound to believe what he defined—and what was said above is false—or it must be denied that the authority of teaching is a part of the power of jurisdiction, which Catholic teachers nevertheless commonly teach.

I reply: the power of jurisdiction of the magisterium extends to subjects; but the Roman Pontiff is subject to no jurisdiction on earth. And so he must believe himself, because it is necessary to believe God revealing when the revelation is certain—not only because the Church commands it, but because the natural law requires it and God himself commands it positively. But we concede that the Roman Pontiff is not coercively bound by the magisterium of the Church, just as he cannot be bound by any penalty, whether of excommunication or of any other kind. Yet if as a private man he were to hold a doctrine opposed to a defined dogma, he would be deformed in respect of the magisterium of the Church and truly heretical, because he would be opposed to a revealed truth manifested through the magisterium of the Church; yet he would not be properly disobedient to the Church, because one who has no superior cannot be disobedient.

Therefore the authority of teaching is a power of jurisdiction, but with respect to subjects; and therefore it is lacking with respect to the

Roman Pontiff himself, and with respect to him alone. Hence to the argument: either the Roman Pontiff is not bound to believe what he himself defines, or the act of teaching is not an act of jurisdiction, which no one exercises over himself—the reply is that he is indeed bound to believe, but not by reason of the obedience owed to the jurisdiction of the Church, but by reason of the obedience owed to God; and that his act of teaching is indeed an act of jurisdiction, but with respect to those capable of being its subjects, that is, with respect to subjects, not with respect to himself.

APPENDIX

We have completed the treatise on the Roman Pontiff. If the demonstration of his Primacy be firmly held, no other mark is needed to discern the true Church of Christ. But since Catholic writers are accustomed in controversy with Protestants to prescind from this special mark and to bring into question whether the Roman Church—namely, the one that obeys the Roman Pontiff—is the true Church; and since we have treated of the Church in the prolegomenon, lest the treatment of this matter seem incomplete, we will briefly append a treatise on the marks of the Church, so that from this too it may appear what we have established throughout the preceding treatise: that the Roman Church is the one true Church.

§ I

It is necessary that the true Church of Christ have certain marks by which she may be known and discerned from false sects. But the Protestants foolishly constitute the marks of the Church as the truth of doctrine and the legitimate administration of the Sacraments. Rather, unity, holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity, which are ontologically properties of the Church, are also logically her marks, and all of them are necessary in order for any assembly to be regarded as the true Church of Christ; and they are sufficient—both all of them together and also some of them separately—to demonstrate the true Church of Christ.

I. A mark properly pertains to the subject which it manifests, and therefore has a smaller extension than a sign. A mark, therefore, is that which, when known, leads to a certain knowledge of the subject. It can be an intelligible as well as a sensible mark, according to the nature of the subject. But when the subject—such as the Church—is sensible, the mark must itself also be sensible; not in such a way, however, that it is something merely immediately visible, for the knowing subject for whom the marks are necessary is not the sense but the intellect, and the knowable object is not only what falls under the senses. Rather the mark must be sensible in such a way that what is intelligibly visible is contained in what is sensibly visible, just as we said (§ X) about the visibility of the Church. When knowledge of the subject is sought through marks, the mark must be, not indeed in itself, but with respect to us, better known than that to whose knowledge it leads.

The subject to be manifested by the marks of the Church is not simply some visible Church, but the true visible Church, having the true faith, the legitimate administration of the Sacraments, and the legitimate authority of governing; for this is what is sought. Several assemblies appear which boast of being the Church of Christ; the question is which of these is the true Church. But the visible Church must also be visible precisely as the true Church, as we proved in § X; and she becomes visible through marks. For since the Church must be visible in herself, it is necessary that she become visible through what

inheres in her; and what, inhering in her, manifests her, is properly her mark. It is therefore necessary that the true Church have certain marks by which she may be certainly discerned from false ones. For she must be clear to unbelievers so that they may approach her; the faithful must certainly discern her from false sects, so that they can guard themselves from communion with them. This cannot be obtained without certain signs or marks. Whence it is evident that the question of the marks is necessary.

When the true Church is inquired into by means of marks, it is not supposed that knowledge of the true Church in the abstract is lacking—that is, knowledge of what and of what quality the Church must be, which knowledge may be drawn from the Scriptures. Rather it is supposed that knowledge of the true Church in the concrete is lacking—that is, knowledge that this particular assembly is indeed that true Church of whose abstract notion we have knowledge. This knowledge in the concrete we obtain insofar as we apply the abstract notion to some assembly and see that the assembly best corresponds to it, just as when applying the notion of man to some individual we see that he is a man.

Since a mark is something inhering in the subject to be manifested and manifesting it with certainty, only that can be a mark which is a property of the same subject, so as to belong to the subject as proper to it—either something one, if there is only one mark, or at least the whole collection of several, if several marks are found. Now by proper or property we mean that which belongs to the subject essentially or necessarily and to it alone. That the marks of the Church must be such is evident. For if they are not necessarily present, but can be absent, when they are absent the true Church will not be known; but if they are common also to false churches, the true Church will not by them be discerned from the false.

A mark can be positive and negative; or the function of a mark can be twofold, affirming or denying. A positive mark, or one having an affirming function, is one by whose existence in some assembly it is known that the assembly is the true Church—just as from the presence of a miracle in testimony of some doctrine, that doctrine is known to be the true one. A negative mark, or one having a negative function, is one by whose absence from some assembly it is known that that assembly is

not the true Church—as if apostolicity is lacking in some assembly, it is rightly inferred at once that it is not the Church of Christ.

II. Since that which is a mark must be something proper to the Church and must manifest the true Church to all with certainty, marks cannot be invented at anyone's discretion, but there must be some objective norm according to which marks are established. This norm can be drawn from two sources: from reason or from revelation. The Church can be viewed both under the generic concept of a divine religious society and under the specific concept—namely, that which is contained in the Christian revelation. Furthermore, the true Church must be manifestly discernible from false sects not only for the faithful but also for unbelievers, who must approach her and who do not yet give assent to divine revelation. Now 1° reason can at least partly determine what must necessarily be present in a divinely instituted society which presents itself to men as such, teaching and commanding in the name of God; or it can determine what the most certain sign of such a society is: namely, divine testimony through miracles. 2° It is necessary that reason be able to know these things before faith, so that the assent of faith may be rational. And because 3° revelation exhibits the specific characters of the Church instituted by Christ, and these must certainly be found in the true Church, and it is frequently necessary to deal with those who receive revelation at least as contained in the Scriptures; therefore, when disputing with these persons, the marks of the true Church must also be drawn from Scripture, nor can the adversaries refuse them; for the Church must be specifically such as Christ instituted her.

III. The evidence which marks can engender is evidence both of truth and of credibility. That is said to be evident by evidence of truth whose truth is seen in itself—that is, through the analysis of the same thing, either immediately or mediately through reasoning. That is said to be evident by evidence of credibility whose truth is seen not in itself but in testimony which is evidently worthy of belief. Now since marks are properties of the thing whose marks they are, by knowing them in the concrete you know the thing itself through an intrinsic medium—that is, you receive knowledge of it from an analysis of the same thing, and thus you obtain evidence of truth. But through marks there is also

present evidence of credibility; for when you use the marks as a sign of divine testimony that this is the true Church, when you hold this, you hold it because you rely on divine authority; and an act of this kind is faith.

Both evidences—both of credibility and also of truth—can in themselves, as we have said, be produced by the marks, faith being supposed. Yet we do not affirm that perfect evidence need shine upon all; it suffices that it be evident to men that they act prudently if they give their name to this Church—which even the rustic and children can attain in a manner proportioned to themselves, and in which they can be aided by the interior divine light and the holy motion of God. These two things do not obtain when under the same external motives some falsehood is proposed.

IV. Given these observations, it is clear that those two marks which the Protestants propose must be rejected: namely, the truth of doctrine and the legitimate administration of the Sacraments. For this is what is sought: which assembly has the true doctrine, which truly interprets the Scriptures, which legitimately administers the Sacraments. But the truth of revealed doctrine must be received from the magisterium of teachers, who must therefore be known first. What Christ revealed to the Apostles must, as I will prescribe here, be proved from no other sources than from the same Churches which the Apostles themselves founded (Tertullian, *Praescriptions*, 31). The same must be said about the legitimate use of the Sacraments, which cannot exist, as the Protestants themselves concede, except in the Church which has the true doctrine. In sum, the truth of doctrine, which consists in testimony, and the right administration of the Sacraments are things immediately invisible in themselves, which must be manifested through something else; they are therefore not marks, but what must be made known through marks.

However, if the question is with those who receive the Scriptures, then 1° from them, as we have said, true marks can be drawn, delimiting what the true Church is, and the abstract concept of her can be obtained; and 2° if moreover those who seek the true Church admit certain dogmas contained in the Scriptures—for example, the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff—granted the truth of this doctrine, it can be demonstrated both negatively that all those Churches which deny this

dogma are false, and also positively that this one is the true Church, if what is assumed is such that the assembly possessing it is necessarily the true Church. But universally, in order for the true Church to be demonstrated from the truth of doctrine, the whole true doctrine would have to be assumed; for heretics too can retain a part of it. But the whole doctrine will never be better known than the Church itself.

Therefore two questions must be accurately distinguished: 1° whether the true doctrine and the legitimate use of the Sacraments can ever be separated from the Church of Christ; 2° whether the true Church is discerned from the false by the truth of doctrine and the right use of the Sacraments. But this second question can again be twofold: that is, a) whether it is discerned ontologically; b) whether logically. The first question is to be answered negatively, as is evident; and therefore to the second a) affirmatively: because by that through which something is constituted, it is also ontologically discerned from others. But to the second b) negatively, as we have proved. From which it is clear that not everything that constitutes and discerns ontologically also discerns logically; for it must moreover be immediately known to us or better known than the discernible subject.

The things which the Protestants bring from Matthew 18:20; John 10:27; 15:3; Ephesians 5:23, 26, prove indeed that in the true Church there are those things which are there affirmed; but they do not prove that the Church is discerned through the same things. They say, however: the Fathers in controversy, especially the Donatian controversy, appealed to the Scriptures, when the question between them and the heretics was "where is the Church, whether with us or with them" (Augustine, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, ch. 2). Therefore from Scripture, that is, from the truth of doctrine, the question about the true Church is to be resolved. I reply: I distinguish the antecedent. They appealed to the Scriptures in order to show, by the truths drawn from them comprehending the sum of all revealed truths, that the Catholic Church is the true one because she has the true doctrine which is contained in the Scriptures—this I deny. They appealed to the Scriptures in order to gather, from the clear testimonies of the Scriptures which the adversaries also received, marks which they would then use to discern the true Church—I distinguish this; and accordingly so that the

question about the truth of doctrine and specifically about the value of baptism was to be decided through knowledge of the true Church—this I concede; so that the question about the true Church was to be solved through the truth of doctrine—this I deny. I distinguish the consequent. Therefore from the Scriptures, and indeed against those who receive them, marks can be derived by which the question about the true Church is to be resolved—this I concede. From the Scriptures the truth of doctrine can be gathered, according to which it is judged which is the true Church—I sub-distinguish: the whole revealed truth, and that with certainty, can be gathered before the Church is known—this I deny; some truth can be gathered, and by it, provided the Scripture is admitted by those with whom the question exists, the question about the true Church can be resolved—just as we ourselves do using marks—this I concede. Wherefore it is clear that these are wrongly held to be equivalent: proving the true Church from Scripture and from the truth of doctrine.

V. What then are the marks? Speaking absolutely, if what was demonstrated in the preceding Treatise about the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff is supposed, the true Church can be determined by this single mark. The mark is, namely, dependence on and communion with the Roman Pontiff, which is visible in itself: so that that Church is called the true Church of Christ which adheres to the Roman Pontiff, and any one which departs from him is false. To this comes down the argument of Optatus, bk. 2, where he proves himself and his companions against the Donatian Parmenianus to be in the true Church because they are in communion with the chair of Peter, which is, he says, the first of the gifts of the Church. And he therefore concludes that the other gifts of the Church belong to his assembly; because "they are so connected and inseparable that one is understood to be unable to be separated from the other," and "it is proved that the other gifts are with us through the chair of Peter, which is ours," he says. Optatus calls gifts what we call marks, and they had been so called also by Parmenianus; because they belong to the bride. Among these gifts are numbered a single font, and the angel, that is, the Bishop—namely, fellowship with the angels of the churches.

However, given a certain method adopted by Catholics in disputations with Protestants, in which dispute they permitted, by way of superabundance, and setting aside for a while the arguments proper to themselves by which the Primacy is shown, the Roman Church itself to be disputed about, comparing it with others according to the norm of the Scriptures; if we wish to follow this method, it is necessary, abstracting from the demonstration of the Primacy, to engage the Protestants again—which we are now about to do.

VI. Therefore Catholics establish four marks, which the symbolic profession also contains and to which any others there may be can be reduced: "I believe in one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church." It is established 1° that these can be marks—that is, that they have what is primarily required in order to be marks of the Church: namely, they are to be reduced to a sensible fact, and are better known than the subject to be manifested. For in the first place these are properties of the Church; they differ formally according to diverse reasons, but materially they can be one and the same reality. But, as we have already seen, marks must be something proper to the subject. Now not all properties can be marks; but if there are properties that are reducible to a sensible fact, these both constitute the thing ontologically and will discern it logically. Note that it is not precisely the same to say that something is contained in a sensible fact as to say that something is reducible to a sensible fact. The former requires that all elements of it, if it has several, be something individually sensible in themselves; the latter does not require this, but demands that some elements are in themselves sensible, and if it has any elements not sensible in themselves, they are necessarily connected with those and represented by them; so that the whole is seen both sensibly and intelligibly. And what we said in § X about intelligible visibility and its various degrees must be recalled here.

Now in the aforesaid properties, first the necessity of them and their actual existence must be distinguished; the former pertains to right, the latter to fact. But their actual existence is reducible to a sensible and in itself evident fact. Consider unity: it is threefold—unity of profession of faith, social unity or subordination of all to one governance, ritual unity or communion of all in the same Sacraments. But the same profession, the subordination to the same governance, and

the communion in the same Sacraments are matters posited in fact and visible with intelligible visibility. And the unity of interior faith is reducible to a visible fact, because it is certainly represented by the common profession of all; for it cannot be absent from an assembly where that profession exists. It therefore suffices to employ the profession of faith as a mark. Now although the faith which the Church professes must be the true faith, just as the Sacraments in which all communicate must be true, and the governance likewise true—that is, they must be what Christ instituted—yet because the unity of profession of faith, social unity, and ritual unity, even taken in themselves, are properties of the Church; hence, prescinding from truth, if they are sensible, they can certainly be marks. Such is unity, which Christ wished to be present in his Church in such a way that in the Church there is an efficacious and stable principle of the same unity—namely, a ministry endowed with authority, which all hear and all obey; and therefore a sensible ministry, whose existence and the obedience rendered to it is reducible to a sensible fact. But what the true ministry is—that is, endowed with true authority—is what is sought. Yet a certain form of governance, abstracting now from its legitimacy, which is established to be required in order for the Church to be one, is visible and suffices for a mark. Thus the threefold unity together with its principle is contained in a sensible fact or is reducible to a sensible fact.

Consider holiness. Interior holiness is not immediately visible, but the exterior culture of virtues is a fact visible to sense and intellect alike, and through it interior holiness too—not in this or that determined individual, but in the generality of the many—is seen; for it is recognized that it is impossible that many among them are not truly holy. Again, charisms—for example, miracles—consist in a sensible and intelligible fact, and through them the holiness of those or of that assembly is seen, for whose confirmation of holiness the wonders are performed by God. The holiness of the law, whose promulgation is made sensibly, is naturally knowable also by the intellect; and therefore the fact that this assembly has a holy law is a fact visible with intelligible visibility. Its principle also, which is the ministry instituted by Christ and subject to scrutiny, is visible in itself. Therefore the property of

holiness too is contained in a sensible fact or is reducible to a sensible fact.

Consider catholicity: it is itself contained in an external fact, in which the intellect sees one and the same assembly diffused everywhere with material and formal catholicity, and sees the principle of its catholicity—that is, the authority.

Consider apostolicity. It is distinguished as threefold: of origin, of doctrine, of governance; but we distinguished above apostolicity of succession of pastors into material and formal. We cannot now consider apostolicity of doctrine and the formal apostolicity of succession, because these pertain to what is sought through the marks. Yet because both the simple apostolic origin and the material apostolic succession are also properties—namely, that the Church began from the Apostles and through the Apostles, and is governed by the continuous series of their Pastors who ultimately trace back to the Apostles—this is sufficient for us now. But this is a fact contained in public monuments and records, which can therefore be seen by a man with intelligible visibility, just as past facts can be seen when the monuments are viewed or the witnesses recounting them are heard. Therefore all these properties consist in or are reducible to a sensible fact.

It remains to demonstrate that they are better known than the subject. When the marks are said to be better known than the Church, the two terms being compared are on the one hand the marks themselves, on the other the true Church of Christ. These two terms are not separated in reality nor conceived as separated, but are distinguished by reason insofar as the subject is viewed on the one hand confusedly, and on the other its properties or marks are distinctly known and the subject without the marks is asserted to be still at least unknown in the concrete, while once the marks—which are its properties—are known, the subject is manifested in the concrete. Now that is better known than another which is more immediately seen than the other and through which the other is seen by some mental discourse. But these marks, since they are reducible to a sensible fact, are immediately seen in comparison with the Church viewed in abstraction; and once they are posited, the intellect at once sees the unity, holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity of some assembly. But once

these are seen, since reason or revelation teaches it that all these can belong to none but the true Church, it concludes: therefore this assembly—or this subject of these properties—is the true Church. Therefore.

We have said that reason or revelation teaches this. For revelation teaches all the marks, and if someone admits revelation, he can learn this from it. But reason alone also teaches that miracles, outstanding holiness such as shines for example in so many martyrs, and catholicity which can and must be regarded in some determined assembly as a miracle, are most certain signs that that religion is divine, that assembly divine, which is honored by them; and that at least some of these must necessarily be present in that assembly which presents itself to men as speaking in God's name and requiring faith and obedience.

It is established 2° that these four aforesaid marks are necessary. We do not say that they alone are marks; that is not at all necessary. Nor do we say that all of them necessarily need to be known in order for the true Church to be known; for this is false, as we shall see. But we say that it is necessary that all of them be present in the true Church, such that if one is absent, it can at once be inferred that that assembly is not the true Church of Christ. The reason is that, as we have proved, they are all necessary properties; and since these are reducible to a sensible fact, it is necessary that they be present also under the aspect of marks. Therefore all four marks are necessary. Hence each one of them is a negative mark, or one having a negative function.

It is established 3° that these four marks are sufficient: a) both all of them together, and b) also some of them separately. For although some of them separately may not by themselves alone be sufficient positively to discern logically the true Church from heretical and schismatic sects, yet some of them separately are also positively sufficient. For holiness, for example, and the catholicity of the Church of Christ cannot but be regarded as testimony of God. Hence much more will all of them taken together be sufficient positively to demonstrate the true Church. And indeed in the symbolic monuments the true Church is designated through these four marks, and all of them taken together represent that society than which none more excellent or more divine can be conceived.

What we have proved by intrinsic argument up to this point is also confirmed by an extrinsic argument drawn from the authority of our forebears, who used these marks to demonstrate the true Church. The Apologists used holiness against unbelievers; Tertullian in *Praescriptions* and Optatus bk. 2 used apostolicity against heretics and schismatics; Cyprian in *De Unitate Ecclesiae* used unity; Augustine in *De Unitate Ecclesiae* and Optatus in the same work used catholicity.

§ II

Besides the assembly which is contained in the Roman communion, there is no Christian assembly to which all the necessary and sufficient marks belong. Indeed, although some of the four aforesaid properties may apparently belong to some assembly that is not the true Church, it can easily be demonstrated that no eastern or western sect distinct from the Roman communion rightfully claims even one of these properties. But the one assembly comprised in the Roman communion is the one to which all the marks belong; and therefore the designation Roman, applied to the Church, is the mark by which the true Church is distinguished from false sects.

I. A double question must be distinguished: 1° whether any property of the Church of Christ, viewed according to all its proper elements and therefore integrally, can truly belong to another Christian assembly which is not the true Church; 2° whether some or all of the properties can apparently belong to another Christian assembly. To the first question the answer is negative. For in order for a property of the Church to truly belong to some assembly, it must be a true property—that is, constituted by its own proper and specific elements. For if one of these is absent, its essence is no longer present, although it may apparently seem to be such. Now the elements of each property of the Church are those which are either contained in the very concept of the thing, or have been determined by God.

Now as regards holiness, if you consider the holiness of faith, which can only be true, the holiness of laws which rest upon true faith, the perfect and outstanding culture of virtues which presupposes true faith and due submission to those whom Christ established, and the

miracles and other charisms by which God testifies to the holiness of faith, laws, and the men constituting the assembly—it is manifest that holiness can only belong to one assembly which is the true Church. Likewise catholicity, since it consists not only in the Church being simply large but in being comparatively larger than any other assembly which arrogates to itself undeservedly the name of Church, can only belong to the one true Church. Now unity, in order to be true unity, requires not only some principle of unity, but that same principle which Christ determinately instituted; but this is unique and can exist only in the one assembly which is the true Church. For if others adhere to this principle, they are no longer separate assemblies but are part of the true Church. Finally, apostolicity viewed integrally requires formal succession; but this is necessarily connected with the principle of unity which Christ determinately instituted. Therefore it too can only be present in the true Church. Therefore.

To the second question, as to its first part, the answer is affirmative. For in order for some property apparently to belong to some assembly, it suffices that some element of it—and that one which is first visible—be seen in the assembly. But it is clear that material succession from the Apostles can also be found in an assembly which afterward embraces heresy or commits schism; likewise there is nothing to prevent an assembly severed from the principle of unity which Christ determined from nonetheless retaining unity of doctrine, governance, and sacraments and retaining some principle of unity placed in authority, to which all are subject—and indeed according to the generic idea of the institution of Christ, namely in the authority of bishops or even of a single bishop. Therefore.

But the answer is negative to the same second question if its other part is considered. For it is evident that not even apparently can catholicity be present in another assembly which is not the true Church; for in order for it apparently to be present, that assembly must appear and therefore be larger than any other Christian assembly. But this can belong to none but the true Church. Again it is evident that the holiness of virtues proven by miracles according to the laws proper to some assembly can exist only in the true Church. For God cannot testify to what is false. Indeed, even if only the culture of virtues is considered, it

is morally impossible that this perfect and outstanding culture of Christian virtues—not in one or another individual, but in many and continuously—be had without true interior faith and sanctifying grace and the legitimate use of the Sacraments; but these obtain only in the Church. Therefore in false assemblies that culture of virtues cannot manifest itself, since it does not exist; for hypocrisy in a great multitude and continuously is morally impossible.

II. Now when properties are assumed as marks to discern the true Church, they cannot, as we have already noted, all be considered integrally according to all the elements of their essence; but it suffices to consider them under a certain true but imperfect aspect, abstracting, namely, from certain specific elements which truly constitute them. For if all the marks had to be considered integrally according to all the elements of their specific essence, then at least with respect to some of them what is at issue would have to be presupposed. For when, for instance, you compare with each other the Roman assembly which adheres to the Roman Pontiff as successor of Peter, the assembly of the Greeks, and the assembly of the Protestants, and applying the marks inquire which of these is the true Church of Christ—you suppose you are ignorant of, or at least prescind from the knowledge (if you have it), that the true Church is and is only where Peter is; and therefore you prescind also from the knowledge that the principle of unity determined by Christ is Peter and his successor, and consequently you prescind also from the knowledge that the formal succession of pastors can only be had through Peter and his successors. That is, you prescind from the knowledge of what is specifically determined by Christ as the principle of unity and as the formal reason of succession. But having made this prescission, you can no longer view integrally according to all their elements unity and apostolicity. Moreover, if you can demonstrate without any begging of the question that certain marks belong to some assembly only in appearance and materially, this argument rightly proves that that assembly is not the true Church; for it is established that the properties must be present formally and according to the truth of the matter in the Church.

Although, therefore, in such a disputation it is not necessary to assume all the properties according to their complete essence, it is

nonetheless necessary that, after you have proved through the marks that some assembly is the true Church, you be able to demonstrate, by a certain regressive demonstration, that no property truly belongs to any other assembly—for this is true, as we proved in reply to the first question, and it is to be accurately noted.

III. Now the assemblies about which the question can be instituted are three: the assembly comprised in the Roman communion, the assembly of the Greeks called schismatics, and the assembly of Protestants. But 1° it is evident that the assembly of the Protestants lacks all the marks. Unity of faith and governance is lacking, since there are very many professions of faith (compare the work of Benignus Bossuet, *Les Variations*) and very many sects mutually independent. The principle of unity is lacking, because individuals are led by private spirit and there is in their assemblies no authority that recalls all to unity; nor is the authority found there the one which Christ instituted—namely, episcopal authority—nor is it of the kind Christ instituted; for ministers are sent not by ordination and institution of bishops but by election and authority of the people or king. Holiness is lacking; for there are no miracles, no divine charisms, no perfect and outstanding culture of Christian virtues—although civil virtues, such as existed even before Christ among the nations, are or seem to be there. Indeed certain of their dogmas—for example, regarding free will and the necessity of good works—evidently conflict with the holiness of the assembly. Catholicity is lacking; for none of the many independent sects (for each must be considered separately, since they are diverse) is universal; but each one is bound to a certain realm or province. Indeed all the Protestant assemblies together not many years ago were said not to exceed the number of 80,000,000; now, however, on account of defection to rationalism, which is quite common, they have certainly diminished. The Roman communion, however, certainly contains more members. Moreover the Protestants lack the characteristic proper to catholicity—that is, fruitfulness through the preaching of the Word, as is evident from their missions. Apostolicity is finally lacking, since they began either from simple presbyters or from laymen and are governed by lay power. The principle of unity must moreover be the authority which Christ established in the Church, which is episcopal authority.

Now concerning the Greek Church and the Russian Church; for about the other eastern sects, which are some fragments of the ancient Church, there is no reason for us to be concerned. As for the Russian Church, it is unnecessary to demonstrate that it lacks holiness. Catholicity is lacking, because the church is bound to one empire or nation and because it lacks the principle of fruitfulness; for it is propagated by arms and force, not by preaching and persuasion. And if it is viewed carefully, it is also manifest that the other two marks are lacking from it. For 1° the Russian Church, which was previously part of the Church of Constantinople, then toward the end of the seventeenth century ceased to adhere to it, when the Patriarch of Russia, Nicon, withdrew himself from the authority of the Bishop of Constantinople. Shortly afterward, Peter the Great, the patriarchal authority having been extinguished, transferred the supreme power to a Synod of which the Monarch himself was head and president. Therefore in the Russian Church the principle of unity is lacking; for this must not be lay power but episcopal authority—of those, namely, to whom Christ entrusted the office of governing the Church. Moreover, either before the separation from the Church of Constantinople, the Russian Church enjoyed the principle of unity or it did not. If it did not enjoy it, neither can it now; for it was not then the Church of Christ, and if it was not then, neither is it now, since it cannot have begun from itself. But if it did enjoy it, the principle was the authority of the Bishop of Constantinople to whom it was subject; to him, therefore, it ought always to be subject. Since, therefore, it is now not subject to him, it lacks the principle of unity. 2° The Greek Church itself, which separated from Roman communion through Michael Caerularius, was previously subject to the Roman Bishop and revered him as the supreme head and principle of unity (cf. the subscriptions of the Greeks to the document proposed by Hormisdas and Adrian). Now either the Greek Church enjoyed the principle of unity before the separation or not. If it enjoyed it, then the principle of unity, according to the Greek Church itself—leaving aside the question whether this was rightly judged—was the Roman Pontiff. But the principle of unity, the same Church persevering, must always remain the same. Therefore the Greek Church is now lacking in the principle of unity. But if it did not then enjoy this

principle, then it was not then the true Church of Christ, nor is it now. It is established therefore that the Greek and Russian Churches lack the principle of unity.

For this reason they also lack true apostolicity. For their bishops are ultimately sent by lay power, which is not the power instituted by Christ in the Apostles. Moreover, the Russian Church previously depended on the Church of Constantinople, from which it borrowed authority; now it does not depend on it. If therefore it was previously apostolic, it is now not; and if it was previously not apostolic, it is now not apostolic either, since it cannot have begun from itself.

IV. On the contrary, the assembly comprised in the Roman communion is evidently one—with unity of faith, governance, and sacraments—and has in itself the principle of unity, that is, the authority of the Roman Pontiff, to whom all are subject, whose decrees of faith all revere, and whose laws all obey. It is holy—with the perfect and outstanding culture of Christian virtues, with miracles and other charisms—of which so many who profess the evangelical counsels are witnesses, so many men devoted to the care of souls and occupied in the conversion of unbelievers, so many steadfast in the faith against all adversities and most unjust persecutions, so many who have merited the honors of sainthood, etc. It is catholic. Indeed the Roman communion is most extensive; whether account be taken not of the political societies that claim its name—for that is beside the point—but of the Churches adhering to Rome both in the old and new world, or of the multitude of faithful scattered everywhere throughout the earth even among heretics, schismatics, and unbelievers professing the Roman faith, it is most extensive. Indeed a few years ago its members were reckoned at about 200,000,000. You will say, however, that the number is now diminished. But it must be noted: 1° that even public sins do not in themselves exclude from the Church; 2° that defection of believers is continuously supplied by the accession of new faithful through the work of missions; 3° that since good and honest men more willingly remain obscure, while the evil having gained dominance fill everything with rumors and commotions, a comparative judgment is wrongly formed from the many evildoers and enemies of the Church who now appear concerning the multitude of believers and non-

believers; 4° moreover, even if the number of members of the Roman Church were diminished—for it is not something immutable—so great a multitude of them certainly still remains that it is without doubt comparatively larger than the other sects, among which incredulity has also caused far more havoc. Moreover the Roman assembly possesses the principle of Catholic diffusion or fruitfulness through the preaching of the Word, as history itself and continuous experience demonstrate. The Roman assembly is finally apostolic; for this does not require that individual bishops be traced back to some predecessor or founding Apostle—which could not even have been done—but it suffices that the first chair to which the entire assembly is subject and from which all authority derives be Apostolic, as the Roman chair certainly is. Wherefore for the Fathers—such as Irenaeus, Optatus, and Augustine—it sufficed, to prove the apostolicity of their Church, to prove the apostolicity of the Roman chair. Therefore.

The Roman Church is therefore uniquely the true Church of Christ. From which it is permissible to gather that the principle of unity and the formal reason of succession is what such is in the Roman Church, which is nothing other than the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff.

You will say: the Buddhist sect is more diffused and extensive, to which 500,000,000 members are attributed.

I reply 1°: That such greatness is apparent and nominal, since there are so many sects among them.

I reply 2°: That by the comparison of marks the true Church is discerned from other Christian sects, and the Roman Church is shown to be the true Church of Christ in comparison with the other Christian sects. But if the question concerns other sects or religions that are not Christian, other arguments are at hand by which their falsity is demonstrated. And no extent aids them—which moreover is only apparent, for in reality there are as many sects as there are nations. Buddhism especially was from the beginning atheistic, and now, mixed with polytheism and idolatry, is only a simulacrum of some religion.

But it is established that once the question is resolved in this manner, it is easy to demonstrate that no property truly belongs to any other assembly claiming the Christian name, and that all those properties are had in the Church by the force of the Roman Primacy

alone. For as we have already seen, they are not had except through the mediation of the authority of the ministry instituted by Christ; but there is no ministry without Peter, and the whole fullness of his authority is in Peter and his successors. Therefore. And indeed truly, if the matter concerns unity, it is established from what has been proved elsewhere that it derives its origin from the Primacy of Peter. If the matter concerns apostolicity, it must be held that the apostolicity necessary to the Church is first and in itself the apostolicity of Peter, which indeed perseveres intact in the Roman Church. Catholicity of one society cannot be had except through that efficacious authority to which the supreme power of propagating the whole Kingdom of Heaven throughout the universal world has been given, and to which therefore, as the Church says, all the kingdoms of the world have been handed over. Holiness likewise—which presupposes holiness of faith, holy administration of the sacraments, and holy laws—must be obtained in the Church through him who is the infallible teacher of faith, to whom as supreme and universal Pastor the legitimate administration of the sacraments has been entrusted and universal and full power of binding and loosing has been conferred. Therefore.

COROLLARY

Therefore the appellation Roman, applied to the Church, is the mark by which the true Church is discerned from false assemblies; for by this appellation is represented that assembly which is the true Church, over which by divine law the Roman Bishop presides.

To God Alone the Greatest Glory.

On the Roman Pontiff

In *On the Roman Pontiff*, Fr. Domenico Palmieri, S.J., proceeds by way of principled demonstration: if the Church is a single, visible societas ordered to the one faith and one communion, then it requires a determinate and perpetual principle of unity capable of issuing a final judgment in matters that concern the whole. From this he argues that the Roman Pontiff possesses a primacy not merely of honor but of jurisdiction—ordinary and immediate—such that the governance of the Church is not left to an indeterminate aggregate, but is secured through a head who can bind and loose with decisive authority for the sake of ecclesial unity in doctrine and discipline.

He then treats contrary theses (notably Gallican and Febronian) with the method of disputation, weighing them against both the historical exercise of appeals and conciliar praxis and the intrinsic requirements of doctrinal settlement. For Palmieri, a merely "coordinated" or purely conciliar supremacy fails to provide the Church with a sufficient cause of definitive resolution; for if the last word is nowhere, the unity of faith is contingently suspended upon contestable majorities. Hence he defends the Pope's office as that juridical and doctrinal terminus by which controversies are brought to rest, including the conditions under which papal teaching, when proposed as to be held by the universal Church, enjoys irreformability.

Contained in this Book:

To the Reader · Prolegomenon on the Church · On the Primacy of Blessed Peter · On the Force & Nature of the Roman Pontiff

Claude Sonnet 4.6

AI-assisted translation